



Converging and conflicting ethical values in the
internal/external security continuum in Europe

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Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in
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Annex I - List of INEX Beneficiaries

Executive Summary

The aim of the INEX project has been to clarify and assess the value-based premises and ethical consequences of present and planned European trans-border security initiatives and to formulate recommendations on how to strengthen the coherence, effectiveness and justice of their impact. This objective was based on a strong set of premises about the centrality of human and societal values to the provision of security. It set out the hypothesis the human and societal values are not incidental to security practices, not just the measure of a certain value-added, a desirable supplement. Rather it assumed that values were the very core of security. It took security and insecurity as social, cultural, political concepts, and then sought to assess this assumption by studying the new and quickly evolving challenges of European internal and external security.

INEX has been an interdisciplinary project, designed around two research axes: thematic and geopolitical. On the thematic axis it has studied four fields of knowledge of high relevance to the question of the ethics and the value-laden tensions arising along the continuum between internal and external security in Europe: (1) the ethical consequences of the proliferation of security technologies, (2) the legal dilemmas that arise from transnational security arrangements, (3) the ethical and value questions that stem from the shifting role of security professionals and (4) the consequences of the changing role of foreign security policy in an era when the distinction between the external and internal borders grows less distinct. On the geopolitical axis it has studied and produced recommendations relative to two geographical theatres of high relevance for ethical issues of internal/external security: the Eastern European 'neighbourhood' and the Mediterranean 'neighbourhood' including Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, Middle East and North Africa.

The results of this complex project are understandably complex. This is certainly part of the practical conclusion of the INEX project: The quest to provide security is irreducibly complex. It cannot be reduced to one political approach, a single institutional orientation or dependence on scientific approach. More importantly, research has shown that reliance on security technologies as the default approach to security challenges, is not only not an adequate solution to threats to European society but, in addition, can stand in the way for adequate solution.

The research of INEX suggests that ensuring security in Europe involves an intricate interplay of institutional fields of power, influence, informal relations and the negotiation of conflicting networks of interest and influence. Institutional action in the field of policing and security is not coordinated, and falls along a variety of lines, using a variety of instruments. Legal dimensions of security governance is slightly more coherent, primarily given that there are fewer points of reference and a higher degree of shared legitimacy. Nonetheless, the technological nature of internal and external security poses new challenges, requiring not only new interpretations of conventional legal documents, but also revisions of certain guidelines, such as the Data Retention Directive, currently under revision. The cultures of security professionals are equally under pressure to unified widely diverse traditions, structures of authority and institutional cultures. This pressure has also had consequences for the external policing policies of the EU in an age of rapid security sector reform. Finally, the ambitions of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Mediterranean Policy have been challenged by the rapidly evolving geographical determinations of security, varying not only as a function of objective threats, but also geopolitical, cultural, religious and economic changes.

1. Project Context and objectives

1.1 The internal/external security continuum

The European project is in many regards an attempt to provide institutional responses to processes of globalization. These processes centre in one way or another on the weakening of the sovereignty of the modern nation-state, on the development of trans-national networks and institutions, as well as on the global flow of information, capital and human beings. Thus in a general way one can observe, in a time frame that reaches centuries back, a growing porosity or even blurring of nation-state borders, but also an emergence of non-national institutions and regions, to a certain extent weakening both the role and capacity of traditional sovereignty arrangements. Europe is also generally understood as a project based on a set of shared values. In this sense security shall be understood as a situation in which the well-being of individuals, groups or society is in terms of what it values, be that a certain form of life, language, religion, wealth or power. If the European Union faces new security challenges, these are deeply related to the political, social, cultural and ethical values with which it identifies and with which it differentiates itself from what is outside it. Since the end of the Cold War the threat to Europe's security have significantly transformed from previously being significantly framed in the logic of a bipolar arms race, to being understood as ubiquitous. This environment, it is claimed, lies in the trans-national and asymmetric dimension of danger, and thus, in its unpredictability as compared to the previous period. As a result the need to protect against security threats have turned increasingly *inward*. This logic implies that security agencies traditionally responsible for assuring security from *external* dangers (primarily the military) began to develop means and mechanisms for seeking out threats *inside* Europe, thus overlapping with the traditional dominion of internal security agencies. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, together with those in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, indeed intensified and accelerated this process. Following these events a wide range of new threats were identified often associated with the somewhat ambiguous concept of the 'war against terror'. These threats range from trans-national organised crime and terrorism to illegal migrations, and include various forms of political violence including assumedly new forms of warfare. This gave more space of movement to security agencies and lawmakers, thus allowing new security initiatives to multiply and thrive.

However, while external security authorities increasingly seek to locate threats in the internal security sphere, that is, within the borders of Europe, traditional *internal* authorities such as police and intelligence agencies, border and customs officials, increasingly seek out security threats *beyond* borders, such as for example: transnational organized crime networks, terrorist cells, etc. In this environment, threats become increasingly identified as 'transversal' that is, anchored in immigrant or minority milieus. Thus the spheres of internal crime-fighting and external war-making were henceforth blurred. What is evident from this process is the fact that this wide variety of social, political and technological developments, interlinking with a complex processes of globalisation, has complicated the classical opposition between external security questions (war, defence, international order and strategy), on the one hand, and internal security questions (crime-fighting, public order, criminal investigation and policing) on the other. As a result of this development a *security continuum* linking and imbricating internal and external security concerns has emerged. Moreover, the internal and external security challenges rests on a continuum of distinct but interrelated security practices.

1.2 Managing insecurities

In order to combat these threats the management of insecurities through technology and the development of new technologies of security is increasingly becoming a policy priority for the EU and its Member states. This new emphasis on technological responses to insecurity is justified in governmental arenas through the argument that this drive is rendered necessary by the environment of contemporary threats of the post-bipolar era that was elaborated above in the light of the internal/external security continuum. New technologies of control and surveillance, which rely in particular on evolutions in technologies of information and communication (ICTs), are in this perspective deemed crucial, because they supposedly permit to move beyond reactive measures, developing the capacities of security agencies to anticipate threats and act proactively, minimising the risk for a crisis, catastrophe or serious crime. The EU and its Member states are not the only ones moving in the direction of high technology. To a large extent, the shift towards an increasingly technological management of insecurities is a general movement in liberal regimes. The European specificity, in this respect, lies in the fragmented landscape of both its governmental structures and its security industries. The claim has been made, particularly in the Community sector, that Europe needs a more coherent policy regarding the development and promotion of security technologies. The European arenas have been, in this respect, a major forum for discussions and decision-making. It is in the face of such claims that an ethical reflection on security technologies, their uses, and their impact on fundamental rights and freedoms at the European level is necessary.

Emerging from the contemporary globalized and technological situation is another, more symbolic and thus more politically potent security challenge, namely that of the continuity and coherence of the value-based premises that both support Europe as a distinct identity, and exceed its political borders. Europe's security has historically revolved around the presumption of a distinct set of European *values*. These values, which are imbedded in a wide range of treaties and legal and policy documents, are presumed to be shared by all Europeans, thus forming the foundation of European identity. Thus European *security identity* stems from the political notion that such distinct European values are to be defended. Thus defending Europe is identical to defending these values. However, like values in general, the European values, be they political, legal, social or cultural are by no means restricted to the political borders of Europe. The prevalence of values, their validity and significance varies as a function of political, social and cultural change. Thus this needs to be added as another challenge which traverses the internal/external security continuum.

If, as suggested, the central security challenges of today straddle the internal/external security continuum, it is because the challenges of its values also straddle its sovereign borders. Europe's external borders are not, and never were, simply physical barriers. Yet, important to realize that they are also demarcations between 'ethical zones' where certain regimes of social, political, legal and moral rights are distinctly valid and where others are not. Yet from a pragmatic point of view Europe's borders also represent the limit that differentiates what security *practices* may be implemented, which tools and means of policing and criminology, diplomatic protocol, and military modes of operation, etc. are both legitimate and functional. The borders differentiate institutional interests and aims, and the complex interplay of European, and international political norms and codes of conduct. Moreover, the logic of the border always implies a set of ethical values distinguishing the codes of behaviour of the in-group from the codes of the out-group. From the point of view of individuals, the border separates those who belong from those who do not belong, it protects and shelters, ascribes

privileges and obligations. From the point of view of society, the border takes the individual into a system which controls and monitors him or her. Borders in this sense protect from the threatening others who are outside of the collectively while simultaneously protecting society from the others that are within. If these *ethical* borders of Europe are as argued above clearly not identical to the *physical* borders of Europe, but rather forming a system of value-based principles and practices which both circumscribe the physical borders of Europe, and also give them political, social, and cultural legitimacy. Why then do European security practices struggle at present to adapt the institutionalized logic of physical borders to the evasive and complex ethical borders that reflect the threats of the present time? This *evolution* in the complex set of ideas surrounding internal and external security takes place parallel to a *consolidation* of a European internal and external security identity. In other words, at the moment where the complexity of threat to Europe reaches a high-point, the political principles of inclusion and exclusion, defence against foreign and domestic threats, protection against crime, refuge and shelter, put into question the meaningfulness of differentiating between internal and external security. As European law- and policy-making becomes more distinct in its broad expression of the political principles of internal and external security in Europe, the practices of security in Europe are being put to a test by a security threats that are trans-national.

1.3 Objectives and line of research

The internal/external security continuum reflects an emerging ambiguity of the ‘inside-ness’ and ‘outside-ness’ of *security practices*. Here, both the concepts and definitions, and the actual practices by which Europe traditionally differentiates between itself and the threats which it confronts are less distinct. INEX therefore was set out to advance and tests the assumption that this picture is only partially complete. As a starting point it was suggested that the practices that make up the internal/external security continuum are driven by an implicit logic of ethical values. Also, that these values contribute significantly to structuring the continuum of security practices, and consequentially this have significant implications for how present and future security policy should be formulated and implemented. Past and present security policy in Europe has to a substantial degree ignored the ethical dimension of security practice. It shall be said that by their very nature, ethical values are difficult to track, impractical to test, and ungainly in implementation. This impediment is increased by the fact that, as underscored above, practical solutions to security challenges increasingly take the form of complex technological systems. It could be argued that contemporary approaches to these problems therefore display a common favouring of technological solutions at the expense of human solutions. In the light of this the overall aim of the INEX project, became to contribute to the existing understandings of European security through an innovative analysis of the values based premises and the ethical consequences of the internal/external security continuum. While realizing that the continuum is studied in on-going research, it is important to acknowledge that it contains essential value assumptions and ethical consequences that have remained largely under-studied, with significant consequences for both European policy and law-making in further security practices. The project was therefore established on the foundation to fill this gap by supplementing the current state-of-the art research on the continuum with an ethical and value-oriented analysis. The project hence elaborated with the broad and general question on what is the link between security and ethics on the internal/external continuum?

