

From Salvation to Struggle

Commemoration, Affect and Agency in Cyprus

REBECCA BRYANT AND METE HATAY

This article explores the divisive commemoration of the battle of Erenköy, which has gained significance since the early 2000s in a resignifying of Turkish Cypriot history. Over time, the commemoration has shifted from a triumphalism symbolized in monuments to an act of mourning at the graves of the fallen. We show through this commemoration how actors have repurposed official narratives, deterritorializing them from the terrain of nationalist ideology and its countermemory and reterritorializing them in ways that look similar but are affectively quite different. We argue that this repurposing of the ritual produces an affect of agency among participants that is open-ended and future oriented.

Keywords: commemoration; cultural heritage; hegemony; counterhegemony; reterritorialization; agency; Cyprus

This article explores the commemoration of a battle, an act of collective remembrance that has gained significance since the early 2000s in a resignifying of local history in divided Cyprus. The local history in question is that of the Turkish Cypriot minority, while the commemoration's enactment each year provokes ire in the Greek Cypriot media.¹ The site of the ceremony is the village of Kokkina, known in Turkish as Erenköy, a Turkish Cypriot-administered exclave in the island's south (figure 1). Located in the remote Tylliria region of the island, Erenköy was part of a cluster of five small, Turkish hamlets that experienced extreme isolation and military bombardment during the conflict period (1964–74)[OK?].² Because of events that occurred there at that time, the name “Erenköy” has become synecdochal with the only part of Turkish

Cypriot collective memory of the conflict that has acquired the status of “legend” or “epic.”³

Fig. 1. Map delimiting north Cyprus. The Erenköy exclave is in the west.

In 1964, when the village became the site of the major battle that we describe below, it also became a symbol for the Turkish Cypriot struggle of that period. Today, thousands of Turkish Cypriots make the annual pilgrimage to the south, to this isolated spot, to remember those who died there. Because it was a battle, there were of course lives lost on both sides, and indeed the Tylliria battle constituted the single greatest loss of life for the Greek Cypriot community during the conflict leading up to 1974. Greek Cypriot public discussion of that battle, however, reveals no knowledge of Turkish Cypriot losses—a silence that reflects not only the division of the island but also a division of the conflict’s history. Instead, the Turkish Cypriot commemoration is viewed as a celebration, and each year there is much media discussion of why, some years ago, the Greek Cypriot leader was willing to sign an agreement allowing Turkish Cypriots to cross by land to the exclave, rather than traveling by boat as they had done in the past. In 2017 there was so much public criticism of this agreement that Deputy Government Spokesman Victoras Papadopoulos found it necessary to reiterate the government’s condemnation of the “celebrations”: “[I]t goes without saying that [the government] condemns the bombings and atrocities against the Greek Cypriots by Turkey in 1964, but also the celebrations of the Turkish Cypriots for such a heinous anniversary.”⁴

Our analysis of this commemoration builds on a body of work, beginning from the 1970s, that demonstrates the role of symbols and rituals, particularly commemorations, in producing and reproducing a sense of nationhood,⁵ as well as a critical body of research that shows how hegemonic narratives of the collective and its past are always contested and challenged.⁶ Our particular concern here, however, lies with the historical experience that we find so often falls into the gaps between the polarization of hegemonic and counterhegemonic that dominates this literature. In our own research, we have found that the terms “nationalist” and “anti-nationalist,” “hegemonic” and “counterhegemonic” are often insufficient for understanding the ways in which average persons act as what Jay Winter calls “agents of remembrance” or how individual experience may inform, shape and be shaped by communal memory.⁷

Our concern with this polarization emerges from our ethnographic research, where we observe that a dualism born in the academy has shaped everyday politics. As long-time researchers on Cyprus, we have been dissatisfied with the too-neat division, drawn both in local politics and in the academy, between supposedly dualistic histories described as Right and Left, nationalist and anti-nationalist, top-down and bottom-up, violent and peace-loving. This has led, for instance, to both local and international expectations that having a left-wing leader or party in power should automatically lead to success at the negotiating table, or to assumptions that the Left's history of the conflict must be more likely to bring reconciliation. As we further discuss below, however, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives engage in forms of mythologization that ignore certain historical experiences and sacralize others. In our own research, then, we have found that this neat division obscures more than it explains about the failures of historical reconciliation in Cyprus and the region.

To give an example: in approximately three hundred formal and informal interviews that Bryant conducted with displaced Turkish Cypriots and their children, the ways in which they narrated their lives and experiences often appeared directly to conflict with the political views that they expressed. While almost all were in favor of a federation that would reunite the island, almost all of the same people expressed a desire never again to live in close proximity with persons from the other community.⁸ Similarly, Joyce Dalsheim has demonstrated how, in the discourse and education of left-wing, liberal Israeli Jews there is nevertheless an absence of Palestinians, one that portrays them not as a threat but rather as “an uncanny other, not fully recognised, not fully known, somehow magically imagined away, and for all these reasons that much more frightening.”⁹ These examples point to the ways in which historical experience and the stories that narrate it may not neatly align with political convictions and may challenge the categorization of particular narratives into the hegemonic and counterhegemonic, nationalist and anti-nationalist.

Looked at from the outside, the Erenköy commemoration might appear to be part of a hegemonic narrative, what one Greek Cypriot politician called a “celebration of hate.”¹⁰ Yet many of those who make the pilgrimage to the site consider themselves to be left-wing and supporters of reconciliation. Like the Orange Parades in Northern Ireland that give “the appearance of continuity in an annual commemorative occasion” while containing “clear evidence of political changes both within and outside the event,” we cannot assume that the use of symbols and the form of a commemoration

map neatly onto political alignments.¹¹ In our case, at a time when nationalism and nationalist symbols are in decline amongst Turkish Cypriots, and when most young people have a healthy skepticism regarding the nationalist histories that they learn in school, attendance at the Erenköy commemoration is steadily rising.

In this article, we suggest that a shift of academic focus from the mythic to the epic and from the past to the future provides us with better tools for understanding the longevity and resistance to change of particular narratives of past events. The idea that national histories are a type of myth is today pervasive in scholarship, with critics of nationalist histories often demonstrating the ways in which such histories are mythologized and thereby sacralized, making the nation into a “mythical construct” that renders its history immune to critique.¹² Our subject here, however, is one that Turkish Cypriots have always called a “legend” or “epic,” a historical form that we find gives us a more complex way of understanding the narrativization of communal experience. Indeed, as we shall see, while myth points us to a distant past of origins, epic points us to lived history which may be repurposed for particular visions of the present and future.

Looking at the Erenköy commemoration through the lens of legend or epic also allows us to build on David Henig’s concept of “vernacular histories,” stories “in which grand (nationalized) historical narratives, local historical consciousness, and personal memories intersect.”¹³ The concept of vernacular histories, in turn, intersects in interesting ways with Jay Winter’s observation that when average persons perform commemorative rituals, they are doing liminal work that “occupies the space between individual memory and the national theatre of collective memory choreographed by social and political leaders.”¹⁴ Winter emphasizes the role of such agents in creating acts of remembrance that exist in the space between the public and the private, mobilizing both individual actors and their memories and the agents of the state for purposes that often exist laterally to official narratives.¹⁵ These lateral narratives, moreover, may be repurposed as time and circumstances change.

In the case that we describe below, participants in the commemoration of the Erenköy battle shift between triumphalism and loss, between rebellion and mourning. The commemoration contains elements of both hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives, but these have been repurposed or reterritorialized. We take the term “reterritorialization” from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, for whom it is the counterpart of deterritorialization, both aspects of resignification.¹⁶ In some cases, such as ours, this may involve a repurposing of official narratives, deterritorializing them

from the terrain of nationalist ideology and its counter-memory and reterritorializing them in ways that look similar but are affectively quite different. As we describe below, reterritorialization creates an affective shift from passivity to agency, from victimhood to action. In particular, we describe the entangled themes of salvation, sacrifice, solidarity and struggle as core elements of the legend or epic that are not mutually contradictory. The *affect of agency* that emerges only reinforces Erenköy and its commemoration as central to what it means to be a Turkish Cypriot today.

