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Introduction

Scholars of public diplomacy have focused much of their energy on understanding state agencies in charge of external relations: specifically, Ministries of Foreign Affairs, or State Departments. Surprisingly, there is limited empirical study on what the *military* has done for public diplomacy and how it might be able to communicate with a foreign general public.¹ As the study of propaganda is gradually replaced by the study of public diplomacy, ignoring the role of hard power (i.e. the military) may be a natural and somewhat inevitable outcome of the current research trend, because public diplomacy studies emphasize soft power instead of (military) hard power.²

However, as Cull (2013: 130) argues, the US Department of Defense after 2001 uses more of the budget than State Department in information transmission to foreign countries. The US military has its own Office of Global Engagement and generates a variety of materials to be connected with people in other countries. Moreover, Lord (2006) regards the Department of Defense as a key actor in public diplomatic efforts to win “hearts and minds” in fighting terrorism in the Middle East.³ In this study, we would also like to refocus attention back to the military and uncover what the military organization can do in public diplomacy efforts.

In an attempt to empirically confirm the power of public diplomacy, Kendrick and Fullerton (2006) evaluated the “Shared Value Initiative” (SVI), a widely known US public diplomacy project. To do this, they took an experimental approach;⁴ they recruited international students studying in London and tested their attitudes toward the US before and after showing them advertisements used in the SVI. While there are critical assessments of the SVI overall, Kendrick and Fullerton’s study concluded that the campaign was successful by showing that significant attitudes change. The experimental approach is indeed a powerful tool to assess the power of public diplomacy.

We would use an experimental approach to evaluate what the *military* can do in changing perceptions of foreign general public, and in this particular paper, we do so in the context of international relations of the Asia-Pacific. We believe that this study is one of the very first attempts for elaborating the power of *military* public diplomacy by using experiment method. Especially, it is important for public diplomacy literature since it will show *who* would be the most likely target of their information transmission and allow us to know *what they can change* in the public perceptions.

Military and Media Outreach

The military has been one of the major actors in war-time *propaganda*. Propaganda is defined as one-sided information transmission activities to the general public from the government aimed at winning “hearts and minds” of the people (Tago 2017). In particular, with the motivation to increase support for a war, propaganda is believed to help governments to mobilize the people for the war efforts. Historically, the military was at the center of propaganda efforts during world wars.

Nevertheless, the end of the war in 1945 changed the military’s role in public information. As the US became involved in the Cold War, organizational reforms by the Truman and Eisenhower administrations led to the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency taking over information activities abroad (McMahon 2010: 294-295; Gienow-Hecht 2010: 406-411). The military’s role in

¹ Studies on military public diplomacy can be found in Copeland and Potter (2008) and Munoz (2012). While they focus on the military public relations at fighter zones, this study focuses on military public relations at peace time.

² For studies on Foreign Ministries and the State Department, see Fullerton and Kendrick (2006; 2013), Schatz and Levine (2010) and Dragojlovic (2011).

³ Recently, we see newly emerging concepts such as “defense diplomacy” and “military diplomacy” (e.g. Swistek 2012). While the concepts cover what the military does in public relations, the terms cover broad activities such as military deception activities, and training and drills, which are purely international operations for the military but would not be a part of public diplomacy efforts. As a report by the “American Security Project”, Wallin (2015) examines a variety of practical cases and offers suggestions on how the military can contribute to public diplomacy.

⁴ See also the later works by Goldsmith, Horiuchi and Wood 2014; Sheafer, Shenhav, Takens and van Atteveldt 2014; Yarchi, Wolfsfeld, Sheafer and Shenhav 2013.

public information efforts was considerably narrowed. In the 1970s, as the new terminology “public diplomacy” was invented and rapidly replaced the traditional term *propaganda*, information transmission abroad was managed mainly by the State Department and CIA.

However, after the end of the Cold War, media outreach once again became highly important for the military since it must self-explain why national defense is important (even without Soviet threat) and why a large scale US military presence remains indispensable for an allied country. Without the clear and present danger from the Soviet Union, for instance, US bases may not be justified in allied states unless there is media outreach to persuade people’s minds in host nations. Accordingly the US military started to allocate some of their resources to PR strategies in host nations. Furthermore, with the impact of the 9.11 terrorist attack on US soil and as a countermeasure policy to it, the Defense Department started to invest very substantive resources in creating public relations materials (Lord 2006: 101). Lord believes that those materials are made “primarily for historical reasons” (i.e. as the record for the US military) and “for various public relations uses” (i.e. for its audience in the US and foreign countries).

