Nigeria Country Study

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Population: 182 000 000 (2015)
Capital: Abuja
GDP pr capita: 2,640 USD (2016)
Gini: 43 (medium) (2009)
HDI: 0.514 (low) (2014)
Fertility rate: 5.65 children per women (2014)
Infant mortality rate: 69.4 per 1000 live born children (2015)
President: Muhammadu Buhari (2015-)
Independence: 1. October 1960
Democracy: 29. Mai 1999
Largest ethnic groups: Hausa-Fulani (north), Yoruba (south-west), Igbo (south-east) and Ijaw (west Niger Delta)
State structure: Federation, 36 states
Executive summary

Conflict trends

- Violent conflict has steadily worsened in Nigeria since 2010. The increase in overall conflict deaths and events is mainly driven by the conflict with Boko Haram (Graphs 1 & 2; Maps 3-7).
- In 2015, there was a small decline in total Nigerian conflict deaths, from XX to XX.
- There are three geographically distinct conflicts in Nigeria:
  - **Niger Delta** – The conflict related to the oil resources in the Niger Delta calmed down after the amnesty in 2009. Lately, the conflict seems to have heated up, with increasing violence (Graphs 4 and 5) and attacks on oil installations leading to a decrease in oil production (Graph 6)
  - **Boko Haram** – The conflict has escalated significantly in the period from 2013 through to early 2015. Since the presidential election in 2015, Nigerian and neighboring forces have cracked down on the movement, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015. Conflict activity is still high by mid-2016 (Figures 8 and 9; Maps 9-13).
  - **Eastern Middle Belt** – The Middle Belt is mainly affected by non-state communal conflicts (Map 8), often related to conflict between herders and nomads. There was an increase in this type of conflict in the early 2000s and again between 2010 and 2015 (Graph 3). These conflicts intensify in years with substantial drought during the growing season (Maps 15-19).

Socio-economic and demographic trends

- Nigeria is one of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the greatest economic and social differences between ethnic, religious, and regional groups. This inequality may contribute to fuel future conflict.
- This development gap is largely between north and south. The Niger Delta and the south-west region are doing particularly well (Maps 22-25).
- Education levels among women vary greatly between the north and the south, coinciding broadly with the divide between Muslim and Christians (Map 24).
- The gap in education between Muslim and Christian women has widened over time, and does not seem to become smaller (Graphs 10-15).
- Overall, Muslim women have on average 1.5-2 years of schooling, while Christian women have 8-9 years.
- Geography is part of the religious divide in education. Muslim women living in Christian areas do considerably better than Muslim women in Muslim-majority areas, but still worse than Christian women (Graph 15).
• Similar regional and inter-group differences exist for vaccination of children (Graphs 16 and 17). However, there is no real difference between boys and girls (Graph 18).
• The Nigerian population is young and is expected to grow from 182 million in 2015 to 262 million in 2030 and close to 400 million in 2050.
• The country will experience massive urban growth in the same period (Maps 26 & 27; Graphs 19 & 20). Lagos will have the largest growth in absolute numbers. Six cities, mainly in the south, will more than double its population in the coming 15 years.
• The northern areas are less mature demographically than the south, and will face a large youth bulge within the next 10 years (Maps 28 and 29; Graph 21).
• Women living in the eastern part of Nigeria report higher levels of sexual violence than women in the rest of the country. This appears to be related to overall higher levels of domestic violence. In the north east, women report the highest rates of non-partner sexual violence (Maps 30 and 31).
Nigeria Country Report

This report has three main sections, first a brief overview of history and geography, second we discuss conflict trends and finally we look at the socio economic factors.

