The population of north Cyprus is one of the most contested issues in the Cyprus conflict, with many and widely varying figures being published for numbers of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals in the island. In 2008, Mete Hatay published a report in which he assessed all available sources on Turkish Cypriot population, and that report has since been a standard source for understanding demography in north Cyprus. In the past decade, however, there have been continuous changes to the north’s population, including an explosion in numbers of university students and the issuance of new citizenships by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. In light of these changes, Hatay again assesses available sources on the Turkish Cypriot population, gives an overall portrait of the population breakdown; and presents results not only for immigration but also for Turkish Cypriot emigration. In addition, he assesses both Turkish Cypriot reactions to these changes and their potential effects on future negotiations.
About the Author

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POPULATION AND POLITICS IN NORTH CYPRUS

An overview of the ethno-demography of north Cyprus in the light of the 2011 census

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Mete Hatay
Nicosia,

December 2017
ABBREVIATIONS

AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CAHP European Population Committee
CTP Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party)
CTP-BG Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi ve Birleşik Güçler (Republican Turkish Party and United Forces)
DP Democratic Party
DMP Demokratik Mücadele Partisi (Democratic Struggle Party) DP Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party)
EU European Union
IDP İnternally Displaced People
ROC Republic of Cyprus
TC Turkish Cypriots
TFSC Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TKP Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi (Communal Liberation Party) TFSC Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TR Turkish citizens
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UBP Ulusal Birlik Partisi (National Unity Party) UK United Kingdom
USA United State of America
UN United Nations
YDP Rebirth Party
SUMMARY

At least since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, population ratios have played a role in the politics of the island. After the island’s division in 1974, a facilitated migration between 1975 and 1979 brought around 25,000 Turkish nationals to the island as a labour force. This influx of Turkish nationals was also intended to secure the territory of the north in any future settlement. However, the result was to make the population of north Cyprus a source of continuous controversy and speculation, even amongst Turkish Cypriots themselves.

To assess the demography of north Cyprus today, this report builds on my two previous works on the north’s population (Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish ‘Settlers’ in Northern Cyprus, 2005, and Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?, 2007). It draws on those reports’ discussion of conceptual problems attached to the settler label, and their conclusion that the variations present within this grouping warrant more fine-grained distinction. It uses the subcategories identified in those reports, the most important for the purposes of the present work being the distinction between citizens and non-citizens, as only the former enjoy the right to vote. In this report, as well, I restrict the settler label to the subcategory of ‘agricultural labour’, i.e., those persons whose migration to the island formed part of a deliberate settlement policy pursued by both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot authorities following the partition of the island in 1974. Other Turkish nationals have since migrated to the island on their own initiative, acquiring citizenship through either naturalization or assisted naturalization (e.g., through marriage to Turkish Cypriots).

The present report provides an introduction to the current politics of population in the island’s north and assesses the last census of 2011, which was the first that was undertaken with unofficial United Nations supervision. However, since that census there have been other changes in the population, such as large numbers of naturalizations and an exponential increase in university student numbers. The report examines the available data to give an overall assessment of both de jure and de facto populations in north Cyprus today.
INTRODUCTION

In early 2017 there was a notable shift in Turkish Cypriot politics. While throughout the two previous years, there had been an excited expectation that ongoing reunification talks would this time bear fruit, by early 2017 it became clear that this was unlikely, and the negotiations began to occupy a less prominent place in Turkish Cypriot media. Instead, both traditional and social media began to discuss how Turkish Cypriots might ‘clean up their house,’ a reference to the systemic corruption that had harmed the public sector, crippled the delivery of social services, and endangered relations with Turkey, which financed the system but wanted its reform. When the negotiations indeed collapsed in the summer, followed by the announcement of an early parliamentary election in January 2018, discussion turned to ‘cleaning house’.

The issue of reform had acquired some urgency because of the deterioration of the political landscape in Turkey, the country on which Turkish Cypriots politically, economically, and militarily depend. An increasingly authoritarian Turkish state also used its financial contributions to the Turkish Cypriot economy to attempt to impose certain policies of the ruling party, such as the building of more mosques and schools for religious education.1 Turkish Cypriots, in turn, have tended to view the ruling party in Turkey as a potential threat to their way of life.2 ‘Cleaning their house’ was viewed by many as a last hope for maintaining some independence from Turkey.3

In this increasingly tense atmosphere, Turkish nationals and their descendants have occupied a contradictory position on the island. At the time of my first report on the subject in 2005, many Turkish Cypriots tended to view this group as a ‘Trojan Horse,’ a ploy to maintain Turkey’s influence over the island and an instrument for assimilation. At that time, then, the rhetoric of the left was that the settlers were responsible for keeping right-wing parties in power

1 http://www.yeniduzen.com/yeniduzen-ulkedeki-cami-sayilarini-arastirdi-51110h.htm
2 https://www.cnnturk.com/dunya/cami-kibrista-tepki-cekti
and were an obstacle to peace. Since that time, there has been more acknowledgment in the Turkish Cypriot community of the heterogeneity of this group, which includes large numbers of persons from communities that are victims in Turkey (Kurds, Arabs and Alevis, in particular). In addition, the left has begun to acknowledge that there has been discrimination against this group on the basis of class, education, and ethnicity (Ekenoğlu 2012; Erhürman 2007).

Despite this change in attitudes, however, there remains a general public perception that many Turkish nationals or persons of Turkish origin living on the island are easily drawn into complicity with the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Furthermore, and, in contrast to earlier perceptions that they were a potential ‘Trojan Horse’, i.e., a vehicle for Turkey’s plans for the north, there is now a growing belief that a certain segment of this population are active agents of the current Turkish government, or that they are willing and able to access the AKP’s networks for their own purposes, and conversely, to increase the presence of the AKP in the island.

This perception became more widespread in the autumn of 2017, when a newly formed settler party began to gain ground in parliamentary election campaigning in Cyprus’s north. Although the main faces of the party were affiliated with ultra-right nationalist parties in Turkey rather than the AKP, they and their supporters immediately began to defend the Turkish government in any conflict with Turkish Cypriots or their own administration. The party had been formed only a year earlier, and yet it immediately attracted a solid base of Turkish-origin ‘TRNC’ citizens who believed that they had been excluded by the system in the island’s north—a system that is highly unfavourable to persons born in Turkey or whose parents were born in Turkey. These citizens complain that they have difficulty finding jobs in the civil service and are excluded from nepotistic networks. They also perceive that any tension between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot political leaders, or between north Cyprus and Turkey, is deflected onto them.

Leaders of the new party named it the Rebirth Party (Yeniden Doğuş Partisi), a reference to the first party in north Cyprus formed in 1984 to represent persons of Turkish origin (Yeni Doğuş Partisi, or the New Birth Party). While the extreme-right political views of the party’s leaders created concern amongst a certain segment of the populace, their slogans and party program

---

4 The leader of the party, Erhan Arıklı, was already known to Turkish Cypriots for having threatened Afrika newspaper editor Şener Levent in 2002 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/canli-yayinda-kufur-38440520). Although several years later he apologized to Levent and expressed remorse at his extreme position, Turkish Cypriots retained a memory of the incident (http://www.kibrismanset.com/erhan-arikli-sener-levent-ve-afrika-makale-928.html). Moreover, in 2013 Arıklı was arrested in Kirgizistan, where he was the ‘TRNC’ representative, because of an Interpol warrant issued by the Republic of Cyprus. He was accused by the RoC, along with ten other men, of having been involved in the deaths of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou in 1996. Arıklı has denied the charges, and he was set free by Kirgiz authorities. On the other hand, in 2017 YDP General Secretary Bertan Zaroğlu lost a case brought by MP Doğuş Derya for sexual harassment on the Internet. Zaroğlu was one of six defendants in the case who were fined for making obscene and threatening comments on Facebook in 2014, after Derya had made public remarks regarding rapes committed by the Turkish military in 1974 (https://www.gundemkibris.com/kibris/kktc-yargisinda-bir-ilk-yanasacak-h228672.html).
emphasized their ties to Cyprus. Their main slogan became ‘Vatanım Kıbrıs’, or ‘Cyprus, My Country’. In their party platform, they emphasized their desire to be tied to Turkey while at the same time decrying the ‘babyland’ (Yavruvatan) rhetoric so often used in relation to the ‘motherland’, and calling instead for equal recognition between the two countries. Equality at an individual and group level was also an important part of their platform, as one of their slogans emphasized, ‘We want equality and justice’.

The rise of a ‘settler’ party at this moment tells us much about both the political polarization in the island’s north and the changing landscape of relations between north Cyprus and Turkey, and the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and what the party’s leader, Erhan Ankli, chooses to call ‘New Cypriots’. As I explain below, the current political conjuncture is more complex than in the past, particularly because the community of Turkish nationals in Cyprus is more heterogeneous, and because the extreme political polarization in Turkey is also dividing this community. This internal polarization within the community is also reflected in a new polarization within north Cyprus as a whole: one between Turkish Cypriots along with their allies in the Turkish immigrant community, and certain groups of Turkish immigrants who align themselves more closely with the Turkish state. Whereas in the past those interactions with the Turkish state were filtered through local politics in Cyprus, today there are indications that certain groups, for their own political reasons, allow themselves to be used as instruments of Turkish government policy in the island.

In this context, we may see the rise of a new settler party as an entry point for thinking about Turkish nationals and their descendants on the island, and as a pivotal point for the relationship between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government. As should become clear in this report, that relationship has also changed because of a new transnational Turkish politics as well as political polarization in Turkey, both of which have begun to reshape the position of Turkish nationals on the island. Moreover, as I will outline below, population continues to play a key role in this changing landscape of Turkish Cypriot politics, insofar as the number of persons of Turkish origin, as well as those of Turkish Cypriot origin, is continuously questioned and called into doubt, as well as politicized, securitized, and turned into a political weapon.

‘New Cypriots’ and the Turkey-North Cyprus Relationship

Turkish Cypriots recognize that the current predicaments in which they find themselves are traceable to the development of a nepotistic political system that they now are attempting to ‘clean’ (Egemen 2006; Sonan 2014). For several decades, the National Unity Party (UBP) had kept its place at the center of Turkish Cypriot politics by developing a sophisticated nepotistic network that took advantage of the social-democratic economic model implemented in north
Cyprus after 1974. This system consisted of many state-run industries, and included farms, hotels, banks, and factories. As the party most often in power, the UBP exploited this system, using these state-run enterprises to create jobs for party supporters. Gradually, nepotism came to infiltrate all aspects of Turkish Cypriot political life, such that it was essentially through nepotistic networks that one secured a civil service job or got a road fixed.

The UBP was also the party that for decades was perceived to be closest to Turkey. It had been founded by long-time president Rauf Denktaş, and even if he later distanced himself from the party, it maintained a political line close to his own. The UBP was the party that periodically suggested further cultural and economic integration of the island’s north with Turkey, and it openly used a language of ‘motherland’ and ‘babyland’, suggesting that north Cyprus was a child dependent on its mother. For the opposition leftist parties, the UBP’s monopolization of political space and openly nationalistic rhetoric seemed to suggest more than simple ideological closeness to Turkey. Rather, as early as the 1980’s parties on the left began to suggest openly that Turkish settlers were Turkey’s ‘vote pool’ on the island, supporting the UBP as the party closest to the ‘motherland’s’ agenda.

In a previous report (Hatay 2005), I demonstrated that, in fact, voting patterns among Turkish settlers were diverse from the beginning, and that the UBP could not have stayed in power without the support of Turkish Cypriots who benefited from the nepotism that the party provided. Indeed, many Turkish settlers were disgruntled with the UBP, which they complained was reserving state jobs for its own indigenous supporters. Moreover, although settlers initially joined Cypriot parties that seemed to correspond to their party affiliations in Turkey, they soon found what they felt was reluctance by these Cypriot parties to address the concerns of people from Turkey.

