

Online appendix for ‘Local elites, civil resistance, and the responsiveness of rebel governance in Côte d’Ivoire’

Overview

This appendix complements the article ‘Local elites, civil resistance, and the responsiveness of rebel governance in Côte d’Ivoire’. The appendix elaborates on the conduct of the field research in Côte d’Ivoire, interview methodology, archival research, survey data, and analytical approach. It also presents an overview of all interviews underlying the analysis.

Fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire

The field research for this article was conducted over the course of five field visits that lasted for a total of eight months. The field visits included Abidjan, Bouaké, and Katiola (October–December 2017); Abidjan, Man, and Odienné (April–May 2018); Abidjan, Odienné, Man, and Vavoua (October–November 2018); Abidjan and Odienné (April–May 2019); and Abidjan, Vavoua, and Man (February 2020). During these field visits, I met with dozens of local stakeholders with first-hand information about rebel-civilian relations during the civil war and collected unique secondary data in several archives across the country.

Conducting field research in the case study areas demanded that I sought permission from both formal and informal authorities. I always informed the Ivorian Ministry of Interior (*Ministère de l’Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation*) about my fieldwork plans before travelling to the fieldwork locations. Once I arrived in a particular area, I always met with the prefect or sub-prefect to announce my presence in the area, inform them about the project, and ask for their cooperation. This practice of meet-and-greet ensured that I was not seen as a spy and that my project was officially sanctioned by the state authorities. However, at no time did representatives of the state try to influence where, how, and with whom I executed my field research.

I always requested an audience with the paramount chief (*chef de canton*) to inform him (it was always a man) about my fieldwork and ask for his assistance. Such meetings often took place outdoors and in the presence of the chief’s advisors and family. In line with local custom, I

provided the chief with two symbolic gifts. The chiefs' blessing and support was often critical for the success of the fieldwork.

Interview methodology

The article relies on interview material as one of several sources of evidence. This was critical for testing the theoretical argument given that there is very limited publicly available information about the dynamics of the civil war and rebel governance in the case study areas (cf. Wood, 2006).

Sample frame and response rate

For each case, I sought to interview local stakeholders that were knowledgeable about rebel-civilian relations during the civil war and that resided in the area during the studied time period (2002–2010). Of primary interests were local elites: traditional and religious leaders, local businessmen (and women), political leaders, government bureaucrats, and civil society representatives. I also interviewed individuals that in various capacities worked in or for the rebel administration, such as formal teachers, volunteer teachers, administrators, and political representatives, as well as citizens that remained in the occupied areas during the war. In each area, I took special care to interview chiefs representing the various ethnic communities present, Christian and Muslim religious leaders, women's leaders, youth leaders, and representatives from all major political parties (RDR, FPI, PDCI, and UCDPI). Table AI provides an overview of all interviews that the article builds on, including those not cited in the article.

93 interviews were conducted during field trips in 2017–2020. Most people approached agreed to an interview, especially those that were contacted through referral, even though some respondents were less willing to answer the most sensitive questions. For each case, I identified a number of relevant respondents from different categories, such as volunteer teachers, traders, chiefs, and religious leaders. Other interviewees were identified through using so-called snowball sampling, a form of convenience sampling that relies on respondents referring the researcher to other respondents through trusted personal networks. This sampling strategy has been shown to have clear benefits in marginalised or conflict-affected societies (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). A particularly useful entry strategy during the fieldwork was to start by interviewing individuals that were involved in facilitating education during the civil war. Wartime education proved to be a less sensitive interview topic, and possible respondents were easy to identify by visiting the main high schools in each locality. Not only did these interviews provide valuable information

about the facilitation of education itself, it also helped me to start discussing other more sensitive aspects of rebel governance during the war.

The interview table indicates whether respondents were identified in advance or through referral.

Table AI. Overview of interviews and interview methods

<i>Respondent</i>	<i>Case focus</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Format</i>	<i>Length</i>	<i>Recording</i>	<i>Source</i>
Hyacinthe Bley, researcher	All cases	2017-10-19	Abidjan	In person, at noisy café	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Katharina Heitz-Tokpa, researcher	All cases	2017-10-20	Abidjan	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Amani Michel N'Guessan, former minister of defence	All cases	2017-10-24	Abidjan	In person, at home	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi	All cases	2017-10-24	Abidjan	In person, at home	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Krekre Firmin, researcher	All cases	2017-11-02	Abidjan	In person, at offices	1 hr 30 min	Yes	Referral
UN representative	All cases	2017-11-03	Abidjan	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Businessman	Katiola	2017-11-09	Abidjan	In person, at offices	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Referral
FN representative	All cases	2017-11-12	Abidjan	In person, in quiet courtyard	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Alain Sissoko, researcher	All cases	2020-02-10	Abidjan	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Hyacinthe Bley, researcher	Man	2020-02-11	Abidjan	In person, at quiet café	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Katharina Heitz-Tokpa, researcher	Man	2020-02-11	Abidjan	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Ousmane Zina	All cases	2017-11-16	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Teacher	Bouaké	2017-11-16	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
NGO representative	Bouaké	2017-11-19	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
C2E member	All cases	2017-11-20	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Referral
Humanitarian aid worker	Bouaké	2017-11-21	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Civil servant	Bouaké	2017-11-22	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Referral
Member of La Centrale	All cases	2017-11-22	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Referral
FN ex-combatants	Bouaké	2017-11-22	Bouaké	In person, in quiet courtyard, group interview	1 hr 30 min	Yes	Referral

