

THE PROBLEM OF PIGEONS: ORIENTALISM, XENOPHOBIA AND A RHETORIC OF THE 'LOCAL' IN NORTH CYPRUS

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Abstract

This article discusses the Orientalism at the heart of Turkish Cypriots' visions of modernity, as well as the more recent effects of this Orientalism on the immigrants from Turkey who now both compose and symbolise old Nicosia within the walls. The article, first, discusses the Kemalism of Turkish-Cypriot modernisation, looking at Kemalism's roots in a type of Orientalism aimed at the supposedly "backward" self. The initial arrival of Turkish immigrants on the island after 1974 and Turkish-Cypriots' initial reactions to them are also described. Later the article sketches the recent neoliberal privatisation in the north, its wealth effect, and the growing distinction between Turkish Cypriots and working-class "others" that has become a defining facet of a new Turkish-Cypriot identity. In this process, the article shows how representations of those "others," especially in relation to the walled city of Nicosia, are inherently Orientalising, and it documents the ways in which this representation affects the lives of those now living within the walls.

Keywords: Settlers, immigrants, Kemalism, Orientalism, xenophobia, Turkish-Cypriots and Nicosia.

In one of the central squares of north Nicosia stands a statue of Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the first recognised leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community and first vice-president of the Republic of Cyprus after 1960. Dr. Küçük looks down benevolently on a child who accompanies him, and two pigeons sit on his head. The casual observer is likely to think the pigeons are part of the assemblage of the statue, since they are usually the same grey as the iron from which it was cast. One might think that they are there to show Dr. Küçük's love of animals as well as children, except that on more careful observation, unlike the child, the pigeons can be seen to move, flap about, or trade places on their resting spot. The pigeons are intruders on this homely scene, their intrusion visible in the white splotches that they leave on Dr. Küçük's shoulders and head.

In recent years, the birds that have proliferated around the statue and in the other squares of Nicosia's walled city do more than provide entertainment for children and retirees. Many Turkish Cypriots have cast the avian invasion as something much more sinister: the symbol of a cultural and political colonisation that threatens to sully local culture in the same way that the pigeons have dirtied the main squares. Hasan Hastürer, a columnist for *Kıbrıs* newspaper, explained the local perception of these feathered intruders:

"In most of the mudbrick houses of Nicosia's walled city, pigeons were raised in holes in walls or in empty cans that had been nailed into the walls as nests. And the baby pigeons would be boiled and fried and afterwards served on a bed of macaroni. After 1974 those living in Nicosia changed. While the Cypriots who ate this dish known as palaz abandoned the old, historic city, their places were taken by persons of Turkish descent. Palaz does not exist in the cuisine of the city's new inhabitants. The pigeons that had for so many years lived in the holes in walls or cracks in roofs of the city's houses slowly began to gather in Sarayönü Square. The pigeons of Sarayönü have now begun to symbolise the city's changing human composition. And now in Sarayönü there are women wearing şalvars and children in plastic sandals who try to make a living selling seeds for the pigeons".¹

The pigeons' multiplication, then, came to stand for the proliferation of cultural others, persons with different cuisines and different habits who, like the pigeons, were visible to them not only as a growing mass but also as one that dirtied the local landscape.

The growing nostalgia amongst Turkish Cypriots has been discussed elsewhere² for the walled city of Nicosia, a place that historically has been the heart of Turkish-Cypriot cultural and political life but which Cypriots began to abandon in the 1980s in search of modernity in the spreading suburbs. In this article the Orientalism at the heart of Turkish-Cypriots' visions of modernity will instead be discussed along with the more recent effects of this Orientalism on the women in şalvars [traditional baggy trousers] and children in plastic sandals who now both compose and symbolise Nicosia within the walls. This article will aim to sketch the recent neoliberal privatisation in the north, its wealth effect, and the growing distinction between Turkish Cypriots and working-class "others" that has become a defining facet of a new Turkish-Cypriot identity. In the process, this article also aims to show not only how representations of those "others", especially in relation to the walled city of Nicosia, are inherently Orientalising, but also the ways in which this representation affects the lives of those now living within the walls.

The intention is to show the ways in which representations of the walled city elide political and cultural "colonisation", conveniently confusing labour migration from Anatolia with accusations of a political colonisation by the Turkish state. It is

argued here that the effect of this confusion is that many Turkish Cypriots cast discriminatory attitudes and practices toward immigrants as a form of “resistance”, thereby appearing to give that discrimination a political and social justification. This has meant that even parties and organisations that claim to work for equality and human rights do not include the immigrant labour force in the scope of their struggle, and indeed often cast those immigrants as a group that they must struggle against.

The article, then, will first discuss the Kemalism of Turkish-Cypriot modernisation, looking at Kemalism’s roots in a type of Orientalism aimed at the supposedly “backward” self. The initial arrival of Turkish immigrants on the island will then be described as well as Turkish-Cypriots’ initial reactions to them, before discussing the economic transformations of the 1980s and 1990s and their effects on Turkish-Cypriot society. It was in this period of neoliberal change that a new immigrant population arrived on the island, making their home primarily in Nicosia’s walled city, which had been abandoned by Turkish Cypriots. The ways in which media representations of that population vacillate between describing them as a form of “Turkish colonisation” and a type of “Anadolulaşma [Anatolianisation]” will be demonstrated. While the former implies colonisation tied to the policies of the Turkish state, the latter representation points to a local form of Orientalism that casts Anatolia as “the East”, a backward place where people are darker, more conservative, and in general culturally different from Turkish-Cypriots’ self-perceptions. The article concludes with a few remarks about the ways in which this Orientalism has been reflected in Turkish-Cypriots’ everyday perceptions of the divided city, in which many have also appropriated common ways of describing that division as one between a “Western” south and an “Anatolianised”, or “Eastern”, north.

Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus and the Orientalism of the Orientalised

In his groundbreaking work, *Orientalism*, Edward Said observes that the emergence of a discipline describing a place called “the Orient” depends on a relationship between knowledge and power, in which defining the place and its people and ruling over them are intrinsically related.³ Moreover, the West, in this description, is “modern” and “progressive”, while the East is “backward”, proved both for colonisers and colonised alike in the fact of Western hegemony. Following on from Edward Said, numerous postcolonial scholars have noted that Orientalism also became part of the self-perception of the colonised. As James Carrier notes, “Said’s concept of ‘Orientalism’ does not account for the potential for Orientals themselves to use Orientalism in their self definition”. Carrier claims that Orientalism serves “not just to draw a line between societies, but also to draw a line within” and that “this process is likely to be particularly pronounced in societies that self-consciously stand on the border between the occident and the orient”.⁴

This observation may also be made with regard to the Turkish-Cypriot community. Prior to the emergence of Turkish nationalism in Turkey, this community identified itself as either Ottoman or Muslim. But in the context of British colonial rule on the island, both these identities were also characterised by British rulers, as well as by some members of the community, as “backward” and incapable of modernisation. Although the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements of the late Ottoman Empire attempted to trace a path to modernisation, that path was also defined by the belief that their own identities were, indeed, Oriental and in need of Westernisation.⁵ At the same time, as Muslims, many in the community found it difficult to accept what they viewed as ethical changes brought by a Western, colonial modernity. For example, when the colonial administration attempted to bring an English schoolmistress to the Muslim girls’ school in 1902, the newspaper *Mir’at-ı Zaman* protested, “We are not going to make our girls [serve as] English schoolmistresses, or Interpreters in the Government Departments, or let them dance a waltz at a public ball. If the intention of the Government is to drag us into English Civilisation, such things can never be admitted by Moslem Civilisation”.⁶ They were, in other words, caught between the rock of “Oriental backwardness” and the hard place of “English civilisation”.⁷

The contradictions experienced by the Muslims of Cyprus reached a critical point during and after World War I, when Britain annexed the island, the Ottoman Empire suffered a humiliating defeat, and Philhellene Europeans encouraged Greek endeavours to occupy Anatolia.⁸ Mustafa Kemal’s stunning defeat of the invading forces and subsequent establishment of a new state was met with excitement by Muslim Cypriots, even though they found themselves excluded from their “motherland’s” nation-building project. Some heeded Kemal’s call to Turks in nearby territories to join in the establishment of the new nation-state and took advantage of the opportunity to opt for Turkish citizenship.⁹ Those Muslim Cypriots who chose to remain gradually embraced the ideology of Turkish nationalism.

