

**The Illusion of Inclusion: Assessing the Effects  
and Gendered Implications of Power Sharing**

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Examining Political Inclusive Power Sharing,  
Female Inclusion, and Women's Empowerment in  
Post-Conflict Environments

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# Abstract

In parallel with the rise of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000, consociational power sharing has emerged as the model of choice for post-conflict governance within the international peacebuilding community. Although both WPS and power sharing have inclusion at their core, however, the literature on power sharing has thus far exclusively focused on the connection between power sharing and democracy, and power sharing's ability to ensure ethnic minority representation in decision-making processes, with no clear attention given to gender. Similarly, feminist political theory and WPS-related research have not explored the role of power-sharing in-depth. While previous research has not examined the potential effects of political inclusive power sharing, this thesis thereby addresses a central knowledge gap on the potentially illusory connection between political inclusive power sharing in post-conflict settings and the actual effects on women's representation, participation, and empowerment. By reviewing and drawing on both works of literature, this thesis examines the gendered implications of power sharing, and highlights how existing power sharing models are not able to fully accommodate other differences that ethno-national identities, and that such models, therefore, might not promote gender equality through women's empowerment.

This study sits at the intersection of political institutions, power sharing, feminist literature, as well as post-conflict state-building. The analysis builds on two opposing assumptions regarding the implementation of power sharing and how these

institutions affect women's inclusions and empowerment. Consequently, this thesis offers a linear country-year fixed effects research design that analyzes the cause-and-effect relationships between inclusive power sharing, female inclusion, and women's empowerment in all global states between 1975-2010. Despite the lack of sufficient attention given to gender in power sharing frameworks, such institutions remain a tool for promoting women's formal political representation in post-conflict societies. The statistical results demonstrate that the first measurement of female inclusion, namely the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, is positive and statistically significant and thereby affected by inclusive power sharing arrangements. However, the other models find no statistical support that the implementation of inclusive power sharing increases women's empowerment in civil society.

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"If divided societies are to succeed in their attempts to build a just and stable democracy, then that democracy must make room for everyone in society."

| Rebouche and Fearon (2005, 168)

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All mistakes and inaccuracies are my own.

R-scripts are available on [GitHub/natalie-az](https://github.com/natalie-az)

*Oslo, Norway*

*12 June, 2021*

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

With the rise of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000, consociational power sharing has simultaneously emerged as the model of choice in institutional design for post-conflict governance within international peacebuilding as well as academic scholarship. Political power sharing institutions have been instrumental in easing ethnic tensions, and as a result, they have been applied in a variety of conflict resolution processes over the last two decades (McCulloch 2014, 502). Political power sharing was implemented in the wake of the 2007 election in Kenya, and it has also been used to mitigate political conflict between Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change and Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in Zimbabwe. Moreover, power sharing arrangements have also been applied to terminate civil wars in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Lebanon, Nepal, Sierra Leone, as well as the apartheid regime in South Africa (Sisk 2017; McCulloch and McEvoy 2018, 468). Broadly speaking, sharing political power serves three purposes. The first objective of political power sharing is to include all relevant groups and give them access to important political decision-making. The second objective of political power sharing is to divide the policy process and thereby grant groups inclusion and relevant autonomy. Finally, the third objective of political

power sharing is to constrain holders of political power from abusing their authority (Ström et al. 2015, 165). The literature on political power sharing exclusively focuses on the central causal chain between power sharing and democracy and power sharing's ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making processes and create incentives to cooperate (Norris 2008). Despite nearly fifty years of scholarship on political power sharing, there is still no concise and widely agreed concept nor a definition of political power sharing (Ström et al. 2015, 165). In part, this is due to the fact that critical research has emerged in two contexts and distinct settings. Classical theory on political power sharing traditionally examines power sharing practices in relation to one or two broad political phenomena, namely democracy or civil war (Lijphart 1984; Norris 2008).

As a consequence of the UNSCR's Women, Peace and Security agenda, national and international actors are met with new pressures to consider women and gender in their work (Byrne and McCulloch 2018, 9). Nevertheless, even with this symbolic resolution, women's rights are generally the most ignored and under-enforced category of norms in a transitional context. While power-sharing and the WPS agenda are not yet aligned in actual-existing practice nor predominant normative assumptions, the possibility is maintained that both can be reconciled to a greater or lesser degree (Mackay and Murtagh 2019). The question remaining is whether and how the concerns of WPS can be reconciled with the practice of power sharing in post-conflict states. Since there has been no systematic attempt by power-sharing scholars to adopt a gender perspective (McCulloch 2020, 46), there is a need for competently examining this specific focus.

While the literature on power sharing is vast, it is considered gender-blind in its approach to conflict regulation since it ignores women and pays no heed to gender equality. Given that power sharing is a predominant framework to peace and conflict resolution, there is a need for scholars to adequately theorize the gendered implications of power sharing arrangements. Especially in conflict-torn societies

where the need for power sharing may be most pressing, and where formal institutions do not always describe the politics 'on the ground' accurately (Ström et al. 2015, 171). On the one hand, the first argument is that power sharing as a democratic institution is argued to ensure minority representation in decision-making (Norris 2008). In other words, promote inclusion. On the other hand, others argue that power sharing leads to stronger divisions and worsens disagreements within countries (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Political inclusive power sharing at an elite level can hinder popular support for the political system since voters seem to have no influence on government. Guaranteeing representation in government to some groups can make it almost impossible for others to get access to power. While being inclusive of the main groups at the heart of a conflict, power-sharing arrangements are often challenged as excluding other identities and groups, such as women (Aolain 2018).

## 1.1 Research question and the knowledge gap

The following master's thesis conducts a systematic quantitative analysis on the gendered paradox of political power sharing, by shedding light on the uneven outcomes of post conflict institutional design and reform efforts. To theorize this knowledge gap on the relationship between political inclusive power sharing, female inclusion in politics, and women's empowerment in civil society, I turn to different theories incorporating the term inclusion from both the power sharing- and the feminist literature. I begin by examining Lijphart's theory on consociational democracy, followed by Norris' (2008) theoretical implications, and finally, the typology incorporating three types of power-sharing, in which power is "shared" politically in three different forms (Ström et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016). The central claim of consociational theory is that power sharing is the only alternative for divided societies to create stable democracy. Norris (2008) argues that power sharing mitigates and solves disagreements and strengthens democracy. Put differently, power sharing

has the ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making processes and create incentives to cooperate. The emphasis throughout this thesis will be on political inclusive power-sharing institutions, one of the three types of power sharing (Ström et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016). Inclusive power sharing arrangements require that the representatives of designated parties or groups hold offices or participate in decision-making processes. These types of inclusive power-sharing arrangements are mostly part of post-conflict settlements, such as in Burundi, Lebanon, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Gates et al. 2016, 516).

Nevertheless, female inclusion and women's empowerment as an outcome have been ignored in contentious debates regarding inclusive power sharing arrangements in a post-conflict environment. This thesis aims to draw on and combine the literature on power sharing with the feminist literature. Drawing on these theoretical discussions, I will stress an unusual combination of both works of literature, also known as inter-disciplinarity. With ethno-national identity dominating frameworks for conflict resolution, there is little or no room for any other understanding of identity and/or difference (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016, 619). The causal link between gender inequality and conflict is therefore often left unexplored (Ibid., 621). While elite-based power sharing institutions are often implemented in peace negotiations, they merely contribute to inclusion, the promotion of human rights, and justice if they do not tackle the gendered implications. However, both works of literature often speak of political inclusion as a remedy for injustice as well as non-democracy (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 5). Feminist and power sharing scholars are equally concerned with the notion of injustice and unfairness brought about by exclusion. Throughout this thesis, I will shed light on this crucial knowledge gap by weaving together their contrasting understandings of the term "inclusion" using a theoretical framework composed of contributions from both the power sharing and feminist literature. Based on this, I will examine two contrasting hypotheses which will help us fulfill the aim of this thesis which is to examine if inclusive power sharing arrangements in peacebuilding processes result in greater female inclusion

and women's empowerment.

In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA-region) the gendered impacts of conflict affect women and men differently. For instance, the implementation of inclusive elite-based power sharing institutions in Lebanon, was intended to contribute to an inclusive political sphere between the eighteen different religious groups in the country. Lebanon is a prime example of backsliding and the failure of inclusive power sharing arrangements to give peace lasting value to all sides. Religious elites have become rooted in the Lebanese system, leading to a low level of genuine political competition, a divided public administration as well as low female inclusion and women's empowerment. During the peace negotiations in 1989, the agreement had fixed quotas for all public bodies and institutions. For example, the department heads in the telecom's authority were appointed according to religious sects. The Lebanese people's trust is argued to be towards the shared identity with their respective religious political leaders in each sect, not towards the public (The Economist 2013).

Parliamentary seats are allocated to fixed confessional quotas in Lebanon. Such arrangements grant members shares in the exercise of political power, so that each group can contribute to important public decisions (Gates et al. 2016, 519). Inclusive power-sharing institutions such as reserved executive positions are also present in Lebanon (Ibid., 517). Advocates of inclusive power-sharing institutions argue that such inclusive institutions guarantee access to power and policy making, which triggers the mechanism of elite co-optation. In addition, they argue that peace becomes more attractive when elites of all groups in society are represented (Ibid., 519). On the other hand, regular citizens, women, and other minorities are left out of this inclusive mechanism focusing on the elites. Critics of this type of power-sharing arrangement argue that such inclusive arrangement can lead to strengthening the ethnic- and religious divisions in a country, by reinforcing them to guaranteed positions in government (Horowitz 1991, 171-175; Sisk 2017). One can

argue that the exclusive focus on ethnic groups as building blocks of polities is a significant source of omissions (Horowitz 2005, 2).

Since the quality of governance is not only a key casualty of war but also a major driver of conflict and fragility (The World Bank 2011), research is needed to improve our understanding of how power sharing provisions work in these contexts if one opts for long-term inclusivity and stability. I am convinced that my contribution to this knowledge gap through my master's thesis, will strengthen the existing literature. This rests on the logic of confirmation. In other words, when the study agrees with what has been done and propose to extend it to a "missing case" or an "unlikely setting" (Schmitter 2002, 2). The following figure illustrates the causal relationship to be addressed in my master's thesis. The blue arrow represents the statistical adjustments in order to account for reversed causation and endogeneity biases. Since the implementation of inclusive power-sharing do not work instantly and takes more than a year to be effective, the thesis will include time-lagged effects. Finally, the analysis will also control for unknown or unmeasured confounders.




Figure 1.1: Endogeneity between power-sharing and female inclusion

The aim of the thesis is to contribute to the knowledge gap on what factors ensure full and inclusive representation in post-conflict settings, and why there are no gender progressive institutional mechanisms aimed at the inclusion of women and the integration of WPS-agenda norms in inclusive power-sharing frameworks. The problem statement I intend to address is how the increasing use of power-sharing as a tool of peacebuilding and the intensified focus on implementing the WPS agenda sit

together with female inclusion and women's empowerment. By assessing how the gendered implications of inclusive power-sharing arrangements affect women and other minorities, and explore why the models are not able to accommodate other differences than ethno-national identities, nor promote gender equality and inclusion (Byrne and McCulloch 2012). Therefore, the following research question(s) is to be investigated:

*Do inclusive political power-sharing arrangements and frameworks of conflict resolution aimed at establishing democracy as a peacebuilding tool lead to an increase in female inclusion and women's empowerment?*

## **1.2 Relevance and contribution: key findings**

In the remainder of this chapter, I present the contributions this thesis makes to the literature and the policy relevance of the research question. Finally, I outline the structure of the rest of my thesis. The methodological approach is applying statistical analysis to model data from the dataset on inclusive, dispersive and constraints (IDC) power-sharing in the World's states (Ström et al. 2015) to measure my independent variable. The latter was collected by Ström, Gates, Graham and Strand in 2015 and contains data on post-conflict power sharing institutions and their impact on democracy and civil peace. As a first step towards disentangling how these phenomena relate to one another, I have chosen to focus on direct relationships and measure four indicators of female inclusion and women's empowerment as an outcome. The measurements include women's share in parliaments, the presence of autonomous women's movement organizations, and public opinion data and attitudes towards gender equality. These measurements were merged with a country-year unit of analysis together with the Ström et al. (2015) data set. Hopefully by conducting a so-called cross-fertilization study, I will be shedding lights on the UN's women, peace, and security agenda through the literature on power-sharing, peace, and con-

ict as well as the literature on women's political representation, participation, and empowerment. The OLS-model rests on the assumption of a linear relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. To secure robustness, I use different statistical estimation methods, and estimate the OLS-model with and without country-year specific fixed effects. I also include economic, political, and civil conflict related control variables to investigate the effect of high- and low- income countries. Since my data vary over the period between 1975-2010, it is important to add time fixed effects and country specific fixed effects. The research design was carefully designed to study a valid research under controlled conditions that can be replicated by other researchers and scientists. The key statistical findings from the linear country-year fixed effects models with its specifications indicate that only one dimension of female inclusion and women's empowerment is affected by inclusive power sharing. Model 1 in table 5.1, indicates that inclusive power sharing has a relatively strong effect with statistical significance on the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. However, the other models demonstrate that inclusive power sharing has no statistical effect on women in the broader society and thereby no effect on women's empowerment in the long run.

### **1.3 Structure of thesis and delimitations**

The following chapter provides a review of the literature with the purpose of drawing a picture of the existing debates and knowledge on power sharing arrangements and feminist literature. The first part of the literature review will examine the power sharing literature, focusing on scholars such as Arend Lijphart and his work on power-sharing and consociationalism. The second part will then draw on the feminist literature and inclusion in peace- and state-building processes, focusing on how the feminist work on consociationalism sees it as a barrier to successful enactment of the WPS agenda. The combination of the two bodies of literature is unusual, which makes the research question crucial for further inter-disciplinary

research. Finally, the chapter will take into consideration the importance of connecting the two strands of literature, by addressing the knowledge gap on how inclusive power-sharing arrangements affect female inclusion and women's empowerment in post-conflict environments. In chapter three, I elaborate the theoretical framework followed by the key expectations. The theoretical approach is founded on the literature and seeks to strike a balance between the two strands of literature. The study makes an important contribution by demonstrating the effect of inclusive power sharing institutions on female inclusion in the broader literature on post-conflict institutions and women's empowerment. Based on inadequate research on the gendered implications of power sharing, I shall develop two competing hypotheses on these effects. In other words, the hypotheses are conjecture or proposition based on inconclusive grounds on how power sharing affects female inclusion and women's empowerment.

Following the theoretical chapter, I present the data employed in the analysis, outline the key variables, and discuss shortcomings and strengths associated with the two main data sets. I merge the "Inclusive, Dispersive and Constraints" (IDC) data set by Ström et al. (2015) with measures from the Varieties of Democracy data set on female inclusion and women's empowerment in all global countries, between 1975 and 2010. Then, I introduce relevant control variables and briefly discuss how both strands of literature rest on different epistemological understanding of the phenomenon of inclusion. At the end of chapter 4, I present the research design based on estimating various specifications of the linear regression model in order to examine the robustness of the results. The assumptions of the ordinary least squares (OLS) model are provided, as well as the reasons why the linear country-year fixed effects model is the best fit for this study. Finally, the chapter will address the issues of reversed causation, drawing causal conclusions with an emphasis on spurious relationships and endogeneity bias.

In chapter 5, I turn to the analysis of the data. I demonstrate through

the interpretation of the results that inclusive power sharing is associated with an increase in the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. However, the other models reveal no statistically significant link with women's empowerment, indicating that inclusive power sharing may not promote women's empowerment in civil society and broader political representation in the long term. Then, the findings are discussed throughout chapter 6 while considering the broader theoretical framework and hypotheses. Chapter 6 also includes a thorough discussion of the possible implications of the findings, the limitations, and strengths, as well as proposals for further research. The contribution of this thesis is clearly critical since it is bringing in the gendered implications and aspects of the effects of power sharing on gender equality. The argument is significant from both an academic and a policy standpoint because it connects two bodies of literature that do not talk to each other and sheds light on this knowledge gap. The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the key ideas discussed throughout this thesis. The conclusion summarizes my findings concisely, providing avenues for further research, and drawing attention to the far-reaching policy implications.

# Chapter 2

## Literature review

This literature review will draw a picture to assess the evidence of links between female inclusion, women's empowerment, and power sharing in peace- and state-building processes. Female inclusion and women's empowerment are critical to operationalize in the process of implementing gender equality in both formal and informal institutions in post-conflict societies (Aolain 2018, 117). Yet contentious debates regarding inclusive power sharing arrangements in a post-conflict environment, and the dispersed scholarship across academic disciplines, have obscured understanding of how inclusive power sharing arrangements affect women's representation, participation, and empowerment and vice versa. The aim of the following chapter is to sum up the academic conversation around political power sharing and their understanding of the term inclusion and shed light on how the state of the field has developed. Then, build the relationship between the literature on political inclusive power sharing and the feminist literature by assessing the evidence of links between them, and examine what has been written (and not written). Furthermore, the chapter explains how the thesis will improve upon and differ from what has been done by proposing to extend it to the missing case on how such power sharing affects female inclusion and women's empowerment.

The combination of the two bodies of literature is unusual, which makes

the research question crucial for further inter-disciplinary research. No one has yet examined this unlikely setting i.e., the relationship between inclusive power sharing arrangements and female inclusion and women's empowerment, which is why I will shed light on this knowledge gap. The study makes an important contribution by demonstrating the effect of inclusive power-sharing institutions in the broader literature on post-conflict institutions and women's empowerment. However, connecting the topic to an academic discourse is essential. Therefore, I will be weaving together contributions from scholars participating in the discussion and assess the possible explanations for the near-total exclusion of female inclusion in post-conflict environments. Any statistical relationship needs a compelling causal story to underpin it (Bjarnegard and Melander 2013, 561).