Introduction: Brief history

Nigeria became independent from Great Britain October 1st 1960. From 1960-1966 the country had civil rule, but in 1966 it suffered from a coup by the ethnic group Igbo, followed by a counter coup led by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. This was the start of the Biafra war (1967-1979), where the Igbo ethnic group declared independence (see Map 1), killing more than one million people. In the period after the Biafra war there were several attempts to establish civil rule and democracy in Nigeria (1979-1983, Aug-Nov 1993), but these were overrun by military coups, and democracy did not succeed until 1999. Since then the country has had 4 elections (2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015) The first three elections were won by the People's Democratic Party (PDP), while in the 2015 election the opposition parties rallies around one candidate (Buhari) from the All Progressives Congress (APC). The figure below shows a timeline of important events in Nigeria particularly related to this report. Above the line are major political events, below are conflict related events.
Nigeria is a highly ethnically, religiously and geographically diverse country, and understanding the diversity in socio-economic trends within Nigeria is important for also understanding conflict patterns. Map 1 indicates the three main conflict regions in the country, the Niger Delta, the Middle Belt and the northeast (Boko Haram). For further reference, when we refer to the north, this is the region above the Middle Belt, and when we talk about the south west this is the region around Lagos between the Niger Delta and Middle Belt. In addition, Map 1 includes the major cities, and also the location of the Sambisa forest (the Boko Haram stronghold), the extended Niger Delta region and the area that was proclaimed as the Biafra state in 1966. Map 2 describes the spread of ethnic groups in Nigeria.
Conflict

In this section we will mainly look at conflict after the return to civil rule in 1999. We first give a general overview over conflict trends before we look specifically at the conflicts in the Niger Delta, the conflict against Boko Haram in the northeast and the violence in the eastern Middle Belt region.

General conflict trends

Based on data from the UCDP/PRIO data base, Graph 1 indicates how many conflict events have occurred each year since 1990, and Graph 2 indicates the number of battle death each year. Both show clearly that there has been an increase in conflict events and violence since 1999, and in particular since 2010. The UCDP/PRIO database also split the data into three types of conflicts: state-based, one-sided, non-state depending on the type of actors involved in the conflict event. We see that the increase after 2010 is evident in all three types conflict events. There is also a peak in 2000-2005 which is caused by the Niger-Delta and Middle-Belt conflicts (more details below). The second graph indicates that there has been a steep increase in battle related deaths particularly in 2013 and 2014, with the total number of deaths in 2014 being above 9,000. Only back in 2010 the number of conflict deaths was as low as 1,000. This recent peak is mainly driven by the Boko Haram conflict.

Further, in addition to the temporal conflict trend, the UCDP GED data allow us to the investigate the spatial development of conflict. The time trend Maps 3-7, show a clear movement of conflict events over the past 25 years. Larger circles indicate that there are several events recorded in the same place.

Right after the return to civil rule in 1999 there was an increase of events in the Niger Delta (comparing Maps 3 and 4), while in from 2010 to 2014 we see less conflict in the Niger Delta.
region, but an increasing amount in the northeast (Maps 6 and 7). We also see that there is an increasing number of conflict events in the region to as the eastern Middle Belt with a peak between in the early 2000s (Map 4) and again in 2013-2014 (Map 7).

Non-state conflicts
The GED data from UCDP also includes a breakdown of the non-state category (i.e. conflict where the state is not part of the conflict, the red category in Graphs 1 and 2) into three types of non-state conflict: Armed organizations, Political support and Communal conflicts depending on level of organization of the involved groups. These are important and relevant conflicts to look into. As we see from Graph 1 a large share of the conflict events in Nigeria are defined as non-state conflicts, thus indicating vulnerable areas that might not fall under the radar as the state is not involved, this is particularly true for the communal conflicts in the eastern Middle Belt region. The development of these conflict is Nigeria is shown in Graph 3 and Map 8.
Since 2009 there has been an extensive increase in communal violence (conflict between groups with a low level of organization, blue area), the red area in Graph 3 indicates political violence and we see that this type of violence typically arises around election years (2003, 2007 and 2011). Finally, the green area indicates that there is a slight rise in non-state conflict between armed organizations, but the level has been mainly stable since the early 2000s. Map 8 indicates the geographical spread of the three types of Non-State Violent Events. We see that the communal violence is mainly concentrated in the eastern Middle Belt area, and particularly around the city of Jos (see section on the Middle Belt). Non-state conflict between armed organizations are concentrated particularly in the Niger Delta where there are many militant, often ethnically based, fighting each other as well as the state. Political violence is more spread. This fits very well with the overall conflict picture of Nigeria.
**Niger Delta Conflict**

