

# How Historians May Explain the ‘East Asian Peace’

Stein Tønnesson

International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)

**This paper discusses how historians may go about seeking to explain that there has been so relatively little war in the East Asian region since 1979, after a period of three decades when East Asia was the world’s most war prone region, despite the fact that many serious territorial disputes remain, and that only some of the East Asian countries have made the transition to a democratic political system.<sup>1</sup>**

Since 1979, East Asia has been surprisingly peaceful. While there were on average ten armed conflicts<sup>2</sup> going on in East Asia each year in the period 1946–79, the average was down to 8 in the period 1980–2005. And if we only count conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths in one year (the PRIO Uppsala dataset’s threshold for qualifying an armed conflict as “war”), there were 4 such conflicts going on in an average year during 1946–79, but just 0.5 during 1980–2005. The worst year after WW2 was 1949, with 15 armed conflicts, eight of which were “wars”. The most peaceful year since 1945 was 2004, with four minor conflicts, none of which exceeded the 1,000 threshold. The tendency is even clearer if we look at how many people (soldiers and civilians) who were killed in acts of war (battle related deaths). While the total number of battle deaths in East Asia during the thirty years 1950–79 is estimated at 4.2 million, the number of battle deaths in the 26 years from 1980 to 2005 is calculated at just a little over 100,000 (Figure 1, based on data presented in Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). Battle death figures show that the first period after World War 2 was characterized by very high numbers of casualties (although lower than during WW2), mainly because of the Chinese Civil War, the First Indochina War and the Korean War. More people were killed in war in East Asia – and worldwide - in 1950 than in any other year since WW2. However, the mid-50s, after Stalin had died, the Korean armistice had been signed, Indochina had been divided by the Geneva conference, while the Bandung conference was held in Indonesia, and before Mao’s Great Leap Forward, were relatively peaceful. Then, from the late 1950s, the Second Indochina War took off and became the worst of all wars after 1945 in terms of the cumulated number of battle deaths. The last East Asian wars to take lives in the tens of thousands within a short time were the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978–79 and the ensuing Chinese invasion of Vietnam’s northern border provinces from January to


---

<sup>1</sup> ‘East Asia’ consists of Northeast Asia (Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and China with Hong Kong and Taiwan) and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma [Myanmar], Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, The Philippines, Brunei, and East Timor).

<sup>2</sup> An ‘armed conflict’ is defined in the PRIO-Uppsala dataset as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battl-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state.”

March 1979. Since then, the level of warfare has been on the same low level in East Asia as it was in the years 1955–57.

**Figure 1: Battle deaths in East Asia, 1946–2002**



While the decrease in battle related deaths follows a global decline, other regions have had significantly higher numbers of battle deaths since 1979. Hence there has also been a shift in the global geography of warfare from East Asia to other parts of Asia and Africa, and also to southeastern Europe. Only few attempts have been made to explain the dramatic decline in warfare in East Asia as compared to other world regions (Kivimäki 2001; Goldsmith 2007), a phenomenon we may tentatively call ‘the East Asian Peace’.

### What is there to explain?

The term ‘East Asian Peace’ is a catchphrase that could be misleading. We do not seek to explain that East Asian societies have become more just or more apt at peaceful conflict resolution, i.e., more peaceful in a deeper sense. To the extent that Asian societies have become more socially just or better equipped to manage or resolve conflicts peacefully, this should come in as explanatory factors (independent variables), not as part of the fact we seek to explain (the dependent variable). Our dependent variable is the number of battle deaths in the East Asian region, and we wish to explain why it was so low in the 1980–2005 period as compared with the 1945–79 period, and also as compared with other world regions. What was it that changed? Did the change happen in 1979, or did the drop in warfare follow changes that had begun earlier?

### Explanatory approaches

It is tempting to resort immediately to some of the standard theories of peace and security. Warfare is mostly a matter for states and groups intending to form a new state or take over an existing one. Hence realist theories based on power balance analysis are

likely to provide a good framework for explaining the East Asian Peace. The realignment of the Cold War conflict pattern during détente in the 1970s, with a bipolar system being replaced by a tripolar system, with China, Japan, the United States and all of ASEAN on the same side, may go a far way towards explaining the rapid drop in intensive warfare with great power involvement (Yahuda 1996: 77–104). After that, it has been argued, China and the United States have formed a kind of condominium, organizing East Asia into “two distinct spheres of influence”, within which each of the two powers holds sway and has ordered relations without the interference of the other (Ross 2003: 370; Odgaard 2007). At the same time, the completion of the decolonization process had led to the formation of a system of sovereign states with a growing capacity for controlling their territories and suppress insurgent groups. So growing state capacity, both for integration and repression, could be important causes behind the increasing stability and drop in armed violence in many East Asian societies.

