Extra-territorial interventions in conflict spaces: Explaining the geographies of post-Cold War peacekeeping

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Abstract
The period since the end of the Cold War has presided over a dramatic expansion in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Yet individual states have varied significantly in their enthusiasm for peacekeeping and, moreover, demonstrated a greater propensity to participate in operations located in certain countries than others. Our contribution in the present paper is to provide new insights into how geography underpins these spatial variations. Uniquely, we make use of a geographically disaggregated dataset of multilateral PKOs, which allows us to capture various dyadic linkages between sending and receiving countries. Our results confirm previous work indicating that more democratic countries are more likely to participate in PKOs, but extend these findings by showing that countries’ commitment to human rights has a similar positive influence. We also show that aspects of spatial proximity (physical distance, same region) and relational proximity (colonial ties) between potential sending and receiving states raise the likelihood of participation. Yet we find that two relational variables widely discussed in the literature as possible correlates of peaceful interactions – bilateral trade and joint membership of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) – have no statistically discernable influence on countries involvement in particular PKOs.

Keywords Conflict; dyads; extra-territorial; peacekeeping; proximity; relational
INTRODUCTION

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed considerable growth in the number of multilateral peacekeeping operations (PKOs) (Chopra, 1996, Solomon, 2007, Welsh, 2003). Much of this expansion has taken place in the world’s ‘geopolitical blackholes’ (Ó Tuathail, 2000: 170), spaces of instability where rising levels of conflict have been accompanied by economic collapse, human rights abuses and loss of life (Mullenbach, 2005, O’Loughlin, 2005, Silberfein, 2004). PKOs have sought to bring an end to hostilities, prevent further conflict, provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate post-conflict state-building (Diehl, 1988: 487, Ku and Jacobson, 2003). The central aim of this paper is to provide new understanding into the geographic factors which shape states’ uneven participation in post-Cold War PKOs.

Our contribution advances on previous research in three ways. First, we examine the influence of a far wider set of geographic attributes on countries’ uneven participation in PKOs, including aspects of spatial and relational proximity largely overlooked in previous work. Second, departing from previous monadic analyses, we analyse a novel dyadic dataset which records individual countries’ participation in specific PKOs. And third, unlike a number of past studies, which have focused exclusively on NATO (Shimizu and Sandler, 2003) or United Nations (UN) (Khanna et al., 1999) operations, we examine peacekeeping under the auspices of both the UN, regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and ad hoc “coalitions of the willing.”

Our results suggest that more democratic and human rights respecting countries have a higher probability of providing troops for multilateral PKOs. Aspects of spatial
proximity (physical distance, same region) and relational proximity (colonial ties) between (potential) sending and receiving states are also found to raise the likelihood of participation in post-Cold War operations. Yet relational linkages via bilateral trade and joint membership of IGOs – two of the cornerstones of the so-called “Kantian peace” (Kinsella and Russett, 2002; Oneal et al., 1996) – fail to emerge as statistically significant predictors of countries’ participation in PKOs.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly outlines the changing nature of peacekeeping and summarises the findings of previous research. Section 3 outlines our conceptual framework and theoretically-inspired predications. Variables, measures and estimation methods are detailed in section 4. Section 5 presents results, while section 6 concludes.

POST-COLD WAR PEACEKEEPING

Multilateral peacekeeping has changed significantly during the post-Cold War period. One difference (already noted) is the number of operations. For example, UN-commanded PKOs tripled from 12 during the period 1947-87 to reach 36 over 1988-2001 (Jakobsen, 2002: 270). Another difference is the targets of intervention. From a predominant focus on inter-state conflict during the Cold War period, a large share of PKOs over the past two decades has targeted countries experiencing intra-state hostilities. Moreover, the objectives of intervention have expanded to include a growing number of operations incorporating humanitarian and state-building functions (Ku and Jacobson, 2003, Wheeler, 2002), although most authors continue (as we do here) to use peacekeeping as a catch-all term to
describe these varied activities. The post-Cold War period has also witnessed a heightened role for non-UN operations. As during the Cold War, UN-commanded operations have continued to dominate multilateral peacekeeping (accounting for approximately half of all operations), but a growing number of operations have been orchestrated by regional/sub-regional IGOs and “coalitions of the willing”, i.e. ‘groups of actors that come together, often around a pivotal state, to launch a joint operation in response to particular crises’ (Bellamy and Williams, 2005: 169). These two sets of actors have respectively accounted for approximately 25% of PKOs – a share which has remained broadly similar over the period of our study. Another difference is the range of participating countries, with a rising number and diversity of developing nations contributing to post-Cold War peacekeeping duties (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, Jones, 2004, Neack, 1995, Neethling, 2004).

States’ commitment to multilateral peacekeeping has nevertheless remained highly geographically uneven. Approximately one-third of countries have abstained from peacekeeping altogether, while amongst active peacekeepers, certain states have participated in a far larger number of operations. Most importantly for the analysis here, individual countries have also proved selective in where they send their peacekeepers, demonstrating a greater propensity to volunteer for PKOs in specific countries than others (Neack, 1995, Pugh, 2004, Solomon, 2007).

Previous large-N, quantitative research into the uneven geography of peacekeepers has predominantly focused on aspects of the so-called “peacekeeping burden”, i.e. states’ relative contribution to the overall financial and/or personnel requirements of PKOs. Most, but not all, of these studies have found that more powerful countries contribute more to the
overall peacekeeping burden (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, Lebovic, 2004, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). They have also shown that democratic polities are far more likely to carry the burden for PKOs than autocracies (Andersson, 2002, Lebovic, 2004).

Although instructive, we find these studies unsatisfactory. Most importantly, previous work has not gone far in examining extra-domestic influences on peacekeeping contributions, focusing predominantly on the domestic attributes of sending states. To be sure, territorially-bounded characteristics are central elements of place, and therefore important to geographers’ understanding of uneven peacekeeping contributions (O’Loughlin, 2000). Indeed, in the present paper, we examine a number of these country-specific, internal factors, both as main explanatory and control variables. Yet territory is not an isolated container. As well as internal factors, such as the characteristics of the territorially-bounded community, the contextual environment is also constituted through external interactions, interests and influences beyond the boundaries of the state (Flint, 2004).

