Sweden as an Elected Member of the UN Security Council

Promoting Women, Peace and Security as Core Council Business, 2017–18

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The *Sweden in the UN Security Council* project aimed to study how small states contribute to more effective United Nations Security Council (UNSC) governance on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). To that end, this report does not constitute an authorized or official account of Sweden’s term on the Security Council and is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of all of Sweden’s work during its two years on the UNSC. Rather, the interviews, written material, and data collected have been used to explore and expand our understanding of internal UNSC dynamics and to contribute to a growing research agenda on the role of states for WPS implementation.

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to a continued discussion on both internal UNSC dynamics and the role of states for WPS imple-
mentation.
1. Introduction

“I am honoured to address the Security Council at this yearly open debate. It’s a debate on peace and security, conflict resolution and conflict prevention. On core Security Council business. It’s not an add-on or an ad hoc discussion on women and girls.”

Swedish statement at the Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, UN Security Council, October 2016

In June 2016, Sweden was elected in the UN General Assembly by 134 other member states to become a UN Security Council (UNSC) member for the 2017–18 period. As the quote signifies, Sweden there decided to promote the further integration of Women, Peace and Security (WPS) into the mainstream of the Security Council’s processes and decisions, to contribute to making it “core Council business”. Through the decision to focus on WPS, Sweden joined a long line of states before them, starting with elected members Bangladesh and Namibia in 2000 (Basu 2016). Other recent examples are Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, and Norway in the UNSC term 2021–22, preceded by Germany and South Africa in the UNSC 2019–20. For the latter, focusing on WPS entailed that women’s participation in conflict resolution, protection from conflict-related sexual violence, and gender mainstreaming were considered key during their terms. Other prominent examples are Peru (2018–19), Uruguay (2016–17), and Spain (2015–16), to mention a few among many distinguished others. The most recently adopted resolution focusing on improving women’s participation in peacekeeping operations, UNSCR 2538, was sponsored by 93 states, including all UNSC members: both the elected ten states (so-called E10s) and the five permanent states (so-called P5s). The resolution was adopted under the UNSC presidency of E10 Indonesia, itself a credible peacekeeping contributor, and included heavyweight sponsors such as India, which was about to enter into the UNSC for the 2021–22 term.

Even though WPS is of growing importance for elected states, there exists limited systematized knowledge on the role of E10s in driving progress for WPS in the UNSC (Basu 2016; Davies and True 2019). In this report, we will place a specific focus on how Sweden as an elected state sought to promote the integration of WPS language into regular UNSC resolutions, in particular peace operation and political mission mandates, in order to positively affect the lives of women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas. This, we argue, could be considered a central aspect of making WPS core Council business. Increasingly, this focus on the meaningful integration of WPS into regular UNSC resolutions has been a part of WPS discussions in the UNSC (see Coomaraswamy 2015; Kreft 2017; Sharland 2021). Other ways in which an elected state can promote progress on WPS in the UNSC can be raising the visibility of a specific, overlooked WPS issue, or promoting the adoption of a new WPS resolution, as exemplified by the efforts by Germany and South Africa as regards UNSCR 2467 2019, and 2493 in 2019.

To better understand the role of E10s is additionally important as there has been increased competition among states to hold one of the elected seats in the UNSC (Ekengren et al. 2020). This is
in itself somewhat puzzling, as the E10s spend their time maneuvering an arena dominated by the often frosty relations between P5 veto powers – the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China), the French Republic (henceforth France), the Russian Federation (henceforth Russia), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (henceforth the UK), and the United States of America (henceforth the US) – which sometimes block efforts to resolve conflicts and handle humanitarian disasters, such as those in Yemen, Myanmar, and Syria. Hence, many question the relevance of having a seat at the Council’s illusive “round table” (Ekengren et al. 2020). Knowledge on how an E10 can work to affect the UNSC and its core outcomes must therefore be generated with an awareness that such possibilities have always been constrained. An E10 constitutes only one state out of a total of 15 on the UNSC, made up of members of varying strengths, priorities, and resources. Even more limiting, unlike the E10s, the P5 right to veto resolutions is combined with a long-term institutional presence which provide the P5 with both direct power over decisions and, indirectly, procedural mastery (see, Rosecrance 1992; O’Neill 1996; Winter and Eyal 1996; Voeten 2005; Hosli et al. 2011; Bosco 2014).

1.1. Objective and scope

The objective of this report is to contribute to research which seeks to improve our knowledge of the role, strategy and effects of an E10 in the UNSC (such as, Prantl 2005; Byrne 2011: Thorhallsson 2012; Basu 2016; Schia 2017; Farrall 2019; Ekengren et al. 2020). We do this in two respects: First, we provide insights into preparations for, and the situation in, the UNSC for elected members. We begin by discussing the assessments and decisions involved in forming the E10’s aims and strategy, and then outline four conditions that an E10 has to tactically maneuver while it is in the UNSC. Second, we structure and advance our knowledge of the potential effects a state can seek to obtain in order to better understand and capture the efforts of E10s. We then go more in depth into one of the core effects that Sweden sought to achieve: that is, the improved integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions. We here outline a method for assessing progress on integration and use Sweden’s efforts and data on resolutions during the 2016–19 period to better understand this dynamic.

To fulfill this objective, the report builds on a focused analysis of the experiences of Sweden and the dynamics in the UNSC. In October 2016, just before taking its seat, Sweden proclaimed that it aimed to contribute to WPS becoming more integrated in core Security Council business.


2. Between February 1946 and August 2020, the veto has been used 293 times: there have been 143 vetoes by USSR/Russia, 83 vetoes by the US, 32 vetoes by the UK, 18 vetoes by France, and by Republic of China 1 veto by People’s Republic of China 13 vetoes (Security Council Report 2020). Read more about the role of the veto in the UNSC at Security Council Report 2020.

3. A format which has become increasingly debated over time (see, for example, General Assembly 2020) but which is unlikely to be changed in the near future.
That is, it targeted the UNSC’s everyday work for international peace and security. This approach appears to have been built on Sweden’s existing national approach to WPS, combining gender equality mainstreaming with support to women’s organizations, and was explicitly placed within the framework of its feminist foreign policy. Based on this aim, Sweden developed a more concrete strategy that included strengthening formulations on WPS in regular UNSC outcomes, specifically on UNSC resolutions on mandates of peacekeeping operations and political missions. As a critical step in this strategy, Sweden sought to influence the working methods of the UNSC by chairing the Informal Expert Group on WPS and actively promoting the participation of women’s organizations from conflict areas as briefers in regular UNSC debates. To further strengthen its efforts, Sweden sought to target negotiations for resolutions early and internally institutionalized a “state capital–UN Mission–local embassies” exchange to obtain context-specific WPS suggestions. Thereby, it sought not only to include WPS language in resolutions, but to move from generic statements to more actionable language which could address the different forms of concrete problems women faced on the ground in conflict and post-conflict areas. Externally, Sweden sought to collaborate with, and sometimes mobilize, other E10 states, NGOs, academics, and think tanks. This was done to increase access to resources and information and to bolster external pressure on the UNSC. This strategy thereby also reinforced processes set in motion at the 15th anniversary of UNSC 1325 and efforts by preceding E10s, such as Spain.

In order to study Sweden’s term systematically, we build on and further contribute to existing knowledge and research on E10 influence in the UN Security Council. In fact, there is growing critique against the UNSC often being treated as a unitary actor (see Schia 2017; Ekengren et al. 2020), and, barring a few exceptions (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004; Wallensteen and Johansson 2016; Wallensteen 2019), the limited theoretical understanding of this form of internal UNSC dynamics. In efforts to nuance our understanding of the UNSC, scholars have further noted that the Council’s deliberations take place in a number of different policy areas (Bellamy 2015; Roberts 2016; von Einsiedel et al. 2018; Williams and Pearlman 2018; Hauenstein and Joshi 2020), where we regard WPS as a policy area that can generate particularly fruitful theoretical insights (Olsson and Tryggestad 2001; Shepherd 2019; Davies and True 2019). Originally established at the initiative of an E10, Namibia, during its UNSC presidency in October 2000, WPS is a relatively young policy area where, due to the “power politics” nature of the UNSC, we would expect both that traditional security concerns would be prioritized and that there would be resistance to expanding the mandate of the UNSC to include broader security issues from key players among the P5. This means that findings for WPS could potentially also be relevant for other evolving policy areas, such as climate (Scott 2015) or conflict prevention (Wallensteen and Johansson 2004; Wallensteen and Johansson 2016; Wallensteen 2019).

Further, by focusing on WPS, this report speaks to an additional gap in research and policy. Systematic and comparative research on the role of states in advancing WPS implementation is still in its nascency. Existing studies have instead generally debated the liberal world order that is
said to dominate the WPS agenda (see, e.g. Shepherd 2019) and examined the effect of the UNSC on general WPS norms or deliberated over the participation-protection divide. While critical, in these analyses, the UNSC is still often treated as one cohesive unit (see, e.g. Kreft 2017; Benson and Gizelis 2020) and WPS is primarily examined from a normative perspective. As a result, there is limited data on UNSC policy outcomes on WPS over time (see Tryggestad 2009; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Kreft 2017; Davies and True 2019 for more information). On a more disaggregated level of analysis, research has highlighted the interchange between international organizations, member states, and civil society, but here scholars have been most attentive to the role of women’s organizations (Olsson 2000; Tryggestad 2009; Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad 2019), or they have focused on individual states (see Davies and True 2019). Therefore, in addition to providing insights into the role of Sweden as an E10, this report also seeks to present a mixed-methods approach, which can be used in comparative studies of other E10 efforts in WPS.

**Box 1. Category: Swedish diplomats and experts**

**Interviews: Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs**

1. Margot Wallström, Foreign Minister.
2. Annika Söder, Cabinet Secretary/Deputy Foreign Minister.
3. Efraim Gómez, Head of Department, UN Policy Department.
4. Tomas Wiklund, Head of Section for the Security Council Coordination, UN Department.
5. Karolina Vrethem, Deputy Director, WPS Expert.

**Interviews: Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN**

7. Carl Skau, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations.
8. Joakim Vaverka, Political Coordinator, Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN.
10. Anders Sköldebrand, Desk Officer, Asia (2018), WPS Focal Point at the Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN (2018).
12. Lotta Segerström, Member of Sweden’s Permanent Mission to the UN (2016–17) and Member of Section for the Security Council Coordination (2017–18).
1.2. Methods and material

In this study, we combine qualitative and quantitative methods and material to obtain both granular information on E10 roles and strategies and to be able to place these dynamics within a greater UNSC development context. The qualitative material is based on two main sources: semi-structured interviews and secondary sources. For the semi-structured interviews, we employed a standardized interview guide and a strategic sampling strategy. This strategy entails that respondents have been selected based on their knowledge, expertise, and professional role in the organization of the Swedish UNSC term and/or external views on E10 WPS efforts. The sample therefore includes representatives from four different categories. The first category comprises *Swedish diplomats and experts* working within the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) or at the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations (henceforth Swedish UN Mission), either in the preparatory phase or during Sweden’s membership in the UNSC (12 interviews). These individuals (see Box 1 for an overview of their functions during this time period) were selected in order to garner experiences from the different levels in the hierarchy of those forming and executing the Swedish strategy. The second category consists of *other members of the Security Council, both permanent and elected*. These were selected to provide complementary insights and to provide nuance by offering other forms of experiences (6 interviews). The third category comprises key personnel in the *UN Secretariat and other UN bodies working with the UNSC*. These were selected in order to place the Swedish efforts in the hierarchy of WPS implementation and in the context of the connection between the political-strategic and bureaucratic levels (5 interviews). The fourth consists of *external experts from think tanks, academic milieus, and NGOs focusing on the UNSC*. This final category provides an external, and often more critical, perspective of ongoing E10 efforts on WPS in the UNSC (7 interviews). In this report, the interview material is presented as anonymized categories to protect the source. The quantitative part of the study then places Sweden’s efforts in the context of the WPS trajectory by coding WPS language in UN Security Council resolutions. We specifically track the development of UNSC resolution language in terms of its frequency, clarity, and priority. We focus on resolutions as these constitute the highest-ranking UNSC outcome with the highest likelihood

4. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and then assessed. The analytical method consisted of posing questions to this material using indicator questions and clustering insights based on similarities. Minority views were considered based on the knowledge and particular insights of the specific category of interview, or referred to in the findings if the interviewee was likely to have unique, credible insight on a matter based on their position or access to information. Overall, however, inclusion was only possible if an insight was supported by several other interviews.
of creating an impact on the ground. As Sweden systematically sought to promote the inclusion of WPS language, arguably one of the most difficult forms of UNSC outcomes to influence, we can learn from these efforts and thus gain insights into the ability of an elected member to contribute to positive change on the ground in conflict and post-conflict areas. From a research perspective, assessing language in resolutions is also useful as it provides an independently observable development. The study will thus make use of a temporal scope from 2016 to 2019, which comprises the period prior to Sweden entering the Council, the duration of their term, and the period immediately following their term. This allows us to set a baseline and place the Swedish term in perspective. More specifically, the study consists of resolutions from the last six months of 2016, the full two years when Sweden was a member (2017–18), and the first six months of 2019, split into 6-month intervals (N=184). Here it should be noted that a limitation of the report is that the sample thereby provides a temporal snapshot. This means that while patterns in resolutions are identifiable, the method does not allow for us to attribute the results to Sweden. The same applies to the qualitative material. So, while this report allows us to identify central and important insights on how Sweden as an elected member promoted WPS, the study can only discuss identified factors and conditions and their potential effects, without making causal claims. This limitation is purely due to the research design and does not say anything about the actual impact of Sweden. We hope, however, that the presented framework will in future contribute to further developing the examination and collection of data to design such studies of E10 influence on UNSC outcomes.

1.3. Contribution and outline of the study

As E10s go, Sweden is a relatively small state and dependent upon global cooperation, which it actively pursues in a wide range of areas including climate, peace and security, trade, and development. Both its membership in the European Union and the UN have been motivated by its interest in maintaining a rules-based international order. We argue that analyzing Sweden’s efforts and experiences around WPS in the UNSC allows us to make a contribution by developing and exploring an analytical framework of four areas that previous research has identified as potentially central for E10s in similar positions. The first two areas focus on the preparatory phase, the third is on operating while in the UNSC, and the fourth relates to setting targets and estimating the effects of the term.

1) Assessing Opportunities. We begin by probing the role of assessments of ongoing processes on WPS in the UNSC during the preparatory phase. Assessments are important as these identify concrete gaps for an E10 to address during its term. In addition, we consider how to understand

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5. Constituting a non-probability sample. The reason for this time span is the limitations in the time span of the project.
6. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
7. See Prantl 2005; Thorhallsson 2012; Langmore and Farrall 2016; Paul 2017; Schia 2017; and Wallensteen and Johansson 2016.
the make-up of the UNSC – the varying composition of E10s, as well as existing contentions and priorities among the P5 – when estimating the E10’s actual opportunities to address the identified gaps. Finally, we review the E10’s profile to identify opportunities related to capitalizing on the elected state’s capacity and credibility. Understanding these three forms of context also allows us to reflect on what forms of lessons we can draw from the Swedish material.

2) Strategic decision-making. We then examine the key decisions faced by an E10 as it forms its aim and strategy for the UNSC term. We start from Egnell’s understanding of strategy as the connection between aims, means, and methods (Egnell 2016). We then examine processes related to Sweden’s fundamental choices regarding how to: a) formulate its specific WPS aim and how that relates to the overarching aims for the UNSC term, b) connect the WPS aim to methods to create a strategy, and c) provide resources, such as organizational and personnel capacity, to ensure sufficient means to reach the aim.

3) Tactical maneuvering. We then examine the conditions an E10 has to operate within and negotiate while on the UNSC. We specifically probe four conditions an E10 must tactically maneuver: a) UNSC power dynamics, b) UNSC working methods, c) the role of external actors, and d) the E10 state’s own internal dynamics. This allows for identifying more detailed questions and issues for an E10 to consider during its term.

4) Appraising impact. Finally, we combine insights from Sweden’s experiences with information from our new dataset on UNSC developments on WPS (2016–19). This allows us to explore a) what kind of effects an E10 can strive for while on the UNSC and b) outline and use a method for assessing progress on integration in terms of three criteria – frequency, clarity, and priority. We argue that this method can help us to move from commitments on WPS to actual effects on the ground – in the words of the UN Secretary-General, to move towards “impactful action rather than empty rhetoric." (UNSC. 2019).
2. Assessing Opportunities in the UNSC Context

The UNSC is a dynamic arena where political developments and policy processes continuously evolve and where the composition changes every year. A first step in preparing for a term in the Security Council can be to assess opportunities for promoting WPS in the Council. In this phase, a member state will likely match national priorities based on its analysis of three areas (see Figure 1).

1. Identifying ongoing processes on and gaps in WPS in the UNSC
2. Estimating expected positions and capacities of other UNSC members
3. Reflecting on the E10’s own profile in terms of credibility and capacity

Figure 1: Three steps in assessing opportunities

What do research, our interviews, and existing policy then identify as being involved in the preparations for these areas, and what can we learn from Sweden’s experiences?

2.1. Identifying ongoing processes on and gaps in WPS in the UNSC

Interviews and written material suggest that it is central that an E10 obtains an in-depth understanding of ongoing UNSC processes before entry. This assessment then needs to identify concrete and realistic gaps which it will be possible to address during the two-year term.

2.1.1. A short overview of UNSC resolutions on WPS

At the time that Sweden was elected in June 2016, WPS processes in the UNSC were colored by the decisions and events of the 15th anniversary of the first UN Security Council resolution on WPS, UNSCR 1325. It had been adopted by a unanimous UNSC in October 2000 under the presidency of an E10 – Namibia. The resolution had its roots in the UN Charter of 1945, the preamble of which states the aim of creating equal rights for men and women. This was further developed and formalized in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). From the UN Decade for Women (1975–85) and onwards, the question of women’s empowerment and gender equality became increasingly connected to international peace and security, an effort driven to a large extent by women’s organizations from conflict areas but which resonated with many member states. This meant that the development from early on was based

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on concrete problems and the interest of women from different areas around the globe. This development was further enforced through the *Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action* (BDPfA), adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, held in China in 1995. The BDPfA was the first document to formulate specific targets on what member states were to achieve on Women and Armed Conflict in their work for gender equality.9 As a consequence of the lessons learned during the Decade for Women and the period leading up to BDPfA, the policy of gender mainstreaming was adopted as the main approach to obtain the gender equality targets and CEDAW objectives, a recognition that the main outcome on gender equality was likely to stem from the regular work on peace and development. “All issues are women’s issues,” the motto went (United Nations 1995; Olsson 2000; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Davis and True 2019). These processes continued to play a role in the period preceding Sweden’s term. For example, in September 2015, the *Global Leaders’ Meeting on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Commitment to Action* had been arranged at the UN, co-hosted by P5 China and UN Women, to promote the continued realization of the BDPfA 20 years after its adoption (UN Women 2015).

From the late 1990s onwards, the gender mainstreaming approach at the UN, and the BDPfA targets on Women and Armed Conflict, began to directly affect the UN Security Council (Tryggestad 2009; Olsson 2009; Benson and Gizelis 2020). Women’s organizations worked persistently to forward the important role of women’s participation for peace, collaborating with member states and the UN system (Davies and True 2019; Tryggestad 2009). Cases of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) shook the credibility of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the 1990s. The result was increased pressure on the UN Secretariat but also the UNSC to address this problem. Internally in the UN system, the Lessons Learned United at the then Department of Peacekeeping Operations was tasked with conducting the *Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations* project in 1999. The aim was to identify how UN peace operations could include a gender perspective in the implementation of their mandates and to increase the number of women deployed to operations (Olsson et al. 1999; Olsson 2000). In March 2000, the E10 Bangladesh presidency took the initiative on the first Security Council Presidential Statement that underlined the important role of equality between men and women for peace, released on International Women’s Day (UN 2000). In October, during its UNSC presidency, E10 Namibia arranged the first Open Debate on WPS after an initial struggle with the UN Secretariat on the possibility of placing this theme on the UNSC agenda. Thus, when UNSCR 1325 was adopted on 31 October in 2000, it rested on internationally agreed standards and the contributions of member states, such as Bangladesh, Namibia, Canada, the UK, and Jamaica; women’s civil society organizations, including many from areas affected by armed conflict, for example, Guatemala and Somalia; and actors in the UN system (Tryggestad 2009; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Tickner and True 2018; Davies and True 2019). A collaboration between these categories of actors has

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9. For more information, see UN 1995.
remained a bedrock in the efforts for WPS and many of the following WPS resolutions (see Box 2 for an overview of WPS resolutions).10

Box 2: Brief overview of the UNSCRs on Women, Peace and Security

Based on a list from the Nordic Center for Gender in Military Operations

**UNSCR 1325** (2000) Adopted under the presidency of Namibia. First thematic resolution on WPS. Seeks to improve women’s participation in all stages from preventing to resolving conflict and to address the impact of armed conflict on women.

