Milestone report 5.2:
Report on security practices in Eastern ENP

Milestone report submitted September 2010 (M31) in fulfillment of requirements of the FP7 Project, Converging and Conflicting Ethical Values in the Internal/External Security Continuum in Europe (INEX)
Introduction

There is no doubt that a stable and secure neighbourhood is an interest for the European Union of the first order. This is the case not just in the sense of warding off traditional external security concerns and an overflow of potential instabilities, but is also about the promotion of security by way of extending the European model of regional integration based on political and economic cooperation, beyond the EU’s borders. A large part of this is the extension of the Justice and Home agenda into the EU’s neighbouring milieu, where the adoption of the EU Acquis is expected to have the effect of meeting the security needs of the Union. Driving this objective is the European Neighbourhood Policy, an initiative which anticipates that values and interests concerning a commitment to the rule of law, the installation of democracy and functioning market economies are priorities shared with the Eastern neighbours.

One of our key assumptions in this WP is that the issue of EU visas for nationals of the three countries under study (and all attendant issues this relates to) has become an important instrument of EU foreign and security policy towards the Eastern region and with this the goal of transforming the borders and territories beyond. Beyond the basic question of the issuing or non-issuing of a Schengen visa to any given individual, discussions on visa facilitation towards a smoother application procedure; and the possibility of subsequent moves towards visa liberalization and even visa-free regimes, are subjects which have entered centre stage in the EU’s relations with the Eastern neighbours under the broad mantle of ‘mobility’ and as one of the most toughly applied aspects of the EU’s use of conditionality as a reform-tool. The content and priorities of the EU’s Eastern Partnership confirms this observation in the sense that options for mobility, twinned with the exigency of security go hand in hand in the proposed ‘Security and Mobility Pacts’.

The ENP is sharply connected with the politics of borders in the wider Europe. In the Eastern neighbourhood, ENP both reaffirms the sharp divide between members and non-members and also erects partitions between the current candidates and potential candidates on the one hand and those states with an aspiration to join the Union but remain firmly outside the enlargement dynamic. These practices of dividing and partitioning form the foundations of the EU’s security practices towards the Eastern neighbourhood, which are manifest in the widening and deepening of the Schengen zone, EU

---

1 The authors of this milestone are the official members of INEX work package 5: Marcin Zaborowski, Kerry Longhurst and Anna Zielinska
2 Croatia, Turkey and Macedonia are current candidate states; the remaining states of the Western Balkans are officially viewed by the EU as potential candidates.
visa regimes and many other questions relating to mobility. But ENP is also conceived of as a means to meet a strategic goal of EU security policy, encapsulated in the well-known phrase ‘avoiding new dividing lines’; which in the case of the East means dealing with the consequences of enlargement and the shift of the EU’s borders which occurred in 2004 and 2007. ENP in its design and structure holds out measures to mitigate the negative effects of the fortification of the EU’s perimeters, by way of issuing an invitation to selected neighbours to take part in precise degrees of integration with the EU, based upon principles of enlargement-like conditionality, though without an option for actual membership.

This discussion brings into focus the principle concerns of INEX and the relationships between internal and external security objectives and practices. More specifically it points to the dilemmas of how to ensure the internal security of the EU via hard borders, whilst at the same time ensure stability and security at and beyond the borders via re-conceiving and softening the EU’s peripheries. In this report we will endeavor to identify some of the security practices Brussels adopts to try and manage this task. We seek to add some flesh to the discussion held in the State of the Art Report about the paradoxes and contradictions apparent in the EU’s approach to the Eastern borders. In more specific terms we hope that this report advances one of our working questions: how does the promotion of cooperation and greater proximity to EU norms and values as advocated by the European Neighbourhood Policy sit with the firming up of border management regimes and maintenance of rigid visa practices between the EU and the neighbours? This report offers an inventory of some of the most relevant security practices in the Eastern neighbourhood. The task here is not to present a final piece of analysis, but rather to present what we view as important for the state of play in WP5. When thinking about how to approach this milestone and how best to take forward the WP we posed the following questions for internal discussion:

1. What is the nature of the Eastern border? What factors and forces shape it?
2. What is the EU’s ‘Grand Strategy’ in the Eastern Neighbourhood?
3. What policies constitute the EU’s security practices in the region, what aspirations do they follow?
4. What kind of Visa regimes exist between the EU and Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus?
5. What other questions relating to mobility are pertinent?
6. What about cooperation with FRONTEX?
7. What are the implications of the above for WP5? What are the next research steps?

In this report we focus on these questions and provide some tentative responses. Though, as pointed out below, our presentation of the paper represents a bridge to WP5’s forthcoming series of workshops being held in November and December in Warsaw.

The Eastern Borders - A Complex Picture

It is a well-honed argument that the previous divide, both conceptual and institutional, between the EU’s external and internal security practices has dissipated. How has this been playing out across the Eastern neighbourhood?