At the core of this nationalism were the Kemalist values of secularism, modernisation and westernisation. Muslim Cypriots voluntarily accepted Kemalist principles and reforms introduced by sanction of the state in Turkey, such as the introduction of the Latin alphabet, adoption of western dress and secularisation. However, at the core of this Westernisation process was a belief that something fundamental in the nationalist self needed to change. The old, “Oriental” traditions and beliefs had to be discarded in the name of modernity and progress. Bobby S. Sayyid eloquently describes the relationship between Orientalism and Kemalism:

“To modernise, the Kemalists had to westernise, but the very nature of westernisation implied the necessity of Orientalisation since you can only westernise what is not western, that is what is Oriental. Thus, to westernise

you had first to Orientalise: one had to represent the Oriental, before one could postulate westernisation as an antidote. To reject the Orient in the name of the West meant the articulation of the Orient as 'the Orient'".¹⁰

The "Orient" for Turkish Cypriots in this sense had become the old traditions and Islam. They perceived Kemalism as the only tool to civilise themselves. Anything to do with Arabic or Persian had to be deleted in their daily lives. In the meantime they demanded, too, that the colonial authorities recognise their Turkish nationality and that education be of a "national" rather than religious character. That Turkish Cypriots perceived Kemalism as modernising was also observed by British colonial administrators. A.J. Dawe of the Colonial Office commented that some British officers think that: "by supporting the die-hard Turks of the old regime ... will prevent the Cypriot Turks from becoming Kemalists. In fact, I believe that this attitude is driving all the younger generation into the arms of the Kemalists. The only way to win them over to the British side is to give them a chance of becoming 'modern' in Cyprus".¹¹

By the time the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960, most of the Turkish Cypriots had either become or allied themselves with fundamentally Kemalist Turkish nationalists, partly due to the "civilising" process they had undergone since the late 1920s and partly because of the increasing Greek nationalism and violence in the 1950s. For example, Bryant argues that once the new Turkish state initiated certain reforms such as secularism and westernisation:

"Muslims in Cyprus immediately and voluntarily adopted these new statements about their identity, even while their presumed 'brothers' in Anatolia were in the throes of cultural upheaval. But they adopted them with a twist, for they had at hand an enemy – their Greek Cypriot neighbours – who was constantly agitating for a future that would not include Muslims. In other words, Turkish Cypriots adopted the modernising framework, constructivist history, and future-oriented rhetoric of the new Turkish republic, but they combined this with a belief in a powerful enemy that has been the hallmark of ethnic nationalism".¹²

As part of this "civilising" process, there was also Turkification of the social landscape. During the period leading up to independence, most of the village names or street names in the cities where Turkish Cypriots lived were changed to Turkish ones (even replacing some of the Islamic or old Turkish names).¹³ People were encouraged to use *öz Türkçe*, or "pure Turkish", to name their children and were discouraged from using Muslim names. Turkish Cypriots found these names in history books or in Turkish mythology or legends. Names like Mete, Ulus, Özer, Oğuz, Vural, Hakan, and Kaan began to appear on birth certificates.¹⁴

This Turkification reached its height in the period after independence, when intercommunal fighting erupted and Turkish Cypriots withdrew into armed enclaves. Archbishop Makarios proposed changes to the constitution in 1963, resulting in violent clashes. The enclaves to which Turkish Cypriots retreated were primarily controlled by the formerly underground organisation, Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, or Turkish Defence Organisation, usually known as TMT. The TMT surfaced above ground during this phase, joining with elected Turkish-Cypriot representatives in reorganising their community in these armed ghettos. In this period, due to the perceived and real threats coming from Greek Cypriots, most of the Turkish Cypriots submitted themselves to the nationalist projects initiated by TMT and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. Anthropologist Moira Killoran claims that “during the turbulent and vulnerable period when a Turkish-Cypriot minority population was in direct conflict with the Greek-Cypriot majority, and after the end of British rule in 1960 through the war in 1974, Turkish Cypriots sought protection from Turkey as if from, in the words of Turkish Cypriot scholar Kizilyurek, a “tribal God”. Turkey and things Turkish became a kind of religion for Turkish Cypriots”.¹⁵

This “religion”, discussed elsewhere,¹⁶ also had its own apocalyptic history that appeared inevitably to lead to Turkey’s military intervention. When a Greek military junta overthrew Archbishop Makarios in 1974, Turkey’s invasion and division of the island were welcomed by most Turkish Cypriots, who perceived the so-called “Peace Operation” as a relief from the oppression of nationalist Greek-Cypriot forces. The people greeted the Turkish soldiers as “liberators”.

According to Özkırımlı and Sofos, “Nationalism is almost invariably haunted by a fixation on territory, the quest for a ‘home’, actual or imagined”. They also note that this kind of fixation involves a “reconstruction of social space as national territory, often with a force and intensity that erase alternatives and graft the nation onto the physical environment and everyday social practices”.¹⁷ Following the 1974 war and after the flight and expulsion of the Greek Cypriots all the Turkish Cypriots gathered in the northern part of the island to construct their imagined state. All geographical names immediately changed into Turkish ones. The landscape was transformed into Turkish territory. Slogans like “how happy to say I’m a Turk” and Turkish flags decorated the mountains and hills of north Cyprus.

Moreover, in the period that immediately followed, Turkish Cypriots desired to consolidate their gains and give a jump-start to the new state’s economy. This required people who could work the lands and factories left behind by fleeing Greek Cypriots. And so there were initially no protests when Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot administration entered into an agreement to facilitate the migration of several thousand people from rural Turkey.¹⁸ Immigrants who were part of this policy received empty Greek-Cypriot properties and citizenship in the Turkish-Cypriot “state” almost upon arrival.¹⁹ This facilitated migration ended by the late

1970s;²⁰ a further amendment of the citizenship law in 1993 restricted citizenship rights to persons who had been resident on the island for at least five years.²¹ By that time, however, approximately 25,000-30,000 persons had arrived on the island; of those, approximately 15,000-20,000 of the original “settlers” and 15,000 of their Cypriot-born descendants – many from marriages with Turkish Cypriots – have remained.²²

The ‘Other Turks’ and the Discourse of ‘Demographic Danger’

Following what can be described as an initial honeymoon period, some negative reactions surfaced among the Turkish Cypriots toward the influx of this large number of mainlanders. The rural background and lack of education of these immigrants provided Turkish Cypriots with grounds for prejudice and discrimination. The immigrants’ dress and appearance appeared to contradict the Kemalist ideals to which Turkish Cypriots had been accustomed for the previous four decades. Turkish Cypriots used the mainlanders’ religiosity, appearance, language – including spoken Turkish or other languages – and other cultural differences as “strong boundary-maintaining mechanisms”. Anthropologist, Sarah Ladbury, who carried out fieldwork in north Cyprus in 1976 and 1977, claims that:

“The mainlander is respected for his fighting ability, but not for his cultural ingenuity (‘they saw the legs off tables’), commonsense (‘after two years they still ride their bicycles on the right’), or Western ways (‘they wear shalvar’)²³ ... Even the religiosity of the mainlander is used in the process of ethnic delineation (‘they build mosques before schools’).²⁴

Turkish Cypriots also resented the government’s distribution of the “rewards” of the war, as many of the settlers received empty Greek-Cypriot land and property in what appeared an indiscriminate way. Ladbury notes this relationship between the exaggeration of cultural “otherness” and other motivations:

“Here the cultural differences between Cypriot Turk and mainland Turk, non-existent to the uninitiated observer, are emphasised and exaggerated by Turkish Cypriots in order to justify their exclusive claim to certain resources which seem to be both scarce and, at present, unjustly distributed”.²⁵

Moreover, certain isolated criminal incidents involving Turkish immigrants, such as fights between neighbours, or in one case someone trying to marry a Turkish-Cypriot girl before divorcing his first wife, also caused anger among the secular Turkish Cypriots. The late Turkish-Cypriot leader Dr. Fazıl Küçük wrote a series of articles in 1978 criticising the “immoral behaviour” of the settlers. He said that they should all be sent back (the ones from the East) because they were not “civilised” enough to stay in Cyprus:

“Thus an ‘Eastern sultanate’ has been established in many villages. ... The earlier [mainland Turks,] those who have such bad manners and little civilisation that they would even spit in the face of the policeman on duty are sent back to their villages, the earlier they could reach the freedom they desire, and Cypriot Turks and the people who settled on the island could live in peace. Those coming from the western provinces [of Turkey] are as unhappy as we are”.²⁶

Despite such criticisms, however, the issue of immigration from Turkey was not at the top of the Turkish Cypriots’ political agenda. One reason for this was, no doubt, the fact that many of the first immigrants were settled in remote villages and had little contact with Turkish Cypriots. As a result, any criticism of the policy at the time of the initial migration primarily concerned the distribution of Greek-Cypriot property. Real criticism would surface only much later, with the emergence of an emphasis on the “Cypriot” part of Turkish Cypriots’ identities.

