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Suicide missions in the Palestinian area: a new database

Appendix

References

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The sole purpose of this paper is to provide suicide mission (SM) researchers with certain basic data regarding the Palestinian case. For an interpretation of the data contained herein please refer to chapter *Palestinians: 1981-2003*, D.Gambetta (ed.), *Making sense of suicide missions* (Oxford University Press, 2004).

1. What is a suicide mission ?

By suicide mission we signify an attack against an enemy target in which the agent has no chance of escaping or saving himself.

The crucial element in this definition is the certainty of the agent's death, and not the means used to carry out the attack. No importance is attached to the fact that the agent's death is caused by the agent himself or by the reaction of others: the important point is that the action does not contemplate any chance of survival for the agent. The definition thus *excludes* extreme risk missions, but it *includes* various forms of attacks differing from self-explosion, and in particular all kinds of actions that do not contemplate an escape plan (attacks against military facilities, infiltrations in protected settlements, etc.).

The suicide mission (SM) concept is broader than that of suicide bombing (SB). In the case of suicide bombing, mission success is entirely dependent on the agents death:

> The suicide bomber carries the explosives on his body or in a vehicle driven by himself and, by personal choice and with full self-awareness, he approaches a previously chosen target and blows himself up. The suicide bomber himself, in accordance with the prevailing circumstances, chooses the time and place to execute the explosion so that it will cause the maximum damage to the target.
> Defining a terror attack as a suicide bombing depends primarily on whether the perpetrator is killed. In the event that his mission is incomplete, it is not a suicide bombing. The death of the perpetrator is the key to the success of the attack; and he knows in advance that success depends entirely on this death. (Schweitzer 2001).

In the case of SM, the agent's death can be the unavoidable yet indirect consequence of his action. Technically speaking the action may be successful even in want of the agents death, but conviction of enemy reaction does not allow us to imagine his survival.

Of course we may object that from a psychological standpoint these two situations are quite different, and that it would be appropriate to distinguish, even amongst suicide bombers, between those who prefer their action to end up with their death (martyrs) and those who do not seek their own death though they are willing to accept it for the cause (heroes). We have disregarded the latter case, since it is impossible to deal with it in an empirical manner, whilst we have separated missions based on self-explosion (SB) from those without an escape plan (NE). To be precise:

$$SM = SB + NE$$

Our database contemplates total suicide missions (SM), but it separates them into two types:: suicide bombing (SB) and missions without an escape plan (NE).

2. LUPA: A new database

The characteristics of the database are explained in depth in the appendix. At this point we will just mention the main choices that have been made.

Sources. The LUPA database integrates information coming from five types of sources. First, three large databases (ICT, MIPT, TRC), plus the international ICT database (which contains a sample of attacks). Second, three general chronologies (MIPT, CDISS[1], Nash), plus Clara Beyler's chronology of female suicide missions. Third, all of the SM reconstructed by Pape (2003). Fourth, a number of very specific pieces of news provided by two experts on Lebanon (Robert Fisk and Martin Cramer). Fifth, several press articles published on the Internet, in particular by the New York Times, by Haaretz and the Jerusalem Post.

Time and space. The period under investigation goes from January 1st, 1972 to December 31st, 2003. The area covered does not only include Israel and the occupied territories (West Bank e Gaza Strip) but also Lebanon. This choice depends both on the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has almost always involved Lebanon as well, and on the fact that Hizbollah actions provided a crucial model to the Palestinian factions (Morris 2002, Schweitzer 2000, Ricolfi 2004). In short these four territories – Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon – will be referred to as the IPC area (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict).

Inclusion criteria. The LUPA database exists in two different versions: extended and core.
The *extended* version contains all of the single episodes that meet at least five requirements:
a) to be mentioned in at least one of the 12 aforementioned sources;
b) to have taken place in a known place and at a known date;
c) to have taken place in the ME area in the 34 year period between 1970 and 2003;
d) to have an Israeli or Israeli related target[2];
e) to meet the essential requirements of a suicide mission (self explosion or no escape plan mission), or at least of an almost-suicide mission (very high risk missions).
In the database missions are distinguished in foiled missions (SM_1), failed missions (SM_2), successful missions (SM_3), almost-suicide missions (VHRM: Very High Risk Missions). Successful missions are further split into certainly suicidal (SM_{3c}) and probably suicidal (SM_{3p}) depending on the accuracy of the available description of the event.
The *core* version of the database focuses only on the most specific, reliable and recent data. It includes only executed and certainly suicidal missions:

