Juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora policy with migrants' transnational citizenship practices

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ABSTRACT

Through a juxtaposition of diaspora policy with migrants' transnational citizenship practices, this article explores how peoplehood, nationhood and citizenship are articulated, justified and enacted. The article draws on the politico-spatial context of Norwegian-Pakistani transnational social space, analyzing the Pakistani Origin Card (POC), remittances and return mobilities as transnational citizenship practices. The elusiveness of residency becomes apparent, underscoring the salience of territoriality, for both diaspora strategies and transnational citizenship practices, involving the co-constitution of formal membership and everyday citizenship practices. Through this overlaps, frictions and disruptions in conceptions of citizenship and of nationhood are revealed, underscoring their non-static nature. Whilst questions of who is included within the people are more commonly approached from the vantage point of immigration contexts, they share key tenets of struggles over conceptualizations of citizenship, and more plural ideologies of nationhood, in emigration contexts, exposed by a juxtaposition of diaspora policies and migrants' transnational citizenship practices.

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1. Introduction

Through a juxtaposition of diaspora policy with migrants' transnational citizenship practices, this article hones in on the ways in which peoplehood, nationhood and citizenship are articulated, justified and enacted (Brubaker, 2010; Collyer, 2013; Yamashiro, 2015). It does so by drawing on the case of the Pakistani state's diaspora engagement initiatives and broadly, the ways in which Norwegian-Pakistani migrants' relate to these. Through this, it sheds theoretical light on questions of who a state relates to – in this case with reference to whom the emigration state relates to in its diaspora engagement efforts; which people the state relates to, is a question that lies at the core of the citizenship concept. Through the coupling of the nation with the state in modern nation-states, the question also underpins ideologies of nationhood (Mügge, 2013), drawing boundaries of membership of the people (Bauder, 2013a). However, competing stories of nationhood and national community may run parallel, as different national imaginaries are observable both in diaspora strategies and in migrants' ways of relating to these, through their everyday, lived, transnational citizenship practices (Ho et al., 2015a: 209–210; Dzenovska, 2013; Ho, 2011).

Processes and practices of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are often intertwined (Raj, 2015). Whilst eroding some of the state's powers, they are resulting in the increasing salience for states of institutions, such as (formal) citizenship, including the power to control borders and to issue passports (Martin and Paasi, 2016). Meanwhile, through the mobility of people, the clear-cut connection between the people, the territory and the state, becomes more complicated (Joppke, 1999; Brubaker, 2010; Raj, 2015). This also means that the spatialities of legal aspects of citizenship become increasingly complicated (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Staeheli, forthcoming). The focus of this paper is on migrants' transnational citizenship practices and specifically on the juxtaposition of these, with the Pakistani state's enactment of variants of (transnational) citizenship, from an emigration state vantage point, as part of their diaspora engagement initiatives.

Much attention has been devoted to the implications of immigration (typically into Western Europe) on the formation of citizenship (Brubaker, 2010; Joppke, 1999, 2010). Particular focus has fallen on the challenges of upholding the legitimacy of equal citizenship in diverse societies, foregrounding citizenship both as a
formal status, and as a signifier of membership (in the political community of the nation-state, at least), where practices and lived experience constitute key dimensions (Staeheli et al., 2012). Meanwhile, intersections of nationhood construction and citizenship in emigration contexts have focused in particular on extra-territorial voting and on emigration state’s diaspora strategies (Colley, 2013, 2014; Gamlen, 2008; Mügge, 2013; Ragazzi, 2014). The primary focus has thus been on the formal citizenship status, rather than on citizenship as a signifier of membership (in the political community of the nation-state), where citizenship practices and lived experiences play a salient role. However, geographers (and others) researching migrant transnationalism have foregrounded the mutual interconnectedness of citizenship as formal status, and as lived, practiced and experienced membership, both in emigration and immigration contexts, thus opening up for a multiplicity of scales of citizenship, including the local, national and transnational (Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Spinney et al., 2015). More recently, a special issue of this journal (Ho et al., 2015b), elaborated the multiplicity of actors targeted by diaspora strategies and, in so doing, underscored the need to acknowledge migrant subjectivities, revealing of the practiced and lived dimensions of transnational citizenship. Similarly, the term ‘transnational lived citizenship’ has been advocated in order to foreground lived space and situated practice as inherent to citizenship (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016; Martin and Paasi, 2016). The term also emphasizes ‘not explicitly acting as citizens’ as part of the potential for repoliticizing and respatializing citizenship (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 261). Such an approach, however, need not entail a denationalization of citizenship nor the obscuring the role of (nation-)states, but rather entail centering analysis on situated practices (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Raj, 2015). In order to bring geographical perspectives to the forefront, it is necessary to focus on ‘particular political-spatial contexts, exploring engagements and activities of different people and institutions which shape these entities and disclose the citizenships that these worlds afford and practice’ (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 263–264). This can be achieved through exploring ‘where and how people lead their lives as political subjects, and what governs and guides these lives and subjectivities’ (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 264).