To be fair, previous studies have not ignored extra-domestic aspects outright, but they have adopted a narrow conception of them. Thus, Khanna et al. (1999) finds that trade openness is positively correlated with certain countries’ peacekeeping contributions, while Lebovic (2004) shows that countries with security ties to the US are more likely to participate in PKOs. Missing from these analyses, however, is any consideration of linkages between (potential) troop sending and receiving countries. This omission is curious: it is entirely plausible that extra-domestic linkages might influence both the incentives to participate, as well as countries’ ability to do so.
A major reason for this omission is previous studies’ reliance on geographically-aggregated, monadic data. Although entirely appropriate to investigating questions of burden sharing, monadic analyses have been unable to explore the influence of various dyadic linkages between peacekeeper sending and receiving countries. Our study seeks to rectify this shortcoming by using dyadic data to explore the influence of internal and external contextual factors on states’ uneven participation in multilateral PKOs.

**CONCEPTUALISING PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

Although multilateral peacekeeping is voluntary, the choice of whether or not to participate is by no means unproblematic (Diehl, 1988, Jakobsen, 2002). Thus, peacekeeping is politically, legally and morally contentious on account of the fact that it involves the exercise of extra-territorial influence, violating the supposed immutability of insular forms of sovereignty (Agnew, 2005; Dodds, 2005). Sending peacekeepers is also potentially costly, and exposes countries to varying degrees of risk (for soldiers’ lives, countries’ reputation, etc.) (Chopra, 1996, Mingst, 2003, Welsh, 2003). Two implications follow from these observations. The first is that individual states must possess interests in dispatching peacekeepers for a specific operation (Nye, 2003). Second, a country’s participation must be perceived as legitimate, not only by domestic constituencies, but also influential actors within target states and the wider international community (Wheeler, 2002). It is our contention that states’ participation in particular operations will be determined by a range of domestic and extra-domestic factors which shape interests in peacekeeping and their ability to legitimate intervention.²
According to realists, interests in peacekeeping are self-serving, strategic and materialist in orientation, with participation seen as a means to advance a state’s power, geopolitical influence and prosperity (Pilger, 1999; Pugh, 2004). Another school of thought, closely aligned with liberal theories of International Relations, maintains that countries’ interests in PKOs are more idealistic in nature, and bound-up with domestic concerns about human rights, freedom and democracy. Although different interests will predominate at different times, we believe that both materialist and idealist interests will positively influence a state’s decision to provide personnel for a particular PKO (Nye, 2003).

Even if it is in the interests of states to intervene, willing peacekeepers face a range of constraints which limit their ability to participate. One constraint is capacity and, specifically, the availability of financial, bureaucratic and military resources required to deploy, operate and maintain peacekeepers. What concerns us more here is a second constraint, namely, legitimacy (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Welsh, 2003). The need for legitimacy arises because deploying personnel to “police” conflict transgresses the territorial norm of authoritative sovereignty (Agnew, 2005, Biersteker, 2002). Actors who violate this principle must therefore command, construct or otherwise demonstrate legitimate reasons – moral, legal or political – for doing so. Failure to command or construct sufficient justification for intervention can have a range of negative consequences, ranging from reputational damage amongst members of the international community, domestic political opposition through to difficulties securing the consent to participate in a PKO by belligerents in the target state (Diehl, 1988; Falah et al., 2006).
Accepting our basic premise, we now turn to the factors influencing interests and legitimacy. We conceptualise these into three categories: (1) domestic values, norms and practices; (2) spatial proximity and; (3) relational proximity. Although discussed separately, we suggest that these factors combine to create the contextual setting in which decisions regarding whether to participate in particular PKOs are made by domestic actors.

**Domestically-Institutionalised Values, Norms and Practices**

Our first category draws its inspiration from theories of domestic politics which emphasise the role of domestic political actors, interests and institutions in shaping state policy (Gourevitch, 2002). We focus here on two broad areas of domestically-institutionalised values, norms and associated practices: democracy and human rights. Our basic expectation is that countries which are more democratic or committed to human rights are more likely to provide troops for PKOs.

Expanding on liberal theories of the so-called “democratic peace” (Owen, 1994), scholars have recently suggested that democracies are more likely to be disposed towards spreading democracy to non-democratic territorial spaces, sometimes by force. Central to these claims is the idea that democratic polities regard the creation, maintenance and expansion of well-functioning democracies as part of the national interest, supporting mutually beneficial stability, security and prosperity (Lebovic, 2004). Along similar lines, it is suggested that modern democratic values create normative obligations to defend human rights, dignity and good governance, which states seek to meet out of reputational reasons (Andersson, 2002). Others have argued that democracies are more inclined towards
multilateral approaches to addressing various forms of global disorder (Ikenberry, 2001).

Whether for one or more of these reasons, we suggest that democratic polities are likely to possess greater interests in multilateral peacekeeping, and therefore be more willing to participate in multilateral PKOs. These predications about the importance of polity are supported by recent large-N empirical studies: Andersson (2002) shows that democracies contributed more to UN PKOs over the period 1991-99, while Lebovic (2004) reaches the same conclusion for UN operations between 1993-2001.

A second domestic attribute is concern for and commitment to human rights. As evidenced by countries’ growing willingness to volunteer personnel in conflicts characterized by human rights violations, atrocities and large-scale suffering, human rights and welfare have been increasingly important factors in post-Cold War PKOs (Dodds, 2005, Jakobsen, 2002, Ku and Jacobson, 2003, Welsh, 2003). For some, this new-found enthusiasm is largely a matter of popular demand, with publics concerned about human rights exerting “bottom-up” political demand for humanitarian interventions (Byman and Waxman, 2002, Chopra, 1996, O’Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002, Ó Tuathail, 2000). Others have emphasised the changing values of domestic political elites who, it is suggested, have progressively incorporated norms of human rights protection into their conception of the national interest (Wheeler, 2002). Either way, it follows that countries whose publics and/or leadership value human rights, and believe that states have a duty to intervene to protect the fundamental rights of extra-territorial others, are more likely to possess interests in dispatching peacekeepers. Furthermore, it is possible that countries which care more and are more committed to human rights are more likely to be seen as legitimate parties in
peacekeeping operations, and therefore face fewer political barriers to their participation in extra-territorial operations.