$$SM = SM_2 + SM_{3c}$$

It therefore includes failed missions (SM_2), but excludes foiled missions (SM_1: the number is too heavily dependent on Israeli decision to inform about them), quasi suicidal missions (VHRM), and missions that were successful though only probably suicidal (SM_{3p}). Furthermore it excludes missions that took place before 1980 (Lexis-Nexis checks become impossible before this date).

3. The universe of SM in the Palestinian area

The episodes covered in our reconstruction (extended database) are 318, split up as follows:

Table 1. Content of the extended database

Kind of mission	Code	Number
Foiled	SM_1	24
Failed	SM_2	16
Successful & (certainly) suicidal	SM_{3c}	206+3
Successful & (probably) suicidal	SM_{3p}	32+3
Very high risk	VHRM	33+1
TOTAL		318

Only part of these 318 missions fall into our definition of a suicide mission. If we restrict our attention to suicide missions in the narrow sense of the definition (SM_2+SM_{3c}), confining our interest to the 1980-2003 period, the total number of missions drops to 224.

The whole of the suicide missions can be split up into four main types, according to their outcome (success, failure) and to the adopted technology (self-explosion, no escape mission).

Table 2. Content of the core database

	Successful	Failed	TOTAL
Self-explosion	162	6	168
No escape mission	46	10	56
TOTAL	208	16	224

This is the grouping that most of our investigations will focus on (except for a brief outline on the history of VHRM).

Quite a considerable number of cases when we consider that – ever since SM became a regular tool of political confrontation – no other area in the world has experienced such a large number of suicide missions. The only area in the world with a comparable number of suicide missions is Sri Lanka, where the Tamil Tigers carried out around 200 missions (191 according to the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, more than 200 according to Schweitzer 2000). On their own these two areas cover almost three fourths of all of the suicide missions carried out in the last twenty five years. The other most troublesome areas are, in order of importance, Kashmir, Iraq, Kurdistan and Chechnya (Ricolfi 2004).

Caveat. We believe our database to be substantially complete as to the last fifteen years, though we do not rule out that it may have certain flaws regarding the 80s. Despite our efforts, the number of cases traced by us is in fact slightly lower than Schweitzer's rough estimate for the same period[3].

We do not know if Schweitzer's aggregate findings are based on precise reconstructions of single cases or if they are only simple estimates: in the first case we would be pleased to further integrate our database.

4. An overall picture

When we look at the general trend of the phenomenon in between 1972 and 2003, considering all missions except for the foiled ones (N=294), we immediately notice two main peaks, in 1985 and 2002, and a third less evident one in 1994. Plus a preamble in the years preceding 1980, consisting mainly of VHRM missions.

Figure 1. An overall picture: all missions excepting foiled (1972-2003)

The general characteristics of the phenomenon are clearly summarised in figure 2, obtained through multiple correspondence analysis.

Figure 2. All missions excepting foiled (1972-2003)

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
First of all we find a set of missions carried out by the "forerunners" (North-Eastern quadrant): these are missions that were mostly carried out in the years in between 1972 and 1981 by Fatah Tanzim and PFLP. They are considered forerunners since their attacks do not belong, to all intents and purposes, to the suicide missions category as such ("no SM" in the figure): in our opinion they are mostly VHRM missions that ended up with the death of the attacker caused by Israeli fire or with the attacker unharmed. In the North-Western quadrant, on the other hand, we find the "Lebanese" cluster: Hizbollah, SSNP and Amal (from the organizational viewpoint), military targets and attacks concentrated in the time period in between 1982 and 1987. And furthermore, there is the use of women amongst the ranks of the kamikaze ("at least a W" in the figure). The following cluster (South-Eastern quadrant) is, if we like, the one in the public imagination: attacks against civilians, carried out by organizations such as Hamas, PIJ and Al-Aqsa. The typical dynamics is self-explosion and it mostly regards certainly suicidal missions (SM_{3c}). Hamas and PIJ are connected to the 1994-1999 period more than the Al-Aqsa Brigade is, while it is interesting to note that both the Islamic organisations like Hamas and PIJ and the secular ones like Al-Aqsa are closely connected to civilian targets.

