

Hear nothing, see nothing, say nothing: Can states reduce the risk of armed conflict by banning census data on ethnic groups?

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Abstract

Can states reduce the risk of violent political conflict by simply refusing to collect or publish data on their ethnic makeup and change? This study addresses a neglected aspect of the ethnic conflict literature and provides the first systematic empirical study of the significance of recording ethnic affiliation in censuses for the risk of armed conflict. A general empirical regularity noted in the ethnic heterogeneity and civil war literature is that ethnicity is associated with a somewhat higher risk of conflict in bipolar societies. However, few quantitative studies focus on how changes in the relative strength of groups may affect the risk of civil war. Some recent literature indicates that differential growth may destabilize heterogeneous democracies internally. In democratic societies, political power is distributed according to popular support in elections. A changing balance between groups may thus alter the distribution of power in regimes where ethnic, linguistic or religious divisions to a certain extent determine voting behavior, and this may potentially lead to political instability and ultimately civil conflict. We argue that the relationship between differential growth and instability and violence may be even more important in semidemocracies with electoral systems, but with weak and inconsistent political institutions. We start from the premise that, for differential growth to become a potential driver of instability and violent conflict, information about such change has to be recorded with a national census and actually published. In a cross-national time-series study we investigate whether countries publishing identity data from censuses are at a greater risk of experiencing low-intensity armed conflict. We find that the effect of publishing data on group size is indeed mediated through political institutions. In countries with stable institutions, publication of population identity data is associated with a lower risk of conflict, whereas unstable institutional arrangements are associated with an increase conflict risk when publishing such data.

1.0 Introduction

Comparative empirical studies generally suggest a modest impact of ethnic¹ heterogeneity on violent conflict (Ellingsen, 2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2001; Henderson & Singer, 2000), but settlement patterns appear to be crucial (Melander, 2009; Toft, 2003). It has further been suggested that ethnic conflicts may have different causal roots than other conflicts (Sambanis, 2001; Besancon, 2005). As it is clear that multi-ethnicity in itself is not a strong predictor of conflict, we should focus on what contextual factors makes identity politically relevant. In societies where political power, and thus scarce resources, is partly distributed according to ethnic divisions, we would like to know what mechanisms can trigger political violence.

Some recent scholarship has focused on the importance of institutionalization of ethnicity for ethnic violent conflict to arise. Lieberman & Singh argue that institutionalization increases ethnic differentiation, and that increased differentiation again produces a competitive dynamic increasing the risk of spiraling aggression (2012: 2). National censuses are a major vehicle for states' institutionalization of ethnic categories. Censuses containing ethnic categories force individuals to routinely choose an identity category, deepening institutionalized ethnicity (ibid.: 5). A dynamic of particular relevance pertains to the role that an ethnic census may reveal information about changes in strength between ethnic groups. The political influence of an ethnic group is often at least partly a function of its size, and to the extent that it is true that numbers matter, it is also plausible to assume that perceptions of a change in balance between ethnic groups could increase concerns over shifts in power. A number of studies of ethnic conflict have suggested that when ethnic groups grow at different rates, this may lead to fears of an altered political balance, potentially causing political instability and violent conflict (Bauman & Leech, 2012; Brown, 2001; DeVotta, 2002; Goldstone, 2002; Horowitz, 2001; Kaufmann, 2011, Krebs & Levy, 2001; Lake & Rothchild, 2001; Sciubba, 2011; Toft, 2002; 2003; 2007; 2012; Urdal, 2008; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001; Wriggins & Guyot, 1973).