Journalist	Bouaké	2017-11-23	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Baoulé chief	Bouaké	2017-11-23	Bouaké	In person, at offices	1 hr 45 min	Yes	Referral
Civil servant	Fronan	2017-11-24	Fronan	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Referral
NGO representatives	Katiola	2017-11-24	Katiola	In person, at offices, group interview	Ca. 1 hr 15 min	Notes only	Referral
Teacher	Man	2018-05-02	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Teacher	Man	2018-05-02	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Yacouba NGO representatives	Man	2018-05-03	Man	In person, at offices, group interview	1 hr 30 min	Yes	Referral
Volunteer teacher	Man	2018-05-03	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Yacouba NGO representative	Man	2018-05-04	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Dioula NGO representative	Man	2018-05-05	Man	In person, at busy café	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Referral
Journalist	Man	2018-05-07	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Youth leaders	Man	2018-05-07	Man	In person, at home, group interview	Ca. 1 hr 30 min	Notes only	Referral
Businessmen	Man	2018-05-08	Man	In person, at offices, group interview	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Referral
Yacouba and Wê chiefs	Man	2018-05-08	Man	In person, at offices, group interview	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Female businesswoman	Man	2018-05-09	Man	In person, at busy market	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Referral
Journalist	Man	2018-05-27	Man	Interview by Abel Gbala, at offices	45 min	Yes	Referral
Yacouba chiefs	Man	2018-10-31	Man	In person, at offices	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Youth leader	Man	2018-10-31	Man	In person, at home	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Yacouba women's leader	Man	2018-11-03	Man	In person, at home	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Wê women's leader	Man	2018-11-03	Man	In person, at home	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Journalist	Man	2020-02-24	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Referral
Union leader	Man	2020-02-25	Man	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Women's leader	Man	2020-02-25	Man	In person, at calm restaurant	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame

Yacouba chief	Man	2020-02-26	Man	In person, at offices	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Dioula community leader	Man	2020-02-26	Man	In person, at offices	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Women's leaders	Man	2020-02-26	Man	In person, at home, group interview	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Dioula women's leaders	Man	2020-02-27	Man	In person, at home, group interview	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Dioula chief	Man	2020-02-27	Man	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Yacouba chiefs	Man	2020-02-28	Man	In person, at offices, group interview	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Teacher	Odienné	2018-05-11	Odienné	In person, at quiet café	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Referral
Civil servant	Odienné	2018-05-12	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Referral
Journalist	Odienné	2018-05-14	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 1 hr 30 min	Notes only	Referral
Teacher	Odienné	2018-05-14	Odienné	In person, at quiet café	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Volunteer teacher	Odienné	2018-05-15	Odienné	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Civil servant	Odienné	2018-05-16	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Volunteer teacher	Odienné	2018-05-16	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Civil servant	Odienné	2018-05-16	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 30 min	Notes only	Referral
Volunteer teacher	Odienné	2018-05-17	Odienné	In person, in conference room	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Muslim leader	Odienné	2018-10-24	Odienné	In person, public place, busy	Ca. 30 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Civilian council member	Odienné	2018-10-24	Odienné	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Referral
School director	Odienné	2018-10-25	Odienné	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame
School director	Odienné	2018-10-26	Odienné	In person, at offices	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Journalist	Odienné	2018-10-27	Odienné	In person, in conference room	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Youth leader	Odienné	2018-10-27	Odienné	In person, at quiet café	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Malinké women's leaders	Odienné	2018-10-29	Odienné	In person, in conference room, group interview	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame

Civilian council member	Odienné	2019-04-23	Odienné	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Businessman	Odienné	2019-04-23	Odienné	In person, at offices	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Female businesswoman	Odienné	2019-04-23	Odienné	In person, at home	45 min	Yes	Referral
Women's leader	Odienné	2019-04-24	Odienné	In person, in conference room	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
FN ex-combatants	Odienné	2019-04-24	Odienné	In person, public place, busy, group interview	Ca. 1 hr 30 min	Notes only	Referral
Union leaders	Odienné	2019-04-25	Odienné	In person, in conference room, group interview	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Women's leader	Odienné	2019-04-26	Odienné	In person, at offices	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Teacher	Odienné	2019-04-27	Odienné	In person, at home	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
NGO representative	Odienné	2019-04-27	Odienné	In person, at offices	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Small business owner	Vavoua	2018-11-05	Vavoua	In person, at quiet restaurant	15 min	Yes	Referral
Dioula businessman	Vavoua	2018-11-05	Vavoua	In person, at office	30 min	Yes	Sample frame
Chiefs	Vavoua	2018-11-06	Vavoua	In person, at offices, group interview	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Politician	Vavoua	2018-11-06	Vavoua	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Referral
Yacouba chief	Vavoua	2018-11-07	Vavoua	In person, at home	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Women's leader	Vavoua	2018-11-08	Vavoua	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Farmer	Vavoua	2018-11-08	Vavoua	In person, at church courtyard	1 hr	Yes	Referral
Civil servant	Vavoua	2018-11-09	Vavoua	In person, at offices	45 min	Yes	Sample frame
Dioula youth leaders	Vavoua	2018-11-09	Vavoua	In person, at offices, group interview	1 hr	Yes	Sample frame
Gouro chiefs	Vavoua	2020-02-17	Vavoua	In person, at home	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Yacouba youth leaders	Vavoua	2020-02-17	Vavoua	In person, at offices, group interview	1 hr 15 min	Yes	Sample frame
Akan youth leader	Vavoua	2020-02-17	Vavoua	In person, at offices	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame
RDR politicians	Vavoua	2020-02-18	Vavoua	In person, at home, group interview	Ca. 45 min	Notes only	Sample frame

Mossi chiefs	Vavoua	2020-02-18	Vavoua	In person, in courtyard, group interview	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
PDCI politicians	Vavoua	2020-02-19	Vavoua	In person, in courtyard, group interview	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
Akan youth leaders	Vavoua	2020-02-19	Vavoua	In person, at offices, group interview	Ca. 30 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Muslim leader	Vavoua	2020-02-19	Vavoua	In person, at mosque	Ca. 1 hr	Notes only	Sample frame
FPI politicians	Vavoua	2020-02-20	Vavoua	In person, in courtyard, group interview	Ca. 1 hr 15 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Sokuya chiefs	Vavoua	2020-02-21	Vavoua	In person, at home, group interview	Ca. 1 hr 15 min	Notes only	Sample frame
Volunteer teacher	Vavoua	2020-02-21	Vavoua	In person, at home	Ca. 30 min	Notes only	Sample frame

Interview format

The interviews were semi-structured, meaning that the interviews followed a pre-determined set of questions and themes, while at the same time being open enough for the respondents to develop their own reasoning and allowing for changes in terms of sequence and form (Kvale, 2007: 50–51). The interview protocol was refined and updated following each field visit, often in conversation with my research assistants. All interviews were conducted face-to-face and lasted between 30 and 105 minutes. Almost all interviews were carried out in French. If the respondents consented, interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed (in French) by my research assistants. Other interviews were unrecorded and instead documented through extensive field notes taken by me and my research assistants during the interview.

Below, I provide examples of the most important general questions asked during the interviews. The questions are translated into English. Most respondents were asked the majority of these questions, even though there was some variation depending on the type of respondent and their particular role during the war. More specific questions about education, for instance, were only asked to people that in some capacity were involved in wartime education, such as teachers, school directors, and volunteer teachers.

Most interviews were conducted together with an Ivorian research assistant. Throughout my field research, I worked closely together with two research assistants, Abel Gbala and Abiba Koné. Their main tasks included facilitating interviews, providing interpretation when needed, and advising me on how to approach respondents. Working closely with research assistants means that not only the positionality and reflexivity of the researcher, but also that of the research assistants, must be taken into consideration (Turner, 2010). The gender, language skills, and ethnic background of my research assistants certainly influenced our rapport with the respondents, but because they had very different backgrounds, I could use this to my advantage and access different groups of respondents. Each interview was followed by a debriefing session where we discussed the content of the interview responses, the flow of the interview, and possible biases of the respondents. These post-interview discussions produced useful metadata that could be used when evaluating the validity and reliability of the interview data.

Selected interview questions

- Can you tell me what the cause of the political-military crisis was?¹
- Can you tell me how your community is organised?

¹ Ivorians often refer to the civil war and period between 2002 and 2010 as the ‘political-military crisis’.