An alternative approach would consist in comparing East Asia with the more well-known European Peace, and try to see if the same explanations that are generally thought to explain the deepening peace in Europe after World War 2, may also be valid for East Asia. It is generally believed that the relative absence of war in Europe between 1945 and 1989 was primarily caused by mutual deterrence between the two camps in the Cold War. The risk that a confrontation between East and West would lead to nuclear war led both sides to show restraint. Meanwhile, however, Western Europe went through a process of economic and political integration, instigated by leaders who were partly motivated by an urge to overcome the conflicts that had given ground for the two World Wars. The European integration process in the 1950s and 60s was accompanied and followed up by a process of democratization that spread from northwest to southern Europe in the 1970s and to eastern Europe after 1989. Hence the European Peace is considered a ‘liberal peace’, based on a combination of economic and political integration, liberal values, and democratic political systems. It is a problem for liberal peace theory that the East Asian case hardly fits the model. East Asia has seen neither political integration nor the introduction of democratic political systems on a general basis. East Asia consists of a mix of consistently authoritarian states (Brunei, Burma, China, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam), semi-democratic states with elections always won by the same party (Malaysia, Singapore), states that have shifted between authoritarian and democratic regimes (Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, East Timor) and well established electoral democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). With such a mix of authoritarian, democratic and in-between forms of governance, East Asia should not enjoy any ‘protection’ from the rule that democracies rarely fight each other. Instead this ought to make East Asia more war-prone than some other regions. Liberal peace theory can only explain the East Asian Peace if it is premised entirely on *economic* integration (Goldsmith 2007). Moreover the first decades of economic growth in East Asia were characterized by global rather than regional economic integration, with a rapidly increasing and lucrative trade with the USA and Europe.

A third kind of explanation, also to some extent inspired by the European example, is cultural or constructivist. The assumption would then be that there has been a shift of attitudinal paradigm leading to a drop in the practice of armed conflict. Northeast Asia, with the stalemate in Korea and the continued suspicion between Japan and China, does not lend itself easily to a constructivist explanation, which must therefore seek

support mainly in Southeast Asian practices and in the ideology of “Asian Values” or the “ASEAN Way”. Southeast Asia may be assumed to have formed a distinct culture characterized by informal consultation and consensus-building. In the process of founding and expanding the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Southeast Asian leaders agreed to put their differences aside while showing “good-neighborliness” (Acharya 2000: 127–128; Acharya 2001: 47–79). Acharya (2001) claims that ASEAN contributed to peace by “fostering a climate of socialization and trust.” ASEAN further widened the regional scope of such consensus-building to Northeast Asia by establishing consultative forums with outside powers (ASEAN+3, ASEAN Regional Forum).

An alternative to applying existing theories to the East Asian case is to first undertake a systematic empirical study of all armed conflicts in East Asia during the period 1945–2005, compare the period 1945–79 systematically to the period 1980–2005, compare East Asian trends with trends in other world regions as well as with the global pattern, distill some main findings and only then relate them to existing theories, or form new ones.

If we do this, we may choose two different empirical approaches, which are both valuable, and should be pursued in parallel. One is statistical, while the other consists of historical case studies. By ‘case’ is not here meant one that is representative of a large sample, but one that is interesting in itself, and which may also be compared with others. The statistical analyst will wish to separate the history of armed conflict in East Asia into a number of quantifiable entities, such as ‘armed conflicts’, ‘conflict years’ or ‘conflict dyads’, and then correlate them with other factors such as ‘trade’, ‘FDI’, ‘democracy/autocracy’, etc, in the hope of finding statistically significant correlations. Goldsmith (2007) has made a good start at practicing this method, and finds that liberal peace theory fits with the East Asian case if we leave out the political side of the theory and keep just its economic aspect. Peace in East Asia is highly correlated with economic growth and increased trade.