In the context of the Eastern enlargement of the EU, a preoccupation with insecure borders gained ground. The concern was that the soon-to-be new member states would bring to the EU’s door an influx of mass migration and cross-border criminal activities. Challenges compounded by the fact that authorities in the neighbouring states lacked legal, political and technical capacities to effectively guard their borders with the EU and their external boundaries with third countries. This fusion of internal and external security concerns and practices at this time was also, of course, given huge impetus by 9/11, which ushered in new phases in technology for data gathering, cross-border surveillance and new emphases in risk-assessment analysis, all developments reflected in the tone and focus of the Hague Programme. In such a context in the accession process, the JHA Schengen agenda was dominated by security, with broader socio-economic questions of salience to border-regions sidestepped.4

Crucially, at the same time as the new member states were bringing the management of their eastern borders up to Schengen standards (the Schengen zone was eventually extended in December 2007) the EU was rolling out the European Neighbourhood Policy as a framework for its relations with the new neighbours. To repeat an argument posited in our previous report, this task was awesome given that the EU was confronting this job, without having the prospect of enlargement as a foreign policy tool to rely on. This, for our purposes, is where the story begins.

A host of new neighbours residing at the EU’s Eastern borders characterized by weak democracy, authoritarianism and experiencing unsteady economic transitions after the dismantlement of the Soviet Union provided the canvas for new EU security practices. Consequently, to preserve the internal security of the Union, the EU made moves to bolster its border management – preserve and firm-up the Schengen perimeter and at the same time configured the European Neighbourhood Policy as one of the main means to stabilize the neighbourhood and ensure external security.

The implications of this were discussed at length in our State of the Art report, where our review of literature highlighted key arguments about the broad inconsistencies of the EU’s security practices towards the new eastern neighbours in this respect, and in particular the damaging effects associated with the uniform implementation of the Schengen zone. To be brief, commentators such as Judy Batt and Joanna Apap spoke about the ‘high costs’ of excluding the new neighbours from the integration process by erecting non-negotiable borders around a fortified EU. Traditional patterns of cross-border social and economic activity and promises of new Euro-regions criss-crossing the EU’s borders would be destroyed by new visa-regimes, the argument went. The net result of such new border regimes would be quite the opposite to the actual goals intended, namely insecurity and instability. Such a configuration leads to a paradox between the EU’s objectives of achieving internal and external security - strict border regimes erected to protect the internal security of the Union undermine external security; whilst preserving external security via an opening of the EU’s external borders is seen to damage the integrity of Union’s internal security. In a nutshell ENP represents the EU’s attempt to mitigate and take the edge of this pervading contradiction.

The realities of an ever harder Schengen border at the eastern edges of the EU have particularly strong impacts upon relations with Moldova, Ukraine and to a lesser degree Belarus. The costs and efforts involved in applying for a visa to enter the EU is, for citizens of these countries probably the only contact or direct experience they will have of the EU. Such an experience surely gives the strong impression of exclusion and imposition of non-EU citizens as outsiders. After all, in the 1990’s the EU’s offer of visa-free regimes for the states of Central Europe, even before they officially became candidates, was a tangible sign of inclusion and a ‘welcome’ voucher into the European club. In short, visa practices are an important basis for the assessment of the EU for these states; declarations from Brussels about the importance of the Eastern neighbours in the European project and of the need to forge ever closer political relations will not be seen as sincere in a situation of restrictive visa regimes. Moreover, for domestic elites involved in internal and home affairs the tremendous costs entailed in bringing their eastern borders up to Schengen standards and adhering to ever more expensive border technologies, plus the acceptance of agreements with the EU on readmission are not seen to be counterbalanced by any significant gains, since neither membership nor shortcuts to visa free travel into the EU remain distant, if not improbable possibilities.

---

8 Olga Wasilewska et al. ‘What to do with Visas for the Eastern Europeans?’ Batory Foundation, June 2009
Hard, Soft or Fuzzy?

The changing nature of the EU’s Eastern borders has been the subject of extensive scholarly analysis, as noted in our previous report and in other INEX documents. Though we concur with the argument that the Schengen boundaries of the EU make for hard borders, the argument that these borders are also somewhat ‘fuzzy’ in nature and not necessarily uniform in nature is also a compelling notion and one that will be visited here briefly. We will use the following discussion as a basis for further research and for the preparation of a publication assessing the vitality of ‘fuzzy borders’ in the context of the EU/ENP borders and changing nature of EU/Schengen visa regimes.

Fuzzy borders implies something of an evolution away from a purely territorially defined border, towards a vision and practice of bordering based on more fluid, differentiated boundaries where political, economic and cultural life can flow over traditional divides. The idea of the EU having fuzzy borders emerged in the literature in the run up to the 2004 enlargement, alongside policy discussions about what to do with the ‘Wider Europe’ and the new borders. Some ten years on, Christiansen, Petito and Tonra’s original work on ‘Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy Borders’ remains alluring in connection with the changing realities on the Eastern borders and the security practices of the EU. How does this conceptualization of fuzzy borders sit now that the EU has the ENP as the main framework for its relations with its neighbours but does not have the prospect of membership as a tool with which to exert conditionality upon these Eastern states?