Anecdotal evidence for such connection is ample. In Lebanon, censuses were suspended altogether to avoid conflict over the distribution of ethnic quotas for

¹ We will be using 'ethnic group' and 'ethnicity' interchangeably for identity groups separated by linguistic, religious or ethnic divisions.

parliamentary elections (Baaklini, 1983; Krebs & Levy, 2001). In Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 1990s, radical Serb leaders were agitating for the secession of ‘Serbian’ areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina by instigating popular fears that Serbs would soon be outnumbered by a growing Muslim population heading for the establishment of a Shari’a state (Urdal, 2001). In Northern Ireland, the Catholic population is projected to form a majority of the electorate within a few decades, contributing to shape the ethnonationalist conflict (Kaufmann, 2011). While potentially overlapping identities like ‘Yugoslav’ and those emphasizing stronger ethnic ties like Serb, Croat or Bosniak/Muslim in Bosnia-Herzegovina underscore the fact that individuals often have multiple identities (Sen, 2010) and that political conditions may partly determine which identity is most salient (Urdal, 2001), the fluidity of identity, for instance as a result of significant political changes, can contribute to greater shifts in the balance between ethnic groups.

Despite often being mentioned as a potential driver of ethnic conflict, surprisingly few attempts have been made to systematically explore how and when institutionalizing of ethnic identity and shifts in the ethnic balance can influence conflict behavior. A noticeable exception is Toft (2007), who tests the differential growth propositions for a global time-series sample of countries.² She finds mixed evidence for the effect of differential growth, in that countries with decreasing majorities were at greater risk of conflict when the minority was static, but not when the minority was increasing. Bauman & Leech (2012) and Urdal (2008) find corroborating evidence at the regional level in India.

While Toft’s test represents a very significant advance in the study of ethnicity and armed conflict, using global datasets on ethnic composition to measure changes in relative group size over time represents some challenges. Data on ethnic composition over time are often based on a variety of different sources, including censuses, surveys and expert assessments. Methods to gauge group size vary hugely over time and between different estimation approaches, and so do ethnic categories. Hence, changes

² In an early stage of this project we attempted to analyze the impact of differential growth directly, based on estimates made from a widely used dataset on ethnic heterogeneity (Ellingsen, 2000). The dataset is not constructed for this purpose, however, and is of limited use as a basis for estimating inter-census differential growth especially due considerable changes in what categories constitute the two largest groups over time within the same country.

in group size over time as recorded by these datasets may include shifts that merely result from the use of different sources. These ‘shifts’ are not necessarily observed by ethnic entrepreneurs or the population at large, and should be less likely to affect instability and inter-ethnic conflict.

The aim of this study is to investigate the potential role of identity registration in censuses as a trigger of political instability and political violence. We are not attempting to test the differential growth argument directly. We argue, however, that ethnic census categorization leads to a deepening of ethnic differentiation, and that a census will often be the most authoritative source to estimates of the ethnic composition and change of populations. There will always be some variation between the growth rates of ethnic groups, and even small changes can be utilized by ethnic entrepreneurs. Even if the balance between ethnic groups is maintained at the country level, a census may reveal regional or local changes in groups size causing tensions. Hence we focus here on the role that the ethnic census plays in institutionalizing ethnicity and implicitly ethnic competition. For the purpose of cross-national comparison we consider whether countries that publish data on ethnic composition are more prone to violent conflict and political instability than those countries that conceal ethnicity in the census. We ask whether states are able to reduce the risk of armed conflict simply by not publishing data on ethnic composition. If so, this would have important policy implications. The results from this study suggest that publishing such data is primarily a problem in states with unstable regimes.

2.0 Ethnicity, differential growth and political violence

The numerosness of ethnic groups is generally related to their political influence. Horowitz argues that it is not only the numbers as such that matter, but that the ‘apprehensions about numbers are equally important’ (2001: 170). Fears of being outnumbered may cynically be exploited for political purposes even where higher minority growth poses no real threat to overwhelm a majority. DeVotta (2002) shows how differential growth is exploited by Hindu fundamentalists to stir up inter-communal tensions even under the impossible scenario that the 10% Muslims in India will outnumber the Hindu population for the next several hundred years. As Krebs & Levy (2001: 82) note, ‘ethnic groups in a society generally have different fertility rates and different rates of immigration’, and hold that the differential growth argument overstates the relationship. We agree, of course, that differential growth does not always

