

## **Hopes and misguided expectations: How policy documents frame gender in efforts at preventing terrorism and violent extremism**

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## **Hopes and misguided expectations: How policy documents frame gender in efforts at preventing terrorism and violent extremism**

In recent years, increased attention has been given to the role of women in preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE). This potential role of women has been included in the United Nations Security Council's follow-up resolutions to Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, as well as in the CVE policies of other intergovernmental organizations and governments. This policy development has been met with both support and criticism. In this article, we critically analyse CVE policies to better understand how the intersection between gender and violent extremism is conceptualized in them. We analyse how gendered identities and roles are framed in policy documents on preventing and countering violent extremism. Through the analyses, we discuss how CVE policy documents define the spheres of gendered influence in efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism.

### **Introduction**

This article critically investigates the ways in which conceptualizations of gender are framed in policy documents focusing on how to prevent terrorism and violent extremism (hereafter 'CVE'). Ideologies embedded in terrorism and violent extremism, whether secular or religious, use gendered constructions in messaging, ways of organizing, modes of violence, etc.<sup>1</sup> In order to prevent these forms of

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<sup>1</sup> This statement was made at the conference 'Women and Girls in Violent Extremism as Perpetrators, Survivors and Peacebuilders', organized by the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), the International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and held at the University of Oslo, 26–27 April 2018. For further details, see: <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/events/2018/ican-workshop.html>.

violence, therefore, it is important to consider gender dimensions of violent extremism, and an increasing number of stakeholders are now focusing on this issue. These stakeholders include the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the Organization of Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), international civil society actors, national NGOs and national governments. Further, we note growing attention within the media<sup>2</sup> and the policy arena to the number of women who become foreign fighters, who support extreme ideologies and who do not shy away from violence. Clearly, we can conclude that gender is central to the portrayal, understanding and prevention of violent extremism. Yet it is less clear what kinds of conceptualizations of gender are embedded in different prevention strategies and what the implications of such conceptualizations might be.

Therefore we ask: *what conceptualizations of gender emerge in CVE documents and how do they shape notions of prevention?* This question will be analysed through a thematic analysis of policy documents from 2001 to 2017 that focus specifically on gender and CVE, as outlined in more detail below.

### **Conceptualizing men, women and extremist violence**

Before engaging with the policy texts, it is important to look to the established literature on gender and political violence. While the term used in this article is *extremist violence*, which refers to physical attacks where the target selection is based

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<sup>2</sup> J.R.Owe , *Runaway jihadi bride: Media framing of Western female foreign fighters to ISIS*. Master's thesis in Peace and Conflict Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, 2017.

on extremist beliefs,<sup>3</sup> the literature on gender and political violence is highly relevant for the purpose of our analysis. In this literature, we find a concern that the understanding of men's and women's engagement in political mobilization and violence has been overshadowed by certain myths. Elshtain has argued that there exists a dichotomy whereby women are seen as 'beautiful souls' and men as 'just warriors'.<sup>4</sup> Profoundly gendered divisions between men and women in armed conflict and political struggle have been remarkably sticky in policy thinking, scholarly analysis and popular culture, and have been analysed by a vast array of scholars.<sup>5</sup> A common argument made by these scholars is that the mythological dichotomy between men and women clouds other perceptions of gendered constructions in such a way that women's political participation, armed mobilization and willingness to engage in terrorist violent extremist activities have largely been overlooked. Women who demonstrate willingness to commit acts of violence are seen and explained as deviations from gendered norms – as though these women were acting against the true nature of women.

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<sup>3</sup> This is an edited version of Jacob Ravndal and Johannes Enstad's definition of right-wing extremist violence. For their full definition, see: <https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/topics/online-resources/compendium/what-explains-far-right-violence.html>.

<sup>4</sup> J.B. Elshtain, *Women and war* (University of Chicago Press, 1995).

<sup>5</sup> L. Åhäll, *Sexing war/policing gender: Motherhood, myth and women's political violence* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015); C. Cockburn, 'Gender, armed conflict and political violence', background paper for conference on 'Gender, Armed Conflict and Political Violence', World Bank, Washington, DC, 10–11 June 1999); C.O. Moser & F. Clark, *Victims, perpetrators or actors? Gender, armed conflict and political violence*. (London: Zed, 2001); F. Ní Aoláin, 'Political violence and gender during times of transition', *Columbia Journal of Gender and the Law*, 15(2006), pp. 829–849, [https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty\\_articles/89](https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/89); C.D. Ortals & L.M. Poloni-Staudinger, *Gender and political violence: Women changing the politics of terrorism*. (Cham: Springer, 2018).

One example of the strong resistance to seeing women's propensity for violence can be found in Berko and Erez's study of Palestinian women's participation in terrorist activities.<sup>6</sup> The authors found that, in contrast to their male co-terrorists, Palestinian women who engaged in terrorism were rarely seen as heroes by their respective communities. Rather, they were seen as implementers of male-orchestrated terrorist attacks or as auxiliary members of terrorist organizations, and their political engagement was viewed as being a result of social or personal problems. In other words, they were not perceived as truly ideologically or politically motivated, but rather as being motivated by private and personal reasons. Karla Cunningham, who conducted a study of cross-regional trends in female terrorism with similar findings, has argued:

Typically, women are said to have engaged in political violence for personal (private) reasons, whether because of a male family member, poverty, rape, or similar factors. Importantly, this argument suggests women do not choose their participation consciously, but are rather drawn in as reluctant, if not victimized, participants.<sup>7</sup>

Women's political motivations and at times violent engagement are seen as a form of gendered norm deviation. Even when faced with evidence to the contrary, there is a willingness to stick to the notion of women as 'beautiful souls' – and thereby innocent. Such myths, however, have become harder to maintain in the face of – and in some respects have been outright challenged by – studies and facts on the

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<sup>6</sup> A. Berko & E. Erez, 'Gender, Palestinian women, and terrorism: Women's liberation or oppression?' *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 30:6 (2007), pp. 493–519. doi: 10.1080/10576100701329550

<sup>7</sup> K.J. Cunningham, 'Cross-regional trends in female terrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 26:3 (2003) pp. 171–195, at p. 186. doi: 10.1080/10576100390211419

ground.