ON MYTHS AND LEGENDS

It was six o'clock on an August morning when we boarded a bus arranged by the Erenköy Fighters' Association (Erenköy Mücahit Derneği) and departed the northern town of Kyrenia heading southwest toward the Erenköy exclave. Along the way, our bus picked up passengers from nearby villages and eventually merged with a larger convoy. By the time we reached the newly opened Limnitis/Yeşilirmak checkpoint in the west of the island, the number of buses had risen to more than a hundred. Our fellow passengers were families and couples, some elderly, as well as a handful of children, and most had brought stocks of water and sandwiches for lunch. As we rode, we conversed with our fellow passengers, including men who had fought at Erenköy and their wives. The atmosphere was one of subdued excitement.

Part of that excitement derived from the exceptional nature of the trip, which allowed us into a closed military area to which civilians were normally not given access. Today, while the surrounding hamlets are in ruin, Erenköy hosts a lonely contingent of Turkish Cypriot conscripts in what has become the only territorial exclave of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). While families of the fallen had long been permitted access by boat on this day, the opening of a land route in 2009 made it possible for larger numbers of people to make the journey. Some of these were former fighters, but others were individuals who saw Erenköy as a significant site in Turkish Cypriot history. This was not any simple excursion but one specifically intended to honor the dead and viscerally experience the site of legend. Indeed, the reverential comportment of the travelers, the exceptionality of the day and our admission to the site, and the sense of this being a journey that would not often be made all gave the event the air of a pilgrimage. As though acknowledging that, several

friends who later learned of our excursion would jokingly comment, “Hacı oldunuz” (You’ve become pilgrims), a word derived from the *hajj* or pilgrimage to Mecca.¹⁷

Erenköy’s exclave status is not insignificant to our story, because the manner in which it became an exclave and the reasons it has remained so both describe and explain the significance of this tiny village in Turkish Cypriot vernacular history. Indeed, the village’s exclave exceptionality comes to stand for the exceptionality of the “legend” or “epic” itself—those designations already indicating the extraordinary feats of a person or group. What is interesting in our case is that while the name of the village today connotes epic or legendary action, the heroes of that epic keep shifting.

The background to the legend is the narrative arc of the Cyprus conflict. In most Turkish Cypriot narratives, the first important date is 1955, when Greek Cypriots began a struggle against British colonial rule intended to unite the island with Greece. The minority Turkish Cypriot community objected to a future in Greece and instead demanded the partition of the island and the unification of its two parts with the two “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey. In 1957 they formed their own guerrilla organization to achieve this aim, and the first widespread intercommunal fighting began. A year later, negotiations resulted in the bicomunal Republic of Cyprus (RoC), declared in 1960, with a power-sharing constitution that left the majority Greek Cypriot community dissatisfied.¹⁸ Within three years there was a breakdown of constitutional order and renewed intercommunal fighting. While in most Greek Cypriot narratives that breakdown resulted from a rebellion of the minority against the majority’s attempts to change the constitution, most Turkish Cypriots explain those events as the time when they were attacked and retreated into militarized enclaves.

Those enclaves were besieged for more than four years, and only after the RoC’s president unilaterally decided to lift the siege in 1968 were Turkish Cypriots able to exit without safety concerns. After that date, many left the enclaves daily to go to work, but returned to those ghettos in the evenings until 1974. In that year, a splinter Greek Cypriot guerrilla organization, in collaboration with the Greek junta government, attempted a coup against the Republic’s president that was intended to unite the island with Greece. This provoked a Turkish military intervention on July 20, 1974, the flight of large numbers of Cypriots to either side of the ceasefire line and the de facto division of the island, eventually resulting in the establishment of an unrecognized Turkish

Cypriot state in the island's north. While today Greek Cypriots remember that day as a tragic date, it is officially commemorated in the island's north as a date of liberation.

In an important early work on collective memory and commemoration, Yael Zerubavel proposes that an act of commemoration produces a “commemorative narrative ... a story about a particular past that accounts for this ritualized remembrance and provides a moral message for the group members.”¹⁹ She skillfully demonstrates how the cycle of commemoration in Israel aids in constructing what she calls a “master commemorative narrative” that shapes collective memory and gives a “story line” to the past. The July 20 commemorations in Cyprus would be an example of this, where in the north official celebrations have told a tale of triumph and liberation. According to Zerubavel, contests over how to hold a commemoration are contests about narrating the past in particular ways, presumably shaping what is to be remembered and what forgotten. We will certainly see these contests in the following pages.

The assumption of Zerubavel's schema that we will challenge below is that the master commemorative narrative is hegemonic and that it is opposed by countermemory, which “is essentially oppositional and stands in hostile and subversive relation to collective memory.”²⁰ According to Zerubavel, it is through such countermemories, which seep into and challenge the hegemonic narrative, that changes may occur in the master narrative. Building on her work, for instance, Lisa Jenny Krieg has studied an antimilitaristic Independence Day celebration in Israel, which she views as explicitly counterhegemonic:

The two ceremonies show different approaches in their celebrations. While the state ceremony tends to conceal sociopolitical problems, is patriotic, uncritical of the regime, emotional, militarist and presents an idealized picture of Israeli society, the alternative ceremony is explicitly antimilitaristic: it criticizes government policies, points to problems in society, advocates human rights and is in support of the peace process.²¹

Moreover, she describes the ceremony as “a part of the fierce fight between the right and the left-wing that divides Israeli society.”²²

Zerubavel's account has resonances with other works of the period that attempt to understand the workings of hegemony, especially James Scott's “weapons of the weak,” or ways in which the powerless challenge power.²³ And like more recent

anthropological works that show how we may choose to mold ourselves as religious subjects or as subjects of the state, we find that the dualism of hegemony and counterhegemony is particularly insufficient when dealing with the complex subject of how we remember both individually and collectively.²⁴

Nevertheless, this duality has infiltrated many post-conflict spaces, creating “good” and “bad,” or “reconciliatory” and “divisive,” narratives of the conflict. In Cyprus, this duality of hegemonic and counterhegemonic narratives has become an accepted part of scholarship on the politics of history.²⁵ At the same time, as in Israel, it rather neatly maps onto the political division of Right and Left, which in the island is primarily a division between nationalists and those who describe themselves as anti-nationalist. For almost four decades, the official narratives in the Turkish Cypriot community were nationalist ones that emphasized their victimization at the hands of Greek Cypriots between approximately 1955 and 1974. That official history appeared in schoolbooks in photographs of corpses and crying women, and it appeared in everyday life in, for instance, the large numbers of streets in what is now north Cyprus that are named after *şehits*, or martyrs. In the triumphant statues and monuments that celebrate the 1974 “victory,” but also in the officially sanctioned memorials that mourn their losses, the narrative attempted to subsume individual suffering in a sweep of history in which their victimization by Greek Cypriots was “rectified” by a Turkish military victory.

The Left on both sides of the island has been primarily responsible for counternarratives that acquire their own semi-official historical arc. If the official Turkish Cypriot narrative has been that of an essential antagonism between two groups in which the numerical majority attempted to oppress and even to eliminate the minority until a “big brother” stepped in, the semi-official leftist position has been that Cypriots were all essentially one until divided by the machinations of imperial powers who manipulated the Greek and Turkish governments and, by extension, their “kin” communities in the island.²⁶ If the narrative of the Right never mentions cooperation and coexistence before the conflict, the narrative of the Left erases any tension or difference that existed prior to the armed struggle. What makes the latter position semi-official is that while it has not been the dominant position, it has provided the primary counternarrative that has occasionally acquired prominence when leftist parties were in power. Moreover, as one analysis of these complementary narratives notes, “the leftist ‘unofficial’ history may strengthen the official discourse by appearing co-opted and

confined within the same rhetoric.”²⁷ What both the dominant official narrative and its Leftist counternarrative have in common is a focus on identifying victims and perpetrators and subsuming narratives of suffering into larger ideological narratives, whether nationalist or otherwise.