- What is the role of customary chiefs?
- Are there any other local authorities that are important in your community?
- Can you describe what local politics looked like in [area] before the beginning of the crisis in 2002?
 - Who were the most important politicians in [area] before the crisis?
 - Did the customary chiefs play a role in local politics in [area] before the crisis?
- Can you describe what life looked like in [area] during the crisis between 2002 and 2010?
- How was the relation between the civilian population and the Forces Nouvelles in [area] during the crisis?
- How was the relation between local political leaders and the Forces Nouvelles in [area] during the crisis?
- How was the relation between the customary chiefs and the Forces Nouvelles in [area] during the crisis?
- Was there a dialogue between the civilian population and the Forces Nouvelles in [area] during the crisis?
- Did the civilian population organise themselves in any way to influence the behaviour of the Forces Nouvelles in [area]?
- Did the civilian population ever protest to influence the behaviour of the Forces Nouvelles in [area]?
 - If so, who organised those manifestations?
- Who was in charge of maintaining public order and security in [area] during the crisis?
- To whom would you turn if you were the victim of a crime in [area] during the crisis?
- How did the schools work in [area] during the crisis?
 - Did the Forces Nouvelles do anything to help the schools?
- How did the hospitals work in [area] during the crisis?
 - Did the Forces Nouvelles do anything to help the hospitals?
- Did the Forces Nouvelles collect taxes in [area] during the crisis?
 - Can you describe how the Forces Nouvelles' taxation system worked?
- Finally, is there something else about civilian life during the crisis that you think is important but that we have not discussed yet?

Ethical and security considerations

A first moral and legal imperative was to apply for ethical approval for the field research from the Swedish Regional Review Board in Uppsala (*Etikprövningsnämnden*).² This body, which is

² *Etikprövningsnämnden* was replaced by *Etikprövningsmyndigheten* in January 2019.

mandated to vet the ethics of any research involving human subjects in accordance with Swedish law, approved the project on 7 June 2017.³

Two prime ethical considerations were important for the conduct of the field research. First, I took active measures to ensure that my respondents did not suffer any additional risks to their well-being due to their participation. All respondents provided their informed oral consent before I initiated the interviews, meaning that they were provided with information about the project and their rights before the interview to make sure that they could make a fully informed decision as to whether to talk to me. Using an oral consent procedure instead of a written protocol ensured that there was no written record linking participants to my project (Wood, 2006: 380). In line with the rules and regulations of the Ethical Review Board at the institution where the research was conducted, the names of most respondents are kept confidential. This decision was communicated to the respondents before the interviews. Holding the identity of the respondents confidential was motivated both by the sensitive nature of the research topic and to maximise participation in the study. Moreover, I took several steps to ensure the protection of digital data and communication by following ten guidelines for digital security during field research (Van Baalen, 2018).

Second, I sought to ensure that talking about one's experiences during the civil war caused as little psychological and emotional stress as possible for the respondents, so-called re-traumatisation (Brounéus, 2011). The oral informed consent protocol partly contributed to this end in the sense of empowering the respondents to take command of the interview situation. I also made it clear that I was not primarily interested to learn about their personal experiences with violence, but rather wanted to talk about everyday civilian life during the civil war. This meant that most respondents did not actually talk too much about their most traumatising experiences during the war. I also had the feeling that talking about how civilians negotiated with or resisted the rebels had an empowering effect on the respondents similar to what (Wood, 2006, 2003: 380) refers to as 'pleasure in agency'. Respondents often recounted with pride how they organised during the war and navigated the tough war years.

Archival research

In order to triangulate and contextualise the interview data, I also collected and read more than 1,500 newspaper articles accessed in Ivorian archives. The main archives used were the library of the Centre de Recherche et d'Action pour la Paix (CERAP) and the Autorité Nationale de la

³ Reference number 2017/217.

Presse (ANP) in Abidjan. Three newspapers were chosen based on their coverage of the rebel-held areas and their affiliations: Nord-Sud Quotidien, Le Patriote, and Le Jour. Nord-Sud Quotidien generally favoured the main opposition party, the Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR), whereas Le Patriote was more sympathetic to the FN political wing. Le Jour was politically independent and provided the most neutral accounts of the dynamics of the civil war. In addition, I also studied five years of news coverage in the unique local newspaper Le Tambour. The newspaper was founded by local journalist Doumbia Balla Moïse and published between 2003 and 2007. While the newspaper was officially independent, it operated with the permission of the rebel authorities.⁴

With the exception of Le Jour, these newspapers generally favoured the political opposition or the rebels over the government. This meant that the reporting suffered from significant biases, but it also meant that the journalists held much greater access to rebel-held territories. This made their reporting both more extensive and detailed. While this would constitute an important limitation in terms of comparing government and rebel-held localities, there is less reason to suspect that this influenced their reporting across the FN-controlled localities in this study. To be sure, I also made an effort to cross-reference (as far as possible) the reporting on critical events in the government aligned newspaper Notre Voie and the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) aligned Fraternité Matin.

Below, I provide full references for the newspaper articles cited in the article. Copies of all cited newspaper articles are available from the author upon request.

References to newspaper articles

Fraternité Matin (2001) Tableau des résultats définitifs [Table of final results]. 2 April.

Le Jour (2002) Conflit de leadership à Man : Bleu-Lainé et Blaise Blon à couteaux tirés [Conflict over leadership in Man: Bleu-Lainé and Blaise Blon at loggerheads]. 28 November.

Le Jour (2003) Zacharia Koné hante les étudiants [Zacharia Koné haunts the students]. 8 May.

Le Jour (2006) Man : La garnison militaire assainit la ville [Man: The military garrison cleans the city]. 7 June.