The table given below attempts to show how one might come to the conclusion that the EU’s Eastern borders are indeed ‘fuzzy’. Different categories or ‘gradients’ of membership and association, might suggest that the borders are less than clear-cut. Such a situation is compounded, perhaps by the existence of ‘policy borders’, implying that not all EU states are members of all EU policy areas, moreover some neighbours are part of some policy frameworks, almost like members. Finally, a border is not always necessarily the border. As Bigo notes, it can be the case that entry points into the Schengen area may well be located inside the territory of a neighbour, at an airport or an international train station, for example. Finally, one can add the argument that the EUs borders resist definition ultimately because of the ways in which Brussels exports its policies well beyond its borders to both

---

9 Fuzzy borders was also picked up by Work Package One in their study of border technologies. Didier Bigo et al. ‘State of the Art Review of Scholarly Research on Security Technologies and their Relation to the Societies which they Serve’ INEX D.1.1, November 2008.


accession and non-accession ENP states.\textsuperscript{12} Seen in this way, the argument goes that the EU is surrounded by states which are neither ‘properly inside’ nor ‘properly outside’ the Union; and which are subject to a diffusion of EU policies and norms.\textsuperscript{13}

In the table presented below we build on the conclusions drawn by other scholars by giving an updated survey of EU policies and arrangement post-2004.


**TABLE: One Border or Several?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Various Categories of EU Membership</th>
<th>a) EU member states in Schengen;</th>
<th>b) EU member states not yet in Schengen;(^14)</th>
<th>c) EU member states outside of Schengen;(^15)</th>
<th>d) Non-EU states in Schengen;(^16)</th>
<th>e) EU Accession States;</th>
<th>f) States with a membership perspective;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Diversified Geographical Factors</td>
<td>a) Integral parts of EU states that lie physically outside of national territories.</td>
<td>b) Dependent / Commonwealth / non-dependent territories of EU states lying across the globe.</td>
<td>c) Legacies from the Soviet period – the case of Kaliningrad</td>
<td>d) Un-demarcated national boundaries.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Categories of Association Between the EU and its Neighbours</td>
<td>a) ENP states with PCAs or AAs;</td>
<td>b) States in the Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
<td>c) Neighbours with quasi positions within ENP / no contractual relations with the EU;</td>
<td>d) Other neighbour-states funded by ENPI (ie Russia, Kazakhstan..)</td>
<td>e) Non-ENP Eastern Neighbours with a Strategic Relationship with the EU</td>
<td>f) Regional enclaves within neighbouring / ENP states, that are not recognized by the EU(^17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Borders or Sub-Zones</td>
<td>a) Not all EU states are part of all EU policies ie. The Euro Zone, ESDP, Schengen etc.</td>
<td>b) Neighbours can be in or align with certain EU policies and Frameworks.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Governance in the ‘Near Abroad’</td>
<td>a) Either though the accession process or via ENP the neighbouring states are subject to a diffusion of EU norms and policies. EU efforts at democratization via conditionality, for example.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Border Security Practices beyond the Borders</td>
<td>a) The physical border is not necessarily the point at which Schengen-related controls and customs procedures are carried out. The outermost points of the EU’s border can be located within a neighbouring state.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa /Mobility Regimes as Bordering Practices</td>
<td>a) States that remain on the Schengen Black List</td>
<td>b) Neighbouring states that already have or are about to have visa-free travel into the Schengen Zone.(^18)</td>
<td>c) Local border traffic zones</td>
<td>d) The special case of Croatia(^19)</td>
<td>e) Special provisions being put in place for the 2012 Euro-football context being held in Ukraine and Poland.(^20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Certainly, this idea of overlapping boundaries softening the edges of Schengen is appealing, but what we are seeking to do in WP5 is to construct an argument which sees that whilst the EU’s border is indeed in some ways indistinct and is not a traditional purely territorially defined

---

\(^14\) Bulgaria, Romania  
\(^15\) UK and Ireland  
\(^16\) Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein (pending full ratification)  
\(^17\) Transdnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia  
\(^18\) Schengen Visa free travel into the EU is now possible for Serbians, Montenegrins and Macedonians.  
\(^19\) Croatians Reed only an ID card to enter into Italy, Slovenia and Hungary  
\(^20\) Involving two new border crossing points and the implementation of more modern checkpoints and the issuing of visas at or around football matches by roving visa application desks.
entity, it is nevertheless a physical, hard-edged reality when seen from the outside. With this point in mind, what exactly does the EU’s Eastern border look like?

Getting Physical

Far too much analysis is, we argue, based upon only a loose understanding of where national and EU borders actually lie in the eastern neighbourhood. An appreciation of the geographical facts of the Eastern border is expedient to any discussion of the security practices of the EU. Which states share borders with the EU? Which neighbours have common borders? And where are official cross border points?  

The Schengen area has 42 673 km of sea and 7 721 km of land frontiers, guarded by 1,792 designated and controlled border crossing points at the external EU border; of these 665 are air borders, 871 sea borders, and 246 land borders. The EU’s eastern borders are primarily physical land-frontiers (see diagramme below). Here the EU meets Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia and Georgia (across the Black Sea), as well as Turkey. Across such frontiers the Eastern Schengen borders are punctuated by local border traffic zones since 2006 and Euroregions. The former, which is the vastly more consequential initiative of the two, represents a derogation of the standard Schengen rules by providing a regime for easier cross border travel for permit-holding third-country citizens to enter the EU, on social, cultural or economic grounds, so long as they have resided within 30kms (exceptionally 50kms) of the border and remain within the designated border area for their declared activities. A number of EU member states in the East have already negotiated bilateral local border traffic zones with their neighbours based on the Commission’s geographical guidelines, though in the case of Kaliningrad the nature of what local border traffic actually should entail is currently being contested. The case of Kaliningrad becoming a de facto local border traffic zone is an example to watch – not least in the context of EU-Russia discussions on visa-free travel and Russia’s relations with the Baltic states.