lead to serious episodes of instability and conflict. Rather, the relationship is conditioned on several factors that will be addressed below. Krebs & Levy (2001: 82) go on to argue that the differential growth hypothesis fails to recognize that ethnicity is neither constant nor exclusive. This goes to the heart of the problem of comparing multi-ethnicity cross-nationally and temporally as there are no universal criteria employed for determining what constitutes a separate identity group and thus for measuring multi-ethnicity. Census categories as well as subjective self-identification can change significantly within the same country over time. In our view, this is a more fundamental critique of large-N empirical studies of ethnic heterogeneity and conflict. For the differential growth argument, the question of whether ethnic categories are static or exclusive is of lesser importance. Furthermore, changes in census categories or people's self-identification are an integral part of popular apprehension of changes in relative strength. But as Horowitz (2001: 170) notes, 'the significance of numbers, real or apprehended, should not be overestimated. Numbers often have something to do with political power, but not always, not everywhere, and not everything'. Our aim with this article is to try to answer whether the publication of identity data from censuses, indicating deeper ethnic differentiation and potentially contributing to increasing competitive dynamics, may be related to low-intensity conflict risk.

2.1 Census and the numbers game

In terms of quantifying ethnic groups, censuses are by far the most important and authoritative tool. According to Kertzer & Arel (2002: 30), the census tends to become politically contested because it is the most important means by which 'majorities' and 'minorities' are being officialized. 'The acts of categorizing and measuring become parts of society's struggles, both directly – for they set the size of various groups' claims on scarce resources – and indirectly – for they contribute to crystallizing people's identities' (Uvin, 2002: 170). But not only do census categories contribute to institutionalizing and deepening state-approved ethnic identities, there are also examples of campaigning from 'below' to make census categories better correspond to subjective identification.

The census is an indication of whose country it is, and needs to be 'won' (Horowitz, 1985: 194, 196). In fact, in many countries, the instrumental dimensions of

census politics are immense, and the prize for winning similarly large. The measuring of ethnic groups may be used to inform policies such as the establishment of social programs based on sizes of ethnic minorities, establishing quotas for ethnic representation in parliament or public administration, and the designation and use of official languages in schools and public administration, nationally or locally.

While changes in relative size between groups is often popularly portrayed as being a result of high fertility (see Kaufmann & Skirbekk, 2011; Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998; and Toft, 2011 for contributions on the political-religious dimensions of fertility) and immigration, aspects about the census itself may also be important reasons why groups change over time. Ethnic identities are not mutually exclusive or clear cut. This presents challenges to census enumerators trying to fit individuals into often preset ethnic categories. Colonial powers often struggled to find categories that could place their colonial subjects in the racial hierarchy, colonial censuses in Malaysia show ‘an extraordinarily rapid, superficially arbitrary, series of changes, in which categories are continuously agglomerated, disaggregated, recombined, intermixed, and reordered’ (Anderson, 1992: 164, summarizing original studies by Charles Hirschman). Significant changes in categories happen quite frequently, even in US censuses (Nobles, 2002), and categories may further be overlapping, allowing individuals to feel affinity with multiple identities (Sen, 2010). While changes in categories most often result from governmental initiatives, there are also examples that popular pressure has forced governments to recognize new categories. A prominent example is the massive registration by Slavic Muslims as ‘uncategorized Yugoslavs’ in the 1953 census finally leading to the recognition of ‘Muslims’ as a separate category in the 1971 census (Urdal, 2001).

In addition to altered identity categories, changes in perceptions among the respondents may also account for substantial variation in the support for ethnic groups. Kertzer & Arel (2002: 28-29) describe how groups have been campaigning for respondents to report specific identities. Following a grassroots campaign against the ‘balkanization’ of Canada, the share of registered ‘Canadiens’ on the ‘ethnic origin’ question, increased from 3.3 to 24.1 per cent between 1991 and 1996 (Kertzer & Arel 2002: 16). Categories appearing as ambiguous to respondents may equally lead to unforeseen and shifting results. On the race question in the 1981 US census, 55.6 per cent of all Hispanics considered themselves to be white, while the other half either reported ‘other’ or ‘black’ (Thernstrom, 1987: 315). Identity groups that are presented

as examples are also increasingly likely to be reported, as shown for the ancestry question in the 1970 US census (Kertzer & Arel, 2002: 17).