## **2.1 Political institutions and visions of democracy**

Prominent theories anticipate both political power sharing and political power concentration as two major categories of democratic systems (Norris 2008). Scholars such as Arend Lijphart (1999) use the terms consensus and majoritarian, while Bingham Powell (2000) uses the terms proportional and majoritarian visions of democracy. Nevertheless, the terms power sharing and power concentrating, capture similar distinctions (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). The two distinctions in the allocation of power are created by political institutions. In power sharing, institutions are rooted in democratic values such as inclusion and broad representation. On the one hand, power sharing institutions aim to generate governments that serve a broad range of interests and representatives (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). On the other hand, power concentrating institutions focus on the rule of the majority while concentrating the power in the hands of few political actors. The latter is designed to generate efficient and accountable majority rule (Lijphart 1984; Powell 2000). The two visions of democracy have been used to explain a wide range of political outcomes, including research on the effect and impact of these

institutions on public opinion. Powell (2000) argues that power-sharing democracies produce more representative governments promoting greater policy coherence between government and citizens. Similarly, other scholars have investigated the implications of power sharing and how it can create greater support for the legislature among the citizens (Norris 1999; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). As demonstrated by the numerous studies on contemporary democracy, which is heavily influenced by Lijphart's typology of consensus versus majoritarian democracy, consensus democracy is associated with "kinder and gentler policies" such as foreign aid, environmental protection, and inclusion in the legislature (Bogaards 2018, 887). Both Powell and Lijphart argue that power-sharing institutions operate norms and ideals of inclusiveness, broad representation, as well as the distribution of power. The core argument of inclusion is that power sharing systems send signals of inclusiveness to their citizens, which generates greater political engagement (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). In contrast, power concentrating systems may generate perceptions of exclusion and discourage participation. Ever since the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, democracy has gained ground dramatically since then (Huntington 1991; Ström et al. 2015, 171). As no research has been conducted to theorize the impacts of power sharing institutions on female inclusion and women's empowerment, the following thesis will investigate the effects of inclusive power sharing institutions.

### **2.1.1 Two strands of literature on power-sharing arrangements**

The literature can be divided into two strands whereas both engage with power sharing as a peacebuilding and conflict-resolution device (Bell 2018, 14). The first one focuses on consociationalism and power sharing as a tool for ethnonational accommodation, which draws explicitly on the work of Lijphart. The second strand involves large-n quantitative studies aiming at coding power-sharing arrangements

across peace- and conflict environments. In other words, the latter attempts to measure power-sharing outcomes. These measurements attempt to understand matters such as when and how power-sharing arrangements contributes to peace (Ibid., 14). Both strands of literature are useful in understanding important insights of power-sharing design and implementation. However, neither of them has comprehensively addressed female inclusion and gender equality issues (Ibid., 14). The quantitative literature on power-sharing has only focused on elite representation as an analytical effect and has therefore been criticized by feminists for marginalizing women. Consequently, the following thesis focuses exclusively on questions of the inclusiveness of power sharing arrangements and their effects on female inclusion and women's empowerment.

Power sharing has been used as a peacebuilding approach in divided societies for the inclusion and representation of ethnic minorities (McCulloch 2020, 44). While the literature on power sharing is vast, it is often gender-blind in its approach to conflict regulation since it ignores women and pays no heed to gender equality. The term power-sharing is mostly associated with consociationalism and pays tribute to the seminal work of Lijphart (1977; 1984) in deeply divided western European nations. Opposed to pluralist theory (see for example Almond 1988), Lijphart argued that divided societies face a dilemma of choosing either consociational democracy or 'no democracy at all' (Lijphart 1977, 238). A consociational democracy is aimed at bringing ethnic political leaders together from different communities, in a grand coalition in government. Lijphart argued that proportionality rules, veto rights and group autonomy provisions among others in a consociational democracy is the best way to secure peace and democracy (Ibid.). However, the question is securing democracy for whom? In the case of consociationalism, the assumption is that citizens see their ethnicity as the most salient political identity. The purpose of a consociational system is to be considered as democratic and inclusive. Nevertheless, this leads to a dilemma with serious consequences to consociationalism's values and its power-sharing settings. The narrow way of thinking of ethnicity

as the only political identity leads to a narrow inclusion of the people. The decision of bringing only some ethnic groups into government automatically excludes others. This phenomenon is called the exclusion amid inclusion (EAI) dilemma (McCulloch 2020, 45). The analysis part will assess this phenomenon, and examine if women are indeed affected by the EAI dilemma.

Inclusion, representation, and participation in inclusive power-sharing settings, implies that consociationalism values and favors certain identity-based groups more than others in deeply divided states. For a theory of democracy premised on broad inclusion, it seems that consociationalism has a narrowly defined conception of what that inclusion entails (McCulloch 2020, 45). Lijphart suggests in his work on consociationalism and consensual decision-making, that such consociational provisions may improve women's representation. However, this is the only time women and gender is mentioned. Other scholars on consociational theory do not mention gender at all, which leads to the assumption that gender is not fundamental in the function of power-sharing provisions. One can argue that consociationalism accommodates different identity groups but may disregard the most salient forms of identity in contemporary politics, namely women's representation.

## **2.2 Feminist literature and consociationalism: a gender intervention?**

Women have long been marginalized by the political processes. They were excluded and thereby enfranchised much later compared to most men (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Even after gaining the right to vote and run for office, women continued to be both politically and socially marginalized. Consequently, women's movements originated in many democracies around the world. The emergence united women around a collective and common call for greater gender equality and representation in civil society and women's empowerment in politics (Gelb 1989; Jensen 1995). In

their article, Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010) argue that political institutions that favor proportional representation over majoritarianism give a message that the long-established male dominated political system is open to a broader representation and thereby the inclusion of women. They argue that signals that symbolize power sharing institutions should encourage political participation in diverse social groups, especially women. Subsequently, they argue that countries with power sharing institutions should have higher levels of women's political engagement.

In a report, Bell (2008) examines how peace agreements and peace negotiations formalize political power sharing arrangements. Through a qualitative methodological approach, she tries to bridge between these two bodies of work, considering the contradictions between the participation of the political elite in the current regime and the wider society, such as women (Bell 2018, 7). In cases such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Macedonia and the Comoros Island, power sharing was used as an arrangement in the peace processes. In all these cases, the political power-sharing arrangements were understood to be indefinite rather than interim. Although several pointed to a need to revise and move on from these arrangements in the future, they all provided for power-sharing as the new political settlement rather than a mechanism for getting to it. Power-sharing was the center-piece of a new state institutionalization that aimed to accommodate national minorities whose domination or marginalization had been central to the conflict (Ibid., 17). Nevertheless, the effect of power sharing institutions on female inclusion is not well-studied. Women's negative experiences dominates feminist criticism of power-sharing institutions. Women often find it difficult to enter political institutions as participants, given the focus on ethno-national balance in the central political institutions. However, there are many divisions among feminist scholars over politics and ideology.

### 2.2.1 Women and peace hypothesis

Much of the feminist work on consociationalism sees it as a barrier to successful enactment of the WPS agenda (McCulloch 2020, 47). However, almost all the studies such as Bell's qualitative analysis, do not focus on the direct effect of power sharing on gender equality. Therefore, there is a need for greater attention to the conflict resolution drivers and the distinct functional types of power-sharing. In other words, what they produce is important if we wish to understand the connections between power-sharing design and possibilities for an inclusive peace (Bell 2015, 29). If indeed the choice facing divided societies is between consociational democracy or no democracy at all (Lijphart 1977, 238) the need to integrate a gender perspective, enhance women's representation and ensure that women can participate is even more urgent. Power sharing theory is currently ripe for such a gender intervention.

Studies have shown that states with a high level of gender equality are more likely to be peaceful and have a peaceful relation with other states (Melander 2005, 695). This easily lends itself to interpretations suggesting that more women in parliament will make different decisions from those made by men. In other words, the share of female decision makers should impact peace directly (Bjarnegard and Melander 2013, 560). However, despite the importance of gender equality in institutionalizing peace, ethno-national identity dominates frameworks for conflict resolution, with little or no room for any other understanding of identity and difference (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016, 619). Elite-based power sharing institutions are often implemented in peace negotiations based on the consociational democracy model. While this is a governmental model that is based on strengthening elite cooperation and political stability, this applies primarily to ethno-nationalistic groups. The model focuses on inclusivity, the promotion of human rights, and justice, however without considering gender as a stand-alone variable. Consequently, the causal link between gender inequality and conflict is often left unexplored (Ibid.).

Women's participation is a predictor of peace. There is evidence that gender equality is a better indicator of peace and a state's peacefulness than other variables such as democracy, religion, or gross domestic product (GDP) (Hudson et al. 2014). The causal direction of gender equality leading to a state's peacefulness is not yet clear. However, statistical analysis demonstrates that where women's empowerment is high in multiple spheres of life, countries are less likely to pursue warfare with neighboring countries and thereby have peaceful relations to other states within the international community (ibid.). In addition, women's empowerment is associated with lower risks of intrastate conflict onset (Melander 2005, 710). Women frequently mobilize groups in societies that are diverse. They do so by working across religious, ethnic, political, and cultural groups. This can be argued to be a horizontal bridge-building. Women also bridge the vertical divide between elites and the grassroots, and thereby broaden societal participation. This in turn may increase the chances that peace will last by promoting buy-in and generating legitimacy (O'Reilly 2015, 7). The relationship between women's participation and peace duration may be partially explained by women's inclusive approach to governance in post-conflict environments (Ibid., 10).

### **2.3 The knowledge gap**

The implications of women's absence from peace mechanisms are emphasized by feminist theorists. When women are excluded from peace negotiations, their issues and concerns are more likely to be de-prioritized and go unaddressed (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 3). This exclusion causes gender hierarchies to continue in the post-conflict context<sup>1</sup>. The feminist literature emphasizes the gendered effects of women's exclusion from peace negotiations and has advocated for women's inclusion and the adoption of a gender perspective in numerous peacebuilding areas (Aolain

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<sup>1</sup>Further readings: Bell and O'Rourke 2010; De Alwis, Mertus, and Sajjad 2013; Peuchguirbal 2012

et al. 2011)

The two bodies of literature perceive a gap between their respective inclusive and equality projects (O'Leary 2005). To illustrate, the power sharing literature assumes that to be considered a genuine or serious candidate for sharing power, groups must have "a strong sense of itself" and must be organized into political parties. Conversely, feminist theorist Anne Phillips suggests that "no one really expects women to secede" (1995, 15). She goes on by suggesting that power sharing, especially consociationalism, lacks the understanding of powerlessness and marginalization that occurs for those groups. Women are often marginalized, and political party formation for women is not the dominant mode of mobilization (Phillips 1995, 16). If this is true, it is clear that feminists and scholars of consociationalism are talking past one another, employing different conceptions of democratic inclusion (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 4).

There are two main differences between feminists- and power sharing theorists. On the one hand, their focus on different identity structures is an issue. The institutional recommendation within political power sharing institutions is to bring competing ethno-national groups into the political fold to stabilize the politics. On the other hand, the focus of feminist scholars is not solely on nations and ethnonationalism, but rather on gender. The level of analysis within the two bodies of literature is also an issue. Power sharing scholars tend to focus on the elite level in political institutions, while international relations feminist scholars often focus on questions of civil society and informal political organizing. These are questions of grassroots activists and transnational feminist peace activism (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 4). Most power-sharing and consociationalism scholars do not speak of civil society and informal political organizing. In the analysis part, I will be measuring different types of female inclusion and women's empowerment to test these expectations.

It is important to note that both the power sharing literature and the

feminist literature share similar concerns. These concerns are unfairness and injustice brought about by exclusion. As a result, both bodies of literature seek political inclusion as a remedy for injustice and non-democracy. However, the difference lies in their analytical frames. The power sharing literature focuses on the elite-ethnic framework, while the feminist literature prioritizes the grassroots-gender frame. Even if both concentrate on political and democratic inclusion, they come from very different conceptions and understandings of the term inclusion.

# Chapter 3

## Theoretical framework

While the previous chapter highlighted the ongoing discourse on political power sharing arrangements and the feminist literature on female inclusion and women's empowerment, the following chapter conceptualizes the theories drawing from the literature review. In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework developed for this study along with the two hypotheses derived from the research question. This part provides the critical purpose of connecting the concepts behind the thesis to the ideas articulated by other scholars in their work. To theorize the relationship between political inclusive power sharing, female inclusion in politics, and women's empowerment in society, I turn to different theories incorporating the term inclusion from both the power sharing- and the feminist literature. I begin by explaining Lijphart's components from the theory of consociational democracy, then expand on Norris's (2008) theoretical implications as well as the typology incorporating three types of power-sharing, in which power is "shared" politically in three different forms (Ström et al. 2015; Gates et al. 2016). To lay out these theories, I specify their main arguments and explain why power sharing has emerged as the model of choice in institutional design for post-conflict governance within international peacebuilding as well as academic scholarship.

The second part of this chapter assesses the critiques from the feminist lit-

erature focusing on how they emphasize the term inclusion. Moreover, I focus on theorizing their main arguments on female inclusion and women's empowerment. The purpose of comparing and critically evaluating these theories on inclusion is to illustrate how both strands of literature rest on different epistemological understanding of the term inclusion. By taking an independent look over the term inclusion in power sharing through a feminist lens, it is possible to further develop what mechanisms works best and what does not. This is critical to assess before moving on to the next chapters, where the data, research design and results are presented.

At the end of this chapter, I summarize the two main hypotheses derived throughout this chapter. These are founded on the theoretical assumptions about how inclusive power sharing arrangements affect female inclusion and women's empowerment. The first hypothesis is based on assumptions from the power sharing literature, implying that inclusive power sharing arrangements should have a positive impact on gender equality in politics, hereby defined as female inclusion and women's empowerment. The second hypothesis relates to feminist literature and its criticism. The term "female inclusion" is covered by the variable measuring women's share in parliaments in all global states between 1975 and 2010. The term "women's empowerment" relates to women's broader political participation, women's civil liberties, and women's civil society participation. Throughout this thesis, the term female inclusion is used interchangeably with women's share in parliaments. Whereas the term women's empowerment refers to women's broader political participation, women's civil liberties, and women's civil society participation. This chapter aims to operationalize the key terms from the research question and show what glasses to put on for the purpose of this research on political inclusive power-sharing arrangements, female inclusion, and women's empowerment.

### **3.1 Linking the research to a larger body of knowledge**

As mentioned, the power sharing literature focuses on elite-ethnic structures, while the feminist literature prioritizes the grassroots-gender structures. Even if both works of literature concentrate on political and democratic inclusion, they come from very different conceptions and understandings of the term inclusion. That is why I will be shedding light on this knowledge gap by weaving together these works of literature and intersections. The purpose is to compare and critically evaluate these theories and illustrate how both strands of literature rest on a different epistemological understanding of the term inclusion. Theories serve three fundamental purposes: as the provision of a conceptual framework for a research study, serving as a vehicle for joining earlier knowledge, and linking the research to a larger body of knowledge (Hair et al. 2001). As a result, the objective is to explore and find an explanation for the research problem based on what is currently known in both the power sharing literature and from a feminist perspective. This part connects the two bodies of literature by bridging the knowledge gap through a theoretical framework. Weaving together these works of literature is crucial in assessing the gendered implications and effects of inclusive power sharing arrangements on female inclusion and women's empowerment. The literature on women's empowerment from a feminist institutional point of view does not speak to the literature on inclusive power sharing arrangements. Both works of literature have their own understanding of the term inclusion, which indicates that in practice there is no common understanding of the effects of inclusive power-sharing institutions on women. While every theory on power sharing completely excludes gender aspects, consociational power-sharing has simultaneously emerged as the model of choice in institutional design for post-conflict governance within international peacebuilding as well as academic scholarship (McCulloch 2014, 501). However, the literature exclusively focuses on the central causal chain between power sharing and democracy and power sharing's

ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making processes and create incentives to cooperate (Norris 2008). How can the term "inclusion" shed light on the knowledge gap related to what frameworks of peace- and conflict-building fulfill its purpose? Throughout this thesis, I will test two contrasting hypotheses to help us fulfill the aim of this thesis which is to examine if inclusive power sharing in peacebuilding processes results in greater female inclusion and women's empowerment. The first hypothesis is presented in the first part of this chapter, based on the broader power sharing literature and their assumptions on how these institutions work. Then, the second contrasting hypothesis is derived in part 2 of this chapter, based on the assumptions from the feminist literature and their critiques towards power-sharing institutions.

### **3.2 Part 1: Political power sharing arrangements**

There is a wide variety in the understandings of power sharing. The conceptualization of power sharing varies from grand coalition, mutual veto, proportionality, and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977) to a parliamentary system, PR-elections, federalism, and a free press (Norris 2008), to rebel inclusion through peace agreements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). As a result, research on power sharing can be divided into two strands of research. On the one hand, there is the democratic approach focusing on power sharing as means to attain democratic stability, especially in divided societies (Jarstad 2009). On the other hand, there is the conflict-building approach that examines power sharing's role in peacebuilding and consolidating post-conflict peace. However, the theorization of the potential outcomes of power sharing is highly contested. Researchers have theorized about four potential outcomes or consequences of power-sharing, namely democracy, non-democracy, peace, or armed conflict. These causal relationships are justified with empirical findings of the causal mechanisms that link power-sharing to the four outcomes (Binningsb 2013, 99).

### **3.2.1 Power sharing at an elite level and guaranteed representation in government**

The central claim of the consociational theory is that power sharing is the only alternative for divided societies to create a stable democracy. According to Arend Lijphart (1977), divisions among segments will be so grave that cooperation is unlikely. Lijphart argues that skillful leaders will see the need for compromise and consensus to avoid society breaking down. Along the lines of Lijphart, Pippa Norris (2008) examines democracy as the most relevant outcome of power sharing. She maintains that power sharing mitigates and solves disagreements and strengthens democracy. In other words, that these power sharing institutions function the way they are supposed to. Norris discusses each of the causal links between four types of power sharing institutions, namely parliamentarism, PR elections, federalism, and a free press, as well as the quality of democracy (2008). Her main argument is that a government's reliance on support from its parliament promotes a dependence that encourages cooperation and broad-based policy change in parliamentary systems. She goes on to argue that the proportional representation election rule (PR) lowers the barriers for small political parties, which strengthens minority representation in decision-making bodies. Norris contends that when groups first gain representation in the legislature, they have strong incentives to negotiate and cooperate (Norris 2008, 107). Consequently, PR elections will increase elite cooperation, but inclusion should also increase democratic attitudes who see their group interests represented. Moreover, she asserts that vertical power sharing, or federalism, promotes social stability and democratic consolidation (Ibid., 157). Relocating decision-making authority from the national to the sub-national level provides citizens with multiple access points. Which should increase public participation in policy-making while also holding politicians accountable and responsive (Ibid., 160). To conclude, the main central causal chain between power sharing and democracy in Norris' (2008) work is power sharing's ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making

processes and create incentives to cooperate (Binningsb 2013, 100).