21 This final question has yet to be fully answered, FRONTEX does not hold such data, thus we are getting clarification from the individual Border Guard Agencies.

22 Bug Euroregion (Belarus, Poland, Ukraine); Carpathian Euroregion (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine); Superior Prut and Lower Danube Euroregion (Romania, Moldova, Ukraine); Białowieża Forest Euroregion (Belarus, Poland)


24 The recent Polish-Russian proposal on local order traffic in the case of Kaliningrad has led to discord amongst a number of Eastern EU member states. If the proposal succeeds in its objective of extending a local border traffic zone status to the whole of the Kaliningrad territory it might be assumed that a new, more expansive definition of the EU’s external borders at the Eastern frontier May be reached. See Kinga Dudzińska Small Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad District http://www.pism.pl/bulletin/a198-2010.pdf
According to FRONTEX reporting, when it comes to irregular migration across the Eastern land borders there is actually little activity, at least in terms of the numbers detected. The northern part of the Slovak-Ukraine border is the most targeted zone, with illegal crossings mounted mostly by Georgians, Moldovans and Afghans. WP5 is currently in dialogue with the Polish Interior Ministry and Border Guards Agency with the aim of supplementing the data supplied by FRONTEX.

MAP: The Eastern Neighbourhood in Context

---

25 Frontex FRAN quarterly http://www.frontex.europa.eu/situation_at_the_external_border/art17.html September 2010
The Borders beyond the Borders

The significance of the borders that lie between the EU’s immediate Eastern neighbours and the band of states further to the East is important to note in the current discussion. Far from a deviation, the EU’s endeavours to secure the Schengen border and facilitate legitimate travel is unavoidably affected by insecure or uncertain borders further to the East (and indeed this argument relates to the southern dimension of the ENP as well). In this context a number of interrelated points are noteworthy:

First, there are the obvious cases of territorial disputes regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Nagorno Karabakh situated inside Azerbaijan, but ruled by Armenia. In all cases the EU does not recognize the independence of these enclaves and with Abkhazia and South Ossetia (and Transdnistria) complicated questions about nationality, citizenship and thus access to EU visa regimes arise. Part of this state of affairs is the playing out of visa-politics as part of broader regional geopolitics. For example, in October 2010 the Georgian government decided to institute a visa-free regime for residents of the troubled Russian Northern Caucasus regions, including Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan to visit and work in Georgia. Such a move ignited Russian criticism of Georgian policy. Evidently, WP5 needs to take stock of this situation, especially from the perspective of the EU-Georgia mobility partnership.

Second, historical legacies of the Soviet period continue to have reverberations on EU bordering practices. Internal borders within the USSR were often merely administrative boundaries, relatively unconnected to any barriers to freedom of mobility issues and border controls. Meanwhile the borders between the Soviet Union and the satellite states, for example with Poland, were heavily militarised – thus restricting normal mobility. The contemporary implications of such facts are multiple, but one of the most significant are questions relating to a lack of delimitation and demarcation of national borders. Only recently has a Latvia - Russia border treaty be signed (agreement on a local border traffic zone is also online). Progress was also recently made between Ukraine and Belarus, which led to the ratification by the Belarussian parliament in April 2010 of the previous Belarus-Ukraine 1997 State Border Agreement. Of course the implementation of this treaty will only have physical effects when the actual demarcation of the border is done.

26 National boundaries in the Western Balkans also remain unclear; Croatia and Montenegro have referred theirs to the ICJ; the demarcation of the BiH - Croatia border is ongoing and as yet there is no agreement on how to resolve it.

The case of the Ukraine/Russia border brings into the light the tendency for opposing Russian and EU perspectives on the nature and functions of borders. EU activities vis-à-vis the Ukraine-Russia border reflect Brussels’ strategic objective of transforming Ukraine’s eastern border. From an EU perspective the Schengen zone will be more secure if border regimes further to the East also resemble a Schengen-type arrangement, replete with common practices and supported by the same legislation. Subsequently, though agreement between Kiev and Moscow on the border limits might have been made already in 2003, beyond topography, the physical demonstrations of the border are apparently not so clear on the ground. As it stands, in this instance, the Schengen-Ukraine border might well be coined the ‘EU-China border’. Consequently EU positioning calls for better demarcation, making for tighter borders which are easier to guard. A fundamental feature of this is the EU’s persistence that proper international passports should always be used rather than ID cards or internal passports for the crossing of national boundaries within the CIS area, by all accounts the implementation of such practices and a whole range of other internal CIS mobility, visa, working permit are rather patchily applied. Such issues regarding the mal-definition of quasi-national boundaries and examples of diminishing security are found elsewhere in the Soviet sphere and are highly pertinent to one of the EU’s most important security practices in this region – namely the settlement of functioning readmission agreements as part of bilateral discussions on visa facilitation/liberalisation. From a current vantage point the most live development in this area is the question of visa-free travel between the EU and Russia. Although Russia is not a core concern of WP5, its relevance in this context is obvious and will be appraised alongside our Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova studies and other external publications.