The conflict in Niger Delta is related to the struggle connected to oil exploitation in the region, in particular the sharing of oil revenues and environmental degradation. The conflict has mainly been concentrated in the three states: Delta, Rivers and Bayelsa (see Map 1). It has involved in particularly the ethnic groups Ijaws and Ogoni (see Map 2). The conflict began in the 1990s, and escalated further after Ken Saro-Wiwa and 8 other Ogoni leaders were executed following a questionable conviction for the murder of four pro-governmental Ogoni leaders in 1995. The conflict is supported by a number of ethnic pressure groups. During the 1990s the most prominent groups where the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) supported by the Ijaw community, and the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSPO). These groups are responsible for attacks on oil installations, kidnappings, car bombs and oil theft (Bunkering).

The conflict escalated further towards the end of the 2000s. During this period the most prominent group was the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), mainly consisting of members of the Ijaw ethnic group and often seen as the successor of NDPVF. However, the conflict culminated in an aggressive military incursion starting in May 2009. Where the Kingdom of Gbaramatu was bombed and according to ACLED approximately 1200 were killed between 15th and 21st of May. This is very evident in Graph 5 showing battle death in the Niger Delta region between 1995 and 20015. The Gabaramatu Kingdom is in Delta state and is the stronghold for the Ijaw community. The government forces (the Joint Task Force Operation) believed that MEND had its main camps in this area, thus the military chose to bomb the area. However, many of the killed were civilians.

While the violence in the Niger Delta seems to stay fairly low compared to the 1990s and 2000s, there are many militant groups being established in the Niger Delta. One of the more resent is The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), which announced its existence in March 2016. This group
uses new channels to reach their supporters and have their own webpage and twitter account. During the spring of 2016 the groups has taken responsibility for several attacks on oil installation reducing the Nigerian oil production to its lowest level in 20 years. Graph 6 indicates how the conflict level in the Niger Delta has affected the oil production in the region. We can see a clear trend that when the conflict heats up, the production decreases, this is particularly evident in the late 2000s and after 2015.

We also see that there is a rivalry between the groups, thus some of the violence in the Niger Delta is not only directed towards the government and oil companies but towards other militant groups. As indicated on non-state conflicts on Map 8.

**Niger Delta Amnesty**

In October 2009 the President established an amnesty program for the Niger Delta rebels, where they would hand in the weapons, included in DDR programs, received a monthly allowance and finally be reintegrated in to the civilian society. The aim of the program is to train 30,000 ex-combatants. At the beginning of 2017 17,000 ex-combatants had graduated from the program. Graph 7 indicates the projections of graduates from the program during 2016.
The program has since its establishment been able calm the situation in the Niger Delta, as a result we see a clear drop in violence in the Niger Delta after 2010. However, while the program has been able to calm the situation, it is not addressing many of the root causes related to grievances towards the oil extraction. As a consequence, we see a steep rise in conflict events from 2012 (Graph 4), however many of these events are riots, and we do not see a corresponding raise in fatalities in this period (Graph 5). However, the amnesty is an expensive undertaking. Hence, with the decreasing oil price, and the new President, Muhammadu Buhari, who indicated in his inauguration speech that he would let the amnesty program expire, thus tensions are starting to build up again in the Niger Delta, such as establishment of groups like the Niger Delta Avengers. However, in February 2016 Buhari granted an extension of the program until the end of 2017.

**Boko Harem (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad)**

While the lion’s share of the violence in Nigeria in the 1990s and 2000s occurred in the Niger Delta, there was a move of violence towards the North East around 2009. This trend is very evident across the 5 time trend maps above (Maps 3-7).

Boko Haram, which roughly translates to ‘Western education is sinful’, was established in 2001 and has since 2009 promoted their agenda through violent actions. Among the major goals of the group is to have a Muslim president and to implement Sharia laws in all of Nigeria. The extreme violence has taken form as suicide attacks and bombs particularly aimed at schools and churches, with large casualties and killing many children. Graphs 8 (conflict events) and 9 (battle deaths) indicate the development of the conflict Boko Haram from January 2009 until current, differing between events that are battles between government forces and Boko Haram (red) and violence towards civilians (blue). There is a generally high level of violence, with some peaks. The most notable in in January 2015. This was caused by a massacre by Boko Haram in the town Baga on the boarder to Chad between 3th and 7th January. The headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task was established in Baga and was overrun during this attack, and reports say that more than 2000 civilians were killed and 35000 were forced to flee during these 4 days.