In contrast, the commemoration that we study here is, as we will show, one of reclaimed agency. It does not entirely reject the dominant narrative but rather repurposes and reterritorializes it in the creation of vernacular histories that interweave historical experience and communal narrative. The vernacular aspect of this history making is summarized in a tendency to refer to the battle as “the Erenköy legend” or even more frequently as “the Erenköy epic” (*Erenköy efsanesi* or *Erenköy destanı*)—the only part of Turkish Cypriot recent history that has acquired that status. Referring to it in that way emphasizes the extraordinary status of real events, but also their narration. After all, epics are the sorts of stories that in the past would have been related in Cyprus and much of the region by wandering bards, who sung their tales and whose listeners derived much of their pleasure from the forms of narration.

We contrast this local attribution of the status of epic to the story of the battle with a tendency in studies of collective memory and commemoration to focus on “master narratives” that often take the form of national or political myth.²⁸ In regard to the etymology of the word, Bruce Lincoln remarks, “*Mythos* ... was the speech of the preeminent, above all poets and kings, a genre (like them) possessed of high authority.”²⁹ While myth has acquired many other meanings since the ancient Greeks, it retains its connotations of singularity and sacrality or authority, particularly when used in reference to the nation-state. Indeed, myth is often viewed as the *sine qua non* of nationalist narrativizing: “Myths simplify, exaggerate, dramatise or reinterpret events into a form that serves as a symbolic statement about social order and reinforces social cohesion and functional unity.”³⁰

One reason for the focus on mythmaking is that, as Paul Ricoeur usefully notes in his monumental study of memory and forgetting, while beginnings are historic, origins are mythic.³¹ Moreover, it is important for our purposes that some of the most common national myths are myths about war.³² Wars are also what we might call “originary” events, events that produce new orders, that begin new eras. In other words, we may speculate that wars inevitably produce myths because they are not only about glory and sacrifice but also about origins.

Within this literature, myths are viewed as useful for the present, as important “for what they reflect about contemporary society, rather than their historical accuracy.”³³ This contrast of presentism and historical accuracy, moreover, has a lengthy genealogy going back at least to Ernst Renan, who remarked that the historical error that accompanies mythmaking was essential to the construction of nation-states, while “progress in historical studies is often a danger to nationality.”³⁴ This means that while such myths have a relationship to history, “History aims for the truth, whereas myth begins as truth.”³⁵ As we will see, it is precisely this idea of a simplified, sacralized story that promotes exclusion of other stories that cannot describe the various forms of entangled meaning that are expressed in the idea of a “legend” or “epic” and that emerge in practices of commemoration.

Instead, that vernacular history making is uneven, often disjointed, and allows room for contested and even conflicting strands of narrative. The commemoration of the Battle of Erenköy is one that, over time, has shifted from a triumphalism symbolized in monuments to an act of mourning at the graves of the fallen. As we know from the famous scenes of Lenin’s and Stalin’s statues being toppled in the post-Soviet space, monuments may lose their meaning when the victories they supposedly commemorate are reinterpreted as defeats. Triumphalism often fades with the passing of time. Memorials to the dead, however, signify loss, grief and the sacrifice of life. While monuments remind us and usually inscribe loss of life as the price for victory, memorials call on us to be “mindful.”³⁶ And while monuments tend to rise triumphally from the ground, usually offering few words, memorials tend to be closer to the ground and inscribed with the names of those lost. “Monuments are not generally built to commemorate defeats; the defeated dead are remembered in memorials.”³⁷ This transaction with death is what can make the act of commemoration a form of history making, one in which actors call on repertoires of cultural and religious symbolism and gestures, and in which private loss and suffering are entangled with public histories and collective memory.

FORGETTING AND REMEMBERING ERENKÖY

One of the main differences between epic and myth is that unlike the latter, epic is not sacralized and so does not acquire the status of the structural and formulaic that so

fascinated anthropologists like Claude Lévi-Strauss with regard to myth. Moreover, because an epic is presumed to be based on real events, it lends itself to various forms of narration. In Cyprus one of the ways in which the narrative's status as legend becomes apparent is in the tendency to write and recite it as an epic poem, as a bard would do. The tendency to narrate the legend in poetry began even as the battle was ongoing, and in the period leading up to 1974 dozens of books of poetry were published about Erenköy, two of which had the title *Erenköy Destanı* (the Erenköy epic).³⁸ The epic poetry form continues today with YouTube videos of former fighters and villagers, who either tell the story in epic verse form or in a recitational style that suggests poetry.³⁹

Unlike myth, the elaborated narration of the epic form allows the story's beginning and ending to shift depending on the perspective from which the story is told. While the epic form suggests the grand and heroic, it also often involves the transformation of ordinary people and circumstances through exceptional events. As a result, as we will see, it also opens the possibility for the overlapping and coexistence of alternative narratives that, rather than detracting from the epic, only add to its status as legend.

In the case of the "Erenköy epic," some versions of the tale begin in the summer of 1958, when several village men boarded a small fishing boat and made their way across about sixty kilometers of sea to the south coast of Turkey in search of weapons. These four men and seventeen others soon became known as *bereketçi*, literally the "bringers of blessings," because of the bridgehead they established to smuggle guns (the "blessings," or *bereket*) into the island. This involved twenty-eight trips by fishing boat to Turkey during this period and the loss of several village men's lives.⁴⁰

In other versions, the legend begins in the summer of 1964, when in response to reports of attacks on Turkish neighborhoods and villages approximately five hundred young Turkish Cypriot university students left their studies in the UK and Turkey and volunteered to be smuggled into the island. As one man interviewed for a documentary film on Erenköy described that period,

We were following events from the press, the newspapers, the radio, but of course in those days there were no televisions or mobile phones. When the massacres began, and our mothers and fathers and siblings are there, we asked

ourselves what business we had in school. We went in search of a way to get to Cyprus with the idea that we needed to take our place in the armed conflict.⁴¹

His description is echoed in numerous oral histories and autobiographies narrating the period, all of which describe the desperation of the students studying abroad to return to protect their families.⁴²

In documentary films and subsequent writings about the period, this mass enlistment of the best and brightest of the Turkish Cypriot youth and their deployment to a remote village is sometimes referred to as “Kıbrıs Türk Gençliğinin Destanı” (the epic of the Cypriot Turkish youth). Bryant has noted elsewhere that there are many similarities between the creation of this version of the “Erenköy epic” and the Anzac myth, the tale of Australian soldiers’ valiant fight at Gallipoli.⁴³ In particular, both shared the idea of “pure” sacrifice of the best and brightest young men of a generation. Indeed, virtually all male Turkish Cypriot university students landed on that beachhead, which they were expected to defend and which by 1964 was surrounded by Greek Cypriot troops.⁴⁴

By the time the young men arrived in Erenköy, villagers from the surrounding hamlets had already taken refuge there after attacks by Greek and Greek Cypriot forces in the previous months. In early August 1964 approximately two thousand Greek and Greek Cypriot forces began the most substantial attack on Erenköy, bombing the village with heavy weapons from the mountains and government patrol boats.⁴⁵ After two days of bombardment, the Turkish military intervened, sending warplanes to strafe and bomb the surrounding Greek Cypriot villages, hitting both military targets and civilian areas. Fifty persons were killed in those attacks, nineteen of those being civilians.

For approximately forty years, Turkish Cypriot memorialization emphasized those killed in this battle, but particularly their “rescue” or “salvation” by the Turkish military. The Erenköy epic was subsumed into a larger national myth of Turkish Cypriots’ salvation by Turkey, its willingness to intervene to protect its Cypriot “kin.” After 1974, the island’s north was filled with memorials and museums to the Turkish Cypriot dead, while triumphal monuments celebrated the Turkish military victory. While Turkey was the “hero,” the “savior,” then, Turkish Cypriots were not only extras on the set of history, but extras who had no speaking parts, whose roles were those of suffering victims and martyrs, but not heroes.