The research performed in INEX was structured in two main overlapping, though separate *phases*. In the *first phase* the project sought to document, clarify and analyse the ethical value assumptions implicit in internal/external security practices, such as for instance: various forms of border control and surveillance, data and intelligence sharing, crisis management and police mission etc. The different security practices were placed and analysed in four distinct, but interconnected themes or dimensions:

- (1) the proliferation of security technologies for surveillance and border control;
- (2) the cross-border legal dilemmas of security practice;
- (3) changes in the nature of criminology and policing and;
- (4) the transnational value issues implied in EU's common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy.

The *second phase* sought to take the regional situation of the EU as its basis. The aim with this phase was to articulate and analyse these value assumptions relative to the provisional results and future ambitions of the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) by mainly focusing on six representative countries covered by the arrangement. The selected case countries were: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. The research in the project would also include focus, identification and analysis of the ethical consequences of particularly the above mentioned security practices in the internal/external security continuum. The basis for this was supposed to be defined in the first phase together with the documentation of value assumptions and then subject to further refinement, evaluation and expansion in the second phase. Furthermore, the purpose was to use the results from the case studies and the overall research on the identified value assumptions and ethical consequences of security practices to provide informative recommendations for improving security practices and security policies, and increase the general knowledge of contemporary security.

In sum, INEX objectives are to address the identified gaps in the research and knowledge on the ethical dimension of security practice by charting, clarifying and analysing the value-premises of security thinking on the internal/external security continuum, and by making distinct recommendations about how heightened awareness of, and emphasis on, the ethical dimension of security policy on the internal/external continuum improves the effectiveness and efficiency of security measures.

2. Main results

2.1 The evolving threat landscape

In general terms, Europeanization has taken the form of a certain kind of globalisation. The general characteristics of the globalization process are well known. They centre in one way or another on the weakening of the sovereignty of the modern nation-state, on the development of trans-national networks and institutions, and on the global flow of information, capital and human beings.¹ Thus in a general way one can observe, in a time frame that reaches not only to the post-War European construction, but also centuries back, a growing porosity or even blurring of nation-state borders. This large-grain definition of globalization can be plotted far into the past, with origins and forms that precede by far the modern, technology-driven, flow-based conceptions. And yet if we are attentive to the distinct metaphysics of globalisation then its core experience can be related to a general experience of interconnectedness with the foreign and experience of the 'world' as otherness, and of this experience-of-the-world as threat and insecurity.²

Globalization has also brought significant changes to the present threat landscape. There is thus a consensus today, both among scholars and practitioners, that a wide range of security threats, both new and traditional, confront both states, individuals and societies. New forms of nationalism, ethnic conflict and civil war, information technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource conflicts, pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental dangers challenge the conventional means of understanding threats and of assuring the security of all regions of the world. The growing awareness of these new threats is challenging the way in which the principles and tasks of security scholarship are presently understood. No one state can manage the array of threats to its own security, nor can anyone state manage the threats to the security of its neighbours both inside and outside Europe. In the globalised setting the challenge of maintaining security is no longer limited to the traditional foreign-policy and military tools of the European member states.

Already starting from the immediate post-Cold War environment, but then intensifying after 11 September 2001, the phenomenon that has had the most significant consequences for the course of European security thinking is the problem of migration. Not only have patterns of migration flows changed significantly in the last decades, an increasingly globalized awareness of the migration of both European citizens and foreigners, both within and toward Europe has had growing political consequences. Perhaps even more importantly is the impact

¹ Didier Bigo, 'Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease,' *Alternatives* 27(2002); J. Peter Burgess, 'Coal, Steel and Spirit. The Double Reading of European Unity (1948-1951),' in *Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other*, ed. Bo Stråth (Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 2000); J. Peter Burgess and Bo Stråth, 'Money and Political Economy: From the Werner Plan to the Delors Report and Beyond,' in *From the Werner Plan to the Emu: The Economic-Political Embedding of Labour Markets between Europe and the Nation in Historical View*, ed. Bo Stråth and Lars Magnusson (Brussels: P.U.I., 2001); Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford, *Rethinking Europe : Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2005); T. Risse, 'Neofunctionalism, European Identity, and the Puzzles of European Integration,' *Journal of European Public Policy* 12, no. 2 (2005); Ben Tonra, 'Constructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Utility of a Cognitive Approach,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 41, no. 4 (2003).

² Arjun Appadurai, *Globalization* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001); Mohammed A. Bamyeh, *The Ends of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalization : The Human Consequences* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Mike Featherstone, 'Global Culture: An Introduction,' in *Global Culture. Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*, ed. Mike Featherstone (London: SAGE, 1990).

it has on the European sense of self, of cultural values, social conventions, human rights and citizenship. Thus in cultural terms the challenge of migration reaches deep with in social and cultural boundaries and, problematizing their self-understandings, their rules of inclusion and exclusion, the ways of circulating with each other.

The management of insecurities through technology and the development of new technologies of security is increasingly becoming a policy priority for the European Union and its Member states. This new emphasis on technological responses to insecurity is justified in governmental arenas through the argument that this drive is rendered necessary by the environment of new global threats of the post-bipolar era. The novelty of this environment, it is claimed, lies in the trans-national and asymmetric dimension of danger, and thus, in its unpredictability as compared to the previous period. Threatening developments, in this perspective, range from trans-national organised crime to illegal migrations, and include various forms of political violence including assumedly new forms of warfare. New technologies of control and surveillance, which rely in particular on evolutions in technologies of information and communication, are in this perspective deemed crucial, because they supposedly permit to move beyond reactive measures, developing the capacities of security agencies to anticipate threats and act proactively.

The conceptual logic of the border always implies a set of values distinguishing the codes of behaviour of the in-group from the codes of the out-group. From the point of view of individuals, the border separates those who belong from those who do not belong, it protects and shelters, ascribes privileges and obligations. From the point of view of society, the border takes the individual into a system that controls and monitors him or her. Borders in this sense protect from the threatening others who are outside of the collectively while simultaneously protecting society from the others that are within.

In a traditional sense Europe's security has also historically revolved around the presumption of a distinct set of European values. These values, which are imbedded in a wide range of treaties and legal and policy documents, are presumed to be shared by all Europeans, thus forming the foundation of European identity.³ Thus European security identity stems from the political notion that such distinct European values are to be defended, indeed defending Europe is identical to defending these values. However, like values in general, the European values, be they political, legal, social or cultural, are by no means restricted to the political borders of Europe. The prevalence of values, their validity and significance varies as a function of political, social and cultural change. Thus to the security challenges which traverse the internal/external security must added another challenge, that of the continuity and coherence of the value-based premises that both support Europe as a distinct identity, and exceed its political borders.

In this sense, Europe's external borders are not, and never were, simply physical barriers. They are also demarcations between 'value zones' where certain regimes of social, political, legal and moral rights are distinctly valid and where others are not. Yet from a pragmatic point of view Europe's borders also represent the limit that differentiates what security practices may be implemented, which tools and means of policing and criminology, diplomatic protocol, and military modes of operation, etc. are both legitimate and functional. The borders differentiate institutional interests and aims, and the complex interplay of European, and international political norms and codes. These ethical borders of Europe are clearly not identical to the physical borders of Europe. Rather, they form a system of value-based principles and practices that both circumscribe the physical borders of Europe, and also give them political, social, and cultural legitimacy. Why then do European security practices

³ J. Peter Burgess, 'What's so European about the European Union? Legitimacy between Institution and Identity,' *European Journal of Social Theory* 5, no. 4 (2002); J. Peter Burgess, 'Insecurity of the European Community of Values,' *Paper presented at the International Studies Association* (San Diego 2008).

struggle at present to adapt the institutionalized logic of physical borders to the evasive and complex ethical borders that reflect the threats of the present time?

Whereas external security is understood as external security in relation to something beyond the state's borders, something different, *internal* security, by contrast, refers to insecurity of individual citizens and society relative to themselves, relative to other people living within a state's borders. This distinction, however, itself entrenched in international politics, becomes increasingly more difficult to uphold. It has been progressively weakened together with the dichotomy of law (binding judgments and principle of legality) and politics (from diplomacy to war). In this sense the growing acceptance of security as an individual right in European case law seems to be a factor that influences the relationship between internal and external security. For example, the expanding recognition in the European Court of human rights duties to be respected abroad by the European member states operating abroad challenges traditional understanding of state's duties in and outside the territory.⁴

Illegal activities across national and European borders have expanded steadily in the last decades. A wide range of contraband, human trafficking, narcotics and weapons is not only a threat to society itself, but is also linked to global networks involved in financing terrorism or other illegal activities. The international character of such criminality puts it in proximity with forms of political violence, ethnic or sectarian conflicts. Thus in the sphere of criminal violence, the local, national and international levels are become easily overlapping or mixed. These significant changes in the landscape of crime, all of them to a greater or lesser degree, caused by changes in the European security landscape, have distinct consequences for law enforcement on the nation-state level. National law enforcement agencies are forced to make a transition from policing on a national level to policing in an entirely different European theatre of not only norms and laws, but of cultures of criminality. The means and legitimacy of police activities has been dispersed internally and externally.⁵ And had become the subject of 'multilateralisation' or 'pluralisation', and of privatisation and 'nodal' security orientations.⁶ The forms of authority and democratic control have thus been put under pressure by a new era of policing tasks as well as by encroaching mutation in the nature of police work. The tasks and responsibility of maintaining civil law and order can no longer be successfully carried out based in or by reference to a local level. In the last decades Europe has undergone a number of significant transformations in the use of technology with the aim of managing insecurity. These transformations are to be understood in the context of the growing de-differentiation between previously distinct activities: fighting wars abroad, controlling populations at home, and managing the border between these two spheres. The European Union stands as a clear illustration of these evolutions. The military is involved in activities within the territory of the Member states, but also abroad in missions of international police. Police agencies have invested the European arenas, and policemen are sent abroad to conduct crime-fighting and liaison activities. Border-guard services no longer operate at the borders between the Member states of the EU, but in other spaces inside the

⁴ Louise Amoore, 'Biometrics Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror,' *Political Geography*, no. 25 (2006); Amoore, 'Biometrics Borders: Governing Mobilities in the War on Terror.'; Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny, *The Idea of Global Civil Society : Politics and Ethics in a Globalizing Era* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2005); Germain and Kenny, *The Idea of Global Civil Society : Politics and Ethics in a Globalizing Era*; J. P. Olsen, 'Survey Article: Unity, Diversity and Democratic Institutions: Lessons from the European Union,' *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 4 (2004).