### 3.2.2 Inclusive power-sharing arrangements

Both Lijphart (1977) and Norris (2008) use broad concepts of power-sharing institutions and other decision-making bodies as characteristics of societies that share power (Binningsb 2013, 96). The discussion has also attempted to extend the power sharing literature relating to conflict more generally. The qualitative assessment offered on power sharing suggests that the obsession with consociationalism versus liberalism dominates one-half of the literature is a largely European obsession. Globally, permanent ethnonational accommodation power-sharing in peace agreements is a limited practice in comparison with transitional governance power-sharing. The focus of the latter theories on power sharing and its institutions is on the effect these provisions have on peace agreements, and power sharing as a mean for ensuring minority representation in decision making. However, none of the consolidated theories on why we should apply power sharing provisions, examine the effects it has on female inclusion and women's political empowerment. Considerably a lot of the literature focuses on elites, and power sharing tends to be defined in terms of institutions that facilitate the sharing of power among elites (Gates et al. 2016, 514). As a democratic theory of governance, consociation should develop institutions such as power sharing, which leads to an increase in women's political participation and inclusion.

Gates et al. (2016) define power sharing in a broader manner, aiming at encompassing institutions by which the government shares power with the broader public. In their article, they define political power sharing as "an arrangement that mandates or facilitates the participation of a broad set of decision-makers in the policy process" (Gates et al. 2016, 515). In accordance with Ström et al. (2015), the authors develop a typology incorporating three types of power-sharing, in which the way power is "shared" politically is divided broadly into three different forms.

In the first type, namely constraining power sharing arrangements, they argue that these institutions limit the power of political office holders, and in so doing serve to protect vulnerable groups, individuals, and civil society more broadly against encroachment and abuse (Gates et al. 2016, 516). The second measure is dispersive power sharing arrangements which distribute authority among groups or regions in a well-defined pattern. For example, federalism. Finally, the last typology is inclusive power sharing arrangements, which require that the representatives of designated parties or groups hold offices or participate in decision-making processes. These types of power-sharing arrangements are mostly part of post-conflict settlements, such as in Burundi, Lebanon, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, similar inclusive institutions have been established and/or evolved through other processes, including liberalization and democratization, such as federalism in Switzerland, judicial review in the United States, and Fiji's system of reserved legislative seats. (Ibid., 516). The emphasis throughout this thesis will be on political inclusive power sharing institutions, illustrated by the following table: <sup>1</sup>

Table 3.1: Inclusive power sharing based on Ström et al. (2015); Gates et al.2016

<b>Inclusive Power Sharing Institutions</b>	
<b>Indicators:</b>	<b>Examples of power sharing polities:</b>
Mandated Grand Coalition or Unity Government	
Mutual Veto	Burundi (1995{2010)
Reserved Seats Legislative Positions	Yugoslavia (1975{1992)
Reserved Executive Positions	Lebanon (1975{2010)
Inclusive Military	

<sup>1</sup>Note that in Table 3.1, the examples of the specific institutions are limited to the time-frame between 1975 and 2010, as they correspond to the IDC dataset (Ström et al. 2015). The categories are furthermore not mutually exclusive.

As illustrated in Table 3.1, inclusive power sharing arrangements mandate that the representatives of designated parties or groups hold particular offices or participate in particular decision-making processes (Gates et al. 2016, 516). This line of reasoning leads to the first closely related hypothesis. The first hypothesis is derived based on the argument made up until now. Power sharing as a democratic institution is argued to ensure minority representation in decision making (Norris 2008). In other words, promote inclusion. Norris (2008) finds that power-sharing institutions are correlated with higher levels of democracy when compared to power-concentrating institutions. Her cases consist of 191 countries, during the 'third wave of democratization' between 1974-2004. Nevertheless, her analysis examines power-sharing institutions in all countries, and do not use a definition of power sharing that assume ethnically diverse countries. Most of her analysis show how power-sharing arrangements is helpful in plural societies. The interesting part of her reasoning is that she refers to the literature on post-conflict power-sharing arrangements to support her claims (Binningsb 2013, 98).

The first outcome of interest is female inclusion, measured by the share of women in national parliaments. Based on the theoretical framework up until now, I expect that the variable measuring inclusive power-sharing arrangements will cause an increase in the inclusion of women in parliaments. In other words, the implementation of political inclusive power sharing institutions should lead to making women more likely to engage in the formal political process. This effect should be particularly high since women has historically been excluded from the political sphere. Thus, if the power sharing literature is right about inclusion, we should expect that:

**Hypothesis 1: Inclusive power sharing arrangements increase women's share in national parliaments.**

I now turn to the second outcome to be tested, derived from the feminist literature and its criticism of power sharing arrangements. In the same manner, as other scholars such as Bjarnegard and Melander (2013, 565), I also include several outcome variables to get a more nuanced answer on how power sharing affects women's empowerment. In their article they focus on the role of representation of women in parliament, however, they include an alternative measurement of gender equality to underline that there are other theoretical understandings of the role of gender for peace (Bjarnegard and Melander 2013). I will use indices on women's political participation, women's civil liberties, women's civil society participation, measuring women's empowerment as outcomes (V-Dem data set). There has been almost no systematic research to back up the claims made by either side, which is why I will be testing these two opposing outcomes.

### **3.3 Part 2: Feminist institutional dimensions on inclusion and women's empowerment**

The following paragraph aims to look at an in-depth critique of power-sharing and consociationalism. In the analysis part, the limitations and critiques of power sharing will be analyzed through the data. The political and academic response to ethnic conflict is salient and complex, especially when it comes to what are the best political, social, and legal means to balance the interests of both minorities and majorities in societies (Kettley 2001, 248). Critics of consociational power sharing, argue that consociation reinforces the elite's dominance within their own communities (Brass 1991). Another objection made by liberals, socialists, and feminists to consociational arrangements, is that they threaten important democratic values, principles, and institutions (O'Leary 2005, 6). They argue that the use of quotas or encouraging proportional representation in affirmative action programs and preferential policies will weaken the merit principle. The merit principle is often the first sacrifice of

power-sharing arrangements in contested countries such as Belgium, Nigeria, and Lebanon (O'Connor 2014, 113).<sup>2</sup> For example, in Lebanon, the merit principle was replaced with simple quota systems. Others argue that "consociational democracy inevitably violates the rights of some groups and the rights of some individuals" (Brass 1991, 334).

### **3.3.1 Why focus on female inclusion and women's empowerment?**

Representation of women in parliament is the most used measurement for political gender equality. However, the measurement of women's parliamentary representation as a measure of female inclusiveness exacerbates the perceived discourse where the share of women is pragmatically used as an oversimplified solution to a complex problem (Bjarnegard and Melander 2013, 560). In other words, there are reasons to question the more simplistic assumption about the percentage of women in parliaments. Due to this, the proportion of women in parliament is questioned in my thesis, which is why I incorporate other indicators from the Varieties of Democracy project (data set) measuring women's representation, participation, and empowerment. Questioning some of the more simplistic assumptions about the role of women in peacemaking and politics contributes to a more nuanced scholarly debate. The fact that there are fewer armed conflicts in countries with more women in parliament easily lends itself to interpretations suggesting that more women in parliament will make different decisions from those made by men. In other words, the share of female decision-makers hence should benefit peace directly. The measurement of women's parliamentary representation as a measure of female inclusiveness exacerbates the perceived discourse where the share of women is pragmatically used as an oversimplified solution to a complex problem (Ibid., 560). Other discussions on

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<sup>2</sup>For further reading on this principle see O'Connor 2014: should emerging power-sharing societies introduce community recruitment quotas to guarantee a substantial representation of the tradition out-group.

the substantive representation of women representatives show how such simplistic formulation is problematic, especially because female legislators are divided when it comes to race, class, age, and party affiliation (Vianello and Hawkesworth 2016, 225).

### **3.3.2 Power sharing and its controversies of inclusion**

The second aspect of Lijphart's conceptualization of power sharing is mutual veto (Lijphart 1977, 36). The latter instrument is used to ensure the political protection of minorities through the possibility of blocking political decisions. In the same manner, Norris (2008) argues that power sharing arrangements "protect" and "help" minorities. As the causal chain linking a factor to an expected outcome is the centerpiece of every theory (Binningsb 2013, 40), I will be looking at how the causal mechanism between power sharing and ensuring minority rights truly affect women. While being inclusive of the main groups at the heart of the conflict, power-sharing arrangements are often challenged as excluding other identities and groups, such as women. In her article, Aolain (2008) applies key insights from the feminist institutional literature to analyze power sharing in post-conflict environments. She stresses three parts in her argument, first that the WPS agenda has not translated into full women's inclusion in post-conflict power sharing institutions. Second, both formal and informal spaces are regulated by gender orders. These orders play a supporting role in managing social roles, practices, and expectations for both men and women. Finally, power-sharing arrangements create complex intersectional challenges for women. She deploys a feminist institutional analysis to explore the complex interactions between gender and power-sharing. The aim is to consider whether and to what extent women have affected both the formal and informal "rules of the game". In other words, how have power-sharing arrangements played out for women, and what does this tell us about the "wider process of bargaining between elites"? (Aolain 2018, 118). Even if women are present in power-sharing

arrangements and around the negotiating table, it does not mean that there is an institutional change for them. Women's presence as a formal matter should not be understood as the delivery of profound institutional change in the priorities and outcomes of political institutions (Ibid., 121). Their presence is necessary but not a sufficient condition for a gender transformation. In the final chapters, I'll go over this line of argumentation again, while testing out the two contrasting hypotheses with the statistical results.

### **3.4 Power sharing and the UNSCR Resolution 1325**

In the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the Bosnian war in 1995, the United Nations (UN) was criticized for its lack of action through the Brahimi report. The latter explicitly drew attention to how the UN failed in protecting civilian women from being sexually abused and raped by perpetrators (Skjelsbæk 2015, 220). Moreover, this led to a turning point in women's inclusion in international peacemaking when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 (ibid.). The ground-breaking resolution on women, peace, and security agenda was regarded as a breakthrough for women's rights in the peace and security field (Tryggestad 2009, 539). However, nearly twenty years after the adoption of the UN resolution 1325, research indicates that women are relatively absent from peace processes (Bell 2015, 5). Women still face exclusion, and the number of women signatories has not increased since the resolution was adopted (Krause et al. 2018, 987). According to data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, only one peace agreement ended civil conflict since 2015, namely the Final Colombian Peace Agreement signed between the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Pettersson et al. 2019, 594). The Colombian peace negotiation in Havana was historic since it included over 100 provisions on gender issues

and had the highest average of women participating, compared to global averages, with nearly one-third of delegates being women (United Nations Security Council 2020). There is an anticipating consent that women's inclusion in peace negotiations contributes to a durable peace after a civil war (Krause et al. 2018, 985).

Power sharing or rules-based power distribution is widely used as a peace-building tool after civil conflict and is also key to the institutionalization of democracy (Norris 2008). Power-sharing institutions have been instrumental to ease ethnic tensions and applied in multiple conflict resolution processes, for example following the December 2007 election in Kenya as well as to mitigate political conflict between Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change and Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, power-sharing arrangements have also been applied to terminate civil wars in Lebanon, Bosnia, Nepal, Burundi, Cambodia, Sierra Leone, and the apartheid regime in South Africa (Sisk 2017). While the literature on power sharing is vast, it is considered gender-blind in its approach to conflict regulation since it ignores women and pays no heed to gender equality. Therefore, scholars have yet to adequately theorize the gendered implications of power-sharing arrangements.

According to a UN representative, power-sharing can be used as 'an entry point for us to secure greater women's representation and participation'. Since the focus is already on the inclusion of different kinds of representation, it should be 'the most natural environment to be securing gender-based quotas' (McCulloch 2019, 51). Other scholars find empirical evidence for this insight and argue that 'references to gender equality are roughly five times more likely to occur in a power-sharing agreement than one that does not contain such provisions' (Bell and McNicholl 2019, 34). In addition, their findings demonstrate that power-sharing arrangements are seven times more likely to include gender quotas (Ibid.). However, this relationship or a link between power-sharing rules and gender protections has not been systematically studied and is therefore worthy of further exploration (McCulloch 2019, 51).

In the analysis chapter, I will evaluate these assumptions, as well as account for the effect of international gender norms and civil conflict and battle-related deaths in my models. This study employs time fixed effects for country and year, to adequately account for both the UNSCR 1325 resolution, and for other impacts associated with a peace agreement being signed a specific year.

### **3.5 Conceptualizing women's empowerment in politics**

Women's political empowerment is increasingly seen as crucial to the survival of modern states (Sundstrom et al. 2015, 3). A wide variety of international organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union and many more, urge all member states to achieve a minimum of 30 percent women in all elected positions (Krook 2006, 309). There is a dual emphasis in policy statements such as the Beijing Platform for Action and the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). First, that women's empowerment is an inherent aim in itself, that may result in other forms of prosperity (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 2002). Women's empowerment is a multifaceted concept and is typically defined with several dimensions, such as "rights, resources, and voice" (World Bank 2001). It has been discussed in several terms, such as economic empowerment and access to resources (Parveen 2008), power within the household (K. O. Mason and Smith 2003), and involvement in politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Other scholars have used women's political participation in politics both at the village and national levels, as an indicator of empowerment (Malhotra, Vanneman, and Kishor 1995). Defining women's empowerment is a significant concern because empowerment is a complex term. When analyzing the term within the literature it reveals that different measures are used for the same conceptualization, however, it lacks consistency. Women's empowerment covers several aspects, including economic, socio-cultural,

legal, and political dimensions (Malhotra, Schuler, and Boender 2002). This makes the conceptualization of the term broad, a difficult one to measure in a reliable way.

In this thesis, I will solely use the term "women's empowerment" defined as "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, and participation in societal decision-making" (Sundström et al. 2015, 4). I will be using the Varieties of Democracy Project and three of their indices measuring Women's political empowerment to explore how inclusive power-sharing arrangements affects participation, choice, agency, and political participation in societal decision-making.

As demonstrated, the critiques of power sharing argue that these institutions lead to stronger divisions and worsens disagreements within countries (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Political inclusive power sharing at an elite level can hinder popular support for the political system since voters seem to not influence government. Guaranteeing representation in government to some groups can make it almost impossible for other parties to get access to power. I will test this assumption using variables on women's political empowerment index (V-Dem) through the following three indices: women's political participation index, women's civil liberties index, women's civil society participation index.

From this perspective, we should therefore see the implementation of inclusive political power sharing as a hindrance or obstacle to women's empowerment in civil society and their inclusion in informal political institutions. The implication from this logic and along the lines of the feminist literature and their nuanced understanding of inclusion I develop the second hypothesis, assuming that power sharing institutions do not have a positive impact on women's empowerment:

**Hypothesis 2: Inclusive power sharing arrangements do not increase women's empowerment in civil society and their inclusion in informal political institutions.**




Figure 3.1: Modelling a bigger picture

Inclusiveness is either understood as

- engaging leaders of confrontational groups, or
- it can be about involving the main political and social groups affected by the conflict, including women and marginalized communities.

Figure 3.1 illustrates the contrasting hypotheses and how they function as a tentative tool to achieve dependable knowledge by directing the analysis towards the solution of a problem. What both quantitative and qualitative research share is the logic of "deriving testable implications from alternative theories, testing these implications against quantitative or case study data, and modifying theories or our confidence in them in accordance with the results" (George and Bennett 2005, 11). The two hypotheses derived are assumptions based on the existing theories and knowledge, and they will guide the rest of the chapters in this study in terms of the research design and methodology, data analysis procedure, and discussions of the research findings.

The notion of identity and nationalism is important to theorize, before moving on. Some feminists argue that nationalism often serves men, leading to the disadvantage of women (Cockburn 1998). In other words, one might argue that nationalism is already gendered, making particular roles for men and women. This has consequences for political inclusion in power sharing institutions. If only the leaders of ethnonational groups are called to the peace table and subsequently create a new power-sharing government, the hierarchical relationship between men and women in national groupings is preserved (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 7). This theoretical- and conceptual framework is meant to give an account of the effects of power sharing on women's empowerment and inclusion such as women's share in parliaments, women's civil liberties, and women's civil society participation. In the discussion chapter, I will use the hypotheses and assumptions built in this chapter to discuss and interpret the related evidence and analytical findings.

Until now, this chapter, together with the literature review, has informed and provided us with the knowledge needed to comprehend the scientific research hypotheses that will be addressed in the remainder of this research study. The main aim of the hypotheses is to develop several amenable indications that could explain a possible influence on the outcome variables. The hypotheses will in the next chapters be either confirmed or disconfirmed through the collection and analysis of the data. The relationship between the independent- and dependent variable(s) functions as a means of contributing to understanding the relationship between inclusive power sharing and female inclusion. If significant, such relationship points to the fact if the independent variable is manipulated, there could be desirable changes on the outcome variable(s), leading to an explanation of the research problem. In other words, these hypotheses imply the fact that the observed difference or relationship is above what could be accounted for by chance or random error. I will return to the meaning of significance in the following chapters. As empowerment entails change (Kabeer 2005, 13), the manipulation of the data and analysis will account for the time-measurement.

Due to the lack of empirical evidence on how inclusive power sharing institutions affects female inclusion and women's empowerment across different political contexts, I gathered data on different forms and measures of women's empowerment. To operationalize my dependent variables and to test the two contrasting hypotheses, I will be using different measurements and indices from the Varieties of Democracy project (V-Dem). The first hypothesis will focus on the elite argument and therefore on the variable measuring women's share in parliaments from 1975-2010. The second hypothesis focuses on women's political empowerment and is measured using three indices from the V-Dem data set. It measures women's political empowerment with significant spatial and temporal scope. The index is based on assessments from thousands of country experts who provided original ratings for dozens of indicators (Sundström et al. 2015).