5. Waves & technology

We will now restrict the range of our investigation solely to suicide missions as such (SM_2+SM_{3c}: and more precisely failed missions and certainly suicidal missions) carried out in the years in between 1980 and 2003. The cases we will be looking at thus become a total of 224.

Elsewhere (Ricolfi 2004) we proved that, when we analyse the trend of suicide missions in connection with the number of total attacks carried out in the IPC area, we obtain what we might call "propensity" for suicide missions; this propensity gave rise to four waves[4]: the Lebanon wave (1982-1985), the (first) Intifada wave (1988-1990), the Oslo wave (1994-1996) and the Al-Aqsa wave (2000-2003). In short we may mention that the propensity for suicide missions displays a cyclic pattern with a 5-year interval between one peak and the next.

Table 3. Technology of suicide missions

Wave	Period	Frequency	Death toll
Lebanon	1982-1985	Medium	Very high
Intifada	1988-1990	Low	Low
Oslo	1994-1996	Medium	High
Al-Aqsa	2000-2003	Very High	Medium

Furthermore, the technology of suicide missions changes as years go by. During the Lebanon wave we find medium frequency attacks with an extremely high level of victims per attack. After the first Intifada wave ("low intensity": low frequency and low death toll), the Oslo wave sees an increase in damages caused by each attack whilst attack frequency remains at a medium level. Finally, there is a further change in technology in correspondence with the Al-Aqsa wave: a medium level of victims is associated to very high number of attacks.

Figure 3. Average number of victims per attack

6. Main trends and cycles

We will continue to analyse only suicide missions as such (SM_2+SM_{3c}: and more precisely failed missions and certainly suicidal missions). In the first two periods (up to 1990) these missions are carried out primarily by organisations belonging to the Damascus Cartel[5] or by Lebanese secular organisations[6], with a small fraction of attacks that may be ascribed to the Fatah Area[7] in 1985. This year also marks the peak in secular suicide missions, with – amongst the others – indeed 6 attacks by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. On the other hand, the first missions that can be ascribed to the Islamic Area[8], appear in 1993, the year that we may consider as the preamble to the Oslo wave. Following the drop that took place in between 1996 and 2000, year 2001 records another – more consistent – peak in attacks carried out by organisations in the Islamic Area, followed in the subsequent year by the peak in the Fatah Area (and a very low percentage of Lebanese Secular organisations; figure 4).

*Figure 4. The organizations*

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Figure 5. Propensity for attacks against civilians

It is interesting to look at figure 4 against figure 5, which reports the share of attacks directed against civilians (over the total SM: $SM_2 + SM_{3c}$). In between 1983 and 1993 civilians are not subjected to attacks while it is in conjunction with the first appearance of organisations belonging to the Islamic Area (the preamble to the Oslo Wave: 1993) that this percentage becomes more and more consistent. The percentage of attacks against civilians records high levels until 1998, and then drops to its relative minimum level in 2000 (year in which the Islamic organizations are absent) and then climbs back to consistent levels in 2001 and 2002.

From a locational viewpoint, the first two waves take place in Lebanon, as clearly shown in figure 6. After a spell of relative calm, attacks against territories belonging to the State of Israel become more consistent starting from 1994 (up to 1996: end of the Oslo wave), attacks that reach their peak in 2002, in the midst of the Al-Aqsa wave. A low, though continuous, intensity trend is recorded in the Occupied Territories until 2000, when the trend starts to surge.

Figure 6. Location

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
Finally, the dynamics of attacks (figure 7): the percentage of self-explosions over the total number of attacks is always quite high (never below 60%), with only three exceptions represented by years 1986, 1987 and 1988 (when, moreover, a relative calm was recorded in the area). Extremely high levels (above 80%) are recorded in between 1982 and 1985 (Lebanon wave) and in between 1994 and 1998 (Oslo wave). On the other hand, the propensity for self-explosion recorded during the Al-Aqsa wave is slightly lower.