⁵ Neil Walker, *Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order* (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000).

⁶ Adam Crawford et al., *Plural Policing. The Mixed Economy of Visible Patrols in England and Wales* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005); Les Johnston and Clifford D. Shearing, 'Justice in the Risk Society,' *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 38, no. 1 (2005).

national territory (e.g. in airports or train stations), at the borders with non-EU members and beyond.

Particularly noteworthy are the ethical consequences of three kinds of challenges to policing security in Europe: ongoing and emerging informal networks of police professionals, new modes of inter-governmental cooperation, and emergent supranational institutions. All three types of development in policy involve cooperative arrangements and exchanges of both information and service traditionally anchored in locally based institution organized and supported by value systems proper to one environment. The norms and codes of transform of information and services also traverse value-borders characterized codes, norms and practices that map poorly or not at all to corresponding categories in other national environments or on different levels in the global policy systems.⁷ Facilitating this transition has been a primary task of the Justice and Home Affairs unit of the European Council.⁸

The 2003 European security strategy A Secure Europe in a Better World, opens by framing the new 'global challenge' facing Europe as one where 'increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked'. The 'key threats' to Europe mapped out in the document are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime. The strategy underscores the fact the none of the new threats to Europe are entirely military, nor can be addressed with entirely military means. It asserts that a number of non-military instruments (political and economic pressures, humanitarian efforts) must be taken into use in order to address them. These will, the document affirms, rely on a mixture of 'intelligence, police, judicial, military, and other means'.⁹

The value-laden nature of security and insecurity has contributed to a fragmented understanding of both perceived European security threats and European approaches to these perceived challenges. The adaptation of European institutions to this new reality has been difficult, thwarted by the wide variations in cultures of law enforcement, border control, intelligence and diplomacy and, not least, new cultures of fear and prudence. This shift to a new security environment has at the same time brought a shift in the areas of focus of security thinking in Europe and, accordingly, a re-tooling of the roles of security institutions, the scope of their responsibilities, the European partners they work with, the international rights regimes they answer to and the source and the nature of the threats they are confronting.¹⁰ This new security continuum of internal and external security has created a novel situation whereby concepts and institutional arrangements traditionally aimed at internal security challenges (police, national and local information and administrative authorities, social agencies, etc.)

⁷ James Sheptycki, 'Policing, Postmodernism and Transnationalization,' *British Journal of Criminology* 38, no. 3 (1998); James Sheptycki, 'Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: National and International Dimensions of Crime Control.,' *Social & Legal Studies* 13, no. 4 (2004).

⁸ Council of the European Union, 'Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism,' (2002); Council of the European Union, 'Jha Council Declaration on the Eu Response to the London Bombings,' (UK Presidency of the EU 2005, 2005).

⁹ Sven Biscop, 'The European Security Strategy and the Neighbourhood Policy: A New Starting Point for a Euro-Mediterranean Security Partnership?' (paper presented at the Conference convened by ECFA and RIIR which analysed the three dimensions of the Barcelona Process : political, economic and cultural, Cairo, 8 May 2005); Council of the European Union, 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy,' (Brussels: European Council, 2003).

¹⁰ Didier Bigo, 'When Two Become One. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe,' in *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community* (London: Routledge, 2000); Monica den Boer and Joerg Monar, '11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism to the Eu as a Security Actor,' *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2002); H. Grabbe, 'The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards,' *International Affairs* 76, no. 3 (2000); S. Haack, 'Constitutional Concepts within the Process of European Integration,' *Futures* 38, no. 2 (2006).

become increasingly challenged to address matters traditionally reserved for the external security professionals (military and international police forces, foreign affairs officials, international legal agencies, diplomatic corps etc.) while the latter are increasingly required to deal with matters reserved for the former.

The primary aim of the INEX project has been to systematically address the value premises and consequences of this new landscape of security and insecurity, and in particular the institutional challenges that grow out of them. The project was structured in such a way as to approach four particular thematic dimensions of this landscape, each with its dedicated methodology: political sociology of technology, international and European legal studies, criminology, and political science.

2.2 The role of security technologies

The primary objective of Workpackage 1 on the value dimensions of security technologies was to provide a detailed assessment of the ethical and political stakes of security technologies and their use, with a specific focus on EU border management. Research carried out in the workpackage sought to develop ways of promoting a 'data-protection culture' among security technologies stakeholders in the EU, in particular, examining how to include privacy requirements within the practices and products of the technology providers.

Research on the ethical premises of security technologies was carried out in three areas. First, it explored current technologies of security in use in the context of EU border management, including in the context of the EU's research and development policies. Second, it considered the human/ethical consequences of pro-activity, mainly in the broader context of practices of pro-activity, profiling and prevention in the contemporary management of insecurity. Finally, it reviewed the ethical issues relative to technological social control and surveillance across national borders, including an analysis of the current dominant standpoint on the relationship between freedom and security among EU policy-makers, security professionals and security industrialists, and of the ethical stakes emerging from this standpoint, particularly when this view is correlated with the growing use of security technologies.

The workpackage focused on the policy processes surrounding the development of the Schengen Information System II. It examined the decision-making practices that have shaped the evolution of the Schengen Information System II from 2001 to the present day, linking the policy processes and governance frameworks on SIS II to the technical, political and ethical difficulties facing this new EU large-scale database. Significant results of the study include the collection of empirical data, including a mapping of the current (formal and informal) governance framework on SIS II, which fills a gap in current knowledge on the dynamics of decision-making on EU security technologies. By charting the evolution of a large scale EU database from conception through to technical development, it enhances understanding of the link between policy processes and the final technologies which result, as well as how policy processes can undermine or challenge EU rule of law. The research provides a set of policy relevant findings that can contribute to more effective, efficient and proportionate policymaking at European level, particularly regarding the development of large scale IT systems.

In research on the transformation of gendered security values as a result of the evolution of security technologies the workpackage further examined the ethical implications and consequences of security technologies from a gendered perspective, highlighting the technologies identified by the workpackage. It specifically addresses a suggested scheme of a subjective understanding of these security technologies from a human security perspective with emphasis on gender. It aims to include the gender perspective deriving from international

relations into a contemporary analysis of European security technologies. It also touched upon the issue of irregular migration and through a gendered lens.

The research explored the idea informing a number of sociological analyses of European construction processes that one needs to question the legally defined boundaries between institutions, pillars and policies to focus, rather, on the chains of associations between agents and the practices sustaining these associations. It also sought to confront the challenges arising from the analysis of the European (in)security landscape and the internal/external security continuum as a particularly dynamic and labile regime of practices. In sociological terms, it considered the different methods available to understand the expansion of the chains of association related to (in)security in the EU, their mediation through computerised interfaces for the collect, exchange and analysis of information, and the growing involvement of private sector professionals in this configuration. It further explored, in this respect, techniques of visualisation that would allow for a more accurate account of INEX research efforts.

The research of the workpackage accentuated the contemporary orientation of existing and developing security practices and technologies, which are strongly leaning towards the ‘monitoring of the future’, *i.e.* the privileging of pro-activity, prevention and profiling stance in the management of insecurity, to the detriment of the practices of criminal investigation and criminal justice, including the presumption of innocence or the right to a private life. The ‘monitoring of the future’, accordingly, has been singled out as a key focus for research in the next two years.

It also focused on a critical assessment of the notion of the ‘security continuum’ which lies at the core of the INEX project. Research has shown, however, that one needs to distinguish between the semantic continuum of (in)securities and the discursive operations that are taking place around contemporary conceptions of security, the practical continuum of coercion and surveillance practices, and the technological continuum induced by the use of dual or multi-purpose technological systems.

The analytical framework of this research provided elements for identifying more precisely the ethical premise and consequences of security technologies in the context of EU border control and surveillance practices. The dominant standpoint which currently informs EU security policies is that security, understood as protection of EU citizens from threats, is a right, and that security of EU citizens depends on the capacity of security agencies and services to systematically anticipate potential perils. This standpoint is problematic in many respects, most significantly because it fosters the idea that freedom and security are equivalent values. Against this vision, the analytical framework developed by the workpackage argues that freedom and security are not ethically equivalent, and that reflection on the modalities to protect and enhance fundamental freedoms and rights should constitute the imperative background for contemporary security policies, including for the development of new technological systems.

With regard to the ‘monitoring the future’ dimension, the idea that current security practices, supported by the reliance on technology, undermine practices of criminal investigation and criminal justice, has been further refined, by showing how this process was concretely taking place. Research provided an in-depth analysis of the various facets of the reliance on technology, and on the interplay between various technical modalities for the control and surveillance of EU borders. It also concluded that although security practices have always included a degree of anticipation, a difference should be drawn between anticipation as a means to enhance and accelerate reaction to specific events, and anticipation as pro-activity, as a means to *prevent* certain developments from taking place. The shift towards the ‘monitoring the future’ embodies, in this respect, a changing relation to temporality in security practices – a shift from possibility to probability, which orientates security practices

towards prediction. The work carried out in the workpackage placed emphasis on the fact that contemporary border control and surveillance practices in the EU are underpinned by a twofold process of generalisation and individualisation of scrutiny for travellers. Individualisation, in this context, does not so much imply the in-depth analysis of a given individual's travels and relations, than the reduction of a given profile to one single unit. In this respect, then, the reliance on technology entails a generalisation of surveillance and the diffusion of the principle that all travellers are, by default, suspect – with the consequence that the relations between EU citizens and non-citizens is re-qualified, as a difference less grounded in an essential distinction than in the degree of applicability of surveillance practices.