Indeed, so strong was the focus on “salvation” by Turkey that for several decades the main Erenköy commemoration was held at a monument built in honor of Cengiz Topel, a young pilot who was shot down during the Turkish military intervention, captured by Greek Cypriot soldiers and lynched. After 1974 the Turkish Cypriot administration erected a monument in honor of the young man at the site where his plane was supposed to have crashed. Although twenty-one young Turkish Cypriot men died during their service at Erenköy, Cengiz Topel was the only Turkish soldier to lose his life there, and he became a symbol of the sacrifices Turkey was willing to make for Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, after 1964 Cengiz Topel’s name was given to hospitals and schools, to streets and associations. His face was familiar to all Turkish Cypriots, many of whom named their children after him. Within this framework, Erenköy officially became an event in which the active participation of young Turkish Cypriot men was written instead as their salvation by the mighty force of Turkish jets, embodied in the person of Cengiz Topel.

However, entangled within this official narrative that subsumes the Erenköy epic under the arc of national myth, there is already a countercurrent of narrative, another version of the Erenköy legend that emphasizes Turkish Cypriot rather than Turkish sacrifices. For about four decades, this countercurrent appeared to be officially “forgotten,” even if it was not erased from collective memory. Paul Ricoeur refers to a “reserve of forgetting” to indicate those aspects of memory and history that are forgotten but available to consciousness.⁴⁶ The Erenköy legend that emphasized the young men’s struggle was not forgotten in this sense, as it existed in collective memory and could easily be called upon, for instance when politicians who had fought at Erenköy would refer to their service there in their biographies. Neither could we call this alternative version of the same events a “counternarrative” or “countermemory,” as it did not reject the official narrative but rather gave it different emphasis. Instead, we believe that this and other versions of the legend indicate what we call “countercurrents” of remembrance, or currents that may intersect with, fold into or run in parallel to and alongside official narratives of lived events.

This, we believe, is the usefulness of the legendary or epic form, which allows for stylized recitation of events that also opens the door for multiple interpretations and ways of telling the tale. In this sense, the epic of the young men’s “pure” sacrifice could always exist alongside the national myth of salvation without contradiction. Even in 2003, before the beginning of the commemorations that we describe below, the official

website of the TRNC Public Information Office announcing the 39th anniversary of the Erenköy struggle noted:

Erenköy serves as a sign that Turkey will always be at the side of the Turks of Cyprus *for as long as they resist*, and so was not left to the Greeks but is instead the site of a memorial service every 8 August in which our martyrs are honored, and a chance is given for our young people to learn a lesson by going to see Erenköy, *one of the most important turning points in the struggle for existence of the Turks of Cyprus.*⁴⁷

As we explain below, commemorations at the time (2003) were limited by problems of access to the exclave, the resolution of which would subsequently make the commemoration one of the most important events in the Turkish Cypriot ritual calendar.

Right around the time of the announcement above, the “Erenköy epic” reemerged as a key moment in Turkish Cypriot history. The turn of the millennium was a time that brought many changes to the Turkish Cypriot community.⁴⁸ Since the island’s division in 1974 and the establishment of a de facto state in the island’s north, Turkish Cypriots living there had been isolated because of their state’s non-recognition. This isolation only increased with the declaration of the TRNC in 1974, a state that would be recognized only by Turkey. As a result of this isolation, Turkish Cypriots became politically, economically and militarily dependent on and tied to Turkey. Those ties have included Turkish troops stationed in the island, dependence on Turkey’s financial aid and adoption of the Turkish currency and Turkish banking system in order to make international financial transactions.

These forms of dependency helped lead, in 2000, to a collapse of local financial institutions, to be followed in 2001 by an economic crash in Turkey. The latter crisis, especially, led to increased dissatisfaction with their isolation as citizens of an unrecognized state. When the Republic of Cyprus was given a date for entry to the EU, and Cypriots were presented with a United Nations plan for reunification that would have allowed them to enter the EU with their Greek Cypriot neighbors, Turkish Cypriots gathered in mass rallies to protest their nationalist leadership, which intransigently refused to negotiate an agreement. By 2004, Turkish Cypriots had overturned the status quo of almost four decades, bringing to office a leftist leader who put emphasis on his Cypriot, rather than Turkish, identity. Although this rebellion was

accomplished with the aid of Turkey, which had just acquired its own leadership that tore down the status quo, it was perceived as an important historical moment for Turkish Cypriots, who during that period found motivation and voice.

It was also during this period that the Erenköy epic reemerged as a polyphonic story of sacrifice, solidarity and struggle. Suddenly, a spate of memoirs appeared, as well as one collection of such memories by more than one hundred Erenköy fighters. Before 2002 only one book had been published on the subject, and that to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the battle in 1989. Since 2002, however, more than a dozen books have been published, of which eight are memoirs of men who fought at Erenköy.⁴⁹ All of these books appeared at a particular historical conjuncture, one in which Turkish Cypriots were once again engaged in a struggle. This was a struggle that many on the left perceived as a struggle for independence and self-determination and that many on the right perceived as a struggle for existence. Many of these newly published narratives told not of the Turkish military strike but of what happened afterwards, when the students and villagers were trapped in the village for more than a year, often on the verge of starvation. For the survivors, then, a battle that was supposedly “won” by Turkish forces, a story that ended with the arrival of Turkish jets, had a more ambiguous ending. In many of those narratives, the fighters describe being “abandoned” by the Turkish military and officers, left to suffer in that remote area for months after the heroic Turkish “rescue.” What they describe through this story of “abandonment” is their own solidarity and struggle, allowing Turkish Cypriots to acquire a place as heroes of their own history.

An example of this can be seen in the preface of the 2008 memoirs of Erdal Camgöz, a veteran of Erenköy, who explains why he spent two years of his life working on the book:

This book tells the story of a cross-section of the lives of young men who, even before the flood of change brought by the '68 Generation, did not just hold demonstrations in the squares but raced each other to the front for freedom, to protect their real identities, and because they heard the call of the homeland in their hearts. In 1964, 561 young men landed in Erenköy as fighters, challenging the uncertainty of the future. About 500 of these young men constituted almost the entirety of that period's male university students. These educated Cyprus youth were the heroes of one of the most important

turning points of the Cypriot Turkish Freedom War, namely the Battle of Erenköy.⁵⁰

Between 2003 and 2008, then, a change had occurred, one that emphasized the heroic nature of the struggle and depicted the Turkish Cypriot fighters as heroes in a battle of epic proportions. This was also clear in former president Mehmet Ali Talat's 2008 speech in honor of the forty-fourth anniversary of Erenköy, when he noted that "Erenköy is an example of the kinds of solidarity of which the Turks of Cyprus are capable in order to ensure their existence in this country."⁵¹

The Erenköy fighters were especially suited to fill this role because they were perceived not only as having engaged in instinctive defense but also as having sacrificed and as having fought selflessly. However, in response to this initial spate of memoir production and exaltation of Erenköy heroes, another version of the epic began to emerge, one written by the villagers who had established the bridgehead for smuggling weapons, who had fought alongside the students and who had remained in the village for more than a decade after the students were evacuated in 1965. In the villagers' versions of the epic, the heroes do not engage in "pure" sacrifice for their country or community, although they suggest, like former president Talat above, that their struggle and what they endured may come to stand *synecdochally* for the struggle of the Turkish Cypriot people. Rather, their version of events describes the extraordinary acts of ordinary people in defending their families and their village. During this period, living conditions were primitive, supplies were short, and the entire community became militarized. Moreover, the villagers' versions of the epic emphasize their refusal to surrender the village after 1974 and their insistence on defending it for two more years. It was because of their resistance that the village remained in the hands of the Turkish Cypriot military and gained its current exceptional status as an exclave.