By contrast to the statistically oriented economist or political scientist, the political historian will tend to discriminate already at the outset between the more or less salient armed conflicts in terms of severity and regional ramifications. He or she would examine the start, duration and ending of each conflict on a case by case basis, focusing mainly on the most important ones, and the biggest or most powerful states. Then the historian would seek to explain why there were more armed conflicts and more devastating conflicts in the 1946–79 than the 1980–2005 period. With the historian’s inclination towards chronology, he or she will moreover try to discern certain decisive moments or turning points, and see if something happened then, or shortly before, that could explain later developments. The historian would be open to the possibility that a few key choices, made by individual leaders such as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping or Suharto, on the basis of their attitudes and perceptions, may have played a determining role.

### **Which wars? What violence?**


‘East Asia’ consists of Northeast Asia: Japan, North and South Korea, Mongolia, and China with Hong Kong and Taiwan; and Southeast Asia: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma [Myanmar], Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, The Philippines, Brunei, and East Timor. The region thus comprises 17 internationally recognized states and also

the Republic of China, which is recognized only by a few countries, but has exerted de facto control of Taiwan and a few small islands on the Chinese coast for almost sixty years. Figure 2 shows the wars and armed conflicts among and within these 18 states in the period 1946–2005. We see that the decline in the number of “wars” – with more than 1,000 battle deaths in a year – exceeds the decline in the number of minor conflicts – with between 25 and 2000 battle deaths in a year.

The worst wars in East Asia (and the world) in the pre-1980 period were the Chinese Civil War 1945–49 (which flared up again with Taiwan in 1954 and 1958), the First Indochina War 1945–54, the Korean War 1950–53, and the Second Indochina War 1959–75, during which Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia continued to be seen both by Hanoi and the USA as a combined military theater. In addition there were a number of liberation struggles and insurgencies in several Southeast Asian countries, and many of these insurgencies were supported by China. In the 1960s there was a short period of Konfrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia, costing the lives of many Indonesian soldiers. And there was a brief, but extremely murderous war between China and Vietnam January–March 1979. In addition to the armed conflicts as such there were also genocides, massacres and violent repressions conducted by states against their own population or minority groups within it (Tibet 1959, Indonesia 1965, Cambodia 1975–78) and there were economic and social experiments leading to enormous losses of human life (the Great Leap Forward 1958–60, the Cultural Revolution 1966–69). This violence happened in conjunction with the formation of a new indigenous East Asian state system to replace the European and Japanese colonial empires, and with ideological class wars between various state-building groups. One possible explanation for the turn towards less warfare in East Asia by the end of the 1970s may be that the formative phase of the regional state system was over, often in effect of one party having won against another (China 1949, Malaya 1957, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 1975). However, this is not the whole truth. The Korean and Taiwanese disputes were not resolved, many border issues remained, new maritime border issues emerged, several secession movements continued their struggle on a lower scale while waiting for new opportunities, and there was also the unresolved dispute over Vietnam’s dominance in Cambodia and Laos, as well as over the status of Mongolia. So the East Asian Peace cannot be explained primarily by military victories or the resolution of disputes.

The worst wars since 1979 have been in Cambodia 1978–89; in East Timor and Aceh until they achieved independence and autonomy respectively, and still today in West Papua; in the Philippines, where conflicts between the government and Communist and Islamist insurgent movements cost many thousand lives in the 1980s and are still ongoing; and in Burma, where various conflicts escalated to large-scale warfare in the period 1992–94, after a junta had been established in defiance of the elections held in 1992. In south Thailand, after a long period of relative peace, violence flared up again in 2003, albeit on a relatively low level. Although these are serious problems, causing much suffering and inhibiting social and economic development, the scale of armed fighting in East Asia since 1979 has been surprisingly low.

**Figure 2: Armed conflicts in East Asia 1946–2005<sup>3</sup>**



So what we need to explain is firstly, how the wars in the pre-1989 period ended, and secondly, why the states and groups who conducted them did not engage in new and similarly devastating wars after 1979. In order to approach these questions, we need to discern the time when each country made its transition from war policies to conflict avoidance policies, and conduct case studies of each transition.