The 'cataloguing' of security technologies and analysis thereof showed that the notion of a technological continuum, while semantically enforced by the private sector in particular, was far from being applicable in practice. The convergence between military and police technical systems, in this regard, is undermined by the turf battles opposing the various groups of (in)security professionals for symbolic and material rewards. Research highlighted how convergence was organising around the reliance on computerised interfaces for data exchanges and (close to) real-time situation awareness – and the tendency of struggles between various groups of (in)security professionals to coalesce around control and access to these interfaces. Research pointed out that a dimension of this convergence is the shared notion that new technical and technologies should include 'function creep by design' – *i.e.* that the possibility for systems to evolve beyond their original purpose should be planned from the start, with the implications that this might carry for fundamental freedoms.

With regard to the ethical and political implications of the reliance on technology for the purpose of managing (in)security: a key conclusion concerns what was termed as the 'heterotopic' dimension of European border control and surveillance practices. This heterotopic character is shown by the seemingly contradictory assumptions upon which they rest – and which they share. The first one is the imperative of mobility: even in the case of systems of border detection, interception and interdiction, one does not find the notion that mobilities can, or should, be stopped. The second, however, is that all movements are potentially suspicious. Technology, in this respect, is called in for the purpose of sorting, among individuals and groups but also goods and vehicles, those that can be considered *bona fide* and those that are to be considered as *mala fide*.

Following on this idea the research further refined the *bona fide/mala fide* distinction by highlighting how the reliance on technical systems, by allowing both a generalisation and an individualisation of controls, is making the distinction between EU and non-EU citizens, if not irrelevant, at least more fluid and heterogeneous: the categories of EU citizens and non-citizens are re-engineered through the categories of trusted/distrusted, wanted/unwanted, known/unknown travellers. Such techniques do not however obliterate the arbitrariness of the control, and regardless of citizenship, continues to operate and channel the distinction between the suspicious and the trusted. The 'advantage', in the broader political economy of movement is that the 'trusted' travellers will have the impression of a lighter form of control, without the need to stop nor to wait. The 'distrusted' and the 'unwanted', on the other hand, categorized as potentially dangerous (be it because of the suspicion of terrorism, organized crime or maybe simply because they are suspected of potentially overstaying their visa) will be traced, and possibly face pre-emptive detention, 'randomized' supplementary checks and other measures on the basis of a risk profile and through actuarial statistics. In sum: the surveillance operates on all, but will become control only for a few, leaving the majority with a sense of increased comfort - although under surveillance - in their travels.

The research team enhanced the policy relevance of their work by issuing a number of policy recommendations regarding policy-making on large IT systems in EU security policies. In this

regard, the research shows clearly how policy-making has been evidence-based rather than incident-based, and has highlighted how, despite the treaty of Amsterdam and the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the original ‘Schengen spirit’ was still prevailing in the context of the AFSJ – with the consequence of limiting the room for manoeuvre of the European Commission, the role of the European Parliament despite its new standing as co-legislator in these policy areas, and of marginalising data protection and fundamental rights authorities as well as civil society organisations. This methodological reflection unfolded in two steps. Firstly, researchers examined the available methodological options for the sociological analysis of transnational processes, with a focus on sociological investigations of European construction processes. The exploration led to an emphasis on the interest of combining the field analyse perspective that had been used in political sociology to analyse the European internal/external security continuum with an actor-network theory (ANT). Proceeding through the mapping of controversies among ‘actants’, ANT appeared as an interesting method for extending the chains of association underpinning the European (in)security landscape to mediators such as large data-systems, as well as to agents from the private sector. Furthermore, the emphasis placed on controversy mapping entails that ANT-inspired research has early on investigated the possibilities for visualisation of results offered by digital technologies.

Applying a quali-quantitative approach to the study of the European (in)security landscape and the internal/external security continuum proved to be more than a technical exercise, which is a significant outcome. Two strong conclusions emerge more specifically. The timeline representation highlights, firstly, that European border control and surveillance practices are characterised by a strong tension between two logics: the first one emphasises the border in its traditional legal understanding, territory and control, while the second is articulated around computerisation and surveillance. This tension is related to some key moments where proponents of each logic are obliged to agree on a label – in this case, integrated border management (IBM). The terminology of ‘integration’ veils the profound contradictions emerging from the practices of the different agents. In this respect, if one looks at the evolution of references to internal and external security with regard to ‘border security’, one can see how border control has been reframed as a form of surveillance and how technology has been put forward to the detriment of the professional qualifications of the persons in charge. The second conclusion is that the internal/external security continuum is best understood as a process of entanglement, rather than one of fusion, merging or de-differentiation. One trend that is worth highlighting in this regard is the apparent autonomisation of ‘border security’ as a critical point demarcating the different groups of EU security professionals. This process should be studied in a more detailed fashion, particularly with regard to upcoming policy developments on DG Home’s upcoming ‘smart borders’ initiative and the drafting of a European border security strategy paralleling the (external) security strategy and the internal security strategy. In a similar fashion, the methodological efforts undertaken by INEX researchers during the last leg of the project should be taken up, in one way or another, for they appear relevant both for the scientific objective of an innovative investigation of European construction processes and for the policy objective of mainstreaming the practice of evidence- and knowledge-based policy-making in the field of European security policies.

The reinforcement of the methodological framework is in itself a significant scientific result. The idea that methodology is a preliminary step in a research scheme, not to be modified once this scheme is enacted, is to some extent misleading. It is only through actual investigations that the limitations of a specific method can be identified and its assumptions redeployed and refined. For scholars in the natural and mathematical sciences, this is a commonplace notion, but its reach remains limited in the social sciences that manifest an attachment to a somewhat

dated understanding of scientific processes. As such, it should come as no surprise that the last research efforts in the INEX project have returned to questions of method, a move that should be considered as the sign of a sound scientific process.

2.3 Changing and unchanging legal frameworks

The overall aim of Workpackage 2 was to identify and analyse the ethical value assumptions implicit in the transnational legal dilemmas of European security practice. Such analysis was intended as a basis for generating policy recommendations capable of addressing possible alternatives. The workpackage undertook the review of the main existing perspectives on the law-security nexus, the notion of security as present in European law, and the relation between European security policies and the European legal framework.

Contemporary security technologies being deployed in the area of internal/external security are regularly based on the processing of personal data, and for these technologies to be developed and implemented certain legal requirements must be met, which are particularly problematic in the context of cross-border legal transfers. In this perspective, the right to respect for private life and data protection law appear both as obstacles and as enablers of the international deployment of security technologies and correlated security practices. Core research was carried out on the most significant current and future legal challenges for the internal/external security continuum as a starting point and analyses the values they reflect, as well as their impact on such a continuum. The research required, among other things, sustained follow-up of related developments in the field of EU policy and law-making and served as a basis for further work in the workpackage.

The main result of research carried out on the state of the review of current scholarship on the law-security nexus in Europe is that, although the security-law nexus is not marked in Europe by any structural opposition, there are a series of frictions between certain EU security initiatives and the protection of individual rights. Furthermore, there exists a general consensus on the idea that security measures can in practice impinge on human rights and civil liberties. Thus, research identified a series of paths requiring further consideration in the analysis of value assumptions linked to the cross-border legal dilemmas relevant to current and anticipated challenges to European security – the identification and contextualisation of which is the most significant result of the work undertaken.

Research highlighted the fact that data processing is a core element of European security practice, and covers six main thematic areas (i.e., the upcoming European information model, the future information systems architecture, the control and surveillance of borders, financial monitoring, communications surveillance, EU data protection and international data protection instruments). It emphasizes the need to take into consideration recent European case-law on the impact on fundamental rights of security-related data processing and critically pointed out at a series of problematic questions, such as: the exact place of fundamental rights in the priorities established for the ASFJ; the trend towards the deployment of ‘pro-active’, forward looking approaches to security-related issues; the lacunae of the EU legal framework for data protection and, especially, the obstacles to effective personal data protection in relation with digital borders and security-related international data transfers.

Important findings were made on the identification of the legal dilemmas relevant to the EU internal/security continuum and related value dimensions, focusing on the examination of concrete legal challenges related to the Stockholm Programme. Starting with the analysis of legal issues and ethical aspects as derived from preparatory texts, progressively incorporated the review of pertinent policy documents. Special attention was given to a series of issues related to the trend towards the reinforcement of data processing practices envisaged not only in said programme (as one of the chief elements of the new EU internal security strategy), but also through parallel measures. This reinforcement can take different forms, ranging from the

increased storage of data (in particular through the creation of new information systems) to the increased gathering of data (for instance, via the strengthening of border surveillance systems), including the increased sharing and making available of data, both at intra-EU level and with third countries, as well as qualitative changes in the way data are processed, significantly through the use of techniques such as profiling.

The research made a contribution toward the identification of the legal dilemmas relevant to the EU internal/security continuum and related value dimensions. Concrete legal challenges related to the Stockholm Programme have been explored and discussed with detail, in particular through the perspective of relevant European case law (both from the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights). The legal challenges examined concern a series of issues related to the trend towards the reinforcement of data processing practices for security purposes envisaged not only in the Stockholm Programme (as one of the chief elements of the new EU internal security strategy), but also through parallel EU-level measures. The main features of this reinforcement of data processing for security purposes were described. These can take multiple forms, ranging from the increased storage of data (in particular through the creation of new information systems) to the increased gathering of data (for instance, via the strengthening of border surveillance systems), and including the increased sharing and making available of data, both at intra-EU level and with third countries, as well as qualitative changes in the way data are processed, significantly through the use of techniques such as profiling.

The articulation between EU security and mobility, borders and fundamental rights and freedoms was studied in detail. The exploration has been marked by the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the adoption of the Stockholm Programme, but also by case-law developments in relation to data processing and the insurance of fundamental rights. Research developed through continuous interchange with decision-makers, civil society and academia, for the benefit of all parties involved. The regular dialogue with both decision-makers and civil society has guaranteed the policy relevance of the final results.