The considerations so far lead to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1. More democratic countries are more likely to send troops to PKOs.

Hypothesis 2. Countries which are more committed to human rights are more likely to send troops to PKOs.

Spatial Proximity

A second set of factors considered here relate to spatial proximity and, more specifically, various aspects of the (potential) sending country’s position in physical space vis-à-vis the receiving one. The importance of spatial proximity has been widely recognised in the geopolitical and international relations literature (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001; Tir and Diehl, 2002; Xierali and Lui, 2006). Within the present context, one way in which proximity is likely to matter is by influencing the geo-strategic gains from intervention. Actual or aspirant regional powers may be more inclined to participate in “backyard” PKOs because such interventions are more compatible with self-interests in maintaining or extending geopolitical influence over the critically important “near abroad” (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Lyons, 1998, Neethling, 2004, Pilger, 1999). Another, arguably more important, reason why spatially proximate countries might demonstrate a greater willingness to participate is that they are more likely to experience, or fear that they will experience, the
negative spillovers from nearby conflict (Ó Tuathail, 2000). These real and/or perceived spillovers include refugees and economic-cum-political instability arising from the spread of conflict to neighbouring states which, it is suggested, create domestic interests in peacekeeping (Byman and Waxman, 2002, Mingst, 2003; Murdoch and Sandler, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). Indeed, precisely because of these readily apparent material interests, governments will likely find it easier to convince the public that there are legitimate grounds for intervening, and therefore secure their consent for sending peacekeepers (Dodds, 2000, O'Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002).

In reality, there are a number of different aspects of spatial proximity, and their influence may vary (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001; Tir and Diehl, 2002). Three are examined here. The first is physical distance between the (potential) sending and receiving state which we anticipate to be negatively correlated with participation. A second, more ambiguous, dimension of spatial proximity is contiguity. At one level, there is a case for expecting contiguous countries to be more willing peacekeepers, not least because they are likely to be most affected by refugees, economic turbulence, etc. As immediate neighbours, however, contiguous countries are more likely to be subject to boundary disputes (Clark and Regan, 2003, Kinsella and Russett, 2002). Likewise, contiguity also provides increased opportunities for the projection of “unwelcome” power, influence and interference by one state over another, giving rise to political tensions between contiguous countries (Silberfein, 2004, Tir and Diehl, 2002). We might therefore expect one or both disputants in the target country to show a greater reluctance to sanction the involvement of neighbouring states, while IGOs and/or regional hegemons might similarly be reluctant to include
immediate neighbours in PKOs owing to questions over the legitimacy of their involvement (Lebovic, 2004).

A third dimension of spatial proximity is regional location. We argue that countries are more likely to participate in PKOs where the target state is located in the same world region. Although regional “membership” is likely to pick-up a number of distance-related effects, the regional influence will include several additional factors which are not a simple function of distance. Included here are a whole set of economic (e.g. regional production networks) and political (e.g. membership in regional inter-governmental bodies) relationships. Also potentially included are shared cultural norms, institutions and diplomatic networks (Buzan, 2004). Together, these regional linkages, mutual dependencies and commonalities might plausibly foster recognition of shared obligations, roles and interests amongst countries located in the same region, increasing the incentive for countries to dispatch peacekeepers. At the same time, a combination of heightened familiarity, mutual understanding and trust, might render a particular country a more legitimate party in domestic affairs, and therefore raise the readiness of domestic belligerents to sanction the involvement or invite nearby states.

An additional way regional location might influence peacekeeping contributions is through neighbourhood spatial contagion. As discussed in other contexts, countries’ behaviour may be strategically interdependent, in the sense that the actions of one state in a region may be linked to the actions of other states in the same region (Starr, 1991; Ward and Gleditsch, 2002). An important corollary is that patterns of geopolitical behaviour may become spatially clustered. Applied to peacekeeping, we might expect the probability of any one country participating rising as more states in the same region also participate.
Again, many of the same contextual factors which influence interests and legitimacy outlined above may result in countries “moving together”, e.g. heightened levels of trust, co-operation and communication, the presence of regional IGOs instrumental in initiating, orchestrating staffing PKOs (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Neethling, 2004). A closely-related reason why states may move together centres on the idea that extra-territorial peacekeeping demonstrates public good characteristics. Reducing conflict, instability and suffering through the provision of troops may well deliver benefits to all countries in the same region, but the costs of PKOs will fall exclusively to willing participants, creating an incentive for individual states to “free-ride” (Solomon, 2007). Aware of these potential asymmetries, states may be unwilling to contribute to peacekeeping efforts unless their regional peers do so, such that participation is only likely to happen as part of a regionally-concerted effort to overcome the collective action problem. We capture these regional sending propensity dynamics in our research design through the use of a spatial lag variable.

In sum, our spatial proximity expectations lead to the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3. Countries which are physically closer (in continuous terms) to the target state are more likely to send troops.

Hypothesis 4a. States which are contiguous to the country hosting the PKO have a higher probability of sending peacekeepers.

Hypothesis 4b. States which are contiguous to the country hosting the PKO have a lower probability of sending peacekeepers.
Hypothesis 5. Countries from the same geographic region as the target state are more likely to contribute troops to PKOs.

Hypothesis 6. Participation by more states from the same region in a PKO increases the chances that an individual state will also provide troops.

Relational Proximity

Interactions, engagement and interdependencies between individual states are not simply a function of spatial proximity. They also depend on “closeness” in terms of the strength of boundary-spanning relational ties linking different territories. As with physical distance, these ties can be seen as a way through which foreign countries enter the moral, policy and interest space of actors in distanced places, and are domestically embedded to become part of the contextual setting which governs peacekeeping decisions.