While most existing scholarly research tends to focus on what the US military has done in the Middle East (e.g. Lord 2006), other major regional commands such as Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii have their own media/public relation team and create their own pictures and videos to promote the American values and US view on international security.⁵ Lord (2006: 102) pointed out that Hawaii is now one of the three strategic communication centers for the US military. At the very least, the PACOM media office is directed by a highly-experienced officer specialized in public relations.⁶

As of August 2017, the official website (www.pacom.mil) for PACOM features sections on “the latest headlines”, “photos from past events, exercises and engagements”, “videos from past events, exercises and engagements” and “the latest USPACOM-related Speeches and Testimonies”. Information on these activities is widely open to the public. In the news headlines section, for instance, we can see the outline as follows for one day (August 16, 2017);

Dunford Stresses Diplomacy, Sanctions for North Korea in Talks with Chinese August 16, 2017 — SHENYANG, China

U.S., Philippine Forces Improve Interoperability through Bilateral Training August 16, 2017 — JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM, Hawaii

US-South Korean Alliance Ready to Defend Against North Korean Threat, Top Generals Say August 16, 2017 — SEOUL, South Korea

Mustangs’ Challenges Platoon Leaders, Sergeants August 16, 2017 — SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii

Marine Returns Japanese WWII Flag to Original Family August 16, 2017 — HIGASHISHIRAKAWA, Gifu Prefecture, Japan

Carrier Air Wing Five Squadrons Conduct Heritage Flight over Solomon Islands August 16, 2017 — SOLOMON SEA

Forward Arming and Refueling Point Exercise Demonstrates 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade Readiness and Operational Reach August 16, 2017 — KUNSAN AIR BASE, Republic

⁵ PACOM is now renamed to United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) in May 30, 2018.

⁶ For instance, as of 2017, the chief of the Public Affairs Communication and Outreach section for PACOM is Capt. Darryn C. James, who simultaneously serves as the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) and Chief Spokesperson at the PACOM. Capt. James was previously stationed in Naples as the 6th Fleet PAO. Also, he had served as the Director of the Department of Defense Press Office and a senior Pentagon Spokesperson. From 2008-2011 across two White House administrations --- Bush Jr. and Obama, Capt. James provided daily counsel to senior executives and communicated DoD policies. He coordinated interagency strategic messaging on the death of Osama bin Laden; the surge and drawdown for Operation Iraqi Freedom/New Dawn; humanitarian and relief efforts in Haiti for Operation Unified Response and in Japan for Operation Tomodachi. In short, he is highly capable communication specialist in the military.

of Korea

These pieces may not be viewed *directly* by the general public. However, the media feature what USPACOM has issued as a press release or a video. PACOM inserts some hard military news items like alliance response to the North Korean threat gesture and other soft information items like commemoration of the end of World War II, by featuring the Japanese WWII flag returned from a US marine.

A good example of successful military public diplomacy by PACOM can be seen in Operation Tomodachi. Scholars see the communication strategies in this operation as a great success in promoting favorable views toward the United States in Japan (Harris 2013: 10-11). For instance, the US military delivered a variety of picture materials to Japanese media and the SNS. As a result, it was easy for people to know that the US military worked hard to help the victims of the disaster, accelerate recovery efforts (e.g. clearing Sendai international airport) and counter a devastating nuclear accident in Fukushima.

The communication on the operation was supported by and coordinated with the embassy in Tokyo. Immediately after the March 11, 2011, earthquake in northern Japan, US Ambassador John Roos used tweets to determine where to send American armed forces and this helped to effectively mobilize US troops to work for disaster recovery efforts. For one year following the event, the ambassador's followers increased dramatically and ended up with over 50,000 by the end of December 2012. According to Wike (2012), the overall image of the United States in Japan, which was already quite positive before the 3.11 earthquake/tsunami (roughly two-in-three Japanese respondents expressed a favorable view of the US in a spring 2010 survey), turned into further positive view --- 85% of respondents reported positive views to the US in a Pew survey conducted just weeks after the 3.11 earthquake. This was the highest percentage among 23 nations polled. Similarly, a September-October, 2011 survey, which was conducted by the Japanese Cabinet Office, found 82% of the respondents with a "friendly feeling" toward the US, which was the highest number since the poll began in 1978.