Particular attention was given to the implications of governance decisions of large-scale databases for fundamental rights and freedoms. Supplementary research summarised a series of key ideas in the light of the major cross-border legal dilemmas of the EU security as identified, providing policy-relevant orientation. Among the issues discussed, can be highlighted: the need to carefully conceptualise and locate the relative importance of fundamental rights and legal principles affected by the development of EU security practices, and notably the right to privacy and the protection of personal data but also other rights and legal principles, such the principle of non-discrimination; the multiplicity of legal implications of allowing the storage or the widening of access to personal data; the particularly vulnerable position of third-country nationals in the face of EU security and mobility measures; the risks of the evolving notion of 'crime prevention'; the problematisation of the notion of '*privacy-by-design*', and the major challenges of the review of the EU data protection legal framework.

2.4 The new security professionals

The primary objective of Workpackage 3 was to document and analyse the value assumptions and ethical challenges involved in the rapidly changing role of security professionals in Europe and to produce political recommendations to address them. During the first reporting period, workpackage researchers undertook work focusing on ethics research and knowledge among security professionals, specifically within public security organisations.

Many factors and variables are at stake in the consideration of ethical issues in policing, including police culture(s), leadership, training and education, social context, technological

influences, police styles and ethical codes. This complexity has several implications for empirical research into the ethical values of policing. First of all, it is necessary to identify and operationalise the variables that are at stake and to analyse their role in specific contexts – for example, the ethical values that apply in local community projects may be considerably different from those that are applied in the context of a joint international investigation team on organised crime. Different contexts raise considerably different issues and questions concerning ethical policing, and they may produce different dilemmas and contradictory ethical claims.

Preliminary research in the project made clear that there was and continues to be need for empirical longitudinal research on compliance with ethical standards in law enforcement organisations that can only be properly investigated when measured over a longer period of time in stable professional environments. An academic void was identified concerning ethics research in emergent hybrid and transnational law enforcement practices. There is need to expand the scope of ethics research to new law enforcement arenas, including international intelligence-led policing, cross-border policing, peace missions, and police reform projects

Although security reform (SSR) is expressed as a way for the EU to engage in external action in a comprehensive manner, it is not feasible to apply these concepts ‘holistically’ in practice as it is implied conceptually. While institutionally SSR may have helped streamline instruments used for security, conceptually it seems to have been drowned by other larger and more encompassing terms, such as ‘democracy support’, ‘democratic governance’ and ‘peacebuilding’. Essentially, the model seems to be ‘think holistically, act fragmentally’, which also puts into question the notion of effectiveness both as a value and as a strategy for action. Both in the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, it seems that the limits of the respective institution’s competency do not necessarily define its value system. Both institutions are constantly trying to expand their competency. In the Council Secretariat, which is a more political institution, personalities/ individuals seem to affect values and negotiate competence.

Values also vary across EU institutions. The discourse on EU security among EU officials is one of recognition of the blurring of EU internal and external security. Within the EU Council Secretariat there is a resolute acceptance of this fact and even a persistent effort to justify the need for such a blurring and the innocuousness of its nature. Thus, the political nature of the Council Secretariat, which is well known, persists but is reduced by the fact that the Secretariat with its expansion with the creation of new Units has turned the Secretariat into a more bureaucratic institution. Nonetheless, the presence of a large number of seconded personnel translates into a vast unawareness of the given EU code of ethics. Rather, police officers seconded in the Secretariat act according to professional ethics accepted at international level for the police corps and do not know the contents of the code of ethics of the EU. Similarly, EU Member State seconded diplomats do not know or follow the EU code of conducts and are more open to using their personal ethical code in differentiating between right or wrong during decision making.

The European Commission is a more bureaucratic institution, consists of more permanent personnel, who are tested on the code of ethics during the entry exam. They are much more aware of the values they ‘must’ follow and are less open to questioning them. Having said that, the SSR field is particular in that it is an area where the Commission is increasingly acting in a more strategic and political manner. This may be due to the fact that the officials working on SSR have a security background (either they are police officers or are administrators who have worked on ‘hard security’ issues in DG RELEX). It is worth remembering here that the SSR concept emerged from the development community. The securitisation of SSR in the European Commission was also generated by the inter-institutional turf wars with the Council Secretariat and the momentum and uncertainty that the

ratification and put into action of the Treaty of Lisbon created. Particularly the value of legality seems to be interpreted more flexibly by higher echelons in the EC (not that they would initiate or engage in illegal activities, but they would interpret the situation in a more elastic manner to accommodate certain interests and handle complex problems).

Values also vary across hierarchical levels. EU Officials at higher echelons seem to be able to interpret the code of conduct of their organisation in a more flexible manner (some are politically appointed and thus are indirectly not bound by this code and/or are not aware of the contents of the code). In addition, those in higher positions enjoy more freedom to use their personal ethical code and flexibility to act then act strategically and according to a set of interests. Those in lower positions who answer to a supervisor do not usually question the code of ethics or have the opportunity to reflect on value premises.

The research results from the post-doc researcher focusing on the two specific case-studies (see above) have revealed that the answers from interviews conducted so far highlight significant cultural differences, depending on the country of origin/service of interviewees. Since interviewees ticked almost the same ethical values in the questions on the codified and non-codified values, it is possible to affirm that self-perception of professional ethics results fundamental, reminding of the famous Daryl Bem's 'Self-Perception Theory'. In this context, self-reflection on ethical values (i.e. the type of ethics we refer to in this study) is therefore more significant than normative ethics (as included in codes).

Officers generally showed a strong focus on accountability (to the leadership) and transparency (to the public), being under more pressure on both fronts. This also entails an increasing role of political and organization leaderships in regulating their service. The role of professional ethics is perceived as fundamental by almost all the interviewees, although they recognise the existence of a considerable shift in the ethical values characterising their job. Such a shift is mostly due to budget constraints, interagency cooperation and the attention of the media. Answers underlined a possible conflict between professional ethics and/or personal moral beliefs and the activities carried out by the respective organizations. According to most of interviewees, ethical dilemmas should be solved having in mind the 'common good' also through internal debates within their organization. This clearly implies a widespread confidence in 'the system' (i.e. the organization they belong to and the society they live in).

With regard to the perceived objectives of selected security policies, security and order result among the most ticked answers. This could entail a perceived strong ethical role by 'security professionals' (attempting to restore good/fair order against evil/disorder). Unsurprisingly, interviewees considered spreading anger/fear as the main goal of 'opponents' (extremists and irregular/illegal migrants). On the other hand, the latter are deemed rather vulnerable subjects but their reaction ends up jeopardizing 'the system' (namely the social order), which has in turn to be protected. Although differently, extremists and irregular/illegal migrants are thus both perceived as a threat.

Research also revealed a general confidence in technology/modernization and sometimes in the support of the EU through dedicated agencies (EUROPOL and Frontex), although the European Union is mostly perceived a means to spread common practices and standards, rather than an 'ethical actor' as such. Concerning the case study on terrorism & radicalization, most of interviewees stated that they are both rising in their country, although responses highlighted differences between the Netherlands and the UK: reportedly, while in the latter country extremism would be mainly due to socio-cultural differences – as amplified by outer events (such as, for instance, the British involvement in military campaigns in Islamic countries), in the Netherlands it should be considered as an endogenous process with a few links with external realities.

Anti terrorism/radicalization measures and the interception of migrants on the high seas are both mainly perceived as exceptional practices, aimed at providing order and security,

although most respondents do not consider the measures in question as examples of ‘normalization’ of exceptional security policies. Respondents tend to admit, however, that political interests and media have played a role in their adoption. This may indicate that ‘security professionals’ deem ethical dilemmas as inherently transitional, as transitional by definition are the threats faced and the measures adopted to tackle them. Once again, this would also imply, on the one hand, a perceived strong ethical role and, on the other hand - in parallel - a practical sense of reality, when they admit to be aware of the self-generating ‘spiral of fear’: media/people/politicians/security professionals. In this chain they figure as the last link. Ultimately, officers are motivated by the adoption of these measures. This could mean that facing new challenges and dilemmas (good vs. evil) is generally seen as professionally rewarding and stimulating.

Research revealed that EU officials at the higher echelons seem to be able to interpret the code of conduct of their organisation (the Commission or the Council General Secretariat) in a more flexible manner than EU officials working in lower positions who have a limited opportunity to reflect on value premises, partly due to the workload and partly due to the specificity of their tasks. Moreover, while the discourse on EU security among EU officials recognises the existence of the blurring of internal and external security interests and concerns, EU Member State seconded diplomats are more open to using their personal moral code in differentiating between right or wrong during decision-making. In addition, the value of legality seems to be interpreted more flexibly by higher echelons in the EC: this does not imply that they would initiate or engage in illegal activities, but rather they would interpret a given situation in a more elastic manner to accommodate certain interests (of their unit/organisation, not personal) when tackling complex obstacles (especially of an inter-institutional nature).

Research suggested that EU officials – and particularly EULEX personnel, since the deployed CSDP mission is the lead organisation in rule of law reforms in Kosovo – are faced with value dilemmas as a consequence of the complex political situation. The absence of a strategy undermines the credibility of RoL efforts and creates confusion on the ground – including at the level of values – and constitutes an ethical paradox *per se*. This situation is further compounded by the fact that the EU does not have real leverage on Kosovo’s political leaders. The uncertainty about the mission has created ethical ramifications and negatively impacts on EULEX effectiveness, external accountability towards local stakeholders (issues of trust), efficiency and to a certain degree impartiality (it is difficult to remain impassive and dispassionate in such a charged conflict environment). The entanglement of ‘internationals’ in webs of corruption further undermines credibility and tarnished role-modelling.

Research also focused on shifts in ethical values and ethical dilemmas in EU Member States new security practices. The research bifurcated into two case studies, namely the implementation of anti-terrorism/radicalisation measures in the Netherlands and the UK and the recent interception of migrants in the central Mediterranean Sea undertaken by the Italian authorities. Research showed that security professionals tend to rely on ‘descriptive ethics’, leaving apart codified sets of values and principles. Non-normative professional ethics is judged very useful in the work of security professionals. Their ethical self-reflection stands at the crossroads of two distinct levels, namely the internal and external dimensions of both officers (considered in either their personal or professional capacity) and organisations.