EU Interests, EU Security Practices

The EU’s ‘Grand Strategy’ in the Eastern Neighbourhood can be distilled by looking at the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the more recent Internal Security Strategy (ISS). It is not necessarily the task of this WP to review the content of such documents at length, however they are worth mentioning for the insights they might give us. By its own admission the ISS does not set out any plans for ushering in any new competencies, but rather aims at integrating existing strategies in the areas of law-enforcement cooperation, integrated border management and criminal justice systems. Accent is placed upon what the common threats and challenges might be, the nature of the EU’s common internal security policy and the principles underpinning it and proceeds to define a

---

29 See, amongst other sources, the ENP Ukraine-EU Action Plan on JHA.
30 Report presented at an INEX Work Package Five workshop by Ukrainian official; communication with academic experts working on Russian/CIS relations.
‘European security Model’. Shared values and principles also adorn the ISS and ESS, referring to fundamental rights, the rule of law, solidarity, the root causes of insecurity and so on. However, the ISS is pretty bare when it comes to concrete measures on how various agencies could be more complementary to each other. Critics have also pointed to the fact that an internal security policy does not, in effect exist, according to EU Treaties. Instead what is actually ‘common’ are sector-specific areas such as borders, asylum, visas codes and so on.  

Three particular challenges appear in both the ESS and ISS, namely terrorism, serious and organized crime and cross border crime. The ENP is noted as one of the key instruments through such problems might be eased.

**What is a Security Practice?** An infinite number of laws, regulations and policies could reside under this semantic label. Our understanding derives from primary-sources documents, discussions and research that we have held with policy makers, researchers and practitioners engaged in EU-related security endeavours in the Eastern Neighbourhood and in particular the shared borders with the EU. We perceive that for the objectives of our Work Package, the notion of EU security practices in the Eastern neighbourhood context best equates with the idea of EU ‘bordering’ practices or processes involved in defining the nature of the external border – geographically, economically and politically. We are inspired by the body of literature straddling political science, geography and anthropology which focuses on the notion of borders/boundaries as social and cultural institutions and in particular in the context of EU enlargement and the wider Europe. In such a context what emerges is not so much a set of well-defined discreet set of ‘practices’ as such, but rather an interrelated collection of topics and associated questions which, as seen so far, lie at the heart of our Work Package:

1. The nature of the EU’s Eastern border – fuzzy or hard – the ENP’s role in shaping this.
2. The Extension of the Schengen Zone and its implications.
3. The trial and introduction of Mobility Partnerships / Security and Mobility Pacts between the EU / EU member states and individual neighbours.
4. The question of visas and discussions about liberalization / prospects of visa-free travel / readmission agreements.
5. The position of ENP within the EU’s bordering processes – alignment with the JHA Acquis etc.

---


6. The implications of ill-defined and un-demarcated borders, legacies of Soviet geographies and internal administrative borders.

The practices involved in these areas and their implementation, it is interesting to note, are subject to changing institutional and political parameters; namely the Lisbon Treaty, the rolling out of the Stockholm Process, the new EU internal Security Strategy and forthcoming reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy, including the Eastern Partnership as a key agenda point under the Hungarian and Polish EU Presidencies. Such developments, *Inter Alia*, foresee greater democratic oversight of internal security practices and agencies, by the European Parliament, ECJ and national parliaments and with this a simplification of budget and administrative procedures, more ‘joined-up’ working relationships between the range of institutions and bodies involved in EU security practices based upon better coordination and standardization of methods, equipment and risk analysis (COSI, Europol budget), a shift of some of the responsibilities held previously by member states towards the EU and a smoother overlap between ESDP and JHA policies and so on. As noted already above, we also see that evolutions in EU-Russia relations can impact upon EU bordering practices in the East, particularly if Russian citizens become able to travel into the EU without short-stay Schengen visas. In this scenario Russia would leave the Schengen ‘Black List’, whilst the ENP states would, it seems, remain. Such an initiative, which is currently on the table, might seem to fly in the face of EU pledges of developing better mobility packages for ENP partners Ukraine and Moldova. Finally, there remains a situation where Member states maintain wide competencies in the field, as Peter Hobbing notes; ‘National segments still dominate the picture as a sort of string of pearls loosely connected.’

The full outcomes of such new developments noted above have yet to be realized, but at the same time our Work Package seeks to understand what the consequences and deviations from existing security practices might be in the EU’s approach to the Eastern Neighbours. With this goal in mind we will continue our cooperation and discussions with border guard agencies within the EU and outside. Our research will also profit from collaboration with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in particular those departments heading-up the EaP/EU Presidency sections.