The Operation Tomodachi case suggests that what the US military does in foreign countries and its public relations strategy can change perceptions of a foreign general public. That is, the power of the US military would not be limited to its material war-fighting capability; its power is manifested more broadly, as it includes the tactics of winning people's "hearts and minds". The next question then should be how we can assess such a soft power of the military, and our experiment will explore the tactic of changing a foreign public's perceptions.

A Hard Case to Measure the Impact of US Military Public Diplomacy

To measure the power of US military public outreach in foreign countries, the example of Operation Tomodachi may not be ideal. In this case, the actions by the US military were purely admirable and appreciated; therefore, there is almost no doubt the people in Japan would feel very positive toward the US military once they saw American public outreach material on the operation. We must test the impact of US military public relations effort by using a different, "hard case" example, which would not be automatically taken-for-granted to generate a positive feeling toward the US and its military. In this particular paper, we make our hard case experiment study by using videos made by PACOM.

In September 2016, PACOM created a short PR video clip in the immediate aftermath of the North Korean Nuclear Weapon test.⁷ The clip features US B-1 Strategic Bombers (B-1Bs) conducting the so-called "sequence flights" with South Korean and Japanese air forces in response to nuclear test by the DPRK. Two B-1Bs took off from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam; when in the vicinity of Japan, the B-1Bs conducted fighter interception training with two F-2 fighters from Japan Air Self

⁷ North Korea carried out its sixth and most powerful nuclear test to date, claiming it was a hydrogen bomb in September 3, 2017. Following this event, the US, Japanese and ROK air forces repeatedly conducted similar "sequence flights" and "hand-offs" of the US bombers and fighter jets.

Defense Forces (JASDF). This was aimed to enhance operational capabilities and the tactical skills of two air forces. Later in the flight, the JASDF and the ROK fighters conducted a “hand-off” of the US B-1Bs in international airspace. Following the hand-off, the B-1Bs and ROK F-15 fighter aircraft and US F-16 fighter aircraft conducted a low-level flight in South Korea.

When the video was opened to the general public, PACOM Commander Harry B. Harris Jr. made the following comment⁸: “These flights demonstrate the solidarity between South Korea, the United States, and Japan to defend against North Korea’s provocative and destabilizing actions” and “North Korea continues to blatantly violate its international obligations, threatening the region through an accelerating program of nuclear tests and unprecedented ballistic missile launches that no nation should tolerate. US joint military forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific are always ready to defend the American homeland. We stand resolutely with South Korea and Japan to honor our unshakable alliance commitments and to safeguard security and stability.” The video and comments by the PACOM commander suggest that, despite South Korea and Japan still have a bitter memory over 35 years’ colonization, the United States is eager to see more Korean-Japanese cooperation to counter the increasing North Korean threat. Also, the video is suggesting the resolve of the United States to defend the two countries in the case of a further escalated crisis with North Korea. The video provides two crucial pieces of information; i) *promotion of Korean-Japanese partnership* and ii) *assurance of alliance capability and resolve*. As of August 2017, the video was watched by more than 100,000 people via Facebook.

As South Korea and Japan are two solid democratic countries in East Asia with a shared enemy (North Korea), and as they are both protected by the shared alliance partner (the United States), logically speaking, the two countries could be considered as a *quasi-alliance* to counter this rising threat in the region (Cha 1999). However, with their long-lasting memories of Japanese colonization, the two countries cannot get along. Indeed, public opinion surveys in the two countries tell us how badly Koreans and Japanese see each other. According to the most recent “Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2017)”, the fifth such poll to be conducted by Genron NPO and the EAI (East Asia Institute),⁹ only around 27 percent of the people in each country have a positive perception toward South Korea/Japan respectively. 49 (in Japan) to 56 (South Korea) percent of people have a bad perception toward the counterpart. That is, almost the half of the nation respectively have a negative impression of each other. The sentiment of the public echoes the relations of the leaders of the two countries (for details of the sore history of the two nations, see Cho and Park 2011; Glosserman and Snyder 2015).