Le Jour (2008a) M. Théodule Diro Lahuet, maire RDR de Vavoua : 'Le pays Gouro est acquis à la cause de ADO... le FPI est inexistant à Vavoua' [Mr. Théodule Diro Lahuet, RDR mayor of Vavoua: 'Gouro country is behind the cause of ADO... the FPI is non-existent in Vavoua']. 25 January.

⁴ Interview, Doumbia Balla Moïse, journalist, Man, 28 May 2018.

Le Jour (2008b) Forces Nouvelles après le départ de Zacharia Koné : Konaté Sidiki demande pardon [Forces Nouvelles after the departure of Zacharia Koné: Konaté Sidiki apologises. 21 May.

Le Jour (2009) Crise à l'UDPCI : Mabri interdit de séjour dans la région des Montanges ? [Crisis in the UDPCI: Mabri forbidden to stay in the Montanges region?]. 20 July.

Le Patriote (2005a) Région du Denguélé : La sante et l'école en panne [Denguélé region: Health and schools fail]. 10 March.

Le Patriote (2005b) Man, Odienné, Séguéla, Boundiali, Bouaké, Korhogo : Le pays profond marche pour exiger le départ de Gbagbo [Man, Odienné, Séguéla, Boundiali, Bouaké, Korhogo: The entire country protests to demand the departure of Gbagbo]. 31 October.

Le Patriote (2008) Après six ans de crise : Vavoua retrouve le sourire [After six years of crisis: Vavoua smiles again]. 14 April.

Le Tambour (2003) Odienné : Passation de charge a l'état major C.O. Kone Alpha remplace Amdallah [Odienné: Handover in command, C.O. Kone Alpha replaces Amdallah. 23 April.

Le Tambour (2004) Man : Marche de soutien a Soro le sursaut Ivoirien reussi le pari [Man: Manifestation in support of Soro, the hope of Ivorians]. August.

Le Tambour (2005a) Zone nord ouest – Odienné renait [Northwestern zone – Odienné reborn]. February.

Le Tambour (2005b) Odienné : La grenade securite nettoie [Odienné: The security grenade cleans]. April.

Le Tambour (2005c) Odienné : Ben Laden accueilli comme un roi [Odienné: Ben Laden welcomed like a king]. September.

Le Tambour (2007a) Man : Séminaire sur la fluidité routière : Les taxes revus à la baisse dans la zone ouest [Man: Seminar on traffic flow: Taxes reduced in Western zone]. January.

Le Tambour (2007b) Man : Opération ville propre : Le commandant Loss donne le coup d'envoi [Man: Operation clean city: Commander Loss kicks it off]. July/August.

Nord-Sud Quotidien (2006) Odienné : Probable mutation du com zone : Les populations s'opposent à la décision [Odienné: Likely transfer of the comzone: The population opposes the decision]. 28 February.

Nord-Sud Quotidien (2008a) Communiqué de presse : Le conseil militaire relève Zackaria Koné de ses fonctions [Press release: The military council relieves Zackaria Koné of his command]. 19 May.

Nord-Sud Quotidien (2008b) Examens de fin d'année : Odienné encore en tête [Final exams: Odienné still ahead]. 18 July.

Nord-Sud Quotidien (2008c) L'Ouest : Le bazaar des partis politiques [The West: The bazaar of political parties]. 2 August.

Nord-Sud Quotidien (2008d) Deux militaires cambrioleurs tués, 300 kilos de drogue saisis [Two military criminals killed, 300 kilos of drugs seized]. 23 November.

Survey data

The survey data referenced in Figure 2 and 3 in the article comes from a nationwide household survey, the Households Living Standards Survey (HLSS), conducted by the Ivorian National Institute of Statistics (INS) in 2008.⁵ This survey, co-administered with the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), focused specifically on documenting the consequences of the civil war, and includes a rich set of information on exposure to the war, living standards, and demographics for 14,668 individuals in rebel-held areas selected using a stratified multi-stage random sampling procedure. The sampling procedure included the random selection of 630 urban and rural enumeration areas across the country. Surveyed households were selected using random walks and visited by trained enumerators between June and September 2008 (INS, 2008). The fact that the survey took place during a relatively peaceful period of the crisis and more than a year after the official dismantling of the demilitarised zone minimises the risk of systematic sampling bias due to insecurity and violence. Nevertheless, as with all findings based on surveys in civil war-affected areas, the findings should be interpreted with the politically unstable context in mind. Figure 2 and 3 in the paper are based on the responses to the following four survey questions:

- Have you been a victim of violence during the crisis? *Avez-vous été victime de violence liée à la crise ?*
- Have you lost your plantation, livestock, or any other productive assets due to the crisis? *Du fait de la crise, avez-vous perdu votre plantation, élevage, ou autres actifs de production ?*
- Have you been forced to hide due to the crisis? *Avez-vous été contraint de vous cacher du fait de la crise ?*
- Do you feel afraid for no apparent reason due to the crisis? *Vous arrive t-il d'avoir peur sans raison apparente du fait de la crise ?*

⁵ The data was provided by the INS upon request.