If the students' narrative gave the story of Turkish salvation a more ambiguous ending, the villagers' narrative temporally extends the story of struggle, exceeding two moments of "salvation" that should have provided "endings"—both the 1964 arrival of Turkish jets, after which they were trapped in the village for another decade, and the 1974 Turkish military intervention, after which they still refused to surrender. Indeed, the villagers' narratives in every way transcend the neat boundaries of national myths, providing an excess of meaning that is available for reinterpretation. Their suffering surpassed that of other enclaves during the 1964–74 period, since the village was

remote and inaccessible but also an exposed target. Villagers we interviewed told us that they had made beds from dried seaweed and had often been on the verge of starvation. Another exceptional phenomenon was the role of women. Women we interviewed emphasized not only their resourcefulness in, for instance, making shelters from driftwood, but also their willingness to fight and die. Young women without children to care for took up weapons. As one elderly woman expressed it, “We protected ourselves, we protected our country and we protected our honor.”⁵² While the “epic” had previously focused on the sacrifices of the students, a recent book by an Erenköy villager emphasizes the heroics of the hamlet’s inhabitants and their conflicts with the students, whom the author describes as spoiled young men unable to endure the hardships of trench life.⁵³

Despite villagers’ desire to reclaim the story, what nevertheless unites the student-fighters’ narratives with those of the villagers is an emphasis not on Turkey’s intervention but on struggle, on the “fighting spirit” of Turkish Cypriots, who were able to express solidarity during years of deprivation. Both these narratives, then, contrast with the older official one that incorporated the Erenköy narrative into a national myth of salvation by Turkey, which also demanded *Türkiye’ye şükran* [thankfulness to Turkey] and diminished the role of Turkish Cypriots in the making of their own history. Moreover, while the national myth is a story that is complete, with a distinct beginning and ending, the ways that both the student-fighters and the villagers narrate their “epic” show us that beginnings and endings may be ambiguous, stretched, excessive.

If we were to leave our story here, it might appear that the epic is rewritten in opposition to the myth, that it stands as a counternarrative or countermemory to a hegemonic way of writing Turkish Cypriot history. This is where the commemoration is important for what it shows us about how personal memory, local histories in epic or legendary form and national myths become entangled in vernacular histories. In particular, we wish to show how those entanglements in the act of commemoration may repurpose or reterritorialize elements of both myth and epic in the creation of affective orientations to the future.

The Erenköy commemoration occurs on August 8 each year, the date of the 1964 Turkish military intervention. This also happens to be the hottest time of the year, when the sun bores down and dust swirls from the village's dirt roads. Today, only the stone walls of the former village still stand, and in that season the bare, surrounding hills are parched and brown.

When we arrived at Erenköy during our first pilgrimage to the site, canopies had already been erected to protect travelers from the heat, and a brass band was fiddling restlessly. Our initial destination was the *şehitlik* (martyrs' cemetery), which was surrounded by an iron fence and was the only area in full shade, under pine trees and a large canopy. Pilgrims milled around and sat on the ground, fanning themselves. Others looked out for the arrival of dignitaries, which would mark the beginning of the ceremony. A group of elderly former fighters stood at attention in their uniforms as members of the press photographed them.

A Turkish warship flying Turkish and Turkish Cypriot flags was anchored just off shore. With the arrival by helicopter of political and military officials, the band struck up a march, and the gates to the cemetery were opened. Politicians and military officers filed to one side of the cemetery, where the official ceremony was to take place, while villagers surged into the cemetery itself, carrying flowers and candles. The official ceremony took place with speeches and a full military salute (figure 4). Meanwhile, those with loved ones buried in the cemetery ignored the official ceremony and engaged in their own rituals of laying flowers, sprinkling the graves with blessed water and lighting incense (figure 5). Since the monument was separate from the cemetery itself, participants in the official ceremony had their backs to the cemetery. As a result, they did not observe the prayers and ritual acts in which the families were engaged. The families' personal acts of mourning took place simultaneously with, yet separate from, the formal acts of folding the flag and firing a military salute.

Fig. 4. Turkish Cypriot soldiers salute the dead. Photo by Rebecca Bryant.

Fig. 5. Families honor their dead with incense and blessed water. Photo by Rebecca Bryant

Once the ceremony ended, we gradually filed out of the cemetery, returning to the unrelenting August sun and making our way down a dusty road through the center

of the ruined village. Along the way, many of our fellow pilgrims stopped to take photographs at the mouths of caves, where the villagers of Erenköy had taken refuge and many had lived for several years (figures 6 and 7). There were no explanatory signs to indicate this, but everyone seemed to know the stories of the caves and to have seen the photographs of small children and elderly persons emerging from them.

Fig. 6: Photo of Erenköy villagers living in caves, c. 1965. Özer Hatay archive.

Fig. 7: Visitors take photographs in front of the caves where Erenköy villagers lived during the siege period. Photo by Rebecca Bryant

On the other side of the village, the Turkish Cypriot military had set up rows of tents, and the fighters' association had arranged for tables where people could eat. Young Turkish Cypriot conscripts stood under a tree handing out boxes of fried chicken. At the entrance to the site was also an open-air exhibition of Erenköy photographs. We took refuge under one of the tents while children in costume danced to folk tunes under the midday sun. The children's groups all came from the villages in the north to which the residents of Erenköy and surrounding hamlets had been relocated after 1976.

Once the entertainment had ended, we gathered our energy to make the last stop on our route, a mosque-museum. The small village structure, no longer used as a place of worship, had instead become the one of the main centers of attraction in an otherwise desolate hamlet. Inside the museum, there were photographs and objects from the struggle, and one former fighter with a voluminous moustache posed in uniform while young people took photographs (figure 8). Before long, exhausted pilgrims began to file back to the buses, where they took refuge in the air conditioning, and many began to sleep.

Fig. 8. Former fighter poses in front of the emblem of the Turkish Cypriot guerrilla organization, TMT. Photo by Rebecca Bryant.

This is the barest sketch of the ceremony and cannot begin to encapsulate the variety of expectations and intentions with which people undertook the journey. The three "heroes" of the narrative—the Turkish army, the Turkish Cypriot fighters and the

villagers—were all present simultaneously, but there seemed to be only minimal congruence between them. The political leaders and Turkish army officers performing the official ceremony, their backs to the mourning villagers, emphasized the symbolic nature of Erenköy as the site of Turkey’s first intervention, as well as the first loss of Turkish Cypriot fighters and Turkish military personnel during the conflict. Former fighters were there to see the site where they had fought and to mourn their fallen friends. Villagers, for their part, were there to see the ruins of their former village and to mourn their loved ones, appearing to pay little attention to the formal ceremony unfolding a few meters away.

Despite these overlapping and seemingly incongruent intentions and practices, Erenköy has grown in recent years as a pilgrimage site, in tandem with its increasing presence in communal memory. In the past, there were two separate ceremonies commemorating the date: one official ceremony at the Cengiz Topel monument, located now within the borders of the TRNC around forty kilometers from Erenköy, and the other the ceremony of veterans and the families of “martyrs,” who would each year take a boat from within the TRNC’s perimeter to this small exclave. The latter was an event with little fanfare in which families engaged quietly. In the past decade, however, commemorations of Erenköy and visits to the site have increased both in size and importance. In 2003 only 150 people attended the ceremony, but the number grew to 450 in 2005, and in 2009, after some pressure to allow travel by land, the number was over 1,000. It was after the opening of land access that the mosque was converted to a museum displaying photos of fallen fighters. At the same time, the status of officials attending the ceremonies rose such that by 2009 all the highest military officers on the island attended, and not long afterwards the president of the TRNC also began to speak at the ceremony. This meant that although a ceremony continued at the Topel monument, it lost importance even as an official commemoration. Indeed, even though the Erenköy commemoration date fell during the month of Ramadan in 2011 and 2012, the numbers continued to rise from 1,200 in 2011 to 1,600 in 2012.⁵⁴ In 2014, the number increased to 2,100.⁵⁵ Hence, Erenköy has gone from being a site of quiet commemoration to a site of ceremony and pilgrimage including highly public and political displays of remembrance.