While it is unfortunate that two countries have such a tragic history, we consider the tough public perception toward each nation provides us with a convenient baseline where a short video would *not* easily change how people think of Koreans/Japanese. If the US military video has the power of persuasion as a public diplomatic tool, then even in this difficult case, it would to some degree capture people's imaginations. In the case of this particular video, we can think of *two information effects*. First, the video may generate positive feelings toward the United States. The video features US bomber jets that could help Korea and Japan in a time of crisis or simply could deter North Korean aggression (this is the information signal to make people realize that the US is a serious alliance partner); thus, it may generate positive feelings toward the US.¹⁰ Second, as a hard case experiment testing of public diplomacy effort, the video on trilateral air force practice could generate positive feelings toward Korea and Japan since the video features two countries as a *quasi-alliance*, or “ingroup”, with the shared purpose to deter and counter North Korea.¹¹

⁸ <http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/941992/us-b-1-bombers-conduct-sequence-flights-with-south-korea-japan-in-response-to-n/>

⁹ Their report in English is available from http://www.genron-npo.net/en/archives/170721_en.pdf.

¹⁰ We do not think this would fulfill a hard case testing hypothesis since South Korea and Japan generally have positive feelings toward the USA.

¹¹ Other than the notion of “ingroup”, the video may suggest that the ROK and Japan share a “superordinate goal”,

H1: Watching a US military made video on US-Korea-Japan trilateral military cooperation induces more positive feeling toward the United States.

H2: Watching a US military made video on US-Korea-Japan trilateral military cooperation induces more public support for the Korea-Japan bilateral cooperation.

Furthermore, the effect of the video may be only appealing to a particular sub-group of Korean and Japanese public. The argument emphasizing the differences between groups of people is common among studies about military images' impact on political attitudes (e.g. Caverley and Kripnikov 2017).

In this case, the credibility of US information may be either weighted or discounted among specific people in each country due to basic attitudes toward the US (for instance, in Japan, anti-US left wing activists would not be influenced by an American military video as much as a pro-US group). Furthermore, the baseline attitude toward South Korea/Japan would be quite different among the right wing and left wing Japanese/Koreans respectively. For instance, it is well known in Japan that the anti-Korean perception is held among some right wing people (that is, they tend to say "No" to the need of Korea-Japan cooperation). Also, it is commonly known that right wing Japanese support US-Japan alliance unless they are *not* a member of the minority of "independent" nationalists, who seek a full scale militarization of Japan even with development of nuclear weapons (the number of such people is quite limited). Since the "normal" right wing people in Japan take US information messages more seriously (because they tend to be more pro-US than independent nationalists) and their baseline attitudes toward South Korea are lower than the average (since they are right wing), there should be more room to change their attitudes toward the need of Korea-Japan cooperation after seeing the US military made video.

By contrast, in South Korea, right wing people tend to accept a positive view toward Japan and the US. They *already* know that Japan is *quasi-alliance* in national security even without watching the video. In other words, they have a higher acceptance rate (baseline support) on Korea-Japan security cooperation. Left wing Koreans, however, would believe less in Korea-Japan cooperation due to their political ideology and tradition. If this is the case, we consider that the left wing Koreans would be more affected by the American made video, again, because of the larger space in which to change the perception.¹²

H3: Watching a US military made video on US-Korea-Japan trilateral military cooperation induces more public support for the Korea-Japan bilateral cooperation, especially among right wing Japanese and left wing Koreans.

Method

To test the hypotheses, we conducted two online survey experiments in South Korea and Japan. The first study (hereafter, Study 1) was done only in Japan on January 15, 2017 via Yahoo Crowdsourcing service (<http://crowdsourcing.yahoo.co.jp>). We collected 1050 participants by paying a 10 yen incentive as a reward. As the second study (hereafter, Study 2), we did simultaneous Korea (sample size = 800) and Japan (sample size = 741) online survey experiments in July 10-15 2017. Likewise the first one, we paid incentives to the respondents. We used services provided by Yahoo Crowdsourcing in Japan and Macromill Embrain (<http://www.embrain.com/eng/>) in South Korea.¹³

which drives a positive perception of each other without the feeling of "we-ness" (Sherif 1958; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and C.W. Sherif 1961).