The first challenge is that there is a considerable number of female foreign fighters who support terrorism and violent extremism. Owe<sup>8</sup> shows that, in 2016, women were believed to constitute 17% of the approximately 5,000 people who had travelled from the EU to join the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This finding is also supported by Mehra<sup>9</sup> and Noor.<sup>10</sup> The eagerness and willingness of some women to take part in Islamist terror movements is therefore well documented. Kathleen Blee's work on women of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi movements also shows that women's political engagement in extremist ideologies and actions stretches far back in time, and that it includes involvement in extremist groups on the far right; she underscores that 'women's involvement in organized racism is more rational, and less capricious, than earlier research suggests'.<sup>11</sup> She refutes the idea that gendered engagement in extremist groups that applaud violence is emotional, and argues that 'if the conditions of women's participation in organized racism indeed are social and rational, rather than psychological and irrational, then it should be possible to design political measures to counter the recruitment of women by racist groups, even to recruit women away from racial politics'.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Owe 2017, p. 1.

<sup>9</sup> T. Mehra, Foreign terrorist fighters: Trends, dynamics and policy responses. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, 2016. <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/ICCT-Mehra-FTF-Dec2016-2.pdf>, p. 11

<sup>10</sup> L. Noor, *Islamsk humanisme* (Oslo: Moment/Minotenk, 2016).

<sup>11</sup> K. Blee, Becoming a racist: Women in contemporary Ku Klux Klan and neo-Nazi groups', *Gender & Society*, 10:6(1996) pp. 680–702. doi: 10.1177/089124396010006002

<sup>12</sup> Idem.

Prevention measures, then, must view women's engagement not through the lens of victimization but from the perspective of active agency.

The second challenge is that violent extremism far too often is seen as a male phenomenon in ways that are not sufficiently nuanced. Kimmel (2018) argues that we misconstrue the connection between masculinity and violent extremism because 'only a tiny fraction of young males ... ever remotely consider such extreme violence. Those 99+ percent that are not involved in violent extremism – are they not men?'<sup>13</sup> We therefore need more fine-grained analyses of the ways in which masculinity and political extremist violence intersect, as has also been suggested by Consalvo,<sup>14</sup> who studied the media coverage of the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in Colorado. Simply arguing that these shooters were disenfranchised young men has little explanatory power, and Kutner argues that one avenue for improving understanding of masculinity and political extremist violence is to understand how attitudes against feminism and gender equality frame the worldview of those who engage in such violence<sup>15</sup> – an argument that can also be found in Ging.<sup>16</sup>

The scholarly literature on gender and political violence argues and demonstrates that the link between the two is blurred and multifaceted. Still, there is consensus that gender is core to understanding and preventing political violence,

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<sup>13</sup> M.S. Kimmel, *Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into – and Out Of – Violent Extremism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2018) pp. 3-4

<sup>14</sup> M. Consalvo, 'The monsters next door: Media constructions of boys and masculinity', *Feminist Media Studies*, 3:1(2003), pp. 27–45, at p. 29. doi: 10.1080/146807703200008011

<sup>15</sup> S. Kutner, 'Swiping right: The allure of hyper masculinity and cryptofascism for men who join the Proud Boys' (ICCT Research Paper). (International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, 2020). doi: 10.19165/2020.1.03

<sup>16</sup> D. Ging, 'Alphas, betas, and incels: Theorizing the masculinities of the manosphere', *Men and Masculinities*, 22:4 (2019) pp. 638–657. doi: 10.1177/1097184X17706401

but exactly how to frame policies that prevent and counter violent extremism based on gendered analyses is not straightforward How, then, can the policy and practice communities deal with this challenge?

### **The global normative framework**

The efforts to address gender dimensions of prevention measures are not only a direct response to threats and on-the-ground concerns, but also a response to a global normative framework, namely, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the United Nations. In brief, the WPS agenda emanates from the adoption in 2000 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. This resolution was considered a breakthrough for the recognition of women's roles in the prevention and resolution of armed conflict, of the ways in which conflict affects women and men differently, and of how women's needs therefore must be addressed specifically in relation to security concerns.<sup>17</sup>

Resolution 1325<sup>18</sup> urges member-states to increase the *representation* of women at all

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<sup>17</sup> S.E. Davies & J. True, (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*. (Oxford University Press, 2018); P. Kirby & L.J. Shepherd, 'The futures past of the Women, Peace and Security agenda', *International Affairs*, 92:2(2016), pp. 373–392. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12549; N. Pratt & S. Richter-Devroe, 'Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13:4(2011), pp. 489–503. doi: 10.1080/14616742.2011.611658; T.L. Tryggestad, 'Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 15:4 (2009) pp. 539–557. doi: 10.1163/19426720-01504011

<sup>18</sup> Since 2000, nine follow-up resolutions have been adopted by the UN Security Council, and together these ten resolutions constitute the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) normative framework. Resolution 1325 was the first to be adopted and laid the ground for the adoption of the subsequent resolutions. It has been criticized for being vague and thus difficult to operationalize and implement, and to some extent the follow-up resolutions have sought to address different aspects of the WPS agenda in a more targeted manner.

decisionmaking levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Further, the resolution calls for the adoption of a *gender perspective* throughout the planning and implementation of peace operations and peace negotiations. Finally, it emphasizes the need for *protection* and respect of women's rights, including protection against gender-based violence.

One theme that has emerged high on this normative agenda is the role of gender in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). In *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, issued in 2015, it is stated that the best preventive measure against violent extremism is to create more sustainable peace and accelerate economic recovery after conflicts.<sup>19</sup> A whole chapter is devoted to countering violent extremism efforts focusing on women's victimization while also underscoring that women's engagement as actors in terrorism and violent extremism significant, as when the authors argue that 'in understanding women's desire to become members of violent extremist groups, it is also critical to recognize the nature of women's agency'.<sup>20</sup> We observe that the global normative framework around Resolution 1325 encompasses some of the concerns raised in the scholarly literature on gender and political violence, namely, the need to recognize men's and women's roles as both perpetrators and victims of extremist violence.