The idea that international contact, communication and interdependence fosters peaceful interactions has long been recognised in theories of the Kantian peace (Kinsella and Russett, 2002; Oneal et al., 1996). We take these ideas further in the present paper to argue that participation in peacekeeping is more likely when (potential) troop senders are more relationally proximate to recipient states – in the sense of being more closely-tied via one of a number of international linkages. One such linkage, and one of the classic pillars of the Kantian peace, is international trade. To the extent that conflict and instability threaten economically beneficial exchange, countries should have material self-interests in
sending peacekeepers to important trading partners. Similar ideas have been espoused by “popular” critics of peacekeeping, who point to the reluctance of Western countries to send troops to conflicts where they lack direct economic interests (Pilger, 1999). More generally, owing to higher levels of (often mutually beneficial) economic dependence, mutual acquaintance and strength of (commercially-derived) diplomatic ties, important trading partners are more likely to be deemed legitimate participants by belligerents in the target state, orchestrators of PKOs, etc.

A second set of relational linkages which might plausibly shape participation in a particular PKO are colonial ties. Although highly variable in its nature, modalities and impacts, colonialism gave rise to a host of enduring social, economic and political legacies, ranging from joint educational programmes to foreign investments (Gwynne et al., 2003). As with trade, we anticipate these ties creating ongoing interests on the part of the former colonizing state in the welfare, stability and prosperity of their former colonies. At the same time, a combination of familiarity, trust and long-established diplomatic relationships also mean that ex-colonies might see their former colonial masters as more legitimate peacekeepers, and therefore sanction their domestic involvement. Over recent decades, the legacy of colonial ties has also increasingly assumed normative dimensions, with countries facing growing international and domestic pressures to exercise their “moral” responsibility towards former colonies by addressing conflict, instability and unrest (Lyons, 1998). Indeed, such factors may explain observations that a number of high-profile PKOs in Africa during the post-Cold War period have been initiated or staffed by former colonial powers (Bellamy and Williams, 2005, Diehl, 1988).
A third relational tie considered here is migrant linkages. According to the literature, migrant communities perform a boundary-spanning role, with transnational allegiances held by foreign populations creating domestic political interests in extra-territorial spaces. Through lobbying, strategic voting, media influence, etc., migrant communities may seek to represent and advance these interests, exerting potentially significant pressure on governments to assist their “home” countries (Popescu, 2005, Shain, 1994-95). Indeed, several authors have documented how “diaspora politics” have been influential in moulding target countries’ foreign policies, particularly in areas involving self-determination, democracy and human rights (Carter, 2005, Dodds, 2000, Haney and Vanderbush, 1999). A high number of migrants from the target state might also help a government in the (potential) troop sending country to secure domestic legitimacy for intervention. Inevitably, the geographic distribution of migrants will be bound-up with the geography of colonial ties, but far from exclusively so (Moore and Shellman, 2007). Thus, even taking account of colonial relationships, it is quite possible that boundary-spanning migrant ties will influence countries’ propensity to intervene.

As well as transnational ties between individual sovereign territories, bilateral relational linkages and interdependencies are created at the supranational level through joint membership of international organisations, another of the classic pillars of the Kantian peace (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006). Membership of particular IGOs potentially ascribes new or heightened responsibilities upon countries, including a duty to assist other members. A combination of increased peer monitoring, diplomatic communication and reputational considerations provide countries with incentives not to ignore the plight of fellow states whose populations are experiencing humanitarian distress. Through
interaction, cooperation and joint problem solving, the stability, prosperity and well-being of other members may also come to enter the geo-strategic interest space of joint IGO participants. By fostering dialogue, mutual understanding and trust, states might additionally be more inclined to treat countries who are members of a larger number of the same IGOs as legitimate parties, and therefore welcome intervention.

Hence we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 7. Countries which are more dependent on trade with the target state are more likely to provide troops.

Hypothesis 8. Ex-colonial powers are more likely to participate in PKOs located in their former colonies.

Hypothesis 9. A higher share of the global stock of target state migrants residing in a potential sending country will increase the probability of participation.

Hypothesis 10. Countries are more likely to provide troops for PKOs where they are joint members of a larger number of IGOs with the target state.
**METHOD**

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in our main estimations is a dummy variable, set to one if the potential sending country participates in a PKO in the receiving country in a particular year, or zero if it does not. Data for the dependent variable were extracted from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s ‘Multilateral Peace Operations Database’ (SIPRI, 2007). Amongst others, the database records the location of PKOs, as well as the identities of contributing states.

We restrict our focus to PKOs involving the deployment of military troops. As the most politically, economically and legally contentious aspect of multilateral peacekeeping, we expect countries’ troop sending actions to be especially revealing about the nature of extra-territoriality. Military troops are invariably armed and are at a far greater risk of casualties than is the case for other categories of peacekeepers. Certainly, their involvement is likely to say a great deal more than civilian personnel, especially in relation to geopolitically interesting questions about the incentives and constraints governing the projection of state power, influence and control across sovereign borders.

It could be argued that our binary participation/no participation dependent variable ignores potentially significant differences in troop numbers and/or financial payments contributed by individual countries, and therefore the actual degree of commitment. Yet this argument needs to be set against the fact that the very act of sending troops is highly politically significant in its own right. Indeed, once a state has decided to commit, we expect the actual number of troops sent to be heavily influenced by its military capacity, per
capita income or level of compensatory payments. Neither of these variables is of central interest in the present study. In any case, we have no information on the size of the troop contributions, and therefore would not be able to construct an appropriate variable.

**Independent Variables**

We use two variables to capture our first set of hypothesised attributes, i.e. domestic norms, values and practices. Democratic polity is proxied by the Polity IV Project’s *polity2* indicator (Marshall et al., 2006), while a county’s concerns for and commitment to human rights is proxied by Gibney’s (2007) respect for human rights measure. A number of different measures could be used to capture our second set of hypothesised attributes, centred around spatial proximity, each with their advantages and disadvantages (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001). We use three widely-used measures here. The first, physical distance, is measured in kilometres between the two countries’ capital cities. A second, contiguity, is measured using a dummy variable for dyads sharing a land border or being separated by less than 150 miles of sea. Distance and contiguity data are obtained from Bennett and Stam (2005). Finally, the World Bank’s (2006) classification of world regions is used to code whether the two countries are located in the same region. This information is also used to construct the regional sending propensity variable which, in fact, represents a spatial lag in dyadic data.  