In the Turkish nationalist discourse, Turkish Cypriots are perceived as an extension of the people of Turkey. There is no difference between the Turks of Cyprus and the Turks of Turkey. The former Turkish-Cypriot president and Turkish nationalist Rauf Denктаş has always emphasised his Turkishness rather than his Cypriotness. In one of his speeches he declared that he is a “Turk coincidentally born on Cyprus”.²⁷ As a result, right-wing parties have not attempted to impede Turkish migration to the island.

Since the 1980s, however, there has been an emerging identification with Cypriotness that has been especially strong on the political left in the north. Apart from the mismanagement by the nationalist government of daily affairs and land distribution, another reason for the left’s attitude could be explained by their reactions against the Turkish nationalist hegemonic historiography which dominated the public sphere until recently. In this apocalyptic history anything Greek was erased. According to this historiography, “Turkish Cypriots suffered the attempted genocide of the Greeks” and “if Turkey was not there to help them they were all going to be killed”. This kind of understanding prohibited any form of criticism of Turkey, i.e. Turkey was the “saviour” who should not be challenged, regardless of who was in power in Turkey. Turkey was the one and only: the one who should, without doubt, be worshipped at all times.

In addition, during the three decades that were perceived by many as “the Denктаş period”, Turkish Cypriots underwent an attempted and only partially successful state-building process. During this era, there was only one direction in which people and goods could flow in and out of the island, and that was through Turkey. Moreover, Turkey had varying degrees of political, economic and military control in the north. As time passed and the parties in power failed to gain

recognition for the state in the north, the nationalist rhetoric of the right began to appear emptier. For all of these reasons, new generations increasingly felt ever more alienated from this monolithic discourse that they viewed as self-isolationist, chauvinistic, and banal. At this time leftist poets of “the generation of 1974”, as they called themselves, began to ask questions that evoked the anger of the nationalists. For example, Neşe Yaşın questioned in her poem:

“People must love their country.
So my father always says
My country has been divided through the middle into two
Which half must people love?”²⁸

From the nationalist side, this kind of questioning and challenge to the official discourse was immediately presented as a betrayal to the nation. Most of the opposition leaders, poets and writers were attacked publicly and branded as “traitors”. Nevertheless, every time nationalists attacked the “traitors”, those “traitors” became more and more Cypriot, because leftists saw these attacks of the right in Cyprus as either initiated or supported by Turkey and especially by the army. With time, this became a monolithic attitude as well, so that eventually anything that appeared to praise Turkey or almost anything Turkish became an object of hostility. According to Killoran, “The ‘Turks’; and that usually meant the poor, uneducated settlers, or the uncivilised-soldiers, and more importantly, the Cypriot Turk ruling party of ‘chauvinists’ and ‘Nationalists’; ... were clearly the ‘oppressors’, the enemy, ‘all bad’ for the Opposition”.²⁹ She also noted that in this discourse, Greek Cypriots were “European” and “all good”. In the 1990s leftist opposition, she claimed, “was united in difference – a sense of difference from the Turkish settlers”.³⁰

In this discourse of Cypriotness, the “settlers” and immigrants were also categorised as the hostile “other”. As a result, the “other” Turks of Cyprus (settlers) were then presented in this discourse as the “agents” of Turkey, which presumably tried to control them. Leftists believed that the majority of settlers and naturalised immigrants voted for the National Unity Party (UBP) and Rauf Denktaş, who collaborated to consolidate the absolute control of Turkey. Conversely, as demonstrated in a previous study, the voting pattern of the settlers (to the extent that the settler villages represent a general tendency among the settlers in general) is not uniform.³¹ The settlers, although predominantly conservative, tend to distribute their votes among many parties, just like the rest of the electorate.

In addition to their embracement of Cypriotness, another possible reason for the left-wing parties’ reluctance to accept the settlers is a presumed lack of information concerning their numbers, especially those who are citizens. In particular, a former leader of CTP, the late Özker Özgür, was very outspoken in his views on this issue. He made numerous statements heavily criticising the on-going

immigration at the time. For example, in an interview recorded in 1986, he claimed:³²

“In the place of our people who flee abroad to earn their living, people come from Turkey under the name of ‘labour force’. This labour force is turned into a vote force for conservative, chauvinistically oriented politicians ... We are faced with the danger of becoming a minority in northern Cyprus ... foreigners in our own homeland”.

It may be noted that this discourse of demographic “danger”, insistently repeated in the leftist press, has also been politically effective as it has drawn votes to the parties that seem to protect Cypriots from this “danger”. The left claims not to know the numbers of citizens and immigrants, but at the same time it must be noted that in a small polity like north Cyprus, with a total of 550 ballot boxes and 140,000 voters, the failure of the leftist parties to determine the exact number of settlers in the total electorate appears suspect.

The leftist parties and newspapers have been outspoken in their negative attitudes towards the “other Turks”, who soon became simply the “Turks”, or Türkiyeliler, in opposition to the Cypriots, or Kıbrıslılar. However, it should be noted that such attitudes have not been limited solely to the left; they also exist on the right. In daily life, as well as in the mainstream press, critical reactions toward the settler or immigrant population are often voiced by people coming from the right or from the Kemalist tradition. Orientalising commentary such as that of Dr. Küçük that saw the arrival of “other Turks” on the island as the establishment of an “Eastern sultanate”, became even more common in public discourse at the start of the 1990s, largely because of the liberalising consequences of the economy in that decade. Killoran claims that in the early 1990s:

“Very rarely Nationalist and very often the oppositional Turkish Cypriots would suggest that they were much more ‘European’ and educated than these ... ‘workers’. For example, a government official once told me that ‘they sent the wrong kind of Turks’ ...”.³³

Economic Transformation of North Cyprus and ‘Neoliberal Cypriots’

Following the 1980 military coup d’etat in Turkey that was intended to quell the then daily conflicts between the leftist and rightist youth, Turgut Özal came to power with the aspiration of liberalising the economy and depoliticising the public sphere.³⁴ The public sector was gradually privatised, and a neoliberal economy took root in the country, including an influx of imported products that had until that time been limited. A mass consumer culture emerged, complete with large shopping malls and various forms of credit. The media became a vital dominant tool in the public sphere, and

under media privatisation a new pop culture also emerged, some branches of which catered to various ethnic groups and subcultures in the country.³⁵ At the same time, the university structure was also altered, ensuring that youth would become increasingly more depoliticised, and oriented toward taking their roles in the new neoliberal economy and its consumer culture.

As in every other sphere, north Cyprus was influenced by these changes to the economic structure of Turkey, and a transformation of its own economy also began. This decade was a period of neoliberal privatisation in north Cyprus, making it attractive for owners of small business enterprises, as well as highly skilled professionals, such as financial experts hired in local or offshore banks, lecturers who teach in the universities, and businessmen who have made investments on the island. Several new hotels were built or older Greek-Cypriot ones, previously run by the government, were privatised. Together with growth in the hospitality industry, hotels began to open casinos which catered mainly to Turkish tourists. In addition, by the middle of the 1990s, changes in property laws resulted in a boom in the real estate sales and construction sector. The same period also saw the establishment of private universities in Nicosia, Kyrenia and Famagusta which attracted an increasingly large population of students from Turkey and other third countries.³⁶ Because the campus dormitories possessed insufficient bed capacity, many Cypriots started to rent their houses out to students, usually for a price above their market value. Apart from the income of rent, a large number of people profited by opening various shops, cafes and small businesses to accommodate the needs of the huge student population.