As a result, and as early as the late 1970’s, these early immigrants began first to form civil society associations, then to engage in attempts at party formation. Hanifi Gürbüz, the second president of the Migrants’ Association, explained why they formed their association, and why it evolved into a party:

> When we came from Turkey, we looked and saw an incredible exclusion. For instance, you go to a government office—of course, it’s also possible that we were too sensitive in this period—a Cypriot’s business always comes before yours. The civil servant

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5 It should be noted that this system was built on appropriated and ‘nationalized’ Greek Cypriot properties.
working in that office is either his school friend or his friend from military service or his relative. You want to get a loan from the bank and can’t. There are all sorts of obstacles. We had no educated children like they had. (Özekmekçi 2012)

In 1981, this situation led to the settlers’ formation of the Turkish Unity Party (TBP) to defend their own more particular interests. Although this party had limited success, it was followed a few years later by the New Birth Party, which managed to gain four seats and the support of about half the settler population in the 1985 parliamentary elections. The UBP and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP) lost votes from this population during this election, mainly because of the persistence of the widespread perception among settlers that they were excluded from privileged, public-sector jobs, forcing most of them to take up seasonal jobs in the agricultural and construction sectors (Hatay 2005; Özekmekçi 2012).

Once these grievances became clear, and once the ‘native’ parties saw the political potential of this vote pool, they began to take these complaints more seriously. This initially meant an alliance with the main leftist parties, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP). When this alliance lost the 1990 elections, the YDP joined with breakaway members of the UBP to form a new party, the Demokrat Parti (DP), which won 16 seats and became the second most important party in the 1993 elections. After this, settlers were integrated into the existing Turkish Cypriot parties, especially the UBP and the DP, but also the CTP and other small, center parties. As a result, although other small settler parties formed during the 2000’s, they were not able to achieve electoral success.

Table 1: Parties representing persons of Turkish origin in north Cyprus:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Years when active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islah ve Refah Partisi (Reform and Welfare Party)</td>
<td>1979-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosyal Adalet Partisi (Social Justice Party)</td>
<td>1978-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türk Birlik Partisi (Turkish Unity Party)</td>
<td>1980-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milliyetçi Türk Partisi (Nationalist Turkish Party)</td>
<td>1982-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Doğuş Partisi (New Birth Party)</td>
<td>1984-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kıbrıs Adalet Partisi (Cyprus Justice Party)</td>
<td>2003--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeni Parti (New Party)</td>
<td>2005--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeniden Doğuş Partisi (Rebirth Party)</td>
<td>2016--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We also see, however, that as this group lost its own representation and was incorporated into existing political parties, they also lost a way to represent their grievances as a group. Arıklı complained in an article that he wrote for *Kıbrıs Manşet*, a Turkish Cypriot newspaper:

The ‘Türkiyeli-Cypriot’ distinction is . . . implemented mercilessly by all the parties who come to power, whether ‘Right’ or ‘Left’. In the past, while the ‘Left’ openly discriminated in this way, the ‘Right’ did it more secretively by seeing Turkish Immigrants as a voter pool. What the politicians desire is this: those who migrated to the island and became citizens after 1974 should just vote, pay taxes, do their military service, and be satisfied with whatever rights are given to them and not ask for equal rights.6

He continued that ‘there’s no discrimination amongst the people,’ and noted that, ‘[T]he sad part is that the vast majority of those citizens whom we call Old Cypriots are genuinely unaware of this discriminatory policy.’7 This, he argued, is because Turkish Cypriots have normalized their position of advantage, such that anyone who points out this discrimination appears to be dividing the community.

While Arıklı clearly represents a segment of the population that feels these grievances very strongly, his assessment does not take account how this community’s position and its methods and strategies for addressing grievances have changed over the past decade. Particularly since the Gezi Park protests of 2013, Turkey has become increasingly polarized between a conservative segment that sees the AKP and President Erdoğan as defenders of their rights, and a leftist, liberal, and Kemalist segment that views them as a threat to democracy. Following the attempted coup in 2016 and the resultant implementation of a state of emergency, a government crackdown has silenced opposition. Additionally, however, the atmosphere and rhetoric in Turkey have given free reign to individuals to silence opposition—violently, if necessary—rather than enter into dialogue. Turkish Cypriots have begun to fear how this political climate might impact them, because although domestic politics in north Cyprus are quite distant from the concerns of Turkey, Turkish Cypriots are affected by these politics through the large population of Turkish nationals living on the island.

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6 Erhan Arıklı, ‘We didn’t come here to return, we came here to die,’ *Kıbrıs Manşet*, 28 June 2015 http://www.kibrismanset.com/buraya-donmeye-degil-olmeye-geldik-makale,885.html
7 Ibid.
In the past, that population consisted primarily of settlers, students, and workers, with the large number of soldiers and their families mostly confined to the camps. First-generation settlers were mostly farmers with no or little education, while students and workers were not citizens and so had no political rights. Today, however, as I will explain in Chapter 3, the population has changed considerably. There are now not only second-generation, but even third-generation ‘settlers,’ and many of these are university educated. Turkish student numbers have continued to grow, but whereas in the past Turkish Cypriots were primarily concerned about, e.g., traffic accidents caused by Turkish students not remembering to drive on the left, today they are concerned that the polarization within universities, especially between Kurdish and nationalist students, will spill over into the population at large. And today, the manual labourers of the past have been supplemented by large numbers of white collar professionals such as doctors and university lecturers, many of whom wish to escape the growing chaos in Turkey. As a result, in the Turkish constitutional referendum and the last election where Turkish nationals on the island cast absentee ballots, larger numbers than in Turkey opposed the AKP.8

In addition to this changing population, however, Turkey’s presence on the island has also changed. No longer content to use the island as a base and to support it financially, the AKP has insisted on the privatization of public works and has encouraged Turkish investors to pour large amounts of money into the sorts of building projects that have fueled the Turkish economy (Buğra and Savaşkan 2014). These have included large resort complexes, universities, housing developments, and even an airport. The Turkish government has also invested in infrastructure, such as new roads and a water delivery project, primarily using Turkish contractors. And most importantly for Turkish Cypriots, the Turkish government has invested in the construction of mosques and religious schools.

All of these projects have brought new and powerful Turkish business interests to the island for the first time. These business interests, furthermore, have inserted themselves into the island’s nepotistic system, which had previously been used by and for local interests. These business interests have poured money into supporting parties that would give them favored

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8 The number of ‘yes’ votes in the 2017 constitutional referendum was 45% and ‘no’ was 55%, though we should note that only 41.6% of those eligible voted in the referendum. This may be compared with the result in Turkey, which was 51.41% ‘yes’ and 48.59% ‘no’, with 85% voter turnout (http://www.turkiyegazetesicomtr2017-referandum-sonuclari/kuzey-kibris-turk-cum-ulke-referandum-sonuclari). In the first general election of 2015, the AKP received only 39.5% of the vote, while the new Kurdish party, HDP, got 18.5%. In the second general election held later that year after the failure to form a coalition government, the AKP increased its share to 49.3%, while HDP fell to 14.9%. It should be noted, however, that the ultranationalist MHP also lost votes in this period, from 13.8% in the first election to 10.1% in the second. Although the number of votes for AKP and the main opposition party, CHP, were approximately the same in Cyprus and Turkey, we find that in Turkey the Kurdish party received less, and MHP more, than in Cyprus (https://secimhaberlercom2015/kuzey-kibris-turk-cum-secim-sonuclari/).
locations to build hotels or overlook zoning restrictions on, e.g., the height of apartment buildings. A large part of ‘cleaning their house’ was provoked by the growing trail of corruption that had changed the landscape to the profit of Turkish business and at the expense of the environment. Although many of these business interests are not directly affiliated with the AKP, there is still the perception among many Turkish Cypriots that their own assets and resources are being given over to Turkey and its economic interests.\(^9\)

In addition to these changes, there is also the AKP’s new diaspora politics in Cyprus, which resembles its transnational politics elsewhere and has the potential to disturb the peace on the island. Since 2014, political parties led by diaspora Turks and supporting the AKP have begun to emerge in countries where Turkish immigrants and minorities live (Sahin Mencutek and Baser 2018). In Germany, the Netherlands, Bulgaria, and elsewhere, the AKP has established political parties that are in some cases rivals to established diaspora parties. All those parties are founded not solely on a message of representing the diaspora, but on a message much closer to that of the YDP, which claims to represent Turkish immigrants as well as ‘all those who are oppressed’. These diaspora parties are intended to have an influence on domestic politics in the countries where they operate, but they also are used to mobilize absentee votes for the AKP in Turkish elections.\(^10\)

These new diaspora parties in Western Europe have played on identity politics and have often produced a backlash. In north Cyprus, which is both geographically closer to Turkey and dependent on it, there is also, as we will see below, a problem of population: at any given moment, Turkish nationals present in north Cyprus outnumber Turkish Cypriots. All of these factors together, then, have produced a new conjuncture, one in which Turkish nationals, or persons of Turkish origin, have access to new networks and new forms of political connection. For instance, there have been numerous cases in the past few years where Turkish nationals found the only way to combat discrimination or fight for what they viewed as their rights on the island was to go through Turkish businesspeople, the Turkish ambassador or the AKP’s representatives. Additionally, there are often now direct connections between important members of the diaspora in Cyprus and businesspeople or politicians in Turkey, particularly in

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9 As an example, businessman Besim Tibuk, the owner of the Merit International Hotels Group, first came to the island in 2000. Today, he owns 12% of the bed capacity in the north in seven resorts. He is the owner of six of the seventeen five-star hotels in the north, while five of these five-star hotels were built in the past decade. The same businessman owns a newspaper, television, and radio station in north Cyprus.

10 http://www.kibrispostasi.com/ak-parti-kktc-temsilciligi-acildi-30092017
the regions from which they come.\textsuperscript{11} This is precisely the sort of grassroots mobilisation that the AKP has encouraged, providing means and networks for addressing local-level grievances that were often overlooked in the past.\textsuperscript{12}

A founder of one Turkish settler civil society organization complained that in the past, ‘Whenever a deputation came from Turkey, it was necessary to gain a place in the official representation. If you weren’t a civil society organization or political party, you couldn’t meet with the delegation’ (quoted in Özekmekçi 2012). In contrast, today Turkish nationals on the island have many options for accessing the Turkish government and political networks in Turkey. Indeed, in some instances it is easier for them to access Turkish government officials than to access local government officials in any effective way. Building on the AKP’s encouragement of what Jenny White (2002) calls ‘vernacular politics’ has provided a vehicle for new political agents to emerge, ones who achieve their goals through the AKP and other Turkish political networks, even as they ‘defend’ Turkey.

In the past many Turkish Cypriots viewed Turkish nationals and their descendants as a ‘Trojan Horse,’ seeing them as passive vehicles, rather than active agents, for Turkey’s politics in north Cyprus. Today, however, there is an increasing fear amongst many Turkish Cypriots that the arterial networks that are the vehicle for vernacular politics enable new forms of political agency that directly link persons living in Cyprus to Turkish politics and the Turkish state. This impression is reinforced in instances where there is tension between Turkey and north Cyprus, or between the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriots, and when the YDP and immigrant associations defend Turkey and the Turkish government.\textsuperscript{13} Such instances only reinforce the idea that they are Turkey’s agents on the island and are here to produce new forms of polarization that had not existed in the past.