**UNSCR 1820** (2008) Adopted under the presidency of the US. The first resolution to specifically recognize sexual violence in armed conflict in the context of international peace and security.

**UNSCR 1888** (2009) Adopted under the presidency of the US. Outlines more practical measures for the implementation of UNSCR 1820 in peacekeeping, such as training and Women Protection Advisors, and establishes the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict position.

**UNSCR 1889** (2009) Adopted under the presidency of Vietnam. Strengthens the commitments in resolution 1325 and places a strong focus on women’s participation in peacebuilding and relief and recovery. Underlines the importance of accountability for implementation, including a discussion on WPS indicators.

**UNSCR 1960** (2010) Adopted under the presidency of the US. Focuses on ending impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict. Sets up a “naming and shaming” mechanism for countries on the UNSC agenda.

**UNSCR 2106** (2013) Adopted under the presidency of the UK. Focuses on sexual violence in conflict and recognizes that men and boys can also be targets.

**UNSCR 2122** (2013) Adopted under the presidency of Azerbaijan. Explicitly links women’s empowerment and gender equality to the maintenance of peace and security. Outlines responsibilities for the UNSC. Further supports the importance of accountability and establishes the mandate for the Global Study.

10. A potential rift between the states and the WPS community of civil society organizations can be detected in later years when the latter has become increasingly hesitant – and even outright negative – towards the adoption of new resolutions.
As can be seen from Box 2 on the overview of resolutions, many of the P5s have played key roles in the development of the WPS framework. The UK has remained the main penholder on WPS resolutions from the outset. The US took the lead on promoting progress on preventing sexual violence in a few of the earlier resolutions. Notably, the debate for the adoption of UNSCR 1888 was presided over by the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The debate adopting UNSCR 2106 was under the leadership of former UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague. Many E10s – Vietnam, Germany, South Africa, and most recently Indonesia – have actively promoted the adoption of resolutions under their UNSC presidencies, many sending their foreign ministers to preside over the adoption.

The content of the resolutions has developed substantially over time. There have been several ways to thematically capture this, but we here focus on three core ones – participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming (see Cohn et al. 20014; Davies and True 2019 for further

**UNSCR 2242** (2015) Adopted under the presidency of Spain. Focuses on the importance of assessing strategies and resourcing to advance the implementation of WPS. Sets the agenda for the post-2015 period, including for the UNSC.

**UNSCR 2467** (2019) Adopted under the presidency of Germany. Has an overall victim/survivor-centered approach and stronger language on sexual violence against men and boys. It also places a more specific focus on the importance of documenting sexual violence in conflict. The first resolution adopted without full support by all UNSC members, with China and Russia abstaining. One main contention, however, concerned the US position on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights.

**UNSCR 2493** (2019) Adopted under the presidency of South Africa. Focuses on participation of women, the role of civil society, and on increased implementation and funding for the realization of WPS.

In addition, there are two resolutions where the content is often included under WPS.

**UNSCR 2272** (2016) Adopted under the presidency of the US. Addresses the topic of preventing SEA by peacekeeping personnel, which is often handled under the WPS theme in practice.

**UNSCR 2538** (2020) Adopted under the presidency of Indonesia under a debate on peacekeeping, but the resolution explicitly placed it in the context of UNSCRs on both peacekeeping and WPS. Focuses on improving the participation of women in peacekeeping operations.
discussions). These themes can, in turn, be divided into a large number of sub-themes, currently being debated under WPS. As exemplified in Box 3, it is important to note that when seeking to address these sub-themes, each one will require its own specific measures and activities. In addition, the solutions need to be specific to the country context in which they take place. While we will not go into these sub-themes in depth, Box 3 provides some insight into the content that lies

**Box 3: Examples of sub-themes on Women, Peace and Security**

Under the overarching themes of WPS – participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming – there exist a large number of sub-themes, such as:

1. Women as mediators and as part of negotiation teams;
2. Civil society participation in peace processes;
3. Women's participation in peacekeeping and political missions;
4. Women in leadership positions;
5. Women's meaningful participation in post-war elections;
6. Preventing and addressing conflict-related sexual violence;
7. Improved protection of women social leaders and human rights defenders;
8. Addressing discrimination in relation to transitional justice, rule of law, and human rights;
9. Promoting gender equality dimensions in conflict prevention;
10. Increased access for women to resources and influence in peacebuilding;
11. Addressing the situation for women and girls among refugees and Internally Displaced Persons;
12. Ensuring women's influence on issues of addressing violent extremism;
13. Improved gender sensitivity in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform;
14. Handling small arms and light weapons; and so forth.

In addition, there are discussions on WPS’s connection to other cross-cutting themes on, for example:

15. Non-conforming gender roles; and
16. Youth, peace and security.

See Open Debates on WPS and the Secretary-Generals’ yearly reports on WPS for an overview of progress and challenges in these different sub-themes.
behind the WPS language. Depending on the priorities and interests of UNSC members, the focus across these sub-themes has also varied over time.

### 2.1.2. 15th anniversary: Demands for integration, information, and accountability

As the above presentation demonstrates, the content of the resolutions, i.e. the normative framework, developed faster than the capacity and interest for implementing and realizing their content. In 2009, as the adoption of resolution 1325 started to approach its ten-year anniversary, demands for assessments and for measuring progress grew. This included pressure on the UNSC members to themselves undertake to better implement the resolutions in the Council’s regular processes. As a result, the UN Secretary-General was requested to submit a yearly report to the UNSC on the progress of implementation (see Gizelis and Olsson 2015; UNSC. 2016 c).

When resolution 1325 approached its 15th anniversary, demands for evaluating progress grew even stronger. To that end, three UN-led or UN-supported studies came to include a WPS focus within their scope. The *Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (henceforth Global Study) had an exclusive WPS focus, which was mandated in UNSCR 2122. The two other studies, the *High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* and the report of the *Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture*, included the assessment of WPS in the context of other core UN processes.

One of the most influential UN studies conducted in terms of effects on the progress of WPS was the 2015 Global Study (for a discussion, see Olsson and Gizelis 2019), which dedicates an entire chapter to WPS developments in the UNSC. It finds that the integration of language on WPS has improved in resolutions, primarily as this relates to protection aspects, but that much work remains to have this theme regularly integrated into the UNSC’s core processes (Coomaraswamy 2015). It highlights that through resolution 2122 (2013):

“…the Council stressed the need for consistent implementation of resolution 1325 in its own work, including by ensuring mission mandates include women, peace and security provisions such as provision of gender expertise, and mainstreaming gender into disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) and election support activities. The Council committed itself to integrate women, peace and security into other thematic issues it regularly considers … There is also a key instruction to leadership of peace operations to stay apprised of and take requisite action on threats to women and women’s rights in armed conflict and post-conflict situations. The Council additionally emphasized the importance of its own interaction with civil society both in New York and during visiting missions to the field. Throughout, the Council emphasized the need for the substantive engagement of women in peace processes, and for gender experts to be embedded within mediation teams.” (Coomaraswamy 2015, 327–328)
That is, there was a need to move from oversimplified understandings of WPS, where for example it only focused on the prevention of sexual violence, or where it was considered a “women’s issue” or “a tick-box obligation.” Instead, the study argued that there was a need for “concrete and consistent implementation” of the fuller content of the resolutions (Coomaraswamy 2015, 328). In order to create “a relevant and achievable mission-level response,” there was a need to improve the flow of quality information to the UNSC through an enhanced capacity for input from expert gender units in the UN system, improved data collection, and strengthened exchange with civil society (Coomaraswamy 2015, 328). To address the issue of information exchange, a mechanism or working group was also suggested, resulting in the later formation of the Informal Expert Group on WPS (hereafter, the IEG on WPS).11 To address the issue of civil society input, it was suggested that women’s organizations should more regularly be invited to speak directly to the UNSC (Coomaraswamy 2015, 339). These suggestions aimed to change the working culture of the UNSC in terms of taking WPS more systematically into account.12

The need for a more consistent and systematic approach was supported by the other UN studies which placed WPS within a broader context. For example, the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations found that “[d]espite annual debates on women and peace and security of the Security Council, there is inconsistent application of the agenda during the rest of the year, including during mandate formulation and renewal consultations, which is exacerbated by the lack of attention to those issues in briefings and reports to the Council by the Secretariat and senior mission leaders” (UN document A/70/95-S/2015/446, cited in Coomaraswamy2015). External WPS actors with influence on developments also underlined this need. For example, the Open Letter from the NGO Working Group on WPS called for:

“Actively supporting the Security Council’s systematic integration of WPS as a cross-cutting issue; Supporting and funding the recruitment of gender expertise, specifically in leadership capacities, both at UNHQ and in the field; Incorporating WPS into the Terms of References of UN leadership, including within special envoys and representatives and senior mediators; and Ensuring that immediate and effective measures are put in place to ensure implementation of the Secretary-General’s zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, across all peacekeeping and special political missions, and with regard to all military and civilian staff.” (NGO Working Group 2015)

Finally, the outspoken support for WPS from UN member states grew substantially during this period. The Open Debate on WPS in 2015 included 113 speakers, the largest number to partake in any UNSC meeting. Close to 70 member states pledged their concrete commitment to WPS implementation. To increase member state pressure and efforts towards WPS in domestic politics by

11. See UNSC 2016a for more information.
12. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
member states. E10 Spain, which chaired the UNSC during the 15th anniversary, took the initiative to establish a WPS National Focal Point Network for states, which was launched in September 2016 (UNSC 2016c., 20). For the UNSC, the 15th anniversary resulted in UNSCR 2242, a resolution that set the agenda for the coming time period (UNSC. 2016c., 2). In the resolution,

“the Council decided to integrate women, peace and security concerns across all country-specific situations on its agenda. It expressed its intention to dedicate consultations to the topic of women, peace and security implementation, convene meetings of relevant Council experts as part of an informal experts group on women, peace and security, and invite civil society to brief during its country-specific considerations” (UN 2015).

In addition, the UNSC undertook to ensure “that the relevant expert groups for sanctions committees” had access to expertise to increase the integration of WPS in sanction regimes and to seek to include WPS and meetings with women’s civil society during UNSC field visits (UNSC. 2016c., 26). Finally, another result to come out of the anniversary process was the strengthened interest in tracking the progress of WPS language in UNSC resolutions and documents. The Secretary-General’s reports on WPS present figures on the integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions from 2016. In fact, several actors – notably both civil society, through the WPS Working Group, and the UN system, through the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and UN Women – collect information on formulations in the resolutions.

In sum, during the period of the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, a number of concrete gaps on WPS were identified and processes to address them were set in motion. Hence, as Sweden’s term approached, there was a recognized need to increase the integration of WPS language in the regular processes and documents of the UNSC. Concrete measures for promoting access to information on WPS, such as the IEG on WPS, and for increasing the participation of women civil society briefers to the UNSC were being established. Resistance was present, but not overwhelming. These processes had support through the UN’s own assessments, by a growing number of member states, and by external WPS actors, such as the NGO Working Group on WPS.

### 2.2. Estimating expected positions and capacities of other UNSC members

Once any gaps in the work/implementation of the WPS in the UNSC have been identified during the E10s preparation phase, there is a need to assess how the composition of the UNSC can affect the actual possibilities to address the gaps. This is important in two respects. First, the composition of the E10 changes every year. This necessarily entails variation in the interests, priorities, and

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13. Accountability mechanisms for member states are suggested to be indicators in National Action Plans, reporting on the CEDAW in accordance with Recommendation 30 and the suggested WPS indicators, and reporting to the Human Rights Council.

14. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies. Interview category external experts.
capacities of the E10 group, which can affect the possibility to promote WPS. Second, the P5s constitute a more consistent but dominant group of actors whose relations can play into what is possible to achieve on WPS. Two of the states that are among the most critical of the WPS agenda can be found in this group. What could Sweden then expect as they prepared to contribute to the UNSC?

2.2.1. The expected role of E10 composition in 2017–18

Sweden stepped into the UNSC in January 2017, together with Bolivia, Ethiopia, Italy, and Kazakhstan. They joined the E10s Egypt, Japan, Senegal, Ukraine, and Uruguay, which were in their second year. In January 2018, the latter group, together with Italy, was replaced by Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Kuwait, the Netherlands, Peru, and Poland. As exemplified by a large number of member state speakers at the 2015 Open Debate on WPS, the verbal support for WPS globally had grown substantially over time. Many respondents interviewed for this study underline that most E10 states today have at least a rhetorically developed message on WPS. Beginning in 2013–14, the part of the Ambassadors’ statement in the UNSC that contains points on WPS had also been noted to increase substantially. That said, there can still exist substantial variations in the E10 group’s political prioritization and capacity to bring WPS forward as elected states juggle a large number of priorities.

How then can potential differences between E10s on WPS be captured in research? We propose to use three indicators to discuss the national and international work of these states on WPS. These indicators can help us understand the make-up of E10s and their efforts in the UNSC.

First, we make use of the Women, Peace and Security Index to get an overview of the internal developments in all the E10s. This index ranks countries on women’s equality across three dimensions: inclusion in the economic, social, and political spheres; justice in terms of formal laws and

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15. They replaced Angola, Malaysia, New Zealand, Spain, and Venezuela. As this paper includes developments after the period Sweden left the UNSC in its comparative analysis, here is the variation in WPS index/rating, NAP, and Group of Friends on 1325 for the remaining E10 in 2016: Angola (Index: 0.575 / 133; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: No); Malaysia (Index: 0.665 / 91; NAP: No; Friends groups: No); New Zealand (Index: 0.826 / 18; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: Yes), Spain (Index: 0.860 / 5; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: Yes); and Venezuela (Index: 0.684 / 78; NAP: No; Friends groups: No).

16. Italy and the Netherlands had shared their two year term. In 2019, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands and Sweden were replaced by Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Indonesia, and South Africa. As this paper compares developments after the period Sweden left the UNSC, this is the variation in WPS index/rating, NAP, and Friends of 1325 group for the new E10s in 2019: Belgium (Index: 0.826 / 18; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: Yes); the Dominican Republic (Index: 0.707 / 64; NAP: No; Friends groups: No); Germany (Index: 0.845 / 12; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: Yes); Indonesia (Index: 0.669 / 90; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: Yes); and South Africa (Index: 0.732 / 51; NAP: Yes; Friends groups: No).

17. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.

18. While it is challenging to accurately capture such a complex phenomenon as gender equality (Forsberg and Olsson 2016), recent years have seen a development of indexes that incorporate a range of different dimensions. This study does not claim that this index captures all aspects. Its use is primarily to illustrate that states in the UNSC grapple with this area in different respects.
informal discrimination; and security at the family, community, and societal levels. The higher the score, the more gender-equal the country (GIWPS and PRIO 2017).

As is visible from Table 1, many countries struggle with gender equality dynamics internally, although the change in E10 composition from 2017 to 2018 meant a small increased average improvement in the rating by E10s from 0.7063 to 0.7164.

A second indicator can be whether an E10 has developed a National Action Plan on WPS. Even if a state struggles with low levels of gender equality, it is possible that it has taken a political decision to address WPS nationally. In such efforts, one tool is to develop a National Action Plan on WPS. As can be seen in the table, in 2017, 50% of the E10s had a Plan, and three more were in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E10s 2017</th>
<th>WPS Index / Ranking</th>
<th>National Action Plan</th>
<th>Group of Friends of 1325</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.707 / 64</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>0.559 / 138</td>
<td>No (developing)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.633 / 106</td>
<td>No (developing)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.795 / 32</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.798 / 29</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.741 / 45</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.616 / 117</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.854 / 7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.646 / 103</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.714 / 60</td>
<td>No (developing)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E10s 2018</th>
<th>WPS Index / Ranking</th>
<th>National Action Plan</th>
<th>Group of Friends of 1325</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.707 / 64</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>0.604 / 121</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.633 / 106</td>
<td>No (developing)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>0.741 / 45</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0.675 / 83</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>0.854 / 7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.693 / 73</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0.799 / 28</td>
<td>No (developing)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.854 / 7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: E10 states and the variations in WPS Index, National Action Plan, and Friends of 1325
the process of developing one while they served in the UNSC. In 2018, this number dropped substantially.

A final indicator we need to look at is whether a state has chosen to focus on promoting WPS internationally, even if WPS can be assumed to be of low priority in a national setting. A state can do this by joining networks of states seeking to promote WPS. The indicator used in this report is the longstanding network of the Group of Friends on 1325, organized by Canada. As Table 1 shows, also using this indicator, we can expect the priority of WPS to vary substantially between the E10s. Again, between 2017 and 2018, the number of E10s with membership in the Friends Group decreased substantially. In addition, if a country has limited to no experience of working with a National Action Plan or with WPS in an international setting, we could expect that their capacity to practically promote WPS is likely to be limited.

By looking at the composition of the UNSC during Sweden’s term, it is unlikely that WPS would be a priority for many of the other E10s. We could also expect that the capacity of these states to promote WPS would be limited, as many appear not to have worked with WPS in their own administrations. There can of course be exceptions. Notably, there are examples of Permanent Representatives taking a more independent stand to promote WPS.19

2.2.2. The expected role of P5 positions and potential contentions

While the P5 group remains stable in terms of member states in the Council, the period prior to Sweden entering the UNSC had seen changes taking place in the political make-up of the P5. In the US, the Obama administration was just coming to an end and was being replaced by the Trump administration. For a small state such as Sweden, this entailed the expectation of an overall altered degree of support for multilateralism and the UN during its term. In addition, the change could potentially affect Sweden’s opportunities to promote WPS, as US Permanent Representative Samantha Powers was replaced by the more conservative Nikki Haley. While some changes were indeed underway, it would turn out that the US remained supportive of WPS, for example, by remaining a member of the Friends of 1325 group together with two other P5s: the UK and France.20 That said, some aspects of WPS, most notably issues that can be interpreted as involving Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), were to become increasingly sensitive.21 However, this change would not become too evident until after Sweden had left the UNSC in 2019.

Even if there was a slight perceived shift in US policy on WPS, however, it would come to have

19. Interview category External experts.
20. See, for example, the United States Strategy on Women, Peace and Security, adopted in June 2019 (President of the United States 2019).
21. Interview category External experts.
an effect when placed in the context of the worsening relations between the great powers of the UNSC. Relations between the US and Russia – and to a lesser extent, between the US and China – had deteriorated in the years preceding Sweden’s term on the Council. Contentions lay mostly in the Middle East, Syria, and Libya, but there were also tensions in relation to Venezuela, Iraq, and Iran. Resolutions on African peacekeeping mandates had been less in the focus of these tensions (Gowan 2020). In these debates, Russia was recognized for being very active in negotiations of resolutions, in making comments, and in being willing to use its veto, such as in the case of Syria. That said, China’s role had grown, showing much more assertiveness and becoming more active on peacekeeping operations. It had in the past been less willing to use the veto, but this has started to change in recent years. Increased tensions, combined with the perceived shift in the US position on the priority of WPS, would result in Russia becoming more vocal also in this area. In addition, there had been disagreement on the UNSC working methods and practices on WPS expressed by these two P5s. For example, when Spain first sought to promote more regular use of women civil society briefers in the UNSC, this was met with critique from some P5s. As there was strong support for the new practice among many others in the UNSC, however, these P5s appeared not to be willing to invest too much political capital in preventing it from becoming established. This means that Sweden entered into the UNSC at a time of growing contentions between the P5s. The expectation was that this would negatively affect Sweden’s opportunities to reach its WPS aims.

2.3. Reflecting on one’s own profile: Sweden’s strengths and weaknesses on WPS

A final issue to consider during the preparatory phase before an E10 enters the UNSC is the role of the state’s reputation – i.e. its history and experiences with gender equality and WPS, both nationally and internationally. This can affect other members’ perception of how determined, namely, how credible, an E10’s efforts are. This point was reiterated by a large number of interviewees. For example, if a state had had the experience of addressing legal dimensions of impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, or of promoting women’s inclusion in pre-negotiations, that country’s stand on those WPS sub-themes were considered to be more credible. In addition, domestic developments were perceived as playing into how much capacity a state had to achieve its aims on WPS. This means that a state in the final steps of assessing opportunities for promoting WPS in the Council should look closely at its own WPS strengths. How can an E10 best capitalize on its credibility and its existing capacity? Let us, therefore, take a brief look at Sweden’s policies and experiences in this area.