Before starting we must ask if the reasons behind the downward trend in international warfare are likely to be the same as the reasons behind the decline in internal warfare. The process leading states to wage war against each other is often different from a process leading to an insurgency or a breakup of a regime into factions fighting each other. A possible research strategy is to start by separating internal from interstate wars, and subject them different kinds of analysis and explanatory frameworks. This, however, seems very difficult in the case of East Asia since so many of its internal wars were inseparable from their international dimensions and vice versa. It is very difficult to categorize the Indochina and Korea Wars as either internal or international, since they were both at the same time. States formed alliances and got help from their allies both against each other and against insurgent groups. Many rebel groups were also allied with each other in both ideological and practical terms, and they obtained assistance from external powers. Hence it does not seem fruitful to distinguish too rigorously between internal and interstate wars in East Asia. We should rather look for changes in the general pattern of war and peace.

<sup>3</sup> An armed conflict is defined as ‘war’ in the PRIO-Uppsala dataset if it has more than 1,000 battle deaths in one year. A ‘minor conflict’ has more than 25 (but less than 1,000) battle deaths in one year.

And in order to explain such changes, it must be useful to determine as precisely as possible the time when a transition from militaristic to diplomatic policies took place. I'm not necessarily thinking of the time a war ended in either victory, a ceasefire or a peace agreement, but of the time when national and other leaders shifted to a policy of war avoidance. And I'm not mainly concerned with their declaratory policies, but with their practice, their actual choices.

### **When did peace come?**

If we look at the statistics presented in the graphs above, it would seem that 1979 was the great regional watershed in East Asia. This is true for *China*, not just because this was the year when it obtained American recognition, but mainly because the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and Deng Xiaoping's victory over the Gang of Four marked a shift to a new kind of policy. Mao had always relied on violence, both rhetorically and practically. He believed in violent revolution and led it to victory, he engaged China on the side of North Korea in 1950 and obtained a stalemate, he provided massive support to the Viet Minh and later North Vietnam in its armed struggle, which succeeded, and he also supported other insurgent movements, with much less success. In the 1960s, Mao worked on the assumption that World War 3 was inevitable, and he provoked armed clashes with the Soviet Union at the Ussuri River in 1969, leading to a danger of a nuclear exchange. Deng Xiaoping was by no means a pacifist. He had served Mao until he was vilified during the Cultural Revolution. And once he was back in power, one of his first foreign policy acts was to launch a punitive expedition against Vietnam in January 1979. However, once Deng had consolidated power in his own hands and seen the terrible effects of his war with Vietnam, he settled for a very different policy of prioritizing economic growth, seeking to avoid armed conflict, and maintaining a de facto alliance with the West in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. His successors would continue his economy-first policy, and resolve a number of border disputes, while also modernizing China's military forces. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has upheld a policy of repressing democratic dissent, reacting violently against any outburst of protest movements among the Tibetans or Uighurs against Han Chinese domination, and it has obliged itself by law to attack Taiwan if the island declares itself independent. Still it seems remarkable that China has not been engaged in one single war since it withdrew from Vietnam in 1979, in a period when other great powers, the USA, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and a range of middle powers, have been engaged in a series of wars of intervention. So 1979 certainly seems like a watershed for China on its way from war to relative peace. Because of China's size and importance 1979 therefore also seems like the best candidate for being considered as the turning point in the region as a whole.

However, if we leave China aside, we shall find that the other countries in the region made similarly paradigmatic transitions at other points of time. *Japan's* transition happened as an immediate consequence of its defeat in World War 2, which compromised its militarism not just internationally, but also in the view of its own population. Japan's new constitution was drafted, deliberated upon and adopted in 1946 and entered into effect on 3 May 1947, with its famous article 9 stating that the "Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes", and providing that "land, sea, and air

forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained". This clause has not since been fully respected. Japan has built up and maintained a highly modern and well equipped Self Defense Force, but Japanese troops have not taken directly part in any war, although there has been mounting political pressure to let Japan take part in UN operations or UN-sanctioned coalition warfare. (Among the world's major armies, the Japanese, Chinese and German are today the ones with the least real war fighting experience.)