The effect of this new wealth also had a significant impact on the cultural landscape. Everyday life began to change rapidly. Consumption and the need for change became the defining concepts of this period. Purchasing power and consumption in turn became virtues and symbols of status, while in the meantime many concepts, attitudes, trends, fashions and thoughts began to be consumed rapidly. This was marketed mainly under the guidance of the new private TV channels in Turkey, which Turkish Cypriots eagerly followed. The lives and lifestyles of Turkey's beautiful fashion models, famous actresses and pop singers entered Cypriot homes nightly and became their regular guests. The fake Euro-American way of life which was promoted by such Turkish TV channels began to dominate every kind of cultural and social interaction. Turkish Cypriots very quickly tried to imitate what they viewed on programmes, and Cypriot replicas soon began to appear on the local national TV (later on private TVs too). Fashion shows became a popular draw for local restaurants and hotels, where models would strut while grandparents ate kebab. Especially popular were underwear fashion shows, for evenings organised by football clubs, when frilly bras and bikinis were used to raise money for a "cause".

Even though the non-recognised 'TRNC' was isolated from the rest of the world and it was difficult for globalisation to implant its symbolic products such as McDonald's on the soil of northern Cyprus, pirate copies of such products mushroomed in the north. Turkish Cypriots were soon frequenting Big Donald's instead of McDonald's, Pizza Hat instead of Pizza Hut, Burger City instead of Burger King, and Kermia Fried Chicken instead of Kentucky Fried Chicken. Huge supermarkets became the crowns of the new suburbs. During this period, however, places that brought different people together, and spaces where different people from different classes could meet, almost totally disappeared. The inner cities were left to the poor immigrants, while the neo-rich and middle class withdrew to particular neighbourhoods surrounding the cities. The new capital that was now accumulating from sectors such as tourism, catering, real estate sales, construction, banking and education became ever more visible on the motorways of the north: Luxury cars were everywhere.

At the same time, the political landscape changed. Socialist parties who were the main guardians of the state-run sectors also liberalised their attitudes toward the economy too. Many former leftists became businessmen themselves, and gradually featured in magazines that catered for the new Cypriot consumers and in the gossip columns of newspapers. Almost all of the newspapers in the north brightened their pages with colour, opening a society and "culture" section in the centre. The pages of the latter are usually filled with photographs of Turkish-Cypriot society, whether associations, social clubs or businesspeople enjoying themselves in the hotels, restaurants and night clubs that are now spread along the main roads of north Cyprus, where most of the new cars of the Cypriots are also on display. During the 1990s many bars, discos, cafes, youth bars, and rock bars also sprang up in the main cities. Furthermore, Chinese, Mexican and Italian restaurants opened, representing new global tastes.

This boom experienced a short negative downturn during the banking crisis of 2000 and 2001, when many lost money that had been deposited there at high rates of interest. But within a little more than a year a construction boom began, financed in part by Turkey, which rapidly propelled Turkish-Cypriot wealth accumulation on an upward spiral. Whilst these developments were underway, the population in the north began to crystallise into two main groups: 'TRNC' citizens and investors from Cyprus and Turkey, and those who worked for 'TRNC' citizens and the latter companies. Those Turkish Cypriots who were unable to succeed in the free market economy managed to escape the negative side-effects of liberalisation by seeking refuge in government offices – a sector mainly financed by Turkish aid – and these public-sector workers soon constituted the bulk of the middle-class population. Former carpenters, farmers, small shop owners, or their children who lost out in the new economy, were also rescued by politicians who turned them into civil servants in order to retain their support in elections.

At the same time, however, new sectors under the control of Turkish-Cypriot businessmen such as construction, pulled thousands of workers from Turkey. Many local entrepreneurs found the wages demanded by Cypriots to be more than they were willing to pay, and as a result, construction companies brought their workers from Turkey, especially from the poorer areas in Turkey's south and southeast.³⁷ In addition, large numbers of these workers were of Kurdish or Arab origin, and many hailed from the area of south eastern Turkey where they had experienced economic devastation and social turmoil as a result of long-term, low-level conflict.³⁸ Many construction workers were originally offered accommodation on construction sites, but they gradually began to find housing in the empty properties of Nicosia's walled city:

"When the need for construction workers created by the growing construction sector came together with the Turkish Cypriots lack of willingness to work 'for nothing', an unskilled labour force began to flow from Turkey's undeveloped areas in the east and southeast to Cyprus. The accommodation needs of these 'guests' were first met in the half-finished construction sites, but as their numbers multiplied, the old houses that Cypriots had begun to abandon in Nicosia's side streets began to be turned into workers' boarding houses. These new residents of Nicosia's side streets began to produce anxiety in its old residents and to accelerate their move into the suburbs".³⁹

Although the houses remained in disrepair, and many lacked proper plumbing or cooking facilities, Turkish-Cypriot owners soon discovered that they could turn their unused properties into rooming houses.⁴⁰ Crowding many workers into dormitory-style rooms allows owners to collect significant amounts of rent without upgrading the structures. They currently charge 100-200 Turkish lira per person, per month, often crowding as many as twenty or thirty workers into some of the larger houses.⁴¹ For immigrant manual labourers, however, the rents are relatively cheap, and living temporarily in these conditions provides them with an opportunity to fulfil their goal of sending as much money as possible to their families in Turkey.

However, the increasing use of Ottoman mansions and houses as pensions for manual labourers, or homes for large immigrant families, has effectively transformed Nicosia's walled city into an immigrant ghetto. And as a ghetto, stores, cafes, and restaurants have also grown up that specifically serve workers and immigrants, often intended to cater to people from one's home area.⁴² Cafes and restaurants are often named after the owner's home region, which encourages people from that region to frequent them. The walled city now is not only crowded with persons who look different, speak different languages (mainly Kurdish and Arabic) and may dress differently, but the city centre is also sprinkled with the names of Anatolian towns and cities. In addition, young soldiers from the 35,000-strong Turkish military force come to Nicosia in civilian clothes on their days of

leave, and so additional shops selling jeans and cheap phone cards, or cafes where the soldiers drink tea and play backgammon, are scattered throughout certain accessible areas of the walled city. And because immigrant workers are primarily male, evenings and days of leave within the city's walls have begun to take on not only an Anatolian image but a predominantly male character.⁴³

The opening in 2003, of the checkpoints that divide the island, provided new access to the island's south and gave Turkish Cypriots a new vision of the island's "essential" "European" character. The south's economy had grown rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, and especially in the period leading up to its EU accession. Boutiques carrying international brands, and stores selling the latest electronics and other consumer items confronted Turkish Cypriots on their initial checkpoint crossings. Suddenly, they were also confronted with the "not-quite", even "fake" nature of their own products, indeed their own existence. Everything seemed much shabbier, not as new, clean, or progressive as the island's "other half". Moreover, it was very easy to blame this difference on the immigrants who appeared most viscerally to represent it. While Greek Cypriots were "European" – perceived by the cars they drove, the clothes they wore, the type of vacations they took – immigrants had made the north into "the East", a piece of Anatolia. In this same period, this visceral, visual difference became one of the primary motivations for large segments of the population in the north to support a UN reunification plan that would have insured EU citizenship for the Turkish Cypriots and would have made north Cyprus, also, a part of Europe.

Such differences are particularly visible in Nicosia, which has been divided not once but in several ways: between north and south, but also, on both sides of the checkpoints, between the ancient walled city and the new, "modern" suburbs. In the north, as pointed out above, this abandonment also resulted in the ghettoisation of the walled city, which was left to immigrants from Turkey. In most Turkish-Cypriot representations, the walled city has become a place occupied by women in headscarves and children who run unsupervised in the streets, a place where the numbers of men in public spaces call up images of remote Anatolia rather than the city that Turkish Cypriots remember.