22. Interview category External experts.
23. Interview category External experts.
24. Interview category External experts; Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
2.3.1. A history of gender mainstreaming and women’s rights promotion

Over time, Sweden’s foreign policy has increasingly considered women’s rights and the gender equality perspective. In its early developments, it incorporated international demands and progress in its national gender equality policy efforts. For example, Sweden was among the first countries to sign and ratify CEDAW in 1980. In the foreign policy area, the gender equality perspective was initially primarily included in Swedish development aid programs (Government of Sweden. 2019: 77). By the end of the 1990s, the gender equality perspective was starting to explicitly affect the country’s security policies. For example, as an E10 in the UNSC in 1997–98, one of the main objectives was to reinforce “the new generation of peacekeeping operations,” including strengthening the civilian component of these missions. In this effort, including more female police officers was a main priority (Utrikesdepartementet. 1998: 165). In 1999–2000, Sweden, together with Norway, Croatia, Denmark, and Switzerland, funded the first Lessons Learned study under the auspices of the (then) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on how to mainstream a gender perspective in UN peace operations. One key outcome of the study in June 2000 was the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations – a document that served to inform relevant parts of what was to become UNSCR 1325, adopted a few months later (Olsson et al., 1999; Olsson 2000; UNGA and UNSC. 2000; Tryggestad 2009; Tryggestad 2014).

The use of a gender equality perspective in Swedish foreign and security policy did, however, for a long time expand quite slowly. In many respects, it remained marginalized to the realm of a few experts and actors often operating outside of core processes. In the early 2000s, given the adoption of UNSCR 1325, Swedish civil society organizations – such as the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation and what was to become Operation 1325 – started to push for an increased use of the resolution in Swedish foreign policy and to have the resolution translated into Swedish for national dissemination. In 2004, a special working group, under the leadership of the MFA and with the participation of the Prime Minister’s Office and other key ministries, was established to provide a mechanism for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at the national and international levels (Government of Sweden 2006, 3). In 2006, Sweden became one of the first countries to adopt a National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, covering the period 2006–2008, a decision following after Denmark (2005) and Norway (2006). Sweden’s overall priorities were the participation of women in conflict areas, for more women to take part in international peace support and security-building operations, and to build capacity on gender mainstreaming in concerned government organizations (Government of Sweden2006). In 2009, a second, revised, National Action Plan for the 2009–12 period was then adopted. This document included reflections on the role of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence. In February 2010, Margot Wallström became the first UN Special

Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, following the adoption of UNSCR 1888 in 2009 (Utrikesdepartementet. 2009). During the same period, Sweden often reiterated its support to UN Women, launched in 2010. Nationally, indicators and yearly reporting formats on the Swedish Plan were developed in 2011. In 2013, Sweden co-initiated, together with the UK, the Call to Action on Protection from Gender-Based Violence in Emergencies – a global initiative of governments and donors, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The international focus was accompanied by national efforts to strengthen gender equality in relation to security and foreign policy. Most notably, in 2013, the Swedish government decided to give several government agencies, including the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the Swedish Armed Forces and the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the assignment to systematically mainstream gender equality into their work, a program called Mainstreaming in Government Agencies. By 2016, this assignment had been extended to over 59 government agencies (see Sveriges Regering 2020).

2.3.2. Raising Sweden’s profile and ambition through feminist foreign policy

In addition to these long-term developments, in 2014, a new Social Democratic-led government was formed in Sweden. It declared itself to be a feminist government (Government of Sweden 2014). Half of the ministers were women, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Margot Wallström. Following this declaration, a feminist foreign policy was outlined which should “… permeate all work of the Swedish MFA, the aim being to strengthen women’s rights, increase women’s access to resources, and improve women’s representation” (Government of Sweden 2015). While Sweden’s foreign policy had been increasingly considering women’s rights and the gender equality perspective over time, the feminist foreign policy was to represent a strengthening of these political ambitions (Government of Sweden. 2019 16). This brought with it raised visibility, investment of political capital in promoting women’s rights, and clearer responsibilities at the MFA-leadership level to deliver results consistently. As a means to strengthen the bureaucratic capacity to translate these political objectives into action, the Swedish Foreign Service Action Plan for a Feminist Foreign Policy 2015–2018 was launched in 2015. This carried an explicit focus on concrete objectives, measures, and actions on gender equality in general, including on WPS specifically. An increase in activity can also be identified. For example, the launch of the United Nations-supported Global Initiative; HeForShe in Sweden in June 2015; SheDecides on SRHR in 2017, co-organized by Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark; the Forum of Gender Equality in Stockholm in April 2018; and the International Conference on Men and Equal Opportunities in Stockholm in May 2018. Based on an initiative by Norway, Sweden contributed to forming the Nordic Women Mediators Network in 2015 in order to support women’s participation in peace processes. Nationally, Sweden adopted its third National Action Plan in 2016 for the 2016–20 period. This Plan explicitly connected the overall feminist foreign policy framework to WPS (Government of Sweden 2016b). In this National Action Plan it is determined that it is the responsibility of the leadership to ensure implementation. New reporting formats
were set up, including an implementation matrix and operational planning (Egnell 2016, 575). Moreover, while there is a substantial body of critique against the feminist foreign policy, both from those who think that more Realist-inspired power perspectives should trump normative considerations (Sundström and Elgström 2020) and from those who consider feminist foreign policy to represent primarily liberal or essentialist understandings of women (Aggestam and Berman-Rosamond 2016), the adoption of a feminist foreign policy did increase the international visibility of Sweden on gender equality.

Overall, in preparing for and entering into its 2017–2018 term on the UNSC, Sweden could thus build on the image of a long and public history of working with, and for, gender equality – both domestically and internationally. Combined with its feminist foreign policy, this history conferred Sweden with a high degree of visibility and credibility on WPS, particularly as Foreign Minister Wallström had previously served in the UN as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict. This history of seeking to promote gender equality integration into the foreign policy bureaucracy also meant that Sweden had built up some internal capacity to promote WPS. Through the institutionalization of feminist foreign policy, this capacity-building had been reinforced, making diplomats more capable of practically pushing WPS in its negotiations and among its networks. The MFA had strengthened the practice of identifying concrete gaps on WPS, which the bureaucracy as a whole was to strive to address, and which was then followed up at the leadership level. That is, the MFA organization had started to move away from the marginalization of WPS to specific functions and separate tracks and toward integration into the core processes of foreign policy, regulated through the regular chain of command. While WPS specialists continued to exist and would carry a substantial workload during Sweden’s term in the UNSC, demands for desk officers and leaders to be able to own and promote WPS within their portfolios were growing. While this was far from a completed and uncontested process, it provided additional resources in pursuing what was to become the Swedish aims on WPS in the UNSC.

“The Swedish approach: Key words: Integrated, concrete, analytical, ownership. In short: From words to actions.”

Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2017

When an E10 has assessed the opportunities for promoting WPS in the UNSC, the next step is to formulate a concrete aim and form a strategy. As outlined in Figure 2, an E10 makes fundamental choices in this process on how to: a) prioritize and concretize what it wants to achieve on WPS; b) connect the aims to a method – that is, to formulate a strategy on how to realize the aim; and c) ensure that the method is backed up by sufficient resources. Here, we focus on issues related to how to set up the organization for the UNSC term in a way that ensures the promotion of WPS is handled effectively.

3.1. Formulating an aim: What did Sweden want to achieve on WPS?

When considering the formation of the aim, a state needs to make strategic choices on both a) how WPS fits into its overall aim for the entire UNSC term and b) what the specific and achievable aim on WPS should be. Through making these choices, the tools available and the priority of WPS can be more easily determined in the formation of the strategy in the next step. Moreover, as discussed in the section describing the UNSC context (see for example Section 2.1), the decision on the aim needs to ensure that it contributes to addressing gaps in ongoing WPS processes and grasps the opportunities available.

Sweden’s overarching aims for its term in the UN Security Council were laid out during its campaign for UNSC election. The government framed its objectives as being in alignment with the...
UN Security Council’s mandate for maintaining international peace and security. It intended to contribute to improving the soundness and effectiveness of the body, building on a process previously also developed by other countries as well. For example, E10 Japan, which had preceded Sweden in the UNSC, also promoted the strategic aim of making the Council’s role more meaningful. Underscoring the Swedish decision was the stated observation that “the Council’s agenda was Sweden’s programme of work” (Government of Sweden 2017, 2). The overall ambition was thus to contribute to making the UNSC more effective, credible, and consistent. Sweden furthermore committed to pursuing the integration of four perspectives: 1) international law, 2) human rights, 3) gender equality, and 4) humanitarian dimensions. Thereby, promoting WPS became integrated into the core objectives of the Swedish term.

This fairly abstract aim also needed to be concretized to be achievable and to be possible to communicate externally and internally. In order to identify concrete WPS gaps that needed to be addressed, the MFA carried out internal and external consultations, problem-formulation, and analysis of the WPS agenda as well as the entire Security Council workload. This included its own review of WPS language in all current resolutions, specifically mandates for political missions and peace operations (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016b). This assessment built on the lessons from ongoing UNSC assessments (such as the Global Study and UNSCR 2242) and the work of preceding E10s, in particular, Spain (2016–17), as these had set in place a fruitful framework on which to build. The assessment concluded that an important contribution lay not in further thematic, normative development, but in the implementation of existing decisions. The theme of participation was considered as in particular need of advancement. All government officials interviewed explicitly underscored that the aim was to promote WPS becoming core UNSC business, i.e. the focus would be on integrating the content of the thematic progress made in the fifteen-plus years since the passing of resolution 1325 into the daily work of the Council.

This aim was felt to be novel; Sweden had not had such a specific, coherent model for the integration of gender equality during its previous UNSC membership. It could also not identify another elected or permanent state which used this comprehensive integrative aim for promoting WPS, although previous states had focused on specific aspects of it before. Moreover, it was deemed central that ongoing processes in New York provided support for this need for integration, in particular, that UNSCR resolution 2242 specifically included a decision to integrate WPS into all country situation resolutions and that the UNSC should take responsibility for including WPS in its regular processes. In addition, Spain had set in motion a change in UNSC working practices on briefers to debate to bring in more women’s voices into the Council. Building on this,

28. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
29. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
30. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
31. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
Sweden wanted to contribute to overcoming the hurdles of poor to low implementation. Key decision-makers at the MFA explained that it was for this reason that Sweden sought to emphasize better engagement between the Council members.

### 3.2. Connecting aim and methods: Forming Sweden’s WPS strategy

What then were the core considerations for how to turn Sweden’s stated aim of promoting the integration of WPS into “core UNSC business,” i.e. to integrate WPS aspects into the regular decision-making processes of UNSC outcomes, into a concrete strategy? Considerations have to connect the aim to a method. This involves two sets of key decisions. First, while having a specific WPS aim is central, its realization needs to be clearly placed within the broader context of the entire E10 UNSC strategy. The second group of decisions concerns identifying and forming the core components of the specific WPS strategy.

For Sweden, the first round of decisions concerned how to operationalize the realization of the WPS aim as this had been placed within the scope of Sweden’s overall ambitions for its term in the UN Security Council. Hence, the formulation of the WPS strategy was influenced both by Sweden’s understanding that there were deep divisions between powerful states, which were reflected in the workings of the UNSC, and by its own principles, interests, capacities, and prospective initiatives. Above all, the government in Stockholm sought to use its time in the UNSC to move from division to consensus, from inaction to action, at least for its priority areas, including on WPS. Contributing to making WPS “core business” was thereby shored up by an understanding that the dynamics in the Council had grown more challenging, with cooperation among the P5 increasingly limited. In this regard, it was understood that engendering positive action would not only align with Sweden’s own interests, but could furthermore demonstrate how elected members might meaningfully add value. Hence, the political leadership at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs determined that the remedy to stalemate within the UNSC would be to use Sweden’s membership in the Security Council to advance a results-oriented approach, as an opportunity to build consensus and confidence where there was division and doubt.

Based on this overall understanding, the process of formulating the WPS strategy started to crystallize by late 2015. Insights from our interviews suggest that the strategy was then sharpened...
from late June 2016 until the taking up of the Council seat in 2017. The specifics of this strategy were to be formulated in a preparatory working paper on WPS, the Basic Memorandum for UN Security Council Membership on Women, Peace and Security (Grund-PM inför SR-medlemsskapet kvinnor, fred och säkerhet/1325), which outlined and explained the strategy to personnel at the MFA and the UN Mission in New York. In practice, the strategy entailed that Sweden would need to persistently and uniformly integrate its own work during the UNSC term to include a gender equality perspective in all its documents, statements, and proposals, specifically for conflicts in geographic regions and country-specific situation resolutions and for mandate renewal for missions and operations. That is, it would concentrate on promoting the operationalization of WPS matters through a daily, organizationally coherent approach. This was embodied in the effort to address WPS in country-specific policy papers written within the MFA, and became part of its wider organizational commitment to ensure that for each situation to come before the Council, Sweden would be able to propose relevant solutions from a WPS perspective.

The focus on country-specific situations and particular mission and operation mandates was furthermore specified in two respects. First, there was a determination to increase language on WPS. Interviews revealed this emphasis on pragmatism, and the drive to bring ideas, information and insights which could be operational, as a distinct feature of the strategy. This focus on improved language, combined with the fact that Sweden sought to affect the UNSC working methods by contributing to an increased representation of women civil society briefers in the UNSC’s meetings, has been interpreted as a pivot toward participation, away from protection from sexual violence. However, while promoting participation, Swedish officials, including leadership within the ministry, were of the view that both participation and protection are important and interconnected. The elevation of the concept of participation was a means of reshaping the view that women were purely “vulnerable” or “victims” who required protection or championing. The UK – the penholder on WPS – concurs that it is important to advance WPS language and formulation by integration, but is of the view that this in and of itself is difficult as novelty is not encouraged in drafting resolutions and statements, and few opportunities have existed in the past to include WPS perspectives from women and from the local context. The second and related way to systematically integrate WPS into the work of the Council would be to encourage other members, UN Secretariats, and UN missions and operations to include WPS in their own inputs; to facilitate consistent and meaningful women’s participation in the UNSC’s work; to produce or work with sex-disaggregated statistics in reporting and information; and to be

38. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
39. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
40. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
41. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
42. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
43. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
accountable for the implementation of WPS across the UN system, including in its peacekeeping and political missions. This effort included co-chairing the IEG on WPS to strengthen access to information on WPS.

As described above, the Swedish strategy included developing positions on WPS through the preparation of approximately 40 country-specific policy papers on items that were within the purview of the UNSC. The country-specific items before the UNSC would have included situations in Burundi, Central African Republic, Liberia, Libya, Mali, and Somalia, and thematic items were as broad as the protection of civilians in armed conflict and small arms, for example.44 The papers were not used as templates or fed directly into proposals, statements, or documents prepared by Sweden during its term. Rather, their purpose was to catalyze informed policy development and to capture the state of affairs. These preparations and discussions contributed to the production of Sweden’s membership program, which was presented in Stockholm and New York in December 2016. Core components of Sweden’s strategy had also been externally signaled already on 26 October 2016, with the speech by the Cabinet Secretary (Deputy Foreign Minister) at the Security Council Open Debate on WPS (Government of Sweden 2016a).45 In order to close the gap between the WPS normative framework and implementation, the speech proposed the following mechanisms: 1) the inclusion of a gender equality perspective early on in UNSC processes, and increased dialogue with women’s organizations and relevant stakeholders in the field through the various arms of the UN system; 2) improving data collection, including sex-disaggregated statistics to ensure the basis for every decision having a solid and actionable gender perspective; 3) holding UN mediators, peacekeeping operations and political missions accountable to the formulations on WPS in their mandates.46

In sum, this means that the broad aim of integrating WPS into core UNSC processes included balancing the themes of protection and participation, and engaging with Council working methods to improve the body’s effectiveness. Of particular interest for this study is the work to analyze and create a baseline on language in existing resolutions, with a focus on operations and mission mandates. The strategy to strengthen WPS language in resolutions then included promoting such language early on in the process of revision or adoption and to move successively toward more actionable language. Dialogues with women’s organizations and stakeholders were to be used to formulate ever more context-relevant suggestions for resolution language. Progress was then to be followed up in regular dialogues with leadership and with operations and missions to improve accountability. Working to reach the additional aims of promoting civil society speakers and a strengthened IEG could be seen as contributing further critical parts of this overall strategy to strengthen WPS with the aim of creating an outcome on the ground.

44. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
45. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
46. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
3.3. Identifying sufficient resources

The final area for strategic decision-making focuses on backing up the aims and methods with sufficient resources by shaping the foreign affairs institutional structures and organizational processes for the UNSC term. As has been discussed in this report, Sweden’s historic development on WPS, accelerated by the adoption of a feminist foreign policy, had entailed that the MFA and the UN Mission had started to establish the capacity to work with WPS more broadly in the organization. That said, under the particular and capacity-demanding circumstances of being an elected member of the UNSC, it is important to consider the overall organizational resources and aspects involved.

Swedish officials reportedly quickly realized that they would need to bring to bear the entirety of knowledge and insights – including on-the-ground experiences – from the MFA in Stockholm and the UN Mission in NY, the embassies, partners in UN institutions, and civil society to develop concrete proposals that would be relevant to situations on the UNSC’s agenda. In order to organizationally strengthen the process of forming and executing the overall UNSC strategy, a Section for Coordination of Sweden’s Membership of the UN Security Council 2017–18, placed within the MFA’s UN Policy Department and under the leadership of the Cabinet Secretary, was also established (Sveriges Regering 2019). This entity became important for the mapping that took place during the preparatory stage, but also for facilitating the execution of the strategy over the next two years. Moreover, during the membership period itself, the Section for Coordination was responsible for all instructions given to the Mission in New York. Furthermore, the section was a designated hub between the MFA’s political leadership, the Mission in New York, and the rest of the Foreign Service. It played the main role in facilitating coherence and ensuring support for the Mission at every level in the capital.

More concretely, the formation of the Section for Coordination meant that a task force of seven foreign service personnel was established in August 2016. It organized a formal working group across ministerial departments. Consultations were held involving Sweden’s embassies in countries that were members of the Security Council during this period, and embassies in countries on or affected by the UNSC’s agenda were particularly involved, to discuss positions, country-specific situations, themes, and working methods of the Council. Officials and officers across the ministry were tasked with assessing and reporting on various aspects of the Council’s work. This included the working paper outlining the Swedish WPS strategy and an assessment of WPS language in existing operation and mission mandates. Approximately 30–40 foreign service personnel participated in the task force, which met regularly from August to December.

47. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
48. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
49. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
in 2016. Interviews with key personnel note that maintaining a red thread was of critical importance, so that international law, human rights, gender equality, and a humanitarian perspective were mutually reinforcing and equally addressed in each of the country-specific situations under consideration, as well as UNSC work on the thematic issues. Furthermore, the MFA spent time developing and refining concepts, identifying concrete action points, and laying out how to communicate Sweden’s position internally and externally. The convening of the task force thereby mobilized the Foreign Service’s institutional focus on how Sweden should act, and what issues it should address in the Council.

The Swedish UN Mission met with the following actors based in New York: P5 and E10 members, UN Secretariat and agency civil servants and representatives, think tanks and NGOs. Engaging with these different elements in the preparatory stage helped to establish a better understanding of how the UNSC worked, and allowed the Swedish UN Mission to listen, to share information, and to promote future cooperation. Work on WPS was integrated throughout the Mission and the responsibility rested at the highest level of the Permanent and Deputy Permanent Representatives, supported by the Political Coordinator and the WPS Focal Point. Representatives of UN member states (both on and outside the Council) interviewed for this study highlight this as one of the keys to Sweden’s success: that thematic knowledge of WPS, as well as a sense of responsibility for its implementation, rested upon the leadership and other high-ranking external functions and the daily execution with everyone on the Swedish team. This approach appears to also be increasingly pursued by other UNSC members, including P5s such as France and the UK.

Hence, strategic decision-making on the organization of Sweden’s UNSC term involved setting up internal and external functions for coordinating expertise on all UNSC matters and striving to include WPS in this regular chain of command. A key to Sweden’s WPS strategy was to emphasize that the responsibility for implementation rested on the leadership and was to be part of the daily execution of everyone on the Swedish team. There was also an emphasis on strengthening the State Capital–UN Mission–embassies connection to create systems for gathering and sharing information and for developing concrete policy action recommendations. WPS-related information was an integrated part of this system.