In *Korea*, the first turning point was the armistice agreement in July 1953, which put an end to the armed fighting although it did not formally end the war, which has still not been concluded by a treaty. What might perhaps have been a second turning point occurred in 1971–72 and again in 1978–79, in conjunction with the two reorientations of China's foreign policy, leading to unsuccessful attempts at dialogues between the North Korean and South Korean leaders. A more significant turning point came in 1991, when the two Koreas both joined the United Nations as members at the same time, while keeping up their long term goal of national unity. A crisis provoked by the discovery of North Korea's nuclear program was temporarily resolved in 1994 through a multilateral agreement. A new turning point was South Korea's switch to the so-called 'sunshine policy' when Kim Dae-Jung was elected president in December 1997, obtaining the first South-North summit in June 2000. During the aggressive US presidency of George W. Bush, South Korea played the role of peace maker, seeking to smoothen out differences with North Korea and providing investments and humanitarian support in an attempt to secure peace on the Korean peninsula, with a view to unleashing the whole of Korea's potential as a regional economic hub. On October 4, 2007, the South Korean and North Korean governments signed an agreement to pursue peace.

If we move to *Indonesia* and Southeast Asia, an important reorientation took place when Sukarno fell from power and General Suharto took over in 1965–67. The regime change happened in reaction to a violent coup, provoking a massacre of almost genocidal proportions against the Indonesian left, who did not take up arms to defend themselves. By contrast to Sukarno, who had carried out a balancing act between the country's two main organized forces, the Army and the Communist Party, Suharto's New Order was based squarely on the Army, which was set to carry out two functions at the same time. One was to defend the country's borders, the other to continuously suppress two *internal* enemies: Communism and Islamist separatism. On the internal level, Suharto's New Order was extremely repressive, and it also seized the chance to invade and occupy East Timor when it slipped away from Portuguese rule in 1975. However, Suharto also departed from Sukarno's policies in two other significant ways. Where Sukarno had been experimenting with state-run companies and had no interest or understanding of the market mechanism, Suharto applied policies to stimulate export-driven economic growth. He also realigned Indonesia's foreign policy with the West, and reconciled Indonesia with its neighbors to the north, called off Sukarno's policy of Konfrontasi against the formation of the Malaysian federation, and founded ASEAN in 1967 together with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. On November 27, 1971, the foreign ministers of ASEAN declared a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and stated "1. That Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are



determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;” and “2. That South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.” In ASEAN’s conflict with Vietnam, Suharto’s Indonesia played a moderating role. Indonesia thus combined a policy of harsh internal repression with a quest for regional consensus and stability. Only with the fall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor in 1999, and the Aceh peace agreement in 2005 did the Indonesian government seem to engage in a more consistent – and democratically oriented – peace policy. It is noteworthy that the wave of Islamist terrorism in the early 2000s seems to have petered out in Indonesia (Sidel 2007), so the world’s most populous Muslim country may now also be the most stable and democratic of them all.

*Vietnam* only made its transition to a more peace-oriented policy in the late 1980s, in connection with a change of top leaders (from Le Duan to Truong Chinh to Nguyen Van Linh) and with its economic reform policy (Doi Moi). By keeping troops and advisors in Cambodia during the whole of the 1980s rather than seeking an internationally negotiated solution, Vietnam contributed to keeping Cambodia in a state of continuous warfare. The other party contributing to this outcome was the Sino-US-Thai alliance that supported the insurgency of the loose alliance of royalist, liberal and Khmer Rouge forces in western Cambodia. In the late 1980s, Vietnam adopted a new foreign policy aiming to break out of its dependence on the Soviet Union and making friends with everyone (Thayer and Amer 199). This led to Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989, which in turn paved the way for the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991, allowing a boost to Thailand’s Prime Minister Chatichai Chonhavan’s vision of an Indochinese market place. What we may call “The Vietnam Peace” after 1989, as a contrast to “The Vietnam War” of the 1960s–70s, brought normalization with China in 1991, with the USA in 1995, entry for all three Indochinese countries (and Myanmar) in ASEAN during 1995–98, and membership in the World Trade Organization for Cambodia in 2004 and Vietnam in 2007.

What I’m trying to suggest is that the East Asian Peace came in stages (Japan 1946; Korea 1953/1991/2000; Insular Southeast Asia 1967; China 1979; Indochina 1989–91; Indonesia internally 1999/2005), and that a higher level of peace and stability was established through a certain number of political transitions with effect for both the foreign and internal policies of the states concerned. A historian seeking to explain the East Asian Peace will want to examine each of those transitions and compare them with a view to establishing what they have in common and what distinguishes each transition from the others. Such an analysis must also emphasize the limitations of each transition. Since some serious international disputes remain unresolved, since no solid regional organization has been established for East Asia as a whole, since several regimes remain highly repressive, and are preventing social movements and ethnic minorities from expressing their grievances and fighting non-violently for their perceived rights, we should ask if the East Asian Peace can be sustainable.