Figure 7. Propensity for self-explosion

Figure 8. Suicide missions as such (SM$_2$+SM$_{3c}$), 1980-2003 period

A summary based on the support of multiple correspondence analyses is shown in figure 8[9], where we can identify three mission clusters. The first, astride the North-Western and South-Western quadrants, is formed by the "Lebanese" period: the years in between 1980 and 1987, military targets, Lebanese secular organisations or organisations connected to the Damascus Front. The second, located mostly in the South-Eastern quadrant, identifies a relationship between the organizations belonging to the Islamic Area, the prevalence of civilian targets, the time period in between 1994 and 1999 and the number of victims (4 or more). The third, ascribable to the last time period under investigation (2000-2003), sees a prevalence of Fatah Area organizations, attacks against "other" targets, a number of victims ranging between zero and three, and the conclusion of an attack with the death of the attacker due to Israeli fire. With this said, it might be useful to emphasize three peculiarities: women attackers are connected more to the Lebanese cluster than to the other two; symbolic targets are connected more to the Lebanese and Islamic clusters than to the Fatah cluster; from the dynamics viewpoint, self-explosion is not a discriminating factor since it is used by members of all three clusters.

7. The case of women

On April 9, 1985 a young woman enlisted in the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, sixteen year-old Sana'a Mehaidli, blows herself up in her Peugeot next to an Israeli convoy: the location is in the South of Lebanon, close to the town of Jezzine. This episode, recorded over and over again in literature, is usually considered as the first suicide attack carried out by a woman in the IPC area. According to many sources the attack is ascribable to the Shiite sphere, in fact there is often talk about the "Shiite girl" or "Muslim girl" (and the Mipt database itself falls into this error), whilst the secular matrix of the attack is quite clear. Insomuch that the SSNP includes Sana'a in its gallery of martyrs published on the organizations web site[10].

Yet, if this is the "official" starting point, the story nevertheless comes from further back, even if with different forms and modalities. Back in 1968, in fact, Leila Khaled, a young PFLP activist, participates in the hijacking of the Rome-Athens flight (29 August)[11]. Arrested and then exchanged with other prisoners, today Leila lives in Damascus and is the mother of two children. In 1978, nineteen year-old Dalal al-Mughrabi, close to the Fatah organization, heads a group of 11 attackers (with a second woman in the group) that hijacks an Israeli bus: the attack ends up with 39 deaths, 72 wounded and 9 victims amongst the attackers (amongst whom we find Dalal herself)[12]. According to various sources this is the first real female suicide mission in the area. We believe that both actions can fall into the "forerunners" category. But before we get to the attack carried out by Sana'a, on March 10, 1995 – once again in South Lebanon – a car packed with explosives is blown up killing 12 Israeli soldiers and wounding another 14. The body of a young woman is also found amongst the remains of the car.

Yet if these are the phenomenon's so-called origins, what trend does it follow in the years to come ? If we investigate the years in between 1980 and 2003, we will notice that the presence of women amongst the attackers "opens" and "closes" our period. In fact, the number of attacks carried out by women shows two peaks (in correspondence with the years 1985 and 2002) and their complete absence between 1990 and 2002. But this data conceals a change in the characteristics associated to the attacks.

Figure 9. Attacks carried out by women

In fact, the years in between 1985 and 1990, witness a marked prevalence of secular organizations (seven attacks out of a total of nine): five attacks are carried out by members of the SSNP (amongst whom we find Sana'a Mehaidli, Ibtissam Harb, Miriam Khaierdin, Norma Abi Hassan), one by the Lebanese Baath Party and one by the Lebanon Communist Party[13]. After which, women seem to disappear from the scene: at least until 2002. When, on January 27, Wafa Idris carries out a suicide mission. But the context of the action has changed: no longer in South Lebanon, but in the heart of Jerusalem (Jaffa Road). One again the matrix of the attack is secular: in this case the attack it is organized by the Tanzim militia. Again in 2002 another three attacks are successfully carried out by kamikaze women: Daaren Abu Aeshah (21 years-old), a student in Nablus, carries out her suicide mission on February 27, 2002 against a checkpoint in West Ramallah (West Bank)[14]; Ayat al-Akhras (18 years-old), resident in the Dehaishe refugee camp and close to the Tanzim, blows herself up in a supermarket in Jerusalem; 21 year-old Andaleeb Taqataqah, from Bethlehem and a member of the Tanzim, blows up her belt packed with explosives at the Mahane Yehuda market bus stop in Jerusalem.