\textsuperscript{11} For instance, YDP General Secretary Bertan Zaroğlu belongs to an important Hatay family that includes an uncle who is the head of the Reyhanlı Chamber of Commerce and Industry and a cousin, Hüseyin Zaroğlu, who is an important name in the Hatay branch of the National Action Party (MHP) http://www.kibrispostasi.com/index.php/cat/35/news/31508.

\textsuperscript{12} On the grassroots mobilization of the AKP, see Doğan 2016 and White 2002.

\textsuperscript{13} For example, when Afrika newspaper published a cartoon that many people saw as insulting to Erdoğan, Zaroğlu and a number of Turkish immigrant civil society organizations protested in front of the newspaper and left a black wreath (https://www.habererk.com/gundem/kibris-afrika-gazetesinden-erdoganla-ilgili-alcak-karikatur-h43163.html).
In August 2017, during the period each year when Turkish Cypriots officially commemorate the 1974 Turkish military intervention/invasion on the island, a cartoon began circulating on social media that quickly caused a stir. The cartoon had originally appeared in Kıbrıs newspaper some months earlier, but it only came to public attention when it began circulating on social media. Within days, the Rebirth Party protested in front of the newspaper offices and laid a black wreath, claiming to represent 16 civil society organizations—primarily groups representing Turkish nationals by region, such as associations of persons from the Hatay or Black Sea regions.14 For more than a week, the scandal occupied a large place in both local and Turkish media.

The cartoon built on Turkish Cypriot perceptions that most crime in north Cyprus is committed by persons from Turkey. Public discourse consistently reiterates that there was no crime until the 1990 agreement that allowed Turkish nationals to enter the island with their identity cards alone. At the time, this agreement was justified as a way to facilitate tourism from Turkey, but many people today assert that it only increased the number of illegal, casual, and seasonal workers. It also, they assert, significantly increased crime, as it made it possible for someone to fly to the island in the morning, rob houses in the afternoon, and fly back to Turkey in the evening. Indeed, starting in the 1990’s there were reports of gangs working in this way. However, again beginning in the 1990’s and accelerating with the rise of labour migration in the 2000’s, there was also a tendency to conflate such isolated cases of criminality with a preponderance, especially in certain areas, of male migrant labourers.

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As I write elsewhere (Hatay 2008; Hatay and Bryant 2008), the 1990’s and 2000’s were a period of economic and sociospatial segregation. As Cypriots moved into the suburbs of major cities, the inner-city areas were left to this migrant population. The walled city of Nicosia, for instance, became a space where Turkish Cypriots feared to go, but also one for which they nostalgically mourned. This conflation of workers with criminals, as well as the above-mentioned tendency for left-wing parties to view Turkish nationals as a voter pool for the right, was only compounded by a lack of reliable statistics on the number of Turkish-origin immigrants on the island. This fear of immigrant numbers was cast in public discourse as Turkish Cypriots ‘disappearing’ or being flooded, overwhelmed, or invaded by persons from Turkey.

In my previous reports I showed, first, that this ‘voter pool’ was a politically heterogeneous one that did not reliably vote for the UBP (Hatay 2005), and second, that their de jure numbers were nowhere near the figures of half a million, even a million, that were often bandied about in the media (Hatay 2007). Since those publications, several masters and doctoral theses, as well as academic articles, have written about the heterogeneity and experiences of the early migrant population. Whereas the only previous study of this population had been Greek academic Christos Ioannides’s 1991 book, *In Turkey’s Image*, which portrayed this population as part of Turkey’s plans to colonize the island’s north, recent research such as Hatice Kurtuluş and Semra Purkis’s 2014 study, *Turkish Immigrants in North Cyprus* (*Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Türkiyeli Göçmenler*), has considerably complicated the picture. These authors document, for instance, three waves of migration: the early facilitated migration between 1975 and 1979; a second in the 1980’s that consisted primarily of white-collar workers and small traders; and a third wave that began in the 1990’s and accelerated in the 2000’s, consisting mainly of labour migrants brought to work in industry and construction, often coming from areas of Turkey that were hard hit by conflict or neoliberal restructuring (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2008, 2013, 2014; also Hatay 2005, 2007). These authors also remark on the difficulties of disentangling these populations in public discourse, and the problems for research due to seeing them only as persons ‘sent by Turkey’:

According to this presumption migrants from Turkey are seen as settlers artificially settled by Turkey to dominate the area and/or as vote reserves brought from Turkey to facilitate the continuity of local political power and to manipulate the political decision making. This approach carries the risk of downgrading the population movements into ‘numbers’ by overlooking the human essence of migration. (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2013: 3)
It is precisely this ‘human essence of migration’ that other studies have attempted to
demonstrate. A recent article by Helge Jensehaugen (2017) based on his M.A. thesis, analyzes
the agency of the first wave of settlers, and the extent to which their settlement in Cyprus was
ideological. Recent doctoral theses by Ayşenur Talat (2015) and Mehmet İnanç Özakmecî
(2012) examine social and political integration problems of these early migrants, while the
particular integration problems in the island. Still other works (e.g., Akçalı 2009; Loizides 2011)
show the effects of these migration waves on Turkish Cypriot identity, and how fluctuating
understandings of identity play a role in Turkish Cypriot desires for a federal solution.

However, despite these numerous works, and despite attempts by political parties to adopt
more moderate language, a cartoon depicting mustachioed Turkish men as frenzied, weapon-
carrying invaders still circulated with considerable approval on social media. The cartoon may
be seen as an expression of what is referred to in popular discourse as the ‘population problem’
(nüfus sorunu), or the idea that Turkish Cypriots are being overwhelmed, outnumbered, and
have—or may potentially have—their political will impeded.

This report, then, is intended as a contribution to this debate. Although the population
problem is often portrayed in international media as an impediment to the resolution of the
Cyprus Problem, as should be clear from the above it is a problem that many Turkish Cypriots
find most urgent in the event of a non-solution to the problem. In the event of a non-solution,
Turkish Cypriots will be left on their own with an increasingly authoritarian and divided Turkey.
And whereas in the past the portrayal of immigrants as Turkey’s Trojan Horse perhaps implied
that they were instruments of the Turkish government, today, as I have shown above, there
are more complex relations with that government. Indeed, today there are elements of the
Turkish population on the island whom Turkish Cypriots perceive as active agents of the Turkish
government. It is in this sense, too, that the crude cartoon with which we opened this section
strikes a chord.
Outline of the Report

The following report builds on my two previous reports (Hatay 2005 and 2007) to analyze the current population in the island’s north. Any information taken from those previous reports has been updated.

Chapter 1 provides the historical background of migration in Cyprus, which will allow us to see the complexity of the politics of population sketched in this introduction. Here, I show how migration to the island has changed over time.

Chapter 2 gives an analysis of the 2011 Turkish Cypriot census. I examine the undertaking of the census and provide an overview of its results. I also look at shortcomings and irregularities in the census, and consider certain categories that were not included by the census-takers.

Chapter 3 then uses the results of the 2011 census as a basis for an estimation of north Cyprus’s current population. Census results are correlated with voter registration records for the recently held January 2018 election, as well as with national insurance contributions, registered student numbers, and house sales. All these factors enable us to have a relatively accurate picture of the north’s current population.

Because the ‘population problem’ has been not only one of immigration into the island, but also one of feared Turkish Cypriot emigration out of the island, Chapter 4 looks at the numbers of persons of Turkish Cypriot heritage living abroad today. Census data from the U.K., Australia, and Turkey reveal how many Cyprus-born Turkish Cypriots and their descendants today live in the diaspora.

The ‘population problem’ is a problem that not only concerns the north but also plays a central role in resolution of the Cyprus Problem. For those who wish to think about how the growth in the north’s population may or may not change the overall population ratios in the island, Chapter 5 provides an overview of the current population in the entirety of Cyprus. For this, I compare census figures from the island’s south with my estimated current population, provided in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER 1:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MIGRATION TO NORTH CYPRUS

From the late 1950’s to the late 1970’s, the island of Cyprus experienced population movements that in some way affected almost its entire population. The beginning of intercommunal conflict in 1958 led to the displacement of more than 4500 persons from both communities. It was after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960 and the subsequent breakdown of constitutional order in late 1963, however, that much larger numbers of Cypriots began to be displaced from their homes. During this period, around 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were internally displaced, moving to wholly Turkish neighborhoods or villages where they believed they would be safe.\(^{15}\) Even as the Turkish Cypriot administration of the era was still attempting to house these internally displaced persons (IDPs), the 1974 Greek coup and Turkish military intervention/invasion again brought huge waves of displacement. During the war and following the division of the island in 1974, more than 150,000 Greek Cypriots and 55,000 Turkish Cypriots were forcefully uprooted.

The result of these population movements was the ethnic homogenization of the two parts of the island. The RoC became a de facto Greek Cypriot state, with effective control only over the southern part of the island. The Turkish Cypriots who gathered in the northern side of the divide proclaimed the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ (TFSC) in 1975. Furthermore, in 1983, in response to Greek Cypriot demands for United Nations condemnation of the division, Turkish Cypriots declared sovereignty under the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’). Because

\(^{15}\) The ensuing months of violence in 1960’s resulted in the displacement of 1,500-2,000 Greek and Armenian Cypriots, and approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots (Patrick 1976: 343). Most of these Greek and Armenian Cypriots were displaced from Nicosia neighbourhoods, while Turkish Cypriots were displaced from neighbourhoods and villages throughout the island. Between December 1963 and August 1964, Turkish Cypriots evacuated their neighbourhoods in 72 mixed villages and abandoned 24 Turkish Cypriot villages (Patrick 1976: 340). Additionally, eight mixed villages were partially evacuated. According to Patrick, 442 Greek Cypriot and 231 Armenian houses were either taken over by Turkish Cypriot fighters and allocated to displaced Turkish Cypriots, or were abandoned due to damage caused by fighting (Patrick 1976: 456).
the state in the north is not recognized by any country other than Turkey, the RoC remains the sole recognized government for the entire island.

The significance of demography in Cyprus changed after 1974 not only because of this ethnic homogenization of the two sides, but also because of an influx of people from Turkey. In addition to the resettlement of displaced Cypriots, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot administration initially facilitated and encouraged an immigration of Turkish nationals from Turkey following the war. This policy was designed to bolster the Turkish population and to create a viable economy independent of Greek Cypriots. Kurtuluş and Purkis (2014) claim that this ethnic homogenization of the two sides of the island was intended to foster a belief that the north was now to be a ‘homeland’ for Turkish Cypriots. They further argue that the need for labour in the island’s north after the island’s division legitimized the ‘political desire’ to increase the island’s population by bringing persons from Turkey (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2014). Özekmekçi, on the other hand, points out:

When we consider that, since the founding of the Republic of Cyprus, the balance of powers in the island’s administration had been designed based on population ratios, it is difficult to refute the assumption that the immigrants that were to come from Turkey would create a situation that would work in favor of the island’s Turkish population in any potential solution to Cyprus’s future. This situation is closely related to Turkey’s strategic calculations regarding the island and to population projections for the future. (Özekmekçi 2012: 54-55)

Recent research suggests that the immigration movements from Turkey to north Cyprus after 1974 can be best analyzed in three different waves, occurring at different time periods and under different historical and political circumstances (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2008, 2014; Hatay 2005; Özekmekçi 2012).