# Chapter 4

## Data and Research Design

This study sits at the intersection of political institutions, power-sharing, feminist literature, as well as post-conflict state-building. Consequently, the data selection is carefully chosen to reflect this intersectionality. To be able to answer the research question, one must first comprehend the sequence that occurs between the onset and outcome variables. The data is limited in scope to provide viable analysis and to give valid generalizable results. This chapter provides insights by describing the methodological approach followed by the research design in enough detail for another researcher to replicate this study. The first part describes the methods of data collection, the data sources used for this study, its structure, and the unit of analysis. Then, I scrutinize the main data coded as a cross-national time-series data set on governance with a country-year unit of analysis, before discussing the shortcomings and strengths. I proceed by explaining how I operationalize the independent, dependent, and control variables. Finally, I turn to explain the statistical procedures used to gather and operationalize the variables. This chapter aims to establish a cause-and-effect relationship between the variables, then highlight the research design including its intent. A fruitful discussion of the research design and the statistical tools and procedures will be deliberated. To assess the robustness of the results, the research design is based on estimating various specifications of the

linear regression model. Let us recall the research question once again,

*Do inclusive political power-sharing arrangements and frameworks of conflict resolution aimed at establishing democracy as a peacebuilding tool lead to an increase in female inclusion and women's empowerment?*

## 4.1 Data collection and unit of analysis

I now turn to describe the methodological approach taken towards disentangling how inclusive power sharing relates to women's representation, participation, and empowerment. Answering the research question requires different data sets. The data structure is coded using a country-year unit of measurement to support a variety of data structures, such as economic- and political indicators that are used as control variables in the analysis. The observations in the data set extend over a period of 35 years, from 1975 to 2010. As the research is focused on inclusive power sharing arrangements as the independent variable, that provides a first step in narrowing the data set and limiting it to one of the three typologies of power sharing (Ström et al. 2015). The Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint (IDC) data set developed by the authors Ström, Gates, Graham, and Strand (2015) is the primary source of data. The authors develop a new global data set on political power sharing, disaggregated along three institutional dimensions which are: inclusive-, dispersive-, and constraining power sharing. They introduce nineteen different indicators of power sharing and twenty-four related variables across 180 countries covering the period from 1975 until 2010. The data set includes a global sample of all independent countries with populations over 250,000 persons and codes them back to the year 1975<sup>1</sup>. The second step that assists with narrowing down the data source material is to limit the timeframe, which in this case is inherent to the topic being analyzed, namely post-conflict environments. The timeframe of the data set

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<sup>1</sup>See Appendix for all the countries included in the IDC data set

covers the period between 1975 and 2010 with all world states controlling for post-conflict countries. The starting year 1975 is interesting since it was during this time the third wave of democratization emerged (Huntington 1991).

#### 4.1.1 The Varieties of Democracy data set project

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project has developed as a new approach and framework for assessing democracy around the world. The data set is updated and expanded every year, and the institute has developed more than 470 indicators within its data set. The strengths of using the V-Dem data set are reflected in its data collection and data cleaning methods. Every indicator is coded by at least five country experts that contributed to creating the country-year data set (Coppedge et al. 2020; Hegedus 2020). To evaluate the hypotheses about the impact of inclusive power sharing on female inclusion and women's empowerment, I use three separate indices from the V-dem data set measured as the dependent variable(s). The indices are as follows: women's political participation index, women's civil society participation, and women's civil liberties index. These are measured originally in the V-Dem data set with separate questions <sup>2</sup>.

The first index, women's political participation, is understood to include women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. The second index, women's civil liberties, are understood to include freedom of domestic movement, the right to private property, freedom from forced labor, and access to justice. The third index, women's civil society participation is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists (Sundström et al. 2015). The three measurements capture distinct, but related dimensions of women's political representation, participation, and empowerment (Coppedge et al. 2018). This is consistent with other studies and research that similarly employs

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<sup>2</sup>See Appendix for all clarifications and questions included in the indices from the V-dem dataset

several measurements to conceptualize gender equality as an outcome, in a more nuanced way (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; Bjarnegard and Melander 2013). Critics of prior measurements of women's empowerment have emphasized that the measurement of empowerment must include all women, not only elite women (Sundstrom et al. 2015, 10). Moreover, according to Christian Welzel, he argues that when assessing the state of empowerment in the citizenry of a nation, "the critical question is inclusion { What is the typical condition of most people in a society?" (Welzel 2013, 47).

#### **4.1.2 Shortcomings and strengths of IDC data set and V-Dem data set**

I now turn to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of both the IDC data set and the V-Dem data set. By using a global sample of events, the IDC data set makes it easier to assess the determinants which avoid selection problems. Additionally, it enables testing the hypotheses based upon theories about the conditional effectiveness of power sharing with conditioning variables. Another advantage of the IDC data set is that it provides far richer information on political power sharing, compared to anything collected previously. Especially in terms of the depth of the scope of its political institutional coverage, the method in which the institutions are disaggregated, and its temporal and geographical scope. The authors divided power sharing into numerous components and utilized global cases. Furthermore, they demonstrate through the IDC data set, that the three types of political power-sharing do, in fact, express themselves in systemic ways through a variety of regimes (Ström et al. 2015, 166). Avoiding skewed or biased results is one of the primary reasons for using the IDC global sample data set. There are numerous unresolved and unaddressed concerns in the literature on power sharing, some of which will be addressed in this study. The methodological approach will give insight into the main independent variable to be studied, namely inclusive power sharing. Previous

analysis of power sharing has failed in describing, measuring, and analyzing the wide colorful components of power sharing institutions. In other words, others have not captured the full range of institutions through which power is shared (Ström et al. 2015, 170). However, the shortcomings of the Inclusion, Dispersion, and Constraint data set, is that they fail to measure and mention gender aspects in their typology of power-sharing and division into the three forms of power sharing. Their broader definition of political power sharing is not incorporating nor mentioning women. Therefore, I will be adding other aspects to their fruitful theoretical baseline. As a point of departure, I will use their index, inclusive, as a measurement of political inclusive power sharing in which power is allocated through inclusive arrangements.

Doing explanatory analysis with longitudinal data such as Varieties of Democracy data can also pose some challenges. First, the data set includes a large number of variables and indicators on gender equality. In other words, the data set provides a wealth of choices. The indices used to measure the outcomes in this analysis is disaggregated which means that one can choose or construct outcome variables to the research hypotheses to fit more closely (Coppedge et al. 2020, 179). On the one hand, it is advantageous to have disaggregated variables that make it possible to perform robustness checks, to reduce omitted variable bias, and of course to precisely test the hypotheses (Coppedge et al. 2020, 178{79). On the other hand, some of the indices on women's empowerment could be disaggregated further, so that the interpretation of the findings can be more nuanced. I return to this discussion in chapter 6 when interpreting the statistical findings and evaluating the results.

## 4.2 Independent variable: Inclusive power sharing arrangements

Existing literature identifies many distinct manifestations of power sharing (Ström et al. 2015, 169). For example, Pippa Norris (2008, 107) captures a much wider array of power sharing institutions than most other studies. To better understand these institutions, I will be drawing on political inclusive power sharing, one of the three power sharing typologies. In their article, the authors Ström, Gates, Graham, and Strand (2015, 170) generate a factor analysis for each of the three types. They run a separate factor analysis for each latent variable, the weights from which they create the index. The panel data in this study is manipulated to only include the index on inclusive power sharing since the emphasis is on how inclusive power sharing institutions can foster inclusiveness in post-conflict environments. Inclusive power sharing agreements mandate the participation of several parties or groups in particular offices or decision-making processes. The main purpose is to give each person, minority- or ethnic group a share in the exercise of political power (Ström et al. 2015, 169). In other words, to help solve the collective action problems among different groups and political leaders.

The independent variable, Inclusive, covers two of Lijphart's components of consociationalism: grand coalitions and the mutual veto. The variables also include the reservation of seats or executive positions for specific minority groups to ensure their inclusion in central government decision-making (Ström et al. 2015, 171). The authors' empirical measures capture two types of grand coalitions. First, those mandated by constitutions or peace treaties. Second, de facto grand coalitions in non-elected governments, for example when peace treaties install governments of national unity. The first is mandated grand coalition and the latter unity. Since both are mutual substitutes, they are combined in the data set into a single measure. The second measure of inclusive power sharing is a mutual or a minority veto provision

(Mutual veto) and is coded as present whenever there is a constitutional or treaty provision supporting for a minority veto over legislation such as language or cultural policy, in a particular policy area. The third component used to measure inclusive power sharing, is the reserved executive positions that encapsulate whether any executive positions are reserved for members of specific groups. This can be found in Lebanon<sup>3</sup> and their inclusive power sharing institutions, where for example the speaker of the Lebanese parliament must belong to the Shi'a religion (Ström et al. 2015, 172). Then, the variable 'reserved seats' describes the proportion of legislative seats (lower house).

Drawing from Lijphart's conception, I expect to see that countries with higher scores on the inclusive index should have a positive effect, and thereby increase women's share in parliaments and women's empowerment (Hypothesis 1). Since the emergence of the third wave of democracy in the 1970s, democracy has grown rapidly. In the same manner as the authors Ström et al. (2015, 179), I expect temporal trends in power sharing to mirror those of democratization to the extent that power sharing is part of, or has contributed to this democratization process. Figure 4.1 shows these trends of political inclusive power sharing over time, between 1975 and 2010.

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<sup>3</sup>Or as dictated in the Lebanese constitution, the president can only be a Christian Maronite.




Figure 4.1: Trends of Inclusive Power Sharing, 1975-2010

### 4.3 Dependent variables: Female inclusion and women's empowerment

I now turn to the operationalization of the dependent variables encompassing the following: women's share in parliaments, women's political participation index, women's civil society participation index, and women's civil liberties index. The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is collected from the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) for the years 1975-2010 in all global states on the basis of information provided by National Parliaments<sup>4</sup>. The last three indices are referred to as women's political empowerment. Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, resulting in greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open

<sup>4</sup>Data collected from the Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019 ([www.ipu.org](http://www.ipu.org))

discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions (Sundström et al. 2015; Coppedge et al. 2018, 234). The relation between women's political empowerment and positive developmental outcomes is both recognized within the policy arena and academia. However, adequate, and appropriate measures of women's political empowerment are lacking (Dieleman and Andersson 2016). Both women's political empowerment along with women's civil liberties are crucial to democracy and development. Scholars such as Sen and Mukherjee (2015) argue that progress towards gender equality and women's empowerment requires a more human rights-based approach as well as support for women's movements. Empowerment requires agency along multiple dimensions (Sen and Mukherjee 2015, 188). The three indices overcome numerous challenges faced by existing measures in terms of countries and coverage over time.

In accordance with the theoretical chapter, women's empowerment is a multifaceted concept and is typically defined with several dimensions, such as "rights, resources, and voice" (World Bank 2001). It has been discussed in several terms, such as economic empowerment and access to resources (Parveen 2008), power within the household (Mason and Smith 2003), and involvement in politics (Norris and Inglehart 2003). The focus will be on the latter, namely women's empowerment in politics. The recent V-Dem Women's Political Empowerment Index (WPEI) overcomes many of the shortcomings faced by existing measures in terms of time-coverage and across countries (Dieleman and Andersson 2016). In addition, it captures different dimensions of women's political empowerment which makes it more comprehensive. In the context of this study, female empowerment is denoted by women's degree of civil liberties, civil society participation, and political participation, hereby measured with three dimensional indices that assess women's political empowerment. The three different indices also include indicators that are important in non-western countries, such as women's freedom of domestic movement and forced labor.

The three indices listed below are operationalized as three outcome variables and are defined as follows:

1. The women's political participation index indicates the extent to which women are represented in formal political positions. In terms of both legislative representation as well as political power distribution by gender (Sundström et al. 2015, 12-15).
2. The women's civil liberties index measures whether women can make informed choices in important areas of their everyday lives. In other words, it measures the dimension of choice providing indicators of women's property rights, access to justice, domestic movement, and freedom from forced labor (Sundström et al. 2015, 12-15).
3. The women's civil society participation index provides indicators of women's freedom of discussion, participation in civil society organizations, and representation in the ranks of journalists. In addition to capturing women's ability to engage in public debate freely (Sundström et al. 2015, 12-15).

There are some observations within the data set for which information on one or more indicators is missing due to a lack of credible information. Following Gates et al. (2016)<sup>5</sup> I have re-coded missing values through assignment operations in the R programming software. Similarly, some of the missing values in the data set were represented by another value (i.e. 47) which I assigned as missing by subsetting<sup>6</sup> the vector to identify NAs and then assign these elements a value. I test the robustness of the results by using an alternative strategy that codes instances of missing data as zeros. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the variables.

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<sup>5</sup>Gates et al. (2016) impute the missing indicator data using the Amelia 2 Program (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) before running the factor analysis

<sup>6</sup>Subsetting in the software R is a useful indexing feature that can be used to "Iter" and assign variables and observations

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Pctl(25)	Pctl(75)	Max
Inclusive Power Sharing	5,868	0.0	0.9	0.2	0.2	0.2	7.3
Women's Share in Parliaments	5,107	11.7	9.3	0.0	5.0	16.1	56.3
Year	6,452	1,992.5	10.4	1,975	1,984	2,002	2,010
Women's Political Participation Index	5,582	0.6	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.9	1.0
Women's Civil Liberties Index	5,670	0.6	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.9	1.0
Women's Civil Society Participation Index	5,670	0.6	0.2	0.01	0.4	0.8	1.0
GDP per capita Log	5,292	8.7	1.2	4.9	7.7	9.6	12.2
Petroleum production per capita logged	4,728	2.3	2.9	0.0	0.0	4.6	11.3
Intensity level/Battle-related deaths	5,805	0.2	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0
Post 2000 UNSCR 1325	6,452	0.3	0.4	0	0	1	1

## 4.4 Control variables

In this section, I operationalize the control variables. Previous studies have not yet adequately theorized the effects of power sharing on women's empowerment. Therefore, the analysis includes a series of control variables specific to the termination of war, economic control variables as well as provisions for women's political rights. The control variables are held constant to prevent them from influencing the outcome of this study. Even if the control variables are not relevant to the research question, i.e., I am not interested in studying their effects, it is still important to check that they do not interfere with the results. I recognize that political inclusive power sharing occurs within a political environment and context, which is why I include several control variables that have been found to increase the implementation of power sharing. All the control variables included in the analysis are measured on the country-year level. Rather than directly influencing the effect of inclusive power sharing on female inclusion and women's political empowerment, the control variables may rather exert an indirect effect by influencing the relative capacity of governments. (Gates et al. 2016, 520).

### 4.4.1 Economic control variables

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita serves as a proxy for both state capacity, which may influence its ability to include women, and as a proxy for economic development. By including economic control variables, I examine the ways in which power sharing institutions together with GDP affect women independently or interactively. For example, some factors might explain both the implementation of power sharing and the inclusion of women. The data for GDP per capita is collected from the V-Dem project dataset. The variable measures the GDP per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm (Coppedge et al. 2018). The second economic aspect controlled for is the Petroleum production per capita (Oil). The variable measures the

real value of a country's petroleum production (see Haber and Menaldo 2011 in the V-dem codebook). The Oil Logged control variable is included because it is advantageous since it is not directly a measure of the GDP but contains values for oil extracting countries. Although there are no assumptions made in linear regression about the distribution of independent variables, heavily skewed variables, such as this variable, can result in heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed residuals (Christophersen 2013). As a result, the variable is log-transformed.

#### 4.4.2 Civil conflict related control variables

The capacity of war to change social power inequality has been the subject of extensive research (Webster et al. 2019, 257). Scholars such as Charles Tilly (1990) have prominently argued that war has shaped the organization of post-conflict states and that the shape of warfare has been shaped by the organization of states. Therefore, recognizing that the effect of war and its social legacies affect gender power inequalities, is crucial. When focusing on women's empowerment and linking it to intrastate war there are different perceptions of how armed conflict affects women's empowerment. One perception is that women's empowerment declines in societies facing major security issues (Webster et al. 2019, 257). The other perception, which does not automatically exclude the first one { examines how a shift in a society post-conflict, can create space for women's empowerment. In other words that war or civil conflict may function as a catalyst for women's empowerment (Ibid.). The impact of civil wars on women and gender relations is well-studied and can be accessed through many studies <sup>7</sup>. The term conflict or intrastate conflict is used as a synonym for civil war in this thesis. From the literature review, I find that countries with excluded ethnic and religious groups are somewhat more likely to experience internal armed conflict. Since the literature on power-sharing speaks about the implementation of these institutions in a post-conflict environment, I will include a

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<sup>7</sup>See for example the book (Kumar 2001)

control variable on civil conflict in the model. The variable measures the intensity level in the country-year, with two different intensity levels coded in the data set: 1 is for minor armed conflict and 2 is coded as war. If there are several active conflicts in a country-year, the variable codes the conflict with the highest intensity level. The variable is collected from the original UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data set by Gleditsch et al. 2002 but transformed to contain annual observations of all states in the international system. Armed Conflict UCDP defines conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year". I use a redefined version of the data set containing all internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts (Themner and Wallensteen 2014). The following control variable is included in the data set:

1. Intensity level in the country-year. Two different intensity levels are coded in the data set. 1 is coded as minor armed conflict (>25 battle related deaths). 2 is coded as war (>1000 battle related deaths). If there are several active conflicts in a country-year, the variable codes the conflict with the highest intensity level.

#### **4.4.3 Peace agreements and the effect of international gender equality norm**

The existing research on gender equality and provisions in peace agreements is modest. However, some studies can provide directions on relevant variables to include. In this analysis I will be drawing from Bell's article (2015) where she examines what 'a gender perspective' in peace agreements might mean, suggesting that the term has not been fully considered. Some of her findings suggest that peace agreement references to women have increased over time, apparently partly under the influence

of UN Security Council Resolutions on women, peace, and security. In addition, overall, 18 percent of peace agreements reference 'women'. Nevertheless, before the UNSCR 1325, only 11 percent of peace agreements referenced women, while after the resolution in the year 2000, almost 27 percent of peace agreements mention women (Bell 2015, 3). To control for the effect of the international gender equality norm, I will include a control for the UNSCR 1325 resolution controlled for by coding whether power sharing was implemented before or after October 31, 2000, the day the resolution was approved. However, in this study, time fixed effects controlling for time and year are used, which is already a very efficient way to control for both the influence of the resolution and other time-invariant factors of a country, such as global temporal shocks.

## 4.5 Research design

The research design is guided by the question on whether inclusive power sharing arrangements constitute a liability or a valuable tool to gender equality and female inclusion in a global context as well as in post-conflict states. The analysis aims to examine the effect and establish whether the implementation of political inclusive power sharing institutions leads to an increase in women's share in parliaments and women's political empowerment incorporating women's political participation, women's civil society participation, and women's civil liberties. To empirically investigate this relationship, I will pursue my research through quantitative statistical analysis and explore it using linear country-year fixed effects models. To better capture the concepts of female inclusion and women's empowerment, the outcome variables are operationalized with four different measures. The independent variable is operationalized using Ström et al. (2015) index measuring inclusive power sharing arrangements. Other wealth, economic, political, and civil war-related control variables are included in the analysis. The word explore is used throughout the analysis, given that there is a knowledge gap in the understanding of the term

inclusion. The term is often referred to in quite different scenery in both the power-sharing- and feminist literature. The interesting part is that they both aim for the same outcomes, namely a more inclusive post-conflict governance, as well as better arrangements to be implemented for the sake of minorities and others so they are included and heard.