The latter’s activities have expanded both externally, i.e. in direction of other organisations and countries, and internally, i.e. through reforms aimed at favouring a progressive centralisation of functions as well as an increase in the general organisational effectiveness. An increasing shift was observed in the ethical values of reference for security professionals. Principles such as integrity and honesty, accountability, transparency, expertise and reliability are held by security professionals among the most significant in their job. This value shift is

mostly due to external reasons, i.e. the potential consequences that misconduct may have on the work of security officials, amplified in political and media discourse. To the extent that the role of ethical leadership is involved, security officers tend to play down their responsibility and refer to that of their organisation. This situation matches with the results of the above mentioned research on the EU SSR Policy and Value Dilemmas. Security professionals believe that their job has strong ethical and moral connotations, as they see it as a means to fight evil/disorder so as to achieve good/a fair order. Their self-reflection is therefore not the result of an objective analysis on the needs of society and the most effective long-term responses to address them, in light of consolidated ethical principles, but rather the consequence of irrational thinking.

In light of this, security professionals admit that threats such as violent extremism or uncontrolled migration flows have been amplified by the media and manufactured for the sake of national political elites. However, they also tend to believe in the existence of such threats; they believe in the exceptionality of the policies they are mandated to implement and consider them as ethically acceptable. Here, security professionals act according to a 'preventive logic'. In this framework, technology may then offer useful tools to settle moral and ethical dilemmas arising out from the adoption of precautionary tactics and methods against *external* threats. Extremists, terrorists and uncontrolled flows of migrants are considered as external threats to the internal social order, under a clear *us vs. them* rationale.

The ethical role of the EU and its agencies in dealing with controversial security practices is undisputed. Security professionals recognise the Union and its agencies as international actors which can more or less successfully combine ethical values such as humanity, social justice, impartiality and transparency, with efficiency, expertise and integrity, in the implementation of the practices in question.

2.5 Reconfiguring foreign policy values

The main objective of Workpackage 4 was to assess the retooling of political and social values inherent in the important institutional changes brought on by the shifting security environment in Europe. Its main focus is on the CFSP/ESDP aspects of the European 'security continuum', tying together the internal and external aspects of the Union's security policies and practices. In keeping with this stated objective, the researchers undertook during the first reporting period a review of existing literature on the shifting nature of the EU's external border and the implications of this for European security institutions.

The work carried out by the workpackage was innovative in that it sought to explore a link that is currently being established, of analysing practices and competencies while they are being developed (cf. below). In order to identify the relevant literature and correct framing of the state-of-the-art review, researchers from WP4 found it necessary to do some preliminary research to identify those practices that would be of interest for the report. For example, Annex I stresses the need to study the links between CFSP/ESDP actors and the First pillar Frontex agency in charge of border surveillance. However, the first memorandum of understanding between these actors was only signed during spring 2009.

Research has revealed the importance of specifying that the analysis of CFSP/ESDP in the context of the EU 'security continuum' cannot ignore recent developments such as, the incorporation of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) into the EU's external security and policy frameworks and the recent trend of CFSP/ESDP instruments taking into account internal aspects of European security. The focus on CFSP/ESDP entices observers to take into consideration the full spectrum of EU external security activities, including the external dimension of the European 'Area of Freedom, Security and Justice' (AFSJ) – if only because

the coexistence of different legal and policy frameworks in this domain raises significant ethical questions regarding both matters of accountability and matters of ethical coherence.

This enlarged focus is all the more important as the major part of the existing literature on the EU's external security activities seems to have missed the importance of current transformations in this domain. The linking between internal and external security represents a challenge as EU studies have traditionally espoused the contours of the formal division between policy domains established by the treaties and the Union's institutional framework. A preliminary review of the literature seems to confirm the fact that most the research does not succeed escaping from reproducing and legitimising EU institutions despite even sometimes self-proclaimed critical labels. On the one hand, one finds studies that, built on notions derived from the field of international relations and foreign policy analysis, have privileged the narrowly-defined analysis of CFSP/ESDP. On the other hand are studies which have concentrated on JHA matters, with an initial focus on questions of police cooperation. The relationship between the EU's external activities and its allegedly 'internal' security policies has generally been dealt with, in this respect, as an 'intersection' between different policy domains, and analysed as a 'policy space' or a 'policy universe'.

Beyond an intersection taking place in a specific policy space/universe, researchers were actually confronted with an in-depth transformation of the EU's security apparatus, both internally and externally, a transformation that challenges the traditional boundaries between various strands of professional activities (border guard, military, police), various policy domains (foreign policy, justice and home affairs, military affairs), and European integration process actors (states and supranational). While this should not lead to the uncritical embracing of the notion of the development of a 'security continuum', these specifications nonetheless point to the need for a more nuanced analysis of the EU's external security activities, which should not be determined by the formal distinction between 'pillars' or 'policy domains', but by the study of the actual practices that underpin these activities.

Research indicated a substantial transformation challenging the traditional boundaries between various strands of professional activities (border guard, military, police), various policy domains (foreign policy, justice and home affairs, military affairs), and European integration process actors (states and supranational), the second year deliberately focused the analysis on the actual practices of EU missions and security agencies that underpin the actual external activities carried out by the European Union, before turning to the internal/external characteristics of EU's common foreign and security policy. The research also reflected on the rapidly changing environment in EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty.

The analysis of the value premises and human, ethical consequences of the CFSP/EDSP in the changing environment of border security resulted in a charting of the value premises underlying CFSP/CSDP and their ethical consequences in the implementation of individual CSDP missions and operations. The analysis was carried out in light of the linkages between CSDP and the EU's broader foreign policy goals. The analysis gave particular attention to the EU's Eastern borderlands where questions over the internal-external security continuum and overlapping policies are particularly relevant. It revealed that value assumptions underlying the EU's foreign policy and its crisis management instruments can result in contradictory practices. The reason for this is not because these practices clash but instead often because these policies are conceptualized and implemented separately with little considerations left for whether or not these policies result in a comprehensive approach towards a particular country, region or policy problem. Research also gave some insight into the current debates over the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, on-going security challenges on the Balkans and finally on the broader Eastern borderlands and enlargement.

These findings highlighted the general contemporary challenges and strengths with EU's police missions. It recognized that these missions have become an integral part of EU's civilian crisis management identity. It also highlighted the difficulties inherent in these same missions having to do with accountability and operational challenges, such as different practices among European police officers, and problem with standardization and local dynamics.

The results of the research indicate a substantial transformation challenging the traditional boundaries between various strands of professional activities (border guard, military, police), various policy domains (foreign policy, justice and home affairs, military affairs), and European integration process actors (states and supranational). The analysis focused on the actual practices that underpin the actual external activities carried out by the EU.

Research importantly underscored the need to examine the ethical consequence of the changes in the CFSP/ESDP and the consequences for EU external engagement. Furthermore, the workshop sought to examine the value assumptions underlying traditional CFSP/ESDP objectives including SSR, rule of law and peace building; and compared these assumptions with the value premises underlying JHA that touch on CFSP and that further underlines the increasing blurring of the line between internal and external security objectives of EU external relations. It gave insightful reflections on the consequences of these sometimes conflicting objectives, including the challenges of civil-military relations with examples from EU Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), Kosovo (EULEX) and Georgia (EUMM). A closer examination of these cases confirmed that the policies originally designed for external interventions engage in internal reform, thus blurring the internal/external border that formally separates these two objectives. Research also underscored the issue regarding different value assumptions and ethical consideration on the conduct of the different police force in EU's external engagement. It was highlighted that different countries within the EU and beyond engaging in these activities possess a different set of values and understanding on how police work shall be conducted.

Moreover, the research also highlighted that in order to address and study the ethical aspects of EU external actions more closely there is a need to incorporate a focus on the actual subjects of EU crisis management initiatives into the analysis, in other words the receivers of EU security policy initiative being the countries where various mission are carried out. This again opens up a myriad of values and ethical implications that have an impact on how crisis management initiatives is being carried out, the accountability of crisis management operations, but also what impact they potentially have on the local population.

In addition, a number of conclusions were reached on the ethical issues related to security practices that need to be further addressed. Among these issues are: CFSP / ESDP and intelligence; border management and illegal immigration and; Crisis management operations and accountability. Evidence also suggests that the current transformation of CFSP/ESDP opens up multiple venues for further research and scrutiny that goes beyond the scope of research of the INEX project.

The research in this area culminated in a set of policy recommendations report on managing the changing relationship between CFSP/EDSP and the jurisdiction and activities of Frontex. The report identifies that CFSP/CSDP activities in the borderlands increasingly concern themselves with border management. As a consequence increasing focus is given to intensifying closer cooperation with Frontex. The result of this closer cooperation is that two policy domains, but also two modes of policy implementation, to a greater extent are interacting. This has several implications for the EU as such but also for its member states. On a value level, potentially conflicting policy objectives can not only lead to outright clashes or internal contradiction - but also weaken policy effectiveness and the EU's ability to achieve its broader political aims by its means of CSDP missions as a result.

The research also reiterated previous findings that much focus is spent on individual technical aspects. To avoid such overlap, and inconsistencies, the policy recommendations from the report realize that policy makers must explicitly take into consideration the broader political implications of the increasing interaction between Frontex and CFSP/CSDP in the formulation of its policies. It is also important that this is done in the eventual implementation and evaluation of its policies. Moreover the institutional changes in the Lisbon Treaty are designed to facilitate the increased alignment of policy competences and execution. The research indicated that this is a positive and welcome development – but also one that makes inconsistencies costly in instances where policies pursue contradictory rather than mutually reinforcing objectives.

2.6 Geo-security realities east and west

2.6.2 The Eastern Neighbourhood

Workpackage 5 was one of the two empirically-led workpackages, with a focus on policy developments and research based on primary source analysis and field-work to be carried out in ‘The Eastern Neighbourhood’, specifically Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. The research carried out in the workpackage complements the mirror study of the three Southern Neighbours carried out by Workpackage 6 (cf. below), these two constituting Phase II of the INEX Project. The objectives of the workpackage were to identify and analyse the consequences of the evolution of the internal/external security continuum with regards to Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus – the EU’s closest neighbours in the East.