---

34 Eleonora Koeb ‘A More Political EU External Action: Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU’s relations with developing countries’ June 2008; Sarah Wolff (2009) ‘From The Hague to Stockholm: the Future of the EU’s Internal Security Architecture and police Cooperation’Overview Paper, Clingendael European Studies Programme. Commentating on this broad swathe of change INEX Work Package Four researchers have pointed to the profound links between ESDP and border management. In this context it is argued that ESDP’s raison d’être – enhancing the EU’s role in peacebuilding / conflict resolution is supplemented by a focus on border controls and illegal immigration matters. A memorandum of understanding for the use of ESDP military capabilities in FRONTEX operations was signed in 2008 and the European Defence Agency (EDA) is implicated in developing EUROSUR.

35 Hobbing p.67
To re-focus our attention on the notion of EU security practices we think that it is useful to cast the net widely to get a fuller sense of the extent of the EU’s presence in the Eastern neighbourhood. In the following table we attempt to draw out the goals, tools and instruments adopted by the EU when tackling security problems and issues generated in the Eastern neighbourhood. We ask what are the EU’s aspirations in the East in terms of the projection of norms and values, the promotion of economic prosperity, provisions for internal and external security and the EU’s wider participation in regional fora and organizations.
### TABLE: EU Security Practices in the Eastern Neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspirations of the European Union in the Neighbourhood</th>
<th>EU Policies, Practices and Instruments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Projection of Values and Norms</strong></td>
<td>• Mutually agreed-upon PCAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Use of conditionality in ENP Action Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The carrot of Association Agreements and/or enhancement of relations vis a vis the EU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sanctions; threat of sanctions; freezing of foreign assets/funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU focus on human rights, freedom of the media etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU engagement with civil society groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Election monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nurturing Economic Prosperity</strong></td>
<td>• Access to elements of the EU single market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prospect of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU support for entry into the WTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Aid and technical assistance (ENPI, AIDCO, Twinning etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU cooperation on Energy supply and Energy efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘External’ Security</strong></td>
<td>• European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pledge of ‘solidarity’ and protection of territorial integrity (especially after Georgia / Russia war)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Five plus Two talks on Transdniestria(^\text{37})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security of energy sources and transit – Extension of EU energy community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>‘Internal’ Security</strong></td>
<td>• EU Internal Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stockholm Programme(^\text{38})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Schengen borders / systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Stringent visa regulations; all three neighbouring states remain on the Schengen Black List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Visa liberalization/facilitation and Readmission Agreements, visa dialogues on prospects of visa-free regimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frontex’ coordination of risk analysis; security efforts at external borders, including agreements with third parties. EU external borders fund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Cooperation with State Border Guard Authorities; IBM handbooks, curricula etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Extension of Integrated Border Management systems and methods (legislation, documents, risk analysis, document security etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local border traffic initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Technological innovations; SIS, eurosur etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Broader Political Relations in the Region</strong></td>
<td>• EU Common Strategy for Ukraine (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• EU Special Representative for Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sub-regional fora i.e. Black Sea Synergy; Northern Dimension, Eastern Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Euroregions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{36}\) Highlighted in bold are the core policies currently under study in WP5.  
\(^{37}\) The 5+2 talks involve Moldova, Transdniestr, Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE plus the EU and the US.  
\(^{38}\) The successor to the Hague Programme attempts a less security-led agenda, less lead by the fight against terrorism and the European Security Strategy. With the Stockholm Programme greater emphasis rests on the slant of freedom and justice to address the apparent lack of observance of the so-called ethical principles, fundamental rights and liberties at the heart of the EU.
As stressed at the outset what we offer here is a working document; some food for thought in the advancement of our Work Package. Further rounds of fieldwork in Ukraine and Belarus will draw from this report and three forthcoming workshops will focus on specific security practices in the East, recent policy developments and initiatives (such as local border traffic regimes, border demarcation amongst the CIS and EU versus member-state competencies) and country-specific issues and on the ground evidence. For the moment we will hold on to the assertion made earlier that the EU’s use of dialogues on Visas with the Eastern neighbours has become a major component of Brussels’ foreign and security policy towards the region, indeed a standard requirement, perhaps in the EU’s endeavours to development its cooperation with third countries in this neighbourhood region. It was noted already in our state of the art report what the exact terms and direct implications of visa facilitation – readmission agreements between the EU and any given third party entail. It suffices to say that when it comes to the Eastern neighbourhood such agreements have already been sealed with both Ukraine and Moldova. It was the case of the EU’s dialogue with Russia and states in the Western Balkans on mobility questions that a link between readmission and visa facilitation - liberalisation was made. Subsequently, the link between readmission and visa facilitation became official for Ukraine, too.