The research design intends to investigate the cause-and-effect relationship using the panel data presented up until now in this chapter. It is designed for disentangling certain relationships between or among interacting variables and the phenomenon of inclusion. I proceed, by discussing why the fixed effects model is the most appropriate model for this study and compare it to regular OLS estimations. Then the chapter describes the statistical procedures, and how the overall research design went about answering the research question, using statistical tools and models in the statistical software and programming language, called R. Finally, I describe the overall research design and its shortcomings. By moving on from the big picture to the more specific description of the intent of the research, the methodological approach, and how the research question is analyzed statistically with the procedures involved and measures taken (Nygaard 2017, 140).

## **4.6 The appropriateness of the research design**

The purpose of the hypotheses and research design is to highlight the theoretical mechanisms and validate the empirical findings. Accordingly, when I first formulated the research question, one of the first things I did was consider which research method would better support the fit of this study. A good starting point in answering the research question is based on the use of existing theories or what is "known up until now". While reviewing the literature on power sharing, it is apparent that no one has ever investigated how political inclusive power sharing arrangements affect female inclusion and women's empowerment. Furthermore, inadequate quantitative work has been done in both works of literature to examine and assess women's full

inclusion in post-conflict environments. Because of the richness of the panel data set I have compiled, this thesis belongs to the methodological field of large-N data analysis. I use a fixed effects regression, an estimation technique used in panel data. It allows us to control for country- and year fixed effects. In other words, a modeling strategy controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics that can be correlated with the observed independent variable(s) (Christophersen 2018, 171{73).

## 4.7 Ordinary least squares estimations

The ordinary least squares (OLS) model estimates the parameters in a regression model by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals. In other words, OLS has the purpose of minimizing the sum of squared differences between the observed dependent variables in the given dataset and those predicted by the linear function of the independent variable inclusive. However, we can only rely on the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values from the OLS regression, if certain assumptions hold. The p-value is a measure of the probability that an observed difference could have occurred just by random chance (Christophersen 2018, 29). For linear regression to be suitable, the data analyzed must meet some prerequisites or assumptions for linear regression (Ibid., 73). The following assumptions are associated with a linear regression model: a constant error variance, independent error terms, normal errors, no multi-collinearity and exogeneity. If these assumptions do not hold, the coefficients are unreliable and become biased, which is used to describe infringement upon the coefficients. Alternatively, it could be that the standard errors are unreliable, which could mean that hypotheses testing we are doing on our coefficients becomes unreliable. If the standard errors are unreliable so is the two other metrics, namely the t-stat and p-value as well. The first thing is linearity, which means that the regression needs to be linear in the betas.

This is described by the well-known equation (4.1),

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + \epsilon_i \quad (4.1)$$

The linear model is found to be a robust estimator in a broad variety of setting (Angrist and Pischke 2009). However, choosing the most appropriate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model has not been straightforward. As a first procedure I estimated several OLS regression with varying specifications. This included running a series of controls, then running the regression models without them. The purpose of doing the latter is to observe how the main coefficients of interest changes, once the economic-, political-, and civil conflict-related control variables were included. Consequently, after testing a variety of OLS-regressions with different parameters in relation to the two competing hypotheses derived, I ended up with the Fixed Effects model as the most appropriate for the purpose of this study. Since the results substantially changed across the regular OLS models compared to the Fixed Effects models, I investigated whether that temporal aspect has something to do with it, and if there is something going on there worth checking.<sup>8</sup> The results of the other regression models, from the Pooled OLS models are included in the Appendix, to demonstrate that the results I get are robust to specification. Generally speaking, the conventional OLS estimation does not take into account the unobserved variables, which will thus remain in the error term and yield biased estimates (Stock and Watson 2012). Linear regression is used to study the linear relationship between the independent variable (x) and the four different dependent variables measuring female inclusion and women's empowerment. The linearity of the relationship between the independent and outcome variables is an assumption of the model. Put differently, the relationship I am interested in, is

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<sup>8</sup>The results of the other regression models, from the Pooled OLS models are included in the Appendix, to demonstrate that the results I get are robust to specification

modeled through a random disturbance term or error variable  $e$ . The inclusion of the error variable is important because we are unable to capture every potential influential factor on the dependent variable of the model.

## 4.8 Panel data and fixed effects model

With panel data, the question of causation can be partially addressed. Since several social science issues are causal, causation is central to address. Causal issues dictate experimental research designs, but ethical and practical considerations can make experimental research impossible. However, in terms of causal inferences, panel data are not equivalent to experimental data (Christophersen 2018, 166). After all, the research design is crucial for valid causal conclusions. Panel data can be analyzed in different ways. For example, by using pooled OLS regression or fixed-effects regression as methods of analysis. When compared with regular OLS-regression, pooled OLS-regression represents little new compared to regular OLS. However, panel data make autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity central issues. Without addressing these conditions, OLS regression is unsatisfactory for panel data. Lagged explanatory variables are often applied in political science to address endogeneity problems in observational data. In response to the issue of endogeneity within my panel data set, and since the impacts of the independent variables often take some time to show up, I use time lagged explanatory variables in the main models (Table 5.1.) (Christophersen 2018,169). This means estimating the following equation where the  $Y_{i,t}$  is the value of Y for country  $i$  at time  $t$ .

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 X_{i,t-1} + e_{i,t} \quad (4.2)$$

## 4.9 Assessing the fit of the country-year fixed effects model

A good way to account for omitted variables that are static across time and countries is to incorporate fixed effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009). As mentioned, the data is organized as a panel structure with country-year as the observational unit of analysis. In the OLS estimator, omitted variable bias arises when the regressor,  $X$ , correlates with an omitted variable. For this to occur, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, that  $X$  is correlated with the omitted variable. Second, that the omitted variable is a determinant of the dependent variable,  $Y$  (Christophersen 2018, 171). Therefore, applying country-year fixed effects makes it possible to account for unobserved heterogeneity. An F-test showed that the fixed effects model is preferable over the standard OLS model, as there is significant individual heterogeneity in the data (see Appendix). However, a limitation with the fixed effects model is that it only allows for within-group comparison (Mummolo and Peterson 2018). The estimated coefficients answer to the change in  $Y$  by a within-unit shift of the associated predictor. If the omitted variables that are modeled through the use of fixed effects vary across the units, this is not possible to assess (Christophersen 2013). A second issue relates to the loss in degrees of freedom when estimating unit-specific dummy variables.

Since my unit of analysis is country-year, I have controlled for year and country as fixed effects. Generally speaking, a fixed effects regression holds constant (fixes) the average effects of each country. By including these fixed effects, we are controlling for the average differences across countries in any observable or unobservable predictors, i.e., omitted variables. The fixed effect coefficients "soak up" all the across-group action. Subsequently, we are left with within-group action, which is what we want to study. In addition, the threat of omitted variable bias is reduced, when including the fixed effects. This technique or statistical tool known

as fixed effects takes advantage of the within-country variance over time. However, fixed effects models have one potentially important drawback in that they cannot determine the impact of variables with little within-group variance. In other words, if a variable of interest does not differ significantly from year to year, it is difficult to use a fixed effects model to examine the impact. When estimating an OLS model there are some concerns related to unobservable or omitted variable bias. On the other hand, when the unobserved variables are time-invariant, the fixed effects regression will greatly reduce the potential of omitted variable bias compared to the ordinary least squares model. Only looking at the variation that occurs within the countries over time, which is also known as within-estimations.

The research design also includes time-fixed effects, by specifying this while conducting the statistical analysis and regression models. The time-fixed effects specification takes into account that there might be time-specific effects that affect all countries in the same manner. These effects are typically related to temporal shocks that affect the independent variables at the same time. An example could be that an increase in oil prices or an oil price shock, may have an effect on income inequalities in countries. In quantitative methodology, time-fixed effects vary from country fixed effects in that country dummies get their intercepts, while time fixed effects are estimated compared to a base period. Like this,  $(t - 1)$  (Greene 2003). The following chapter will interpret the results and address the issue of endogeneity bias followed by a comprehensive discussion of causal effects.



Figure 4.2: Mind-map: Unobserved Confounding Variables and Fixed Effects

# Chapter 5

## Analysis

There has been no systematic research to back up the claims made by either side, on the political effects of power sharing on female inclusion and women's empowerment. The following findings shed considerable light on the knowledge gap on how such institutions promote formal political inclusion and empowerment in the broader civil society for women. This chapter presents the empirical analysis of the data, by testing the two contrasting theoretical expectations in a large N-analysis. The aim throughout this chapter is to test the hypotheses regarding inclusive power sharing by analyzing its effects on female inclusion and women's empowerment.

Despite the lack of sufficient attention given to gender in power sharing frameworks, such institutions remain a tool for promoting women's formal political representation in post-conflict societies. The estimate for *Inclusive Power Sharing (t-1)*, is positive and significant in the first model in table 5.1. Thus, the first hypothesis (H1) is supported, based on the consociational literature and proponents of power sharing. Inclusive power sharing arrangements increase women's share in national parliaments. However, the results fail to find any statistical support that inclusive power sharing is linked to women's empowerment in civil society, indicating support for the feminist literature and their criticism of power sharing. Hypothesis 2 is supported since the estimate for *Inclusive Power Sharing (t-1)*, finds no evidence

that the implementation of inclusive power sharing increases women's empowerment in civil society and their inclusion in informal political institutions.

Given the panel data, the linear fixed effects model is the most appropriate regression model for this analysis, as stated in the research design. Fixed effects estimators are often used to minimize and limit selection bias. It is well known that with panel data, fixed effects models eliminate time-invariant confounding, and thereby only estimating an independent variable's effect using only within-unit variation (Mummolo and Peterson 2018, 829). First, I present the results from the country-year fixed effects model (Table 5.1), which is a specification of the linear regression model, with the main independent variable, *Inclusive power sharing*, controlling for the other variables. All independent- and control variables are lagged with one year in table 5.1. Then, I explore four separate linear country-year fixed effects models to test the two contrasting hypotheses. Drawing on both the global IDC data set (Ström et al. 2015) and the V-Dem data set (Sundström et al. 2015) I examine the effects of inclusive power sharing on female inclusion and women's empowerment. The variables are collected to test the research question and assess the relationship between inclusive power sharing and female inclusion on the one hand, and women's empowerment on the other. The data set includes all polities, regardless of whether power-sharing institutions were created before or after civil conflict (Gates et al. 2016). When interpreting results of the fixed effects models, it is crucial to consider hypothetical changes in the independent variable (a counterfactual) that might possibly occur within units when interpreting the variable's effect (Mummolo and Peterson 2018, 829). This is done to avoid overstating the significance of the effect of inclusive power sharing. The results show that only the first measurement of female inclusion, namely women's share in parliaments, is positive and statistically significant and thereby affected by inclusive power sharing arrangements.

## 5.1 Methodological approach: dealing with panel data

In political science, data observations are often clustered. This is the case with this data set as well, where multiple spells are clustered in countries. Besides, there are repeated events, for example, the same conflict occurring multiple times. It is reasonable to assume that units sharing observable characteristics, such as location, also share unobservable characteristics that would lead the regression disturbances to be correlated. If the disturbances are correlated within the groupings in the data set, then even small levels of correlation can cause the standard errors from the ordinary least squares (OLS) model to be seriously biased downward (Moulton 1990, 334). I proceed with correcting the standard errors so that the coefficients are not biased. To encounter the issue with unobserved variables within the data I use fixed effects. I will use a country-year specific fixed effects estimation to control for heterogeneity within the model (see figure 4.2). The linear fixed effects regression reduces concerns related to omitted variable bias, which can arise from both unobserved variables being constant over time but vary across the countries (Angrist and Pischke 2009, 225).

In addition, the bias may arise from either unobserved variables that are constant across countries but vary over time. To control for such omitted variable bias, I include control variables such as GDP per capita, petroleum production logged, and a civil conflict variable measuring the intensity of battle-related deaths, which implicitly tells us whether there has been a civil conflict or war within a given country between 1975-2010. However, there could be other unobserved confounding variables that are influencing both the dependent- and the independent variable of interest, in which the statistical model does not pick up. I refer to this discussion in the chapter's final section, where I explore the validity of the results in terms of drawing statistical inferences, and whether the results can be interpreted in causal

terms. The concepts of political inclusive power sharing and female inclusion are related, and under specific assumptions, there might even be a correlation. However, it is important to control for confounding variables. The problem is that a confounding variable may be influencing the independent variable of interest so-called treatment variable which is the inclusion index, and the dependent variables. To address these concerns, I include lagged variables (t-1) in the regression analysis to provide robust estimates of the effects of the independent variable. The main model 5.1. is estimated with all independent variables lagged by one year. When including lagged variables, we adjust for omitted variables, and it can also help reduce trends and autocorrelation (Christophersen 2018, 164). When units in panel data are assumed to vary systematically from one another in unobserved ways that influence the outcome of interest, unit fixed effects are often used because they exclude all between-unit variation. In this case, it produces an estimate of a variable's average effect within units over time (Allison 2009). Figure 4.2 illustrates the research design and methodological approach used to address unobserved confounding variables with fixed effects.

## 5.2 Results

As a researcher, it is critical to clarify which variation is being used to estimate the coefficient of interest when discussing the results of a fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects model merely reports the average within-country effect. As inclusive power sharing changes and varies within countries over time, Y changes. The interpretation of the coefficients in models 1-4 in Table 5.1 is interpreted as a within-unit increase of the variable of interest. Before presenting the results, it is crucial to understand that the coefficient on each key predictor tells us the average effect of that predictor. In other words, the common slope (Dranove 2012, 8). Keeping in mind the intuition that we are conducting experiments within each country and averaging the results when using fixed effects. The effect of each predictor variable

Table 5.1: Country-year linear fixed effects models with lagged independent variables

Dependent Variables: Model:	Women's share parliament (1)	Women's political participation (2)	Women's civil society participation (3)	Women's civil liberties (4)
Variables				
Inclusive power sharing <sub>t-1</sub>	1.585 (0.6564)	0.0108 (0.0195)	0.0219 (0.0170)	0.0040 (0.0187)
GDP per capita logged <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.3511 (0.9827)	-0.0089 (0.0208)	-0.0130 (0.0182)	0.0005 (0.0194)
Petroleum product. per capita logged <sub>t-1</sub>	0.6315 (0.5268)	0.0047 (0.0085)	-0.0041 (0.0076)	-0.0056 (0.0098)
Intensity level/con ict country-year <sub>t-1</sub>	-0.8494 (0.5035)	-0.0256 (0.0095)	-0.0118 (0.0114)	-0.0394 (0.0134)
Inclusive power sharing <sub>t-1</sub> Post-2000 UNSCR	0.2436 (0.4465)	0.0121 (0.0098)	0.0053 (0.0067)	0.0103 (0.0084)
Fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year				
Fit statistics				
Observations	3,976	4,336	4,408	4,408
R <sup>2</sup>	0.76075	0.84926	0.88168	0.88455
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.02675	0.01394	0.01297	0.02709

One-way (country) standard-errors in parentheses  
 Signif. Codes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \*, 0.05, 0.1

(in other words, the slope) is presumed to be equal across all the countries in the linear fixed effects model. The regression simply reports the average within-country effect. Table 5.1. below demonstrates the results from the linear country-year fixed effects model with one year time-lagged independent variables.

I want to examine if variations in levels of inclusive power sharing around their means are related to variations in women's share in parliaments around their means. Because of the exploratory nature of this study, I will be focusing mostly on interpreting the sign of the coefficients and the statistical significance of the results. I will be examining the specific marginal effect of the theoretical variables and the main independent variable, *Inclusive*. The nature of the measurements in models 2, 3, and 4 make it more reasonable to assess and compare their respective coefficients together. This is because these models on women's empowerment (model 2-4) are more comparable because of their similar measurement in the original data. Whereas the first model in table 5.1, measures women's share in parliament with different bases created on percentage.

Model 1 in Table 5.1 reports the effect of inclusive power sharing institutions on women's share in parliaments from 1975-2010 in all global states, controlling for other factors. This model tests the first hypothesis that expects political inclusive power sharing to have an increase in the share of women in parliaments. The results indicate that inclusive power sharing has a significant positive coefficient in model 1, suggesting that such institutions are associated with an increase in the proportion of women in parliaments, rather than a negative effect, as much of the feminist literature would suggest. In other words, there is a relatively strong effect, it is positive with a strong statistical significance. The results are statistically significant on the 5 percent level. Figure 5.1 illustrates that a one unit increase in the inclusive index would cause a 1.585 percent increase in the women's share in parliaments.




Figure 5.1: Coefficient estimates on Women's share in parliament

First, the estimate for GDP per capita is negative in the first three models, and slightly positive in model 4. However, the estimate is not statistically significant, indicating that there is no relationship between GDP, female inclusion, and women's empowerment. The estimate stays negative even when I include Petroleum product. per capita logged is included. The latter is included to adjust for some of the high GDP per capita countries, to check if it is being generated by the country's oil production. The variable *Petroleum product. per capita logged*, is not statistically significant, however the sign changes from positive, towards negative in the last two models (3 and 4), controlling for some of the high GDP countries that have oil wealth.

Second, the estimate for *Intensity level/conflict country-year*, on the other hand, is significant with a negative sign. This relation is very powerful in models 2 and 4. Indicating that post-conflict countries and other levels of battle-related

deaths are more likely to negatively affect women's empowerment, thereby women's political participation and women's civil liberties. Countries with higher battle-related deaths and civil conflicts have lower levels of female inclusion and women's empowerment. Interestingly, this variable is the only one that is significant beyond the models measuring women's empowerment. This finding implies that women's empowerment declines in societies facing major security issues. Furthermore, as discussed in the literature review and theoretical chapters, civil war has a statistically negative effect on female inclusion and women's empowerment. Previous literature on peace negotiations has also focused on the effect of the UNSCR resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and the international community's impact (Bell 2015). Some researchers argue that the implementation of the UNSCR 1325 resolution in 2000, has a positive impact on both the participation of women and the constituency of peace agreements. As a result, I have created an interaction variable in the dataset, *Inclusive power sharing X UNSCR 1325*. The interaction variable is a dichotomous variable, based on the assumption that the international gender equality norm will have an impact on countries after the year 2000. However, the variable is not statistically significant, showing that the implementation of inclusive power sharing after the year 2000 has no effect.