Further, we see that after the attack on Baga the level of violence is lower than in 2013 and 2014. This can be explained by the fact that 2015 was a presidential election year, and the sitting President and incumbent candidate Jonathan Goodluck did a huge effort to crack down the violence towards the (delayed) election held in April 2015, as well as the establishment of the Multinational joint task force in January 2015. During this period, they were able to minimize the area that Boko Haram controlled to the areas around Maiduguri and the Sambisa Forest (about 60km south east of Maiduguri). The Sambisa Forest has been used as the main shelter of Boko Haram, and is where the kidnapped Chibok girls are assumed to be held. In May 2016 one of the Chibok girls were found in the forest.

In December 2015 President Buhari claimed that Boko Haram was “technically defeated”.
However, while Boko Haram has lost control over areas, they are still able to preserve a high level of violence, particularly through suicide attacks. Both Graphs 8 and 9 and Map 13 indicate that this is retained in 2016.

The time trend maps (Maps 9-13) show the geographical spread of conflict events including Boko Haram, indicating both the number of events within each point (size of the circle) as well as differing between battles and violence against civilians. While the main share of the events is concentrated in the north east we see that the city of Kano and the capital Abuja, and also other areas particularly in the North. However, we also see Boko Haram related events both in the Niger Delta and in Lagos, these are most often bombs in public places. Further, Map 13 indicate that the Boko Haram activity in 2016 (up until May 2016) is mainly occurring in the north east areas.
The Boko Haram conflict has spread to several of the neighboring countries, as shown on Map 14. The violence is mainly concentrated in the Lake Chad region along the board of north east Nigeria, mainly in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. But we also see occasional attacks further away as well. Cameroon, Chad and Niger are part of the Multinational Joint Task Force, which are collaborating to fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (under Nigerian leadership).
Boko Haram and Islamic State (IS)
In March 2015, Boko Haram pledge allegiance to IS, and has also started to refer to themselves as the Islamic States West African Province. This type of internationalization of Islamic civil wars has become more common in the last years. According to the UCDP, only three civil wars involved IS in 2014, while in 2015 this had increased to 12. Among these 12 are the Boko Haram related conflicts in Nigeria, Cameroon, Mali and Chad.

Boko Haram weapons
(This a continuous project and we will possibly be able to present more numbers at a later stage)
In general, arms availability in Nigeria is not as high as other parts of Africa. Between 2012 and 2015 reported annual prices for factory made Kalashnikovs are between almost USD 2 000 and just over USD 3 000. Such high prices strongly indicate that demand for factory made guns clearly exceeds supply. Much cheaper and readily available in Nigeria are locally made craft firearms that can be purchased for as little as USD 20-30.

Boko Haram has been able to develop a sizeable military force, that has been capable of defeating Nigerian army unites operating in parts of Northern Nigeria. In a country such as Nigeria the most important factors needed to create such a military force are recruits, and enough weapons and ammunition to enable those recruits to be combatants. In 2014, Borno state governor Kashim Shettima stated that Boko Haram was better equipped than the Nigerian army. Boko Haram’s sources of arms are:

Capture
By far the most important source of arms has been through capturing weapons from the Nigerian security forces. Boko Haram has taken over Nigerian government bases and depots,
and has been able to obtain a small number of armored vehicles and anti-aircraft cannon, and much larger quantities of mortars and rifles, and their ammunition. In particular, Boko Haram released videos displaying weapons captured from raids on Nigerian army barracks. Notably, after the capture of a military base in Baga in January 2015, video evidence shows that it had captured: hundreds of rifles; tens of machineguns and mortars; and hundreds of boxes of ammunition.

Production
There is extensive local craft production of firearms in Nigeria and in other parts of West Africa. Most are relatively unsophisticated shotguns, rifles and handguns. But some craft production of automatic rifles has been reported. In addition, Boko Haram has produced improvised explosive devices.