A third set of main explanatory variables capture four dimensions of relational proximity. Bilateral trade is measured relative to the sending country’s GDP using data from Gleditsch (2002) and World Bank (2006). Colonial ties are captured using a dummy variable which denotes whether a potential sending state exercised colonial control over the
country in which the PKO is located. We include Russia in this definition since its imposition of political and military control over ex-Soviet territories has been analogous to that exercised by the classic Western and Japanese colonisers. A third variable measures the share of the global migrant stock – that is, migrants from the state hosting a particular PKO – residing in a potential troop sending country. Bilateral migrant stock data are taken from Parsons et al. (2007).

Data for the joint membership of IGOs variable is from Hensel (2005). The variable measures the number of IGOs – and, more precisely, intergovernmental organisations requiring participants to settle disputes peacefully – in which country pairs are both members. We purposely chose this measure (over alternative ones which capture all IGO memberships, regardless of the organisation’s security remit) in order to ensure that we specifically test the influence of IGO relationships which might plausibly influence the decision to intervene for peacekeeping purposes.

Control Variables

Our main estimation model features two control variables. We include military power to take account of the possibility that militarily stronger countries – which presumably are better positioned to send, operate and maintain troops – will participate in a greater number of PKOs. Military power is measured according to the widely used Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) score, taken from the Correlates of War project (Singer et al., 1972). A country’s CINC score is a composite of its total population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure. A second variable is gross domestic product (GDP) per capita which we include to control
for relative income. All else equal, richer countries are likely to be better-positioned to absorb the costs of deploying troops, and therefore more willing and able to participate in a larger number of operations. Data are from World Bank (2006).

**Estimation Approach**

In our main estimations, we take the population of multilateral PKOs as given, and merely analyze what determines country participation in these operations. Given our dependent variable is a binary one, we employ a logit estimator. Standard errors are assumed to be clustered on country dyads. With nearly half a million observations, failure to cluster standard errors would lead to a large under-estimation of standard errors, owing to the fact that observations from different years within the same dyad cannot be said to be independently sampled.

It is possible that decisions of countries to participate in PKOs, on the one hand, and the decision about whether a PKO takes place, on the other, are not independent of one other. In a separate robustness test, we adopt a two-stage estimation method which controls for potential sample selection bias, details of which are presented later.

**Sample**

A lack of data for some variables means that our sample does not feature all countries in the world. Our sample in the main estimations comprises 150 countries, both developed and developing, and the unit of analysis the dyad year. The number of dyad years in which a country contributes troops for PKOs ranges from zero (51 countries never send any troops) to 40 (the United Kingdom tops the list of sending countries in our sample). The average
number of dyad years in which countries send troops is eight with a standard deviation of 10.3.

RESULTS

Table 1 shows our main estimation results. The first model excludes, while the second model includes, the spatial lag variable. For the estimations without the spatial lag, results broadly support a priori expectations. Thus, democratic polity is positively and statistically significantly correlated with PKO participation, indicating that more democratic countries are more likely to send troops. The estimated coefficient for human rights protection is significantly negative which, as anticipated, suggests that countries with greater concern for and commitment to human rights are more likely to participate in PKOs.

Our findings also provide qualified empirical support for the idea that a target country’s spatial proximity promotes participation. The estimated coefficient for distance is negative and statistically significant. This is entirely plausible: the “negative” spillovers of conflict are more likely to be experienced by nearby countries, creating domestic interests, legitimacy and support for sending troops (Bobrow and Boyer, 1997, Byman and Waxman, 2002, Shimizu and Sandler, 2002). We additionally find statistically robust evidence that countries are more likely to participate in PKOs located in their own region. Although a whole series of factors could explain this result, it is nevertheless consistent with the idea that macro-regions constitute geographically distinctive spaces, bound together by dense inter-state relations, shared interests and mutual recognition of legitimacy (Buzan, 2004, O’Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002). Yet our estimated coefficient for contiguity is statistically
insignificant. At one level, this result is surprising: countries might be expected to possess
greater interests in tackling potentially costly conflict, instability and humanitarian crises in
bordering states. However, it may be that these positive incentives are offset by historic
animosities between contiguous countries, which constrain the ability of immediate
neighbours to legitimate intervention (Kocs, 1995, Mitchell and Prins, 1999, Silberfein,
2004).

Turning to relational forms of proximity, we find mixed evidence for the role of
distanciated forms of geographic influence. Confirming anecdotal observations, our dummy
variable denoting former colonial powers (including the quasi-colonial status of Russia) is
positively and statistically significantly correlated with participation (Diehl, 1988, Jones,
2004, Neethling, 2004, Silberfein, 2004). Yet we find that the share of the target state’s
global migrant stock residing in a particular country does not have a significantly
discernible influence on the latter’s probability of intervening. The estimated coefficient is
positive, but it is not statistically significant at the 10% level. Our remaining two relational
variables, bilateral trade and joint membership of IGOs, are also both statistically
insignificant.

We now turn to our second model which includes our spatial lag variable. As
expected, we find evidence of strategic interdependence amongst states located in the same
region, in that our estimated coefficient for regional sending propensity is positive and
statistically significant.\textsuperscript{8} Put simply, our results strongly indicate that the probability of a
country sending troops to a particular PKO rises with participation by other states in the
same region. The inclusion of the spatial lag variable leaves results for our main variables
of interest largely unchanged, with the exception of same region which becomes statistically insignificant.

Finally, we turn to our control variables. Capturing the effect of superior capacity to project extra-territorial influence, our estimated coefficients for military capacity is positive and statistically significant. Similarly, consistent with the idea that richer countries are better able to afford the costs of sending peacekeepers, we estimate a positive relationship between GDP per capita and participation. Note, GDP becomes statistically insignificant when we include our spatial lag variable capturing regional sending propensity, most likely because of the regional clustering of countries at roughly similar levels of GDP per capita – and, in particular, the strong propensity of the relatively rich, Western European countries for concerted peacekeeping activity. The differences in regional sending propensity across regions and their effect on the likelihood of sending troops cancels the effect that differences in GDP per capita across countries has on this likelihood.