Since the dependent variable measures change, coefficients with a positive sign indicate that inclusive power sharing is associated with an increase in the proportion of female inclusion and women's empowerment. However, none of the coefficient values across the second, third and fourth models in table 5.1. are statistically significant. Models 2, 3, and 4 reveal no effect of inclusive power sharing on women's political participation, women's civil society participation, and women's civil liberties. In comparison to the first model on the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (percentage), model 2-4 has a relatively weak effect. While in the right direction, it is not statistically significant, indicating no evidence in support for the argument from proponents of power sharing. This could imply that inclusive power sharing arrangements do not empower women and thereby do

not include them in the broader political sphere and civil society. Model 2 in table 5.1. shows that there is no effect on women's broader political participation in governments, as well as other political positions. However, since we cannot break down the index any further, we cannot get a more nuanced image. To conclude, the linear fixed effects model illustrates a nuanced answer through the results: in some ways, women are included in their share in national parliaments, however, in other ways women are not empowered. We see no evidence in other ways of women's empowerment through women's political participation, women's civil society participation, and women's civil liberties. I will elaborate on this discussion in the next chapter and interpret how inclusive power sharing may improve.

### **5.3 Spurious relationships, endogeneity bias, and reverse causality**

The next paragraphs aim to sensitize the analysis and show what statistical techniques were used to deal with endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and spurious relationships. In political science, omitting bias from unobserved variables is often a challenge when doing quantitative analysis. In other words, it is seldom possible to include all confounding variables in a single model to rule out spurious relationships. When analyzing causation and correlation, it is important to distinguish between the two terms. The existence of a correlation does not, on its own, entail the existence of a causal relationship between the variables (Simon 1954). As an aspiring political scientist and statistician, it is important to understand this claim. An observed correlation between two events or processes is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the existence of a causal relationship between the variables (Hausman 1986, 146). The failure of not being able to recognize a correlation as spurious can lead well-intentioned studies to adopt strategies to bring about a specific outcome (Ward 2013, 701). Let us recall the figure from chapter 1, illustrating the research

question:




Figure 5.2: Endogeneity between power-sharing and female inclusion

The backward dotted arrow is especially interesting here since it aims to identify other variables that might influence the relationship between the independent and dependent variable. Endogeneity bias can create a critical issue when analyzing the cause-and-effect relationship between variables. Put simply, the term means creating severely biased results. Technically speaking, endogeneity occurs when an independent variable ( $x$ ) in a regression model is correlated with the error term ( $e$ ) in the model. This endogeneity between inclusive power sharing and women's representation, participation, and empowerment can occur on a variety of occasions, but two cases are common. First, when important variables are omitted from the model, which is called omitted variable bias. Second, when the dependent variable ( $Y$ ) is a predictor of the independent variable ( $X$ ), which is called simultaneity bias. To partly test for this, I will be running a reverse causality model between the variables. We will never be able to completely address endogeneity without running a randomized experiment, as most published papers cannot<sup>1</sup>. However, by running a reverse test, as well as the linear country-year fixed effects, I can control for a lot of heterogeneity. The reversed model (see the Appendix) does not produce borderline significance  $p$  for the main outcome of interest, Women's share in Parliament. In addition, the main model with country-and-year fixed effects deals with removing the so-called unobservable heterogeneity, by removing all variation in  $Y$  due to time

<sup>1</sup>More testing will be needed to fully account for endogeneity. I decided to not include instrumental variables since I was not able to identify an appropriate instrument

effects and all time-specific shocks that are identical for all countries in the data.

When examining the impact of political institutions, the issue of endogeneity bias becomes particularly pressing. Or as Przeworski argued: "institutions are almost always endogenously chosen" (Przeworski 2004, 527). The latter presents a methodological challenge since the influence of political institutions is dependent on the particular context in which they appear (Ibid.). Consequently, I include statistical adjustments to mitigate the likelihood of reversed causation and endogeneity biases. I include a statistical technique for reducing the probability of reversed causation, by taking advantage of the temporal sequence of cause and effect (Knudsen 2008, 7). I run different model specifications with time lags ranging from one to three years (see the Appendix). This is done following other scholars where they estimate models where they lag the independent variables with three years, to provide further evidence for the direction of causality (Rid and Weidmann 2015). In the same manner, I also partial out these effects as much as possible by including lagged values of GDP per capita, petroleum production per capita, and battle-related deaths/intensity level in a country-year. The country-and-year fixed effects also deal with removing the so-called unobservable heterogeneity. In other words, it removes all variation in  $Y$  due to time effects and all time-specific shocks that are identical for all countries in the data. This reduces biases due to unobservable heterogeneity further, because now one only must worry about omitted variables whose variation differs between units (countries) over time.

In sharp contrast to the well-known problem of unobserved heterogeneity, however, experts are unsure how to cope with reverse causality (Leszczensky and Wolbring 2019, 2). Following the econometric and statistical literature on how to deal with reverse causality, I use time lags and lag the independent variables to account for reverse causality. A fundamental assumption behind any form of regression is that there are no omitted variables that describe the dependent variable or are correlated with the independent variable (Hanck et al. 2019). I find that inclusive

power sharing is significantly positively related to women's share in parliaments with country-year fixed effects. The causal effect implies that when inclusive increase, the proportion of seats held by women (model 1 in table 5.1) increases by 1.585 percentage points. When using fixed effects, the study is restricted to specific aspects of the data, such as within-country (i.e., overtime) variance (A. Bell and Jones 2014). Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the methodological choice of using fixed effects and focusing on within-unit-variation might lead to missing out on the between-unit-variation.

## 5.4 Validity, reliability and causal inference

The global scope, time frame, nuanced scales and measurements, and the emphasis on inclusion in both power sharing and feminist literature, all implicate that the data sets fit the purpose of my research question. Importantly, I do not regard the shortcomings of the data sets as serious enough to doubt the validity of my study. The terms validity and reliability are concepts that originated in the natural sciences and are used to evaluate the quality of a research design (Ritchie and Lewis 2003:270). In general, validity refers to whether we are measuring what we intend to measure or not (Bryman 2008: 149). More specifically, there are two types of validity worth mentioning here, namely external validity and internal validity. The latter, external validity is concerned with the representativeness of a sample for a population (Gerring 2005, 183). In other words, whether generalizations to a larger population can be made based on a single case. The ability to generalize findings from research projects has been regarded as critical in determining the significance of social science research, as generic knowledge can provide us with information about a phenomenon that is not delimited to the case.

As my research question suggests, I want to know what effects the implementation of inclusive power sharing has on female inclusion and women's empow-

erment. As stated in the theoretical chapter, the hypotheses are based upon the assumption of two contrasting outcomes of the effects of inclusive power sharing arrangements on the share of women in parliaments, women's political participation, women's civil society participation, and women's civil liberties. Before continuing, I need to address the claims of causal interference that I am making. I expect that inclusive power sharing has a positive effect on the share of women in national parliaments. Such claims of causal relationships differ from merely descriptive findings of correlation (Keele 2015, 313). The difference lays in the choice of language when foreseeing the findings. However, in line with the feminist theoretical assumptions, I argue that inclusive power sharing institutions do not increase women's empowerment in civil society. Although statistical analyses cannot provide full and definitive evidence of causality, this study opts for a methodological approach in which these threats are less evident (Bachman 2007, 147). When determining a causal relationship between a dependent variable (X) and an independent variable (Y) three conditions must be considered (Ibid.). To begin with, there must be an empirical relationship between X and Y. Second, there must be an appropriate time order. Third, that the relationship between X and Y is not spurious, i.e. Causality implies that X leads to Y through a causal mechanism. In other words, that X is the cause, an event or condition, "that raise the probability of some outcome occurring" (Gerring 2005, 169). Furthermore, causality implies a correlation, however, correlation does not necessarily imply causality. I will discuss this notion further in chapter 7.

# Chapter 6

## Discussion

The reasoning toward an explanation of the problem started deductively in the theoretical chapter then through the research method and ends inductively in this chapter when interpreting the findings and adding to the theories. The analysis provided valuable insights into the dynamics between power sharing, female inclusion, and women's empowerment; a phenomenon that is ripe for further research. The findings provided in chapter 5 are interpreted during the course of this chapter while considering the broader theoretical framework and the two hypotheses based on the two opposing assumptions. I was able to shed light on this crucial lack of comprehension by weaving together contrasting understandings of the term "inclusion" using a theoretical framework composed of contributions from the power sharing literature and the feminist literature.

Moreover, I will discuss how the test of the two opposing hypotheses helps us fulfill the aim of this thesis which is to examine if inclusive power sharing in peace-building processes results in greater female inclusion and empowerment of women. In the end, I will discuss the implications of the results and whether statistical inferences can be drawn from the first model presented in Table 5.1. Whether statistical conclusions are valid is determined in part by whether the relationships are strong and whether it is statistically significant at conventional levels of uncertainty. The

standard levels of uncertainty are often at the 5%, which is also adopted in this thesis (Lund 2002, 2). Finally, the chapter will evaluate the results and address often ignored limitations when using fixed effects estimations, and point to recommendations for future research from an econometric perspective. There is likewise a need for gender progressive institutional mechanisms aimed at including women and incorporating WPS-agenda norms in inclusive power sharing frameworks. This raises the question from the introduction chapter: Do power sharing arrangements ensure full and inclusive representation for women in post-conflict settings?

## 6.1 Bridging the knowledge gap

Feminist and power sharing scholars are equally concerned with the notion of injustice and unfairness brought about by exclusion. Moreover, both works of literature often speak of political inclusion as a remedy for injustice as well as non-democracy (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 5). Despite these apparent similarities, however, my review showed that they operate with quite different understandings of inclusion. In line with the consociational literature on power sharing, I find reasonable support for the first hypothesis (H1), *inclusive power sharing arrangements increases women's share in national parliaments*, that is, that from 1975 to 2010, political inclusive power sharing arrangements are more likely to increase the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. H1 is based on the assumption that inclusive power sharing arrangements mandate that the representatives of designated parties or groups hold particular offices or participate in particular decision-making processes (Gates et al. 2016, 516). My results have proven that political inclusive power sharing indeed function as a means for ensuring minority representation in decision making. Having said that, it could be regarded as a "naïve" hypothesis since it is based on an elite argument and because the theoretical notion of power sharing does not include gender provisions.

Nevertheless, the criticism from the feminist literature against power sharing and its limited focus on elite representation is also supported as the analysis further reveals that political inclusive power sharing arrangements do not affect the indices measuring women's empowerment. While the results are in the right direction, they fail to support the power-sharing understanding that these institutions should be linked to an increase or positive change also on broader inclusions, in this case, on women's civil society participation and women's civil liberties. Thereby, the second hypothesis (H2), *Inclusive power sharing arrangements do not increase women's empowerment in civil society and their inclusion in informal political institutions.*

The second hypothesis explores a more nuanced understanding of the feminist literature and their prioritization of the grassroots-gender structures. Power-sharing scholars tend to focus on the elite level in political institutions, while international relations feminist scholars often focus on questions of civil society and informal political organizing<sup>1</sup>. Most power-sharing and consociationalism scholars do not speak of civil society and informal political organizing. The feminist literature focuses on a more median- and mass-level argument of the importance of women in civil society in relation to power sharing. While the first hypothesis is a more elite-based approach, often made by the power sharing scholars. The line of reasoning from my results is that we must consider the inclusion of all women, both elite and non-elite. Even if both works of literature prioritize democratic inclusion and participation, they have different understandings of inclusion. Furthermore, it is important to stress in line with other scholars, that female inclusion and political empowerment must be accessed over time. Inclusion and empowerment must be seen as a transition and a movement away from disempowerment (Sen and Mukherjee 2014). Since empowerment entails change, I tested for both hypotheses and controlled for the year after these institutions were implemented (t-1). What do

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<sup>1</sup>These are questions of grassroots activists and transnational feminist peace activism (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 4)

these results mean in terms of the theoretical background and overarching research question?

In compliance with the results from the statistical analysis, this chapter suggests a new approach of thinking of the phenomenon of inclusion regarding women's empowerment in the long run. After laying out theories from both the political power sharing and the feminist literature focusing on the term inclusion, I was able to find a sort of guidance for the following search of a problem. Following that, the results and discussion sections contribute to both increasing our confidence in some of the theories and developing our understanding of the cause-and-effect relationship between the variables. The paragraphs that follow interpret the findings, offering insight on what they signify for this study.

### **6.1.1 Female inclusion: women's share in national parliaments**

As shown in the previous chapter, the statistical results from the country-year linear fixed effects regression with its specifications, demonstrate that only one dimension of female inclusion and women's empowerment is affected by inclusive power sharing. Model 1 in table 5.1, indicates that inclusive power sharing has a relatively strong effect and promotes inclusion in formal politics. The assumption that power sharing as a democratic institution ensure minority representation in decision-making is strengthened. The findings suggest that power sharing arrangements truly do mandate and facilitate the participation of a broad set of decision-makers. In line with the first hypothesis (1) derived, the positive sign and statistical significance indicate that inclusive power sharing arrangements do increase the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. Based on the theoretical framework and expectations, political inclusive power sharing arrangements are more likely to engage women in the formal political process. In line with the concepts of both

Lijphart, Norris, Gates, and Ström et al., inclusive power sharing function the way they are supposed to. However, this effect is not particularly high, as I expected, since women have historically been excluded from the political sphere. As seen in the theoretical chapter, the main central causal chain between power sharing and democracy in Norris' (2008) work is "power sharing's ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making processes and create incentives to cooperate".

The independent variable, *Inclusive Power Sharing*, covers two of Lijphart's components of consociationalism: grand coalitions and the mutual veto. The variables also include the reservation of seats or executive positions for specific minority groups to ensure their inclusion in central government decision-making (Ström et al. 2015, 171). Strong critics of consociational politics such as Paul Brass believe that consociationalism exaggerates the problems associated with strong collective identities and questions their core premise that "ethnic divisions are more inflammatory than other types" (Brass 1991, 338). Even while political inclusive power sharing is inherently elite focused it does have a positive effect and thus increases women's share in parliaments. Lijphart's consociationalism and early literature on power-sharing focused relatively on peaceful and segmented societies. It was not until the 1980- and during the 90s that scholars started focusing on power-sharing as a mechanism for peacebuilding in conflict-ridden and war-torn countries (McCulloch 2017, 3). Interestingly, civil society is already "ethnicized" (O'Leary 2005, 8{10). Certain groups are empowered as a matter of political expediency, usually ethnic groups. Therefore, power-sharing essentially includes empowerment to overcome social and political exclusion (Byrne 2020, 65). In the core meaning of power-sharing empowerment and inclusion almost exclusively refers to minority "ethnicized" groups that are empowered through inclusive power-sharing arrangements.

Studies have shown that states with a high level of gender equality are more likely to be peaceful and have peaceful relations with other states (Melander 2005). This finding easily lends itself to interpretations that suggest, for example,

that more women in parliament will make different decisions from those made by men. In other words, the share of female decision-makers should impact peace directly (Bjarnegard and Melander 2013). However, despite the importance of gender equality in institutionalizing peace, ethnonational identity dominates frameworks for conflict resolution, with little or no room for any other understanding of identity and difference (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016). Elite-based power-sharing institutions are often implemented in peace negotiations based on the consociational democracy model<sup>2</sup>. While this is a governmental model that is based on strengthening elite cooperation and political stability, it applies primarily to ethno-nationalist groups. The model focuses on inclusivity and the promotion of human rights and justice, without considering gender as a stand-alone variable. In addition, the causal link between gender inequality and conflict is often left unexplored (Kennedy, Pierson, and Thomson 2016).

This thesis has demonstrated that women are included in the national parliaments, which is the first measure of the dependent variable, *women's share in parliaments*.<sup>3</sup> The global average for the proportion of women in parliaments reached an all-time high of 25.5 percent last year (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2021, 2). As Erik Melander and Elin Bjarnegard argued in their article, "The measurement that is most often used to measure political gender equality is the percentage of women in parliament in a given country. This may be a crude measurement, and its empirical value can be questioned. For one, we may not know to what extent parliament is actually effective, or whether representation is mere tokenism." (Bjarnegard and Melander 2011, 144). Since the power sharing literature assumes that the implementation of power sharing and relocating decision-making authority should increase women's broader political participation beyond mere parliamentary seats, and thereby providing citizens with multiple access points (Norris 2008, 160).

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<sup>2</sup>This model is defined by power sharing between elites from different social groups in deeply divided societies, see Lijphart (1977, 1984, and 1999)

<sup>3</sup>There is a lot of critiques that argue that women's share in parliament is only driven by the quota system, i.e., they are symbolically included { but not formally included.

This assumption raises the interesting question: to what extent is parliamentary representation in some countries effective for women since they are not prominently present in formal politics. This is the fundamental reason behind why I included the other measurements on women's empowerment in the broader civil society.

### **6.1.2 Women's empowerment: political- and civil society participation, and civil liberties**

The focus on the second outcome is on how political inclusive power sharing is on over-time changes in women's empowerment in politics and civil society. As mentioned, female inclusion in politics is measured and defined as women's share in parliaments. Let us recall the definition of the term women's empowerment defined as: "a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, and participation in societal decision-making" (Sundström et al. 2015, 4).

While being inclusive of the main groups at the heart of the conflict, power-sharing arrangements are often challenged as excluding other identities and groups, such as women (Aolain 2018). In her article, Aolain applies key insights from the feminist institutional literature to analyze power-sharing in post-conflict environments. She stresses three parts in her argument. First, that the Women, Peace, and Security agenda has not translated into full women's inclusion in post-conflict power-sharing institutions. Second, both formal and informal spaces are regulated by gender orders. These orders play a supporting role in managing social roles, practices, and expectations for both men and women. Finally, power-sharing arrangements create complex intersectional challenges for women. She deploys a feminist institutional analysis to examine the complex interactions between gender and power-sharing. The aim is to consider whether and to what extent women have affected both the formal and informal "rules of the game" (Ibid., 118). Even if women are present in formal political representation in inclusive power sharing arrange-

ments, it does not mean that there is an institutional change for them. Women's presence as a formal matter should not be understood as the delivery of profound institutional change in the priorities and outcomes of political institutions (Ibid., 121). Other scholars suggest that when consociationalism explicitly brings in some dominant groups into government it will necessarily lead to the exclusion of other more marginalized groups, such as women. This is referred to as the exclusion amid inclusion dilemma (EAI) (McCulloch 2019, 45). In compliance with this line of reasoning, we should therefore see the implementation of inclusive political power sharing as a hindrance or obstacle to women's empowerment in civil society and their inclusion in informal political institutions (H2).