¹² We understand the opposite argument could be true for left wing Koreans since they are anti-US and thus a 38 seconds US made video may not be as influential as in the Japanese right wing case --- thus, in our study, it is very important to test hypotheses by using two-tailed tests.

¹³ The random assignment was successfully implemented. Respondents' mean age, male/female proportion, education level and political attitudes have no difference between the two groups. This can be confirmed by the replication file posted on our replication website [*****]. Also, it is important to note that our sample is very close to the national sample; for instance, college enrollment rate in South Korea (2016) is 71%. In

Both at the study 1 and 2, we made the experiments a very simple design with only 2 groups. For the treatment group, we used the 38 seconds long video made by PACOM in September 2016 (see Figure 1 and appendix for the actual video).¹⁴ This is a manipulation that is designed to promote US-Japan-South Korea military cooperation to counter the rising threat from North Korea. We expect that the respondents who saw the video would become more favorable toward the United States and more supportive of Japanese-Korean military and national security cooperation.¹⁵

For the control group, we searched for a PACOM made video with the same length and created in a similar time of the year and not related to Japan nor Korea. We used a 38 seconds video entitled “Exercise Koolendong 16: Movement-to-Contact Drill” featuring a US-Australian military exercise, uploaded to the PACOM Facebook account on August 15, 2016; see Figure 2 for key scenes and the appendix for the actual video.¹⁶ It was seen over 5190 times and received “likes” from 424 viewers, with 41 shares. In our experiment setting, a half of the respondents saw this control video while the other half saw the treatment video. This control video is important as a *placebo* since we are going to measure how the content and messages of the video change the people’s perception (for the merit of placebo, see for example Iyengar and Kinder 1987).¹⁷

We measure the attitudes toward the US by using questions like “How much do you like or dislike the countries listed below? Please rate your feelings toward the countries listed below on a scale between 0 and 100 points, such that; 0 = strongly dislike, 50 = neutral, and 100 = strongly like.” Also, we measure the attitudes toward Korea-Japan cooperation by using questions like “Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? – Korea (Japan) should promote economic cooperation with Japan (South Korea) or Korea (Japan) should promote security cooperation with Japan (South Korea)” and five point Likert scale choices. Other than the key attitude questions, we asked the respondents’ age, gender, political party identity, education (in four point scale), and political ideology (in ten point scale).¹⁸

In the second study that aims to do a Korea-Japan comparison by using the exact same study design as the first study, to ensure if the manipulation was received correctly by the respondents, we additionally asked if the respondents remember accurately what they saw. For the control group, 90% of Japanese and 93% of Koreans answered that US military was in the video while 79% of Japanese and only 42% of Koreans answered that Australian military was there as well. For the treatment group, 96% of Japanese and 97% of Koreans answered that US military was in the video while 73% of Japanese and only 51% of Koreans answered that Japanese SDF was there as well. As for South Korean military presence in the same treatment video, 81% of Japanese and 83% of Koreans answered correctly.¹⁹

our South Korean sample, 73% of the respondents are college graduate/current student. The same rate for Japan (2016) is 51%, and in our data, 52% of our respondents are college graduate/current student.

¹⁴ Originally, the video clip was uploaded in the US Pacific command facebook website (<https://www.facebook.com/pacific.command/videos/10155688211942588/>) but now it is moved to the Indo-Pacific command website.

¹⁵ In our experiment, we actually showed the respondents either Japanese or Korean short translation of the English messages in the video clip saying “cooperation among Japan and South Korea ---- both American allies --- is increasingly important to counter North Korean nuclear weapon testing and ballistic missile testing”; we must thus note that both the video clip as well as the short text message would have generated the treatment effect.

¹⁶ Originally, the video clip was uploaded in the US Pacific command facebook website (<https://www.facebook.com/pacific.command/videos/1015556857872588/>) but now it is moved to the Indo-Pacific command website.

¹⁷ This assures that the participants were equally treated for the fact that they watched a video clip made by the US PACOM, but the only content and messages they consumed were different between the groups.