This change, moreover, is part of a wider shift in commemorative practices among Turkish Cypriots. The Erenköy pilgrimage is part of a larger season of commemorations, beginning on July 20, the anniversary of the 1974 Turkish military

intervention, continuing on August 1, the date of the official establishment of Turkish Cypriots' paramilitary organization in 1958, and concluding on August 8, the date of the pilgrimage. While in the past the July 20 event had attracted the highest number of participants, followed by the other two anniversaries in descending order, in the last decade participation in that event has fallen significantly. Indeed, Turkish Cypriots have increasingly lost interest in commemorations or national holidays perceived as associated with the Republic of Turkey and the Turkish military, and they have begun to resist the intrinsically militaristic nature of these ceremonies.

At the same time that attendance at the military parades on July 20 was declining, participation in the Erenköy pilgrimage was rising. The growing emphasis on struggle rather than salvation was one that not only began to reshape Turkish Cypriots' narrative of these events but also had the power to unite Turkish Cypriots across the political spectrum. Because almost all Turkish Cypriot males who could hold a gun had been fighters between 1964 and 1974, the emphasis on their own struggle, rather than Turkey's salvation of them, was an orientation on which both nationalists and those in favor of reconciliation could agree.

In response to this growing lack of interest in, indeed cynicism toward, the official ceremonies and their militarism, a group of nationalist Turkish Cypriots decided in 2010 to hold an alternative July 20 ceremony, which featured both well-known Turkish entertainers and Turkish Cypriots as active participants. The ceremony, known as *Şafak Nöbeti*, or Dawn Watch, begins on the evening of July 19 on the beach where the Turkish military first landed in 1974. That stretch of sand today also happens to be home to one of the most popular and exclusive beach clubs in the island's north, situated below an impressive monument in the shape of an abstract hand rising from the sea. Singers and other entertainers are brought from Turkey, and participants remain on the beach throughout the night, holding torches and waiting for the "arrival" of Turkish troops at dawn. Just at dawn, Turkish Cypriot fighters and Turkish veterans of 1974 take the stage to receive the thanks of the waiting crowd. While the official ceremony later in the day continues to be attended mostly by officials, the crowds for the Dawn Watch have grown, with thousands in attendance every year. It is effectively an all-night party with a patriotic theme, but one that also requires attendees' participation rather than passive observation. This is implied in the name, as the word *nöbet* means "to watch," "to guard," or "to be on duty," and asks that all who attend remain "on duty" to bring in the dawn of the Turkish military arrival.

Like the repurposing of the July 20 anniversary from passive observation of military parades to an active “guard duty” carried out as an all-night beach party, so the “Erenköy epic” has been resignified as the “Erenköy Resistance Epic” or even the “Glorious Erenköy Resistance Epic” (*Şanlı Erenköy Direniş Destanı*), while official and vernacular histories have been brought in tandem. The ceremonies and acts of mourning side by side do not cancel each other but rather repurpose or reterritorialize each other. Deleuze and Guattari give the example of an orchid and a wasp, in which certain orchids take a form that will attract female wasps thereby ensuring their own pollination and causing the wasp to “become orchid” even as the orchid “becomes wasp.”⁵⁶ In similar fashion, we may say that the presence of military officers and politicians allows a “becoming monumental” of the personal and informal memorialization, just as military and official collaboration with the families and fighters’ association in the commemoration allows a “becoming vernacular” of what would otherwise be a sparsely attended official ceremony.

This allows us to see, in turn, how the various versions of the “epic” may intersect, overlap and become entangled without needing to cancel each other out. We have emphasized not the official commemorative narrative and its countermemory but rather countercurrents of memory and history that have always existed within the epic form. Generally, such countercurrents do not challenge the role of Turkey in helping Turkish Cypriots to establish their own state. What they do instead is emphasize the active role played by Turkish Cypriots in the struggle, which paved the way for Turkey’s intervention. Moreover, one of the main changes in that narrative form is that it goes from a story with an ending—“Turkey saved us, and we established a state”—to a story of ongoing struggle. It goes, then, from a story that is completed to one that remains incomplete. And while the nationalist narrative that emphasized thankfulness to Turkey called on Turkish Cypriots to be wary with regard to their Greek Cypriot neighbors, the moral of this new narrative is more diffuse.⁵⁷

By leaving the ending open, it calls on Turkish Cypriots to be ready for struggle and gives to the epic an affect of agency, though unlike the national myths of official narrative it does not prescribe for them the object of that struggle. Rather, it appears to accomplish what Sara Ahmed calls the formative role of collective feelings, which she describes as making “‘the collective’ appear *as if* it were a body in the first place.”⁵⁸ Not only this, however, but in stressing an affect of agency the narrative appears to steer that collective body into the future.

CONCLUSION

The Erenköy Fighters Association today has a new headquarters and museum outside Nicosia, Cyprus's divided capital, and has established a Facebook page where one can find comments from interested citizens who have participated in their events or visited the association. One businessman who happened to be in the neighborhood for work stopped by the association and wrote afterwards on their webpage about his experience. After explaining that he was the son of an Erenköy fighter, he remarked,

I commemorate our martyrs with respect. May they rest in peace. We will work even harder today than we have worked before to crown your struggle with an agreement in which Turkish Cypriots will be an essential element [founding community]. Let that be our promise!

The agreement to which he refers is a negotiated solution to the Cyprus division, talks for which were underway at the time of his writing. One of the key elements in those negotiations since their inception in the 1960s has been that Turkish Cypriots would continue to be a founding community (what the commentator calls an “*aslı unsur*”—essential element) of any federal state to be established. In this comment, then, the author suggests that the unfinished business of the struggle could be completed only by an agreement that would grant Turkish Cypriots political equality. It is a comment that expresses a particular disposition toward the future, what we have called here an affect of agency. Indeed, our use of the term “affect” relies as much on its etymology in the Latin *affectus*, or disposition, as it does on the “affective turn” in the social sciences. By an “affect of agency” we mean here the transmission, through acts of commemoration, of dispositions such as resolve, determination and endurance that appear both to describe who “the Turkish Cypriot” is today and to constitute it.⁵⁹

What this suggests to us, then, is that while commemorations associated with national myths may be concerned with narrative closure, the capacity to write or rewrite one's own story into larger narratives not only forecloses closure but also belies any neat historical endings. If reterritorialized narratives, as we have suggested, are ways in which the same story may be resignified and acquire a different affect, vernacular

histories may point us more toward the future than the past. This suggests to us, then, that studies of commemoration would benefit from paying as much attention to the epic as to the mythic, and to the vernacular repurposing that may exceed the closure of official histories.

NOTES

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¹ A growing transitional justice literature on memorialization and commemoration attempts to address the ways in which stubbornly lasting memorials to violence and its victims may impede or promote peace. For overviews of the literature, see Rebecca Jinks, "Thinking Comparatively about Genocide Memorialization," *Journal of Genocide Research* 16, no. 4 (2014): 423–440, and John E. Tunbridge and Gregory J. Ashworth, *Dissonant Heritage: The Management of the Past as a Resource in Conflict* (Chichester: Wiley, 1996). As numerous scholars of peace education have noted, one of the primary problems is how to enable mourning, and how to teach future generations about the conflict, without producing enmity (e.g., Elizabeth Cole, ed., *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation* [Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007]; Michalinos Zembylas, "Unmasking the Entanglements of Violence, Difficult Knowledge, and Schooling," *Religious Education* 109, no. 3 [2014]: 258–62). Although a full discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of this article, we wish to acknowledge that the commemoration discussed here is similarly contested. In that regard, this article offers the modest contribution of illuminating a ceremony that holds central significance in the Turkish Cypriot historical imaginary but is almost unknown in the island's south.

² In this article, we will refer to the village only by its Turkish name because this is the way in which it has entered Turkish Cypriot history and it is the only name by which most Turkish Cypriots know it. From their establishment, probably sometime in the

nineteenth century, the villages of the remote Tylliria district were Muslim and Greek-speaking. Kokkina acquired its Turkish name, Erenköy, during a flurry of toponym changes in 1958, when the Turkish Cypriot leadership of the time, in the form of the Turkish Cypriot Federation of Institutions (Kıbrıs Türk Kurumlar Federasyonu), undertook to change the names of all Turkish or Turkish-majority villages and neighborhoods. As we describe elsewhere, this was a process in which villagers were consulted and their approval sought. See Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, *De Facto Dreams: Building the So-Called State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming 2019).