The other statistical models demonstrate that inclusive power sharing indeed has no statistical effect on women in the broader society. The results from models 2, 3, and 4 indicate a relatively weak effect compared to the other coefficients. While in the right direction, it is not statistically significant. This suggests that women's political empowerment, or the process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making is not affected. For example, the second equally weighted index, measuring women's descriptive representation in formal politics, is not statistically significant. Showing no relationship between political inclusive power sharing and women's descriptive representation in the legislature and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. Nevertheless, we cannot break down the index further down, to get a more nuanced discussion of the meaning. There is a difference in how inclusive power sharing affects women in established political institutions and how inclusive power sharing affects women individually (non-governmental institutions in society). When measuring women's political participation in both parliaments and governments, it seems that women are not represented at the government level. This leads back to the discussion in the theoretical chapter, on women's formal representation in established political institutions. Women are not included in government and thereby not given the highest level of political representation. The second outcome, mea-

suring three forms of women's empowerment, is not statistically significant which indicates that power sharing has no apparent effect on women's representation at the government level, nor a positive effect on women's increasing capacity in civil society.

## 6.2 Empirical examples for visualizing

Based on the feminist assumption and my non-statistically significant results in the last three models (Models 2-4 in Table 5.1.), I will use Lebanon as an example to illustrate the challenges related to power-sharing and women's empowerment. In turn, this assists in identifying further how this research contributes to the discussions in feminist institutionalism and their criticism of the power-sharing approach to peacebuilding. In Lebanon, for example, a relatively democratic state, women have one of the lowest representations in parliament compared to the rest of the Middle East and North African region. This is partly due to the nature of the Lebanese political system and the importance of kinship-based political networks, which heavily impact women's access to high levels of political power. The dichotomy of the public- and private spheres in civil society, is more problematic in the Middle East and North Africa than in the West.

In many third-world countries, kinship and community are crucial in organizing social life, where state institutions and civil societies do not operate independently of kinship-based political networks (Joseph 1993, 23). In this region, the importance of family creates a need for strong kinship that continues to be important between the state, the public sphere, and the civil society, which is the sphere of private organizations (Joseph and Slyomovics 2001, 12). Lebanon has taken no steps to improve women's political representation (Geha 2019, 499). The inclusive power sharing arrangements in Lebanon are sectarian and ensures the elite representation of the 18 recognized religious confessions. According to Byrne and

McCulloch (2012), gender mainstreaming in Lebanon appears to be incompatible with a sectarian type of inclusive power-sharing. Elected political leaders are all too often urged to see their own interests and maintain the status quo, so that the risk of threatening their self-interest is reduced (Maalouf 2000, 122). By bringing insights from Lebanon with their ethno-nationalist and inclusive power sharing arrangements, we can understand more how it is crucial to differentiate between, on the one hand, women's formal representation in parliaments, and on the other hand women's empowerment. The case of Lebanon has shown that the intersection of formal and informal institutions of power-sharing can create insurmountable obstacles to women's political representation. If one simply assessed the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (Model 1 in Table 5.1), one would conclude that power sharing merely function as a gender-friendly approach to post-conflict resolutions in ethnically divided societies and nations.

### **6.3 Implications: why do the results matter?**

Scholars such as Bjarnegard and Melander criticize the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, by using a feminist critique to point to the idea that gender equality and the representation of women should be considered as issues of justice regardless of the outcome they bring about (2013, 560). The resolution stresses that women should participate in the prevention as well as resolution of conflicts in peacebuilding, which has been an important tool for women's rights advocates in conflicts. However, scholars and other practitioners argue that there is a risk of UNSCR 1325 being used instrumentally in a broad woman, peace, and security agenda. Some may claim that the acknowledgment of UNSCR Resolution 1325 has been purely rhetorical. The message of the resolution must be widely accepted on political and diplomatic levels (Tryggestad 2009, 552). Since the mid-90s most internal armed conflicts have reoccurred where a post-conflict peace has a median duration of seven years (Gates, Nygard and Trappeniers 2016). The women and

peace hypothesis claims that more women participating will lead to a longer-lasting peace. As my results indicate, even if women were included at the negotiating table or in parliaments - nothing much has happened in terms of women's empowerment in social life and civil society.

One research implication would be to move from an ethnic focus in power-sharing to a more diverse approach. At the heart of the feminist critique, there is a deep suspicion that the prioritization of power is masculine and therefore a merely technical matter of sharing power and seats. This is a subject of special concern in Africa, which has been the site of various forms of power sharing encounters (Jarstad 2009, 42). Governments in some African countries have been formed based on elite-negotiated power sharing rather than on popular election results. According to power sharing scholars, it is all about empowering communities, especially those that have been disempowered and marginalized. However, a feminist approach would conceive such empowerment beyond ethnocentric terms. Therefore, under the circumstances of power sharing theories and practices, there must be a way to develop a more feministic approach that goes beyond an ethnocentric focus, but rather develops an inclusive and ethical project of empowerment (Byrne 2020, 65).

The feminist literature has labeled these power structures as patriarchal systems. The question of interest that arises is: in relation to what are women supposed to be a political agent? There is an equal gap in both the feminist literature and the WPS agenda in understanding this phenomenon. Both works of literature constantly state that all women are political agents, but they are not successfully connecting this political agency to existing power structures. It is clearly difficult to relate to power structures since the feminist and WPS agenda have labeled the political system as patriarchal. Most of these power distribution institutions, are something that women are related to, and thereby trying to negotiate their way into these and getting power in the existing established institutions. Inclusive power sharing in my findings seems to make some headway into some structures, but it does

not seem to affect other structures. In other words, we need to understand women's agency in relation to existing political power systems and structures. A policy recommendation is that we should bring these two together in a political system, since institutionalizing power sharing in peace agreements, will have consequences for gender equality over time.

Power sharing rules may constrain the ability of anyone who seeks political participation on terms other than ethnicity to be effectively represented in the system (McCulloch 2020, 50). As John Nagle and Tamirace Fakhoury (2018: 86) suggest, writing in the context of Lebanon, "corporate consociations purposely exclude nonethnic actors because they are deemed a threat to the equilibrium assumed needed to maintain peace". This kind of ethnic representation at all costs may not have its intended effect of moderating divisions, with corporate rules running a risk of entrenching ethnic divisions. In the case of women's inclusion, this means finding a way "to avoid trading one kind of groupism { ethnic { for another { gender" (McCulloch 2019, 52).

Jarstad (2008) argues that in reality power-sharing agreements reflect the power balance at the time of the negotiations between parties<sup>4</sup>. This was the case in Lebanon, where the ruling party leaders got more power, and the political elite could divide the people more and make them dependent on the regions. Deciding who to include and who to exclude in power-sharing arrangements is not straight forward. This case illustrates how power sharing at an elite level, hinders popular support for the political system since voters seem have no influence on government. By guaranteeing representation in government to some groups, it can make it almost impossible for other parties to get access to power (Jarstad 2008, 125). According to Horowitz (2003), power sharing will not lead to stable democracy; in particular, he claims that PR electoral rules in divided societies strengthen ethnic divisions

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<sup>4</sup>See, for example, criticism about the problems posed by lack of opposition, in Jung, C. and I. Shapiro (1995) "South Africa's Negotiated Transition: Democracy, Opposition and the New Constitutional Order" in *Politics and Society* 23(3)

and magnify political differences. The lack of support from the mass population might again lead to a non-functioning democracy over time. As mentioned, even if power-sharing research can be divided into a democracy-theory approach and a conflict-management approach, democracy and peace are often viewed together in much of the literature.

The good news is that inclusive power sharing does not seem to have a negative effect on women's share in parliaments. This thesis has clearly demonstrated that inclusive power sharing has a statistically positive effect on women and their inclusion in national parliaments. Still, power sharing scholars such as Lijphart, Ström et al., Gates et al., Norris, Binningsbø, among others, fail to mention the gendered implications of power-sharing institutions. Therefore, the following two consequences are worth mentioning. First, power sharing arrangements aimed at ensuring stability and peace in multiethnic states can risk embedding patriarchal and heteronormative attitudes in the institutional design as highlighted by the feminist literature<sup>5</sup>. As suggested by Bell, previously antagonistic power sharing partners 'frequently find that one of the key areas they can agree on is the conservative retrenchment of women's rights, particularly reproductive services' (2018, 18). The control of women's reproductive functions by men and/or the state has long been critiqued by feminists (O'Rourke 2013).<sup>6</sup>

Second, power sharing and consociationalism which emphasize group identities at the expense of all else may be predisposed to political crisis. When combined with the fact that post-conflict transitions are already characterized by political elite identity groups getting included<sup>7</sup>, women's interests can easily fall by the wayside in moments of crisis. From a gender perspective, corporate consociations appear to 'sacrifice women's claims for equality in the interests of communal unity' (Hayes

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<sup>5</sup>The latter is highlighted by the literature and critiques of consociationalism (e.g., Hayes and Nagle, 2018).

<sup>6</sup>See empirical and legal research in Chile, Northern Ireland, and Colombia (e.g. O'Rourke 2013)

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, 'the tyranny of the urgent' (Jacobson, 2012: 221)

and McAllister, 2012: 124). When everything is urgent, gender issues inevitably get placed on the backburner (McCulloch 2019, 51).

## **6.4 Evaluating the results: limitations, relevance and impact**

I now turn to evaluating the results, focusing on their limitations, relevance, and impact. While I have developed a study and analysis based on a crucial knowledge gap on how power sharing affects women, a complete review of the causal effect of power sharing on women's empowerment is beyond the reach of this study. In this thesis, I have mapped the floor for this knowledge gap by weaving together an unusual combination of two works of literature. Consequently, many phenomena have emerged in this study, ripe for further research. I will discuss avenues for future research and policy recommendations in the last chapter. Since an experimental design is not feasible with this type of research, the issue of causation must be assessed. The first regression model (Table 5.1) can be interpreted in causal terms if there is no omitted variable bias and that all relevant confounding variables are adjusted for (Angrist and Pischke 2009).

One of the greatest challenges of studying power sharing is to synthesize ideas and information across approaches that seek a more complete understanding of the term inclusion. On the one hand, scholars within power sharing tend to focus on elite-level inclusion and whether power-sharing was adopted in a peace negotiation or through political institutions in constitutional reforms. Peace processes are typically focused on a narrow understanding of the parts involved in the conflict. As John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty noted: "Those who held guns or the dominant positions on the battlefield when a ceasefire was called become negotiating partners regardless of their ability to represent their community. Other voices, often those without power, tend to go unheard. This might help to explain why many peace processes

are overwhelmingly male" (Darby and Mac Ginty 2002, 3). On the other hand, feminist scholars have focused on questions of grassroots activism and transnational feminist peace activism. It is also worth mentioning, that the adoption of power-sharing arrangements often occurs in political arenas from which women have been historically marginalized (Byrne and McCulloch 2015, 4).

The second challenge is that formal institutions do not always adequately represent the politics "on the ground". This is often the case in conflict-torn societies where the need for political power sharing is most urgent. On the one hand, countries such as Switzerland, have a long history of de facto power sharing but few formal institutions. On the other hand, countries such as Lebanon in the mid-late 1980s had formal detailed rules that in practice were not respected because the central authority had broken down (Ström et al. 2015, 171). When comparing Switzerland and Lebanon, the dataset and empirical findings demonstrate that de facto power sharing can exist in the absence of formal rules where the risk of violence is low, while cases of societies characterized by chaos and instability fail to implement and enforce de jure power sharing<sup>8</sup>. However, even if formal institutions are not always strictly implemented, they serve as crucial points of departure, expectations, and ambition (Ström et al. 2015, 171). Even when a government, such as the one in Lebanon, is governed by several parties and paramilitary groups, the constitution remains important because they provide a crucial point in bargaining that sets the rules out for each of the group's decision. The complexity of measuring political power sharing institutions in such settings is to be able to capture both the formal and the informal institutions (Ibid.).

While the associations in the data are robust across model specifications, this does not necessarily mean that higher levels of inclusive power sharing arrangements are a cause of female inclusion or women's empowerment. In other words,

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<sup>8</sup>For a broader discussion, Bormann et al. (2015) analyze the joint relationships between de jure measures of power sharing, EPR's measures of de jure power sharing, and the occurrence of civil conflict

causality implies a correlation, but correlation does not necessarily imply causality (Lund 2002; Gerring 2005; Christophersen 2018). However, the inclusion of control variables in the analysis did not influence the substantive interpretation of the results. Even if it does not eliminate the risk of omitted variable bias, the fundamental principle is that omitted variable bias is often reduced under a fixed effects approach (Hill, Davis, and Roos 2020, 3). Yet, the fact that the relationship in model 1 (Table 5.1.) holds when controlling for all the specifications, increases the likelihood that the model does have a causal interpretation. One limitation that is generally not talked about when using fixed effects, is the limitation of units that do not change that much over time. As our fixed effects estimates are based on characteristics that change over time, some variables and cases that do not change either 1) do not provide much information to the study or 2) are altogether removed by design (Hill et al. 2020, 9). According to Allison, another potential limitation is that "standard errors for fixed effects coefficients are often larger than those for other methods, especially when the predictor variable has little variation over time" (2009, 9).

There is also an issue of the level of analysis, worth mentioning. As the unit of analysis is country-year, the variables are at a national level. However, there are huge differences between countries and within-country variations. For example, in India, one finds enormous differences in different situations and spaces. Power sharing might sometimes be limited in scope, in other words, that it only affects small parts of a country and its population, for example, the power sharing agreement in Bangladesh. To be able to control for these variations, further research should assess these variations in countries and include other variables. Additionally, the indices from the Varieties of Democracy data set are measured in a very 'inclusive manner' when it comes to the time aspect, the spatial aspect, and the disaggregated aspect. It would be valuable for future work to disaggregate these indices even more and look at what aspects of women's empowerment are affected. Is it governmental representation, or is it individual political participation? In other

words, investigate further what is driving the relationship between power sharing and women's empowerment.

To capture and investigate if there was an external pressure from the UN mediation that would make parties promote the empowerment and inclusion of women, I included a variable post-2000 controlling for the implementation of the UNSCR Resolution 1325. This control variable had no statistical effect. I also controlled for the standard understanding of armed conflicts and civil war, which had a statistically negative effect on the outcomes. The relationship between democratization and political gender equality is complex. Bjarnegard and Melander suggest that the representation of women in politics appears to be nearly perfectly curvilinear (Bjarnegard and Melander 2011, 145). Further research should take into account this finding. This can be done from an econometric perspective, by considering the long-term effects of inclusive power sharing arrangements. For example, looking for interaction effects, such as the pre-existing levels of democracy in the countries. Since women's share in parliaments only seems to be relevant in relation to peace in democracies. Then, there is the possibility of sequencing. Sequence analysis is a method to process sequence data, where the sequences are being defined as a series of states or events. Another possibility for further research would be to assess the long-term effects of implementing power sharing arrangements. One could opt for analyzing the formal representation of women, where an increased share of women in parliament may lead to women's empowerment in the long run. On a final note, variables referring to the existing level of gender equality in the countries should be controlled for in future research. This is to ensure that it is not women's influence already in countries that are important, but rather how it changes if inclusive power sharing is implemented (e.g. women's labor force participation rate).

# Chapter 7

## Conclusions

While previous research has not examined the potential effect of political inclusive power sharing on female inclusion and women's empowerment, this thesis has provided a more in-depth look at the effects these institutions produce. While we might easily presume that inclusive power sharing contributes to other forms of inclusion in society beyond female inclusion in parliaments, the effect on women's empowerment had yet to be properly examined. Moreover, feminist research had raised serious concerns about the effect of power-sharing on women's empowerment beyond mere numbers. The analysis has built on two prevalent and opposing assumptions regarding the implementation of politically inclusive power-sharing and how it results in improvements in women's inclusions and empowerment in post-conflict environments. This chapter will demonstrate what has been addressed in terms of aims and objectives. Then, explain through the main findings the significance and implications of this research. In the end, I lay out avenues for further research as well as policy recommendations.

The first assumption derived from the power sharing literature is that inclusive power sharing will empower and include minorities in a conflict-ridden and ethnically divided country. The literature on power sharing, has focused on including political opponents in a joint executive coalition government, based on the argument

that this reinforces peacebuilding and democracy. However, there is no consensus on what power sharing is, and there is a wide range of conceptual understandings of the term. The literature on power sharing exclusively focuses on the central causal chain between power sharing and democracy and power sharing's ability to ensure minority representation in decision-making processes. The most important objective of inclusive power sharing is to include all relevant groups and give them access to important political decision-making. The second objective of sharing power is to divide the policy process and thereby grant groups inclusion and relevant autonomy. While most published work focuses on power sharing's ability aimed at establishing democracy as a peacebuilding tool, however, power sharing literature is often gender blind in its approach to conflict regulation as it ignores women and pays no heed to gender equality. Through this master's thesis, I have demonstrated that the implementation of political inclusive power sharing arrangements is significant and that there is evidence that these institutions increase women's share in national parliaments.

The second opposed assumption derived from the feminist literature proposes that inclusive power sharing institutions will not serve to strengthen women's empowerment and their broader political participation. The feminist literature argues that consociationalism and inclusive power sharing rules which emphasize group identities at the expense of all else are predisposed to a political crisis. Moreover, women's interests can easily fall by the wayside in moments of crisis. From a gender perspective, power sharing appears to 'sacrifice women's empowerment'. As mentioned, when everything is urgent, gender issues inevitably get placed on the backburner.

Throughout this thesis I have placed these two assumptions to the test by exploring the empirical patterns of inclusive power sharing arrangements and their effects on several measures of female inclusion in politics and women's empowerment in civil society. By utilizing both power sharing- and feminist literature I

have been mapping the territory and established a fundamental relationship between political inclusive power sharing, female inclusion and women's empowerment. As stated in the introductory chapter, the aim of this master's thesis is to contribute to the knowledge gap on what factors ensure full and inclusive representation in post-conflict settings, and why there are no gender progressive institutional mechanisms aimed at the inclusion of women and the integration of WPS-agenda norms in inclusive power-sharing frameworks.