Statistical significance is not equivalent to substantive importance. In order to shed light on the relative impact of different determinants, we report as additional information the percentage change in next to the coefficient (but only for coefficients that are statistically significantly different from zero) following a one standard deviation increase in the case of continuous variables, or a change from zero to one in the case of the dummy variables, for which standard deviation changes make little sense. For the model without the spatial lag, we find that the most important variable is colony, followed by democracy, same region, distance, military capacity, human rights and GDP per capita. In the model that includes the spatial lag, the order is little different, with the lag itself among the substantially most important variables. Thus, colony is most important, followed by
regional sending propensity, democracy, military capacity, distance, human rights and migrant share.

Robustness Test

As an additional robustness test, we take into account potential sample selection bias, arising from the fact that the geography of peacekeeping is determined over two stages. The first (selection) stage involves a decision about whether a particular potential state qualifies for a multilateral PKO. Although many inter- and intra-state conflicts, both actual and potential, have existed over the post-Cold War period, only a small share of these have led to a multilateral PKO (Dodds, 2005, Fortna, 2004a, Mullenbach, 2005). The second (participation) stage – as in our main estimations – centres on the decision to provide troops to a particular PKO. We model both stages together using Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator. This works by first estimating the selection stage, and then the participation stage for all PKOs, allowing the error terms of the two regression stages to be correlated with each other. In the first stage, the unit of analysis is the country year. Up to 154 developing countries are included in this stage (note, we exclude developed countries here, since none of them has either hosted a PKO or is likely to do so in the future). Over the period 1990-2005, multilateral PKOs – orchestrated under the UN, regional IGOs and “coalitions of the willing” – were held in 26 of these developing countries.

The sample, dependent and explanatory variables are the same in the second stage of this model as they were in our main estimations above. The dependent variable in the first stage of estimation is a dummy variable that is set to one if a peacekeeping operation has been in place in the potential recipient state in a particular year. Seven selection
variables are included in the first stage. The first is a measure of conflict intensity which has been found to positively influence the likelihood of a multilateral PKO (Fortna, 2004a, Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). Our specific variable, derived from Lacina and Gleditsch (2005), is the number of conflict deaths over the past five years. Along similar lines, we include a variable measuring the number of refugees relative to population size, based on data from UNHCR (various years). Again, we expect that PKOs are more likely to be established where conflicts are accompanied by a larger number of refugees, not least because of heightened self-interest motives. After Mullenbach (2005), who finds that ceasefire agreements increase the likelihood of a multilateral PKO, we include a dummy variable to denote where there is a ceasefire treaty between belligerents (using data from Fortna, 2004b). IGOs and ad hoc coalitions are more likely to be willing to orchestrate an operation where belligerents in the candidate state have signalled their commitment to abide by the rules of the international “society of states” by agreeing to a cessation of armed violence. We also include regional dummies to capture the geographic region in which a particular country is located. The underlying idea, which receives a degree of empirical support in the statistical literature (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003), is that conflicts in some regions are more likely to be selected for a multilateral PKO than others. Coding data for regional location is again derived from World Bank (2006). A fifth variable is a dummy indicating whether a country is an ex-colony or former Soviet republic which we anticipate to raise the likelihood of a PKO taking place. A resource abundance metric seeks to control for selection effects arising from the alleged heightened willingness of countries to actively intervene in resource-rich countries (Klare, 2005). We use the World Bank’s (2006) measure of energy and mineral rents relative to a country’s gross national income.
Our final variable is democratic polity which we include to take account of the possibility that democracies are more likely to grant consent for intervention by multilateral peacekeeping forces than autocracies. Democratic polity is again proxied using the Polity IV Project’s polity2 indicator (Marshall et al., 2006). The variable is only coded for countries with populations of over 500,000, and furthermore, does not provide a measure of democracy for states occupied by a foreign nation, whose political system is in transition or is highly disrupted by armed conflict (Plümper and Neumayer 2007). As a result, the inclusion of the democratic polity variable leads to the loss of a substantial number of observations, and we therefore report two sets of estimations: one with and one without democracy in the first stage.

Table 2 shows results. As concerns the first-stage, estimated coefficients for variables measuring international refugees, battle deaths and ceasefire treaty are statistically significant with the anticipated (positive) sign. We find evidence for an increasing trend toward multinational PKOs over time. We also find a regional selection effect, with South Asia and Latin America less likely to receive a PKO than sub-Saharan Africa, the omitted reference category in our estimations. Yet neither colony nor natural resource rents emerge as statistically significant predictors of PKOs. If democracy in the location country is added to the analysis in the second column of table 1, then results hardly change for the other variables, despite losing approximately 20 per cent of the observations. More democratic countries are not statistically significantly more likely to receive international peacekeeping than more autocratic ones, but the expected positive coefficient is only marginally insignificant.
For the estimations in columns 1 and 4, the Wald test of independent equations signals that the two stages are not independent from each other, suggesting that the Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator is appropriate. For the estimations in columns 2 and 3, the Wald test suggests that modelling both stages simultaneously is not strictly speaking necessary. Even where the Heckman model seems appropriate, as in columns 1 and 4, the second-stage estimation results are very similar to our main estimation results. We can therefore be confident that our results are not tainted by a potential non-random sample selection effect.

CONCLUSION

Post-Cold War peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are instructive in relation to debates about the changing nature of territorial sovereignty and conditions under which countries are able to legitimately exercise extra-territoriality (Agnew, 2005, Ó Tuathail, 2000). Multilateral operations also say a great deal about the spatiality of the international “society of states” and, specifically, the distribution of states willing to contribute towards the public goods of peace, security and human rights protection (Dodds, 2005; Solomon, 2007). Peacekeeping also reveals something very important about the characteristics of contemporary geopolitical interests, and how these are shaped by domestic and non-domestic attributes (Chopra, 1996, Silberfein, 2004).