Then, in 2003, we record a further change: Islamic martyrs make their first appearance on the scene. On May 19, nineteen year-old Hiba Daraghmeh blows herself up at the entrance of a shopping mall in Afula: responsibility for her gesture is claimed both by the PIJ and the Martyrs of Al-Aqsa (Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades): the latter claim is the one that receives most credit. It is nevertheless the first time that the PIJ claims responsibility for a suicide attack carried out by a woman. On October 4 of the same year, Hanadi Tayseer Jaradat, 29-year-old trainee lawyer, carries out her kamikaze attack in a restaurant in Haifa: the claim by the PIJ and the woman's religious zeal leave no doubt this time as to the change of scenario that has taken place amongst the Islamic organizations. A fact, this, which is confirmed by the attack carried out in January 2004 by Reem Raiyshi, 22-year-old mother of two small children, the first woman to carry out a suicide attack in the name of Hamas[15].

Appendix. The LUPA database: rules and choices

In literature there is no trace of an exhaustive public database on suicide missions carried out in Israel, Palestine and Lebanon from 1972 to today. The LUPA database tries to fill this gap, at least in part, by integrating 12 different sources[16].
A total of 326 episodes relating to the period from 1972 to 2003 have been classified. In order to be classified each single event has been carefully assessed against all available sources. Caution has been the constant rule, in case of doubt missions were classified as VHRM o SM_{3p}.

Codification rules. For each single episode, the LUPA database supplies 19 different pieces of information stored in as many fields. And more precisely: day, month, year, target, organization, location, tactic, weapon, mode of operation, type, killed, injured, attackers, deceased attackers, female attackers, sm, dynamics, source, name of the female attacker.

Date (dd/mm/yy): the date in which the attack was carried out or foiled. In case of conflict between sources, the less recent one prevails.

Target: contemplates 18 modalities. When both Mipt and Ict sources are present, the former prevails with its 15 related modalities (private citizen, diplomatic, utilities, military, government, transportation, airlines, business, religious, terrorists as targets, maritime, police, ngo, journalist & media, other). When only the Ict source is present, in order to allow integration between the two databases, we conceived a simple model contemplating three modalities: military (attack against a physical military structure, convoy, barracks, etc., or against military personnel, police, security and also settlement and marketplace guards provided other civilian personnel are not involved); civilian (in as much as people – not things – innocent victims, including settlers; presumable intentions hold provided they are evident); neither clearly civilian nor clearly military.

Organization: we have drawn up a complete list of the organizations combining both the Mipt database and the Ict database. The possibility of conjunct claims of responsibility is contemplated. In case of conflict source hierarchy is taken into account (see further down).

Location: the Ict database, the most meticulous and precise database in this connotation, prevails. When a specific case is not present in the Ict database source hierarchy is taken into account identifying the first source that is sufficiently explicit (with at least one reference to the Gaza Strip or West Bank, for example). When the name of a town is mentioned it is looked up in the map. This variable contemplates a total of four modalities: Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip and Lebanon.

Tactic: formed by three fields, and namely tactic/1 (Mipt-1, 1968-1997), weapon (Mipt-2, 1998-2003) and Mode of operation (Ict). No more than two fields may be enabled for each record.

> *Tactic/1:* is the field included in the Mipt-1 database. It contemplates eight modalities (bombings, chemical/biological, assassinations/shootings, arson non bombing, significant threats, barricade and hostage, hijackings, kidnapping) and is enabled only for episodes contained in the Mipt-1 database.
> *Weapon:* is the field included in the Mipt-2 database. It contemplates five modalities (explosives, firearms, remote-controlled explosives, suicide bombing, knives and sharp objects) and is enabled only for episodes contained in the Mipt-2 database.
> *Mode of operation:* is the field included in the Ict database. It contemplates 24 modalities (bombing, car bombing, hand grenade/Rpg, hijacking, hostage-tacking, incendiary device,

kidnapping, knife attack, letter bomb, mortar attack, helicopter missile, shooting, suicide bomb, vandalism, bomb threat, arson, chemical, infiltration, stoning, vehicle attack, lynching, artillery, ground-to-ground missile, other/unknown) and is enabled only for episodes contained in the Ict database.