## What might be the conclusion?

If we compare the transitions outlined above, they seem to have two features in common:

1. The main national leaders shifted priority from pursuing nationalist or ideological goals linked to control of territory to a policy of giving main priority to (at first export-driven) economic growth – and many of them succeeded. I'm not implying that it was the growth in production or trade or welfare in itself that led to more peaceful conditions. Instead I suggest that when the top national leaders decided to set economic growth as their main benchmark of success, they tended to see territorial disputes as a nuisance, and therefore sought either to resolve such disputes, shelve them, or put them under the carpet.
2. Established governments sought to align themselves with the world's leading capitalist power, the USA, through formal or de facto alliances, or simply through rapprochement with a view to diplomatic recognition. The defeated Japan quickly found its place under the umbrella of its former foe and occupying power in 1945–47, and has since remained a loyal US ally. For all practical purposes, the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand also remained firmly attached to the UK and/or USA, even though some of them could be vocal in their criticism of Western deprivation and arrogance. Indonesia switched from leftist non-alignment to a US alliance in 1965–67. China switched sides in the Cold War after its clash with the Soviet Union in 1969, took over the Chinese UN seat in 1971 and obtained full US recognition in 1979. Vietnam reconciled itself with its former enemy and worked assiduously for six years in order to obtain US recognition in 1995. North Korea is now engaged in a similar effort to get a peace treaty and recognition from the world's only superpower.

The main explanation for “the East Asian Peace” would seem to be that a growing number of national leaders have come to prioritize economic growth and good relations with the USA over more divisive or provocative aims. Can any kind of general theory be derived from this finding? Could we say more generally: When political leaders give priority to economic growth in a system that is open to international trade and investments, and seek to maintain cordial relations with the global hegemon, then they tend to see disputes over territory and national symbols as a nuisance rather than a matter of life or death; hence they tend to downplay conflicts or even resolve them.

If this is so, it would seem that the East Asian Peace depends on the health of the global economy as well as on US power – hard as well as soft. How long will these two conditions obtain? Might East Asians find it preferable to put their peace on a more solid footing, make a regional virtue of the relative peace they have enjoyed for close to three decades, and discuss how to make it sustainable?

## References

- Acharya, Amitav 2000. *The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeast Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Acharya, Amitav 2001. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*. London: Routledge.
- Alagappa, Mutthiah (ed.) 1998. *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press: 445–476.
- Brødsgaard, Kjeld Erik and Susan Young (eds) 2000. *State Capacity in East Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Calder, Kent E. 2006. “Stabilizing the US-Japan-China Strategic Triangle”, The Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies (Washington DC) *Asia-Pacific Policy Papers Series*.
- Clodfelter, Micheal 2002. *Warfare and Armed Conflicts. A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000*. Jefferson NC: McFarland.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand 2002. “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 39, No. 5: 615–637.
- Goldsmith, Benjamin E. 2007. “A Liberal Peace in Asia?”, *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 44, No. 1: 5–27.
- Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch 2001. “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992,” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 95, No. 1: 17–33.
- Kivimäki, Timo 2001. “The Long Peace of ASEAN.” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 1: 5–25.
- Lacina, Bethany, and Nils Petter Gleditsch 2005. “Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,” *European Journal of Population* Vol. 21, No. 2: 145–166.
- Lacina, Bethany Ann, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Bruce M. Russett 2006. “The Declining Risk of Death in Battle,” *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 50, No. 3: 673–680.
- Odgaard, Liselotte 2007. *The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security: US-China policies on regional order*. London: Routledge.
- Ross, Robert S. 2003. “The U.S.-China Peace: Great Power Politics, Spheres of Influence, and the Peace of East Asia,” *Journal of East Asian Studies*, No. 3: 351–375.
- Sidel, John T. 2007. “Is it Not Getting Worse: Terrorism is Declining in Asia,” *Global Asia*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 41–49.
- Thayer, Carlyle A. and Ramses Amer (eds) 1999. *Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Tønnesson, Stein forthcoming. “The Vietnam Peace.” In Ari Kokko (ed.), *Twenty Years of Doi Moi*. Hanoi: UNDP.