This article contributes to these bodies of work, foregrounding the practiced and experienced dimensions of citizenship, of transnational lived citizenship, and how these are mutually constitutive of notions of membership of the nation, the citizenry or the people, which are also articulated, justified and enacted by the Pakistani state, through their diaspora engagement strategies. The article thus combines a focus on individual and collective bottom-up iterations of citizenship, through acts of citizenship, acknowledging that transnational subjects negotiate ‘the many citizenships that frame their lives’ (Staeheli, 2011: 399), with the observed reality, that there are governance dimensions, where the state’s role is highly relevant to include. These are spheres where the state holds power, such as granting citizenship, but also national identity cards (such as the NICOP and POC) or with regards to managing mobility and settlement (such as in relation to return mobilities), but also spheres where the state holds less power, in terms of financial and economic matters (such as remittances).

Through the analyses of situated practices and acts of citizenship, where individuals may ‘not explicitly act as citizens’ (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016: 261), the relevance and (non-)roles of the state come to the fore. This perspective contributes to unpacking the “who” of diaspora strategies, which conversely is a useful lens on more far-reaching questions about nationhood ideologies, conceptualizations of citizenship, and constructions of shared collective identities of peoplehood in the contemporary world. Adopting an approach that acknowledges the multiplicity of scales which transnational lived citizenship entails, the article remains open to the possibility of the renationalization of conceptions of citizenship and peoplehood, with potentially differing roles for states.

In the geographic literature on (transnational) citizenship, less attention has so far been paid to the striking similarities in the effect of migration on the premises for conceptualizations of citizenship in both contexts of emigration and immigration. As the population inhabiting nation-state territories increasingly move in and out over time, they may have simultaneous formal or experienced membership status and ties with one or more other nation-states (see also Smith and McQuarrie, 2011). The migrant transnationalism literature foregrounds how, for individual migrants and for migrant communities, citizenship relationships with both emigration and immigration states are often parallel (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013; Snel et al., 2006; Carling and Pettersen, 2014), of which the increased prevalence of dual citizenship regimes is also reflective (Faist, 2012).

For each state, however, citizenship remains to a certain extent singular, relating to its own citizenry, and tending to ignore the ways in which dual or multiple citizenships effectively have implications for the frames within which both conceptions of citizenship and ideologies of nationhood may develop. Given the prevalence of dual citizenship, in practice more and more nations states formally acknowledge double or multiple citizenship ties – as formal status and to some extent as memberships and practiced realities. Thus, nationhood ideologies that seek to remain consistent with the notion of peoplehood, which the state enacts through citizenship policies, need to encompass a more plural story (Antonsich and Mavroudi, 2014). This is a story allowing for the multiplicity of citizenships, for non-singular national belonging, and for more flexibility in types of residency within the nation-state’s territorial boundaries.

Rainer Bauböck discusses ‘citizenship constellations’, which refer to the formal, quasi-formal and informal ways individuals may be simultaneously linked to multiple political entities (2010, p. 848). In moving this up to the collective level of the people or the nation, with reference to the people as a whole, conceptualizations of both citizenship and nationhood need to be approached with flexibility and with pragmatism (Ong, 1999; Mavroudi, 2008). The somewhat atypical case of how a state relates to its diaspora population and how the diaspora may relate back, provides a useful lens through which to explore these contemporary processes of re-conceptualizing citizenship and nationhood ideologies. Here, the category of membership in the nation-(state) as singular and connected with citizenship and residency, due to mobility and sustained transnational ties is challenged and reconstituted, opening for more plural conceptualizations, which are inclusive of lived experiences and migrants’ transnational citizenships as these may be practiced.