Type of incident: is the field included in the Ict database. It contemplates three modalities: terror attack, guerrilla attack, unknown/puzzling. It is enabled only for episodes contained in the Ict database.

Killed: is the number of deaths caused by the attack. When information is available from more than one source, we list the different assessments and calculate a rounded down arithmetical average, excepting cases where the assessments of certain sources prove clearly less reliable than others.

Injured: is the number of injured caused by the attack. As for the killed variable, when we have information coming from more than one source, we list the different assessments and calculate a rounded down arithmetical average, excepting cases where the assessments of certain sources prove clearly less reliable than others.

Attackers: is the number of attackers participating in the attack; when this number is not given by any source or when there is a marked conflict between sources, it is considered not available.

Deceased Attackers: is the number of attackers who died during the attack. As for the case above, when this number is not given by any source or when there is a marked conflict between sources, it is considered not available.

Female attackers: is the number of female attackers participating in the attack. The same rules used for the two preceding items also apply here.

Name of the female attacker: in case of attacks carried out by female attackers and when the name of the female attacker is found in literature, it is recorded in this text field.

Sm: is the key field of the database. It differentiates missions in: successful & (certainly) suicidal, successful & (probably) suicidal, very high risk, failed, foiled.

Dynamics: is the dynamics of the attack. In cases where the "sb" field is enabled, dynamics may adopt the following modalities: (1) unharmed attacker, (2) self-explosion, (3) Israeli-fire, (4) other. Actions that appear as infiltrations (against settlements) are differentiated with specific codes (11,12,13,14). In cases where the "sb" field is not enabled, the assigned dynamics value is 5 (other or unclear).

Source: identifies the main source of information and other sources where the information has been found. In case of conflict between sources the following hierarchy applies:
1. Kramer
2. Ict: Arab Israeli Conflict
3. Ict: International
4. Mipt
5. Trc
6. Beyler
7. Fisk
8. Cdiss
9. Mipt Chronology

10. Nash
11. Pape
12. Other (including the New York Times, Haaretz, Jerusalem Post, Internet in general).

Footnotes

[1] Centre for Defence & International Security Studies (Lancaster, www.cdiss.org).

[2] Our investigations exclude the (very few) episodes of anti-Palestinian or anti-Arab actions carried out by individuals or terror organisations connected with Israel.

[3] According to Schweitzer, the number of suicide missions in Lebanon in the eighties is higher then that found in our database by 15 cases.

[4] Strictly speaking they are 3+1 waves, since Ricolfi's analyses identify three main waves and a lesser marked wave (first Intifada wave). For a more detailed explanation see Ricolfi 2004.

[5] The Damascus Cartel is formed by PFLP, Hizbollah and Amal.

[6] The Lebanese secular organisations include the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the Lebanese Baath Party, the Lebanon Communist Party and the Nasserit Syrian Socialist Party.

[7] In the Fatah Area we included: PLO, Al-Fatah, Japanese Red Army, DFLP, PFLP (General Command), Tanzim and Al-Aqsa.

[8] Hamas e PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad).

[9] The field of investigation is always the one identified by suicide missions as such (failed and certainly suicidal) carried out in the time period in between 1980 and 2003.

[10] The Syrian Social Nationalist Party gallery of martyrs is at http:\\209.151.89.99/galley/shouhada_en.htm.

[11] A VHRM according to our categories of investigation.

[12] Also this action, like the former, is classified as VHRM.

[13] In two cases, on the other hand, women seem to become the vehicle of death despite themselves (these are the attacks carried out by Soraya Sahyouni at Beirut airport on November 11, 1987 and by Mahmud Karima Shagir at Beirut hospital on November 14, 1987). There is much fear that the two women were under the effects of narcotics when they blew up. These two cases have been provisionally classified as SM_{3p} in the LUPA database.

[14] According to Clara Beyler, researcher of the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "she went to Hamas to volunteer, but was turned down" (Beyler 2003).

[15] This attack is not included in our charts that refer – as we have stated over and over again – to the 1980-2003 period.

[16] We considered the Mipt database as a sole source, even if in actual fact it is composed of two distinct databases. The first (Mipt-1) covers the years in between 1968 and 1997; the second (Mipt-2) covers the years in between 1998 and 2003.

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