Trafficking
Some press reports suggest that arms freely available after the 2011 war in Libya trafficked to Boko Haram. The 2014 and 2013 UN Panel reports on the Libya arms embargo state that information from countries neighbouring Nigeria indicates that arms trafficking is likely to have taken place from Libya to Boko Haram in North-eastern Nigeria via routes through eastern Niger and western Chad. However, the 2014 Panel report states that it was unable to verify media reports of such trafficking, nor was it able to examine arms seized in North-eastern Nigeria to assess whether any were of Libyan origin. It is likely that if trafficking from Libya is taking place it is at a fairly low level. Other countries in West Africa, particularly Benin and Ghana, have also reported arms being trafficked to Nigeria, or the activities of Nigerian traffickers.

The United States, South Africa and some European arms exporters have been reluctant to supply arms to the Nigerian government, and have expressed reservations about the Nigerian army’s human rights record (though Nigeria has found arms suppliers). In addition, Nigerian generals and other senior personnel have been accused of widespread corruption in arms procurement deals worth billions of US dollars.

A key policy priority should be to prevent Boko Haram from obtaining arms and ammunition. That can be addressed by reinforcing efforts to prevent arms trafficking in West and North Africa. More importantly, though also much more difficult to achieve, is to improve the Nigerian security forces control over their own weapons and so prevent them from being obtained by Boko Haram.

Eastern Middle Belt conflicts
The Middle Belt area is a melting pot ethnic groups, where both the larger ethnic groups as well as Muslims and Christians have coexisted peacefully however since the 1999 transition to democracy, the area has experienced a tremendous amount of violence between indigene and non-indigene ethnic groups (i.e. groups that have lived in the area for a long time vs
immigrants). As a result of the violence in the Plateau State and Jos 250,000 people where internally displaced from February to May 2004. This is one quarter of all the internally displaced people in all of Nigeria between 1999 and 2004.

After 2009 the number of conflict events and violence in the Middle Belt increased, particularly around the city of Jos. This is clear from Maps 6 and 7 (above). The conflict is grounded in both religious and ethnic differences. But these differences are further enhanced by political struggles and economic differences. Many of the conflict events are attributed to conflicts between herders and nomads. Thus, it has been argued that there are elements of climate change driving the conflict in this area. Maps 15-19 show the time trend of non-state communal conflict events and drought. The grid indicates the share of the growing season for the main crop in each cell that was harmed by drought during the 5-year period for each map. We see a clear correlation both in time and space between severe drought and communal conflict events, particularly in the periods between 2000-2004 and 2010-2014.

Maps 15-19: Time trend maps over communal conflict (GED) and percentage of drought in the growing season
Other types of conflict

Map 20 indicate areas with high levels of cattle conflicts. These conflict are related to cattle rustlers trying to steel cattle or the right to grazing. These conflict often becomes violent and deadly. We can see that the areas where cattle conflict are most common overlap with the communal conflict in the Middle belt in Maps 15-19.

Map 21 shows the spread of land use disputes in Nigeria. These includes dispute between communities over the ownership and right to use land and personal conflicts between individual and families over the right to land. Common for the areas where these types of conflict occur more frequently is that they are ethnically diverse such as the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta.
**Socio-economic trends**

This section will look at some of the most important socio-economic trends in Nigeria, particularly socio economic indicators, demography, inequality and sexual violence.

**Socio economic indicators**

Maps 22-25 present four different socio economic indicators: health, wealth, education and electricity. The four maps have some variation but show one general trend: The norther parts seem in general to be worse off than the south. Particularly the Niger Delta and South West region around Lagos are much better than the others, while the most northern states, and particularly north east seems to be worse off than the rest on all accounts.