The assumption made here is that publishing data on ethnicity showing differential growth may be exploited by political entrepreneurs to create fears of being outnumbered. In France, asking questions on ethnicity, language or religion is prohibited by law. In Lebanon, censuses were suspended after the 1932 census showing a narrow Christian majority. In Pakistan the government postponed the census five times between 1991 and 1998, fearing violence by groups likely to claim that they were undercounted. When the results finally were published they showed the highly improbable result that there had been no change in relative group size since 1981 (Kertzer & Arel, 2002: 23). In Burundi, ethnic categories have been officially ruled out to mask the rule of the Tutsi minority, while in Mauretania, the results of the 1978 census were suppressed by the minority Moor government (Kertzer & Arel, 2002: 23).

Hence, we would like to know whether a country that publishes data potentially showing a changed balance between ethnic, religious or linguistic groups are more likely to experience political violence, *ceteris paribus*. From this follows the next question: Under what conditions is public knowledge of differential growth dangerous?

2.2 Differential growth and violence

To the extent that numbers constitute an element in the distribution of political power and resources between groups, a change in numbers is a factor that may alter the balance of power and potentially lead to instability and violence (Kerzer & Arel, 2002: 30; Toft, 2002: 75; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001: 32). Shifts in the balance of groups may be particularly volatile in contexts where resources are distributed unevenly between groups, so-called horizontal inequality (Østby, 2008; Cederman, Gleditsch & Buhaug, 2013).

We contend that for differential growth to be an important driver of instability and violence, proof of such changes has to be publicized and known among the population. It is not primarily slow, actual changes ‘on the ground’ that matters, but rather fears of being outnumbered, usually instigated by political entrepreneurs. As noted by Weiner & Teitelbaum (2001: 32), groups often perceive differences in their relative size and growth rates as affecting the distribution of political power for the future. Hence, current population trends projected into the future may be thought to foretell changes in future political fortunes of competing ethnic groups. While not the

only source to such information, we have chosen to focus on the publication of identity data from censuses, including religion, ethnicity, and language.

There are a number of factors that have been argued to increase the risk that differential growth results in instability and violence. The most important contextual factor is type of governance. In heterogeneous societies where political power is distributed through open elections, a changing balance between identity groups is most likely to be perceived as a threat to the political balance (Toft, 2002; Weiner & Teitelbaum, 2001). But also aspects about the composition are likely to affect conflict propensity. The larger the share that the two largest groups make up of the total population, and the closer they are in size, the more likely is it that differential growth will lead to violence and conflict (Toft, 2002).

We argue that a more relevant distinction is that of institutionally consistent regimes ('ideal' democracies and autocracies), and semi-democracies that allow some competition over power, usually in the form of elections, but where institutions are inconsistent and weak.

2.3 Mechanisms

The identity-based composition of a country does not, except for very special cases, change rapidly. At the core of the causal story suggested here lie the future expectations of how the composition will look like. Even with the most precise census available, forecasting this composition will be a difficult task beset with large uncertainties. This uncertainty can be misused by political entrepreneurs to sow fear among a present majority population.

Yet, this is the best case, where forecasts are prepared by professional demographers and there exists an educated public which can evaluate these numbers as input to an informed debate. When demographic data are published in their raw form the opportunities for political entrepreneurs to take advantage of the situation increases.

The decision to publish or not to publish data showing differential growth of identity-based groups is further complicated by the fact that such decision in itself sends a signal. If the information is not published, said political entrepreneurs are free to misconstrue facts. Furthermore, the decision to hide these numbers may indicate weakness on the part of the government. Hence, *not* publishing demographic data following a census might in itself provide both opportunity and willingness, as the lack

of information can be used to mobilize a worried majority and the signal of weakness might bolster the rebel's belief in the feasibility of the undertaking.