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50. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
51. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
52. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
53. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
54. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
55. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
4. Tactical Maneuvering in the UNSC

On January 1, 2017, Sweden entered the UNSC with the aim and strategy of promoting the further integration of WPS into core Council business, including in particular the integration of WPS language into UNSC outcomes. The first period of Sweden’s term on the UNSC involved a steep learning curve at the MFA and the UN Mission in New York. Consistency became the mainstay of the Swedish WPS integration strategy. As Sweden was generally not a penholder with control over UNSC processes, the tactic of inserting language and priorities into early drafts was discovered to be very important. Overall, however, the Swedish representatives found that their strategy to promote WPS was met with little to no resistance. Other UNSC states appeared to find value in introducing more concrete language on WPS into the repertoire and in improving the accountability of UN peacekeeping missions, assistance missions and offices, and representatives of the Secretary-General to act on the WPS language included in their mandates. There were no major trade-offs or costs for choosing to promote WPS. During Sweden’s term in the UNSC, contentious negotiations mainly seemed to be related to conflict situations that were of direct geopolitical interest to the P5s.

Let us now disaggregate the process of what it meant to carry out the Swedish WPS strategy. As outlined in Figure 3, we do that by exploring Swedish experiences based on insights from previous research (see for example Langmore and Farrall 2016; Paul 2017; Prantl 2005; Schia 2017; Thorhallsson 2012; and Wallensteen and Johansson 2016). The various insights suggest that there are several conditions that are key for an E10 to maneuver while in the UNSC. We have organized these conditions into four clusters: a) UNSC power dynamics; b) UNSC working methods; c) UNSC external dynamics; and d) the internal dynamics of an individual E10 state. The first two clusters directly focus on the diplomatic and procedural conditions of the UNSC, whereas the other two situate the E10 work in the UNSC in a broader context, considering both external and internal dynamics.

56. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
57. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
58. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
4.1. What can UNSC power dynamics mean for WPS efforts?

The first cluster of conditions that an E10 must maneuver is *UNSC Power dynamics*. This concerns the role of hierarchies in the UNSC. This first cluster recognizes the veto powers and the dynamics of the P5, as well as the changing composition of the UNSC due to the short-term periods of the E10, as important. Therefore, we take a closer look at the role of P5–E10 dynamics and at how Sweden worked regarding networking and cooperation with fellow elected states (Langmore and Thakur 2016; Farrall et al. 2019; Monteleone 2015; Basu 2016). Finally, we examine the role of Sweden’s leading diplomat in New York – the Permanent Representative of Sweden – and the role of political capital provided by the Foreign Minister in handling the diplomatic power game.

4.1.1. Maneuvering P5–E10 dynamics when promoting WPS

As we observed, Sweden entered the UNSC expecting that the ongoing power dynamics among the P5s could become challenging. Sweden could also observe early on that Russia and China were unlikely to always agree with what was perceived to be an “activist perspective” on WPS. The Swedish hope was therefore that the remaining P3s – the US, the UK, and France – would be important allies in their integration strategy on WPS. The P3s, with penholder UK at the fore, had supported UNSCR 2242 (2015), a resolution which had underlined this responsibility of the UNSC. While the election of US President Trump raised some international debates about a potential effect on WPS, changes in the US administration did not result in a radical shift in support for WPS. Overall, during Sweden’s term in the UNSC, the permanent members of the Council did not obstruct efforts to integrate WPS into outcomes. Though beyond the scope of this report, in the spring of 2019, US WPS standpoints appeared to have hardened. Disagreements between the US and other members worsened, centering on the connection made between protection and SRHR in the negotiations of resolution 2467 on sexual violence in conflicts (adopted under the German Presidency). This is argued to have played into why Russia and China put forward their own suggested resolution text and, in the end, abstained from supporting the adoption of the resolution in April 2019, making UNSCR 2467 the first WPS resolution to be adopted without full UNSC support. The result was a fairly “toxic” WPS situation during large parts of 2019. Through UNSCR 2493 (adopted in October 2019), South Africa then attempted to create consensus on WPS and managed to obtain full support for the resolution. But, some argue, this was at the cost of both formulations on SRHR (to handle the US’s concerns) and on

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59. This dynamic should be further understood in relation to the different positions that exist on UNSC reform, an issue that has been long debated.

60. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.

61. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.

62. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.

63. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
women human rights defenders (to obtain support from Russia and China).\textsuperscript{64} Sweden’s membership in the Council predated this later period of more complex negotiations.

Generally, Swedish diplomats met limited resistance when proposing more robust WPS language. Interviews with various categories of representatives suggest that counterparts in other Permanent Missions were not hostile, but occasionally ambivalent or uncertain about new WPS language. When the Swedish Permanent Mission pressed the issue of WPS with concrete suggestions for Council outcomes, such recommendations often were acceptable.\textsuperscript{65} Indeed, there did not appear to be any political resistance. Occasionally, however, concern from inside the Council might arise from a perception that a proposal on WPS language might be unusual or innovative. Even the theme’s penholder, the UK, could find it challenging to generate fresh proposals on occasion.\textsuperscript{66}

For instance, observers interviewed indicated that Council resolutions might just simply reuse language that had been previously adopted, bypassing complex negotiations about new terms or concepts. This could be done without consideration of whether previous WPS language addressed the most current context-specific problems. Thus, advancing new WPS language could be difficult, even for the UK, as novelty is generally not encouraged in drafting new resolutions and statements. At the same time, past formulations might rarely include WPS perspectives from women and from the local context.\textsuperscript{67} Most of the work that Sweden did to counter regular or recurrent use of prior language when women’s experiences of conflict situations demanded it was to share concrete suggestions and ideas before draft resolutions or statements were tabled. For example, the agenda of the incoming President is shared at a coordination meeting every month. For Sweden, this was an opportunity to start highlighting key WPS issues or aspects that were of relevance for the coming month.\textsuperscript{68} When suggestions for language were ignored, the Swedish representation persisted. When told “this is how it’s done,” the Swedish representatives responded that language on WPS needed to be clear, concrete and actionable, and that Sweden had both the entitlement and the responsibility to improve texts.\textsuperscript{69} Given the limited resistance Sweden faced, by the end of its first year on the Council, Sweden’s insistence on proposing specific – and, if necessary, new – language seemed to have become accepted, and some other E10s followed with similar approaches on WPS.\textsuperscript{70}

4.1.2. The role of E10 composition and collaboration

As we saw earlier in Section 2.2., many E10s entering the UNSC with Sweden scored quite low

\textsuperscript{64} For a discussion on this, see O’Rourke & Swaine (2019).
\textsuperscript{65} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
\textsuperscript{66} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
\textsuperscript{67} Interview category Members of the Security Council.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
\textsuperscript{69} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
\textsuperscript{70} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
on the WPS Index, had no National Action Plan on WPS, and were not involved in the Friends of 1325 Group. Based on these indicators, it is reasonable to expect that these E10 states would neither see WPS as a priority nor have much capacity for promoting it. How then could Sweden seek to strengthen E10 cooperation, and what did that mean for promoting WPS?

Cooperation with the other E10s was on the agenda as Sweden entered the UNSC and was perceived by Swedish officials as a means of addressing and opening up the procedural and substantive control of the P5 in the Council.71 This meant that prior to entering, Sweden had already sought to strengthen networks and build alliances with other E10s on the Council. WPS became an integrated part of this network-building. For example, a few months before Sweden joined, several meetings took place with Uruguay (in the UNSC in 2016–17), where Sweden’s strategy and program of work for its Presidency in January 2017 were discussed.72 Uruguay and Sweden were later to become co-chairs of the IEG on WPS upon the request from the UK and Spain. Sweden furthermore deemed that E10s with limited human and financial resources were going to be more likely to simply agree to positions by the great powers. This notion was reinforced by the belief that colonial legacies and trade- and aid-dependencies could drive E10 voting patterns in the Council. Hence, Sweden sought to strengthen consultation and cooperation among the E10s as a way of circumventing some of these obstacles. As a part of this effort, Sweden sought to build the capacity of fellow elected members to think strategically about how to improve the WPS integration in the UNSC’s work.73 In practice, networking and capacity building meant that the Swedish Permanent Mission met with the other nine E10 missions regularly, and the group became more adept at positively framing its collective identity. Although without the veto power, the elected members felt that they had particular legitimacy as they had been elected by wide margins by the General Assembly. This meant that they each had a constituency to which they would report their failures and successes, and they all, therefore, sought to make their two-year terms impactful.74

Finally, when preparing to exit the UNSC, Sweden took initiatives to meet with incoming members on WPS. For example, it held a meeting in November 2018 with South Africa (incoming 2019–20) at the capital level in Pretoria. In addition, Sweden and Indonesia held a public discussion in Jakarta in December 2018 in order to share experiences and knowledge on UNSC issues ahead of Indonesia taking its seat on the Council. Similarly, Sweden cooperated with Germany (incoming 2019–20) through a meeting in Berlin in April 2018 for the WPS Focal Point Network. According to one German interviewee, the collaboration during the transitional period from Sweden to Germany on the Council was very important to Germany and the country’s ambition to take over the informal leadership on WPS from Sweden.75

71. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
72. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
73. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
74. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
75. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
The importance of promoting a productive relationship between E10s was underlined by interviewees from other UNSC member states, the UN Secretariat, NGOs, think tanks and academics. In some discussions, however, these interviewees also presented potential challenges involved in building cooperation, since elected members cannot control which states will enter the UNSC. For example, can an E10 count on support from the countries in their own region? Or should it from the outset recognize that it and other states from its region may be on different sides of the P5 divide? For example, Uruguay, which pushed WPS, was on the UNSC together with Venezuela and Bolivia, both of which sided with P5 Russia in the global power competition. This had implications for WPS.76 Moreover, other interviews highlighted that it was central not to romanticize the role of E10s. There have been examples where E10s have played on WPS to purposely annoy members of the P5 on an opposing side, for example, by putting forward controversial civil society speakers.77 Other examples are E10 states that have used the procedures of the Open Debate on WPS to distract attention from other ongoing conflicts.78

4.1.3. The role of leadership and political capital

A final aspect of handling political dynamics in a hierarchical environment such as that of the UNSC is the role of leadership and political capital for promoting WPS, which was underlined by several external interviewees. The Permanent and Deputy Permanent Representatives were considered key for progress. This is because their role of liaising with other state representatives is critical for resolving more difficult questions.79 Sweden’s Permanent Representative to the UN was recognized for being vocal and articulate on WPS. Another example was the former Ambassador of Uruguay, who was known to be very eloquent and skilled in articulating his ideas. Being able to present a clear vision and consistent arguments, built, if possible, on a credible national history and context, were suggested to be very important for reaching one’s aims on WPS in the UNSC setting. In addition, an E10 state needs an in-depth understanding of the P5s’ intent and standpoints.80

Sweden’s Permanent Representative to the UN, a position continuously supported and coordinated internally by the Deputy Permanent Representative, was to be responsible for the implementation of the strategy diplomatically. Moreover, they communicated the WPS priorities to other members of the Council, but also to the wider UN family, to UN Operation and Missions leaders visiting the UNSC, and to the general public. An important dimension of this was to consistently and continuously signal the priority that Sweden placed on WPS, exemplified in the catch phrase:

76. Interview category External experts.
77. Interview category External experts.
78. See, for example, the Open Debate on WPS in 2018.
79. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies, Interview category External experts.
80. Interview category External experts. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
“Where are the women?” This motto did not mean that the Permanent Representative would ask about the number of women; rather, it was used as a way to signal that he was very likely to raise core WPS points relating to the specific context currently on the UNSC agenda. The same approach was used in meetings with UN mediators, or leaders of peacekeeping missions and political missions. How had they implemented the WPS components included in their mandates? Over time, the Swedish representation noted that asking about WPS and women’s inclusion started to affect behaviors, particularly among UN staff and representatives, who expected to be held accountable on WPS. They learned that if they came back in another month or even in six months, the question of “where are the women?” would be asked yet again (and again). The results were that, after a few rounds of meetings, more staff and representatives began coming to Council meetings and briefings prepared with information about WPS. This is a practice used by other E10s promoting WPS. A recent example is Germany’s Ambassador 2019–2020, who was known for continuously following up and encouraging progress and reporting to be even more specific on WPS at the next time an SRSG or Force Commander briefs the UNSC.

The credibility of the Swedish Ambassador was strengthened by the public political backing enforced both by the feminist foreign policy and the fact that Foreign Minister Wallström had served as the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. Hence, it was known that Ambassador Skoog was instructed to raise his hand often as WPS was a national political priority. This signaling by high-ranking leadership additionally helped to empower foreign service members. Interviews suggested that knowing that WPS was of high priority during the Council membership enabled Swedish officials across the ministry to act with confidence about pursuing the integration agenda. It was also reassuring that they knew that the instructions to the Permanent Mission had been scrutinized and supported by the political and Mission leadership. Importantly, government officials who participated in interviews underscored that the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Foreign Minister were also known for continuously asking the same questions inside the ministry, as well as externally while representing Sweden, something which was seen as resulting in a consistent and consolidated approach. Among the wider WPS community in New York, some had gotten to know Wallström in her earlier role as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and some interviewees expressed that, due to her success in her previous position, there was a widespread belief and confidence in her genuine commitment

81. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
82. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
83. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
84. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
85. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
86. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
87. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
88. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
and capacity to push this agenda. The fact that Sweden’s Permanent Representative had knowledge on WPS and broader security issues, such as children in armed conflict and humanitarian aspects, was also considered important for his credibility and effectiveness in the NGO group, as it made him able to speak in the “right” language when moving among advocates for WPS.

4.2. How did the working methods of the UNSC affect the efforts on WPS?

Whereas the first cluster revolves around the diplomatic craft, the second cluster, *Working methods of the UNSC*, relates to the bureaucratic craft. While the UNSC work is guided by the UN Charter and the UNSC Rules of Procedure, the working methods primarily reflect established practice, which has developed over time (Security Council Report 2019, 14). Hence, the P5 can have a great advantage over the E10 and, in fact, some informants described the P5 as considering themselves to be custodians of existing processes. The working methods come in two forms: formal and informal (see Langmore and Thakur 2016; Paul 2017; Security Council Report’s third Special Research Report 2014; Wallensteen and Johannsson 2016; Farrall et al. 2019). For the formal methods, we here focus on the methods of the penholder and the rotating UNSC Presidency, as well as the role of UNSC field visits. For the informal methods, which can involve established forms of consultations – such as the practice of inviting civil society briefers to the UNSC, and institutions associated with UNSC – we here focus on Arria Formula Meetings and the IEG on WPS. Finally, we consider the working methods related to the connection between the UNSC and the UN Secretariat. For example, the E10 can establish communication with the UN Secretariat and other UN agencies on processes where it provides information to UNSC debates, for example in the form of reports or briefings. What then were Sweden’s experiences with various working methods of the UNSC in the execution of its WPS strategy?

4.2.1. Formal methods: Penholder, presidency and field visits

The penholder “refers to a Council member who leads the negotiation and drafting of resolutions” (Security Council Report 2019, 16). This is a function that has undergone substantial change and formation, particularly in the last 10 years. The result has been that primarily one of the P3s – the US, the UK, or France – has remained a penholder for a specific item (country) on the UNSC agenda. This has been increasingly debated in the context of making the UNSC
more transparent, a debate in which E10 Japan had taken a lead just prior to Sweden entering the UNSC. The critique centered on the fact that this system meant a practice in which the P3s first agree on a draft, then negotiate with the remaining two P5s, Russia and China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>UNSC presidency</th>
<th># of resolutions</th>
<th>% of total resolutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017 (Spring)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 (Fall)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>France</td>
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<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>28.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018 (Spring)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>17.2%</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>2018 (Fall)</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>20%</td>
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Table 2: UNSC presidency by year, month, and number of resolutions

Only thereafter is the draft shared with the E10s. Sweden, together with the other existing and incoming E10s, was therefore co-signatory to a letter directed to the President of the UNSC at the end of 2018, which stressed that there should be a more equal distribution of work in the UNSC (Security Council report 2019, 15–17). As co-penholder, Sweden was part of the negotiations on the humanitarian handling of Syria. Here, we can find that while the resolutions on chemical weapons were devoid of any references to WPS, successive discussions on
the humanitarian situation from 2016 to 2018 saw a shift from no WPS references to a limited increase in the frequency of WPS references to protection between 2017 and 2018. In addition, Sweden was part of the negotiation on conflict and hunger, which concerned the threat of famine in Yemen, Somalia, South Sudan, and north-east Nigeria, regarding Resolution UNSCR 2417 (2018). Here, Sweden shared the penholdership with the Netherlands, Kuwait and Côte d’Ivoire.93 For Sweden, the fairly exclusive P5 penholder system meant that it had to find other ways to inject suggestions on language in resolution texts – or even as part of early negotiations – in an absolute majority of resolution cases.

Unlike the penholder function, the Presidency of the UNSC rotates on a monthly basis according to the alphabetical order of the member states’ names. Compared to the penholder function, the presidency is to a large extent a more administrative function. The President is then responsible for calling and presiding over formal and informal meetings, presenting statements/elements to the press, and so forth. That said, while the Secretariat provides the “base program” of events, the presidency can add suggestions to the program items and themes it considers to be of particular importance. Thereafter, there are consultations at the Political Coordinator level, with all member states to obtain agreement on the content. Sweden would, for example, bring up key dimensions of the items on the agenda, such as WPS, or suggest ideas for briefers.94 The draft program is then adopted at an informal breakfast by the UNSC President for the Permanent Representatives95 (Security Council report 2019, 29–31). As the distribution of presidents is in a sense random, this results in an unequal distribution of items on the agenda by month. Hence, this means that some E10s will preside over more debates and resolution decisions than others (see Table 2).

Sweden was President of the UNSC in January 2017 and in July 2018. It used these opportunities to contribute to the change and consolidation of the informal working practice of inviting women briefers to the UNSC. The primary focus was on women from civil society organizations in the countries on the UNSC’s agenda, such as from Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Sveriges Regering 2019). As a result of these efforts, Sweden’s July 2018 presidency represented the first time that there was a complete male/female balance of briefers to the Council.96 Various interviewees noted that an E10 could have an impact by adapting UNSC working practices in this manner.97 As noted, the Swedish efforts built on preceding work by Spain (on the UNSC in 2015–16), which had actively sought to realize this suggestion

93. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
94. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
95. An invention in the working methods by New Zealand (Security Council Report 2019, 30).
96. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts. Interview category Members of the Security Council. Sweden also continued to recommend organizations and individuals to brief the UNSC throughout its membership even when it was not the President.
97. Interview category External experts; Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
on briefers stemming from the 15th anniversary of 1325. Spain’s effort to change this practice was originally met with resistance. However, Spain obtained support from a majority of other members, and resistance receded. During Sweden’s term, it was then joined in its efforts by the UK and the Netherlands (in the UNSC 2018), which worked to promote civil society speakers, also under their UNSC presidencies. Sweden also continued to work on WPS integration throughout its presidency (Government of Sweden 2018). What Sweden did not do, however, was to use the presidency to focus only on promoting the integration of WPS into the UNSC’s core processes. Interviews with Swedish representatives suggest that they felt that it was not advisable to overwhelm the presidency period with one particular ambition. Instead, they appeared to view the presidencies as opportunities to demonstrate that an E10 member can be good at organizing the Council’s work in the interest of the institution as a whole, both in terms of benefiting the overall agenda and as an opportunity to work to unify the body. As such, Sweden’s approach during its presidencies could be interpreted as part of the maneuvering and balancing between different aims and how WPS fit into the broader strategy, where contributing to the functionality of the UNSC was a core aim.

As regards field visits, these were utilized by Sweden for promoting the importance and meaning of WPS to UNSC members. As the chosen aim and strategy on WPS integration entailed limited external visibility, field visits also allowed Sweden to signal nationally and internationally that it was actively promoting WPS. For example, in July 2018, the Swedish Foreign Minister went on a joint UN and AU trip to the Sahel and West Africa (Swedish Parliament/Sveriges Regering 2019). The field mission visits made by the Permanent Missions of the members of the Council also gave Sweden an opportunity to strengthen WPS and to identify practical solutions to implementing the Security Council’s decisions on the ground. This included suggesting that meetings with women’s organizations or with gender experts in field operations should be incorporated into the agendas of UNSC Field Visits, a practice Sweden was recognized for by external interviewees, and something considered particularly important for increasing the accountability of UN operations and missions regarding WPS.

98. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies. A reason for the acceptance was suggested to be that it would be costly to continuously resist given that they could not use the veto and they did not have the political vote to stop it. Potentially, the effect has also not been severe on the debate as the speeches have been quite strategic in what issues that are being brought up.
99. Interview category External experts.  
100. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.  
101. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.  
102. Interview category External experts.  
103. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.  
104. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.  
105. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
4.2.2. Informal methods: The Arria Formula Meetings and the Informal Expert Group on WPS

If the formal routes in the UNSC are blocked, there are “formalized informal” tools that can be used to push a specific process forward. One such tool is the Arria Formula Meeting. Created in 1992 under the then UNSC presidency of Venezuelan Ambassador Diego Arria, these meetings are a recognized form of meeting “...convened at the initiative of a member or members of the Security Council to hear the views of individuals, organizations or institutions on matters within the competence of the Security Council” (Security Council Report 2019). While Sweden did not take the lead in organizing any such meetings, it was the co-host together with other E10s and P5s at nine meetings. One such meeting concerned health care in armed conflict. This was deemed to be a novel theme with practical, significant WPS implications for the safety and well-being of civilians in armed conflict. Italy and the UK organized a meeting on WPS and global conflict prevention and mediation in March 2017, with Sweden speaking at the meeting in full support of women’s participation and representation in peace processes and calling for holding itself, the Council and UN officials accountable for implementation.

For Sweden, the reason for this approach to Arria meetings might have been twofold. First, Sweden was cautious about diverting from its message of the direct relationship between WPS and “everyday business” inside the Council. Second, and this point was also raised by external interviewees, some caution should be used regarding how Arria Formula Meetings have been increasingly utilized. In recent years, the number of meetings had increased drastically, from six meetings in 2014 to 22 meetings in 2019 (Security Council Report 2019). Given the fact that most E10s (and even P5s) have limited personnel resources, each decision on profiling WPS at an Arria Formula Meeting should be weighed against how those resources could otherwise be used in regular efforts for implementation. For example, many states have only one WPS Focal Point function – and this person often holds several other portfolios – whereby an increase in the external meeting load increases the difficulty of properly following all internal UNSC processes.

The tactical commitment to integration of WPS seemed to Sweden to require systematic focus on the application of concrete proposals to Council outcomes and the advancement of WPS in the context of conflict situations before the Council, rather than investing limited personnel resources only into special forums or functions such as the presidencies or the Arria Formula Meetings.

106. As such, they do not have formal outcomes but since 2016, they are webcast by UN TV (Security Council Report 2019).
107. Topics to which Sweden appeared as a co-host involved issues related to Children in Armed Conflict (Attacks on Schools), Russian Occupation of Crimea (with UK and the US and France), and Syria.
108. Part of the reason can be that they are now broadcast on the UN Web TV and that therefore can serve as a Forum to profile country priorities even under conditions where there is no blockage in the regular UNSC processes.
109. Interview category Members of the Security Council, Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
In another informal forum, the Informal Expert Group (IEG) on WPS, established at the 15th anniversary of 1325, Sweden was much more active. It co-chaired this together with Uruguay (2017) and Peru (2018) respectively, with the UK as a permanent co-chair on the P5 side. The IEG, supported by the secretariat at UN Women, held 15 meetings during 2017–18 and briefed and prepared UNSC members for addressing situations in Chad, Yemen, Mali/Sahel, Iraq, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Libya. Through such activities, the aim of the IEG is to strengthen UNSC states’ capacity to seek out and include a WPS perspective in their own proposals for resolutions, their work with other committees and their voting on UNSC resolutions. The IEG also plays other roles, such as mobilizing Ambassadors for a particular WPS issue in a particular country setting. For example, the IEG disseminated a letter from local NGOs on promoting dialogue with the government on shelters in Iraq, and intervened in the discussion on the cuts to senior gender advisors in the CAR mission in the 5th Committee (resulting in its eventual reinstatement). During the Swedish term, efforts were made to strengthen the status of the group. In part, this was the result of the UN Women Secretariat strengthening the professionalism of the IEG’s work as the institution evolved. Sweden supported this effort by seeking to relate the work of the IEG even more strongly to the UNSC program of work in advance of meetings or decisions on country-specific situations. Another effort was to invite or arrange opportunities for WPS experts or country-specific experts to feed information and insights into IEG meetings. Finally, Sweden ensured the attendance of Foreign Minister Wallström at several meetings. She would actively engage in the sharing of views with experts, which was not a usual procedure at this level of meeting.

To conclude, Sweden’s focus on the IEG rather than Arria Formula Meetings on WPS could be interpreted as a strategic decision to focus its main resources on an integrative rather than a more “campaign-driven” approach to WPS. That said, several interviewees pointed out that the IEG still struggles, as it is an informal institution, and that even when concrete suggestions come out of the meetings in a specific country setting, it has been difficult to transfer these into the core UNSC processes in that same country. One reason for this proposed by interviewees was member states’ view of WPS. For example, if a state viewed WPS as a separate track, then its WPS Focal Point was the one sent to the meeting instead of the one holding the specific geographical portfolio being discussed. Under such conditions, the chances for IEG recommendations reaching the actual negotiations were deemed to be lower. Addressing this misunderstanding was therefore thought to

110. Their work involve preparing notes and background material, facilitate participation by leadership in the field missions and operations to brief the IEG, and to draft the document with the suggested policy recommendations from the meeting. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
111. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
112. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
114. Interview category External experts, Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
115. Interview category External experts.
be central if the IEG should not, unintentionally, result in a marginalization of WPS. In effect, the
IEG could become a silo outside of the UNSC core processes. A development since Sweden’s term
is that the UN Women Secretariat of the IEG has therefore worked together with the co-chairs to
identify strategic ways to integrate the recommendations of IEG meetings into resolutions and de-
bates. A complication is that there has been mounting resistance to this from P5s, which surfaced
in relation to the negotiation on the UNSC resolutions 2467 and 2493 in 2019.

4.2.3. The connection between the UNSC and the UN Secretariat

High-ranking officials in the Swedish ministry noted that working with the UN Secretariat and
with UN field missions and regional offices such as the UN Office for West Africa (now United
Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel) was important, as Sweden championed the WPS con-
cerns from the field and relied upon those at the frontline of implementation to share the challenges
they faced in practice. This approach included efforts at the strategic level, for example, to ensure
that Secretary-General reports included WPS information and sex-disaggregated data. Overall, Swe-
den was perceived as trying to promote exchange between the political level and the bureaucratic
levels, for example, through regular meetings between Secretariat organs, such as the Department
of Peace Operations (DPO) and UN Women, and between EU ambassadors in preparations for
meetings on WPS. For example, as a result of the work with the IEG and women civil society brief-
ers, Sweden had daily contact with UN Women, as it both holds the Secretariat for the IEG and fa-
cilitates the participation of civil society briefers to the UNSC in collaboration with the NGO Work-
ing Group on WPS. In addition, as suggested by interviews with the Secretariat, Sweden’s strategy
to promote tangible language on WPS was deemed important, as the Secretariat faced increased
demands for reporting on progress. To that end, DPO was already in the process of reviewing exist-
ing mandates to establish what the operations and missions were requested to deliver on when Swe-
den was entering the UNSC. In that review, it was discovered that while most mandates spoke of
“gender mainstreaming” quite generically, this was considered too vague for an operation to easily
act and report on. There was a wish for the mandate objectives relating to WPS to become more
concrete, thereby supporting Sweden’s decision to promote specific and actionable language.

116. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies; Interview category External experts.
117. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
118. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies. One external informant also warned against attempting to make the
IEG on WPS a formal working group, similar to the one on Children in Armed Conflict. That would mean that you would have to
have consensus decision on each debate which were very hard to reach.
119. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
120. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
121. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
122. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies. For example, one mandate had described the format and participant
number of a workshop which was considered too detailed a level.
said, a common recommendation that surfaced in the study was that the UNSC language should
stay strategic on WPS and not venture into the responsibilities of the mission or the host state to
operationalize the very specific details.123 Sweden also had regular contact and exchanges with
the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA). Moreover, as part of its work, the
DPPA Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch collects information on language
in the UNSC resolutions, including on WPS in the WPS database, which is updated quarterly.
They also include information in the regular Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council
and in the Highlights of Security Council Practice that includes information about cross-cutting
indicators, such as WPS.124 These sources could be consulted by E10s when seeking to identify
language that builds on existing resolutions in order to develop progress in the language on
WPS. In this respect, however, Sweden was noted not to have relied on DPPA for input on WPS
but rather to have had a clear idea of its own as to how that should be pursued.125

4.3. How did external dynamics affect the efforts on WPS?

The third cluster, *UNSC external dynamics*, situates the processes for promoting WPS in the UNSC in
relation to the broader political landscape at the UN and in New York, particularly among external play-
ers in the expert and non-governmental sectors. In particular, key actors are the Group of Friends on
1325, NGO networks, such as the NGO Working Group on 1325, and think tanks and academic actors,
such as the Security Council Report and the International Peace Institute (IPI). In addition, important
collaborations and exchanges take place with actors in countries on the UNSC agenda and with actors
in the national context of the E10 itself. These actors can be important for an elected state in form-
ing, or in connecting to, broader alliances to create pressure on the UNSC, or they can provide an E10
with critical information from country-specific contexts through extended networks around the globe
(Prantl 2005). In addition, it is important to make note of the fact that over the last decade, the number
of actors doing work on WPS has increased substantially, both in the New York setting and globally in
the UN system and among states, think tanks, and academics.126 This means that there are more op-
portunities for exchange and collaboration, but also that it is increasingly difficult to get an overview of
WPS debates, as they are carried out in a large number of arenas, often specialized on one sub-theme.

4.3.1. The Group of Friends on 1325

According to Swedish diplomats interviewed, the Group of Friends on 1325 played an impor-
tant role for Sweden while on the UNSC.127 The Group had originally been founded by the

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123. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
124. Email contact with UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
125. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies and Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
126. Interview category External experts.
127. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
same group of countries and individuals that were active in lobbying for and negotiating UN-SCR 1325 back in 2000. Since the very start, the Group has been chaired by Canada and by now includes 50+ member states, including three of the P5s – the UK, US and France – plus several NGOs as observers. Primarily, the Group of Friends serves as a platform for mobilizing member states and maximizing leverage for WPS in the UN system. This is done through information sharing, coordination of positions, hosting of briefings, and delivery of joint statements. For example, they negotiate a joint statement for the annual Security Council Open Debates. The E10s play an important role in this group. UN member states supportive of the WPS agenda – and perhaps also with ambitions of becoming members of the UNSC – are dependent on the willingness of the E10s to share informal read-outs. The E10s can thereby also benefit from the exchange and feedback they get from the other members of the Group, including from the NGO observers. Finally, according to one interviewee, the Group of Friends is an example of how WPS is now owned by the general membership of the UN, rather than being limited to the UNSC, something which can apply pressure on the UNSC members when addressing WPS aspects. After Sweden left the UNSC, however, the negotiations on UNSCR 2467 and 2493 placed a strain also on the collaboration in the Friends Group. For example, the US chose not to be part of the customary joint statement for the adoption of 2467 in the spring of 2019 as the Group could not agree on a statement that handled all issues. In addition, new informal formations of states have appeared over time. For example, Italy created the “practically-minded informal group on Resolution 1325” during its UNSC term 2007–08 (Ministry for Foreign Affairs Italy 2013). Recently, Germany and the UK mobilized members from this group to collect ideas and solicit commitments on what WPS progress could look like post-2020.

4.3.2. Interactions with civil society organizations, academics, and think tanks

The interview material from Swedish members of the foreign service suggests that there were important collaborations between external actors in New York, in conflict-affected situations around the world, and Sweden during its term. The input from these actors proved important to strengthening processes for better WPS outcomes, providing additional expertise about gaps in implementation as well as entry-points to networks of peacebuilding and conflict-resolution practitioners. Think tanks and academic forums can here assist in organizing meetings and events as an external and more neutral platform for discussing upcoming issues, set the scene

129. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
130. Interview category Members of the Security Council.
132. Interview category External experts.
133. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
for addressing key problems, and generate new material to support policy development.\textsuperscript{134} Sweden utilized these forums. For example, the Swedish Foreign Minister\textsuperscript{135} participated in external events, such as the IPI Global Leaders Series events on Women and International Peace to present Sweden’s ongoing efforts and achievements in the UNSC and promote a feminist foreign policy at the time of the UNGA in September 2018 (International Peace Institute. 2018). The Swedish Permanent Representative took part in the World Federation of United Nations Associations’ first ever Civil Society Dialogue with the President of the United Nations Security Council already on January 6, 2017 to present the Swedish priorities, including WPS (Wfuna 2017).

As regards NGOs, interviewees stated that it was important to start from the understanding that there exist several categories of civil society groups in New York which incorporate WPS into their work. For example, the NGO Working Group on the UNSC is a network that does not formulate concrete joint standpoints as it consists of a number of different forms of organizations (from rights groups to humanitarian organizations), whereas others, such as the NGO Working Group on WPS and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), push for more explicit and joint objectives.\textsuperscript{136} When discussing civil society’s role, it is important to also recognize the dependency of NGOs on states to share information, often informally, and to provide them with resources. A worsening relationship between NGOs and the majority of the P5s has also been noted in recent years.\textsuperscript{137} Similar to the UN, this NGO Working Group also tracks language developments. Based on this, they provide material for UNSC members through the Monthly Action Points (MAP). The MAP format was first developed in dialogue with an E10, Switzerland, after the adoption of UNSCR 1820 in 2008. The idea was to provide UNSC members with better information with which to advance WPS. In addition, the MAP outline specific expectations for the incoming UNSC President, which inadvertently also created an accountability mechanism for WPS progress.\textsuperscript{138} From the outset, NGOs interviewed expressed that they put pressure on Sweden to promote the implementation of the resolutions. One way forward suggested by an NGO was to progress on WPS language in resolutions and statements and to hold countries accountable for addressing these aspects of the mandates.\textsuperscript{139} Sweden reportedly found the NGO pressure, their exchanges, and their information very useful for pushing ahead.\textsuperscript{140} However, in order for such pressure to be most effective in a UNSC setting with strict time and resource constraints, the feedback to the NGO group was on

\textsuperscript{134} Interview category External experts.

\textsuperscript{135} Then as part of the expedition government.

\textsuperscript{136} Interview category External experts.

\textsuperscript{137} Interview category External experts.

\textsuperscript{138} Interview category External experts. In addition, there is a yearly report that sums up progress over the year.

\textsuperscript{139} Interview category External experts.

\textsuperscript{140} Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts; Interview category External experts.
occasion that their suggestions should be made even more concrete and pointed.141

In addition to exchanges in the New York arena, Sweden engaged in exchanges at the country level in the states on the UNSC agenda. Swedish embassies also consulted with local civil society organizations, including women’s civil society organizations. For example, a reference group established in Monrovia, Liberia, consisted of an official from the Swedish Embassy in Monrovia, also representing the local donor group, one representative each from UNMIL, the UN Country Team, the Government Peacebuilding Office, and from an umbrella group from Liberian civil society (Swedish Parliament/Sveriges Regering 2019).

Finally, at the national level, Sweden created the Reference Council and consulted widely with civil society. The Reference Council’s aim was to discuss issues linked to Swedish UN policy and the Security Council agenda. The council had 16 members and included the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Swedish National Defense College, Kvinna till Kvinna, Lund University, The Nordic African Institute, Save the Children, The Red Cross, Sida, Stockholm Environment Institute, Stockholm International Water Institute, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm University, The Swedish United Nations Uppsala University, and the Institute of Foreign Policy (Swedish Parliament/Sveriges Regering 2019). Additional civil society contact entailed meetings with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and a wider group of NGOs every three to four months. The ministry sought to inform NGO representatives about Sweden’s work in the UNSC, and harvest their reflections and further input. These meetings were normally led by the Cabinet Secretary (Deputy Foreign Minister), with 30–40 NGOs participating.

4.4. How can the E10 state’s own internal dynamics affect WPS efforts?

The fourth and final cluster focuses on the E10 state’s own internal dynamics. This cluster takes as its starting point that the workload of the UNSC is very high and the processes fast-moving.142 New situations can appear suddenly. For example, during Sweden’s first month and its first UNSC Presidency, the crisis in the Gambia, a country previously not on the UNSC’s agenda, escalated. The degree to which an E10 has access to resources and capacity will thereby affect its performance and what types of aims it can afford to establish on WPS.143 Primary resources concern personnel and their capacity (Thorallson 2012; Farrall et al. 2019), as well as the use of these personnel in terms of organization and coordination.144 We will here look closer at Sweden’s

141. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
142. Interview category External experts; Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
143. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
144. At least 15–20 diplomats are estimated to be required, most should have experience of the UN. Ideally, they should be in place quite a long time before the actual term begins (Interview category External experts).
experiences with coordination and exchange between the UN Mission in New York and the MFA in Stockholm. In addition, E10 states can utilize support staff, such as WPS experts or focal points, as well as training, to raise the capacity on WPS. We conclude by looking closer at how this form of support was utilized by Sweden.

4.4.1. Coordination during the UNSC term

How the relationship between the member state’s Capital and its UN Mission is handled is key as it can affect the degree to which there is political capital to push issues in the UNSC. In other words, this relationship affects the credibility of members of the UN Mission in negotiations. For this relationship to work, there needs to be sufficient resources for coordination in place (Langmore and Thakur 2016; Langmore & Tharun 2016; Basu 2016). Deliveries on WPS stand to be directly affected by such decisions.\(^{145}\)

As described, to handle coordination between the Swedish UN Mission in New York, which ran the daily activities in the UNSC, and the MFA in Stockholm, the Section for Coordination of Sweden’s Membership of the UNSC was set up. It supported Sweden’s UN Mission in New York, directing and synchronizing with the ministry’s geographical units, such as the Africa Unit or the Middle East and North Africa Unit, and with the functional units on UNSC-relevant matters. For example, the Coordination Section would always consult with the Unit for International Law, Human Rights and Treaty Law, and with the Unit for Conflict Issues and Humanitarian Policy.\(^{146}\) The international law unit scrutinized or made recommendations on all UNSC language, whether proposed by Sweden or whether a draft text from another Council member, to ensure correct normative language or phrasing, as well as to suggest alternatives. Coordination was essential for maintaining consistency in Sweden’s strategy to prioritize international law, human rights, gender equality, and the humanitarian cross-cutting perspectives. Key interviews with management in the Ministry show that during the Council term, ongoing and new matters were processed through this process of coordination. The coordination process would take place over a 24–36 hour period or, when urgent, within a few hours. New York transmitted proposals and requests in the afternoon/evening, including draft instructions on a matter before the UNSC to Stockholm; the Section coordinated input across the MFA (including input from embassies) during the day; this then came to a determination at the level of the Cabinet Secretary and often, the Minister; thereafter, final instructions would be conveyed, arriving in New York as the sun rose there in the morning.\(^{147}\) Whether in short bursts of response and action on urgent matters,

\(^{145}\) Interview category External experts.
\(^{146}\) Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts
\(^{147}\) Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
or during more routine or lengthy processes, political leadership from Stockholm was sought and given. This allowed the New York Mission to know that its actions and positions were supported at the highest level. The officials interviewed for this study therefore asserted that this coordination role was central in contributing to the capacity for Sweden to speak and act on WPS with one voice in the UNSC.148

Officials who were interviewed suggested that regardless of how an E10 country wanted to organize its work, coordination was useful for taking advantage of new opportunities and navigating the unpredictability of the Council term.149 In practice, this meant that the Swedish UN Mission desk officer and other personnel would have prepared draft language, such as speaking points for the UN Ambassador if he was expected to make remarks, or for resolution formulations.150 The Coordination Section at the MFA in Stockholm would then prepare directives and conduct daily briefings with the Cabinet Secretary (often also attended by the Foreign Minister) before sending final instructions to New York. The capacity for this grew over time. Indeed, toward the end, the UN Mission kept a long list of practical recommendations for work on WPS across a wide range of aims, from accountability, to leadership, to meaningful participation and representation, and so on.151

4.4.2. Handling an E10’s capacity needs on WPS

As a starting point, Swedish representatives interviewed for this project agreed that real challenges related to resources were facing many E10s, in particular on staffing and time,152 challenges that were also highlighted by interviewees representing other E10s.153 This is primarily due to the demanding and high tempo workload of the UNSC.154 Deciding on a limited number of realistic aims on what and how to push for on WPS was therefore described as key.155 To pursue these concrete priorities, E10 states need to have dedicated resources.156 In addition to securing enough personnel, the country needs to ensure that deployed personnel have the right capacity and competence. To further build capacity, it is possible to provide additional training. For Sweden, the aim was to have gender equality as a cross-cutting theme in all work. This was paired with the expectation that all leaders and desk officers were supposed to be able to take responsibility to

148. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
149. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
150. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
151. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
152. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
154. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
155. Interview category External experts.
156. Interview category External experts.
promote WPS within their own portfolio. To strengthen that capacity, Sweden conducted training for its personnel by inhouse experts before entering the Council. One session was held at the UN Mission in New York and two at the MFA in Stockholm. Sweden also partook in training offered by UN Women, where the session included embassies in concerned countries over web-links, and held individual meetings with UN Women desk officers and WPS experts.