The first phase of the research tracked the evolution of EC/EU policies towards the eastern neighbours, (ii) examines the European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular those elements that relate to security in the contexts of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus (iii) extrapolates and analyses the EU’s policies towards the eastern neighbours in terms of explicit and implicit ‘values’ and ‘ethical’ dimensions – the core concerns of INEX. A systematic examination of current scholarship on the theme of enlargement clarified the evolution of EC/EU policies towards the Eastern neighbours and examined the European Neighbourhood Policy, in particular those elements that relate to security in the contexts of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus. The research analyzed the EU’s policies towards the eastern neighbours in terms of explicit and implicit ‘values’ and ‘ethical’ dimensions – the core concerns of INEX.

The research helped to clarify the role played by the Frontex agency in internal security/border control as a part of the EU’s broader actions in the Eastern neighbourhood. It also clarified border, visa, migration and democracy building issues in the three countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood - Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. Furthermore, a series of policy workshops proved very useful in establishing contacts among experts/practitioners and think tankers from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, working on the Eastern neighbourhood and ENP.

The most significant outcomes derived from the research carried out were that, despite the overarching set-up of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU takes a much differentiated approach to the East and the South. This differentiation is vividly manifest in mobility policies and visa practices, which in the East sees the EU attempting a ‘firm but fair’ approach of focusing on visa facilitation and enlarging options for legal migration. Though EU policy is predicated on notions of shared values which are consistently espoused by EU officials, perspectives from the other side of the border see that Brussels’ endeavours harden and securitize the EU’s outer perimeters, stymie free movement and engender insecurities in the Eastern milieu. This is where the ENP’s broader declaratory goals clash with the specifics in the JHA area – which does not fit easily within neighbourhood policy. Thus one of the

challenges for the workpackage was to understand and project the implications of this uneasy JHA/ENP relationship in the Eastern neighbourhood.

Below the political radar much progress is made amidst the cooperative efforts on the ground between border guard agencies. Officials from all three countries are generally satisfied with the cooperation with Frontex and the working bilateral and trilateral programmes they enjoy with the EU/member states. Next, though this was always known to be the case, greater differentiation has set in amongst the three countries under study. Whilst Ukraine both politically and legally has the most advanced partnership with the EU, in the mobility/visa/JHA area Moldova has emerged as a forerunner; Belarus has no contractual relationship with the EU, but working cooperation on border management is extensive.

Though ENP is the framework within which the EU conducts its relations with the Eastern neighbours, it is the restrictive Schengen visa policy which primarily shapes and gives form to these relations. Moreover, the EU's visa regime and its consequences for the mobility of ENP citizens is the prism through which the neighbours' tend to view the EU. The 'hard edges of the EU' are felt very acutely by the Eastern neighbours and in far more tangible ways than any manifestation of the EU's normative and values-laden mission in the neighbourhood. One of the consequences of this is that the broad goals of ENP are being undermined by the EU's practices towards mobility.

Migration is a heavily securitised issue within the EU's approach to the Eastern neighbours. The threat of mass irregular/illegal cross border migratory movements established the creation of new border regimes in the run up to 2004. Such a security rationale behind EU policy remains in place. However, closer inspection of the issue reveals a nuanced picture and an EU policy which remains driven by a badly conceived set of premises and is thus ill-suited to the job in hand. The extent of cross border illegal activity coming from the East is in its nature and intensity less than the case in the Southern neighbourhood. Moreover, some sectors of employment in some new EU member states are quite reliant on ENP citizens as migrant workers. One of the main flaws in ENP in this area is the lack of a rounded-debate on the EU's migration needs, a deficiency which means that member states maintain a defensive posture on the issue. One of the upshots of this is that without legitimate means to travel to the EU for work, migrant workers from ENP states opt for or are forced into taking illegal routes into employment in the EU. Again, this is an example of EU policy issuing negative ethical consequences and undermining the declaratory objectives of ENP.

The EU is attempting, albeit in a piecemeal fashion, to overcome the fissures and contradictions that arise through its 'bordering practices'. One of the most prominent tools here is the marriage of readmission agreements with visa facilitation dialogues. This has been pursued with both Ukraine and Moldova to good effect, indeed the EU has recently launched visa liberalisation Action Plans with both states, which give reference to the possibility of visa-free travel for ENP citizens into the EU at some point in the future. In reality there remains a sizable gap between the EU's current offer in this domain and what the neighbours expect. One of the challenges of the Polish EU Presidency this year will be to ensure a momentum on the mobility question and to put in to better synch' the expectations of the EU and those of the neighbours.

2.6.1 The Mediterranean Neighbourhood

Workpackage 6 was the second empirically-led workpackage, responsible for furthering the goals of the project by exploring the ethical challenges emerging through the internal/external security continuum of the European Union in the Mediterranean Borderlands, specifically in

Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. This research complements the mirror study of the three Eastern Neighbours being carried out by Workpackage 5.

The primary objective of the research done in this area was to document and analyse the direct consequences in value and ethical terms of the evolution of the internal/external security continuum for three members of the Mediterranean segment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt.

The project reviewed and analyzed the status of European Union's Mediterranean policies in terms of security, developing a comprehensive overview and analysis of EU policies in these countries in terms of their value premises and ethical consequences. Two parallel research processes were conducted in order to achieve these objectives. The first one was a review and comparative analysis of EU documentation, comprising of ENP Country Reports, Commission Proposals, Action Plans, Commission and Council assessments and Progress Reports. The second one was a state-of-the-art review and analysis of the scholarly literature on the security dynamics between both the EU and the Mediterranean in general and the EU and the case countries in particular with a focus on revealing the values embedded in the ENP. Most significant results of the research in this area included beginning to fill a vacuum on knowledge about EU security policy making vis-a-vis the Mediterranean on the one hand and Mediterranean neighbours' responses on the other. Moreover, the literature review conducted highlighted, among other things, a shift in EU's notion of security, from 'common and comprehensive security' pursued through non-military measures to a policy that prioritised stability through increasing reliance on border management and security technologies. The second stage of the research has highlighted the occurrence of a merging of the agendas of not-so-democratic regimes in the southern Mediterranean and EU in terms of privileging of stability and reliance on the military instrument through highly technologies responses. Three preliminary conclusions were reached: There is little awareness of bilateral and/or multilateral security cooperation across the Mediterranean. This, in turn, has implications for transparency and democratic governance of the security sector (in the EU and North Africa). Moreover, North African regimes are given a free hand in terms of deciding how to deal with various situations involving asylum seekers and illegal migrants, with implications for security/liberty balances. Accordingly, EU's previous stress on democracy and empowerment of civil society seems to be fading away. There is rising intolerance toward illegal migrants in North African societies. This is regarded by many as the EU exporting its own societal divides and insecurities to North African societies.

The primary finding of the research tied up with the emergence of internal-external security continuum across the Mediterranean was that the European Union was severely criticised for the inconsistency between the values it is built upon and values it seeks to project and practices it engages in. That said, ethical consequences of European security practices for individuals, societies and states in Southern Mediterranean have led various actors (primarily civil society actors, activists, and scholars) to criticize the EU with reference to the values it aims to promote. This finding has four dimensions. First, although the EU is not the actor behind some security policies, and these are repercussions of cooperation at the country level, it is almost always the EU that is (wrongly) criticised. Second, while the EU and its member states have not carefully scrutinised the maltreatment of immigrants by southern Mediterranean states, societal insecurities have emerged in these countries in relation to increasing number of immigrants. Negative perceptions and attitudes at state level towards immigrants can also be observed. Third, coupled with lack of progress in democracy promotion, EU's (member states) cooperation with authoritarian Southern Mediterranean states in the area of counter-terrorism has been questioned by actors at societal level. Finally, although visa facilitation and visa-free travel processes continue in relation to Eastern neighbourhood, lack of visa facilitation for the nationals of Southern Mediterranean states has

been criticized in Southern neighbourhood by recourse to the differentiated treatment of the EU.

3. Potential Impact and dissemination

The INEX project has sought to generate impact on a variety of levels in European social, political, cultural, legal and economic life. It did so by focusing on the value-assumptions and ethical implications of what has been termed the internal/external security continuum. This continuum is defined as the shifting of professional roles, juridical institutions, and political concepts as a consequence of a changing threat landscape. The results of the project have indicated that this shift creates a particular set of challenges when it comes to the way that professional, institutional and legal values that have considerable impact on the functioning of European security institutions. The results of the project contribute to forming a bridge between changing understandings of security and the policy-based implementation of security measures. The ethical reflection generated through the project will provide new understandings of how security ideas can put into action through policy. The potential impact of INEX will in this sense consist of informing policy-makers on the background, nature and finality of available or potential security measures in order to better inform policy-making. It will provide the basis for integrating technological systems with the new social and political structures that will form the basis for assuring security in the coming decades and an era of globalized threats. It will contribute to understanding the function of security technologies, grasping the potential challenges to European law, and tailoring foreign and security policy in a way that accounts for the complexity of the internal/external security dilemmas.

The project began from the premiss that the goal of security research in Europe should be to increase and enhance the security of European citizens. Security was thus understood as a social concept and consequently a social challenge. By clarifying the value-based and ethical dimensions of security, INEX will simultaneously contribute to clarifying the knowledge and insights available to policy-makers, raising the precision level of targeted security policies and increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the security industry. By bringing a more clear understanding of the role of societal values in assuring European security the results of the project will support more efficient and direct use of financial and human resources in the considerable task of providing security. Knowledge of human and societal values in security research will make industrial investment in security technologies more rational, and more effectively and systematically linked to institutionalised scope and limitations of policy-makers.

The potential impact of the INEX project thus spans a number of areas of security policy making and implementation: (1) strengthen the scientific basis of policy-making on security and (2) provide support for security research programme-makers and thereby (3) improve the effectiveness and efficiency of security research performers. From an institutional perspective, INEX will potentially (4) consolidate and institutionalise an innovative interdisciplinary means of linking human and societal values and security policy making. Research has contributed to (5) build a network of European expertise dedicated to understanding the link between human activity, technology and security and, more broadly, thereby also producing spill-over value for other research fields. It has furthermore the potential to (6) develop a new set of vital standards for future strategic planning for policy-making, thus (7) enhancing Europe's security identity in the world.