It is migrants’ transnational practices that diaspora policies seek to affect, thus migrants’ transnational engagements can be understood as responses to state diaspora policies (Bocagni, 2014). However, it should be acknowledged that most migrant practices are undertaken largely independently of the state’s efforts to shape them. Nonetheless, the point for the purposes of this article is that the ways in which the state defines the set of people whose actions are sought affected through diaspora engagement strategies, is revealing of changing, highly pragmatic and flexible, approaches to conceptualizing citizenship and navigating ideologies of nationhood. These approaches are also revealing of the continued salience of the national and of the state, as an imagined community and institutionally, in co-constituting contemporary transnational lived citizenship(s).

Citizenship is always based on particular territorial assumptions, associated with birthplace (jus soli), ethnic homeland (jus sanguinis) or place of dwelling (jus domicile) (Bauder, 2013a). These
assumptions are tied to particular ideologies of nationhood (Brubaker, 1990, 2010); i.e., the ways in which decisions about who belongs to the nation become ideologically justified. As Brubaker (1990) observes, parallels exist between the ideal types of citizenship – where nationalism is traditionally discussed in a more demos-oriented civic form – and a more ethnos-oriented form of nationalism. In other words, all these are ideal types that are increasingly accepted. Furthermore, as Bauder (2013b, p. 56) argues: ‘Although, nationhood, as a marker of identity, and citizenship, as membership in a state, could conceptually be separated, the two concepts are historically closely connected and were fused in the development of the modern nation-state.’ Moreover, nationalism, nations and nationhood are constantly negotiated and renegotiated; and often the domicile ideal type of citizenship is taken on board for populations living within state boundaries (see e.g. Koch, 2015), resulting in further interconnections. Granted the negotiated and processual nature of both nationhood and citizenship, and their interconnections, their relational co-constitution over time, in particular political-spatial contexts, needs to be acknowledged.

Different conceptions of citizenship and ideologies of nationhood affect the development of diaspora strategies and migrants’ responses to them. Different conceptions lead to differing expansions and limitations for the targeted group – that is, the diaspora-cum-citizenry-cumnation (Boccagni, 2014). The ideological underpinnings of who is as part of the diaspora effectively reflect definitions of nationhood, in relation to who is or is not included, and whether or not nationhood is conceived of as something negotiable.

The case of Pakistani diaspora policies and Norwegian-Pakistani responses was selected due to specific salient characteristics. Neither Pakistan nor Norway permits dual citizenship universally. While Pakistan permits dual citizenship with 16 countries, Norway permits dual citizenship only as an exception to an otherwise absolute single-citizenship rule (Brochmann and Seland, 2010). In this context, migrants’ transnational citizenship practices are operationalized in relation to three dimensions: quasi-citizenship in the form of the Pakistani Origin Card (POC), remittances and return mobilities (see also Raj, 2015 on the Indian case). All three forms give rise to conceptual and normative debates about membership, territory and citizenship within modern nation-states.

The next section, on methods and data, sets the stage for a discussion of people beyond residency providing a conceptual backdrop for the analysis, which is followed by a description of the empirical findings of Pakistani diaspora policies and Norwegian-Pakistani migrants. This is followed by the analysis, which juxtaposes diaspora policies and migrants’ transnational citizenship practices relating to the POC, remittances and return mobilities. The conclusion emphasizes the broader theoretical implications of arguments beyond the Pakistani case, relevant for the related but not always mutually cross-feeding fields of geographic inquiry on diaspora policies, migrant transnationalism and citizenship.

2. Methods and data

This article draws on a combination of qualitative data from fieldwork conducted in Norway and Pakistan, from 2008 to 2014 and a desk-based study. The desk-based study, which focuses on Pakistani diaspora engagement policies, was informed by interactions that I had with Pakistani migrants and civil servants in Pakistan and abroad from 2012 to 2014. The qualitative data consist of 80 semi-structured interviews and five focus groups. They comprise 45 Pakistani migrants and their descendants in the larger Oslo area; 35 Norwegian-Pakistanis who were on visits to Pakistani Punjab or residing there over longer periods of time as return migrants; and 25 non-migrants in Pakistani Punjab, who participated in the focus groups. The data was collected as part of two research projects and my own research engagement with this transnational social field extending beyond the projects.