As underlined by many interviewees, the capacity to work on WPS varied substantially between E10s. How an E10 approached that fact also varied. For instance, elected states can take advantage of – or co-organize – trainings to augment capacity on WPS or other issues. A number of UN entities and departments and civil society organizations, working in several different constellations, do offer training for incoming E10 states, either with WPS as a distinct theme or with WPS integrated into broader training content. States may also want to augment WPS expertise with other knowledge about other Council matters and themes. For example, Portugal’s Focal Point on WPS and Human Rights actively promoted that all staff should attend training offered by civil society in New York. The motivation was that human rights was a key theme during their term in the UNSC 2011–12. This effort is said to have contributed to Portugal eventually also being recognized for promoting WPS and for getting other E10s and states engaged during its term. Similarly, the Netherlands (2018) had training sessions with the UN Secretariat, DPPA, UN Women, and DPO to increase the capacity among its entire staff. The reason for this all-staff training was that the negotiations where WPS needed to be considered take place in many different forums, and one WPS expert could not cover them all. But variation also means that there will be some E10s that do not prioritize building capacity on WPS. Some states may have very few of their staff, if any, attend training. This can depend on both a state’s priority and its resources. Some E10s have only one person appointed to a specific WPS portfolio – while also managing other issues or themes – and s/he might not have time for capacity-building, even in cases where s/he has limited previous experience on the topic.

In addition to training, an organization can make use of WPS experts and/or WPS Focal Points to improve its capacity. To specifically strengthen the work on WPS at the Swedish MFA, first one and then two experts were employed. The first came into the MFA in September 2016 with the task of supporting the operationalization of Sweden’s aim and approach into a concrete strategy. Her focus was on understanding the question: “What can the Security Council do to implement [WPS]?” To identify that, her first task was to be lead author on the WPS preparatory paper. This included an

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157. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
158. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
159. Interview category External experts.
160. Interview category External experts.
161. Interview category External experts.
162. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
overview of all existing language in mandates for the UN’s political missions and peace operations. She then consulted with NGOs and the UN Secretariat to provide her colleagues with concrete material for moving forward. The work was done in collaboration with the team around the Swedish Ambassador for Gender Equality and the Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy. The paper was built on the components of the speech by the Deputy Minister of Sweden, to the UNSC in October 2016, on how Sweden would strive to integrate and operationalize WPS into the daily business of the Security Council. During the term in the UNSC, the WPS expert would then support the development of WPS language and review progress. The degree of support needed varied from one case to the next. For some countries on the agenda, the staff already had language and suggestions, allowing them to work independently. Others struggled more. If an item appeared suddenly on the agenda, then the WPS expert also had to step in. That said, all WPS suggestions would be assessed and backstopped by leadership in order to ensure a realistic, coherent idea of what Sweden should propose.

At the Swedish Mission in New York, a WPS focal point provided support. To that end, he liaised at the strategic level, with counterparts at other missions in the UNSC, and with the UN Secretariat, the DPPA, the DPO, and UN Women. The WPS focal point also represented Sweden as the co-chair for the IEG on WPS. Similar to the situation in Stockholm, however, all in the Mission were responsible for WPS in their respective portfolios. Thus, other councilors, advisors and desk officers responsible for liaising across the UN organization; for monitoring UN developments from a regional perspective (such as in relation to Africa, Latin America, Asia and Oceania, the Middle East and North Africa, or Europe); or for implementing Swedish foreign policy in relation to themes such as climate issues, human rights or sustainable development each had to integrate gender equality/WPS into their program of work. In this effort, the WPS focal point would provide overarching strategic support. This could entail, for example, participating in the internal check on all language for Council outcomes (the resolutions, the presidential statements, written press statements, and oral press elements) along with the legal advisor and humanitarian coordinator. Common position papers, background documents, and the list of recommendations for working with WPS assisted in ensuring that WPS expertise was integrated throughout the Mission. According to interviews, this was different from earlier practice in the Swedish Mission and indeed, from how they worked in most other diplomatic missions to the UN. This new approach made everyone their own “WPS expert.”

163. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
164. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts. See Government of Sweden (2016).
165. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
166. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
167. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
168. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
169. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
170. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
5. Appraising Impact: WPS in the UNSC

To be able to appraise the impact of an E10, we need to start by discussing: What are the different effects an E10 can seek to achieve during its term in the UNSC? In fact, E10 contributions have come in many different forms, such as championing a new thematic resolution, or seeking to reshape the UNSC working methods. Therefore, we begin this section by categorizing the effects an E10 can seek to achieve while in the UNSC. In the case of Sweden, we know that it particularly sought to improve the integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions in order to promote implementation. After outlining the different categories, we therefore utilize Sweden’s work to exemplify and develop our understanding of how the integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions can be appraised in terms of language becoming more implementable. We develop three criteria for tracking and assessing progress: 1) Frequency, 2) Clarity, and 3) Priority. Throughout the analysis, we will provide examples of what language on WPS can look like in different forms and contexts. While this study does not allow us to directly identify whether Sweden’s efforts had the desired effects (due to data limitations), it does provide us with a rigorous overview of what occurred regarding WPS integration during Sweden’s term. We also argue that this method of tracking language developments can assist future E10s in setting objectives and assessing how it can contribute to improved language on WPS.

5.1. How should we understand the effect of an E10 in the UNSC?

Accurately assessing the full impact of an individual E10 during their term operating in the UNSC is complicated, if not impossible. That said, this report argues that it is possible to more systematically disentangle what effects an E10 can strive for while in the Council. Based on previous research and interview material, we identify five different forms of effects. The first two effects relate primarily to a strengthening of the normative framework:

- **Raise visibility**: A state can focus on raising the visibility of an overlooked sub-theme of the resolutions – for example, in the setting of the yearly Open Debate on WPS or in an Arria Formula Meeting – or seek to elevate the status of a specific WPS sub-issue – such as highlighting women’s participation in post-war elections during a UNSC field visit. These can be important first steps for establishing the foundation for future decisions.

- **Champion a new thematic resolution**: An E10 can seek to directly affect the WPS framework by striving for the adoption of a new thematic resolution. Such resolutions come in slightly different forms. They can aim to expand or clarify an underdeveloped WPS sub-theme, such as the recent UNSCR 2538 on women in peacekeeping operations.171 A new resolution can also be used to institutionalize progress, such as UNSCR 2242 – a resolution that set the direction for the work on WPS in the years following the 15th anniversary of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Women.

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171. A resolution adopted at a peacekeeping debate while still verbally aligning itself with the other WPS resolutions.
for resolution 1325. These efforts can have a substantial impact on WPS trajectories over time, but often require a high degree of resources and political capital.

Three other effects can be detected that relate more closely to strengthening the implementation of existing WPS resolutions through integration in regular processes:

- **Reshape UNSC working methods**: An E10 can strive to modify the formal or informal working methods of the UNSC to promote a change in UNSC practice that will allow for WPS to be more thoroughly and/or regularly considered. Examples of this include the establishment of the IEG on WPS, or the use of women civil society briefers, both of which aim to increase the access to context-specific information in the Council. Such efforts are more likely to, at least indirectly, affect the core trajectory of WPS realization.

- **Strengthen sanction criteria**: An E10 can strive to promote WPS in relation to sanctions and sanction criteria. For example, an E10 may promote WPS aspects in the language and promote that specific country sanction committees consider WPS in their efforts and monitoring. Sanctions constitute an increasingly important tool of the UNSC. An example from Sweden’s work is that it led the proposal which resulted in the introduction of special listing criteria for sexual violence in the UN sanctions regimes for the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Libya (Sveriges regering 2019).

- **Promote WPS integration into regular UNSC resolutions and statements**: An E10 can seek to promote the implementation of the content of the WPS resolutions through striving to integrate the relevant parts of the content into regular UNSC outcomes: resolutions, presidential statements, press statements, and press elements. Of these, affecting the content of the resolutions can be considered to be the most influential for implementation, as they constitute the basis for UNSC decisions on objectives and reporting on the ground in a large number of conflicts and countries.

As discussed in the above sections, integration is where Sweden placed a substantial degree of effort in realizing an effect, although it also worked across visibility, mobilization, reshaping working methods and promoting criteria in sanctions. Let us look closer at what the integration of WPS into regular UNSC resolutions and statements can mean in practice and obtain an overview of developments in this area.

### 5.1.1. What did Sweden’s effort to promote WPS integration mean in practice?

“This is my take-away from the Security Council: You can’t sit and think too long – you

172. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
In order to understand the reasonable scope of effect on UNSC resolutions a small E10 like Sweden could be expected to achieve, let us look closer at how Sweden sought to promote integration. As was described in Sections 3 and 4 on strategy and conditions, the power in the UNSC is highly asymmetric in favor of the P5s, and the Council is a rules-based arena. An E10 thus relies on substantial resources and networks in order to be effective, as it is always at a disadvantage in relation to the P5. While each UNSC resolution is formed as part of a negotiation including all members of the UNSC, the penholder(s) and the P5s have more say over the content of the text than most E10s. Often, the more powerful actors have the prerogative of drafting early versions of the text, and can thereby set the agenda for other members’ input.

As can be seen in the working papers developed by Sweden on this topic, for a small E10, striving to promote strengthened UNSC resolution language on WPS in practice meant adding or sharpening a few key words and suggesting additional sentences and sometimes whole paragraphs in a resolution text. This does not mean that such key words are not important. In fact, they are what connects the work in the Council to substantial effects on the lives of people and personnel on the ground in a conflict area. But one E10 member cannot singlehandedly drive the agenda or resolve complex conflicts unilaterally. As UNSC items appear on the agenda in cycles, part of Sweden’s plan was to also promote progress strategically over time: that is, to suggest increasingly strengthened formulations each time a resolution item came up for review. To create the foundation for this, the WPS expert at the Swedish MFA had reviewed the state of the language in all current resolutions on the UNSC agenda and identified where it could be improved. A specific focus was placed on language in resolutions constituting the mandate for operations and missions. Additional emphasis was placed on participation language, as this was deemed particularly weak, although Sweden also sought to promote inclusion and sharpening of WPS language overall (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2016b). To track ongoing efforts and ensure consistent progress, the Swedish New York mission maintained an informal log of what form of language had been promoted earlier and whether these suggestions had been successfully adopted. This was done on a running basis until the end of December 2018. The log includes when and where Sweden brought up WPS in statements by the Permanent and Deputy Permanent Representative, as consistent signaling at the highest level was considered central (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2018a). In late 2018, the language in the resolutions was then again reviewed to get an overview of remaining gaps (Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2018b).

173. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
174. For example, Sweden were at times, criticized in Swedish media for not contributing to end of the war in Syria.
175. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
176. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
177. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
5.1.2. Assessing WPS integration in UNSC resolutions

In order to assess whether the trajectory of WPS language in UNSC resolutions is in line with Sweden’s strategy, we constructed a form of measurement and a dataset which relates to outcomes in resolutions in three forms:\(^{178}\) 1) **Frequency**, which measures the degree to which language on WPS\(^{179}\) is integrated in a UN resolution; 2) **Clarity**, which seeks to capture the degree to which the WPS language is actionable compared to language which is formulated in generic terms; and finally 3) **Priority**, which seeks to evaluate whether the instructive words used on WPS make it important for implementation. Sweden did not work directly on the priority dimension, but we argue that it can be relevant to include as Sweden aimed to contribute to an increased opportunity for WPS to be realized on the ground.\(^{180}\)

**Box 4: Three forms of criteria to assess WPS language in UNSC Resolutions**

*Frequency*: Measuring the degree to which language on WPS is at all integrated in a UN resolution. This includes an analysis of what WPS theme – participation, protection, or gender mainstreaming – that the language addresses. Notably, this criteria does not argue that more WPS language is necessarily better. Of primary importance is instead that the language addresses existing context-specific issues.

*Clarity*: Capturing the degree to which the WPS language is operational, that is, actionable. This means that it is related to specific tasks and objectives in the sections of the resolutions determining expected actions. This can be compared to language which is formulated in generic, or very general, terms or that which only exists in the preamble of a resolution. The text in the preamble can be important for providing direction but is unlikely to result in actions per se.

*Priority*: Outlines what forms of instructive words that are used on WPS. Resolutions often include a very large number of tasks and objectives which require a mission or country to prioritize. Are WPS signaled as important by the UNSC in such a process?

\(^{178}\) This considered existing research and was, for example, inspired by the manner in which Bell and O’Rourke (2011), Bell (2015), Kreft (2017) and Bell and McNicholl (2019) approach the study of WPS language.

\(^{179}\) E.g. Women_Children, Gender, Sexual_Violence, Sexual_Abuse, Sexual_Exploitation, and Gender_Adviser.

\(^{180}\) It should be noted that in measuring and tracking language, in particular regarding frequency, there is a difference in perceptions of how to measure and see technical turnover resolutions. This study has developed its own method of classifying such resolutions, which means that our classification can differ from other interpretations.
Importantly, in terms of WPS language, a growing critique against current integration is that the primary focus has been placed on the theme of protection, particularly as it relates to conflict-related sexual violence (see Davies and True 2019 for a discussion). As noted, Sweden sought to pay particular attention to participation but also sought to promote gender mainstreaming and protection. We will therefore examine the trajectory of three themes – protection, participation, and gender mainstreaming – in more detail. This is also important as the challenges and opportunities in moving forward on integrating language can potentially differ between themes.

Finally, in discussing how an E10 can affect resolution outcomes, it is central to know that there are several different categories of resolutions, as noted in the examples of the assessment Sweden performed. Overall, the UNSC resolutions can be divided into three different types: a) country-specific/regional items; b) peace operation/political mission items; and c) thematic items (see Table 3 for the distribution over time). Here as well, the possibility to affect language can differ between these categories as they revolve around different forms of situations and actors. The UNSC was traditionally confined to discussing issues that threatened international peace and security within the context of country-specific or regional items. Through such resolutions, the Council can impose mitigating measures toward a specific government or governments, or non-state actors that pose a threat to international peace and security. Should the Council authorize a peace operation or a political mission, resolutions of this type could establish a mission, determine mandates, assign specific tasks, set a time frame and authorize the deployment of troops, as well as track the progress of, renew and extend missions. A relatively new type of resolution is thematic items that focus on global issues, including but not limited to terrorism, protection of civilians, illicit arms smuggling, and WPS. With thematic items, the Council can impose obligations on all UN member states and compel behavioral changes beyond specific actors to a crisis...
Close to half or (in some cases) over half of the resolutions in the period studied in this report encompassed peace operation/political mission items. Country-specific/regional items represented the second most discussed type of resolutions, followed by thematic items. In the last six months of 2016, there were close to or over double the number of thematic items addressed relative to all other years.

So, did the Swedish integration effort then have an impact on the language in the UNSC’s resolutions? That is, did the WPS integration trajectory develop in the direction Sweden intended? Looking at the overall trends in our dataset for 2016–19, it seems that the Swedish aims and the WPS trajectories align to an extent:

1. The overall percentage of UNSCRs with WPS references varied from 2016 to 2019, but there was a slight increase over time, beginning from the last half of 2017.
2. As regards the different themes, the proportion of WPS references on protection remained the largest throughout the period. It typically represented close to, or over, half of the overall types of WPS references. However, from the first half of 2017, language on participation and gender mainstreaming increased in frequency. While neither participation nor gender mainstreaming references ever approach half the proportion of overall WPS references, it is evident that when Sweden assumed a seat on the UNSC, the frequency of participation and gender mainstreaming references were more balanced relative to the volume of protection references.
3. Finally, the category of resolutions that Sweden primarily focused on, peace operation/political mission items, were the most frequently discussed category of UNSC resolutions. These also had the highest volume of WPS references.

This means that the overall WPS trajectory moved in line with that Sweden sought to promote. That said, when Sweden left the Council, there was some frustration with progress, as is visible in a letter handed over from the Swedish Mission to the UN to the Secretary-General in October 2018. This included suggestions on how to move forward in making the resolution texts even more clear and concrete, i.e. operational, to obtain an effect on the ground (Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations 2018). Our closer analysis of the data supports this argument. There are substantial variations in the scope and depth of WPS references. For example, as regards clarity, our analysis found that the majority of WPS references are more generic: that is, they are not connected to actionable activities. Moreover, WPS language is often associated with weak instructive words, meaning those which signal low degrees of priority. This was underlined by some interviewees who suggested that a route forward is to move toward more robust language: that is, language that can be better implemented and that signals a higher priority of

181. Interview category Swedish diplomats and experts.
the objectives that need to be achieved. In the end, it is not about having WPS references in the resolutions per se. The language is important if it conveys instructions that allow for concretely addressing issues for women on the ground in a specific operational or country context.

To understand what we can learn from the Swedish effort on integration and the WPS developments from 2016 to 2019, we will therefore now look closer at what we mean when we refer to the frequency, clarity, and priority of language, and how an E10 can promote progress toward implementable language.

5.2. How did the frequency of WPS language develop over time?

**Frequency:** Measures the number of WPS references and disaggregates them by WPS theme – participation, protection, or gender mainstreaming.

To what extent did the UNSC resolutions include WPS language in the 2016–19 period? When examining the total number of WPS references in UNSC resolutions, the overall number of WPS references fluctuated, but what is clear from this data is that there has been a slight rise over time from the baseline. Compared to the fall of 2016, the number of WPS references increased shortly after Sweden assumed a seat in the UNSC in January 2017. The fall of 2017 and the fall of 2018 both contained the highest percentage of resolutions with WPS references relative to other time periods in the dataset. However, in both the spring of 2018 and of 2019, the percentage of UNSC resolutions with WPS references (59%) dipped lower than the spring of 2017 (62%), though this is still 14 percentage points higher than in the fall of 2016.

Interestingly, the inclusion of WPS language can even vary within one context. For instance, the Council devoted a considerable amount of time to deliberating matters on Sudan and South Sudan (including Abyei) in discussions on sanction regimes and successive extensions of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), and the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). While 54% of these resolutions contained WPS references, 46% did not. A quarter of the resolutions without WPS references were technical rollovers (or extensions for a short duration with largely unchanged mandate).

182. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
183. Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.
184. A total of 26 resolutions were produced between 2016 and 2019.
185. Technical rollovers have been used by the Council in a variety of settings, including to delay downsizing a mission, to buy more time during difficult negotiations to reach agreement or to make a decision, as well as a method of applying political pressure to parties of peace agreements (in the case of ‘short technical rollovers’). While there is no official definition of what a technical rollover entails, it was referenced for the first time in UNSC working methods note 507 (S/2017/507) in the context of negotiation outcomes. In this example, a short technical rollover was issued as a bridge to enable the consideration of the panel of expert’s assessment report prior to deciding on the extension of MINUSCA for a longer period of time.
content. There was an increased frequency of technical rollovers deployed during contentious or difficult negotiations, where Council members disagreed on approaches to the use of arms embargoes or sanctions, as well as the appropriate way forward in a peace process in the extension of UNMISS. In contrast, technical rollovers were used in the extension of UNAMID and UNISFA to enable more time for consideration of material. The category of resolutions without WPS references was presided over by Council Presidents that ranged from the most critical of WPS to fervent WPS supporters. In fact, whether or not the country presiding in the UNSC was a member in the Group of Friends on 1325 and/or scored high on the WPS index did not appear to influence the degree of WPS reference integration in a peace operation or political mission resolution.

What then was the distribution between the three WPS themes: protection, participation, and gender mainstreaming? Here, we know that Sweden sought to particularly promote language on participation.

Once the WPS reference concepts were studied from this perspective, a slightly different trend emerged. In general, we found that the proportion of protection references in UNSC resolutions was consistently high, representing close to or over half of the overall WPS references. This is in line with our expectations and with the current debate. However, starting from the first half of 2017, language on the other WPS themes of participation and gender mainstreaming steadily increased in frequency. This trend stayed relatively constant into the first half of 2019. While neither the volume of participation nor gender mainstreaming references individually reached half the volume of the WPS references on protection, a discernable increase in their frequency coincided with Sweden’s ascent to the Council could be observed.