1. Strengthening the scientific basis of policy-making on security.

The INEX project has examined current and planned practices aimed at managing security threats to European citizens. Unlike other enquiries into the area of security, its innovation has been in the emphasis on the value-based and ethical issues implicit in policy-making about security, technological approaches to security, legal considerations of security and the policing of security threats. Its most important potential impact is thus its contribution to a more robust and nuanced foundation for policy-making on security in these four areas. The project has clarified the concrete role of societal and human experience in the security equation and my making clear the kinds of changes that are taking place in that equation. It thus creates a significant potential impact in widening the scope of understanding of policy-makers, legal authorities, security professionals, and the security industry and, by including the dimension of values, give a more precise, relevant and flexible description of the dynamics of security. The potential result will be to boost the efficiency and relevant advice to authorities, agencies and industry. This potential impact can be differentiated along the lines of the thematic fields studied through the project.

(i) Policy-making through technology. There are strong indications that the future management of security in Europe will be characterised high dependence upon technological solutions. Security policy-making will become increasingly dominated by decisions about technology, and less about people. Cost effective, efficient and useful security policy must be based on both. By producing knowledge on the human dimensions of security research and particular on the link between security technologies and their human-based premises and actual effects, INEX will have an important impact on making policy judgements on most useful and accurate application of technology to security policy.

(ii) Legal expertise. European legal norms have changed rapidly in the last decades, partly in line with the EU's political evolution, partly as a response to new issues stemming from the evolved security landscape. Questions of privacy, information, visas, arrest warrants, exceptionalism, etc. all have implications for both EU and foreign police in the area of law. INEX will provide potentially important support to the answering of challenges to EU law by producing knowledge on the ethical assumptions linked to the various levels of EU legislation.

(iii) Professionalisation of security. The equally rapidly changing role and function of agencies of security, policing, information and intelligence has necessitated an understanding of security in Europe capable of linking local civic authority to national, trans-national, European and even trans-European challenges requires transversal and multi-level understanding of security challenges. The potential impact of INEX in this area will be to provide a common denominator for linking the diverse systems of intelligence and policing which ultimate must converge in order to achieve success in securing the European Union.

(iv) Foreign policy and security. The quickly evolving landscape of security and insecurity in Europe has produced considerable challenges for formulating relevant and timely Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Defence and Security Policy (EDSP). The shifting internal/external security continuum continues to be the central element in the coming challenges of managing security in a changing international environment. This environment is quickly shifting along the lines of political, social, legal and cultural values that correspond significantly to the basic categories analysed by INEX. The potential impact in this regard will be to contribute to creating the conditions for a more targeted and sound policy in the area of external security.

(v) European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The success of the diverse branches ENP has shown itself to be mixed and only partly coherent. It will depend to a large degree on the

success of policy-makers in matching policy activities with the evolution of security perceptions and security practices in widely diverse geo-political settings. National, sub-national, regional and local determinations of security and insecurity necessitate both accurate and up-to-date empirically based knowledge of security issues on the ground, and a clear understanding of how human and ethical issues shape the way this knowledge can and should be translated into policy.

2. Providing knowledge and analytic support for security research programme-makers.

By bringing a solidly grounded societal focus to security research INEX results have the potential to provide support for the further development and implementation of comprehensive, coherent, culturally aware and socially just research agenda. The fundamental knowledge that INEX research has provided about the ethical links between widely different levels of the security landscape have the potential to fundamentally contribute to the continued formulation of research policy that is relevant to emerging challenges in the security itself and in charting, documenting, assessing and ultimately applying new forms of knowledge to ever more sophisticated research ambitions. Research results will make private investment in security research more predictable, more rational, and more effective. INEX project results hold the potential to not only grant more precision to ongoing and planned security research, but to cast light on what the true security threats to Europe are, by asking what actual human and societal values are at stake when European security is at stake. INEX will in this way make a contribution to focusing security research and the enterprise of securing Europe and its citizens not only as actual security needs but on the cycle of knowledge-production, investment and application that is the basis of research and development in the security industry.

3. Improving the effectiveness and efficiency of security research performers and policy makers.

Given the considerable costs of carrying out technology-based security research in general, the results of the INEX project will contribute to cost-efficiency. They will help target socially relevant research needs, and to clarify the actual human issues directly implicated by security research. This will in turn help to reduce costly technology overkill or inadequately targeted research activity. Social and human scientific research has the virtue of being inexpensive in comparison to equivalent hard scientific or technological research. By creating the basis for more strategically comprehensive knowledge of the field this marriage of interests the project results will directly assist those involved in the security industry to make more effective investments and more efficient spending decisions. INEX has sought to present a model for an innovative research strategy based on a solid link between social and human science, on the one hand, and hard science and technological research, on the other. In this way the project will have provided European enterprises a competitive advantage relative to those enterprises who pay little or no attention to human dimensions of their research.

4. Supporting innovation in security policy.

The innovation of INEX in terms of charting and clarifying the human and values based dimensions of European security will support greater flexibility and more adaptation to the quickly changing environment of security and insecurity. It will advance flexibility by providing a set of tools and models for analysing the human—and thus security—consequences of technologically driven policy. INEX results will in particular contribute

where re-tooling industrial production is more expensive and more slow than political, social, cultural and ethical analysis, which can actual keep policy-makers industry in tune with the needs of a rapidly changing society. The challenge to which INEX responds is that of building bridge between two spheres of knowledge, technological and societal, in order to highlight where they meet and where they diverge. Sensitivity to political, social, legal and cultural issues in policy-making on security issues remains uncommon for a variety of reasons. Moreover the size and character of the European research area and comprehensive inter-linkages of existing social and human science research make this adaptation to a new but related fields of study. Preparation for the proposed project has demonstrated that the political and cultural sciences, sociology and anthropology adapt easily to the challenges of this new security area. Information and research results can be made readily available and be adapted quickly. All these aspects of the proposed value-oriented contribution to security research will thus increase the competitiveness of industries that choose to make use of them.

INEX's innovation will also respond to the new challenges of the European geopolitical reality on several levels. First, the immediate innovation of INEX springs from its original aim: to respond to a new set of circumstances of threat, security and insecurity, and the legal consequences that arises from it. The project indeed responds by contributing to the development of a new set of concepts, categories and definitions with the aim of more adequately mapping the European setting and thereby better supporting policy initiatives and further research that more adequately responds to its challenges. Secondly, the long-term innovative impact of the project flows from its interdisciplinary structure in general and its synthesis of three fields of study—threat construction, a broadened understanding of security, and international law—in particular. Lastly the European Union itself—its demographic and geopolitical character, as well as its domestic and foreign policies—is in constant state of evolution. INEX project results will provide a conceptual platform capable of both capturing the present nature of security and insecurity and analysing its consequences.

In re-visiting and building upon traditional questions of threat, security and rule of law, results for the INEX project provide an integrated, interdisciplinary approach. Far from deploying this approach, engendering policy actions, then discarding it, the conceptual and methodological innovations developed in the course of the research project will have a lasting effect on research in this field well beyond the duration and the confines of the project or its first generation policy implication. The project will, in other words, serve to institutionalise an innovative interdisciplinary approach to charting and analysing threats to Europe based on innovative and up-to-date data and theories. These innovations and methods will be transferable to future policy formation on the ethics of security and the nature of its forms and effects in Europe and elsewhere. It will also serve to give force and legitimacy to projects that wish to advance research-based policy of this kind in the future.

5. Building and consolidating a network of European expertise linked to other fields of research.

The research design of INEX established strong integration between institutes. This integration will have the effect of spreading future forms of collaborations between these and other institute. The networking of scholars has a multiplying effect that will be visibly exploited in the aftermath of INEX as well as international collaboration. In this way a reserve of intellectual capital will remain after the completed project, an investment in further research in the field of terrorist threat, security and international law, for policy-making consultancy and for education. Among the contributions are the development of interdisciplinary collaboration whose form and structure is transportable to other fields and other projects, the charting and development of research competency through conferences,

workshops, and dissemination in several European regions, traversing a number of research areas. It will thus seek to develop the tools for participating in the formation of public policy. The interdisciplinary nature of INEX served to multiply the number of avenues of exchange to other fields of research. By drawing together elements from political science, sociology, philosophy, and history the project permits cross-fertilizing on a wide-ranging basis over long periods. The synergies between law and security, security and threat, law and threat, etc. will spread to respective disciplines and contribute to creating new frameworks for further research of interdisciplinary scope. Furthermore, the methodology of INEX will open questions of methodology and approach and thereby challenge the conceptualisations of neighbouring disciplines, thereby inciting innovation in research models.

6. Strengthening the basis of future security policy formulation.

INEX has a strong potential to result in a synthesis of scholarly concerns brought from a number of different academic fields. At the same time, a fundamental aim of the project is to challenge and recast the premises and presuppositions upon which policy analysis is traditionally based. The convention of policy makers is to build upon discrete spheres of knowledge, (international politics for foreign policy analysis, sociology and economics for social analysis, legal science for juridical analysis, etc.) The central motivating premises of INEX is that European policy should be based on a new and hybrid set of premises. The knowledge produced by INEX will thus potentially have a lasting effect on the way that policy, both domestic and foreign, is formulated by the political class of Europe, by the voices who speak for European interests and the European project. It will in this sense nourish the consequences of the claim that the European Union is an entity *sui generis*, and that policy decisions should be based on the particularity of the European experience of threat and insecurity.

7. European societal value-added.

In general, the project results have the potential to enhance the European cultural, social and geopolitical identity by theorising, documenting, and analysing the particularities of the European experience of terrorist threat and the specificity of the European response. In particular the project, its operation and results will enhance European public life from a number of points of views. It will advance a standard for understanding the background and finality of security policy, thus adding to a unified approach and understanding of security and insecurity, as well as the perception of a socially connected source of security policy. A coordinated means for understanding threat and reacting to it based on principles is will served to fortify the European public sphere. In terms of a coordinated understanding of threat, while at the same time. At the same time, against the backdrop of this unified means of analysis and transfer of security analysis to security policy the differentiation of the European security landscape will permit the recognition of national, regional and local variations in security status and thus policy needs. Furthermore, by bringing the field of European law directly into the study of security policy a clear political reference will be made to the notion of fundamental rights at the heart of the notion of European political identity.

ANNEX I – List of INEX Beneficiaries



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1	International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)	J. Peter Burgess (peter@prio.no) (Coordinator)
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