Our contribution in this paper picks-up on the above themes of extra-territoriality, multilateralism and geopolitical interests by examining countries’ geographically uneven participation in post-Cold War PKOs. We show that countries’ involvement can be
explained by a number of identifiable geographic attributes. One of these, which accords with theories of domestic politics, is place-based norms, values and practices (Dodds, 2005, Flint, 2004, Lebovic, 2004, O'Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002). As in previous work, we show that more democratic countries are more likely to provide troops to PKOs, with levels of democracy emerging as one of the most influential determinants governing the probability of country participation (Andersson, 2002, Lebovic, 2004). Yet, advancing on previous studies, we demonstrate a similar positive relationship between domestic respect for human rights and countries’ involvement in multilateral PKOs. Underscoring further the role of domestic factors, the capacity of sovereign entities to project military power (in terms of military capacity and national wealth) is also found to positively influence countries’ propensity to provide troops for peacekeeping missions.

Yet the uneven geography of PKOs cannot be understood with reference to internal, territorially-bounded characteristics alone. To focus solely on the domestic attributes of place – on the assumption that factors inside state boundaries wholly define the context for decisions over troop contributions – would be to adopt a highly restrictive view of geography. Our results suggest that understanding the geographic distribution of peacekeepers requires us to consider the extra-domestic context and, specifically, aspects of spatial and (albeit to a lesser extent) relational linkages between potential troop sending and receiving states.

Highlighting the influence of spatial proximity and location over extra-territoriality, therefore, we show that countries which are physically closer or positioned in the same region as the target of a particular PKO are more likely to provide troops. Additionally, we find evidence that regional location provides a “context” for strategic comparison,
cooperation and foreign policy action, with states more likely to participate when more of their regional peers do so. Indeed, in our separate spatial lag estimation, the share of same region states participating emerges as the second most important factor in substantive terms triggering involvement in a particular PKO. Boundary-spanning, relational ties also matter but, somewhat surprisingly, only clearly for one of our four hypothesised variables: colonial ties. Relational proximity via bilateral trade and joint IGO membership fail to emerge as statistically significant predictors of participation in our main estimations. The share of the global stock of target state migrants is only statistically significant in our main estimations featuring the spatial lag and, even then, only at the 10% level.

These findings are revealing. Trade and joint-IGO membership are two of the cornerstones of Kantian peace theories which emphasise the pacifying influence of economic interdependence and international organization. Indeed, the case for suspecting relational ties – via trade and international organisations – to influence countries’ willingness to offer troops for PKOs is compelling, with both featuring in popular accounts of peacekeeping. Yet it could simply be that these standard components of the Kantian peace do not increase countries’ willingness to volunteer troops in the pursuit of peace, stability and human freedoms – a claim which is unlikely to surprise a number of scholars who have struggled to find systematic evidence that bilateral trade and joint IGO membership are a major influence on patterns of inter-state conflict and cooperation (Boehmer et al., 2004; Gartzke, 2007; Ward et al., 2007).

Another important insight from our work regards the enduring significance of historical relationships. In our main estimations, colonial ties (between ex-colonial powers and their former colonies) have the highest probability of influencing participation,
indicating that historically-derived ties carry particular weight in the decision by countries to provide troops to a PKO. The result is even the more striking given that two other interest-based, relational, variables which might plausibly be correlated with colonialism, i.e. bilateral trade and migrant share, do not consistently emerge as statistically significant predictors of participation (Eichengreen and Douglas, 1996; Moore and Shellman, 2007). The apparently (largely) independent influence of colonial ties raises interesting questions about the motives for peacekeeping and the underlying reasons for extra-territorial interventions.

At the same time, our findings serve as an important reminder of the ongoing importance of more orthodox, locational foundations of geopolitical behaviour (Chang et al., 2004; Tir and Diehl, 2002; Ward et al., 2007). Although receiving comparatively little attention in the peacekeeping literature, countries’ relative position in physical space would appear to shape the incentives and constraints to extra-territoriality, and their willingness to offer troops for peacekeeping. Despite the unprecedented global reach of today’s armed forces, physical distance and location continue to matter, a conclusion which should serve as a useful corrective to explanations of geopolitical behaviour which focus solely on transnational linkages at the truly global scale.

As is the case with similar large-N, inferential studies, it is not possible to draw definitive insights about why certain statistical correlates identified in the present paper influence countries’ participation, although they do hint at a range of motives. Our findings for democracy and human rights suggest a role for liberal motives (Andersson, 2002, Lebovic, 2004, Lyons, 1998, O'Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002). That is, it may well be that domestically-embedded values, norms and practices which are aligned with liberal goals of
peacekeeping underpin a rescaling of the national interest, and a stretching of state responsibility to protect (Dodds, 2000, O'Loughlin and Kolossov, 2002, Ó Tuathail, 2000). Similar motives may similarly explain – to a greater or lesser extent – the influence of colonial ties. Against a backdrop of heightened expectations and changed norms of appropriateness regarding the role of ex-colonial powers as “guardians” of their ex-colonies, the former may have intervened during the post-Cold War period out of normative obligations to do “the right thing.”

Yet, whilst hinting at liberal impulses, we cannot discount the possibility that more directly materialist, self-help motives might also have shaped the geography of willing peacekeepers. Another possible explanation for our colonialism result is that former colonial powers have sent troops to PKOs located in their former colonies in order to maintain their geopolitical sphere of influence. Moreover, the importance of various aspects of spatial proximity – which is likely to be underpinned by self-help concerns about the negative spillovers of conflict and pressure from regional peers – is difficult to square with the idea that peacekeeping is a wholly altruistic activity, whereby countries endeavour to unselfishly serve the wider interests of humanity at the global level.
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Ward, M. D. & Gleditsch, K. S. (2002). Location, location, location: An MCMC approach to modeling the spatial context of war and peace. *Political Analysis* 10, 244-260.