In the fall of 2016, WPS references in UNSC resolutions focused mainly on protection issues for women and children or women and girls, from primarily sexual and/or gender-based violence.
Almost three-quarters of the WPS references concerned protection. In 2017, the resolutions which contained WPS references were primarily focused on conflicts in the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Iraq, trafficking in persons, terrorism, and human rights issues. The frequency of protection references across resolutions steadily decreased compared to 2016, and while the volume of participation and gender mainstreaming varied within the year, both categories increased in frequency compared to 2016. UNSC resolution 2349 on the Lake Chad Basin region stood out as an excellent example of how WPS language on participation, protection, and gender mainstreaming can be fully integrated into the Council resolution across all issues therein. During the latter half of 2017, the volume of gender mainstreaming language increased by three per cent, whereas participation and protection language decreased.

In 2018, the most frequently discussed issues within resolutions with WPS references concerned increasing women’s participation in military and police contingents in peace operations, and the participation of women and women’s civil society organizations in peace processes. The references were mainly placed in the resolutions handling the conflicts in the Central African Republic and Sudan. While issues on protection, especially accountability in sexual exploitation and abuse and conflict-related sexual violence, formed a large share of WPS references, by 2018, a clear overall downward trend in protection language can be observed (from 67% in 2016 to 45% in the fall of 2018) relative to participation and gender mainstreaming. In contrast, the proportion of
gender mainstreaming language in resolutions stayed constant, while participation language increased just slightly.

In sum, in observing the trends from 2016 to 2018, it was evident that the references to participation and/or gender mainstreaming increased vis-à-vis language on protection over time. This trend in balancing the proportion of protection, participation and gender mainstreaming held with very minor increases and decreases within each category into the first half of 2019.

Finally, as Sweden’s main emphasis lay on increasing the language in peacekeeping operation and political mission mandates, let us look closer at some examples from this category of resolutions. As these appear for renewal and/or debate regularly and in a given cycle, we can here examine the development of specific mandates chronologically. This allows us to more explicitly observe the nuance of Sweden’s approach to filling in the gaps and balancing WPS references in this domain.

In the successive resolutions to extend the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), and the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), all three types of WPS references appear. These are also all peace operations where the resolutions include formulations on WPS as a cross-cutting theme. The WPS references mainly focused on, but were not limited to, the inclusion of women in peace processes (including in conflict prevention, SSR and DDR), engagement with women’s civil society organizations in peace processes, support for gender-sensitive peace processes, monitoring and analysis and reporting on conflict-related sexual violence and deploying women protection advisers, as well as the inclusion of women in governance structures. In tracing the evolution of WPS language in successive MINUSCA resolutions, it is apparent that while there were WPS references prior to 2016, during 2017 and 2018 there was an increase in references to the full and effective participation of women in peace
processes and political processes, and in their recruitment to national defense forces and security personnel. Typical protection language on the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on SEA was improved upon by identifying specific activities to enhance accountability. Resolutions on the extension of MINUSMA from 2017 to 2019 followed a similar trajectory as MINUSCA resolutions described above. While WPS references were distributed throughout UNSCR 2448 (2018), there was also a specific section on gender which emphasized the need for MINUSCA to fully consider gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue amongst other specific suggestions to improve how the mission systematically addresses WPS. In 2019, however, the resolution extending MINUSCA was a technical rollover, which only instructed the panel of experts to conduct an assessment against key benchmarks; no WPS references were present in this resolution. Apart from indicating the temporal duration of the extension, this type of resolution is stylistically brief in that they never repeat the detailed provisions of a mandate, but on occasion would add new tasks.

In contrast, missions with WPS in their mandate but not as a cross-cutting issue, such as the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), had fewer gender-oriented provisions compared to missions with WPS as a cross-cutting issue. While resolutions extending UNAMA featured all three types of WPS references, they only concerned the support for women’s participation in peace processes (i.e., women’s equal and effective participation in SSR), ensuring the protection of women’s rights, supporting women’s civil society organizations in peace processes, and reporting on the integration of women into political, economic and social life in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, all three types of WPS references appear in the extension for the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) between 2016 and 2019, even though WPS is not in the mandate. The references were predominately located in the preamble section of resolutions and discussed improving the situation of women and girls, concerns about heavy civilian casualties to women and children, and the participation of women in political processes (especially in elections). The Council introduced an explicit reference for gender mainstreaming to be a cross-cutting issue in the mission in the operative section of the resolution in 2018. This same directive was unusually echoed in the 2019 technical rollover in the operative section, along with the inclusion of women in political processes at all levels, something not typically observed in this type of resolution.

The successive resolutions on the extension of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) that deals with the disengagement of Israel and Syrian forces in the Golan typically saw a limited increase in the types of WPS reference. From 2016 to 2017, there was only one reference to the UN’s zero-tolerance policy on SEA. However, in 2018, the Council introduced language on the increase of women in military and police contingents in UNDOF, as well as the increase in the number of women in the mission overall. By 2019, the Council introduced further specific language on the UN zero-tolerance policy on SEA, including periodic reporting on the mission’s progress, taking preventative action by vetting all personnel, in-mission awareness training, and timely investigations of all allegations.
5.3. Has the clarity of WPS language improved over time?

**Clarity:** Measures WPS language in terms of whether it is clearly related to specific tasks and objectives in the operative sections of the resolutions determining expected actions. Degree of specificity can be compared to language which is formulated in general or generic terms, or that which only exists in the preamble of a resolution. While the text in the preamble can be important for providing direction, it is more unlikely to result in actions per se.

In order for WPS language to result in implementation, it does not only have to be present in a resolution, it also has to be clear and specific enough to be used for taking action. That is, is the WPS language specific enough for an operation/mission leadership or a state to know what is to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Season</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No WPS references</th>
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<th>One or more WPS references in both preambular section and/or operative sections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2016 (Fall)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country-specific/Regional items</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 (Spring)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country-specific/Regional items</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 (Fall)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country-specific/Regional items</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 (Spring)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country-specific/Regional items</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 (Fall)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Country-specific/Regional items</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 (Spring)</td>
<td>Thematic items</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peace operation/political mission items</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: UNSC resolutions by type and WPS references
be achieved? In this respect, it also matters if WPS references appear primarily in the preamble – which sets the frame and general direction but not the tasks – or if it is included in the operative sections of a resolution. What then happened in the UNSC during 2016–19, and were there differences between the WPS themes?

Overall, our data show that there was a higher percentage of general references on WPS across all UNSC resolutions. This was true for all three WPS themes: protection, participation, and gender mainstreaming. Moreover, given that there were more peace operation/political mission resolutions than country-specific/regional items or thematic items, most general WPS references

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186. In contrast the preamble section often highlights the significance of an issue, the past international action on the issue, recognizes efforts of regional or nongovernmental organizations dealing with the issue, and cites previous UN resolutions or treaties on the topic.
were in this category of resolutions. That the largest number of WPS references are included in peace operation and political mission mandates makes sense as WPS resolutions provide an overall framework for addressing gender in these contexts, including the development of guidance for operations and training. However, while it is positive that WPS language is frequent in these resolutions, the likelihood of implementation is affected by the fact WPS references typically did not contain action-oriented or specific activities. Let us look closer at the WPS references by type to gain further insight into the frequency and clarity of protection, participation, and gender mainstreaming references.

5.3.1. Trends in general and specific references to participation

The 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 suggested the need for an increased focus on participation, something which also preoccupied Sweden during its term. As discussed in the section above, our data here demonstrated a positive development between 2016 and 2019, where the overall volume of WPS references on participation consistently increased. While this is an important first step, however, Council members appeared to be paying more attention to integrating language on participation than to establishing language that is clear on how participation could be improved in a specific country context. Many country- or region-specific resolutions integrated the formulation, “women’s full, equal and meaningful participation”, which simply pointed out the need for or importance of women’s participation in a peace process and for the inclusion of women’s civil society organizations. Fewer resolutions further specified different types of participation in leadership roles with influence at all stages of a peace process. There were few concrete details on the different roles women could play in political participation, the barriers they faced, or even the types of influence they could have within the processes they participated in.
Beginning in the fall of 2018, however, we can see a modest increase of four percent in language on specific types of participation, as compared with the baseline in the fall of 2016. Interestingly, many of these references reflect an interest among certain Council members to reference women’s participation in the context of political processes rather than explicitly within peace processes. Equally interesting is the fact that many references on WPS participation address situations after a peace agreement has been forged rather than prior to, or during, the negotiation process. Considering that these are phases where the impact of ensuring women’s participation could have been greater, this should be particularly noted. Notably, one positive development concerning the evolution of language on participation has been the inclusion of references to women’s participation in elections, including as candidates or voters, as in Resolution 2409 (2018) on the DRC. This has been an area that lacked attention in WPS language in earlier resolutions. Overall, however, there is a considerable gap between generic references to participation, which were far more abundant in UNSC resolutions, than references to specific forms of participation.

In practice, this means that while “meaningful participation” was established as key during the 2015 period, there has been a limited impetus to unpack and articulate what that actually encompasses. One common example is the formulation of the general reference to participation in Resolution 2352 (2017) on Sudan and South Sudan. Although the language is located in the operative section of the resolution, it is formulated in quite generic terms:

“... women’s participation at all levels of inter-community dialogue is critical to ensure a credible and legitimate process and calls upon all parties to promote full and equal participation of women”.

In contrast, Resolution 2349 (2017) on the Lake Chad Basin Region provides an instance where the language on participation is more specific in terms of being related to concrete activities and also grounded in supporting context-specific processes:

“Urges Governments in the Region to ensure women’s full and equal participation in national institutions and mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflicts, including in the development of strategies to counter Boko Haram and ISIL, welcomes initial efforts in the Region to address women’s representation such as the 25% quota for elected offices in Niger, and strongly encourages the further development, implementation and funding of National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria; and encourages all regional organizations engaged in peace and security efforts in the Region to ensure that gender analysis and women’s participation are integrated into their assessments, planning, and operations.”

Finally, as was visible in Box 3 on WPS sub-themes, participation consists of a large number of different forms of issues and challenges for improving women’s influence, each one requiring different
specific forms of activities to come to terms with the problems it seeks to address. For example, one such important distinction can be made between seeking to improve women’s participation in peace processes and increasing women’s participation in peace operations. While these on the surface might appear to be similar, they concern two very different forms of participation. Conflating them can be to the detriment of the progress of both. It might therefore be wise to work toward specific language that signals different forms of activities. Notably, there has been an increased use of language related to “meaningful participation” for peace operations, a term originally used in conjunction with peace processes, something which was considered as potentially confusing two different forms of participation.187

5.3.2. Trends in general and specific references to protection

A consistent critique directed at WPS has been the primary focus on protection. As we described, the overall level of protection references in resolutions also started to decline in the spring of 2017. Unfortunately, this meant a sharp decrease in the use of clear language in the references to protection. In the fall of 2016, there was a large volume of specific protection references (at 35%), even exceeding the number of general protection references. Thereafter, the percentage of specific references to protection in resolutions (especially in the operative section) consistently fell steeply, bottoming out in the fall of 2017 at seven percent. In practice, that means that the language shifted from being more explicit on actions that governments, peacekeepers and the UN system needed to take to prevent and deter sexual and gender-based violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, and on women’s rights, to becoming more vague or being removed all together. By the spring of 2018, however, the level of specific protection references started to rise again. In this way, the balance between specific and generic references improved, but remained substantially lower than the baseline of fall 2016.

![Figure 10: Specific vs. general references to participation](image)

Figure 10: Specific vs. general references to participation

187. Interview category External experts.
General references to protection often acknowledged that women and children are victims, impacted by humanitarian crises and armed conflict. Specific terms related more to concrete events, for example of sexual violence, or of actors responsible and how this behavior should be halted. For example, Resolution 2301(2016) on the situation in the Central African Republic is a good illustration of specific language on protection, indicating concrete, actionable steps the government should take to address sexual and gender-based violence. To underline the need for action, the text is incorporated into the operative section of the resolution:

“Calls upon all parties to armed conflict in the CAR, including ex-Seleka and anti-Balaka elements, to end sexual and gender-based violence, and further calls upon CAR Authorities to investigate swiftly alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable, and to develop a structured and comprehensive framework to address sexual violence in conflict, in line with its resolutions 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013), to ensure that those responsible for such crimes are excluded from the security sector and prosecuted, and to facilitate immediate access for victims of sexual violence to available services.”

A challenge in moving forward on becoming more specific on protection language lies in the fact that women in the resolutions are often considered a homogenous group. In fact, in our data, there were no resolutions that differentiated between particular groups of women or girls in conflict-affected situations. To make matters worse, the references tended to group “women and children” or “women and youth” together, such as in Resolution 2401 (2018) on the situation in the Middle East (Syria), which calls upon all parties to make progress in confidence-building measures, including early release of arbitrary detained persons, particularly women and children.188

As research and data show that women can potentially face other forms of threats in comparison to men, a nuanced understanding of protection is important. Further, it is also important to understand the connections between the themes of protection and participation, as demonstrated in the discussion on the security of women human rights defenders (Kishi and Olsson 2019).

5.3.3. Trends in general and specific references to gender mainstreaming

Looking at references to gender mainstreaming in resolutions, our data show that, similar to participation references, there was an increase in the amount of gender mainstreaming references from the spring of 2017, albeit these were of an overall lower volume than participation. The vast majority of general gender mainstreaming references called for the incorporation of a gender perspective to inform implementation of mission mandates; for gender mainstreaming in peacebuilding; for gender considerations to be reflected in DDR or SSR programs; or for the integration of gender mainstreaming as a cross-cutting issue in mission mandates.

188. Indeed, the resolutions on the crisis in Syria were particularly absent of any type of substantive language on how the conflict-affected environment affects women and girls.
Specific references to gender mainstreaming, while on the whole low, drew a distinction between the needs of boys and girls, solicited gender-sensitive socio-economic impact assessments, or pointed to gender-sensitive programming on sexual violence of women and children, as well as men and boys. To highlight a specific reference to gender mainstreaming on a topic that traditionally does not have many WPS references apart from protection, this passage from (UNSCR 2349 (2017), para. 8 on the Lake Chad Basin serves as a noteworthy example:

“…gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalization for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on women’s human rights and women’s organizations, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses.”

At the same time, there was a significant gap between the volume of generic language on gender mainstreaming vis-à-vis specific references. Indeed, while general gender mainstreaming references appeared to mirror the volume and trajectory of general participation references, the trend in specific gender mainstreaming references was more varied. In fact, there appeared to be an inverse relationship, with a higher level of general references and a lower level of specific references from the fall of 2017 through the spring of 2019. Approximately 10 peace operations were mandated to mainstream gender as a cross-cutting issue and the vast majority of gender mainstreaming references were derived from those resolutions. Notably, one gap filled was the United Nations...
Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) resolution, which requested the mission to ensure gender mainstreaming across its mandate, including in security sector reform.\textsuperscript{193} This is a positive development considering that very few resolutions on Libya contained WPS references, much less so to gender mainstreaming and security sector reform (as opposed to calls for an institutional response to sexual and gender-based violence in the country). That said, it was also suggested that gender mainstreaming overall was guided by UNSCR 2242. In this, it was considered important that the mandate for an operation contained specific WPS language on participation or protection as this could provide the rationale of why gender mainstreaming was needed. Otherwise, there was a risk that, for example, gender advisor functions were cut in the budget process as there was no need that could be directly connected to the gender mainstreaming effort.\textsuperscript{194}

5.4. Setting the priority: The distribution of instructive words

In order to get results in implementation, the WPS language has to be signaled to be of importance also relative to other formulations. The reason for this is that many operation/mission mandates and country-specific resolutions contain a very large number of points, while in reality the resources that exist to address them are too limited for their complete realization. This can result in a need to prioritize between tasks and to adapt the level of ambition. The third and final criterion in our assessment of WPS language is thus its priority. We will therefore discuss whether or not the WPS language in the operative section of a resolution is connected to terms that signal that the UNSC considers this to be a priority. We do this by looking at the italicized operative verb used in resolutions (see Security Council Report 2019 for a discussion). It is central to observe that there is no universal agreement upon specific operative verbs, something which is true even for those used to signal that a UNSCR is legally binding. The Security Council has been inconsistent in its practice over the past 60 years.\textsuperscript{195} The lack of explicit best practices has meant that Council members have often embraced constructive ambiguity in a resolution to reach an agreement.\textsuperscript{196} What we are interested in here, however, is not whether or not something

\textsuperscript{193} UNSCR 2376 (2017)

\textsuperscript{194} Interview category UN Secretariat and other UN bodies.

\textsuperscript{195} In more recent years, international law experts have looked for three specific elements to determine whether a resolution is legally binding: (1) the determination or finding that there is a “threat to international peace and security”; (2) A statement in the last preambular paragraph that the Council is “Acting under Chapter VII” of the Charter; and (3) the use of the verb “decides” in any operative paragraph intended to be binding. At the same time, not all resolutions which have been legally binding contained these three elements (see: Appiagyei-Atua 2011, 2–6; Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs — Article 25, Supp. I 1954 – 1955; Higgins 1976; Joyner2016; and Bellinger 2013).

\textsuperscript{196} See Byers 2020 and Scotto di Carlo 2013.
is binding, but rather whether there is a distinction between the importance the UNSC has given to different sections in a resolution. While scholarship is still underdeveloped on this topic, as a first cut, we draw on and adapt an earlier classification (Gruenberg 2009) to paint a rough picture of the distribution of words that WPS was associated with in the 2016–19 period. While this approach needs to be developed, we think this assessment is important, as WPS priority has become increasingly contentious in the UNSC. For example, in March 2019, the UNMISS mandate was up for renewal under the US as a penholder. In this case, Russia abstained with the motivation that the refusal by some to recognize the “viability of the Khartoum Agreement “sent the wrong message” to the parties. ... and express concern that the mandate of UNMISS, outlined in today’s resolution, is overburdened with language on gender and human rights issues, the latter even taking priority over implementation of the Revitalized Agreement” (UN 2019).

As can be seen in Table 5, we therefore constructed a hierarchical classification of instructive UNSC verbs associated with WPS references located in the operative section of UNSC resolutions to be used as a means of further discussion. This table scores verbs on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 represents the weakest and 7 the strongest intensity. This means that some instructive wording can be gentle, such as the term calls upon (score of 1), which requests a target to comply with a request. This term contrasts with the word urges (score of 4), which is often used to induce a target into compliance with a resolution without excessive pressure. The two strongest instructive words that are followed by an action are the words decides (score of 6), which conveys the act of carefully deliberating the different possibilities available and choosing one of them or making an official or legal judgment; and demands (score of 7), which conveys the required urgency to comply with the resolution or potentially face sanction. Taken together, the selection of words by the UNSC can be said to capture the level of priority for implementation.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Instructive Words</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Calls upon</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Recommends</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Requests</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Urges</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Warns</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Decides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Demands</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 5: 7-point intensity score

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>2016 (Fall)</th>
<th>2017 (Spring)</th>
<th>2017 (Fall)</th>
<th>2018 (Spring)</th>
<th>2018 (Fall)</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Frequency of instructive words associated with WPS references
“Calls on the Government of the DRC and its national partners, including the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), to ensure a transparent and credible electoral process, in fulfillment of their primary responsibility to create propitious conditions for the forthcoming elections, as per the 31 December 2016 agreement, including full participation of women at all stages;”

General participation reference

“Urges the Government as well as all relevant parties to ensure an environment conducive to a free, fair, credible, inclusive, transparent, peaceful and timely electoral process, in accordance with the Congolese Constitution, which includes free and constructive political debate, freedom of opinion and expression, including for the press, freedom of assembly, equitable access to media including State media, the security of all political actors, freedom of movement for all candidates, as well as for election observers and witnesses, journalists, human rights defenders and actors from civil society including women;”

General participation reference

General gender mainstreaming reference

“Requests MONUSCO to take fully into account gender considerations as a crosscutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Government of the DRC in ensuring the participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels, including in the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of elections, protection of civilians and support to stabilisation efforts through, inter alia, the provision of gender advisers;”

Specific participation reference

We then proceeded to score general and specific WPS references located in the operative sections of UNSC resolutions along the 7-point scale. As Table 6 shows, most instructive words associated with WPS references had weak scores (<3). The exception to this is that several resolutions grouped WPS references with the strong instructive word, “decides.” At the same time, however, most WPS references in the operative section of such resolutions were general references without specific actionable activities, which significantly diminished the likelihood that WPS references would be implemented concretely.
For example, UNSCR 2348 (2017) on the extension of MONUSCO’s mandate contained three distinct WPS references on participation and gender mainstreaming that linked weak instructive words to the references:

Although OP paragraph 37 contained a specific participation reference, the efficacy of the language is somewhat diminished by the relatively weak instructive word attached to this reference. This assessment revealed the following potential areas for further development:

1. Consider the systematic integration of WPS references that are clear, specific, and concrete;
2. Consciously advocate for WPS references to be linked to stronger instructive words;
3. Avoid the development of WPS language in the same paragraph that is specific for one type of WPS theme, but general in another, which, in a worst-case scenario, can be interpreted as an after-thought; and
4. Craft nuanced and specific language to enable effective operation of a Council directive; even though nesting of WPS themes occurs in resolution language, especially given the inter-linkages among certain concepts and contexts, these references should be specific and not generic.
6. Conclusions and Recommendations

This report sought to contribute to research on the role of states elected by the General Assembly to serve on the UN Security Council for a two-year E10 term. This is important as there has been an increase in the interest among states to hold an elected UNSC seat, but there still exists limited knowledge of E10 strategies and effects on UNSC outcomes. Analyzing the experiences of Sweden 2017–18, this report sought to strengthen our knowledge in two respects: First, it provided insights into preparations for, and handling the situation in, the UNSC for elected members. This meant that we began by discussing the assessments and decisions involved in the forming of an individual E10 state’s aims and strategies, and then outlined four conditions that an E10 has to tactically maneuver when it is in the UNSC. Second, we structured and advanced our knowledge of what kind of potential effects a state can seek to achieve when on the UNSC. The report then went more in-depth into one of the core aims of Sweden: that is, the improved integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions. This gave us the opportunity to develop and present three criteria — frequency, clarity, and priority — for assessing progress on integration in terms of improvements in implementable WPS language.