The first wave is notable for having been planned and facilitated by the authorities in Turkey and north Cyprus. This facilitated migration, which can be described as a kind of demographic engineering, took place between the years 1975 and 1979 and involved moving families who, in the majority, came from economically disadvantaged rural areas in Turkey. However, we know that during the same period a much smaller number of urban working-class and middle-class individuals and families also moved to the island in search of opportunities and material benefits typically found in a post-war environment. This latter group also eventually profited from the same benefits that were offered to those brought over by Turkish Cypriot officials as an ‘agricultural labour force’.
By the late 1970’s, international pressure forced the Turkish Cypriot administration and Turkey to put an end to this facilitated migration, and for quite a few years the number of Turkish immigrants to the island dwindled to a trickle. In the 1980’s, however, a second wave of immigration began, this time spurred by opportunities found in Cyprus but not in Turkey. At this time then, quite a substantial number of professionals, as well as skilled and semi-skilled workers, arrived on the island. Many of the latter worked in the north’s growing textile industries, which exported their goods to the UK. In addition, restrictions on imported goods in Turkey led to the growth of a suitcase trade, with north Cyprus as a base. Although the suitcase trade decreased with Turkey’s economic liberalization in the 1990’s, some of these traders remained on the island, and the regional ties that their trade had established had an impact on future immigration (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2008). The same period also saw the establishment of universities in Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, and Lefke, all attracting an increasingly large population of students from Turkey, some of whom would ultimately remain in Cyprus.

By the 1990’s, a third wave of migration began that was driven by more global market forces (see Talat 2015). This decade was a period of neoliberal privatization in north Cyprus, making it attractive for a different class of immigrants: owners of small business enterprises, as well as highly skilled professionals, such as financial experts for local or offshore banks, university lecturers, and businessmen with investments on the island. Almost all of these came from Turkey. In addition, by the late 1990’s, changes in property laws resulted in a boom in the construction sector, as new bungalow villages and villas sprouted up all over the north, most for sale to the foreign market. The Turkish Cypriot labour market could not meet this growing demand, and many local entrepreneurs also found the wages that Cypriots demanded to be more than they were willing to pay. As a result, construction companies began to bring their workers from Turkey, especially from the poorer areas in Turkey’s south and southeast (Hatay 2007: 33-38). While many of the immigrants who arrived throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s were relatively educated, the immigrants who began to arrive in the late 1990’s were most often manual labourers, often with little education and few skills. Large numbers of these workers were, in addition, persons of Kurdish or Arab origin, many from the area of south-eastern Turkey that had experienced economic devastation and social turmoil as a result of the long-term, low-level conflict there (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2008: 13).

It is also important to note that the immigrants of the second and the third waves, with very few exceptions, did not receive the privileges of housing and citizenship offered by the Turkish Cypriot ‘state’ to first-wave immigrants.
Analyzing the First-Wave Migrants (Settlers)

A significant percentage of the population currently working in the agricultural sector is made up of farmers who began arriving on the island in February 1975. These are commonly referred to as ‘settlers’, and constitute a large portion of Turkish nationals who now hold dual citizenship with the ‘TRNC’. The majority came to Cyprus between 1975 and 1979 from the regions around Trabzon (eastern Black Sea), Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Samsun (western Black Sea), Konya (central Anatolia) and southeastern Turkey. According to my research conducted for the PRIO Cyprus Centre, a total of 28 villages that were forcibly abandoned in 1974 by Greek Cypriots were totally repopulated by these people. Additionally, many settlers were relocated to Varosha, outside the fenced area. Moreover, another 26 former Greek Cypriot or mixed villages such as Kythrea, Lapta, Komi Kebir, and Yerolakos were repopulated by settlers, together with Turkish Cypriots displaced from the southern part of the divide. In the case of former mixed villages, most of the original Turkish Cypriot inhabitants who had been displaced in the 1960’s returned to the villages they had forcibly left.

In addition to this ‘agricultural labour force’, a number of veterans who participated in the 1974 war also settled on the island. Following the adoption of a resolution by the ‘Council of Ministers of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ (TFSC) concerning its ‘Citizenship Law’, the extended families (wives, children, parents and siblings) of 498 Turkish soldiers killed during the 1974 war also became eligible for ‘TFSC citizenship’. However, most of the latter did not choose to come to Cyprus. The same provision of the ‘Citizenship Law’ offered citizenship to former members of the Turkish ‘Peace Forces’ and all Turkish soldiers who had served in Cyprus up until August 18, 1974. Some officers chose to live in Cyprus after their retirement, and there presently exists a Turkish Army Veterans Association with around 1,200 active members, the majority of whom are married to Turkish Cypriots (Hatay 2007).

In 2003 the ‘TRNC’ ‘Minister’ of the Interior reported that 15,350 persons born in Turkey were granted citizenship en masse between 1975 and 1979. According to the same source, in 1981 this number had increased to 21,851. As we know from other sources, only 1400 persons born in Turkey received ‘TRNC’ citizenship between 1980 and 1984 (Hatay 2007, Appendix 5). This clearly shows, then, that the facilitated migration had indeed ended in 1979, and that although citizenship was no longer being granted en masse, a large percentage of the 6,501 persons who received citizenship between 1979 and 1981 had arrived during the 1975-1979 period.

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16 Research was part of the EU-funded project, ‘Dialogue for Trust-Building and Reconciliation: Cypriots Seeking New Approaches to the Property Issue,’ which ran from 2010 to 2012. More information about this project may be found at www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net.
Interestingly, the 2006 census results yielded data concerning the dates of initial arrival in north Cyprus of those ‘TRNC’ citizens born in Turkey. Of these, 27,333 ‘TRNC’ citizens registered as having been born in Turkey, while 11,925 declared that they had arrived in north Cyprus between the years 1975 and 1979. This is a difference of almost 10,000 persons from the figure reported by the Ministry of Interior as having received citizenship in that period. That difference may be attributable to certain numbers of ‘TRNC’ citizens born in Turkey not having been present in Cyprus at the time of the 2006 census. It is likely, however that the majority of this 10,000 had either died or returned permanently to Turkey. Some sources claim that almost 25% of the original settlers chose to return to Turkey (Kurtuluş and Purkis 2014).

As we see from the chart below (Chart 1), the influx of Turkish nationals who would eventually become ‘TRNC’ citizens continued after 1981, but at a much slower pace. It would only pick up speed again in the 2010’s, for reasons we explain below.

**Chart 1: Citizenships granted according to year**

Source: Mr Mehmet Albayrak (former 'Minister of Interior') disclosed that the number of citizenships granted between 1974 and 14 October 2003 totalled 53,904. (Summary of the report can be found in *Kibris*, 23 October 2003). Mr Kutlu Evren ('Minister of Interior') disclosed that the number of citizenships granted between 1 January 2004-31 March 2017 totalled 22,277.
Analyzing the Second-Wave Migrants

Immigration after 1979 was no longer an official policy, but was rather comprised of persons who came to Cyprus on their own initiative. After the initial settlement of Turkish nationals en masse in the north of the island, social links between north Cyprus and Turkey were strengthened. As a result, although at a much lower pace, many Turkish nationals continued to migrate to north Cyprus on their own initiative, seeking work or engaging in trade with the help of their acquaintances and relatives.

The majority of the second-wave migrants started to arrive on the island following the easing of movement restrictions in Turkey, which had regulated the movement of its citizens during the emergency years between 1980 and 1983. This second-wave group did not receive Greek Cypriot properties or citizenship upon arrival, as had previously been the case.

Until 1992, persons who arrived in Cyprus in this way had been able to apply for citizenship after only one year of residency. The new ‘Citizenship Law’ of 1992, however, required a five-year legitimate residency on the island in order to be entitled to citizenship. This five-year requirement could only be waived for those deemed by the ‘Council of Ministers’ to be ‘of benefit to the state’.

Even though the official policy of facilitated migration to Cyprus was abandoned, and acquisition of citizenship was made more difficult, statistics indicate that there was a visible increase in the number of the persons who acquired ‘TRNC’ citizenship during election years. These irregularities may be seen in Chart 2 for election years 1990, 1993, 1995, 2003, and particularly for the two years prior to the 2018 election.

Analyzing the Third-Wave Migrants

As noted above, the 1980’s also saw an increased demand for manual labour in north Cyprus. Among the main pull factors were initial efforts toward liberalization of the economy in the latter half of the 1980’s, which led to the establishment of numerous small- and medium-sized companies in the tourism, catering and construction sectors. This new incentive system also spurred the construction of many new three-star holiday villages, which, both during the building and after, required substantial labour forces. After 1990 this need began to be met by undocumented workers from Turkey, who were allowed entry into the north with nothing but their identity cards. This influx of undocumented workers was the direct result of an easing of regulations for entry to the island (i.e., only identity cards were required), ostensibly to facilitate tourism. But the new regulations also made it much easier for Turkish nationals to travel to the island, such that many who would not have been able to afford passports or plane tickets arrived by ferry, subsequently finding undocumented employment as labourers in construction
and industry. This undocumented labour force increased with the return to the island of Turkish Cypriot tycoon Asil Nadir in the early 1990’s. While Nadir prioritized employing Turkish Cypriots in his new hotels and other enterprises, more casual and seasonal jobs were offered to the immigrant workers from Turkey.

As explained above, this wave of migration from Turkey to north Cyprus resembles other forms of precarious labour that have appeared as an intrinsic part of neoliberal, global capital. Kurtuluş and Purkis remark:

In-depth interviews and focus group meetings carried out with them [migrants] showed us clearly that as a result of neoliberal policies implemented in Turkey, migrants from this wave became unemployed or lost their means of subsistence where they have been living and they had to migrate to another country to work. . . . They work generally without work permits, long hours with low wages and live in very bad conditions to save money to send to their families. (2013: 19)

In addition, by the late 1990’s, many of these workers began to fill the inner-city areas, particularly in Nicosia and Kyrenia, often living in crowded and sub-standard housing. On their days off, these areas of the city filled with working-class males, leading to complaints by Turkish Cypriots.

Indeed, as described in the Introduction, many Turkish Cypriots by the late 1990’s had begun to associate these migrant labourers—most male, poor, and from Turkey’s south and southeast—with a rise in crime. In general, public discourse saw them as a threat to Turkish Cypriots’ way of life. As a result of complaints about uncontrolled migration, in 2004 the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) government implemented changes that required employers to document their workers. The law was intended to reduce the numbers of informal and temporary workers who were, for instance, being housed at construction sites or factories. It was also intended to bring more regulation to the construction industry, including safety regulations.

There were, however, three significant unintended consequences of this new law and its implementation. The first is that for those persons who had steady employment in the island, the new law gave them a route to citizenship by allowing them to document their work, residence and national insurance contributions. As a result, the number of persons demanding citizenship increased, and as applications began to pile up in the late 2000’s, the ‘Ministry of Interior’ attempted to slow down the process of granting naturalizations. As Table 2 shows, this was a potentially very high number, as the number of registered workers increased by almost 6000 between 2003 and 2004, and by almost 30,000 more between 2004 and 2005.
Paradoxically, although the new regulations led to a gradual decrease in informal working practices, they also made migrant labour more disposable. Because the law directly connects the worker’s right to remain on the island to his or her work and employer, migrants must leave the island as soon as their work contract ends. On the one hand, this increases labour turnover and decreases wages, as many people are not allowed to build up the experience that would enable them to expect and demand a rise in wages. On the other hand, it also places workers more at the mercy of their employers, as the threat of being fired entails the threat of loss of residency rights.

The third consequence, related to the second, was that because documenting workers is a high cost for employers, who must then pay minimum wage and make social insurance payments, those same employers began looking elsewhere for cheap labour. The immigrant Turkish labour force became less desirable, because these Turkish citizens knew the law and how to implement it. The search for cheap labour, then, led to one of the most obvious pools—the growing university population, which was increasingly composed of students from Africa and other third countries. Many of these students could barely scrape by, and they became an immediate labour resource for employers seeking to get around the documentation requirements. And while Turkish nationals might appeal to relatives, friends, and the Turkish embassy when their rights were infringed, a growing pool of labour from third countries such as Turkmenistan, Pakistan, and even Vietnam was defenseless against predatory employment practices. In contrast to Turkish labour, this imported group could not easily demand higher wages, better safety, or better accommodation.
Post-2010 Citizations

As I discuss in Chapter 3, a total of 12,890 citizenships were granted in the 2012-2017 period. While that chapter discusses these citizenships in the context of the population as a whole, it is worth pointing out here that this number is more than half the total granted during the initial period of facilitated migration (21,851 citizenships). As remarked above, ironically it appears that attempts to control migration through documenting labour in fact led to a greater number of persons being eligible to apply for citizenship. Because the new law gave them this right after having at least five years of continuous work permits on the island, by 2009 it became clear that there were many who would be eligible for citizenship.