Table 1. Logit estimation results for troop sending decision to PKOs in post-Cold War period (1990 to 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>1 % change in odds</th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>2 % change in odds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (sender)</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>75.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(8.13)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5.70)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights protection (sender)</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
<td>16.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.40)***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Distance</td>
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<td>55.7</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
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<td>(8.40)***</td>
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<td>(2.23)**</td>
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<td>-0.466</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same region</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>0.214</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.80)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former colonial link</td>
<td>1.223</td>
<td>239.8</td>
<td>1.416</td>
<td>312.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.85)***</td>
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<td>(3.58)***</td>
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<td>Bilateral trade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
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<td>(0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td># common security IGOs</td>
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<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.090</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.60)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of migrants in sender</td>
<td>1.494</td>
<td>2.719</td>
<td>2.719</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.65)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military capacity (sender)</td>
<td>21.111</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>21.306</td>
<td>37.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(6.33)***</td>
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<td>(6.43)***</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP p.c. (sender)</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.59)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional sending propensity (spatial lag)</td>
<td>7.975</td>
<td>212.8</td>
<td>7.975</td>
<td>212.8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(17.48)***</td>
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<td>(17.48)***</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
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</table>

Notes: Standard errors clustered on dyad. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant included but not reported. % change in odds refer to one standard deviation increase in continuous variables and increase from zero to one for dummy variables. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1
Table 2. Two-stage estimation results for PKOs in post-Cold War period (1990 to 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Second stage dependent variable: Troops sent?</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Democracy (sender)</td>
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<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.030</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(7.01)***</td>
<td>(5.10)***</td>
<td>(5.23)***</td>
<td>(3.89)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights protection (sender)</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
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<td>(3.68)***</td>
<td>(2.85)***</td>
<td>(2.69)***</td>
<td>(2.42)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-0.151</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
</tr>
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<td>(7.02)***</td>
<td>(5.98)***</td>
<td>(2.54)**</td>
<td>(2.46)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguity</td>
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<td>0.083</td>
<td>-0.176</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same region</td>
<td>0.435</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.036</td>
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<td>(4.68)***</td>
<td>(3.96)***</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
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<td>Former colonial link</td>
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<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.846</td>
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<td>(2.73)***</td>
<td>(2.93)***</td>
<td>(3.15)***</td>
<td>(3.17)***</td>
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<td>Bilateral trade</td>
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<td>4.241</td>
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<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
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<td># common security IGOs</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Share of migrants in sender</td>
<td>1.394</td>
<td>1.601</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.85)*</td>
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<td>(2.34)**</td>
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<td>Military capacity (sender)</td>
<td>11.815</td>
<td>10.685</td>
<td>11.421</td>
<td>10.365</td>
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<td>(5.12)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP p.c. (sender)</td>
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<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
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<td>(3.02)***</td>
<td>(2.98)***</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
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<td>Regional sending propensity (spatial lag)</td>
<td>4.726</td>
<td>5.541</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(15.67)***</td>
<td>(14.10)***</td>
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<td>First stage dependent variable: PKO in place?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle deaths 5-year sum (location)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.010</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.91)***</td>
<td>(2.45)***</td>
<td>(2.83)***</td>
<td>(2.41)***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.61)***</td>
<td>(3.40)***</td>
<td>(4.59)***</td>
<td>(3.39)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceasefire in place</td>
<td>1.946</td>
<td>1.868</td>
<td>1.952</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(6.07)***</td>
<td>(6.76)***</td>
<td>(6.06)***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former colony</td>
<td>-0.228</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>-0.299</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.69)</td>
<td>(0.71)</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>-0.507</td>
<td>-0.680</td>
<td>-0.513</td>
<td>-0.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe and Central Asia</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.178</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>-0.331</td>
<td>-0.396</td>
<td>-0.332</td>
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<td>(1.57)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
<td>(1.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>-7.288</td>
<td>-7.156</td>
<td>-7.318</td>
<td>-7.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.94)***</td>
<td>(10.15)***</td>
<td>(16.86)***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
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<td>-1.043</td>
<td>-0.681</td>
<td>-1.045</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.82)*</td>
<td>(1.92)*</td>
<td>(1.82)*</td>
<td>(1.92)*</td>
</tr>
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<td>Resources per GNI (location)</td>
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<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>0.210</td>
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<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.01)***</td>
<td>(3.59)***</td>
<td>(4.00)***</td>
<td>(3.59)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (location)</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations (first/second stage)</td>
<td>496302/10974</td>
<td>391253/8296</td>
<td>496302/10974</td>
<td>391253/8296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-27004.204</td>
<td>-23361.044</td>
<td>-26364.266</td>
<td>-22867.573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald test of indep. eqns. (p-value)</td>
<td>14.27 (0.0002)</td>
<td>1.45 (0.2282)</td>
<td>2.46 (0.1169)</td>
<td>4.08 (0.0433)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Heckman’s two-stage probit estimator. Standard errors clustered on dyad (second stage) and country of location (first stage). Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant included in both stages, but not reported. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1
Endnotes

1 The estimation results are fully robust to including dummy variables for the different mission types to account for differential propensity to provide troops depending on the type of mission.

2 We recognise that these two underlying determinants are not independent. Indeed, the need for legitimacy largely arises because it is in the self-interest of states to secure approval for extra-territoriality.

3 Note, our multivariate research design allows us to control for these distance effects.

4 Note, we do not include military observer contributions within this definition.

5 Denote the potential troop sending country of interest as $i$, all other potential troop sending countries as $-i$ and the country in which the PKO is located as $j$, then this variable captures the spatial effect emanating from countries $-i$ on the troop sending decision of country $i$ with respect to countries $j$, where the binary weighting matrix is set to one if country $i$ and countries $-i$ are located in the same region, and zero otherwise. This amounts to what Neumayer and Plümper (2008) call source contagion.


7 Using probit or rare events logit instead leads to substantially almost identical results.

8 Note, our spatial lag results are robust to using an instrumental variable probit estimation to control for the simultaneity bias introduced by the spatial lag (a country’s decision to intervene in a specific mission located in a specific country is affected by the sending propensity of other countries located in the same region, but also affects this regional sending propensity). We use as an instrument the proportion of countries of the sending country’s region that have sent peacekeeping troops in a specific year to all PKOs, not just the specific mission under consideration. This instrument is far less subject to simultaneity
bias as there are many operations in any one year, not just the specific mission under consideration.

9 As noted earlier, the inclusion of a spatial lag variable to capture these dynamics renders the same region variable statistically insignificant.