Analytical approach

Assessing the causal process, as opposed to only investigating the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, is key for assessing the validity of a theory (Bennett & Checkel, 2015). The within-case analysis focuses on identifying so-called causal process observations (CPOs), ‘an insight or piece of data that provides information about context or mechanism and contributes a different kind of leverage in causal inference’ (Collier, Brady & Seawright, 2010: 184–185). Process tracing in this study, hence, entails observing (or not observing) CPOs that are theoretically derived from the argument. To explore both outcomes and processes, I systematically pose the same set of theoretically derived questions to the cases (George & Bennett, 2005). I present these question below.

Responsiveness of rebel governance

- *Civilian involvement:* Did the FN solicit the views of civilian representatives on local governance on a regular basis? Did the FN take input from civilian representatives seriously?
- *Security governance:* Did FN police forces effectively protect civilians from crime? Did the FN establish clear codes of conduct that effectively forbade and sanctioned rebel soldiers from abusing civilians? Did the FN establish effective mechanisms through which civilians could file complaints against abusive rebel soldiers?
- *Taxation:* Did the FN establish a taxation regime that civilians perceived as somewhat fair? Did the FN establish effective mechanisms through which civilians could file complaints if they were taxed too much or too often?
- *Service provision:* Did the FN provide education for civilians? Did the FN conduct public cleaning campaigns? Did the FN help rehabilitate or maintain damaged infrastructure?

Local elites’ political networks

- Did local elites control access to key resources, such as land, jobs, protection, and state services? Did citizens depend on these resources? Were local elites’ political networks nested in local authority structures? To what degree were these local authority structures capable of regulating social life among the population?

Causal process

- Did local elites successfully mobilise civil resistance against the FN? How disruptive was this civil resistance? Did these acts of civil resistance impose costs on the FN? Did the FN make concessions on local governance to local elites? How significant were those concessions?

Alternative explanations

The comparative analysis in the article focuses on assessing the most plausible alternative explanation, namely, the role of ethnopolitical ties between the rebels and the population. Here, I assess six additional alternative explanations outlined in Table 1 in the article: access to lootable resources, the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, the area's strategic importance, the role of the FN's central command, local commanders' respect for human rights, and prewar ties between local elites and local commanders.

Access to lootable resources

A first plausible alternative explanation is that differences in rebel responsiveness are the result of an area's resource endowments. Rebels with access to lootable resources are expected to face greater difficulties in recruiting disciplined soldiers (Weinstein, 2007), have fewer incentives to nurture good relations with the civilian population (Hazen, 2013; Huang, 2016), and make local commanders more difficult to discipline for the rebel leadership (Lidow, 2016), all of which may impact the responsiveness of rebel governance. Both rebel foot soldiers and local commanders did, however, have ample opportunity for enrichment in the four case study areas, meaning that access to lootable resources cannot account for the differences between them.

FN forces in Odienné, where rebel responsiveness was high, had access to significant lootable resources. Although Ousmane Coulibaly was subjected to much less scrutiny than many of the other zone commanders due to the remote location of Odienné, there is evidence that he made substantial profits by taxing the cross-border trade with Guinea and Mali. He also profited from diamond and gold mining around Odienné. According to Frindéthié (2016: 178), Ousmane Coulibaly made these profits through 'a vast racketeering system and a profitable network of illicit diamond and gold trafficking'. Odienné was further located along one of two cocoa smuggling routes, running from Man in the central-west to the border of Burkina Faso. This illegal

cocoa trafficking was estimated to yield some US\$ 30 million per year, of which significant amounts most plausibly enriched the zone commander of Odienné (Global Witness, 2007: 37).

There was also ready access to lootable resources in Man, primarily from the exploitation of timber and from taxing agricultural exports like cocoa. Heitz-Tokpa (2013: 250), for instance, likens the rebels in Man to ‘meticulous administrators skimming off surplus as much as possible’, especially through an ‘abusive exploitation of the forests and forest reserves’. High-ranking rebels also profited from taxing local businesses and using the money to invest in hotels and property. FN factions that benefitted economically from the war defended these gains at heavy costs, for example, by clashing with zone commander Losseni Fofana to defend their economic interests (UNSC, 2009: 17).

The rebels in Vavoua also had access to lootable resources, including diamonds and agricultural rents. The FN’s involvement in diamond mining around Vavoua is well-established (Guesnet, Müller & Schure, 2009; UNSC, 2009). Rebel forces also made large profits from taxing the cocoa trade redirected towards Mali (Global Witness, 2007: 34). Zakaria Koné personally controlled these revenues, of which very little went to the FN’s central revenue collection agency (Guesnet, Müller & Schure, 2009: 19). Zakaria Koné’s successor Ouattara Issiaka made equally large profits. A UN report, for instance, estimates that Ouattara Issiaka made some 1.2 million US\$ in annual profits from taxing the cocoa trade in Vavoua (UNSC, 2009: 56).