¹⁸ The entire test of survey experiment and questions (Japanese and Korean texts) are available at online appendix.

¹⁹ As fully described in replication data and do-files, while we narrowed the sample to the attentive respondents, who correctly answered the manipulation questions, the results of the following section do not change. At the remaining section, we show the results of using the entire sample.

Figure 1: Featured Scenes from the Treatment video



Source: Original video is posted at USPACOM Facebook and the six scenes are selected and cut by the authors (<https://www.facebook.com/indopacom/videos/10155688211942588/>)

Figure 2: Featured Scenes from the Control video



Source: Original video is posted at USPACOM Facebook and the six scenes are selected and cut by the authors (<https://www.facebook.com/indopacom/videos/10155556857872588/>)

In testing our hypotheses, we mainly use the data of study 2 since we are more interested in Korea-Japan comparison.

Result

To begin with, our experiments failed to support hypothesis 1. In Japan (study 2), those who saw the treatment video favor the US government on average, with a favorability score of 52.9 and those who saw the control video favor the US government at around 54.5. In a similar vein, favorability toward American people did not change between two groups (the control: 61.9 vs. treatment: 62.1). In South Korea (study 2), those who saw the treatment video favor the US government on average at the score of 57.6 and those who saw the control video favor the US government at around the score of 57.4. Again, the videos did not make a difference of favorability toward US people either (the control: 55.8 vs. treatment: 56.5). The video failed to generate a positive feeling toward the USA both in South Korea and in Japan. It is a bit surprising (since the video is a clear sign of US resolve to help both Korea and Japan) but it may be possible that the video was focusing too much on the importance of Korea-Japan cooperation. Furthermore, the video could have triggered fear of holding an alliance tie with the USA (i.e. “the fear of entrapment”, Snyder 1997; Cha 1999).

By contrast, by seeing both the data of study 1 and 2, we found evidence to support hypotheses 2 and 3. Figures 3 to 6 show our coefficient plots to test the hypotheses. We run simple OLS regressions to obtain a comparable unit-change effect of our video manipulation (i.e. seeing the trilateral military cooperation video) in relation to other key variables such as gender, education, political interest and so on.²⁰

Figure 3 shows the coefficients for key independent variables for the study 1 in Japan (Jan. 15, 2017). The upper left panel shows the coefficient for security cooperation as the dependent variable. The upper right panel is for economic cooperation. The effects on case by case cooperation and environmental cooperation are shown in the lower left and right panels respectively. The panels show statistically significant positive effects in generating attitudes to support more cooperation with South Korea. For instance, the video increases positive attitudes by .14 in coefficient size, which is roughly equivalent to the effect of a one unit move (out of 10 total) in political ideology. While the video is just about the military countermeasure against the North Korea, it promotes a variety of cooperative attitudes in the field of economic policies and environmental protection.²¹

Figures 4 and 5 show the coefficients for key independent variables for the study 2 in Japan and South Korea (July, 2017). The figures show statistically significant positive effects in generating attitude to support more cooperation in security and case-by-case issues with South Korea in Japan; however, the reverse was not true. South Koreans were not affected by the video and thus do not support cooperation with Japan by USPACOM. Hypothesis 2 is only supported in Japan.

However, after seeing Figure 6, we must be careful of jumping to a conclusion. Figure 6 shows two plots of coefficient including interaction terms of right wing (in Japan) and left wing (in Korea).²² In both Japan and Korea, the video indeed had an effect to the specific group of people. For Japanese

²⁰ It is important to note that we could not find any significant changes in overall *feeling* toward Japanese/Korean governments and people, respectively (we do not report the outcome numbers for the test but it can be seen in our online replication dataset). This suggests that the short military video clip cannot change general feeling toward a counterpart country’s government and people. It can only affect to a rational calculation in international cooperation.

²¹ Due to space limitation, we do not show the figures for the study 2 for those two variables, but there are statistically significant impact of the variables in Japan. This can be confirmed by looking at the replication package.