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<sup>19</sup> R. Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A global study on the implementation of United Nations Resolution 1325*, (2015). [https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy\\_EN\\_Web.pdf](https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_Web.pdf), at p. 5.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 230

While these the multiple roles of women (as both victims and perpetrators of violence) are voiced within the WPS agenda, they are conspicuously absent in the anti-terrorism agenda. In fact, gender as a concept is largely overlooked in that context. If we look at the anti-terrorism agenda through different stages, we can see that, before 9/11, policies addressed specific issues and sectoral problems such as hijacking and hostage-taking. In the next phase, following 9/11, we saw more of a hard security response that entailed putting the military, police, intelligence and, to some degree, financial institutions (i.e. the funding of terrorism) at the forefront. A central element in this response was the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001, which requires states to criminalize terrorist activities, to deny safe havens to terrorists and to work to obstruct the funding of terrorism. Resolution 1373 has been described as a ‘super-resolution’<sup>21</sup> because of its mandatory requirements, unusual legislative character and high level of compliance it demand of states; further, ‘Resolution 1373 has spawned an entire institutional infrastructure based on itself as the foundational norm’.<sup>22</sup> The third phase is marked by the UN General Assembly’s adoption of its Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. This document identified terrorism as one of the most serious concerns to international peace and security, and it sought to set out how the response to that threat and the infrastructure needed to address it would evolve and be broadened. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that all anti-terrorism measures implemented by national governments must be compliant with

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<sup>21</sup> F. Ní Aoláin, ‘The “war on terror” and extremism: assessing the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda’, *International Affairs*, 92(2)(2016) pp. 275–291, at p. 283.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 284

international humanitarian law. However, governments at the time remained very much stuck in a hard security approach.

The term *violent extremism* (VE) does not appear in this document, and its coming into usage marks the fourth phase of international policy development. The VE terminology entered debates at the international level in 2014–2015 as a result of existing counter-terrorism approaches being largely ineffective, and even counter-productive: responses to terrorism seemed to be creating even more grievances. With the rise of new groups such as Boko Haram and ISIS, the need for a broader approach was becoming apparent. The UN Secretary-General launched his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism in December 2015, and it is here that we see the language on violent extremism really enter the global stage.

There is no clear definition of what constitutes terrorism or violent extremism either in Resolution 1373, or in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, or in the Secretary-General's Plan of Action. According to the Plan of Action, 'definitions of "terrorism" and "violent extremism" are the prerogative of Member States and must be consistent with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law'.<sup>23</sup> This allows states a certain degree of autonomy in defining what constitutes a terrorist threat, and thus what should be targeted by counter-terrorism measures.

The shift in terminology from *terrorism* to *violent extremism* reflects an effort to move towards a 'softer' approach. Early criticism of the global/UN counter-

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<sup>23</sup> UN General Assembly 2015. *Plan of action to prevent violent extremism. Report of the Secretary-General*. A/70/674, 24 December 2015, at p. 2.

terrorism agenda came from the human rights community, which sought to engage with the UN Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the new security regime, but found that this was not an easy task. The human rights community was, however, slow to point at gender.<sup>24</sup> Feminist critiques argue that P/CVE instrumentalizes women as 'assets' and securitizes women's rights, which results in the essentializing of women and the entrenching of gender stereotypes.<sup>25</sup> When the CTC held its first open briefing on the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism, it identified the role that women – particularly mothers – might play in preventing the radicalization of their children.<sup>26</sup> Feminist scholars have denounced this as showing 'little sensitivity to the problems involved in engaging mothers as the front-line actors in preventing radicalization', as well as underestimating and ignoring the potential harms for women as they become informers for the state against their sons and daughters.<sup>27</sup> It is perhaps no coincidence that the call for integration of diverse policies happened after a gradual broadening of the counter-terrorism agenda, spurred by new actors such as Boko Haram and ISIS. During the same period, female suicide bombers in Boko Haram

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<sup>24</sup> See UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee 2016. *Report on best practices and lessons learned on how protecting and promoting human rights contribute to preventing and countering violent extremism*. A/HRC/33/29. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/ahrc3329-report-on-best-practices-and-lessons-learned-on-how-protecting-and-promoting-human-rights-contribute-to-preventing-and-countering-violent-extremism/>

<sup>25</sup> S. Giscard d'Estaing, 'Engaging women in countering violent extremism: avoiding instrumentalisation and furthering agency', *Gender & Development*, 25:1(2017), pp. 103–118.

<sup>26</sup> Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). Open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on 'The Role of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism', 2015. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Open-Briefing-Concept-Note.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> Ní Aoláin, 2016, p. 285

and ISIS's female foreign fighters also opened the eyes of WPS advocates to the counter-terrorism agenda.

What we see is that the global normative framework institutionalized through a series of UN Security Council resolutions linked to both the WPS agenda and the anti-terrorism and P/CVE agenda are inconclusive in their dealings with gender. In their assessment of the interconnection between the different normative agendas, Eddyono and Davies<sup>28</sup> argue that P/CVE efforts must acknowledge the diversity of women's roles and their agency, and must also support women's human rights and organizations. How, then, do the policy documents that have emerged from international organizations, think-tanks and national governments balance these concerns?

### **Policies for gendered prevention: An overview of analysed texts**

The basis for this analysis is a selection of texts that focus specifically on gender, terrorism and violent extremism. The texts were found through Google, Google Scholar and Web of Science searches that combined the words 'gender', 'women', 'terrorism' and 'extremism'. The searches were conducted at different intervals throughout 2017. What we found were reports, briefs, overviews and case studies of various kinds aimed at a policymaking audience. We selected 46 policy documents on countering violent extremism (CVE) and counter-terrorism (CT) for analysis.