Research participants were recruited using gatekeepers in Norway and Pakistan. The aim was to engage a range of men and women from diverse backgrounds and with differing education levels, socioeconomic positions and migration histories. The group of research participants in Norway reflects the broader demographic and socioeconomic composition of the Norwegian-Pakistani population. Significant trends here include an older migrant generation and a mixed younger generation comprising migrants and descendants. Research participants in Pakistan were recruited on the premise that they had lived in Pakistan for over a year, although the category of ‘return migrants’ was rather elusive – often, families were leading transnational lives effectively based in more than one country (Erdal et al., 2015). Or, some research participants in Pakistan were included as ‘visitors’ living permanently in Norway; their responses yielded other perspectives, being notably affected by the interviews’ location, Pakistan.

3. Conceptualizing peoplehood beyond residency

Picking up on the research agenda set out by Ho (2011) and Ho et al. (2015b), foregrounding migrant subjectivities and the multiplicity of actors targeted by diaspora engagement policies, this section hones in on the possibility of conceptualizing peoplehood beyond residency, whilst acknowledging the back-drop of the world as largely organized in (nation-)state entities. Arguably, a step aside from the focus on citizenship and nationhood, per se, enables a closer look at the ways in which spatialities of transnational lived citizenship play out. The role of residency is a case in point and its connections with territory may be conceived of collectively not only through the prism of the (nation-)state, but also of the people, where shared collective fate territorially, may be seen differently among actors, people and institutions.

Which ideologies of nationhood dominate has important implications for membership and understandings of who is presumably targeted by diaspora policies, as part of the nation or the people (Mügge, 2013, p. 353). For instance, Brand (2014, p. 9) finds that contemporary developments in extraterritorial voting reveal a ‘process of redefining the boundaries of the nation and of the meaning of citizenship.’ The article’s focus on citizenship as both formal status and practices, is reflected in the analysis, where there is first a discussion of the Pakistani Origin Card, second a discussion of remittance sending – a key focus of Pakistani diaspora engagement initiatives, foregrounding economic and practiced dimensions of citizenship as lived membership in particular communities within the nation-state, and third, on return mobilities, practices central to migrant transnationalism, and ones which in particular ways challenge territorialized connections between citizenship and residency.

As a result of the ways in which spatialities of the legal aspects of citizenship are increasingly complicated (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Staeheli, forthcoming), the power dynamics of state-citizenry relationships are challenged. Emigrants who are naturalized abroad and hold dual citizenship do not wind up on the receiving end of policies that they themselves may vote for (Ho et al., 2015b). The state also has only so much power to exert beyond territorial borders on its non-resident citizens and others positioned to affect policy from the diaspora (Ho, 2011). As such,
migrants ‘are not merely passive objects of state power or capitalist logic, but active agents in the social construction of the practices of transnational citizenship’ (Smith, 2003, p. 499), which an analysis foregrounding these as situated within particular political-spatial contexts showcases. Arguably, in this context the category of residency is both becoming more problematic and more salient. On the one hand migrants may have voting rights enabling policies they will never experience the effects of directly, and on the other hand, the legitimacy and shared understanding of the notion of ‘peoplehood’ may become increasingly questioned along the lines of physical presence. Residence, as a signifier of membership within a community of shared fate bounded territorially, rather than in more abstract nationhood terms may be seen differently from the perspectives of non-migrant populations, migrants and the state.

In this article I question the nature of membership in nation-states vis-à-vis emigrated populations. To make sense of this, I argue that the categories of residency and citizenship – and how they do or do not overlap – provide an avenue into the spatialities of citizenship. Residence, whilst much as formal citizenship is a legal category, is also a category where there are degrees and processes involved, opening up both for multiplicity, and for complex spatialities. These categories then are seen as discursive, and may have particular implications or be flexibly and interchangeably used.

Here the notion of ‘flexible citizenship’ is relevant (Ong, 1999); there is evidence that both state and migrants support flexibilization. Furthermore, both states and migrants it seems, approach citizenship relatively pragmatically, ‘Pragmatic citizenship’ as discussed by Mavroudi (2008) for Palestinians in Greece, invokes migrants – stateless or otherwise – for whom citizenship choices are pragmatic. Here a distancing from the traditional linking of citizenship, state and nation appears necessary (Mavroudi, 2008). However, it could also be said that these processes are tied to a renationalization of citizenship (Bosniak, 2011), as both nationhood and citizenship are negotiated conceptions. So, pragmatic citizenship need not refer to a decoupling of citizenship from identity or belonging, but rather to flexibilization and a degree of pragmatism. In short, it is accepting a multiplicity of loyalties, including those pertaining to citizenship’s formal status(es) (Bauböck, 2010).