It is also worth noting in Map 25 that while we see a high concentration of electric grid in the Niger Delta, the share of households with electricity in Rivers and Bayelsa are lower than in the rest of the Niger Delta. This is due to the fact that a lot of the electricity is connected to the oil industry in the region. Thus, parts of the grievances underscoring the Niger Delta conflict is that, while there obviously are electricity in the region, and they are producing energy (oil) this does not benefit the population living there.
Inequality

The socio economic trends seems to coincide with the religious divide in Nigeria (Muslim North and Christian South), but also with the major ethnic lines. However, the socio economic trends map is just a snapshot of the situation in 2013. To get a better understanding of the development of socio economic trends we have looked at the development over time and compared across groups.

Graphs 10-15 show the development of education level has developed for women born between 1940 to 1990. The graphs are based on 5 rounds of DHS data where women are asked about their level of education. Graphs 10 and 11 focuses on the difference between Muslim and Christian women. As primary and secondary education are normally achieved during childhood and youth we can say something about the level of education back in time by compared women born in the same year. The graphs indicate the same trend as we see in Map 24, women in the south has higher education than those in the north. We see that both Muslim and Christians women have had an increasing level of education over time. However, a worrisome trend is that the gap between Muslim and Christian women has grown large. In 1980 about 25% of Muslim women had achieved primary education while approximately 75% of Christian women. In 1990 the share of Muslim women had increased to approximately 40% while for Christians almost 90%. While, Muslim women has a larger percentage increase, the gap between the two groups seems to be the same. Even more problematic is the development of women achieving secondary education, not only is there a
large gap between the two groups, but it seems to have increased over time. This particularly evident in Graph 11.

We see the same trend comparing ethnic groups Graphs 12 and 13. Igbo and Yoruba which are the second and third ethnic groups in Nigeria mainly situated in the Niger Delta and the South west (See Maps 1 and 2) have a much higher level of education compared to both Hausa-Fulani which is the main Muslim ethnic group mainly situated in the North and the collective category of others, but which is do considerably much better than women from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group.
Finally, in Figure 15 we look at whether there is a difference in share of primary education between women who are a religious minority/majority in the area they live, i.e. Muslim women living in predominantly Christian areas, and vice versa. It seems that for Christian women there is very little difference. Christian minority women have a slightly lower level of education compared to Christian women living in Christian dominated areas. However, it seems that Muslim minority women have a much higher likelihood of achieving primary education than Muslim women living in Muslim areas. However, there is still a considerable difference between Christian and Muslim women living in Christian areas.

Graph 14: Comparing the difference between Christian and Muslim women in primary and secondary education, born between 1940-1990 (DHS)

In Graphs 16 and 17 we have done a similar comparison of children under the age of 5 that has been vaccinated. These data are based on the DHS surveys where women were asked about whether any of their children under the age of 5 have been vaccinated. The graphs consist of one data point of each survey year (the surveys were conducted in 1990, 1999,

Graph 15: Comparing the difference between Christian and Muslim women both as majority groups and minority groups, born between 1940-1990 (DHS)

Graph 16: Share of children under 5 that has been vaccinated, by religious group (DHS)

Graph 17: Share of children under 5 that has been vaccinated, by ethnic group (DHS)
2003, 2008 and 2013), in total five data points for Graph16 and two for Figure 17. Each data point indicates the share of children born in a five-year period before the survey that was vaccinated. We see the same trend here, that children born by Christian mothers are more likely to be vaccinated compared to those born by a Muslim mother. However, see also see that all groups have a high increase from 2008 until 2013, and that the increase among Muslim children is greater. Figure 16 indicates that the converging trend is the same when we look at ethnic groups.

While there is still a fairly large inequality between religious and ethnic groups when it comes to the vaccination of children, Figure 18 indicates that there seems to be very little difference between boys and girls. In fact, the share of vaccinated girls is slightly higher.

Figure 18: Share of girls and boys under 5 group that has been vaccinated (DHS)
**Demographic Trends**

Nigeria is already the most populous country in Africa, but it is foreseeing a large population growth in the next 15 years. It is expected that the population will grow from 182,000,000 in 2015 to 262,000,000 in 2030, and almost 400,000,000 in 2050. A lot of this growth will happen in the cities, which means that the share of the urban population will grow extensively. Map 26 and Graph 19 indicate which Nigerian cities will grow the most in absolute numbers. Most notably is the growth of Lagos and Kano, in the next 15 years Lagos is expected to grow with from 13 million in 2015 to 24 million in 2030.