To investigate these assumptions, I developed a quantitative research design using panel data of a global scope between 1975-2010 with nuanced scales and measurements, controlling for country- and year fixed effects. The linear fixed effects models (5.1) with lagged independent variables ( $t-1$ ) produced a complex answer: the results demonstrated that women were indeed included in terms of an increase in their share in national parliaments, however, in line with the argument in feminist research, women do not appear to have been empowered beyond numbers. The research design helped to highlight the importance of rethinking power sharing dynamics in ways that better recognize and accommodate the complexities of gender equality. As my results demonstrate, in other measurements of women's empowerment rather than just measuring mere representation in parliament, we do not see a positive effect. The time frame, scope, and the emphasis on inclusion in both power sharing and feminist literature, all implicate that the data sets fit the purpose of my research question. In other words, I have contributed to the knowledge gap on how power sharing needs to better accommodate the institutionalization of women's empowerment in the long run.

Let us look closer at the nuances of these complex results. The first finding suggests that power-sharing is associated with an increase in the proportion of women in parliaments in the 1975-2010 period. This means that the finding is in line with the consociational democracy literature on power sharing. Interestingly, much of feminist research would instead have expected a negative effect as power-sharing

is perceived to be illusively inclusive as it often has had a focus on the distribution of power among male-dominated parties. Importantly, however, many feminist scholars are hesitant to overly focus on formal representation as inclusions. In this, my results indicate that they have an important point. The second test, the impact of inclusive power sharing on women's empowerment in civil society, is here less conclusive and clearly does not produce evidence to suggest that women's empowerment advance in countries where inclusive power sharing has emerged. Summing up the empirical evidence provided, there is no indication that the implementation of inclusive power sharing has induced an increase in women's broader political participation-, civil liberties-, and civil society participation. Hence, the latter supports the more critical view from the feminist literature. Still, it may be important for further research to consider the effect of increased representation over time. In fact, one unit increase in the inclusive power sharing index cause 1.585 percentage increase in women's share in parliaments.

The results suggest that inclusive power sharing does not affect women's civil liberties, civil society participation, and their broader political representation. For example, in a country where the rivalry between the ethno-nationalist members of different communities is upheld as the primary basis of political activity, such as in Lebanon, the notion of empowerment becomes harder. Within the context of a divided society struggling to build a sustainable power-sharing democracy, this tension is often heightened and exacerbated. Although power sharing can be a crucial element in according to due recognition to conflicting group identities, it can nevertheless damage cross-communal relationships by ignoring the complexities of individual identity (Rebouche and Fearon 2005, 155). One example of this lack of progress concerns the position of women in politics. In Lebanon, the bulk of political representatives remain essentially sectarian, even though the coalitions being formed at present are reflective of much wider political agendas. How this tension might play out, in the long run, is uncertain. This is partly due to the Lebanese political system that only includes elite representation of the 18 recognized religious

confessions, without ensuring that women's empowerment is in place. The term 'window dressing' is interesting for further research, since the results are indicating that there is no real empowerment for women, even though they are included in parliamentary seats.

## **7.1 Is there an illusion in inclusion in power sharing?**

As demonstrated, this thesis carries huge importance for how we can develop research on power-sharing as the results allowed for a nuanced discussion and exploration about the cause-and-effect relationship between the variables. The decision I made when including several dependent variables enabled the interpretation to go beyond the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. If one simply looked at the result as women's representation in parliament as the dependent variable, we would only obtain a statistically significant and positive association. We would walk away thinking that inclusive power sharing arrangements really do spillover, and that women really are empowered in broader civil society. But the results through the other indices tell us that it is not a clear-cut relationship. Those women are truly represented in parliament, but they do not have any power in the broader and informal political institutions.

Power sharing arrangements are widely used as a peace-building tool after civil conflict and are also key to the institutionalization of democracy. Inclusive power sharing institutions have been instrumental in easing ethnic tensions and have been applied in multiple conflict resolution processes. While debates over the legitimacy of quotas for women often occur in majoritarian electoral systems, in political power-sharing arrangements, participation in the executive and legislature is often specified as a group proportion or quota. The centrality of quotas in power sharing arrangements can assist women in arguing for quotas for women's partici-

pation. For example, some agreements have made provisions for women's quotas as part of the power-sharing arrangement (as in the Burundi and Somalia examples of power sharing), although these have often been difficult to implement in practice. In Burundi, the inclusion of women in the power-sharing arrangements was also assisted by women's mobilization in the peace process, international support, and a mediator who paid attention to women's voices (Nelson Mandela in South Africa) (Bell 2018, 7).

The policy implications of these results are important as they provide policymakers with a better understanding of the relationship between inclusive power sharing and women's inclusion and empowerment in the context of peacebuilding. I have demonstrated that there is a need to carefully consider how this approach can be better used when seeking to create inclusive governance in the future. This is central as power sharing arrangements are widely used as a peace-building tool after civil conflict and are also seen as key to the institutionalization of democracy. Together with the substantive results, this thesis has demonstrated the shortcomings of power sharing theories in the context of women's empowerment. I have shown that political inclusive power sharing has little explanatory power when assessing women's empowerment. On a final note, further research and methodological advances can provide additional insights into how other types of power sharing affect women's empowerment in the long run.

## **7.2 Avenues for further research and policy recommendations**

To overcome the paradox of the illusion of inclusion in power sharing, this thesis invites scholars and researchers to assess further the implications of all types of power sharing on women and their long-term empowerment. For example, the results suggest that the following research question needs to be investigated in the future:

under what conditions would different types of power sharing provide incentives for giving away power? In other words, why would political leaders give away political power to women? The terms tokenism and window-shopping are interesting to assess in further research.

This thesis is important from both an academic and a policy perspective. Academically, I situate this thesis within the wide-ranging body of research within power sharing literature and feminist literature. As stated in the literature review, much of the feminist work on consociationalism sees consociational democracy as a barrier to the successful enactment of the WPS agenda (McCulloch 2019, 47). The connection back to the WPS is interesting for further research. Some scholars find some empirical evidence for this intuition: "references to gender equality are roughly five times more likely to occur in a power sharing agreement than one that does not contain such provisions, and that power sharing arrangements are seven times more likely to have gender quotas" (Bell and McNicholl 2019, 34). Until the present moment, there has been a huge knowledge gap in the feminist literature and the power sharing literature on the relationship between gender equality and power sharing institutions. On the one hand, the feminist literature has been based on qualitative research suggesting considerable tensions between the pursuit of gender equality and power sharing. On the other hand, the power sharing literature has failed in mentioning women and the gendered implications of these institutions.

An avenue for future research is studying thoroughly and identifying the effects of all types of power sharing on women's empowerment over time. For example, if a country is supporting a negotiation or a peace agreement process to end a civil conflict, and the ideas of implementing power sharing institutions come up, one should think of its consequences over time. For gender equality development over time, my findings show that even if in the right direction, inclusive power sharing does not affect women's empowerment, as the results are not statistically significant. This implies that it has very little to no effect on gender equality development over

time in a post-conflict environment. Women's political empowerment clashes with the realization of political inclusive power sharing institutions. Despite this, these institutions contribute to an increase in women's share in national parliaments.

In terms of policy recommendations, this thesis has shown that there is a crucial need for future policymakers and practitioners that seeks to empower women in the long run, to assess women's empowerment and the intersection of the formal and informal political institutions by reforming for example the political party structures, the electoral law, and the personal status laws. Despite the lack of sufficient attention to gender in power sharing frameworks, they remain a tool for promoting women's political participation in post-conflict societies. The line of reasoning from my results is that we must consider the inclusion of all women, both elite and non-elite. There is thus an affinity between power-sharing rules and gender protections worthy of further exploration. Moreover, there is a need to examine the impact of power sharing on women beyond strictly institutional dimensions to be able to capture broader dynamics, as I have done in this study. Based on these conclusions, future studies and practitioners should consider the following:

First, power sharing can be used as an entry point to secure greater women's representation and participation. Because the focus is already on different kinds of descriptive representations, 'it is in fact the most natural environment to be securing gender-based quotas' meaning that there is a need to address women's inclusion at this stage in the conflict resolution process (McCulloch 2019).

Second, power sharing should be considered a vehicle towards greater gender representation, but in order for it to succeed, gender needs to be expressly focused on to ensure that it is not subsumed by other identity factors such as ethnicity, religion, ethnonationalism, and political elite identity. Take into account that this thesis demonstrated that the adoption of power sharing frequently occurs in political arenas based on elite-negotiated power sharing. Policy-makers must develop a more inclusive and ethical project of power sharing, that goes beyond only

ethnocentric, to meet current challenges.

Third, a challenge with power sharing institutions is that formal institutions do not always adequately represent the politics "on the ground". This is often the case in conflict-torn societies where the need for political power sharing is most urgent. The complexity of measuring political power sharing institutions in post-conflict environments is to be able to capture both the formal and the informal institutions.

This thesis has not only provided a theoretical exploration of inclusive power sharing but also comprehensively examined how these institutions affect female inclusion and women's empowerment in all global states between 1975-2010. Through conducting a quantitative analysis with country-year fixed effects, the results show that power sharing has a positive and statistically significant increase in the proportions of seats held by women in national parliaments, in all global states from the period 1975-2010. However, there is a need for further research to focus on the long-run effect other power sharing typologies have on women's empowerment. This is crucial to be able to meet the challenges of transitions in deeply divided societies, as democracy must make room for everyone. While traditional feminist critics appear to discredit power-sharing systems as harmful to women due to the poor track record of women's participation in power-sharing institutions, I argue that the wider feminist criticism of elite-level political power sharing and the need for broader participation is left unexplored. There is thus an affinity between power-sharing rules and gender protections worthy of further exploration.

This study has paved the way for further studies, by examining why, despite its promises, power sharing often fails to deliver positive outcomes for women's empowerment in the broader civil society. As demonstrated, there are some limitations to establishing a common relationship between power sharing and feminist literature. Gendering political power sharing would require more than just descriptive representation of women as ethnic political party representatives. Women's

presence in formal politics is necessary but not a sufficient condition for a gender transformation in the long run. This line of reasoning is consistent with my results. The good news is that inclusive power sharing arrangements do not seem to have a negative effect on women's share in parliaments. In contrast, I find that inclusive power sharing arrangements do not affect women's broader political participation, women's civil liberties, and women's civil society participation. After several decades of implementing power sharing in post-conflict environments, the time is ripe for further scholarly work on their effects on gender equality.

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# Appendix A

## Appendix




Figure A.1: Correlation matrix of main variables of interest

Name	Tag in data set	Question	Scale
Women civil liberties index	(v2x-genc1)	Do women have the ability to make meaningful decisions in key areas of their lives?	Interval, low to high (0-1).
Women civil society participation index (v2x-gencs)		Do women have the ability to express themselves and to form and participate in groups?	Interval, low to high (0-1).
Women political participation index (v2x-genpp)		Are women descriptively represented in formal political positions?	Interval, low to high (0-1).

Table A.1: The dependent variables measuring women's empowerment and their clarifications (Sundstrom et al. 2015)




Figure A.2: The distribution of the four dependent variables.

Table A.2: All 180 countries included in the data set

Afghanistan	Egypt	Luxembourg	Singapore
Albania	El Salvador	Macedonia	Slovakia
Algeria	Eq. Guinea	Madagascar	Slovenia
Angola	Eritrea	Malawi	Solomon Is.
Argentina	Estonia	Malaysia	Somalia
Armenia	Ethiopia	Maldives	Soviet Union
Australia	Fiji	Mali	Spain
Austria	Finland	Malta	Sri Lanka
Azerbaijan	France	Mauritania	St. Lucia
Bahamas	FRG/Germany	Mauritius	Sudan
Bahrain	Gabon	Mexico	Suriname
Bangladesh	Gambia	Moldova	Swaziland
Barbados	GDR	Mongolia	Sweden
Belarus	Georgia	Montenegro	Switzerland
Belgium	Ghana	Morocco	Syria
Belize	Greece	Mozambique	Taiwan
Benin	Grenada	Myanmar	Tajikistan
Bhutan	Guatemala	Namibia	Tanzania
Bolivia	Guinea	Nepal	Thailand
Bosnia-Herz	Guinea-Bissau	Netherlands	Timor-Leste
Botswana	Guyana	New Zealand	Togo
Brazil	Haiti	Nicaragua	Trinidad-Tobago
Brunei	Honduras	Niger	Tunisia
Bulgaria	Hungary	Nigeria	Turkey
Burkina Faso	Iceland	North Korea	Turkmenistan
Burundi	India	Norway	UAE
C. Verde Is.	Indonesia	Oman	Uganda
Cambodia	Iran	P. N. Guinea	UK
Cameroon	Iraq	Pakistan	Ukraine
Canada	Ireland	Panama	Uruguay
Cent. Af. Rep.	Israel	Paraguay	USA
Chad	Italy	Peru	Uzbekistan
Chile	Jamaica	Philippines	Vanuatu
Colombia	Japan	Poland	Venezuela
Comoro Is.	Jordan	Portugal	Vietnam
Congo	Kazakhstan	PRC	W. Samoa
Costa Rica	Kenya	Qatar	Yemen
Cote d'Ivoire	Kuwait	ROK	Yemen (AR)
Croatia	Kyrgyzstan	Romania	Yemen (PDR)
Cuba	Laos	Russia	Yugoslavia
Cyprus	Latvia	Rwanda	Yugoslavia (FRY)
Czech Rep.	Lebanon	S. Africa	Zaire (Democ Republic Congo)
Czechoslovakia	Lesotho	Saudi Arabia	Zambia
Denmark	Liberia	Senegal	Zimbabwe
Djibouti	Libya	Serbia	
Dom. Rep.	Lithuania	Serbia and Montenegro	
Ecuador		Sierra Leone	

Table A.3: Testing for Endogeneity Bias: reverse causality test

Dependent Variable: Model:	inclusive (1)
<i>Variables</i>	
Women share parliaments	0.0088 (0.0056)
Women political empow.index	-0.0779 (0.1341)
Women civil liberties	-0.0337 (0.2023)
Women civil society	0.4659 (0.2516)
GDP per capita logged	-0.0706 (0.0607)
Petroleum product. per capita logged	0.0061 (0.0110)
intensity level in the country-year	0.0148 (0.0839)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>	
country	Yes
year	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>	
Observations	3,961
R <sup>2</sup>	0.88209
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.03074
<i>One-way (country) standard-errors in parentheses</i>	
<i>Signif. Codes: ***: 0.01, **: 0.05, *: 0.1</i>	

Table A.4: Results country fixed effects with year as variable

Dependent Variables: Model:	Women share parliaments (1)	Women political empow.index (2)	Women civil liberties (3)	Women civil society (4)
<i>Variables</i>				
inclusive	1.774 (0.5934)	0.0186 (0.0182)	-0.0052 (0.0157)	0.0123 (0.0162)
year	0.3836 (0.0321)	0.0100 (0.0006)	0.0060 (0.0006)	0.0085 (0.0005)
<i>Fixed-effects</i>				
country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<i>Fit statistics</i>				
Observations	5,022	5,411	5,490	5,490
R <sup>2</sup>	0.74338	0.83526	0.87936	0.87077
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.40498	0.48362	0.29040	0.49198

*One-way (country) standard-errors in parentheses*  
*Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1*

Table A.5: Results Pooled OLS country- fixed

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Wom.Share.Parl (1)	Wom.polit.parti (2)	Wom.civ.Lib (3)	Wom.civ.soci.parti (4)
Inclusive Power Sharing	2.060 (0.244)	0.016 (0.006)	0.008 (0.005)	0.025 (0.006)
GDP per capita logged	1.801 (0.305)	0.057 (0.007)	0.043 (0.006)	0.043 (0.006)
Petroleum product. per capita logged	0.303 (0.119)	0.008 (0.003)	0.018 (0.002)	0.022 (0.003)
Battle-related deaths	0.652 (0.199)	0.026 (0.005)	0.042 (0.004)	0.014 (0.004)
Post-2000 UNSCR 1325	6.360 (0.201)	0.148 (0.005)	0.084 (0.004)	0.124 (0.005)
Observations	3,964	4,335	4,410	4,410
R <sup>2</sup>	0.287	0.250	0.147	0.210
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.260	0.222	0.115	0.181
F Statistic	307.299 (df = 5; 3816)	278.368 (df = 5; 4177)	146.438 (df = 5; 4252)	226.042 (df = 5; 4252)

*Note:*

p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01

<sup>1</sup> The statistical model with fixed effects controls for the within-country specific factors, and the control variables. However, there might be other unobserved variables and temporal factors, that are even harder to control for, that might affect the relationship. In most country-year set-ups, it makes sense to include fixed effects because they control for these country specific factors that remain constant.

<sup>2</sup> Statistically speaking, we are looking at within-country variance, and in this case we observed that this relationship is negative, when you are not controlling for the countries. But it turns negative in the fixed effects model, which means that the difference in countries explained a lot why a country has inclusive power sharing arrangements, and why some countries have a higher share of women in parliaments.

<sup>3</sup> The difference in the coefficients in the pooled OLS compared to the linear fixed effects model, might be explained of high levels of uncertainty. Because when we control for all these time-invariant factors, the relationship is basically non-existing or it's hard to tell whether there is a relationship, because it is almost 0 in all cases. There are specific country factors that influence the inclusion and women in parliament variable. Specific factors within each country, for example the culture, that may affect the outcome.

Table A.6: Country-year linear fixed effects models lagged 3 years

Dependent Variables: Model:	Women's share parliament (1)	Women's political participation (2)	Women's civil society participation (3)	Women's civil liberties (4)
Variables				
Inclusive power sharing <sub>t-3</sub>	1.533 (0.5982)	0.0250 (0.0164)	0.0248 (0.0137)	0.0112 (0.0176)
GDP per capita logged <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.8263 (1.037)	-0.0156 (0.0211)	-0.0182 (0.0182)	-0.0041 (0.0192)
Petroleum product. per capita logged <sub>t-3</sub>	0.5575 (0.5073)	0.0048 (0.0088)	-0.0023 (0.0080)	-0.0057 (0.0097)
Intensity level/con ict country-year <sub>t-3</sub>	-0.7199 (0.5183)	-0.0196 (0.0105)	-0.0062 (0.0117)	-0.0325 (0.0136)
Inclusive power sharing <sub>t-3</sub> post_2000	0.2395 (0.4318)	0.0048 (0.0092)	0.0027 (0.0061)	0.0060 (0.0079)
Fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
country	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year				
Fit statistics				
Observations	3,997	4,338	4,406	4,406
R <sup>2</sup>	0.76972	0.84678	0.88311	0.88463
Within R <sup>2</sup>	0.02329	0.01427	0.01373	0.02071

One-way (country) standard-errors in parentheses  
 Signif. Codes: \*\*\*: 0.01, \*\*: 0.05, \*: 0.1