³ The Erenköy battle's significance in Turkish Cypriot collective memory has constituted a side interest of both authors for more than two decades, with Bryant first writing about its continuing symbolic significance in the Turkish Cypriot political terrain and later about forms of historical revision. See Rebecca Bryant, *Imagining the Modern: The Cultures of Nationalism in Cyprus* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), and Rebecca Bryant, "The Fractures of a Struggle: Remembering and Forgetting Erenköy," in Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis, eds., *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory: History, Community, and Conflict* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 168–94. This article, then, is based on archival research, oral histories and memoirs, and interviews with former fighters and villagers over a period of about twenty years, as well as ethnographic research since 2008 on the battle's commemoration.

⁴ Available at http://www.kibrispostasi.com/c1-KIBRIS_POSTASI_GAZETESI/j159/a33233-Erenkoy-ruhu-bitti-mi.

⁵ For example, Daniel Francis, *National Dreams: Myth, Memory and Canadian History* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2005); Zdzisław Mach, *Symbols, Conflict and Identity: Essays in Political Anthropology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Anthony D. Smith, "The Myth of the 'Modern Nation' and the Myths of Nations," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11, no. 1 (1988): 1–26; Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁶ For example, T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, "The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, Structures and Dynamics," in T. G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, eds., *The Politics of War: Memory and Commemoration* (London: Routledge, 2000), 3–85; Dominic Bryan, *Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control* (London: Pluto Press, 2000).

⁷ Jay Winter, “Forms of Kinship and Remembrance in the Aftermath of the Great War,” in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40–60.

⁸ For a sample of these interviews, see Rebecca Bryant, *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), and Rebecca Bryant, *Displacement in Cyprus—Consequences of Civil and Military Strife, Report No. 2, Life Stories: Turkish Cypriot Community* (Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2012).

⁹ Joyce Dalsheim, “Settler Nationalism, Collective Memories of Violence and the ‘Uncanny Other,’” *Social Identities* 10, no. 2 (2004): 166–67.

¹⁰ See <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/08/09/turkish-cypriots-mark-kokkina-victory-as-survivors-recall-bombings/>.

¹¹ Bryan, *Orange Parades*, 8.

¹² One of the most influential examples is Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983). See also Don Handelman, *Nationalism and the Israeli State: Bureaucratic Logic in Public Events* (Oxford: Berg, 2004); Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003); Graham Seal, *Inventing Anzac: The Digger and National Mythology* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2004). Peter Grant, *National Myth and the First World War in Modern Popular Music* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Sima Godfrey and Frank Unger, eds., *The Shifting Foundations of Modern Nation-States: Realignments of Belonging* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004); and Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin, eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (New York: Routledge, 1997). In the Hosking and Schöpflin volume, see especially Joanna Overing, “The Role of Myth: An Anthropological Perspective, or: ‘The Reality of the Really Made-Up,’” 1–18; George Schöpflin, “The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths,” 19–34; and Mary Fulbrook, “Myth-Making and National Identity: The Case of the GDR,” 72–87 On the way in which mythologization impedes critique, see, e.g., Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972); also, David Archard, “Myths, Lies and Historical Truth: A Defence of Nationalism,” *Political Studies* 43 (1995): 472–81.

¹³ David Henig, “Prayer as a History: Of Witnesses, Martyrs, and Plural Pasts in Post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina,” *Social Analysis* 61, no. 1 (2017): 43.

¹⁴ Jay Winter, “Forms of Kinship and Remembrance,” 41. See also Samuel Hynes, “Personal Narratives and Commemoration,” in Winter and Sivan, eds., *War and Remembrance*, 205–20.

¹⁵ Jay Winter, *Sites of Memory: Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Winter and Sivan, *War and Remembrance*.

¹⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. and with an introduction by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

¹⁷ For observations on a very similar secular pilgrimage and “pilgrims” motivations for undertaking the journey, see Kenneth F. Hyde and Serhat Harman, “Motives for a Secular Pilgrimage to the Gallipoli Battlefields,” *Tourism Management* 32 (2011): 1341–51.

¹⁸ One anonymous reader of this article asked if Turkish Cypriots were not also dissatisfied, as the reader assumed that Turkish Cypriots worked for partition during this period. In a previous article—Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, “Guns and Guitars: Simulating Sovereignty in a State of Siege,” *American Ethnologist* 38, no. 4 (2011): 631–49—and a forthcoming book—Bryant and Hatay, *De Facto Dreams*—we examine the institutions of a state-within-a-state that emerged during the enclave period of the 1960s, and the ways in which an unrecognized state emerged after the island’s division in 1974. In our survey of newspapers of the 1960s and 1970s, and in around four hundred interviews with Turkish Cypriot displaced persons, administrators and politicians, we did not encounter anyone who was dissatisfied with the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, although they did anticipate that it would not last. Both of these responses should not be surprising, as the RoC constitution gave the Turkish Cypriot minority of 18 percent the right to occupy 30 percent of the civil service positions, as well as a crucial veto right over legislation. Turkish Cypriots tended to be satisfied with the arrangement but also aware of Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction with the compromise. Hence, one should not confuse anticipation, and even preparation because of that anticipation, with desire, as we often anticipate out of fear.

¹⁹ Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 6.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

²¹ Lisa Jenny Krieg, “A Fight for Countermemory and Counteridentity: The Alternative Ceremony of Independence Day in Israel,” *Kroeber Anthropological Society Papers* 101, no. 1 (2012): 33.

²² *Ibid.*, 35.

²³ James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

²⁴ See Saba Mahmood, *The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Stef Jansen, “Hope for/against the State: Gridding in a Besieged Sarajevo Suburb,” *Ethnos* 79, no. 2 (2014): 238–60; Stef Jansen, *Yearnings in the Meantime: “Normal Lives” and the State in a Sarajevo Apartment Complex* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2015).

²⁵ Yiannis Papadakis, “Greek Cypriot Narratives of History and Collective Identity: Nationalism as a Contested Process,” *American Ethnologist* 25, no. 2 (1998): 149–65; Yiannis Papadakis, “Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus,” *History and Anthropology* 14, no. 3 (2003): 253–70.

²⁶ For example, Andreas Panayiotou, “Lenin in the Coffee Shop,” *Postcolonial Studies* 9, no. 3 (2006): 267–80; and Andreas Panayiotou, “Hegemony, Permissible Public Discourse and Lower Class Political Culture,” in Bryant and Papadakis, eds., *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory*, 71–93. For the Turkish Cypriot community, see Bryant and Hatay, *De Facto Dreams*.

²⁷ Evropi Chatzipanagiotidou, “The ‘Leftovers’ of History: Reconsidering the ‘Unofficial’ History of the Left in Cyprus and the Cypriot Diaspora,” in Bryant and Papadakis, eds., *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory*, 94–117.

²⁸ For example, Godfrey and Unger, *The Shifting Foundations of Modern Nation-States*; Hosking and Schöpflin, eds., *Myths and Nationhood*; Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State*.

²⁹ Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 10.

³⁰ Grant, *National Myth and the First World War*, 16.

³¹ Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 140.

³² Sarah J. Purcell, “War, Memory and National identity in the Twentieth Century,” *National Identities* 2, no. 2 (2002): 187–95; also Seal, *Inventing Anzac*.

³³ Ross J. Wilson, *Cultural Heritage of the Great War in Britain* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 21.

³⁴ Ernst Renan, “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” in *Oeuvres complètes de Ernst Renan*, ed. H. Psichari (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1947), 202 (translation by Bryant).

³⁵ Charles Stewart, “Uncanny History: Temporal Topology in the Post-Ottoman World,” *Social Analysis* 61, no. 1 (2017): 133.

³⁶ Janet Donohoe, “Dwelling with Monuments,” *Philosophy and Geography* 5, no. 2 (2002): 235.

³⁷ Marita Sturken, “The Wall, the Screen, and the Image: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” *Representations*, no. 35 (1991), Special Issue, *Monumental Histories*, 129.