These are official policy documents published by six intergovernmental

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<sup>28</sup>S.W. Eddyono & S.E. Davies, 'Women's roles in CVE'. In S.E. Davies & J. True (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security* (pp. 680–689), at p. 687. (Oxford University Press, 2018).

organizations and one state (the UK).<sup>29</sup> The following is a breakdown of the number of documents from each organization/state included in the analysis:<sup>30</sup>

- United Nations: 5
- United Kingdom: 9
- Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe: 4
- Global Counterterrorism Forum: 3
- European Union: 15
- African Union: 7
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 3.

The policy documents date from the years 2001–2017, with the exception of one African Union policy document from 1999. We identified documents in two main ways: first, by searching on the websites of the intergovernmental organization or state included in the study; second, by reading through reports by various NGOs and intergovernmental organizations to cross-check that key CVE policy documents mentioned in those reports had been included (see Appendix 2 for overview).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The UK was included in the analysis, as the country’s CVE policy is considered exemplary for other countries; other countries could be included in an expanded version of this study.

<sup>30</sup> See Appendix 1 for an overview of the 46 policy documents.

<sup>31</sup> We also did a search in academic publications on the same themes and found a series of academic articles focusing on *religious extremism* (n=59) in predominantly Muslim movements and a series of articles focusing on *secular extremism* (n=23) in predominantly right-wing and left-wing movements. Altogether 59% of the academic texts on religious extremism were published after 2010, and 43% of the academic texts on secular extremism were published after 2010. Judging from this small sample, it seems that the academic interest on gender and religious extremism has risen since 2010, while the focus on gender and secular extremism has remained relatively stable. The texts on secular extremism date back further in time than the texts on religious extremism, which suggests that there has been an interest in gender and extremism linked to right-wing and left-wing extremism throughout the 1990s (57% of the texts were from the period between 1994 and 2009) – and most likely also before.

Interestingly, all documents focus on recruitment in or to terrorist or extremist groups in the global South – that is, the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region and East and Central Asia. We were unable to find a significant number of policy texts that addressed policies aimed at hindering recruitment of girls and women into right- or left-wing extremist groups in the global North.

We coded the documents using NVivo software and an inductive thematic analytical approach. This means the coding emanated from the data, as suggested by Clarke, Braun and Hayfield,<sup>32</sup> the aim being to see which conceptualizations of gender emerged with different coding strategies, as will be explained in more detail below. On a more general level, however, the first round of coding involved searching each document for key gender terms, including ‘gender’, ‘women’, ‘men’, ‘girl’, ‘boy’, ‘femin\*’, ‘masc\*’, ‘male’, ‘female’ and ‘sexual\*’. Once segments of texts including key gender terms had been identified, we then coded each segment to three thematic areas: ‘Identity’, ‘Role’ and ‘Setting’. We did this with a view to understanding (1) how gender was conceptualized as an identity relevant to P/CVE; (2) which gendered roles were described and made relevant to P/CVE; and, finally, (3) in which contexts/settings gendered identities and roles were made relevant to P/CVE measures.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> V. Clarke, V. Braun & N. Hayfield, ‘Thematic analysis’. In J.A. Smith (Ed.), *Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods* (3rd ed.) (pp. 222–248, at p. 225). (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 2015).

<sup>33</sup> Terms such as ‘gender’, ‘women’, ‘men’, ‘masculinity’, ‘femininity’, ‘sexuality’ and ‘sexual identity’ denote gendered identities, and these comprised the most common gendered terminology in the CVE documents, with 93 references coded to Identity. Words describing gendered roles include ‘mother’, ‘motherhood’, ‘father’, ‘fatherhood’ and ‘parenting’, and were the least-common words used in the CVE policy documents analysed, with only one reference coded to Role. Finally, descriptions of settings such as ‘in the home’, ‘in the family’, ‘in the local community’ and ‘in the religious communities’ relate to settings that

Our analysis of the 46 policy documents clearly revealed two ways in which gender is made relevant to prevention measures: in relation to preventing women from becoming radicalized and in the context of using gendered roles as prevention modes in families and communities. These narratives are addressed in more detail below.

### **Narratives about gendered P/CVE**

What can words tell us about gender and P/CVE? We started by coding the words ‘women’ (65 references in 14 sources), ‘female’ (6 references in one source) and ‘girl’ (14 references in 6 sources). We then followed up by coding the words ‘men’ (12 references in 7 sources), ‘male’ (4 references in 3 sources) and ‘boys’ (4 references in 3 sources) and found distinct narratives taking form. In terms of sheer numbers, this exercise shows that when policy documents address the issue of gender, it is women who come to the fore, while men’s gendered roles are less pronounced and receive less attention. This finding also shows that policy thinking on gender and extremism situates women as the ‘other’ – that is, the atypical, in need of close scrutiny – whereas men are discussed and questioned to a lesser degree, or rather their roles and identities as men are assumed.<sup>34</sup> This finding confirms Kimmel’s argument outlined above.

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describe arenas where gender and CVE intersect and are thus spheres of gendered influence on CVE, and 21 references were coded to this theme of Setting.

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion of how these non-contested norms about masculinity play out, see T. Smith & M. Kimmel, ‘The hidden discourse of masculinity in gender discrimination law’, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 30:3 (2005) pp. 1827–1859. doi: 10.1086/427524

In terms of content, the coding gave rise to two distinct stories about gender and violent extremism: first, a story about gendered pathways into violent extremism and how to prevent *radicalization of women to violent extremism*; and, second, a story about how to use *women's gendered roles as modes of preventing others (often men) from radicalizing into violent extremism*. These two distinct narratives bring out different conceptualizations of gender: one about self-radicalization and recruitment, the other about preventing others from becoming radicalized or being recruited into violent extremism.

### ***Gendered radicalization and recruitment***

Women's radicalization and recruitment to terrorism and violent extremism is presented predominantly as a result of experiences of *exclusion*. The predominant concern has been with female foreign fighters and their pathways into terrorism, and violent extremism is largely seen as the result of experiences of gendered exclusion either in Western societies or in countries of origin outside of the West.

Several descriptions manifest this framing by using phrases such as 'feeling at odds with society', 'strengthening the participation of women in political decision making', 'to live free from persecution of any kind', 'lack of integration ... limit(s) education achievements and access to employment, particularly for women' and 'teaching English language skills and boosting employment outcomes, especially for women' in relation to the exclusion of women/females/girls. As we will see, the exclusion of men/males/boys is described differently.