39 Interestingly, the same kind of arrangement seems not to be applied to the Southern neighbours in such a regular manner. Refusal rates for visa applicants from the Maghreb region far exceed the numbers from the Eastern neighbourhood.
40 Same goes for the states of the Western Balkans
41 EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A new Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool? Florian Trauner Institute for European Integration Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna.
### Mobility Issues in ENP Action Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation between the Ukrainian State Border Service and Frontex Agency signed June 2007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Readmission / Visa Facilitation / Liberalisation

| Since 2001 the Ukraine has had a specific JHA Action Plan with the EU. |
| Visa Facilitation and Readmission agreements signed in 2008. |
| The European Commission launched the dialogue in October 2008. It focuses on four thematic blocks: document security including biometrics, illegal immigration including readmission, public order and security, and external relations. |
| 40% of Schengen visas are now delivered free of charge under the Visa Facilitation Agreement. |

### EU-Ukraine Association Agenda priorities for 2010

- Actively pursue the visa dialogue, developing the relevant conditions, with the long-term perspective of establishing a visa-free regime between the EU and Ukraine, as agreed at the EU-Ukraine Paris Summit of September 2008 with special attention to issues such as document security, illegal migration including readmission, public order and security, and external relations.
- Cooperation between the Ukrainian State Border Service and Frontex Agency signed June 2007

It is worth spending a few moments to reflect on the case of Ukraine, given its widely regarded position of ‘forerunner’ in relations with the EU amongst the group of Eastern neighbours. The visa facilitation and readmission agreements between Ukraine and the EC entered into force in January 2008, after signing the agreements by the two parties in June 2007. A first series of technical expert meetings was launched in December 2008 focusing on document security. On April 30, 2010 in Kyiv the joint readmission Committee discussed the implementation of the Ukraine-EU readmission agreement, creation of temporary holding facilities and migrant accommodation centers as well as the progress in signing of implementing protocols between Ukraine and individual EU member states as foreseen by paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Agreement.

In the field of border management many changes were introduced – in 2007 the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) went through a reform and as of 2008, personnel is recruited by using objective and transparent entry examinations and receive contracts. This is a significant change leading to the professionalism in the SBGS. The reform is based on the Resolution of June 2007 “On approval of the

---


43 The joint readmission Committee is set up to provide the Parties (Ukraine and the EC) with mutual assistance in the application and interpretation of the Agreement, which foresees regular and expedited procedures of re-admission, time limits as well as means of evidence regarding nationality and origin. The Committee meets twice a year.

state special purpose law enforcement programme ‘organisation and reconstruction of the state border’ for the period until 2015”. According to this programme, the government will allocate – until 2015 – up to about € 133 million for improvement of border infrastructure, including equipment.\(^45\) In 2008 reform of the State Border Guard Service (SBGS) continued in line with the targets of the 2015 plan in the area of upgrading of legislation, infrastructure and personnel training. It developed a risk analysis model based on the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Models. Practical cooperation between SBGS and FRONTEX focused on joint operations covering the total length of the EU’s external border with Ukraine, for instance through the ‘Five Borders’ joint-pilot project.

Furthermore, legislation allowing for biometric control of foreign nationals in the processing of visa applications was passed by the Parliament in November 2009. On 5 November 2009, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the EU/State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)-developed Law “On Border Control,” which introduces European standards governing the principles, objectives and methods of border control, risk assessment, and organization of border crossing points into Ukrainian legislation. This act is an integral part of Ukraine’s effort to fulfill its international commitments for EU integration, namely through establishing clear norms and conditions for border crossing and border control procedures and practices defined in the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EC) No. 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006\(^46\)).

\(^{46}\) http://soderkoping.org.ua/page26137.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Issues in ENP Action Plans</th>
<th>Readmission / Visa Facilitation / Liberalisation</th>
<th>Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No PCA and no Action Plan</td>
<td>The EU says that talks on visa facilitation and readmission agreements could start once better political conditions transpire in Belarus. In response to a lack of significant progress in HRs and good governance the EU has almost continuously frozen the foreign assets of the Belarusian government and issued visa bans for its members.</td>
<td>Schengen short-stay visas are more costly for Belarusian citizens than their Ukrainian and Moldovan counterparts. The EU continues to hold fast on its denial of Schengen Visas for certain members of the government. Cooperation between the Belarusian State Border Committee and Frontex Agency signed October 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

47 See the non-paper of 2006 [here](http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf) the nature of the EU’s current expectations vis a vis Belarus can be found in Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner’s speech on 22 June 2009: [here](http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/305&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en)


Moldova

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobility Issues in ENP Action Plans and Strategies</th>
<th>Readmission / Visa Facilitation / Liberalisation</th>
<th>Developments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **2003 Action Plan:** Pursue a dialogue concerning cooperation on visa policy. Exchange of views on Schengen procedures and initiate a dialogue on the possibilities of visa facilitation in compliance with the acquis – Dialogue and exchange of views on visa co-operation (criteria and the procedure for the issue of visas). Dialogue on document security. | Readmission / Visa Facilitation Agreement signed 2008 European Commission launched the dialogue with Moldova in June 2010 on the conditions for visa-free travel. | Cooperation Plan between Moldovan Border Guard Service and Frontex Agency signed March 2009 At the end of 2009 the Common Visa Application Centre in Chisinau which was opened in 2007 was issuing visas for ten EU Member States and two other Schengen states. In 2009, the Centre issued 6,918 visas, compared to 7,487 in 2008, a slight decrease linked to the decrease of applications. In November 2009, Moldova concluded an agreement for small distance cross-border movement with Romania, allowing visa-free stays of up to three months within a 50-km border strip in Romania for Moldovans resident for at least a year in the corresponding 50-km zone inside Moldova. The agreement came into effect after the reporting period. |}

The case of Moldova also provides some interesting insights. As noted above, EU-Moldova cooperation in the broad JHA area and mobility issues in particular have been on fast forward over the past few years. Not only has EUBAM had its mandate extended, but Moldova has also led the way in the piloting of the so-called mobility partnerships – an initiative set to be further developed in the context of the Eastern Partnership. Moldova has also appeared as the *bon éleve* by virtue of Chisinau’s success in adopting EU and international standards on biometric passports.