²² We used the categorical variable for the right-wing and left-wing group respectively. In creating the variables, we used the data of the following question: Q8. *All over the world, political stances are often expressed as “left”-“right.” Where is your position in the scale below? Left 0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 Right.* We coded the left if the answer to the Q8 was smaller than 4; we coded right if it was equal to or bigger than 6 (that is, neutral is coded as 4 and 5). The outcome and key findings were not substantively changed even if we code the variables by using a different threshold like 3 and 7, respectively.

right wing people, the video impresses them that the Korean air force could work with the Japanese SDF and US air force to counter North Korea, the shared enemy. They start thinking of the shared enemy more and thus consider South Korean as a reasonable partner to cooperate for the common goal in the national security. Normally, without seeing the video, the Japanese right tend to deny cooperation with South Korea (-.8 is the coefficient for the right); however, this recovers to the baseline after seeing US-made video (+.66). Likewise, in South Korea, the Korean left tend to think it less ideal to cooperate with Japan for their national security (-.24) but they see cooperation as positive if they watch the video (+.26). The left wing Korean people, who are more dovish toward North Korea and believe more in diplomatic solution, may not fully realize how Japan could be a crucial national security partner in a time of actualized crisis with North Korea until they watch a military made video.

Fig.3 Coefficient Plot for Key Independent Variables (Study 1, Jan. 15, 2017 in Japan)
 Item: Security (Upper Left), Economic (Upper Right), Case by Case (Lower Left) and Environmental (Lower Right) Cooperation




Fig.4 Coefficient Plot for Key Independent Variables (Study 2, July 10-11, 2017 in Japan)
Item: Security (Left), and Case by Case (Right) Cooperation




Fig.5 Coefficient Plot for Key Independent Variables (Study 2, July 10-15, 2017 in Korea)
Item: Security (Left), and Case by Case (Right) Cooperation





Fig.6 Coefficient Plot for Key Independent Variables (Study 2 in Japan and Korea)
Item: Security Cooperation with Right Wing Interaction in Japan (Left), and Security Cooperation with Left Wing Interaction in South Korea (Right)



Conclusion

Remarkably, a 38-second visual image describing the alarming crisis in the 38th Parallel can make a *quasi-alliance* into a *virtual but real alliance* between Japan and Korea.²³ While it did not generate a normal public diplomacy effect, i.e. a positive view toward the US, the video made a significant difference in support for national security cooperation between South Korea and Japan, where people generally see each other in a very negative light, yet which is a US strategic target to effectively counter North Korea.

This study is important since this was one of the rare studies on military public diplomacy in peace time and shows the power and scope of US military public diplomacy: just 38 seconds of video was able to influence people in indirect, quasi-alliance countries (in this case, Japan and South Korea) and make them support further cooperation.²⁴ This can be categorized as a mobilization of the foreign general public in two states.²⁵ The US needs staunch allies and the domestic audiences of those allies to support American national security policy and strategy. While it may not be so easy, it seems to be possible that US military informational efforts could have a positive impact on perceptions of US foreign policy, and even create new supporters of US strategy. In particular, when the President may not be helpful in generating an effective information transmission to the outside of the country, the military message could be the (probably not “only” but promising) *hope* for US public diplomacy.

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²³ There are growing body of evidence suggesting that people are exposed to news on Facebook and other SNS as a by-product of consuming other types of contents such as entertainment and friends’ updates. This inadvertent news exposure happens because users can be exposed to the news that their friends share and/or retweet. That is, the news contents such as the video shown in this study are consumed not only by politically attentive users but also by larger, less attentive audience who stumble across political information on social media, which is studied as “incidental exposure to news” (e.g. Boczkowski P, Mitchelstein E and Matassi M 2017; Fletcher, R., & Nielsen, R. K. 2018; Lee JK and Kim E 2017; Valeriani A and Vaccari C 2016). It is therefore expected that larger number of Facebook users than those who explicitly “liked” or shared the video watched the video.

²⁴ The length of the video clips that we have used in this study was relatively short (38 seconds); it would be possible that a longer video could generate stronger effect. Further studies are needed to elaborate on this point.