The ideal solution is to publish very comforting data, where all groups are growing at the same rate. If factually correct, this is unproblematic and can be published at no cost. Even if factually clearly incorrect to observers, it might still serve a purpose as it sends a message of strength across to any potential rebel, even if the provocation might be used politically by the same rebels.

In the end, the decision of whether or not to publish problematic numbers boils down to a question about whether the greater evil is to appear weak or potentially fuel public discontent. We argue that the outcome very much depends on the regime type. Autocracies and democracies share the common trait that their institutional arrangements are geared towards the same end. These are generally believed to be more stable than the alternative, a semi-democracy. For these regimes, relying on their perception of strength, the greater evil is to appear weak by not publishing the information.

For semi-democracies, the question of institutional strength is already jeopardized. Semi-democracies always have to handle some form of inconsistency, be the exclusion of a large part of society (Apartheid South Africa), the lack of an independent judicial system (Venezuela under Chavez) or the ascription of the executive (old European monarchies). These are all what Lincoln described as 'a house divided against itself', and they seldom are able to stand.

While semi-democratic regimes might foster a false impression of stability by publishing either real or falsified numbers, this is a serious risk to take. Previous research (Hegre et al., 2001) have established that these regimes are more at risk of conflict than other regimes, and we expect that the publishing ethnic census data in already unstable regimes could easily fall prey to exploitation by challengers.

In this article we will empirically investigate the following hypotheses:

H₁: Countries publishing identity data from censuses are more likely to experience political violence than those that do not.

H₂: Semi-democracies are more likely than democracies or autocracies to experience political violence when publishing census data on ethnic group size.

3.0 Data and Methods

The purpose of this article is to investigate whether countries that publish ethnic data have an elevated risk of experiencing civil conflict. A major challenge is that the effect group is quite heterogeneous. There are several possible scenarios that may explain why no identity data are published. First, there are the countries that lack the capacity to conduct large-scale population censuses. Somalia has not held a census in 30 years, for obvious reasons. There is a broad consensus in the empirical civil war literature that low state capacity is highly correlated with civil war. Second, as we have already pointed out, a number of high income countries have banned the collection of identity data in censuses. These countries can be labeled ‘Do not want to know’ countries. These countries are very often characterized by strong ‘rule of law’ institutions, and generally have a very low conflict propensity. Third, there are the countries that gather data, but then decline to publish them, for unknown reasons. Let us label these as ‘Do not want to tell’-countries. A priori, there must be some reason for why this information is withheld, and regardless of what the real motivation is, political entrepreneurs are likely to build upon the uncertainty introduced by the government’s failure to publish. Figure 1 presents the different categories.




Figure 1: Four Different Categories of Census and Identity

Regimes that are unable to complete a census are often, as argued above, very weak states. For that particular reason they are expected to be more likely to experience instability and violence. These regimes are categorized as Type 4. The regimes we are most interested in are Types 1, 2, and 3. Types 1 and 3 include all regimes that do not publish census data on identity.

Ideally we would have liked to be able to empirically separate between Types 1 and 3. There are reasons to suspect that countries that collect identity information in censuses but subsequently decline to publish these do so out of a concern that the data may be politicized. However, systematic cross-national data on whether censuses have contained identity questions are not available, only anecdotal information of single cases as described above exists. Hence, we are only able to observe cross-nationally whether censuses have been conducted, and whether identity data from these censuses have been published.

We believe that the distinction between Types 1 and 3, and Type 2 is defensible for two reasons. First, we want to investigate whether countries can avoid violent conflict by restricting publication of identity information. Both Types 1 and 3 represent strategies to avoid publication of identity data. Second, the number of Type 3 cases is probably very low, as regimes are expected to avoid identity in census questionnaires altogether rather than collecting the information and subsequently withheld it. In the empirical literature surveyed above, only a handful of such cases are mentioned.

3.1 Operationalization of variables

To investigate these hypotheses, we utilize the replication dataset from Urdal (2006), covering a global sample from 1950 to 2000, and modify the core regression model of that article to accommodate our variables.