---

The Eastern Neighbourhood - Reaching a Milestone

We approached this Milestone Report as a means to provide some food for thought for the further implementation of WP5. We have collated and simplified some of our findings and thoughts which have emerged over the course of our research, many of which also provide pointers for us to continue to pursue over the coming months. In this final section we try to bring all this together into five main milestone points. At the end of these conclusions we present a diagramme to illustrate the place an functioning of the internal – external continuum in the Eastern neighbourhood.

1. **The WP5 is on course.** We have combined extensive amounts of desk-based research with elements of field-work. When it comes to the latter more has to be done. It takes some time to peel-off the various levels of agencies and institutions involved in the subject matter in all three countries, plus at the EU-level. Equally, collaboration with FRONTEX takes some time to deliver much needed data and insights from an EU perspective.

2. **EU Security Practices are Bordering Practices.** This statement sets a neat focus for us. We find that the EU’s bordering practices (Schengen rules, IBM, Visa rules etc, local border traffic etc.) illustrate the EU’s processes of setting parameters of identity based on degrees of difference: ‘a neighbour’, ‘a partner’, ‘a friend’, ‘a rival’, ‘a threat’. Equally, we keep EU Visa practices at the centre of our attention, since this, we argue, helps us illustrate the functioning of the internal/external security continuum in the Eastern neighbourhood. Further planned field-work in the three countries, coupled with three workshops will provide us with the means to refine our findings in this area.

3. **Fuzzy Borders provides us with a conceptual label.** WP5 is developing this well-known term. We see that it remains useful, but needs some updating. Our research can provide this detail and present a more nuanced reading of the nature of the borders in the East seen from both the inside and the outside.

4. **New Avenues of Enquiry.** Research needs to be both focused and dynamic. At this milestone juncture we see that WP5 has opened up a range of new topics that need to filter to some degree into our project. As mentioned above, EU-Russia relations are not strictly a concern for INEX, but in the context of WP5 the implications of intra-CIS border demarcations and border management regimes are crucial and often defining factors for the EU’s endeavours to strengthen its borders. With this in mind, two of our forthcoming workshops will involve experts on Russia-neighbourhood relations. Similarly, the topic of
migration is not supposed to feature as a key theme in our research, but our experience shows that we cannot side-step this issue and need to get a handle on current trends as they pertain to the Eastern neighbourhood. Our understanding of EU Border Management and functioning of FRONTEX and RABITS needs to be juxtaposed with a notion of what types of legal/illegal movements derive from the East, what kind of pressures they bring. With this in mind our next workshop will have speakers who are experts on European migration policy. Next, the proliferation of local border traffic regimes across the EU’s borders is providing us interesting examples of the EU’s bordering practices. We intend to delve a little more into these initiatives over the course of the next few months.

5. **Understanding the outcomes of the mix of national and EU competencies.** The question of EU competencies in the JHA area presents a rather mixed and messy picture. Experts themselves often fail to explain the intricacies of where and when the EU has a competence and where and when member states lead. One of our tasks has been to draw into the light of day this complex situation; examples that we have been using on this matter has been the Mobility Partnership schemes, concluded with Georgia, Moldova and also Cape Verde and the setting up of Common Visa Application Centres (CACs). These innovations seem to demonstrate the relevance and vitality of EU thinking on mobility matters and also the central role of the member states in actually realising the policy. In the context of the Lisbon Treaty more thought needs to be devoted to this question.
Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

AIDE MEMOIRE - Enhancing the role of the European Union in the Transnistrian conflict settlement process *Non-Paper presented by the Government of the Republic of Moldova*


EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD AND PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT BELARUS COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER


Working Arrangement on the Establishment of Operational Cooperation between the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the European Union (FRONTEX) and the State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus

Working Arrangement on the Establishment of Operational Cooperation between the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the European Union (FRONTEX) and the State Border Committee of the Republic of Moldova


SECONDARY SOURCES


http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/ARI75-2010


Dudzińska, Kinga Small Border Traffic with the Kaliningrad District http://www.pism.pl/bulletin/a198-2010.pdf


Koeb, Eleonora ‘A More Political EU External Action: Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon for the EU’s relations with developing countries’ June 2008;

Longhurst, Kerry (2010) 'Forging a new Ostpolitik: An Assessment of the European Union's Eastern Partnership' Studia i Analizy (Collegium Civitas) Published in Polish and English


Trauner, Florian EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: A new Standard EU Foreign Policy Tool? Institute for European Integration Research of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna.

Wasilewska, Olga et al. ‘What to do with Visas for the Eastern Europeans ?’ Batory Foundation, June 2009

Wolczuk K., Piorko I. (2001), Beyond the External Border: JHA in the Context of Relations Between Poland, Ukraine and the EU. Brussels, European Policy Centre.