Moreover, these persons were aware of their rights and began to pressure the appropriate offices to grant them citizenships. That pressure happened in some cases through regional associations formed by Turkish nationals (e.g., persons from Hatay, the Black Sea region, etc.), in others through AKP representatives on the island. In response, the CTP government in 2015 introduced the White Card, on the model of the U.S. Green Card, which granted a longer period of residency and rights similar to citizens, apart from the right to vote and be elected. In 2016, there were plans in the works to make the White Card a precondition for citizenship applications. However, with a change of government, as well as pressure from the Turkish government, this was never implemented, and instead the number of naturalizations swelled under the UBP government in 2016 and 2017.

17 http://www.yeniduzen.com/beyaz-kimlik-donemi-57824h.htm
CHAPTER 2:

THE TURKISH CYPRIOJT CENSUS OF 2011

THE TURKISH CYPRIOJT CENSUS OF 2011

In 2011, in the context of ongoing negotiations, a census was called for north Cyprus that would be run in parallel with a census in the island’s south. This was intended to provide information for the reunification negotiations being conducted by Greek Cypriot president Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu. The census received the encouragement of UN Special Envoy Alexander Downer, and the UN unofficially sent observers into the field to oversee the administration of the survey. A curfew was declared from 8:00-18:00, when everyone was required to remain indoors. Although the count would not include military areas, it did include ports and hotels. According to the ‘TRNC’ Planning Bureau, the census was conducted according to the UN’s ‘Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses’.19

District census centres employed almost 7,000 personnel to conduct the count. Of these, 5,000 were on-call personnel, while 2,000 were held in reserve to replace personnel who were sick or otherwise unable to attend. In certain areas that were discovered to have more population than had been anticipated, such as industrial areas employing temporary workers, additional census-takers were deployed. Personnel primarily consisted of civil servants and students who were trained in census-taking for this purpose.

The Census Questionnaire

The census questionnaire contained 54 questions, including questions about dwelling, age, ownership, etc. (Appendix 4). There were 16 questions regarding the dwelling, with the remaining questions to be answered by a single person who was identified as the head of the household. Most questions asked about place of birth, citizenship, date of arrival for those who were born abroad, etc. The survey included all persons found in the household on the date of

the census, as well as persons the head of the household identified as members but who were not at home on that date, as long as those persons were not found in north Cyprus living in dormitories, nursing homes, hospitals, or prisons, or serving in the military. The latter persons were not counted in the household, as they would be counted in the location where they were present on that day. The survey did count those persons who were declared to be part of the household but who may have been temporarily outside north Cyprus, e.g., for business or educational purposes.

Identification was based on declaration, and no identification was requested except when persons declared themselves to be ‘TRNC’ citizens. In this case, those above the age of 11 were required to show their identity cards to the interviewer.

**De Facto and De Jure Populations**

‘The 2011 Census of Population and Housing Units’ surveyed the de facto population, meaning all persons present on the island on the day of the census. However, data was gathered to determine the de jure population, or those who are considered permanent residents. This category includes ‘TRNC’ citizens, as well as those who have residence, work, and study visas. Technically, the de jure population also includes those who were not present on the day of the census. This meant, for instance, that on the declaration of the head of the household, Turkish Cypriots studying in universities abroad (estimated 1,500), were counted as part of the de jure population. However, Turkish Cypriots permanently resident abroad (i.e., those residing or intending to reside outside the country – including in the south of the island – for more than one year) were not counted as part of the de jure population.

For the purposes of the census, any individual who had been resident in north Cyprus for at least one year was considered a permanent resident of the country. In practice, however, it seems that any one intending to stay in the country for at least one year was included in the de jure population. The preliminary results suggest that all the immigrants, including both short-term and long-term residents and all the foreign university students in the country were counted as part of the de jure population.

The reason for including presumably temporary residents such as foreign students in the de jure rather than de facto population is that the financial contribution paid to municipalities from the state budget is calculated according to the de jure population. In areas such as Kyrenia, up to one-third of the population consists of students. As a result, municipalities demanded that the student population be included in the de jure count in order to receive a proportionate contribution from the state.
Undercounting, Complications, and Irregularities

According to reports of observers, personal communication, and media reports, there was some under-counting during the census. There were two main reasons for this. The first was a social media campaign, fueled by one newspaper, that called for a boycott of the census. The newspaper repeated claims from the previous census that any count undertaken in the north without proper international monitoring would be unreliable.\(^{20}\) Social media calls for non-participation, on the other hand, focused on the fact that even a recent prime minister had not relied on the previous census figures and had asserted that the population was not known.\(^{21}\)

Failure to reach some dwellings near or on the Green Line or in remote locations was another reason for undercounting. Although a residential dwelling map had been drawn up prior to the census, in some cases census-takers were unable to locate houses. In other cases, buildings that were not considered dwellings, such as restaurants and factories, were known to have housed workers who were not counted. It is also believed that numerous unregistered immigrant workers remained hidden on the day. Although the number of uncounted persons is not known, officials claim that it is not significantly large.

While in the previous census an attrition of trained personnel had resulted in a shortage on census day, that problem was obviated in the 2011 count by training a pool of reserve census-takers.

Previous censuses had received criticism both from Turkish Cypriots and from the international community because of their lack of international monitoring. For the 2006 census, the Turkish Cypriot authorities requested international monitoring but were refused. For the 2011 census, however, the UN sent a team of seven monitors, led by Jean-Michel Durr, Chief of Demographic Statistics in the UN Statistics Division from 2007 to 2010.\(^{22}\) Durr had also developed the 2010 World Population and Housing Censuses Programme, on the basis of which the ‘TRNC’ census questionnaire was developed. Durr and his team observed the census-takers’ training and checked that the questionnaire met UN standards.\(^{23}\) They also made spot inspections on the day of the count to observe the interviews and identify any irregularities.

Although no irregularities were reported apart from the undercounting noted above, the U.S. State Department Cyprus 2015 International Religious Freedom Report notes that the survey did not ask about interviewees’ religion. That same report presumes that 97% of the de

\(^{20}\) For example, Şener Levent, ‘Bizi Saymayın [Don't Count Us]’, Afrika (Nicosia, 10 March 2006).
\(^{21}\) http://www.yeniduzen.com/sayim-sonucu-cok-kalabalik-15611h.htm
\(^{22}\) www.jmstat.com
\(^{23}\) http://haberkibris.com/37d84dd2-2011_12_02.html
The de jure population is Sunni Muslim. However, given the large numbers of Alevi and Sufi among the Muslim population, as well as a growing Christian immigrant population and large numbers of persons who identify as agnostic or atheist, we may presume that the failure to ask this question on the survey was to preserve the impression of a Sunni majority.

Similarly, there was no language question in the census—an important absence for a linguistically heterogeneous population. The UN document on which the questionnaire was based suggests that three types of data may be collected: mother tongue; the language spoken at home; and other spoken languages. Given that large numbers of the de jure population are known to speak Kurdish, Arabic, Greek (both Cypriot and Pontic), Russian, or English as their native tongue, we must assume that the failure to include a language question was intended to preserve the impression that the majority native language is Turkish.

**Census Results**

According to the census results, on the day of the count the island’s north had a de facto population of 294,906 and a de jure population of 286,257, excluding Turkish military and their families residing in the military bases. Of the latter, 190,494 were ‘TRNC’ citizens, 80,550 were Turkish nationals, and 15,215 had other nationalities.
CHAPTER 3:
BREAKDOWN OF THE POPULATION

Although the last census in the island’s north was taken in 2011, numerous developments since have resulted in a considerable rise in population. While the 2011 census found a de jure population of 286,257, we estimate that today the de jure population has risen to around 370,000.\textsuperscript{26} It is important to recall that, as explained in the previous chapter, the de jure population consists of all persons legally resident in the island, whether citizens, students, workers, or others with residence permits.

The de jure population does not include Turkish army personnel (25,000-30,000) and their families who are living in the camps (approximately 7,500). Nor does it include those tourists and other visitors who may be found on the island at any given moment, who may be estimated to average around 20,000. With the addition of the latter categories, the average de facto population may be expected to exceed 400,000.

A large part of the population rise may be attributed to a swell in the foreign student population, from around 35,000 to almost 90,000 in this period of time. However, as explained below, there has also been a considerable increase in the citizen population. After an overview of historical population trends in north Cyprus, I will analyze both the citizen and non-citizen populations.

Historical Population Trends Based on Censuses

As mentioned above, the first comprehensive census in north Cyprus was held on 15 December 1996. The census recorded data for the social, economic and demographic characteristics of the population of the ‘TRNC’, divided by district.\textsuperscript{27} The 1996 census counted the de facto population of the ‘TRNC’ as 200,587: ‘TRNC’ citizens comprised 82% of this population (164,460), while

\textsuperscript{26} It should be noted that this estimation is consonant with the 2016 projection of the State Planning Department, which anticipated a de jure population of 339,478 (‘TRNC’ Prime Ministry State Planning Organization Statistical Yearbook 2016, p. 15).

Turkish citizens (without ‘TRNC’ citizenship) composed 15% (30,702) and other nationalities another 3%. Of the above-mentioned 30,702 Turkish citizens (TR), 8,287 were students studying at various universities in the ‘TRNC’ and 12,922 were workers. The remaining 9,493 were classified as ‘others’, and included businesspeople and dependents (also counting the families of the Turkish army officers who had residence outside the barracks), as well as retirees who had settled in the ‘TRNC’. The census also included place of birth of the ‘TRNC’ citizen population of 164,460: 137,628 were born in Cyprus (an estimated 11,000 of these Cyprus-born citizens’ parents were born in Turkey); 23,924 were born in Turkey; 1,322 were born in the UK; and 818 were born in Bulgaria.\(^\text{28}\)

The de jure population of the ‘TRNC’ also grew enormously, from 188,662 in 1996 to 256,644 in 2006 to 286,257 in 2011, an increase of 52% in the 15 years between the 1996 and 2011 censuses. The citizen population of the ‘TRNC’, on the other hand, showed a relatively smaller increase from 164,460 to 178,031 (7%) to 190,494 in the same period (16% over 15 years). Over the same period, the number of Turkish citizens rose from 30,702 in 1996 to 70,525 in 2006 to 80,550 in 2011 (162% over 15 years). The number of third-country nationals similarly rose, from 5,425 in 1996 to 8,088 in 2006 to 15,215 in 2011, or 180% over 15 years (see Chart 3 below).\(^\text{29}\)

**Chart 2: Breakdown of de jure population according to citizenship**

\(^{28}\) Ibid.  
\(^{29}\) [http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Census%202006.pdf](http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Census%202006.pdf); [http://www.devplan.org/Frame-tr.html](http://www.devplan.org/Frame-tr.html)
Breakdown of the Population

The 2011 census shows that the distribution of the de jure population according to citizenship was: ‘TRNC’ citizens 66.55%; Turkish Republic (TR) citizens 28.13%; and other nationalities 5.32%.