In response to experiences of exclusion, the assumption is that girls and women will seek inclusion elsewhere. The obvious concern is that women will seek

inclusion in terrorist groups, such as ISIS, which operate with a more clearly defined role for women, where women who experience exclusion can serve a purpose felt to be meaningful. The policy documents devote considerable space and attention to explaining how to transform experiences of exclusion – or prevent that exclusion altogether, by creating spaces for inclusion within schools, religious groups, policy settings and the security sector. The remedy for the exclusion experience is more rights, gender equality and empowerment, as illustrated in the following quote from the European Parliament:

the growing number of young women who have been radicalised and recruited by terrorist organisations, providing evidence of their role in violent extremism; [means that] EU and the Member States should take gender into account at least to some extent in developing strategies for the prevention of radicalisation [they should call] on the Commission to support generalised programmes aiming to engage young women in their endeavours for greater equality.<sup>35</sup>

The same remedy is advocated in the UK Prevent Strategy from 2011, which presents ‘active citizenship training for Muslim women’ as a means for greater inclusion, along with language training and teaching of core British values such as ‘democracy, rule of law, equality of opportunity, freedom of speech and the rights of all men and women to live free from persecution of any kind’.<sup>36</sup> We find the same arguments presented by the OSCE : ‘to prevent and counter violent extremism and

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<sup>35</sup> European Union, 2015a: European Parliament resolution of 25 November 2015 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organisations. 2015/2063(INI). [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0410\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2015-0410_EN.html)

<sup>36</sup> United Kingdom 2011. *Prevent Strategy*. Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, June 2011. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf), pp. 33 and 39

radicalization that lead to terrorism [we need] a focus on women's empowerment'.<sup>37</sup>

These arguments from European institutions identify the problem as Muslim girls and women who experience exclusion from European communities.

The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism adds another element, holding that *past experiences of gendered violence* – specific gendered experiences of situations involving armed conflict, atrocities, disasters and terror that make women vulnerable for further gendered violence – might motivate women towards radicalization and violent extremism.<sup>38</sup> Such experiences might add to existing feelings and experiences of exclusion, or might be the cause of such feelings or experiences in their own right, and they may lead some women to join violent extremist groups. The Plan of Action also notes: 'in areas where ISIL and other terrorist and violent extremist groups currently operate, it appears that religious communities, and women, children, political activists, journalists, human rights defenders and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community are being systematically targeted, abducted, displaced and murdered',<sup>39</sup> thereby underscoring the deeply gendered nature of violent extremism as demonstrated by ISIL. The suggested remedy is twofold: First, it is essential to prevent gendered violence in conflict, atrocities and disasters, because such experiences are assumed to create gendered vulnerabilities for recruitment.

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<sup>37</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2015. Ministerial declaration on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism. MC.DOC/4/15. <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/2/208216.pdf>, p. 4

<sup>38</sup> UN General Assembly (2015). Plan of action to prevent violent extremism. Report of the Secretary-General, p. 2. A/70/674, 24 December.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 6

However, it is also emphasized that working for better and gendered inclusion measures in various member-states with the aim of ‘achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls’<sup>40</sup> is equally crucial.

When examining how men’s exclusion is presented, we quickly found that we needed to look for the texts that addressed the situation for *boys*. The stories in the policy documents that describe male exclusion as a precursor to radicalization are stories about youth and criminal behaviour, as the following quote from the UK’s Prevent Strategy illustrates:

People drawn to extreme right-wing terrorism are usually male, poorly educated (although there are some cases of high-achieving individuals) and often unemployed. In some cases, previous involvement in criminal activity has been an issue.<sup>41</sup>

Prevention measure have focused on, for instance, the underachievement of Pakistani boys in British schools;<sup>42</sup> attempts to create new role models for young boys through cartoons in patriarchal non-Western settings;<sup>43</sup> and the creation of role models that would improve results in school and keep young boys away from criminal behaviour.

Whereas the exclusion of women is seen as an issue of discrimination, traditional roles and religious practices, the exclusion of men is understood as being based on marginalization in the public arena – in schools, mosques and the labour

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 12

<sup>41</sup> United Kingdom, 2011, p .27

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 33

<sup>43</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 2015b. Good practices on women and countering violent extremism CTF documents. <https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Framework%20Documents/A/GCTF-Good-Practices-on-Women-and-CVE.pdf> , p. 6

market. This distinction can be seen in the following formulation by the EU: ‘We will fight poverty and inequality, widen access to public services and social security, and champion decent work opportunities, notably for women and youth’.<sup>44</sup>

The second most prominent narrative of gendered radicalization is that of *ideology* as a motivating factor for violent extremism. Ideology is not presented as a motivating factor per se but as a motivating factor which is based on previous experiences of exclusion. Consider the following quote, for example:

The case of Silvia Celestin is an example of a recruiter disrupted. She was arrested by Spanish National Police on July 2015 in Arrecife, Lanzarote (Canary Islands). She is a Spanish woman who converted to Islam, and was directly involved in radicalization to violence of other women and facilitation of their travel to Syria. She provided them with information on the route to use and security measures necessary to avoid being detected during transit to Syria. She was in direct contact with an ISIL/Da’esh member in Syria, from whom she received guidelines and instructions on how to recruit and facilitate the travel of women for the purpose of integrating them into the terrorist group. She published extremist content on social networks. The girls recruited by Silvia Celestin were mainly motivated by religious belief, but once at their destination in Syria they were exploited as sex slaves, worked as home and hospital support, performed functions of supervisory police enforcement in the women’s field according to the Sharia, and a small group were integrated into the ranks of fighters for ISIL/Da’esh.<sup>45</sup>

A woman recruiting other women from countries where they may have felt various

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<sup>44</sup> European Union, 2016. *Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe – A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy*.

[https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf), p. 26

<sup>45</sup> Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), 2016. ‘Initiative to address the life cycle of radicalization to violence: Plan of action for identifying and countering terrorist recruiters and facilitators’.