²⁵ We must admit our study’s limitation as well. We have done a brief analysis on the Facebook’s number of “likes”. Out of 2000 plus “likes” attached to the treatment video clip, we selected about 580 names and manually coded if a person’s name is obviously Japanese or Korean. Out of 580 samples, 40 (6.8%) were Japanese and 16 (2.7%) were Korean. This evidence shows that majority of the viewers would be non-Japanese and non-Korean. This suggests that we should know that *the movie had an effect to change mind of people in Japan/Korea but it probably did not change the people’s mind when it was actually posted*. If the US military forces likes its PR video clip to have more substantive power to form a particular type of public opinion, it must think carefully what would be the effective way to reach out to more people.

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Appendix: English summary of survey questions and survey experiment

- Q. Which is your gender? *Male Female*
- Q. What is your age? [*Real number*] # Only 20-59 years old can proceed to the next question.
- Q. Which region of the country do you live in?
- Q. What is the last school that you went to (or you're now going to)? *Elementary/Junior-high, High school, College (2 years) / Vocational, University / Graduate school*
- Q. Is your nationality Korean/Japanese? *Yes, No* * Move to the next questions, only if the answer is "Yes."
- Q. Regardless of whether or not there is an upcoming election, some people show continuous interests in politics, and others don't. How regularly do you pay attention to the political situation? *Never, Sometimes, Often, Almost always*
- Q. Which political party in Korea/Japan do usually support?
- Q. All over the world, political stances are often expressed as "left"- "right." Where is your position in the scale below? *Left 0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9 Right*

[Control condition]

[page1] In the next page, we will show you a short video on the international security in Asia-Pacific region. Please click the arrow and start the video. Please watch the video carefully because we will ask you questions related to the video afterwards (you cannot move forward unless you finish watching the video). Note: there will be sound in the video.

[page2] This video is made by the United States Pacific Command, featuring joint exercise between Australian and US armed forces. The Australian and American forces are often conducting this type of drill and increase their capability for joint operation. Please answer the following questions after you finish watching the video.

[Treatment condition]

[page1] In the next page, we will show you a short video on the international security in Asia-Pacific region. Please click the arrow and start the video. Please watch the video carefully because we will ask you questions related to the video afterwards (you cannot move forward unless you finish watching the video). Note: there will be sound in the video.

[page2] This video is made by the United States Pacific Command, featuring the coordinated protection of US B-1 strategic bomber by Japanese SDF and Korean armed forces. Cooperation among Japan and South Korea --- both American allies --- is increasingly important to counter North Korean nuclear weapon testing and ballistic missile testing. Please answer the following questions after you finish watching the video.

Q. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Korea/Japan should forcefully claim sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima, even if it increases tension between (South)Korea and Japan.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should promote economic cooperation with Japan/South Korea.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should promote security cooperation with Japan/South Korea.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should promote cooperation with Japan/South Korea, just on the issues that would contribute to Korea/Japan's own national interest.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should promote cooperation with Japan/South Korea on anti-pollution measures.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should promote cooperation with Japan/South Korea on disaster countermeasures.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Q. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Korea/Japan should listen to Japan/South Korea's arguments about historical issues, such as that of comfort women, among others.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should proactively accept students from Japan/South Korea.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should proactively accept investment from Japan/South Korea.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima should be solved through judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Balance of economic power between Korea/Japan and Japan/South Korea is getting closer to the ideal condition.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should listen to Japan/South Korea's arguments about Dokdo/Takeshima.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Q. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

In the near future, US-China bilateral relations would dominate world affairs.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should develop economic cooperation with China.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should develop security cooperation with China.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should develop economic cooperation with the U.S.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Korea/Japan should develop security cooperation with the U.S.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

From now on, Korea/Japan will develop closer economic cooperation with China, than with the U.S.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

From now on, Korea/Japan will develop closer security cooperation with China, than with the U.S.

Disagree, Somewhat disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, Somewhat agree, Agree

Q. How much do you like or dislike the countries listed below? Please rate your feelings toward the countries listed below on a scale between 0 and 100 points, such that; 0 = strongly dislike, 50 = neutral, and 100 = strongly like.

[The order of the country's name is randomized]

Japan

United States of America

China

North Korea

South Korea

Q. How much do you like or dislike the people listed below? Please rate your feelings about the people on a scale between 0 and 100 points, such that; 0 = strongly dislike, 50 = neutral, and 100 = strongly like.

[The order of the people's name is randomized]

Japanese people

American people

Chinese people

North Korean people

South Korean people