Estimation and Interpretation of the Current Citizen Population

In order to have an accurate estimate of the current de jure population, we must begin with an estimate of the current citizen population, which in the 2011 census constituted around two-thirds of those persons legally resident in the island. According to the Higher Election Council (YSK), prior to the January 2018 parliamentary elections there were 230,747 citizens and 190,551 voters (persons over 18) in the island’s north. This is a difference of 40,253 from the 2011 census results. We know that 12,890 persons acquired citizenship between January 2012 and December 2017 (see Table 3 below).

Table 3: Citizenships granted between January 2012 and April 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Females who gained citizenship from her husband</th>
<th>Males who gained citizenship from wife</th>
<th>Naturalisation</th>
<th>Children and spouses of naturalised citizens</th>
<th>Exceptional citizenship with ministerial council decision</th>
<th>Children and spouses of persons with exceptional citizenship</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,693</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>3,170</td>
<td>4,252</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>12,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: https://www.havadiskibris.com/vatandas-olmak-cok-kolay/

Moreover, if we assume a natural rate of population growth of 1% per year, this would account for a further increase of approximately 12,000 during the same period. Of the remaining approximately 15,000-person discrepancy, an unknown number are persons who remain citizens but are permanently resident overseas and so would not have been counted in the census (according to the criteria listed above). Although the YSK made lists public so that citizens could correct such irregularities, there were no such reports or corrections made. While legally only persons resident in Cyprus may vote in elections, there were also many reports of voter registration cards arriving for persons who are no longer on the island, and in some cases for persons who are no longer alive. Taking into account these calculations, we can assume the present citizen population to be 215,000-220,000.

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30 Based on a reported 3,724 births and 1,200 deaths in 2017, which we use as a base.
Breakdown of citizen population
According to the 2011 census results, the distribution of the 190,494 ‘TRNC’ citizens according to birthplace was: 153,374 Cyprus-born; 31,234 born in Turkey; 2,913 UK-born; 1,028 born in Bulgaria; and 1,945 born in other countries.

As mentioned above, our estimation for the current ‘TRNC’ citizen population is approximately 215,000. While we know that 31,234 of the ‘TRNC’ citizens in the 2011 census were born in Turkey, since at that time 12,890 new citizenships were granted, and we may assume that more than 10,000 of those citizenships were granted to Turkish nationals. From this, we can safely assume that around 42,000 ‘TRNC’ citizens currently living on the island were born in Turkey.

However, we also wish to determine how many children of naturalized Turkish immigrants currently live on the island. Unfortunately, the 2011 census results do not allow us to determine whether both parents were born in Turkey, but because the 2006 census results show the distribution of parents’ birthplace, we can make an estimate. There, we found that of the 147,405 Cyprus-born ‘TRNC’ citizens, 120,031 had both parents born in Cyprus; 16,824 had both parents born in Turkey; and 10,361 had one parent born in Turkey and the other parent born in Cyprus. In the eleven years that have passed since that census was taken, the number of Cyprus-born ‘TRNC’ citizens with both parents born in Turkey has no doubt risen, but because of the advanced age of those Turkish nationals who originally settled in the island, we can assume that this was a minimal growth. In sum, we can estimate that there are 60,000-62,000 ‘TRNC’ citizens with Turkish ancestry, either having been born in Turkey or having both parents born in Turkey.

As stated above, we estimate the current ‘TRNC’ citizen population at 215,000. If we subtract from this the approximately 60,000 citizens of Turkish ancestry, along with approximately 6,000 persons born in third countries whose heritage is not known, we may assume that there are around 150,000 persons of native Cypriot heritage, including 12,000-15,000 of mixed parentage (one Cypriot parent).

Non-Citizen Residents
Using statistics from the Labour and Education authorities of the ‘TRNC’, it becomes clear that a total of approximately 160,000 foreign students, residents with work permits and their families, and expats live in the island’s north.

Analysis of the ‘TRNC’ Government Figures for Residents with Work Permits and Their Families
Until recently, most of the migration into north Cyprus consisted of temporary or seasonal workers. This group includes workers employed in agricultural, construction and manufacturing sectors, as well as in hotels, catering and casinos. Apart from these, a growing number of white-
Breakdown of the Population

collar workers and professionals have begun to live and work in the north. These include IT professionals, designers, health professionals, and professors, among others. In the past decade, the hotel bed capacity has increased from 13,453 in 2006 to almost 22,000 in 2017, and most new hotels built during this period were five-star resorts that drew tourism professionals to work in them. The number of universities increased from five to fifteen within five years, drawing lecturers and other professionals to work in the growing university sector.

It is possible to examine this population using statistics on contributions to the national insurance scheme, a requirement for all registered workers (see Table 4). We see from these figures that between 2011 and 2016 there was not a significant increase in the number of registered workers who are Turkish nationals. While in 2011 there were 26,635 legally working in the island, this number increased only to 30,733 in 2016. However, as noted above, the profile of this population shifted, with an increase in the numbers of Turkish professionals and white-collar workers in the island.

In contrast to the slight rise in the number of Turkish nationals, there was a significant increase in registered workers from other countries, from 3,184 in 2011 to 8,703 in 2016. During this time, an increasing number of workers began to arrive from Central Asia, particularly Turkmenistan; parts of East Asia, especially Vietnam and the Phillippines; and South Asia, particularly Pakistan. Most of these migrants are employed in menial labour in farming, industry, and construction. A significant number is female, employed in domestic labour, particularly elder care. There is also a relatively large segment of educated Turkmenistan nationals employed in the health professions.

The more surprising statistic is the more than 30% increase in ‘TRNC’ citizens registered in the labour force, from 39,905 to 52,225. However, this jump of 12,320 persons is less surprising if we consider that during approximately the same period almost 13,000 Turkish nationals who had already been living and working on the island became ‘TRNC’ citizens. Although Table 3 suggests that almost half of these are either underage children or spouses who may not work, the large number of citizenships granted in this period would still help us to understand the significant increase in the ‘TRNC’ citizen workforce during the same period.

32 http://eohd.mebnet.net/?q=node/34
### Table 4: National Insurance Contributions, 2011 and 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘TRNC’</td>
<td>39,905</td>
<td>52,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>26,635</td>
<td>30,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3,184</td>
<td>8,703</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Chart 3: Numbers of persons contributing to national insurance (i.e., legally registered workers) by citizenship


In addition to these residents with work permits, we also have certain statistics regarding their families, based on residence permits gained through a working spouse. Of these, 7,064 are from Turkey, and 2,795 have another nationality.

School enrollments give us an indication of the numbers of children accompanying these workers. While almost 35,000 students in primary and secondary education, both public and
private, have either ‘TRNC’ or dual ‘TRNC’/TR citizenship, 16,015 students have only Turkish or other citizenship. Other citizenships include Bulgarian, Russian, and UK, among others (see Table 5 and Chart 5). It should be noted that this number includes the children of an estimated 5,000 Turkish officers stationed in the island.

**Table 5: Students enrolled in primary and secondary education, both public and private, by citizenship:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Citizenship</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>29,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC/TR</td>
<td>4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR</td>
<td>13,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2,574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Chart 4: Students enrolled in primary and secondary education, both private and public, by citizenship:**

From these statistics, we can see that as of December 2017, registered foreign workers, their spouses, and their school-age children total 65,310 persons. This figure may be further broken down into persons with Turkish citizenship (51,238) and persons of other nationalities (14,072).

**University Student Population**

Between 2011 and 2017, the number of universities in north Cyprus almost tripled, from seven to seventeen, and the number of foreign students exponentially increased in proportion. While in 2011 there were 36,565 foreign students in the island’s north, by late 2017 that number had swelled to 87,607. Of that number, approximately 55,000 have Turkish citizenship, and more than 30,000 are of other nationalities. In the latter category, there are now approximately 20,000 students from various African countries, the majority being from Nigeria and Zimbabwe (see Chart 6 below).

**Chart 5: University student population according to citizenship**

![Chart showing university student population by citizenship]

**Source:** KKTC Milli Eğitim ve Kültür Bakanlığı, Eğitim Ortak Hizmetler Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 2010-2018 Statistik Yıllıkları.
**Expats**

For the purposes of this report, we use the term ‘expat’ to refer to those third-country nationals who have come to north Cyprus primarily for the purpose of residence, and who may secondarily work or establish businesses. Particularly since the entry of the RoC into the EU, there has been a rise in EU citizens living in the island’s north. Although the EU acquis communautaire is suspended in north Cyprus, the territory is still considered to be part of the EU, so that EU citizens are able to move freely between the island’s north and south. Moreover, EU citizens may benefit from, e.g., EU health coverage, as long as they go to clinics and hospitals in the south. As a result, the cheaper prices of the north, along with the benefits of EU membership, have attracted not only retirees but also an increasing number of families. In addition to EU citizens, a substantial number of families from the former Soviet Union countries, particularly Russian-speakers, have begun to settle in the north. Because all of these groups are often mobile populations, they may sometimes be counted in the de facto, and sometimes in the de jure, population.

Although it is only indicative, we may arrive at some estimate of their number by looking at the figures for non-Cypriots who have purchased immovable property in the island’s north. Table 6 below shows a total of 16,927 foreigners who applied to purchase properties in the period 2000-2015.\(^{33}\) Although again it is only indicative, we see that 5,385 foreigners applied to purchase property in the 2012-2015 period, or an average of around 1,300 per year. In the year 2015, we know that 700 Turkish nationals and 453 third-country nationals applied to purchase property. However, the greater number of Turkish national applications is a new development, post-dating the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey and rising tensions there.

In order to estimate from this the number of third-country nationals who have come to Cyprus for residence purposes, we may take as a base the 3,691 UK citizens who were permanently resident in the north at the time of the 2011 census. Among these, we know that significant numbers are retirees who are not working. However, since 2004 there has also been a wave of working-age British nationals moving to the island, and those who have begun to work or who established businesses would be included in the figures above for persons contributing to the national insurance fund. A conservative estimate, then, would suggest 7000-8000 third-country nationals who have moved to Cyprus primarily as residents and would not be included in one of the other categories discussed in previous sections. These would include retirees, as well as the non-working family members of persons who may be working or may have established businesses.

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\(^{33}\) Remarkably, we know that a total of 18,312 foreigners applied to purchase property from 1974 to 2015, meaning that in the period 1974 to 2000 only 1,385 foreigners purchased property in the north.
### Table 6: Numbers of non-Cypriots who purchased immovable property

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of persons</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>1791</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of persons</td>
<td>2133</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>1576</td>
<td>1602</td>
<td>1153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL: 16,927**

CHAPTER 4:

TURKISH CYPRIOt EMIGRATION FROM CYPRUS

While we have seen that immigration from Turkey is a contested issue that affects quotidian politics as well as reunification negotiations, the issue is inseparable from claims that Turkish Cypriots have been emigrating en masse, particularly to the UK and Australia. One claim, often repeated in both the Turkish Cypriot and the international media, is that this mass migration has resulted in a decline in the Turkish Cypriot population in Cyprus from 118,000 in 1974 to around 80,000-90,000 today.*

Claims of population decline have their own political motivations. Turkish Cypriot officials have argued that although there was a decline, it preceded 1974, as large numbers of Turkish Cypriots left the island during the conflict periods of the late 1950’s and 1960’s and never returned. Turkish Cypriot officials use the claim of decline to suggest that in fact the Turkish Cypriot population would be much closer to that of the Greek Cypriot population in the south if not for this significant migration. Interestingly, opposition parties have also given very high figures for emigration, but in their case to suggest the intolerable conditions created by Turkey’s intervention/invasion in the island and the non-resolution of the Cyprus Problem. These parties, then, claim that emigration to other countries has been high since 1974.