[https://toolkit.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/En/Plan\\_of\\_Action\\_for\\_Identifying\\_and\\_Countering\\_Recruiters\\_and\\_Facilitators.pdf](https://toolkit.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/En/Plan_of_Action_for_Identifying_and_Countering_Recruiters_and_Facilitators.pdf), p. 15

degrees and elements of exclusion can be a powerful force.<sup>46</sup> The policy documents underplay the ideological and religious motivations of these women, and it is mostly in passages coded in our analysis with the word men that prevention strategies address teachings in mosques as a way of preventing self-recruitment to violent extremism. For women, the narrative of prevention is more focused on delivering human rights, empowerment and gender equality for women in various settings.

### *Gendered prevention of others*

While much of the policy literature creates narratives about how to prevent men and women, and boys and girls, from self-recruiting to extremist movements and groups, there is also another storyline in these texts that focuses on how they can and perhaps should prevent others from doing the same.

One example can be found in UN Security Council Resolution 2354. In a list of counter-narratives as prevention measures, it is stated: 'counter-narratives should take into account the gender dimension, and narratives should be developed that address specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women'.<sup>47</sup> The sentence shows that the UN counter-terrorism strategy assumes that men and women live different lives, and that narratives against extremism must be tailored to these differences: the scenarios for alternatives to violent extremism presented to men/boys should be different from those presented to women/girls. But how are

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<sup>46</sup> Ådne Seierstad relates how two Norwegian sisters, strongly motivated by religious convictions and a general discontent with the status of Islam in Western societies, were motivated to join ISIL as volunteers. See Å. Seierstad, 2018). *Two sisters: A father, his daughters, and their journey into the Syrian jihad*. (London: Virago, 2018)

<sup>47</sup>UN Security Council, 2017. Resolution 2354, p. 3. (S/RES/2354, 24 May).

these differences conceptualized, and in what ways should appropriate counter-narratives be shaped?

In order to try to find an answer to these questions, we investigated when and how gendered words such as ‘men’, ‘male’, ‘boys’, ‘women’, ‘female’, ‘girls’, ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ appeared in descriptions of particular settings such as religious practice, community activities, migrant settings and family life. What appeared was an outline of assumptions about, again, women’s roles as preventers, based on gendered social roles, while discussion of the roles of men was conspicuously absent. Consider the following outline in a document from the European Union on the prevention of radicalization and recruitment of European citizens by terrorist organizations:

40. Stresses that recent research points to the growing number of young women who have been radicalised and recruited by terrorist organisations, providing evidence of their role in violent extremism; considers that the EU and the Member States should take gender into account at least to some extent in developing strategies for the prevention of radicalisation; calls on the Commission to support generalised programmes aiming to engage young women in their endeavours for greater equality and to provide support networks through which they can safely have their voices heard;

41. Stresses the importance of the role of women in the prevention of radicalisation.<sup>48</sup>

The centrality of women as preventers of the radicalization or recruitment of others is reiterated in another document from the European Union:

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<sup>48</sup> European Union 2015a, p. 11.

Tools to assist those who can play a crucial role in countering radicalisation on the ground – such as teachers, social workers, local authorities, women, youth and sport representatives, religious leaders – and the exchange of good practices, both in terms of the content of programmes and the training and guidelines provided to staff, must be developed. *In particular women and girls are often some of the most effective voices in countering violent extremism.* (European Union, 2015b, p. 3, italics added)

Why women are assumed to have – or take on – such a role is further explained in another EU document in which gender identities, and particularly the role of women and girls, are linked to *resilience*:

A special focus in our work on resilience will be on origin and transit countries of migrants and refugees. We will significantly step up our humanitarian efforts in these countries, focusing on education, women and children. (European Union, 2016, p. 27)

The assumption, as Ní Aoláin has argued,<sup>49</sup> is that women come into being as relevant political subjects in CVE discourse as wives, daughters, sisters and mothers of terrorist actors; and, as the policy documents show, it is precisely in these roles that they are thought to be CVE actors. Their political resilience is framed by their private, often family, relationships. It is in relation to their gendered roles in the private sphere that prevention measures are understood to be shaped and acted out.

‘Family and community relationships are critical determinants in the process of radicalization, and both women and men are part of that dynamic process,’ state the authors of a document on good practice on women and countering violent

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<sup>49</sup> F. Ní Aoláin, ‘Situating women in counterterrorism discourses: Undulating masculinities and liminal femininities’, *Boston University Law Review*, 93(2013), pp. 1085–1122, at p. 10986 [https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty\\_articles/87](https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/87)

extremism produced by the Global Counterterrorism Forum.<sup>50</sup> They go on to explain that ‘as a core part of families and communities, women and girls have vital contributions to make to a more expansive understanding of the local context for CVE, including violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, and its underlying factors’, and conclude that women and girls ‘can help formulate and deliver tailored CVE responses that are more localized, inclusive, credible, resonant, and therefore sustainable and effective’.<sup>51</sup>

The European Radicalisation Awareness Network argues in the same vein, stating that ‘women can be empowered to come forward and help in the design of countering violent extremism (CVE) interventions by empowering other women to share their experiences, and by providing training for women and in the community itself, via civil organizations and personal networks’<sup>52</sup>(RAN, 2015, p. 4). Again, it is the personal and private roles of women that are the site for CVE efforts, and it is argued that it is at this site that such measures can be acted out most efficiently.

The United States Institute of Peace, on the other hand, warns against being too hopeful about women’s ability to provide CVE and argues that some women may very well be key agents of radicalization in the domestic sphere, whereas others might challenge the support their family members provide to extremist groups, and that ‘programming to reach these women must take into account the full range of their roles – in direct and indirect support, as well as that which counters the

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<sup>50</sup> GCTF, 2015b, p. 2

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 3.