UN peacekeeping presence

A second alternative explanation is that the variation in rebel responsiveness was due to differences in the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. Peacekeepers increase the costs of civil resistance, for instance, because it has a more damaging effect on rebel legitimacy and makes repression less feasible. Local elites in areas with a UN peacekeeping presence may, hence, have greater bargaining leverage than local elites in areas without peacekeepers. This can, however, not explain the difference I observe, since all four localities were close to a UN peacekeeping base. The United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) had military bases in both Odienné and Man. Vavoua was located close to two larger UN deployments, the bases in Séguéla and Bonoufla, and UN peacekeepers patrolled through the area on a regular basis. Residents in all four localities further confirmed that there was a significant UN presence, but that the peacekeepers generally did little to influence relations between the FN and the civilian population.

Strategic importance

A third alternative explanation is that the responsiveness of rebel governance differed because the strategic value of the three areas differed. Arjona (2016: 74–75), for instance, asserts that rebels have lower incentives to avoid civil resistance in areas that are militarily important. While there was variation in strategic importance across the four cases, this variation cannot account for the difference in rebel responsiveness. Man and Vavoua were located close to the demilitarised zone that separated the country and, thus, held higher strategic value than Odienné, which was located in the rebellion's rear-guard. This can, however, not explain why rebel responsiveness was higher in northern Man than in southern Man and Vavoua, two localities of equal strategic importance. Likewise, strategic importance is unlikely to drive the results given that, for most of the studied time period, hostilities were low and government and rebel forces were separated by a combination of UN peacekeeping and French intervention forces. This separation, and the conventional character of the war, limited the threat of enemy attacks in Man and Vavoua. Thus, territorial contestation cannot account for the variation in rebel responsiveness.

FN central command control

A fourth plausible alternative explanation is that differences in rebel responsiveness were due to principal-agent problems between the central rebel command and local commanders (Hoover Green, 2016). When the central command has greater control over local commanders they are more likely to successfully impose discipline and force commanders to implement their governance policies. Since central command control was moderate in all areas, this cannot account for the difference in rebel responsiveness. All local commanders operated with significant autonomy and central command control was not high in any of the cases (Fofana, 2012). All areas were easy to monitor due to their location along major road axes. Representatives of the rebel leadership, including secretary Guillaume Soro himself, visited all localities on multiple occasions. Moreover, the rebel leadership maintained a demonstrated military capacity and willingness to remove disloyal commanders by force in all four sectors; in Odienné (in 2003 and 2005), Man (in 2003), and Vavoua (in 2008). In all instances, the FN deployed loyal factions and commanders to dispose of troublesome commanders by force.

Local commander respect for human rights

A fifth alternative explanation is that individual commander's concerns for human rights account for the difference in rebel responsiveness across the cases. Experts in Abidjan, as well as

respondents in the case study areas, often alluded to this. Respondents in Odienné, for instance, described Ousmane Coulibaly as a good person with great religious devotion and a sense of responsibility towards the civilian population. However, Ousmane Coulibaly showed little regard for human life and dignity more generally. According to HRW (2011: 86), troops under Ousmane Coulibaly's command committed several abuses of the civilian population in the battle for Abidjan in 2011, including murder, torture, and arbitrary detentions. And during his time as a commander of the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) in western Côte d'Ivoire, Ousmane Coulibaly oversaw troops that committed 'grave international crimes', including the summary execution of more than 50 Liberian mercenaries (HRW, 2011: 86).

Zone commander Losseni Fofana of Man was equally unconcerned about human rights. Losseni Fofana commanded the FN troops that played 'a key role' in the Duékoué massacre on 29 March 2011. According to HRW (2011: 107), 'no credible action appears to have been taken by Loss [Fofana] either to prevent the crimes or to punish those responsible in his ranks'. Thus, personal concern for human rights and the well-being of the civilian population cannot explain why Ousmane Coulibaly and Losseni Fofana, two commanders with a documented record of human rights violations, were more responsive to civilian preferences in their governance than Zakaria Koné, a commander with no documented record of grave human rights violations. Nor can it explain why Losseni Fofana, the zone commander of both northern and southern Man, governed these two sectors in such different ways.

Prewar and ethnic ties between local elites and zone commanders

A sixth and final alternative explanation is that rebel responsiveness differed across the cases because local elites had prewar or ethnic ties to local commanders. This can, however, not explain the variation given that none of the commanders had strong ties to local elites. FN commanders—including Ousmane Coulibaly (Odienné), Losseni Fofana (Man), and Zakaria Koné (Vavoua)—generally belonged to the Ivorian armed forces before the civil war. The three commanders concerned here all belonged to a class of junior army officers that left the army during the purges by General Robert Gueï in 1999 and sought refuge in Burkina Faso. As a result, none of these commanders had any prewar ties to the population in the localities they later came to govern. While local citizens often joined the FN over the course of the civil war, the conventional nature of the war meant that the rebels captured cities through superior military force, rather than by slowly infiltrating the area through guerrilla warfare tactics. FN forces were, thus, largely perceived as outsiders and military men in all studied localities.