Publication of identity data: We distinguish between three categories using two dummy variables: regimes that carry out censuses but do not publish identity data (Types 1 and 3, reference category), regimes that publish such data (whether factual or fictional), and finally regimes that did not have a census the previous decade. Data on census organization and whether identity data have been published was collected from the U.S. Census Bureau (2005), and the UN Demographic Yearbook (UN, annual).³ Countries coded as Types 1, 2 or 3 will keep this status for the first ten years succeeding the census, upon which they will be recoded as Type 4 if more than 10 years have passed since the last census.

Stability: Unstable regimes are those regimes that are classified as inconsistent regimes by Gates et al. (2006). Stable regimes are those classified as either Democracies or Autocracies by the same source.

Apart from these variables, we use the following control variables from Urdal (2006): Youth bulges, total population (log-transformed), infant mortality rates, and brevity of peace (to account for conflict history). We refer to Urdal (2006) for details pertaining to the exact operationalization of these variables. In addition, we add a control for the number of excluded ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer, Cederman & Min, 2009).

³ For some countries, data was supplemented with information from the Wikipedia page, “Race and ethnicity in censuses”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_and_ethnicity_in_censuses (accessed 25 April 2014).

3.1 Method

We use a logistic regression model to analyze the dataset (see Borooah 2002 for a short introduction, and Train 2009 for a very thorough introduction). The results from this model can be interpreted using odds ratios. However, while odds ratios make more sense than the corresponding coefficients, understanding them still require detailed knowledge of quantitative methods. We use Clarify (King, Tomz & Wittenberg, 2000) to produce more intelligible results, in the form of change in the annual probability of observing a conflict onset, measured in percentage points. The downside to this choice is that the figures will be context-specific, in that they will be computed based on a fixed set of values for all other variables, which in this case are set to the sample mean. The full regression results are therefore also made available in Appendix A.

4.0 Results

The results from the regression model are displayed in Figure 2 below. The dots mark the point estimate, and the bars indicate the 95% confidence interval around these point estimates.




Figure 2: Regression results: The impact of holding census and publishing identity data

The first model does not find much support for our hypotheses. There is, apparently no difference between the three different categories by which we have operationalized our main dependent variable. Neither Type 2, publishing census data on the demographics of identity groups, nor Types 1 + 3, holding census but keeping identity information secret, exhibit significantly different conflict risks compared to countries that don't collect any census information at all.

The other variables perform as expected. Unstable regimes have about two percentage points higher annual risk of conflict compared to the more stable regimes. Of similar size is the effect of infant mortality rates and youth bulges, and the effect of population.




Figure 3: Regression results including interaction terms between institutions and Type.

The model underlying Figure 3 differs from the one displayed in Figure 2 in that we have added an interaction term between our census categories and the institution measure. This addition provides a very different picture. Changing from Type 4 to Type 2, that is going from having no census to publishing differential growth data from a

census now really does affect the risk of conflict, but the effect depends on the stability of institutions.

With stable institutions, the change reduces the risk by one percentage point per year, whereas the corresponding number with unstable institutions is an increase of two to three percentage points per year. The confidence interval surrounding these two effects are quite narrow, something which adds support to both hypotheses.

The change from Type 4 to the mixed category (Types 1 + 3) of those who did not ask and those that did ask but withheld information is as such larger than the change from Type 4 to Type 2, supporting our expectations, but the uncertainty of this change under both stable and unstable institutions are much larger. The amount of uncertainty present questions the validity of the joint category Types 1 + 3. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the heterogeneity within this category masks two very different effects, consisting of a subset with no effect of census information and another subset with a very strong effect. Identifying these subsets would be a logical next step for this literature.

5.0 Conclusion

Previous empirical studies of ethnicity and civil war have almost exclusively addressed the static distribution of groups and not their dynamics, despite much anecdotal evidence suggesting that it is when ethnic groups grow at different rates that conflict may be most likely due to fears of an altered political balance. A broad literature has pointed to the importance of institutionalizing ethnicity through censuses, and in particular how they facilitate ethnic competition, yet very little comparative work has been done on the topic. One notable exception, Toft (2007), finds mixed evidence for the differential growth hypothesis.