'Invasion of Nicosia': Media Representations of Migrants from Turkey

Media representations (both in mainstream and leftist media) of migration to north Cyprus dwell in great detail on the visual preponderance of the immigrant population, especially in the walled city, which was the historic centre of Turkish-Cypriot social and political life. During the period 1963-1974 when four-fifths of the Turkish-Cypriot population lived in enclaves, the walled city of Nicosia was the largest protected area; the centre of both the Turkish-Cypriot administration and the new, entirely Turkish, cultural life that developed in this chapter. Not only were the

main administrative offices located in Nicosia, but the city was also the centre for festivals, concerts, theatrical and sports events as well as providing cinemas and popular gathering-places that constituted the social and cultural life of the community then. It was a place where everyone knew one another, where faces were always familiar; it was a place of few cars and few shops, the owners of which were always known to all. The “village” atmosphere of Nicosia’s walled city was lost when the Turkish Cypriots moved to the impersonal apartment blocks, council housing, and supermarkets of the suburbs.

The absence of Turkish Cypriots within the walled city, and the preponderance of Turkish immigrants, is often lamented in the Turkish-Cypriot press. One of the most popular columnists in the north recently toured the walled city and wrote of what he found there:

“I don’t remember the last time I strolled through old Nicosia’s streets. It must have been two, maybe five months since I had walked there. The number of Turkish Cypriots that I saw between Kyrenia Gate and Saray Önü Square had decreased incredibly. A woman in a shop that sells coffee and nuts asked, ‘Hasan Bey, did you notice how much the number of Cypriots has decreased?’ ‘I’m aware of it’, I said. But afterwards I interpreted this awareness. The basic problem of the walled city that is Nicosia’s heart is the existence of people who don’t take responsibility for that [social and historical] fabric, or who don’t seem to care about taking responsibility. Or if those who live in the walled city were in a position to take conscious responsibility for that fabric, maybe the discomfort would be eased. But there are a lot of people in the walled city who are there temporarily”.⁴⁴

Many columnists describe similar strolls through the walled city’s streets, and their columns are filled with nostalgia for a time when those streets were “Cypriot”, when the sights and smells were familiar to them. “The scent of pots just beginning to boil emerges from the houses. There’s definitely no scent of molohiya or kolokas!” one such columnist opines. “The new residents of old Nicosia have not yet become accustomed to these authentic foods”.⁴⁵ Other writers contrast the familiar scents of the past with the odour of lahmacun, a spicy pizza from the southeast of Turkey whose aroma permeates certain Nicosia backstreets. The scent of lahmacun that invaded the nostrils of those who wandered Nicosia’s side streets came to represent an unwanted intrusion, one that was cast as backward and unfamiliar.⁴⁶

This change in the social fabric of the walled city is often referred to in the Turkish-Cypriot press as a form of “Anatolianisation”. In the widely read columns of Şener Levent in the newspaper Afrika, the “colonisation” or “Anatolianisation” of the walled city is a common theme. The day after the April 2008 opening of the checkpoint that divides Ledra Street, one of the city’s main arteries, Levent wrote: “The reporter for a television channel from Turkey who was filming at Lokmaci was

saying with great excitement, 'The Greek side stopped the crossings to Turkey. It closed the gate'. Oh, man! I said. Finally someone's come out and told the truth. I'm sick of hearing lies. Let's speak the truth for once. It's not a gate opening onto peace. It's not about Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots uniting ... This gate certainly isn't one that opens from one part of Nicosia to another. It opens from Nicosia to Turkey! From Europe to Anatolia!"⁴⁷ In such portrayals, there is an inevitable elision of immigrants with Anatolia, of immigration with colonisation. Levent continues, "This isn't Cyprus, it's Turkey. A little Turkey. It's a remote Anatolian town, with its pensions, coffee houses, simit sellers, and lahmacun salons". The implication of such remarks is that the ghettoisation of the walled city is part of a plan to "integrate" Cyprus into Turkey, to "assimilate" Turkish Cypriots to Anatolian culture.

There is, as mentioned above, a widespread confusion – consistently reproduced by the media – between early settlers who acquired citizenship and the right to vote, and the later economic migrants, of whom only a small portion have acquired such rights. This confusion leads to laments that the Turkish-Cypriot population is shrinking or being overwhelmed.⁴⁸ It has also led to accusations that "Türkiyeliler", which in this vision includes any person from Turkey regardless of their citizenship status on the island, are following the will of Turkey and impeding the political will of Cypriots. This, therefore, is the "demographic danger," mentioned above as well as the sense that Turkish Cypriots have no control over their own fate.

The fact, however, that this "demographic danger" is not really or only about numbers is clear in other representations of immigrants. Immigrants are not only perceived as a threat because of their numbers, or because they may impede the political will of Cypriots; Immigrants are also consistently portrayed in the media as a physical threat – as either potential criminals or as carriers of disease. In early 2008, newspapers reported that, according to the Ministry of Health, the regular health checks of foreign workers showed 35 cases of AIDS, 792 of Hepatitis B, 121 of Hepatitis C, 607 of gonorrhoea, 78 of syphilis, and 56 cases of human papilloma virus. According to a report in *Kıbrıs* newspaper, all of the cases of HIV and other untreatable diseases were immediately deported.⁴⁹ In this sample there was neither any breakdown of the countries of origin of those who had been infected by these diseases, nor any report on when the diseases might have been transmitted. This is important because during the liberalisation of its economy, northern Cyprus has also developed a thriving sex industry that relies on women who are trafficked primarily from eastern European countries. Although prostitution is illegal in the north of the island, these women are nevertheless subjected to health checks, especially for sexual diseases, upon entry and later to regular health checks overseen by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. In most instances then, they become infected by disease after their arrival on Cyprus; moreover, it is known that most of

these women's clients are local. Still, newspapers group "immigrant workers" in such a way that it appears that those who have brought disease to the island are all manual labourers from Turkey.

Moreover, the metaphor of disease is often used to describe the "plague" of immigrants. One article written by Mustafa Doğrusöz in 2002 described the change that the author had begun to see in the once pure face of Nicosia:

"First shadows began to appear on her face, then black spots. With time the black spots multiplied. According to some they were just a few unimportant pimples, while according to others they were an illness that had no cure. Those who said it was an unimportant illness soon realised that they had been wrong. The black spots multiplied even more ... The pure white face had lost its magic. Both the face and the tongue were gradually obscured".⁵⁰

Doğrusöz later explains the black spots as "an occupation by persons with different languages and different skin".⁵¹ Just as the immigrants themselves carry disease, then, they are also cast as a "disease" on the face of the city.

This metaphor of "disease" is often used to refer to crime, for which Turkish immigrants are believed to be responsible. In early 2008, a wave of sexual crimes, including one violent rape and two cases of incest, led to an immediate and virulent reaction against Turkish immigrants, despite the fact that several of those arrested for these crimes were of Cypriot origin. The latter fact was not disclosed in the newspapers, which tended to tally the crimes and group them on one page.⁵² *Kıbrıs* newspaper, owned by Doğan Harman, former Denktaş adviser and later supporter of the Annan Plan, suggested that this kind of "immoral" behaviour is psychologically contagious. He claimed that,

"But of course because of psychological contagion we see that Turkish Cypriots are also behaving in the same way. ... Because of this, the government needs a very serious population policy. ... If you force people to live together who don't accept each other's morals and conscientious values, it's inevitable that even worse things will happen. ... Beware of the quality of the population!"⁵³

The suggestion in the grouping of these crimes – as well as the fact that the places of origin of Turkish nationals were invariably disclosed, while Cypriots' places of origin were not – is that all crime in the north is committed by Turkish immigrants. Reactions to the wave of sexual crimes were especially virulent, and online commentary in the newspapers' websites labelled the immigrants as "animals" and "barbarians".⁵⁴

Such instances of hate language were not, however, limited to online readers and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, some of the most virulent critics of the recent immigrants are earlier immigrants, often married to Turkish Cypriots, and especially those who come from the Western provinces of Turkey. Again, the newspaper *Afrika* took the lead when it published an article by a Turkish settler, Gülsade Soykök, in which the author described the filth of the immigrants, who live in unsanitary conditions and cannot afford even to use the public toilets:

“It doesn’t matter if, ignoring their own unqualified state, they go out begging saying, ‘I’ll do any work, abi [older brother]’, or if despite their illegal status they manage to find work. (As soon as they grow a bit fat, they don’t see any objections to moving half of their seven tribes here!) And if they don’t find work, what is this pack of hungry, unvaccinated wolves going to do? First, they’ll greedily fill their stomachs; in order to achieve this, they rob small businesses. As if it isn’t enough that the government is banqueting off the people, now the thieves and criminals are also going to share the cake. After that, with their hungry eyes blinded by lust and rabid, they’ll rape anybody, and it doesn’t matter if it’s a baby, a young girl, a middle-aged woman, or the elderly. And in all of this, the biggest fault lies with the government’s laxity! [In what] other country would people enter so freely and shamelessly, swinging their arms and their diseased things [penises]?”⁵⁵

The same author warns that if the government does not take action to stop these crimes, “someone who has already lost trust in the scales of justice will appear to take justice in his own way”. She continues, “If you don’t do it, they’ll do it. They’ll bury these sick perverts (who anyway can’t be integrated) in deep salt-water wells and cover them with lime to keep them from smelling. Hey, with these hopeless, unnatural cases, at least nature could be kept clean and not sullied by this filth (mundarlar)”.

Unlike in western Europe, where hate crimes are legislated and monitored by special government bodies, both sides of Cyprus lack the legislative or political will to monitor such crimes. The ‘TRNC’ is a special case, in that, as an unrecognised state, it also falls outside the scope of international monitoring bodies. For example, the Human Rights First Country-By-Country Hate Crime Report Card of December 2007 takes the Republic of Cyprus to task but makes no report on hate crimes in the north.⁵⁶ The anxiety produced a growing discourse of “demographic danger” among the Turkish-Cypriot public which has led to a proliferation of publications that in many western European countries would be classified as hate speech, but the lack of international intervention in the north has meant that there is no pressure to monitor such offences. As a result, articles such as the one quoted above may be cast as a form of resistance rather than as racism.

Conclusion

Although migrants to north Cyprus face much the same problems as economic migrants elsewhere, they also face special problems as immigrants in an unrecognised state on a divided island. An unrecognised state cannot sign conventions or treaties, including those that protect human rights, and so cannot be held accountable. Most international agencies cannot officially operate in, or provide oversight for enterprises in north Cyprus. And for the citizens of Turkey who constitute the large majority of migrants to northern Cyprus, the importance of demography in the Cyprus Problem impacts their ability to integrate into their new home, their ability to claim basic rights, and their sense of certainty about the future. The pervasive presence of Turkey on the island – militarily, economically, and politically – has made Turkish citizens who wish to work and live on the island into scapegoats for Turkish Cypriots seeking a different future.

At the same time, the contradictions of Turkish Cypriots' "resistance" to Turkey are acted out in everyday interactions, media portrayals, and the legal regulation of immigrant status within the island. Turkish Cypriots have a preference for jobs in the civil service, and the public sector has expanded in past decades to meet demand. Much of the funding for civil service jobs comes from pecuniary aid provided by Turkey – which also demands a say in certain areas, because of its financial support and leads to accusations of colonisation. Moreover, many immigrant workers are aware of this drain on the Turkish state and accuse Turkish Cypriots of ingratitude, exacerbating existing tensions. As one interviewed Kurdish worker reported, "If Turkey would invest this much in my region, I'd be there now rather than here".

As a consequence, the preference of Turkish Cypriots for civil service posts has meant that as sectors requiring cheap, manual labour grew, they had to be filled by an immigrant population. One research team that has conducted research with migrants inside Nicosia's walled city remarked:

"In north Cyprus, the foreign (Turkish national) work force in both the formal and informal sectors is around 50,000, with the greatest number employed in construction. In contrast to this, according to the 2006 north Cyprus census, the number of residents is 178,000, the number of households is 72,000, and the number of persons drawing a government paycheque is 55,000. These figures clearly show that 'TRNC' citizens, as a work force, have clustered in the public sector, and that there is a structural labour deficit in north Cyprus' developing sectors. It is this deficit that non-citizen workers, in both the formal and informal sectors, fill".⁵⁷

In other words, a new economic boom fuelled by the construction of villas, primarily on Greek-Cypriot land, has led to a need for cheap labour that Turkish

Cypriots themselves were not willing to fill and that has instead been filled by people from the impoverished south and southeast of Turkey.

Indeed, ironically, trade unions and businesspeople have unified over the issue of the problems that cheap labour created. As a result, recent proposals to resolve the problem have included one made by the Businessmen's Association to institute two separate minimum wages. One minimum wage would apply to Turkish Cypriots and would be higher, hence encouraging them to seek jobs that they have hitherto avoided, and the second would be for foreign workers, who would, according to this scheme, earn the minimum wage of their home country.⁵⁸ In addition, the new 2005 laws that almost entirely registered the whole foreign workforce and ensured that employers paid their social security, also led to a more secure environment for many of those labourers, encouraging them to bring their families. Labourers, bringing their families are, however, described in the press and perceived by much of the Cypriot public as a further stress on social services. The Businessmen's Association has used these latter complaints to argue against creating conditions of security for workers, claiming that they will remain on the island, become citizens, and constitute a further "demographic danger" and an impediment to Cypriots' political will.

Furthermore, Turkish Cypriots are not only dependent on Turkey's cheap labour force and financial aid to support a burgeoning economy, but they are also unable to wean themselves from dependence on the Turkish military. Even during the latest round of negotiations, a poll conducted for Simerini by Turkish-Cypriot researcher Muharrem Faiz showed that 76.4% of Turkish Cypriots want a Turkish military contingent to remain on the island in the event of a solution.⁵⁹ And in a similar poll that Faiz conducted for the National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik Partisi), results showed that almost 100% of respondents wanted "the continuation of Turkey's right of guarantee", while 80.6% of respondents said that Turkey was the country they trusted the most.⁶⁰ Such results – consistent with other polls conducted in north Cyprus over the past decade – show that the sense of colonisation, or of having one's political will impeded, is one that remains impotent in the face of the "need" for Turkey's economic and military intervention.⁶¹

It is argued here that neither the makeup of the Turkish immigrant population and the reasons for the arrival of those immigrants on the island, nor the dependence on Turkey's economic and military contributions to the north point to colonisation as the real reason for Turkish-Cypriot reactions to the labour migrants. Rather, xenophobic reactions to the migrants resemble those in other parts of the world where migration has proceeded quickly and where the immigrant population is perceived as "different" from the "local" population.

In north Cyprus, the perception of overwhelming numbers of immigrants is fuelled by their preponderance in the walled city of Nicosia. The media portrays the walled city as a place of crime and disease, a place dominated by single men who are both poor and uneducated, leading many Turkish Cypriots to avoid the area, especially after dark. Similarly, the media and public discourse have begun to portray all migrants as potential criminals who have come to disturb the peace of the island. This is reflected in education in the growing refusal of Turkish Cypriots to send their own children to schools where immigrants are present, and in the requests by some teachers to have immigrant children removed from their classrooms.⁶² It is also reflected in the lack of integration of migrant workers, most of whom spend their spare time in spaces owned by people from their own regions of origin.