Nor did zone commanders share ethnic ties to the population in any of the localities. In fact, this was an intentional strategy, since the rebel leadership actively mimicked the state policy of appointing zone commanders outside their home regions to counteract the ‘centrifugal’ tendencies of local commanders to seek greater autonomy (Péclard et al. 2019: 19). Ousmane Coulibaly belonged to the Senoufo ethnic group and came from Siempurgo outside Boundiali in north-central Côte d’Ivoire, yet governed the capital of the Malinké ethnic group in the north-western corner of the country. While the Senoufo and Malinké are sometimes lumped together as ‘Northerners’, this clouds the fact that these groups have different cultures, social organisation, and religion. Likewise, Zakaria Koné, a Malinké from Séguélon outside Odienné, was assigned to govern Vavoua, a heterogenous ethnic area where the Sokuya and Gouro constitute the largest groups. Finally, Losseni Fofana, who governed the Yacouba-dominated southern Man and Dioula-dominated northern Man, came from Mankono in central Côte d’Ivoire and belonged to the Koyaga ethnic group.

Bibliography

- Arjona, Ana (2016) *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- van Baalen, Sebastian (2018) ‘Google wants to know your location’: The ethical challenges of fieldwork in the digital age. *Research Ethics* 14(4): 1–17.
- Bennett, Andrew & Jeffrey T Checkel, eds (2015) *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytical Tool*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brounéus, Karen (2011) In-depth interviewing: The process, skill and ethics of interviews in peace research. In: Kristine Höglund & Magnus Öberg (eds) *Understanding Peace Research*. Oxon, UK: Routledge, 130–145.
- Cohen, Nissim & Tamar Arieli (2011) Field research in conflict environments: Methodological challenges and snowball sampling. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(4): 423–435.
- Collier, David; Henry E Brady & Jason Seawright (2010) Sources of leverage in causal inference: Toward an alternative view of methodology. In: Henry E Brady & David Collier (eds) *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 161–200.
- Fofana, Moussa (2012) *Ethnographie des trajectoires sociales des jeunes enrôlés dans la rébellion en Côte d’Ivoire* [Ethnography of the social trajectories of young recruits in the rebellion in Côte d’Ivoire]. Phd dissertation. Bouaké, Côte d’Ivoire: Université Alassane Ouattara.
- Frindéthié, Kokroa Martial (2016) *From Lumumba to Gbagbo: African in the Eddy of the Euro-American Quest for Exceptionalism*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company Publishers.

- George, Alexander L & Andrew Bennett (2005) *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Global Witness (2007) *Hot Chocolate: How Cocoa Fuelled the Conflict in Côte d'Ivoire*. Report. Washington D.C.: Global Witness.
- Guesnet, Lena; Marie Müller & Jolien Schure (2009) Natural resources in Côte d'Ivoire: Fostering crisis or peace? The cocoa, diamond, gold and oil sectors. Brief. Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion.
- Hazen, Jennifer M (2013) *What Rebels Want: Resources and Supply Networks in Wartime*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Heitz-Tokpa, Katharina Elisabeth (2013) Trust and distrust in rebel-held Côte d'Ivoire. Phd dissertation. Basel, Switzerland: University of Basel.
- Hoover Green, Amelia (2016) The commander's dilemma: Creating and controlling armed group violence. *Journal of Peace Research* 53(5): 619–632.
- HRW (2011) 'They killed them like it was nothing': The need for justice for Côte d'Ivoire's post-election crimes. Report. New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Huang, Reyko (2016) *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- INS (2008) Enquete sur le niveau de vie des menages en Côte d'Ivoire [Household survey in Côte d'Ivoire]. Final report. Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire: Institut National de la Statistique.
- Kvale, Steinar (2007) *Doing Interviews*. London, UK: Sage Publications.
- Lidow, Nicholai H (2016) *Violent Order: Understanding Rebel Governance through Liberia's Civil War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Péclard, Didier; Martina Santschi, Jon Schubert, Gilson Lázaro, Leben Moro & Ousmane Zina (2019) Civil wars and state formation: Violence and the politics of legitimacy in Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and South Sudan. Working paper. Geneva: Swiss Network of International Studies.
- Turner, Sarah (2010) The silenced assistant: Reflections of invisible interpreters and research assistants. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 51(2): 206–219.
- UNSC (2009) Letter dated 7 October 2009 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d'Ivoire addressed to the President of the Security Council. Final Report. New York: United Nations Security Council.
- Weinstein, Jeremy (2007) *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2003) *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wood, Elisabeth Jean (2006) The ethical challenges of field research in conflict zones. *Qualitative Sociology* 29: 373–386.