³⁸ The two books of that title were written by former fighter Oktay Öksüzoğlu and Turkish Cypriot political leader Rauf Raif Denktaş, who had been banished from the island and made a secret landing there by fishing boat in 1964. Turkish Cypriot poet Mehmet Yaşın, in a history of Turkish Cypriot poetry, describes an “Erenköy Movement” and claims that these books of poetry “were like diaries that put the conflict on paper. They are full of frightening images, aggressive expressions, and a dark state of mind.” Mehmet Yaşın, ed., *Kıbrıs Şiiri Antolojisi* [Cyprus Poetry Anthology] (Istanbul: Adam Yayınları, 2005), 107. See also *Kıbrıs Türk Milli Şiirler Antolojisi* [Cyprus Turkish National Poetry Anthology] (Nicosia: Ergenekon Yayınları, 1971).

³⁹ For examples, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fX5m5orkqFU> and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ohn_ZplmtAU.

⁴⁰ Fadıl Elmasoğlu, *Erenköy ve Hayat* [Erenköy and Life] (Nicosia: Işık Kitabevi, 2014), 65.

⁴¹ “Kıbrıs Destanı Mücahitler” [The fighters of the Cyprus epic], <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PdjWl7wwWYQ&t=686s> (unless otherwise noted, translations are by the author/s).

⁴² See, for example, the numerous narratives in Arslan Mengüç, *Anılarda Erenköy* [Erenköy in Memories] (Istanbul: Bir-Mat Matbaacılık, 2005).

⁴³ Bryant, “The Fractures of a Struggle.” Bruce Kapferer, for instance, argues that the Anzac myth constitutes a core element of Australian nationalism because of its emphasis on egalitarian individualism. Bruce Kapferer, *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*

(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1988). [I DECIDED TO LEAVE THE PAGE NUMBERS OUT, BECAUSE THE ARGUMENT CONSTITUTES ABOUT HALF THE BOOK.] See also Bruce Scates, “Memorialising Gallipoli: Manufacturing Memory at Anzac,” *Public History Review* 15 (2008): 47–59; Peter Slade, “Gallipoli Thanotourism: The Meaning of Anzac,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 30, no. 4 (2003): 779–94; Bart Ziino, “Who Owns Gallipoli? Australia’s Gallipoli Anxieties, 1915–2005,” *Journal of Australian Studies*, 30, no. 88 (2006): 1–12.

⁴⁴ It was the discovery of the village’s function that led to the Greek Cypriot armed forces’ attack five years later, though there also appears to have been considerable misinformation involved, as the area is still commonly believed to have been a beachhead for the landing of Turkish troops. While Greek Cypriot journalist Makarios Droushiotis does say that most of those landing at the beachhead were Turkish Cypriot students, he claims that “in five days the Turks had landed 500 men a day at Mansoura.” Makarios Droushiotis, *Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion* (Mannheim and Möhnese: Bibliopolis, 2006), 28. This would have amounted to at least 2,500 fighters, whereas all memoirs and writings of men who were stationed there and villagers themselves state that the total figure was a bit over 500.

⁴⁵ For details on the troop buildup and the attack, see *Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, S/5950, September 10, 1964, 21–22.

⁴⁶ Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*.

47

<http://www.trncinfo.com/TANITMADAIRESI/ARSIV2003/TURKCEarsiv/AGUSTO/S/080803.htm#3> (emphasis added). [I couldn’t access this page - the link leads to another site – maybe update?] [THEY’VE COMPLETELY CHANGED THE WEBSITE AND TAKEN DOWN THE ARCHIVE, SO I’M NOT SURE WHAT TO DO ABOUT THIS.]

⁴⁸ Mete Hatay and Rebecca Bryant, “The Jasmine Scent of Nicosia: On Returns, Revolutions, and the Longing for Forbidden Pasts,” *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26, no. 2 (2008): 423–49; see also Bryant and Hatay, “Guns and Guitars.”

⁴⁹ For example, Mehmet Albayrak, *Bir Erenköy Mücahidinin Anıları* [The Memoirs of an Erenköy Fighter] (Famagusta: Grafik Film Matbaa, 2005); Erdal Camgöz, *Kıbrıs’a İlk Çıkarma 1964 Oradaydım* [I Was There at the 1964 First Cyprus Landing] (Ankara: Kozan Ofset, 2008); Rüstem Köken, *64 Küşağı bir Kıbrıslı’nın Anıları* [The

Memoirs of a Cypriot of the 1964 Generation] (Ankara: Başak Matbaacılık, 2004); Hüseyin Laptalı, *Erenköy Sürüngeni: Özgürlüğün Bedeli, I. Cilt* [Translation] (Istanbul: Ufuk Matbaası, 2003); Hüseyin Laptalı, *Erenköy Sürüngeni: “Özgürlük geleceğe, gelecek ise umutlara kalmıştı”, II. Cilt* [Translation] (Istanbul: Ufuk Matbaası, 2004); Mengüç 2005)

⁵⁰ Camgöz, *Kıbrıs’a İlk Çıkarma*, xxxi.

⁵¹ <http://www.turkishforum.com/content/2008/08/09/erenkoy-direnisi%E2%80%99nin-44-yildonumu/>.

⁵² For a longer transcription of this interview, see Bryant, *Displacement in Cyprus*.

⁵³ Hamit Vurana, *Kuzeybatı Dilirga* [Northwest Tillyria] (Nicosia: Hamit Vurana, 2011).

⁵⁴ Figures provided by the Erenköy Fighters Association.

⁵⁵ Stefanos Evripidou, “Turkish Cypriots Mark Kokkina ‘Victory’, as Survivors Recall Bombings,” August 9, 2014, <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/08/09/turkish-cypriots-mark-kokkina-victory-as-survivors-recall-bombings/>.

⁵⁶ Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 10.

⁵⁷ An anonymous reader asked if the affect of agency produced may be in opposition to Turkey, particularly as Turkish Cypriots’ relations with that country have grown increasingly tense in recent years as a result of political developments in Turkey and their effect on the island. We find that what the ceremony shows is in fact the affective complexity of that relationship, which may contain elements of both love and loathing, of both gratitude and resentment, at the same time.

⁵⁸ Sara Ahmed, “Collective Feelings: Or, the Impressions Left by Others,” *Theory, Culture and Society* 21, no. 2 (2004): 27.

⁵⁹ In what appears to be the only other academic study of commemoration and affect, Jill Stockwell examines women’s narratives of violence both by the Argentinian government and by left-wing guerrillas to argue that “the affect generated by shared memories of trauma acts as an invisible yet potent cultural force.” Jill Stockwell, “The Country That Doesn’t Want to Heal Itself: The Burden of History, Affect, and Women’s Memories in Post-Dictatorial Argentina,” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 8, no. 1 (2014): 42. This seems to suggest that shared affect constructed through commemoration regarding others constitutes an important impediment to

reconciliation. While our argument does not discount the role of mourning and trauma in the Erenköy commemorations, we point to the ways in which affect may be explicitly future oriented.

REBECCA BRYANT is Professor of Cultural Anthropology at Utrecht University. She is the author of *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), editor of *Post-Ottoman Coexistence: Sharing Space in the Shadow of Conflict* (Oxford: Berghahn Books), and co-author of the forthcoming *The Anthropology of the Future* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (with Daniel M. Knight) and *De Facto Dreams: Building the So-Called State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press) (with Mete Hatay). [I WASN'T SURE HOW TO FORMAT THIS. YOU ALSO MAY WISH TO CUT.]

(r.e.bryant@uu.nl)

METE HATAY is an activist, journalist, and Senior Research Consultant at the Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre. He is co-author, with Rebecca Bryant, of the forthcoming *De Facto Dreams: Building the So-Called State* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press). [METE DOESN'T HAVE OTHER BOOKS, BUT HE HAS JOURNAL ARTICLES AND RESEARCH REPORTS. SHOULD WE ADD SOME OF THE JOURNALS WHERE HE HAS PUBLISHED, OR RESEARCH REPORTS?] (mete@prio.org).