<sup>52</sup> Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2015). The role of gender in violent extremism (RAN Issue Paper 04/12/2015). [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-\\*do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/ran-papers/docs/issue\\_paper\\_gender\\_dec2015\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-*do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_gender_dec2015_en.pdf)

radicalization of family members'.<sup>53</sup> Women In International Security explains further: 'emphasis [within CVE measures] has been placed on the importance of mothers and wives in detecting early signs of radicalization with programming targeting women within the boundaries of family'. It concludes that this focus has hindered a broader focus on women's roles outside of the family.<sup>54</sup>

The International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) adds another element and argues that it is women's *civil society* actions that are the most effective in CVE measures because their civil society actions challenge established myths and the authority of religious and community leaders who might promote extremist views.<sup>55</sup> Women's civil society action groups resist these narratives of women's traditional roles, argues ICAN, by 'planting seeds of doubt' and creating counter-narratives in their members' homes and communities. But broadening the scope of gender and P/CVE measures to focus on women's broader civil society engagement can pose new challenges. Consider this passage by the GCTF on family and community-based practices:

Women can be particularly critical actors in local CVE efforts. They often are well positioned to serve as locally knowledgeable, credible, and resonant CVE voices. Women often play a particularly vital role in their families. They often

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<sup>53</sup> United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 'Afghan women and violent extremism: Colluding, perpetrating, or preventing?' *Special Report* 396, at pp. 13–14. (Washington, DC: USIP, 2016).

<sup>54</sup> Women in International Security (WIIS). 'Women preventing violent extremism: Broadening the binary lens of "mothers and wives"', Report by F.A. Ali. (WIIS Horn of Africa, 2017) <https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Mothers-and-Wives-3-14-17.pdf>, p. 1

<sup>55</sup> International Civil Society Action Network, 'Extremism in the mainstream: Implications for and actions by women', report commissioned by UN Women and written by S.N. Anderlini & M. Koch, 2015. <https://icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Extremism-in-the-Mainstream-UNW.pdf>

also serve as institutional memories of their local communities. These and other roles mean that women often are best positioned to identify signs of radicalization and discourage this phenomenon in their families and communities. They also may be the best actors to raise the awareness of, and build capacity among, other local women – thus serving a force-multiplier effect in communities where radicalization and recruitment are likely to occur.<sup>56</sup>

The text goes on to identify the ways in which women may intersect and act as resilience actors through their traditional roles, but the report also acknowledges how these roles create new vulnerabilities for women, who might become security targets as a result of their resilience efforts.

A comprehensive report on what counter-terrorism funding has done to women’s civil society engagement is a case in point. The authors note that women civil society organizations are squeezed between being victimized by terrorism and violent extremism, on the one hand, and preventing and countering violent extremism, on the other. Summing up its finding, this report from the Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women Peacemakers Program notes:

in the survey of grassroots women’s organizations undertaken ... 86.67 percent of respondents classified their organization’s work – including in areas such as peacebuilding and conflict resolution – as contributing to combatting terrorism and violent extremism.... 90 percent said that counter-terrorism measures had an adverse impact on work for peace, women’s rights, and gender equality generally.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> GCTF, 2015b, p. 8

<sup>57</sup> Duke Law, *Tightening the purse strings: What countering terrorism financing costs gender equality and security*, p. 10. Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Women

This ‘adverse impact’ might be felt in various ways – as new restrictions in funding, new demands on target populations for their civil society engagement, new vulnerabilities in the local settings and added administrative burdens.

This is a serious concern and something that Jenny Lorentzen has noted in a field study of women’s engagement in P/CVE in Mali. She concludes that women are pushed into roles as ‘new security actors’ in the places where they are least protected by the state – in their homes/private sphere and in civil society organizations that might be targeted by extremist groups precisely because they would promote counter-narratives to traditionalist and fundamentalist discourses about gender roles.<sup>58</sup>

The hope that women will be voices, actors and forces of resistance and resilience to terrorism and violent extremism is founded in traditionalist understandings of gendered roles. The roles of men as fathers, brothers and sons in the domestic private sphere and in civil society and community settings are absent in these policy documents, and the burden seems to be placed on the woman – alone. Men are not seen as prevention and resilience actors unless they are community and religious leaders.

## **Discussion**

What conceptualizations of gender emerge in CVE documents, and how do they

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Peacemakers Program, March 2017.

<https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/humanrights/tighteningpursestrings.pdf>

<sup>58</sup> J. Lorentzen (forthcoming). ‘Re-presentations of Women as “New Security Actors” in Discourses on Preventing Violent Extremism in Mali’, draft article presented at Department of Political Science, Lund University, Sweden, 20 May 2020.

shape notions of prevention? Our analysis reveals two distinct empirical findings.

First, we find in the documents a highly prevalent narrative that focuses on women's ways into terrorist and extremist movements and activities. The policy challenge, as it is conceptualized, is to see how the recruitment and radicalization pathways of men and women might differ, and there is a strong warning against seeing male recruitment and radicalization as the norm, with which women simply comply to a male norm. Accordingly, policies need to be more finely tuned to gendered differences if prevention measures are to be more effective. By framing the problem of women's recruitment in such a way, the policy documents also prescribe some inherent solutions. Women's motivations for radicalization must be understood as a consequence of women's subordinate positions in particular communities. Social control of Muslim girls and women in Western societies is a case in point; patriarchal societies in the MENA region could be another; and victimization based on gendered violence could be a third. In order to design effective policies, interventions and practices, the various exclusion mechanisms must be addressed, and these mechanisms again appear as highly gendered in the ways in which the policies are presented in the documents. Women/girls need to be included as equal citizens in Western and non-Western societies. Prevention of their potential radicalization is therefore aligned with global gender equality goals such as those found in the Women, Peace and Security agenda and in the Sustainable Development Goals. For men, matters are somewhat different. Prevention of their exclusion does not rely on a global transformative gender-equality agenda, but on participation in public life as income-earners, as moderate

religious leaders and congregation members, and as well-adjusted students and employees.

Second, we find a strong narrative that is not about women in their own right but rather about their gendered roles in families and communities and as civil society actors. It is women's traditional roles within various private and community settings that enable them to be not just resilience actors, but also security actors. However, the emphasis on how P/CVE efforts should focus on women's roles in settings outside of state control, where the state would be unable to provide protection, might lead to the emergence of new vulnerabilities for women and women's civil society engagement. This is thus a risky political project, and one that will be at odds with the transformative political agenda proposed for preventing women's radicalization to terrorism and violent extremism outlined above.