Our analytical framework allows us to identify conclusions and recommendations relevant for other elected states in four areas: 1) how to assess opportunities and strengths, 2) how to make decisions involved in forming a strategy, 3) how to tactically maneuver conditions within the UNSC, and 4) how to appraise impact. The last area includes the presentation of three criteria that can be used to improve the implementability of resolution language to contribute to an actual effect on the ground in conflict and post-conflict areas. Our approaches and conclusions are relevant also for continuing to develop future research on how to systematically study E10 roles and effects.

6.1. How to assess opportunities and strengths

We started from the understanding that assessments are important for identifying concrete gaps and needs in the policy area that an E10 seeks to address during its term. For Sweden, this included building on existing processes established during the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 on demands for implementation and improved participation.

- A newly elected E10 state should try to obtain an in-depth understanding of ongoing UNSC processes on the WPS before entry.

- The assessment needs to identify concrete gaps in existing policy that can realistically be successfully addressed during a two-year term.

Such an assessment further needs to include considerations regarding the dynamics in the UNSC. This concerns how the varying composition of E10s, as well as existing contentions and priorities among the P5, could affect actual opportunities to address the identified gaps. Our
analysis demonstrated variations, indicating potential differences in priority and capacity among fellow E10s as well as rising tension on WPS between the P5s during Sweden’s term. To handle such dynamics given the high workload in the UNSC, it can be central to establish forms of E10 cooperation already in the preparatory phase for a UNSC term.

- Establishing cooperation and division of labor among E10 states that prioritize WPS can be a collective use of resources.

Finally, the section on assessments highlighted the need for an E10 to consider its own profile on WPS in order to capitalize on its capacity and credibility and to handle its own potential weaknesses. For example, if a state has had experience of addressing the legal dimensions of impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, or of promoting women’s inclusion in pre-negotiations, that country’s stand on those WPS sub-themes were considered to be more credible. Here, Sweden had a history of working nationally and internationally for gender equality, and the feminist foreign policy had amplified the credibility and capacity for its WPS aims in the UNSC. That said, this focus has also resulted in some critical voices as to Sweden’s form and approach, nationally and internationally. Such considerations then also need to go into the understanding of E10 cooperation and negotiations in the UNSC.

- Consider how the state’s reputation, i.e. its history and experiences, on gender equality and on WPS – nationally and internationally – play into the perception of how determined an E10 state will be in its actions and how credible/consistent that position will be.

- In preparing to build bilateral or broader alliances, consider that different E10 states might have different forms of competence, credibility, resources, and political capital in different WPS sub-themes.

**6.2. How to decide on a strategy**

When an E10 has assessed the opportunities, the next step is to form a strategy. An E10 makes fundamental choices in this process on how to prioritize and concretize an aim on what it wants to achieve on WPS. This includes considering both how WPS fits into its overall aim for the UNSC term and what the specific and achievable aim on WPS should be. Sweden’s overall ambition was to contribute to making the UNSC more effective and consistent, into which the perspective of gender equality was to be consistently integrated (along with three other perspectives). Thereby, promoting WPS became integrated into the core objectives of the Swedish term. However, such a fairly abstract aim also needed to be concretized to be achievable and possible to communicate externally and internally. A more specific WPS aim was therefore formulated: to promote WPS becoming “core UNSC business.” In other words, the focus would be on integrating WPS content into the daily work of the Council, with a particular focus on the theme of participation.
Determine the priority of the selected WPS aim by placing this in the framework of the E10’s overall UNSC strategy. This will also allow for identifying viable tools and arenas for promoting WPS in the core work outside of those arenas specifically addressing WPS.

Formulating a concrete objective on WPS allows for identifying suitable tools and for determining the priority of WPS in relation to other objectives.

These recommendations also make it easier to connect the aims to an effective method: that is, to operationalize and realize the aim on WPS. In the case of Sweden, this meant that the broad aim of integration of WPS into core processes included engaging with Council working methods. Of particular interest for this study is the work to analyze and create a baseline on language in existing resolutions, with a focus on operations and mission mandates. The strategy to strengthen such language then included promoting language early in the process of revision or adoption and to move successively toward more actionable language. Dialogues with women’s organizations and stakeholders were to be used to formulate ever more context-relevant suggestions for WPS progress.

The final decision in forming a strategy concerns how the method is backed up by resources. We focused especially on issues related to how to set up the organization for the UNSC term. The study suggests that when deciding on what an E10 concretely wants to achieve on WPS in the UNSC, it can be useful to:

- Modify the aim of WPS to correspond with existing resources, including estimations that additional unexpected crises might appear during the term of the respective E10 state.
- Consider the organizational requirements for reaching the set aims, including capacity and distribution of labor among UN Mission personnel (from the highest leadership to geographical portfolios) and establish how designated WPS expert(s) can best support these efforts.

For Sweden, strategic decisions on organization concerned setting up functions for coordinating expertise on all UNSC matters and striving to include WPS in this regular chain of command. A key to Sweden’s WPS strategy was to emphasize that the responsibility for implementation rested on the leadership and was to be part of the daily execution of everyone on the Swedish team. There was also an emphasis on strengthening the State Capital–UN Mission–embassies connection to create systems for gathering and sharing information and developing concrete policy recommendations. WPS-related information was an integral part of this system.

6.3. How to tactically maneuver in the UNSC

We identified four conditions that previous research and our material suggest are key for an E10 to maneuver: a) UNSC power dynamics, b) UNSC working methods, c) UNSC external
dynamics, and d) the internal dynamics of an individual E10 state. The first two clusters concern the diplomatic and procedural conditions of the UNSC, while the other two situate the E10 in a broader context.

As regards **UNSC power dynamics**, this condition focuses on the role of hierarchies in the UNSC, primarily the veto powers of the P5 and the changing E10 composition. During Sweden’s term, the situation on WPS was starting to worsen, but at this point in time Swedish diplomats reportedly still met limited resistance from P5s or fellow E10s when proposing more robust WPS language. Interviews with various categories of interviewees suggest that counterparts in other Permanent Missions were not hostile, but occasionally ambivalent or uncertain about adding new or revised WPS language. When the Swedish Permanent Mission pressed the issue with concrete suggestions for Council outcomes, such recommendations were often deemed acceptable. Pressure by Permanent Representatives, exemplified by the role of the Ambassadors from Sweden, Uruguay, and Germany, and political capital from the capital were both considered key for progress in the hierarchical environment of the UNSC. The credibility of the Swedish position in New York was also based on the public political backing enforced both by the feminist foreign policy and the fact that Foreign Minister Wallström had served as the UN Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict. As regards the E10, Sweden focused on networking and cooperation with fellow elected states to form a stronger basis for WPS progress. In this dynamic, it is notable that WPS has become increasingly politicized – for better and for worse – and involves divisive standpoints in the P5 group. The elected states to the Council can strengthen their chances for achieving their aims through unity and cooperation. While P5 dynamics may be difficult to address and can pose problems for getting the Council to act – particularly with regard to decisions affecting sensitive conflict situations – E10 states can still influence and advance positive WPS outcomes by sharing information with one another and building trust within the body.

- Close collaboration in the E10 group can enable the exchange of information and can lead to efficient burden-sharing.

- Elected states with lower levels of resources and capacity – such as fewer desk officers and thematic experts, less representation in conflict situations, or limited contacts with civil society – could benefit from regular E10 meetings and joint briefings with experts, academics and civil society.

The cluster on **UNSC working methods** relates to the bureaucratic handicraft of an E10 when operating in the UNSC. While the UNSC performance is guided by the UN Charter and the UNSC Rules of Procedure, the working methods primarily stem from established practice. These include formal methods (such as penholder, presidency, and field visits and missions), informal methods (such as Arria Formula Meetings and the Informal Expert Group on WPS), and the connection between the UNSC and the UN Secretariat (regarding the translation of the decisions
in the Council to UN policy and implementation of resolutions in the field). For Sweden, the fairly exclusive P5 penholder system meant that it had to find other ways to inject suggestions on language into resolution texts – or as part of early negotiations – in an absolute majority of resolution cases. As regards presidencies, Sweden’s July 2018 presidency was the first time that there was a complete male/female balance of briefers to the Council and Sweden also sought to be part of dialogues on upcoming programs to promote speakers. Field visits were utilized by Sweden for promoting the importance and meaning of WPS to UNSC members. As the chosen aim and strategy on WPS integration entailed limited external visibility, field visits additionally allowed Sweden to signal nationally and internationally that it was actively promoting WPS. Concerning informal methods, Sweden appears to have placed more emphasis on the Informal Expert Group on WPS rather than on organizing Arria Formula Meetings, something which could be interpreted as focusing the main resources on an integrative rather than a more campaign-driven approach to WPS. As regards promoting relations and liaising with the UN support structures, Sweden was perceived to try to promote exchange between the political level and bureaucratic levels, and between Secretariat organs and ambassadors. For an E10, this exchange can also be important in the process of suggesting language on WPS for resolutions and statements, as this could allow for checking consistency on WPS language with previous formulations. Other resources were outlined as:

- The Secretary-General’s reports and reports from Missions and Operations provide a setting for debates and meetings, making it important that WPS items are included, notably sex-disaggregated statistics. This can also generate an understanding of the gaps in existing UN approaches in an area.

- DPPA’s Security Council Practices and Charter Research Branch collects information on the development and state of language in UNSC resolutions, including WPS.

- DPO is updated on mandate language and how this is (or is not) implemented in the field by UN Missions and Operations.

- UN Women’s IEG Secretariat is updated on WPS inclusion in UNSC debates and resolutions.

In terms of UNSC external dynamics, this situates the processes in the UNSC in the context of the broader political landscape at the UN and in New York. The Group of Friends on 1325 played an important role for Sweden while on the UNSC as the group serves as a platform for mobilizing member states and maximizing leverage in the UN system for WPS. This is done through information sharing, coordination of positions, hosting of briefings, and delivery of joint statements. Other important actors were think tanks and academic forums, which can assist in organizing meetings and events as an external and more neutral platform for discussing upcoming
issues, setting the scene for addressing key problems, and generating new material to support policy development, something that Sweden utilized. Another group of external actors in this broader political landscape is NGOs. Sweden reportedly found their pressure, their exchanges, and their information very useful for pushing forward. In addition, important collaborations and exchanges take place with actors in countries on the UNSC agenda and with actors in the national context of the E10 itself. Exchanges with these actors are key for an elected state in connecting to broader alliances to create pressure on the UNSC or in providing critical information from country-specific contexts through extended networks around the globe. Nationally, Sweden consulted widely with Swedish civil society and created the Reference Council with the aim to regularly discuss issues linked to the Security Council agenda.

- Context-relevant information on WPS from the geographical areas discussed is essential. This includes information from the state and from civil society.

- NGOs, think tanks, and academics can support and complement the WPS approaches taken by E10 states. They do so by providing knowledge, contacts with advocates and experts, and information and arenas for discussion. For example, the NGO Working Group on WPS provides monthly suggestions and expectations for incoming Presidents.

In this setting, it is important to make note of the fact that, over the last decade, the number of actors focusing on WPS has increased substantially in the New York setting and globally: in the UN system, among states, think tanks, and academics. This means that there are more opportunities for exchange and collaboration, but also that it is increasingly difficult to get an overview over debates where sub-themes of WPS constitute integral dimensions.

Finally, concerning the internal dynamics of an individual E10 state, this puts the limelight on a state’s internal conditions. This cluster takes as its starting point that the workload of the UNSC is very high and its processes fast-moving. New situations can appear suddenly. For example, during Sweden’s first month and its first UNSC presidency, the crisis in the Gambia, a country previously not on the UNSC’s agenda, escalated. The degree to which an E10 has access to resources and capacity will thereby affect its performance and what types of aims it can afford to establish on WPS. For Sweden, synchronization occurred on a daily, and sometimes hourly, basis between the UN Mission in New York and the MFA in Stockholm. The coordination unit that Sweden set up at the Ministry in Stockholm was critical, for example, for ensuring language proposals and information about the quickly-evolving Council agenda flowed across this system as well as between the ministry’s geographical units, such as the Africa Unit or the Middle East and North Africa Unit, and with the functional units on UNSC-relevant matters. In addition, E10 states can utilize support staff, such as WPS experts or focal points, as well as training, to raise the capacity on WPS and effect the E10’s ability to meet its aims. Elected member states may improve their efficacy in a number of respects:
Regardless of how an E10 state wants to organize its work, coordination appears to be key for taking advantage of new opportunities and navigating the unpredictability of the Council term. How the member state’s capital and its UN Mission coordinate on WPS, and the degree to which high-ranking political leadership pushes WPS, is central to the E10 credibility in the UNSC.

How E10 states engage their own embassies and wider foreign service staff across the world to obtain information about realities on the ground in conflict situations on the UNSC agenda can be critical, not least for formulating relevant WPS standpoints and statements.

Dedicated personnel with the right capacity and competence can be pivotal for pursuing E10 priorities on WPS. In addition, it is possible to build capacity by providing additional training on WPS. A number of actors offer training for the incoming E10 states, both with WPS integrated and with a specific focus on the theme.

An E10 should make strategic use of WPS experts and/or Focal Points in the processes to obtain its objectives on WPS.

For Sweden, the aim was to have gender equality as a cross-cutting theme in all work. This entailed that all leaders, councilors, advisors and desk officers responsible for liaising across the UN organization or for implementing Swedish foreign policy were supposed to be able to take responsibility to promote WPS within their own portfolio. To strengthen that capacity, Sweden conducted training by inhouse experts before entering the Council. In this effort, the WPS experts and focal point were central for providing strategic support.

6.4. How to appraise impact

To be able to appraise the impact of an E10, we first outlined five different effects an E10 could seek to achieve on WPS during its term in the UNSC: a) raise visibility, b) champion a new thematic resolution, c) reshape the working methods of the UNSC, d) strengthen sanction criteria, and e) promote WPS integration in regular UNSC resolutions and statements. In the case of Sweden, we know that it particularly sought to improve the integration of WPS in order to promote implementation on the ground. As the power in the UNSC is highly asymmetric in favor of the P5s, and an E10’s effectiveness relies on substantial resources and networks, estimating impact should consider that a short-term E10 state is always at a disadvantage. While each UNSC resolution is formed as part of a negotiation including all members of the UNSC, the penholder(s) and the P5s have more say over the content of the text than most E10s. As can be seen in the working papers developed by Sweden prior to entering the UNSC, striving to promote strengthened UNSC resolution language, in practice, meant adding or sharpening key words and suggesting
additional sentences and sometimes whole paragraphs to a resolution text. While this might appear limited, the language in Council resolutions is what is most likely to affect the lives of women and girls on the ground in conflict and post-conflict areas. Hence, implementable language is what connects the work in the UNSC to processes of maintaining peace and security in the field. This is particularly the case for mandates to peace operations and political missions, and to an extent country-specific resolutions.197 Our data showed that, overall, the WPS trajectory in UNSC resolutions and statements moved in line with that Sweden sought to promote. That said, when Sweden left the Council, there was some frustration with progress, as is visible in a letter handed over from the Swedish Mission to the UN to the Secretary-General in October 2018. This letter included suggestions on how to move forward in making the resolution texts even more clear and concrete, i.e. operational, to obtain an effect on the ground.

We therefore utilized Sweden’s work to also develop our understanding of how integration of WPS language in UNSC resolutions can be appraised in terms of criteria for language becoming more implementable. We developed three such criteria for tracking and assessing progress. The first is frequency: that is, the number of WPS references disaggregated by WPS theme. The second is clarity, which measures WPS language in terms of the extent to which it is clearly related to specific tasks and objectives in the operative sections of the resolutions determining expected action. That is: is the WPS language specific enough for an operation/mission leadership or a state to know what is to be achieved? In this respect, it also matters if WPS references appear primarily in the preamble – which sets the frame and general direction but not the tasks – or if it is included in the operative sections of a resolution. The third and final criteria is priority: that is, what forms of instructive words are associated with WPS language? Resolutions often include a very large number of tasks and objectives which a mission or a country are required to prioritize. Do the WPS formulations signal high importance in the resolution? Our data from 2016–19 show that much WPS language remains mainly generic and of lower priority.

The study further suggests issues to consider in the process of improving implementability:

- Including generic references to WPS in the preamble can be important for framing a text and giving direction. However, this needs to be followed up through the use of specific language in the operative sections.

- Avoiding generic language in the operative sections by evaluating the suggested WPS formulations in terms of clarity: Are they a) relevant and actionable so that they can be implemented on the ground and b) in line with supporting the realization of the core mandate, including consistency with a potential general WPS formulation in the preamble? 

197. As regards the third category, thematic resolutions, these can also be important and follow similar need for frequency, clarity, and priority but there, the step to effect on the ground and be considered more substantial.
• Working toward integrated, concrete WPS language that demonstrates priority.

• Following up WPS implementation with mission/operation leaders when attending the UNSC meetings and adapting formulations during resolution revisions if the language is not context-specific enough. Ensuring that formulations are realistic and achievable and engaging in dialogue with selected leaders about how this can be improved.

Our study also indicates a few traps to move away from or avoid in this process:

• Using sweeping or overly standardized WPS statements in the preamble and/or the operational sections. These are very difficult to realize and to follow up. Worst-case scenario, it can even make WPS appear irrelevant.

• Including specific WPS language in the preamble but not in the operative sections.

• Formulating too high a level of detail in the operational statements. Instead, stay within the responsibility of the strategic level and have a dialogue with the UN bureaucratic level, i.e. both leadership and experts.

• Incorporating too many WPS demands and priorities for each operation/mission mandate. Instead, respect that achieving actual change in operations/missions is costly in terms of time and resources.

6.5. The importance for future research

In order to contribute to research in this still underdeveloped area on the role of E10 states in the UNSC in general, and for WPS progress and set-backs in particular, this report has begun the work to create an analytical framework which can be used for further structured studies of E10 strategies, the conditions of the UNSC, and how to understand and measure outcomes. In addition, the report offers a practical example of how a mixed methodological approach can be used when researching E10 roles and strategies. Through this report, we therefore hope to open up new avenues for future research. This can enhance ongoing efforts to develop a theory-based understanding of the role of the E10 states in the UNSC; to identify additional factors for a continued statistical analysis; and to design a study to compare individual E10 strategies. Combined, future studies can thereby contribute to strengthening our understanding of Security Council dynamics, multilateralism, diplomacy, and conflict resolution.
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Sweden as an Elected Member of the UN Security Council

This report seeks to contribute to the growing research agenda on elected states and internal United Nations Security Council (UNSC) dynamics. The report makes two contributions: First, we provide insights into preparations for, and the situation in, the UNSC for elected members. Second, we structure and advance our knowledge of the potential effects a state can seek to obtain in order to better understand and study such efforts.

We then go more in depth into one of the core effects that Sweden sought to achieve: that is, the improved integration of Women, Peace and Security language in UNSC resolutions. We here outline a method for assessing progress on the integration of implementable language. To fulfill this objective, the report builds on a focused analysis of the experiences of Sweden and data on language developments in UNSC resolutions in the 2016–19 period.

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