The perception of difference, and especially of “backwardness”, is also reflected in language. In Turkish-Cypriot argot, persons from Turkey were referred to in the past as *karasakal*, or “black beard”, a name that supposedly emerged to refer to Turkish military commanders based on the island in the 1960s. Its connotations are not necessarily derogatory, though the word may be used in a derogatory way. There are other derogatory terms that have become more widely used in recent years. One of these is *fellah*, a word with Arabic origins meaning “peasant” and which in the Cypriot dialect means “Arab gypsy”. A more recent term which came into use to refer specifically to the large numbers of Turkish nationals arriving to work on the island, is *gaco*, or “gypsy”.⁶³ Both *fellah* and *gaco* emphasise the immigrants’ perceived rural or peasant origins and these are words that are used to refer to immigrants from southern and eastern, but not from western, Turkey. These terms depend upon an East/West dichotomy, in which Cypriots see themselves (as well as educated, westernised Turks) as part of the West, and immigrants as part of an Orientalised East. This is expressed quite well in an interview with a 28-year-old female resident of Nicosia:

“I don’t want to put people down, but it’s mostly workers coming here from Turkey. Everything about them is bad – their clothes, the way they look at you. ... Anyway they don’t come from normal places, they mostly come from Hatay and the East. I don’t particularly like them. ... There’s always the same question: Why don’t you like Turks? Hey, I’m also a Turk! It’s not that we don’t like *Türkiyeliler*, it’s the people from Hatay and Mardin we don’t like”.⁶⁴

Another slang term that has come into popular use in recent years is *fica*, a Turkish-Cypriot word for seaweed. This word refers to the immigrants from Turkey who “washed up” on the shores of Cyprus like dead seaweed brought in by the tide. The word expresses the sense that manual labourers, many of Kurdish or Arab origin, constitute an unwanted invasion that spoils the landscape as seaweed litters a beach.

As the quote above shows, in popular discourse class difference is often confused with cultural difference, just as immigrants are often confused with the Turkish state. Moreover, the fear of “colonisation” is primarily one of “Anatolianisation”, or of Cyprus being culturally “dragged down” by immigrants perceived as uneducated and “backward”. This perception of cultural difference has, in turn, fuelled a new identity politics that is used by many political parties to avoid dealing with real issues of inequality and social injustice. A “Cypriot” identity has taken shape in reaction to immigration, but it is by nature a class-based identity that disguises its own roots in class inequality.

Habermas warned in the mid-1990s about a “chauvinism of affluence” that he saw on the rise due to European Union integration policies and the resulting influx of economic and political immigrants and refugees. As an example, he illustrated how East Germans had at the time begun selfishly to guard their newly acquired status, and the accompanying rights or benefits, against encroachment by “foreigners”.⁶⁵ In parallel, it is argued here that under the cover of “colonisation” Turkish Cypriots are partly “resisting” against sharing the affluence achieved since the 1974 war; the recent economic development built on immigrant workers’ labour; and privileges such as EU passports that Turkish Cypriots acquired since the checkpoints opened. Under the cover of “colonisation,” it has also been possible for Turkish Cypriots to claim that they are “resisting” the north’s “Anatolianisation”, at the same time allowing the perpetration of hate speech, a lack of attention to social inequality, and blindness to other social needs, such as the ecological destruction that resulted and continues to result from the recent construction boom in the north.

Notes

1. Hasan Hastürer, ‘Martılar ve Güvercinler’ [Seagulls and Pigeons], *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 30 December 2001.
2. Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant (2008) ‘The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia: Of Returns, Revolutions, and the Longing for Forbidden Pasts’, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, pp. 423-449.
3. Edward Said (1978) *Orientalism*. New York, Pantheon.
4. James G. Carrier (1995) *Occidentalism: Images of the West*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 22-23.
5. Hugh Poulton (1997) *Top Hat Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*. London, Hurst and Company, pp. 76-77. According to Müssevid-zade Osman Cemal, a former müezzın (leader of the call to prayer), local politician, lawyer and Young Turk of the 1900s, the backward condition of Muslims in Cyprus had been

- caused by religious dignitaries, who failed to adapt themselves to the requirements of modernity. "Our religious dignitaries, or more precisely a large number of turbaned men", Cemal protested, "preach against science and technology and enlightened learning in our mosques and mescits" (Harid Fedai and Fuad Memduh Adsız Kitap [The Book with No Name], KKTC. MEKGSB Yayınları-36, [Ankara, Yıldız Matbaası 1997], pp. 38-41).
6. Rebecca Bryant (2006) 'On the Condition of Postcoloniality in Cyprus' in Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N. and Weltz, G. (eds.), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington USA, Indiana University Press, p. 49.
 7. Although colonial perceptions of their Greek neighbours were similarly Orientalising, Greek Cypriots resolved this dilemma by following the ideological route of the "motherland" Greece, which claimed an unbroken historical and cultural continuity with their ancient Greek ancestors. Hellenic civilisation, in turn, was the foundation for Western civilisation, and in such histories Greeks (and, following them, Greek Cypriots) were able to make claims through their ancestors to be already members of the West. The fact that a succession of "Oriental" rulers had also given them a Romaic culture that existed alongside the revived Hellenic culture did not dilute this identity but only meant that, as Carrier notes, the Oriental within must be expunged. This they attempted to do through language reform, history teaching, and folklore study.
 8. See Richard Clogg (1992) *Concise History of Greece*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 93-97.
 9. Estimates diverge as to how many actually left. The Cyprus Annual Report of 1927, however, reckoned that about 5,000 had emigrated over the course of the previous three years. Cyprus Annual Report 1927, p. 40. According to one demographer, L.W. St. John-Jones, "if the Turkish-Cypriot community had, like the Greek-Cypriots, increased by 101 per cent between 1881 and 1931, it would have totalled 91,300 in 1931 – some 27,000 more than the number enumerated". St. John-Jones speculates that this difference most likely should be accounted for by assuming that as many as 27,000 Turkish Cypriots emigrated during this 50-year period. See L.W. St. John-Jones, *The Population of Cyprus: Demographic Trends and Socio-economic Influences* (London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1983), p. 56.
 10. Bobby S. Sayyid (1997) *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and Emergence of Islamism*. London, Zed Books.
 11. Minute by A.J. Dawe, 18 December 1936. CO 67/268/4, pp. 12-13.
 12. Rebecca Bryant (2004) *Imagining the Modern: Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus*. London, I.B. Tauris, p. 233.
 13. Kutlu Adalı, (1997) *Dağarcık* [Shepherd's Pouch], Cilt I. Nicosia, Işık Kitabevi Yayınları, pp. 156-157.
 14. *Ibid.*, pp. 155-156.
 15. Moira Killoran (1998) 'Good Muslims and "Bad Muslims", "Good" Women and Feminists: Negotiating Identities in Northern Cyprus (Or, the Condom Story)', *Ethos*, Vol. 26, No. 2, *Communicating Multiple Identities in Muslim Communities* (June), p. 187.
 16. Mete Hatay and Yannis Papadakis, 'A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Official Historiographies of Cyprus', Paper presented to the Conference *One Island*,


- Many Histories: Rethinking the Politics of the Past in Cyprus. PRIO Cyprus Centre 28-29 November 2008.
17. Umut Özkırımlı and Spyros A. Sofos (2008) *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. London, Hurst and Company, p.103.
 18. See Mete Hatay, *Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the Ethno-Demography of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census*. Oslo/Nicosia, PRIO Report 2/2007.
 19. According to TSFC Citizenship Law Act No. 3/1975, anyone who resides on the island for one year may apply for citizenship. In addition, families of the 498 Turkish soldiers killed in the 1974 war would be eligible for citizenship, as would all Turkish soldiers who had served in Cyprus until 18 August 1974. Some of the veterans took the opportunity and settled on the island. There presently exists a Turkish Army Veterans Association with around 1,200 active members, the majority of whom (75%) are married to Turkish Cypriots. A clause in the law also allows the Council of Ministers to grant citizenship to anyone who is deemed to be of benefit to the state which was sometimes abused by the parties in the government.
 20. This migration ended as a result of international pressure and internal opposition, which led to the 1982 amendment of the 'Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value' (*İskan, Topraklandırma, ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası* [ITEM law] No. 41/1977) that eliminated property privileges for new immigrants who arrived after 1982. Turkish nationals migrating to Cyprus after implementation of this law received no properties from the state and had to buy or rent properties on the local market.
 21. Although the 1993 citizenship law granted the right to apply for citizenship after five years of residency, not all persons who applied have been granted citizenship. For instance, some of the Kurdish-origin immigrants that were interviewed claimed that because of tensions between Kurdish militant organisations and the Turkish state, many Kurdish immigrants in the north have been unable to acquire 'TRNC' citizenship.
 22. For further analysis of the demography in north Cyprus, see Hatay (2007).
 23. A pair of long baggy pants in a traditional sort of style.
 24. Sarah Ladbury (1977) 'Turkish Cypriots: Ethnic Relations in London and Cyprus' in Watson, J.L. (ed.), *Between Two Cultures: Migrants and Minorities in Britain*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, pp. 320-321.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 318.
 26. Fazıl Küçük, 'Geri Gönderilmeli [They Must Be Sent Back]', *Halk'ın Sesi* 25 May 1978 (translated by Christoph Ramm).
 27. Yael Navaro-Yashin (2006) 'De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey' in Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N. and Welz, G. (eds.), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington USA, Indiana University Press, p. 85.
 28. Translated by Moira Killoran in 'Pirate State, Poet Nation: The Poetic Struggle Over "The Past" in North Cyprus'. Unpublished PhD (1994, pp. 194-195). The University of Texas at Austin.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 170.