In this article, we build on the insights from Toft's analysis and study the political significance of censuses (Horowitz, 1985; Kertzer & Arel, 2002), asking whether states can reduce the risk of civil conflict if they decline to publish census data on identity. Our conclusion is that the effect of publishing data on group size largely rests on the political institutions present. With stable institutions, such publication will lower the risk of conflict, whereas unstable institutional arrangements are endangered by the same publication strategy.

6.0 References

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Table I: Census and Civil War

	Model 1	Model 2
Youth bulges	1.056*** (3.017)	1.053*** (2.812)
Population (ln)	1.202*** (2.757)	1.206*** (2.807)
Infant Mortality Rates	1.004** (2.335)	1.004** (2.468)
Type 1 or 3	1.030 (0.175)	0.651* (-1.790)
Type 2	1.068 (0.171)	0.541 (-1.018)
Unstable regime type	1.898*** (3.817)	1.218 (0.882)
Brevity of Peace	5.780*** (6.108)	5.896*** (6.178)
Number of excluded groups	1.022** (2.157)	1.021** (2.111)
Type 1 or 3 X Unstable regime type		2.649*** (2.844)
Type 2 X Unstable regime type		4.204* (1.819)
_cons	0.000*** (-9.213)	0.001*** (-8.881)
Log Likelihood	-672.08	-667.04
Log Likelihood null model	-732.42	-732.42
N	5223	5223

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

	195 0	196 0	197 0	198 0	199 0	Percent w/ethnic data
Afghanistan			1			0 %
Albania	2	2	1	2		29 %
Algeria	1	2	1	1	1	17 %
Angola	1	1	1			100 %
Argentina		1	1	1	1	0 %
Armenia				1		100 %
Australia	1	2	2	2	2	89 %
Austria	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Azerbaijan					1	100 %
Bahamas, The	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
Bahrain	2	1	1	1	1	17 %
Bangladesh			1	1	1	0 %
Barbados		1	1	1	1	75 %
Belgium		1	1	1	1	50 %
Belize		1	1	1	1	50 %
Benin			1		1	100 %
Bhutan		1		1		0 %
Bolivia	1		1		1	33 %
Botswana		1	1	1	1	25 %
Brazil	1	1	1	1	2	50 %
Brunei		1	1	1	1	100 %
Bulgaria	1	1	1	1	1	80 %
Burkina Faso			1	1	1	0 %
Burma			1	1		50 %
Burundi			1		1	50 %
Cambodia		1			1	0 %
Cameroon			1	1		0 %
Canada	2	2	2	2	2	60 %
Cape Verde	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
Central African Republic			1	1		50 %
Chad					1	100 %
Chile	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
China	1	1		1	2	100 %
Colombia	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Comoros	1	1		1	1	25 %
Congo (Democratic Republic of)			2	1		33 %
Congo (Republic of the)			1	1	1	100 %
Costa Rica	1	1	1	1		25 %
Cote d'Ivoire			1	1	1	67 %
Croatia					1	100 %
Cuba	1		1	1		33 %
Cyprus		1	1			50 %
Czech Republic	1	1	1	1	1	60 %
Denmark	2	2	2	1	1	0 %

Djibouti		2	1	1		0 %
Dominican Republic	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
Ecuador	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Egypt		2	1	1	1	0 %
El Salvador	1	1	1		1	0 %
Equatorial Guinea	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
Eritrea				1		0 %
Estonia	1		2	1		25 %
Ethiopia				1	1	50 %
Fiji	1	1	1	1	1	100 %
Finland	1	1	2	2	2	25 %
France	1	2	1	1	2	0 %
Gabon		1	1	1	1	50 %
Gambia, The		1	1	1	1	100 %
Georgia				1		100 %
German Democratic Republic	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Germany, Federal Republic of	1	1	1	1		0 %
Ghana		1	1	1		67 %
Greece	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Guatemala	1	1	1	1	1	40 %
Guinea		2	2	1	1	17 %
Guinea-Bissau	1	1	2		1	20 %
Guyana		1	1	1	1	50 %
Haiti	1		1	1		0 %
Honduras	1	1	1	1		0 %
Hungary		1	1	1	1	50 %
Iceland	1	1				0 %
India	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Indonesia		1	1	1	1	25 %
Iran	1	1	1	1	2	0 %
Iraq	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Ireland	2	2	2	2	2	0 %
Israel		1	1	1	1	25 %
Italy	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Jamaica	1	1	1	1	1	60 %
Japan	2	2	1	2	2	0 %
Jordan	1	1	1		1	0 %
Kazakhstan					1	100 %
Kenya		2	1	1	1	100 %
Korea, North					1	0 %
Korea, South	1	2	2	2	2	0 %
Kuwait	1	2	2	2	2	0 %
Kyrgyzstan					1	100 %
Laos				1	1	0 %
Latvia				1		100 %
Lebanon			1			0 %