Map 26: Urban growth 2015-2030: Largest cities (UN)  
Graph 19: Urban growth 2015-2030: Largest cities (UN)

Map 27 and Graph 20 indicate which cities that will have the largest growth in percentage. 6 cities (with a population larger than 300,000) will at least double their size between 2015 and 2030 (Graph 20). Map 27 indicates that it is in particularly in the Niger Delta and in the south west region around Lagos this growth will happen. This very high and fats growth will huge pose challenges in terms of infrastructure, health and education in these cities.

Map 27: Urban growth 2015-2030: Fastest growing cities (UN)  
Graph 20: Urban growth 2015-2030: Fastest growing cities (UN)
Youth Bulges

It is not only important in which areas the population grow, but also how it grows. It has been argued that countries and areas undergoing age-structure transitions, resulting in very youthful populations are increasingly susceptible to political violence. Youths often play a prominent role in political violence, and the existence of a ‘youth bulge’ has historically been associated with times of political crisis, the conflict in the Niger Delta is a good example of this. A number of relevant contextual factors have been suggested to affect the relationship between large youth cohorts and conflict. First, the mere existence of an extraordinary large pool of youth is a factor that lowers the cost of recruitment to rebel and militant groups, since the opportunity cost for a young person generally is low. Second, for large youth cohorts, the economic climate at the time they enter into the labor market is particularly crucial. Youths belonging to large cohorts will be especially vulnerable to unemployment if their entry into the labor force coincides with periods of serious economic decline. Such coincidences may generate despair among young people that moves them towards the use of violence. For example, the decreasing oil prices has reduced the economic opportunities for young people in the Niger Delta.

Map 28 indicates in which areas have the highest percentage of youth between 15-24. It seems that the eastern Middle Belt and the south east region have a particularly young population. Particularly in the eastern Middle Belt we have seen substantial amount of conflict, particularly related to herder and farmer conflict, but also urban riots as in the town of Jos. Map 29 indicates which regions have a large under 15 populations, this gives an indication which regions will have a large 15-24 population in approximately 10 years. We see that it shifts from the south east to the northern areas. As we saw in Maps 22-25 this is a region which is relatively under developed compared to the rest of the country. An increasing
youth population could put further strains on this region, and possibly increase the pool of new recruits for Boko Haram.

**Demographic Dividend**

It has been argued that Sub-Saharan Africa is going through a demographic transition, with decreasing fertility rates, thus the difference between those that are in the working force (15-64) becomes relatively bigger than those in the dependency groups (under 15 and above 64). This is often referred to as a potential for a “Demographic dividend”, where a relatively increasing working population increases the economic potential of a country. However, while Nigeria has had a slight decrease of fertility rate over the past 30 years, it is still very high at 5.65 children born per women which is among the highest in the world. Graph 21 shows the development of the youth bulges (i.e share of 15-24 of 15+ population as in Map 27) and the growth in the support ratio (i.e the share of the working population compared to dependent population). Around when these two lines crosses each other is when we could start talking about the potential for a demographic dividend. While for Africa on average this is likely to happen around 2050, Nigeria is not reaching this point until 2070. The continued youthfulness of Nigeria, and in particular the increased youth bulge in the northern areas of Nigeria, represents a real challenge for the country.

![Graph 21: Demographic dividend for Nigeria and Africa](image)

**Violence towards women**

Maps 30 and 31 indicate the level sexual violence. Map 30 shows the share of the respondents that has ever experienced sexual violence. In the north west and south west there seems to be very little sexual violence, while in the north east and particularly in the south east, the level seems substantially higher than in the rest of the country. We see that all the three conflict areas described earlier (North East, Middle Belt and Niger Delta) has an elevated level of sexual violence compared to the rest of the country. In Map 31 only those that has experience sexual violence by spouse is included (this is a sub category in Map 30). We see that the when only looking at sexual violence by spouse the level in the north east goes down, which might
suggest that there is an increase of non-spousal sexual violence in these areas, which fits with the stories of rape and sexual violence conducted by Boko Haram. We also see that non-spousal sexual violence is particularly common in the south east region.