But how should we understand the relevance of gender in these efforts and on what basis policies should be designed? The literature speaks with two minds: a transformative one, in which more progressive views on gendered identities create more open societies in which experiences of exclusion can be minimized; and another that has no transformative aims, but rather takes as its starting point traditional gendered divisions in various spheres and assumes that women will resist radicalization to terrorism and violent extremism through their roles as mothers, wives, girlfriends, daughters and civil society community actors.

Finally, there is in these documents a conspicuous silence and lack of concern about gendered recruitment to far-right extremist movements and communities. This ought to be a concern for policymakers who may have overlooked the ways in which men and women who are part of majority cultures in

the global North are radicalized, and what the gendered underpinnings of such processes might be. There exists a growing scholarly literature that points to the increasing engagement of women in far-right movements – in both leadership positions and as common members.<sup>59</sup> The remedies proposed by the policy literature for addressing the self-recruitment of these women via an understanding of mechanisms of exclusion may be completely misguided. The same can be said in relation to men. What is needed is a policy literature on P/CVE that looks as much to the challenges of the global North as to the global South, and a literature that does not reinforce the myths of women as ‘beautiful souls’ and men as ‘just warriors’.

### Acknowledgements

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<sup>59</sup> See, for example, C. Kinnvall, ‘Borders and fear: Insecurity, gender and the far right in Europe’, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 23:4 (2015), pp. 514–529. doi: 10.1080/14782804.2015.1056115; M. Köttig, R. Bitzan & A. Pető (Eds.), *Gender and far right politics in Europe*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); R. Kuhar & D. Paternotte (Eds.), *Anti-gender campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against equality*. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); S. Mayer, E. Ajanović & B. Sauer, ‘Man, woman, family: Gender and the limited modernization of right-wing extremism in Austria’. In G. Dietze & J. Roth (Eds.), *Right-wing populism and gender: European perspectives and beyond* (pp. 101–116). (Bielefeld: transcript, 2020)



## Appendix 1: List of 46 CVE policy documents included in the study

No.	Year	Document name
<b>European Union</b>		
1	2002	Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism
2	2004	Declaration on Combating Terrorism. 7906/04
3	2004	EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. 10586/04
4	2005	The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy. 14469/4/05
5	2005	Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 196
6	2005	The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment, EU Council document 14781/1/05, 24 November 2005
7	2008	Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, EU Council document 15175/08, 14 November 2008
8	2009	Revised EU Radicalisation and Recruitment Action Plan, EU Council document 15374_09, 5 November 2009
9	2011	Council Conclusions on Enhancing the Links Between Internal and External Aspects Of Counter-Terrorism. 3096th Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting Luxembourg, 9 and 10 June 2011
10	2014	Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. 9956/14
11	2015	European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2015 on the Prevention of Radicalisation and Recruitment of European Citizens by Terrorist Organisations (2015/2063(INI))
12	2015	Council Conclusions on Counter-Terrorism. Foreign Affairs Council, 9 February 2015
13	2015	The Fight Against Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism – Action Plan, 19 May 2015
14	2016	Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy
15	2017	Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on Combating Terrorism and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and Amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA
<b>United Nations</b>		

16	2006	60/288. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. A/RES/60/288
17	2015	Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. A/70/674
18	2015	Resolution 2242 (2015). S/RES/2242
19	2016	The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review. A/70/L.55.
20	2017	Resolution 2354 (2017) – Countering Terrorist Narratives. S /RES/2354 (2017)
<b>OSCE</b>		
21	2001	Decision no. 1 Combating Terrorism
22	2007	Decision no. 5/07 Public–Private Partnerships in Countering Terrorism
23	2012	Decision no. 1063 OSCE Consolidated Framework for the Fight Against Terrorism
24	2015	Ministerial Declaration on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization That Lead to Terrorism
<b>African Union</b>		
25	1999	Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
26	2002	Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
27	2002	Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination Among African States
28	2002	Plan of Action of the African Union High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism In Africa
29	2002	OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
30	2010	Decision on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Kampala Decision
31	2011	The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law
<b>ASEAN</b>		
32	2001	2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, Bandar Seri Begawan, 5 November 2001
33	2007	ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism
34	2017	ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism, 20 September 2017

**Global Counterterrorism Forum**

35	2016	Abu Dhabi Plan of Action for Education and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
36	2017	Zurich–London Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism Online
37	2015	Initiative to Address the Life Cycle of Radicalization to Violence: Plan of Action for Identifying and Countering Terrorist Recruiters and Facilitators
<b>United Kingdom</b>		
38	2011	UK Science and Technology Strategy for Countering International Terrorism
39	2011	Prevent Strategy
40	2011	Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST)
41	2012	2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Counter-Terrorism. Policy paper
42	2014	Counter-Terrorism and Security Act: Related Documents
43	2015	Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015
44	2015	Counter-Extremism Strategy
45	2015	Preventing Extremism in Schools and Children’s Services
46	2016	Action Plan for Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Finance

## **Appendix 2: List of reports on CVE by non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations**

Kundnani, A. & Hayes, B. (2018). The globalisation of countering violent extremism policies. Transnational Institute.

Romaniuk, P. (2015). Does CVE work? Lessons learned from the global effort to counter violent extremism. Global Centre on Cooperative Security, September 2015.

Hayes, B. & Jones, C. (2013). Report on how the EU assesses the impact, legitimacy and effectiveness of its counter-terrorism laws (D2.3 Assessment Report. SECILE project – GA: 313195).

European Union (2017). The European Union's policies on counter-terrorism: Relevance, coherence and effectiveness (Study for the Libe Committee). Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department, Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2016). Inventory of policy documents and legislation adopted by OSCE participating states to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism: Summary of the feedback received by 14 December 2016 (fourth update).

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2017) Overview of OSCE counter-terrorism related commitments (updated February 2017).