Unsurprisingly, Greek Cypriot media and Greek Cypriot officials also repeat the rhetoric of a shrinking Turkish Cypriot population, as this would confirm claims of a Turkish occupation of the island’s north. Such claims, however, have been softened since the last European Parliament elections, when the RoC revealed that there were 98,000 eligible Turkish Cypriot voters.

Interestingly, the number of diaspora Turkish Cypriots is also often inflated by the international press and even, for instance, by the British authorities, as when one House of Commons Home Affairs Committee report suggested that there were 300,000 Turkish Cypriots in the UK, thereby contradicting the UK’s own statistics.**


The available statistics partially confirm the Turkish Cypriot official view, as they indicate that Turkish Cypriot emigration to the UK rose in the mid-1950’s and peaked in the two years before the implementation of the 1962 UK Immigration Act. Statistics also show minimal migration to Britain and Australia after 1974. However, as we will see, these numbers do not at all resemble the inflated ones given by all parties. Moreover, census results from Australia and the UK reveal that, apart from the initial years after the 1974 war, emigration to these countries had been in decline until Cyprus joined the EU in 2004. Now that most Turkish Cypriots possess EU passports, they can more easily work and send their children to study in the UK and other parts of Europe.

**Turkish Cypriots in the UK**

While the UK and Australia have been popular destinations for Turkish Cypriot emigration, the census data from these two countries contradicts inflated figures. The UK census figures for 1971 recorded a total number of 72,665 Cyprus-born persons (including Greeks, Armenians, Maronites and Turks). In 1981, this figure rose to 84,327. It is known that this increase was largely due to mass emigration by Greek Cypriot displaced persons following the events of 1974. According to Constantinou, in response to the 1974 Turkish intervention/invasion, 5,454 Greek Cypriots left the island in 1975 alone (Constantinou 1990: 158). In the immediate aftermath of the war, and until the early 1980’s when the economy had recovered, an estimated 20,000-25,000 Greek Cypriots left the island.36

The 2011 UK census recorded the total Cyprus-born population as 80,010. This number is slightly higher than the 2001 census, which recorded 77,156 Cypriots living in the country.37 As mentioned above, this increase is likely the result of Cyprus’s EU accession, which enabled many Cypriots to look for a better future in the UK or study there with EU scholarship programs. In the 2011 census, of the 80,010 people in England and Wales who declared Cyprus as their country of birth, 57.5% said they were Christian, 20.8% said they were Muslim, 13.1% responded that they had no religion, and 7.9 % did not specify a religion (see Table 7). Small numbers of Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, Sikhs and those of other religions were recorded, totalling 0.6% of the Cypriot-born resident population. Most demographers put the Greek and Turkish Cyprus-born persons at a ratio similar to that in Cyprus, i.e., four Greeks to one Turk. However, given the secularism of many Turkish Cypriots, we may speculate that at least half of those who claimed no religion or did not specify a religion could be classified as belonging to the Turkish Cypriot community. This would bring Turkish Cypriots to around 30% of the Cyprus-born population.

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37 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/cyprus.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/born_abroad/countries/html/cyprus.stm)
Table 7. Arrival dates of Cypriots in the UK according to faith

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Not stated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1981</td>
<td>31,545</td>
<td>9,939</td>
<td>6,183</td>
<td>4,041</td>
<td>51,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-2000</td>
<td>4,809</td>
<td>4,611</td>
<td>2,494</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>12,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>4,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>7,280</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>10,427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Office for National Statistics, CT0265: Country of birth by year of arrival by religion; Dataset population: All usual residents born outside of the UK; Geographical level: England and Wales. Source: 2011 Census (27 March).

In addition to those persons who reported their place of birth as Cyprus, we may also estimate that the descendants of the earlier migrants would be around 20,000-25,000, bringing the total number of Turkish Cypriots in the UK to 40,000-45,000.

Turkish Cypriots in Australia

The first significant wave of immigration to Australia occurred during Cyprus's political turmoil of the 1950's. As in the UK, there was a rise in the Cyprus-born population in the 1970's, but it has since shown a steady decline. Today, the average age of a Cyprus-born person in Australia is 60 years, as opposed to 45 years for other overseas-born and 37 for the population as a whole. Cyprus-born persons, then, are an aging group with less renewal than other immigrant populations in the country.

Table 8: Australian census figures for Cyprus-born population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>13,267</td>
<td>24,000 (approx.)</td>
<td>22,030</td>
<td>19,482</td>
<td>18,070</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Australia's 2011 census, 17.4% of those who declared Cyprus as their birthplace said that they were Muslim, and another 17.7% said they speak Turkish in the home. In addition, another 4.6% indicate no religion and 2.4% did not state their religion, while English is the language at home for 14.8% of the population. These statistics indicate that around 18-20% may be Turkish Cypriot.38

38 Australian Government Department of Information and Citizenship Community Information Summary: Cyprus-born.
While only 7,319 Cyprus-born persons indicated Cypriot as their ancestry (others indicating Greek and Turkish) in the 2011 census, a total of 22,680 Australians did so. The difference of 15,361 persons gives some indication of the numbers of descendants of Cyprus-born persons in Australia today.

**Turkish Cypriots in Turkey**

While there was some immigration to Turkey in the early 20th century (Nevzat 2005), recent migration began in the 1960’s, when many Turkish Cypriots left to study in Turkey, continuing to work, marry, and settle there. The last published results, from Turkey’s 2001 census, show that at that time there were 13,844 ‘TRNC’ citizens living and working in Turkey.\(^{39}\) According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, in 2011 there were 10,000 persons who reported their place of birth as the ‘TRNC’. Because these statistics report only for the ‘TRNC’ and have no separate category for Cyprus, we presume that this category also includes persons born in Cyprus before the establishment of the ‘TRNC’. This category also includes those Turkish nationals who have acquired ‘TRNC’ citizenship and returned to Turkey, as well as their descendants.

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\(^{39}\) Turkish Statistical Institute, [http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1047](http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1047)
AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION ON CYPRUS

As explained above, the demographic ratio of Turkish Cypriots to Greek Cypriots living in Cyprus has always been a politically sensitive topic. Political representation during the British colonial era was based proportionally on this ratio, and when this era ended in 1960 with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) the new state, too, governed with a consociational system based on ethnic quotas associated with population ratios. Since the de facto division of the island in 1974, distinctive population patterns have been evolving in the north and the south of the island. The demographic structures on both sides have obviously changed in the course of the more than four decades following the division. The following three charts (7, 8 and 9) represent three different ways of viewing the overall picture of populations on the island in 2017.
Chart 6 shows the *de jure* population for each part of the island combined together in a single chart. From this exercise, one can see that 25% (12% for the south and 13% for the north) of the population of the whole island—now just over 1,000,000—is made up of non-RoC / non-‘TRNC’ citizens. The figures for the south are provided by the 2005 *Demographic Report* of the RoC government, according to which the *de jure* population is comprised of 706,000 citizens (57% of the whole island’s population), and 148,000 foreign residents (11%). The figures for the north are my 2017 estimation. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the *de jure* population in the north is estimated to be comprised of 215,000 ‘TRNC’ citizens (18% in the whole island’s population) and 160,000 (13%) foreign residents. It is also interesting to note that from 1990 to 2016 the number of foreign residents in south Cyprus increased from 10,529 to 148,000.
Chart 7 shows the de jure population for the south combined together with the ‘TRNC’ citizen population in the north. The figures for the south are again taken from the 2016 Demographic Report of the Republic of Cyprus. According to this, the de jure population comprises 66% citizens, and 14% foreign residents. The two figures combined represent 81% of the island’s overall population. The figure for the north is taken from the 2006 census results. According to these census results the ‘TRNC’ citizen population is almost 20% of the island’s total.
Chart 8 shows the current ratio between the ‘citizen’ populations of the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘TRNC’. It is important to note that almost 30% of ‘TRNC’ citizens are either born in Turkey or born of parents of mainland Turkish origin. Including ‘TRNC’ citizens born in Turkey and their offspring born in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot population has risen from 18.2% in 1960 to 23% in 2017. While giving data for naturalized citizens on the northern part of the island, it is not possible to present similar statistics for the Republic of Cyprus, as information on place of birth was not included in estimates published from the 2016 Demographic Report of RoC.
CONCLUSION

While we have seen that immigration from Turkey is a contested issue that affects his report began with an assessment of the politics of population in north Cyprus today. While population has been politicized in the island at least since the British period, that had primarily revolved around population ratios between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, and how those ratios should be politically represented. After the 1974 de facto division of the island and the resulting displacement of around 200,000 Cypriots from either side of the line, the Turkish Cypriot administration, in collaboration with the Turkish government, engaged in a population transfer that was intended to secure their hold in the north. Although not all of these remained, the ‘TRNC’ Ministry of Interior released data in 2003 showing that between 1975 and 1981, 21,851 persons of Turkish origin received citizenship from what was then the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.’

This first wave of facilitated migration primarily brought agricultural labour to the island. Immigration after this period occurred in two further waves. The second wave, beginning in the 1980s, was comprised of professionals, as well as skilled and semi-skilled workers, who arrived of their own initiative in the island to work in the north’s growing textile industries and in trade. The third wave, beginning in the mid-1990’s and accelerating in the 2000’s, consisted mainly of labour migrants brought to work in industry and construction, often coming from areas of Turkey that were hard hit by conflict or neoliberal restructuring.

In the first wave of migration, settlers automatically received citizenship and Greek Cypriot houses. In the second and third waves, however, citizenship was not automatic, and housing was not provided. Nevertheless, according to the laws of the ‘TRNC,’ after five years of legal residence, immigrant workers would be eligible for citizenship. Because in various periods implementation was slowed, citizenship applications often accumulated, resulting in the peaks and troughs of citizenships granted shown in Chart 2 (p. 21). The number of new citizens had several peaks in the 1990’s, and it has again peaked since 2012. While ‘Ministry of Interior’ statistics show that between 1974 and October 2003 a total of 53,904 citizenships had been given, we also know in the 2011 census, that 31,234 of the ‘TRNC’ citizen population reported having been born in Turkey. Since we know that only a fraction of nationalized citizens in the
island are non-Turkish. This leads us to conclude that a up to 20,000 Turkish nationals who received citizenship in the 1974-2003 period subsequently either died or returned to Turkey.

The last census to occur in north Cyprus was in 2011, but since that time there has been a significant expansion of the de jure population in the north. The report used the 2011 as a basis to estimate and analyze the current de jure population. Using the current voter registration list as a basis, and correlating it with the 2011 census, the report estimates the current ‘TRNC’ citizen population is approximately 215,000. We know that 31,234 of the ‘TRNC’ citizens in the 2011 census were born in Turkey, and that between 2012 and 2017, 12,890 new citizenships were granted. Based on previous figures, we assume that around 42,000 ‘TRNC’ citizens currently living on the island were born in Turkey. Based on previous censuses, we estimate that with their Cyprus-born children, there are 60,000-62,000 ‘TRNC’ citizens with Turkish ancestry, either having been born in Turkey or having both parents born in Turkey.

Taking the estimate of a current ‘TRNC’ citizen population at around 215,000, then, and subtracting the approximately 6,000 persons born in third countries whose heritage is not known, we may assume that there are around 150,000 persons of native Cypriot heritage, including 12,000-15,000 of mixed parentage (one Cypriot parent).

Along with the citizen population, however, the report also provided an estimate of the current de jure population in the island’s north. This estimate took the 2011 census as a base, also using statistics available from the departments of labour and education, as well as property sales. From these, it becomes clear that a total of approximately 160,000 foreign students, residents with work permits and their families, and expats live in the island’s north.