30. Ibid.
31. Hatay, 2005, pp. 23-58.
32. Turkish daily *Günaydın* Newspaper, 1986.
33. Killoran, 1994, p. 244.
34. Beyza Sumer (2003) 'White versus Black Turks: The Civilizing Process in Turkey in the 1990s'. A Master thesis submitted to the graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle Eastern Technical University.
35. Ibid.
36. Ergün Olgun (2003) 'Sectoral Analysis' in Dodd, C.H. (ed.), *The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*. Cambridgeshire, Eothen Press.
37. There are no current figures on regional origins of immigrants, but a 2000 survey showed that 37.2% of the manual workforce came from the Hatay region of Turkey, while another 15.8% came from the country's southeast. The remaining 47% comes from other regions of Turkey, especially in the south, or from third countries. See Özay Mehmet and M. Tahiroğlu, 'An Empirical Study of Turkish Economic Migrants in North Cyprus,' *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi* 2:2 (2000), pp. 127-138, and Ali Bizden (1997), 'Kıbrıs'ta güç/iktidar meselesinin değişen yüzü: Kıbrıs(lı Türk) milliyetçiliği [The changing face of the force/power problem in Cyprus: (Turkish) Cypriot Nationalism]', *Birikim* 97, pp. 79-91.
38. See Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis (2008), 'Türkiye'den Kuzey Kıbrıs'a göç dalgaları: Lefkoşa'nın dışlanmış göçmen-enformel emekçileri [Waves of migration from Turkey to North Cyprus: Nicosia's excluded migrant and informal-sector workers],' *Toplum ve Bilim* Vol. 112, pp. 60-101. The push factors for persons coming from the southeast of Turkey are clear, as the region has been devastated by almost fifteen years of conflict. Over the past decade, between 950,000 and 1.2 million people have abandoned the region, emigrating to other areas of Turkey and abroad. The conflict has not only destroyed infrastructure and security but has also produced an unemployment problem (Cenk Saraçoğlu (2007) 'Yeni disimilasyonist milliyetçilik [The new dissimilationist nationalism]', *Toplum ve Bilim*, Vol. 110, pp. 247-261).
39. Bizden (1997), available at [<http://bizden.blog.com/2777441/>].
40. Report on the Socio-Economic Survey in the Walled City (Turkish Cypriots), Report Prepared for UNOPS by KADEM, 2004, slides 9-11.
41. Information determined from interviews conducted in this study and see also Kurtuluş and Purkis, 2008.
42. One article published by the Fırat News Agency notes changes in attitudes towards Kurdish identity in Nicosia in the past few years. One Kurdish worker quoted in the article sees their ability to watch Roj TV as progress: "Until two years ago, when [the police] would search the pensions, if they saw *Gündem Gazetesi* [a Kurdish socialist newspaper] they would ask, 'Why are you reading this? How do you get it?' But now we can watch Roj TV in the café". Ömer Leventoğlu, 'Kıbrıs'ta da en alttakiler Kürt işçileri [In Cyprus, too, the Kurdish workers are at the bottom]', [<http://www.rojaciwan.com/haber-23275.html>].
43. There are today 11,416 males and 6,946 females of Turkish origin living in north Nicosia

(Figures provided by Güner Mükellef, head of the Statistics Department of the State Planning Bureau).

44. Hasan Hastürer, 'Lefkoşa'yı hüznün yüklü buldum [I found Nicosia loaded with emotion]', *Kıbrıs*, 23 September 2007.
45. Ahmet Tolgay, 'Efkarlıyım dostlar, Lefkoşa'yı gezdim [I'm wistfully sad, my friends, because I walked around Nicosia]', *Kıbrıs*, 13 December 2003.
46. See for example: Hasan Hastürer, 'Yasemin Kokuları Lahmacun Kokuları Altında Kalırken [While the scent of jasmine is overwhelmed by the scent of lahmacun]', *Toplum Postası*, 9 April 2008; Hasan Hastürer, 'Yasemini mağusa'da buldum [I found jasmine in Famagusta]', *Kıbrıs*, 14 July 2008.
47. Şener Levent, 'Anadolu'dan Yol Bağladık Uzunyol'a [We paved a road from Ledra Street to Anatolia]', *Afrika Gazetesi*, 5 April 2008.
48. One commentary in a local newspaper expressed this dilemma quite well: "The problem that we face is not really one of quantification but of qualification. For every second that the Turk of Cyprus believes that he won't be able to determine his present and his future, he's going to feel that he's in the minority, even if numerically he's the majority" (Mutlu Azgın, 'Niteliksel Azınlık Sendromu [Qualitative Minority Syndrome]', *Yenidüzen Gazetesi*, 6 August 2008).
49. '35 AIDS vakası, tümü sınır dışı [35 AIDS cases, all of them deported]', *Kıbrıs*, 2 February 2008.
50. Mustafa Doğrusöz (2002) *Çünkü Ben Buralıyım [Because I Am from Here]*. Nicosia, Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi, p. 102.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
52. Başaran Düzgün, 'Tecavüze Uğrayan Kim? [Who Was the One Raped?]', *Kıbrıs Gazetesi*, 25 May 2008.
53. Doğan Harman, 'Toplumun Kültür Çekirdeğini Parçalayan Olaylar Tırmanışta [An Increase in Incidents Destroying the Cultural Seed of the Community]', *Kıbrıslı Gazetesi*, 22 October 2008.
54. See [<http://www.yeniduzengazetesi.com/template.asp?articleid=622&zoneid=3>].
55. Gülsade Soykök, 'Çirkef Yatağındaki Tecavüzcüler [Rapists in the Cesspool]' *Afrika Gazetesi*, 19 June 2008.
56. Human Right First Country-By-Country Hate Crime Report Card, December 2007, [<http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/071217-discrim-hc-report-card-2007.pdf>], accessed 6 August 2008.
57. Kurtuluş and Purkis (2008), pp. 76-77.
58. Akay Cemal, "'Yabancı" İşçi sorunu ve üretkenlerin beklentileri' [Problem of the 'foreign' labour force and producers' expectations], *Kıbrıs*, 14 November 2008.
59. 'Kıbrıslı Türkler yüzde 63'ü görüşmelerden umutsuz' [63% of Turkish Cypriots are not hopeful about the talks], *Kıbrıs*, 11 August 2008.
60. Ata Atun, 'Kıbrıslı Türkler Kararını Vermiş Bile [Turkish Cypriots Have Already Decided]', *Kıbrıs*, 11 August 2008.

61. Erol Kaymak, Alexandros Lordos and Nathalie Tocci (2008) Building Confidence in Peace: Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace Process, report prepared for Centre For European Policy Studies, Brussels.
62. Cenk Mutluyakalı, 'Nereye Gidiyoruz? [Where Are We Going?]', Yenidüzen, 22 June 2008.
63. Ironically gaco in the Romany language means non-gypsy. In the past, Cypriot Roma used this word for persons not of Roma origin, such as Turkish Cypriots.
64. Çağla Güngör (2002) Kıbrıslı Türk Gençleri Konuşuyor [Turkish Cypriot Youth Speak]. Istanbul, Metis Güncel Yayınları, p. 50.
65. Jurgen Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Boston, MIT, pp. 508-509.



The weekly market opposite Holiday Inn

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