Lesotho	1	1	1	1	1	80 %
Liberia		1	1	1		0 %
Libya	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Lithuania				1		100 %
Luxembourg		2	1	1	1	0 %
Macedonia, The Former Yugoslav Rep. of					2	100 %
Madagascar			1		1	0 %
Malawi		1	1	1	1	75 %
Malaysia			1	1	1	100 %
Maldives	2	1	2	1	2	0 %
Mali			1	1	1	0 %
Malta	1	1		1	1	0 %
Mauritania			1	1		0 %
Mauritius	1	1	1	1	1	60 %
Mexico	1	1	1	1	2	0 %
Moldova	1		2	1		25 %
Mongolia	1	2	1	1		40 %
Morocco		1	1	1	1	50 %
Mozambique	1	1	1	1	1	80 %
Namibia		1	1	1	1	100 %
Nepal	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
Netherlands		1	1		1	67 %
New Zealand	2	2	2	2	2	100 %
Nicaragua	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Niger			1	1		50 %
Nigeria	1	1			1	33 %
Norway	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Oman					1	0 %
Pakistan	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Panama	1	1	1	1	1	80 %
Papua New Guinea		1	1	1	1	25 %
Paraguay	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Peru		1	1	1	1	0 %
Philippines		1	2	1	2	17 %
Poland	1	1	2	1		0 %
Portugal	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Qatar			1	1	1	0 %
Romania	1	1	1		1	100 %
Russia	1		2	1		100 %
Rwanda			1		1	100 %
Saudi Arabia			1		1	0 %
Senegal			1	1		100 %
Serbia					1	100 %
Sierra Leone		1	1	1		0 %
Singapore	1		1	1	1	100 %

Slovakia					1	100 %
Slovenia					1	100 %
Solomon Islands	1		2	1	1	20 %
Somalia			1	1		0 %
South Africa	1	1	1	2	2	86 %
Spain	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Sri Lanka		1	1	1		100 %
Sudan	1		1	1	1	25 %
Suriname		1	1	1		33 %
Swaziland	1	1	1	1	1	60 %
Sweden	1	2	2	2		0 %
Switzerland	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Syria		1	1	1	1	0 %
Taiwan	1	1	2	1	1	0 %
Tajikistan				1		100 %
Tanganyika	1					100 %
Tanzania		1	1	1		100 %
Thailand		1	1	1	1	0 %
Togo			1	1		100 %
Trinidad and Tobago		1	1	1	1	100 %
Tunisia	1	1	1		1	25 %
Turkey	2	2	2	2	1	0 %
Turkmenistan					1	100 %
Uganda	1	1	1	1	1	60 %
Ukraine				1		100 %
United Arab Emirates		1	1	2	2	0 %
United Kingdom	1	1	1	1	1	20 %
United States	1	1	1	1	1	100 %
Uruguay		1	1	1	1	0 %
Uzbekistan				1		100 %
Venezuela	1	1	1	1	1	0 %
Vietnam			1	1	1	100 %
Yemen					1	100 %
Yugoslavia	1	1	1	1		100 %
Zambia	1	2	1	1	1	67 %
Zanzibar	1					100 %
Zimbabwe		2		1	1	75 %