The report further broke down the non-citizen population into three categories:

- Registered foreign workers, their spouses, and their school-age children, who as of December 2017 totaled 65,310 persons. Of these, 51,238 had Turkish citizenship, while 14,072 were of other nationalities.
- Foreign students, who as of late 2017 totaled 87,607. Of these, approximately 55,000 have Turkish citizenship, and more than 30,000 are of other nationalities, particularly from African countries.
- Expats, defined for this report as persons living in north Cyprus primarily for residence, were estimated to be 7-8000 persons.

Our estimate of the total citizen and non-citizen population living and working in the island’s north today is around 370,000. If we add to this number Turkish army personnel (25,000-30,000) and their families who are living in the camps (approximately 7,500), as well as 20,000 tourists and other visitors who may be found on the island on any day, the average de facto population may be expected to exceed 400,000.
In addition to these estimates for population in north Cyprus, the report also provided estimates for Turkish Cypriot emigration to third countries, particularly the U.K., Australia, and Turkey. Basing these estimates on these countries’ census data, we may estimate that the total number of original Turkish Cypriot migrants and their children in the U.K. is we may also estimate that the descendants of the earlier migrants would be around 20,000-25,000, bringing the total number of Turkish Cypriots in the UK to 40,000-45,000. Figures for Australia are even lower, with an estimate of approximately 7,000 persons of Turkish Cypriot ancestry, both Cyprus-born and their children. While census categories in Turkey make it difficult to estimate the numbers of Cypriot-origin (as opposed to Cyprus-born) persons currently living there, the report justified an estimate of 10,000. In sum, then, there is a total of approximately 62,000 persons of Cyprus origin, either Cyprus-born or their descendants, resident in these three countries.

Finally, the report provided information regarding the north’s demography in relation to the population of the island as a whole. There, it was shown that given the rate of population growth in the island’s south, the ratio remains similar to my previous report, with 77% of the total population holding Republic of Cyprus citizenship and living in the island’s south, and 23% holding ‘TRNC’ citizenship and living in the north.

The introduction began with a discussion of the politicization of north Cyprus’s demography, and how a heterogeneous population is being affected by political polarization in Turkey, the state upon which north Cyprus is economically and militarily dependent. In a time of regional conflict and intense debates in Europe around migration, an accurate estimate of the north’s population is necessary to dispel myths and engage in planning. As the report showed, both the citizen and non-citizen populations have significantly increased in only five years’ time. While I focused in this report on persons of Turkish origin, I have also provided figures for persons of third-country origin to show the significant increase in their numbers and to emphasize that any planning will also need to account for a growing population from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East that will have its own impact on the society of the island’s north.
References

Books and Articles


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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, Illegal Demographic Changes.


TRNC Prime Ministry State Planning Organisation Statistics and Research Department, Economic and Social Indicators: Students in Higher Education Institutes in TRNC Table 30. http://www.devplan.org/Frame-eng.html


TRNC Higher Electoral Council’s statements and reports can be found at: http://www.mahkemeler.net/mahkeme-web-t/secim-web/aciklama1.asp

TRNC 2006 and 2011 census results can be found at: www.devplan.org


Office for National Statistics, CT0265: Country of birth by year of arrival by religion; Dataset population: All usual residents born outside of the UK; Geographical level: England and Wales. Source: 2011 Census (27 March).
Census Reports from the British Period


APPENDIX I:
CITIZENSHIPS GRANTED ACCORDING TO YEAR

Source: Mr Mehmet Albayrak (former ‘Minister of Interior’) disclosed that the number of citizenships granted between 1974 and 14 October 2003 totalled 53,904. (Summary of the report can be found in Kibris, 23 October 2003). Mr Kutlu Evren (‘Minister of Interior’) disclosed that the number of citizenships granted between 1 January 2004-31 March 2017 totalled 22,277.
### APPENDIX II:

**EMIGRANTS FROM CYPRUS BY COUNTRY OF DESTINATION, 1955-1985**

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## APPENDIX III:

### TURKISH CYPRiot EMIGRATION TO TURKEY, 1955-1973

Total Emigration by ethnic group with breakdown of Turkish Cypriot emigration to Turkey, 1955-1973

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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2,305</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>3,995</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>2,380</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>2,855</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,649</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>71,036</strong></td>
<td><strong>16,519</strong></td>
<td><strong>290</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX IV:

THE CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE

DEVLET PLANLAMA ÖRGÜTÜ

2011 NÜFUS VE KONUT SAYIMI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAYIM BÖLGE NO.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ÖZEL SAYIM BÖLGESİ İSE &quot;X&quot; İŞARETİ KOYUNUZ.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SAYIM MEMURUNUN DIKKATINE**

Sayanın başarılı sonucunun ve amaçına ulaşması, ancak sizin göreverinizi doğru ve tam olarak yapmazsıniz bağlıdır. Sayımdan bir gün önce, sizen verilen Sayım Bölgesi Binaları Cetvelindeki adresleri Kontrol Memuru ile birlikte tek tek dolasırak kontrol ediniz. Bu kontrollerde herhangi bir sorun tespit ederseniz lütfen Sayım Komitesine bildirerek düzeltmesini sağlayın. Bu önemli görevi doğru ve eksiksiz bir şekilde yerine getirebilme için, eğitimde size verilmiş olan "Sayım ve Kontrol Memuru El Kitabı"nı sayım sırasında bir gün önce bir kez daha dikkate okuyunuz. SAYIIMDAKİ GÖREVINIZ EN İYİ ŞEKİLDE YERINE GETIRECEĞİNİZ İNANICIYA BAŞARILAR DİLERIZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAYIMİN YAPILDIĞI</th>
<th>KOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>İLÇE ADI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUCAK ADI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELEDİYE ADI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAHALLE/MÖY ADI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DIKKATI**


2. Sayım memuru tarafından sorulacak olan, bu defterdeki soru kağıtları yazılı soruları cevap vermek için yaşasının 13/1 merkezinde cevap vermektedir. Cevap vermekten kaçının verme doğru cevap vermeğin ve-auiliary içinde Kutuley Kızı Türk Cumhuriyeti İstatistik Yasası 17/1’ye göre özel konuşturma yapınız.

**SAYIM MEMURUNUN BEYANI**


Hânehalkı teşkil eden yerde;
Hânedeki bulunan hânehalkı iyonler ve misafirler dahil (Bölüm IV’ün sağ üst köşesindeki kutularda yazılı sayılarn toplamı) .............. nüfus yazdım.

Hânehalkı teşkil etmeyen yerde;
Toplam (Bölüm IV’de doldurulan toplam Fert Soru Kağıt sayıs)

Beyan ederim!

**SAYIM MEMURUNUN**

Adı ve Soyadı:

İmzası:

**KONTROL MEMURUNUN BEYANI**

Sayım memuru verdiği beyan tarafından kontrol edilmiş ve hatası var ise düzeltmiştir.

Beyan ederim.

KONTROL MEMURUNUN

Adı ve Soyadı:

İmzası:
### 2011 NÜFUS VE KONUT SAYIMI SORU KAĞIDI

#### Bölüm I - Adres
- Caddesi, Meydan veya Bulvar Adı
- Bölgeli, Kömür Adı veya Numarası
- Bina Değer No
- İç Kapı veya Daire No

#### Bölüm II - Sayımın Yapıldığını Yerin Niteliği

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numara</th>
<th>Konut</th>
<th>Cezaevi</th>
<th>Otel, motel, pensiyon</th>
<th>Hizmete, sağlık odası</th>
<th>Yurt</th>
<th>Şehitlik, Inşaat vb.</th>
<th>Diğer (Belirtin)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
<td>☐</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Bölüm III - Konut Özellikleri

1. Konutunuzun bulunduğu binaın türü nedir?
   - Tek katlı
   - Çok katlı
   - Daire
   - Apartman

2. Bu binada toplam kaç kat bulunmaktadır?
   (Binanın kat sayısı, getirilir, kat sayısını belirtiniz.)

3. Bu binada kaç daire/konut sayısı bulunmaktadır?
   - Konut sayısı
   - Daire sayısı
   - Depo sayısı

4. Bu binanın işyeri ve başka nitelikli alanları (m²) görüntü vermektedir?
   - Evet
   - Hayır

5. Bu konut hangi yılda inşa edildiğine?
   - 1967-1975
   - 1976-1980
   - 1981-1990
   - 1991-2000
   - 2001-2005
   - 2006 ve sonrası

6. Bu konutla milli yet suyunuzun günlük tüketim ne kadar?
   - 1.000 TL
   - 2.000 TL
   - 3.000 TL
   - 4.000 TL

7. Bu konuta şarap tüketmeniz ziyade kırık ne kadar?
   - 1.000 TL
   - 2.000 TL
   - 3.000 TL
   - 4.000 TL

8. Konutunuzda kaç oda (4 metrekareden daha büyük mutfaq dahil) bulunmaktadır?
   - 1
   - 2
   - 3
   - 4

9. Konutunuzda kullanılabilecek elektrik tüketimindeki m²'ye kaç m²'lık vakum箚?
   - 1
   - 2
   - 3
   - 4

10. Konutunuzda ağaçlık.histogram hangi movcudur?
    - Ağaçlık.histogram
    - Evet
    - Hayır

11. Konutunuzda şehitlik, Inşaat vb. veya mezarlık müstehcen mi?
    - Evet
    - Hayır

12. Konutunuzda ağaçlık.histogram hangi movcudur ve mevcut olmasının nedeni nedir?
    - 1
    - 2
    - 3
    - 4

13. Konutunuzda gider enerjiden ne su ustama sistemi var mı?
    - Evet
    - Hayır

14. Konutunuzda merkezi ısıtma sistemine var mı?
    - Evet
    - Hayır

15. Konutunuzda suyu nasıl alıyorsunuz?
    - Evet
    - Hayır

16. Konutunuzda suyu nasıl alıyorsunuz?
    - Evet
    - Hayır
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1.</th>
<th>2.</th>
<th>3.</th>
<th>4.</th>
<th>5.</th>
<th>6.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aşırı sıkışık</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
<td>Genel</td>
<td>Sıkışık</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX V:

### IMMIGRANT POPULATION BY YEAR, CITIZENSHIP AND GENDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Immigration</th>
<th>TRNC (TOTAL)</th>
<th>TRNC</th>
<th>TRNC and Other</th>
<th>TRNC - TR</th>
<th>TRNC - UK</th>
<th>TRNC - Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>66 920</td>
<td>37 524</td>
<td>29 396</td>
<td>23 565</td>
<td>3 002</td>
<td>2 829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>66 920</td>
<td>37 524</td>
<td>29 396</td>
<td>23 565</td>
<td>3 002</td>
<td>2 829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table: Immigrated Population by Year, Citizenship and Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Immigration</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>66 920</td>
<td>37 524</td>
<td>29 396</td>
<td>23 565</td>
<td>3 002</td>
<td>2 829</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>66 920</td>
<td>37 524</td>
<td>29 396</td>
<td>23 565</td>
<td>3 002</td>
<td>2 829</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source:
Source: http://nufussayimi.devplan.org/Additional%20Tables.pdf
The population of north Cyprus is one of the most contested issues in the Cyprus conflict, with many and widely varying figures being published for numbers of Turkish Cypriots and Turkish nationals in the island. In 2008, Mete Hatay published a report in which he assessed all available sources on Turkish Cypriot population, and that report has since been a standard source for understanding demography in north Cyprus. In the past decade, however, there have been continuous changes to the north’s population, including an explosion in numbers of university students and the issuance of new citizenships by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. In light of these changes, Hatay again assesses available sources on the Turkish Cypriot population; gives an overall portrait of the population breakdown; and presents results not only for immigration but also for Turkish Cypriot emigration. In addition, he assesses both Turkish Cypriot reactions to these changes and their potential effects on future negotiations.