The people to whom the state relates cannot be neatly categorized according to residency or citizenship. Still, categorical distinctions can help conceptualize the relationships between citizenship, territory and membership, which simultaneously open up for notions of peoplehood where the state perhaps is less central, or of nationhood with other spatialities than those suggested by residency. Fig. 1 illustrates formal citizenship status and residency as aspects of these relationships. The four categories, which I see as changeable and flexible, are ways of conceptualizing membership vis-à-vis state diaspora strategies, in particular with regards to the question of how the state approaches the question of who it is that is targeted by diaspora engagement strategies. The four categories shed light on citizenship, beyond its formal institution, and on the role of territory in relation to citizenship and membership of a nation or the people. Revealed thus are the practical implications of inclusion and exclusion, of particular ideologies of nationhood, along with ways of constructing citizenship (Bauder, 2013a, 2013b).

First, resident citizens comprise the majority of the population. Some may be return migrants with dual citizenship, while others may be of immigrant descent. Second, non-resident citizens constitute parts of the diaspora. They may be only citizens of the emigration state or dual citizens and, either way, may temporarily visit or stay in the emigration state. Third, resident non-citizens are usually immigrants staying for a while or permanently. They include descendants of immigrants, but also a different category, return migrants and their descendants. Some of them will only hold the citizenship of their former country of immigration. Fourth, non-resident non-citizens, would in principle mean any non-citizen, living anywhere outside the state’s boundaries. Those individuals who are relevant for the discussion in this article, however, are usually diaspora members who have renounced their original (emigration state) citizenship and taken up the citizenship of their country of immigration. They comprise former citizens, who would usually also be former residents, and their descendants (not former residents, usually).

These categories are discursive, though they are also categories of practice with which states differentiate between non-resident citizens and previously non-resident citizens (who have since become non-resident non-citizens). The classification underscores how the territoriality of citizenship stays intact as a dimension of state power, which cannot be ignored (Bauder, 2013a; Staeheli et al., 2012). States approach their different diaspora policy targets differently. Sometimes the focus is on non-resident citizens, as reflected in the term extraterritorial citizens, though categories beyond that of formal citizens are often included.

A pattern emerges: the greater the flexibility surrounding citizenship and residency (e.g. dual citizenship arrangements), the greater the overlap and the fluidity between these categories over time and over individuals’ life courses. This could potentially produce new ways of thinking about citizenship, territory and membership in nation-states. Although the territoriality of citizenship still prevails (Bauder, 2013a), it is necessary to incorporate pragmatic, flexible approaches to citizenship and nationhood when conceptualizing mobility and mobile people’s places within contemporary political communities, whether described in terms of peoplehood, nationhood or citizenship.

How emigration states define the pool of people they embrace (Gamlen, 2014), or target with a diaspora policy provides one, perhaps a-typical, lens for understanding new conceptions of collective identities of peoplehood and nationhood. Notably this lens also permits exploring how those targeted as diasporas seek to relate to and respond to such embracing. The spatialities of citizenship and residency both become more complicated and remain salient for negotiations about membership. As the subsequent analyses sections discuss, migrants’ transnational citizenship practices are revealing not only of the interconnections of citizenship and nationhood, residency and membership, but also of the potential for de-coupling the state from (its central role) in narratives of peoplehood.

4. Pakistani diaspora engagement policies and Norwegian-Pakistani migrants’ responses

As a consequence of postcolonial partition, India and Pakistan was created – with the Pakistani state established in 1947, exhibiting Muslim nationalist proclivities (Ayres, 2009; Navqi, 2012). Since then, Pakistani ideologies of nationhood and conceptions of citizenship have incorporated religious dimensions, on the one hand, and sought to manage Pakistan’s plural society, on the other (Iqtidar, 2012; Lall, 2012). The state is strongly invested in managing notions of peoplehood and nationalism, which are also articulated in its citizenship policy (Iqtidar, 2012). However, Pakistan’s ability to provide for its citizens is challenged, on many counts, as reflected by the population’s high degree of pragmatism and distrust. Meanwhile, this alienation from the state coexists, paradoxically, with a strong sense of belonging to the nation (Lall, 2012).

From its inception, the Pakistani state has dealt with migration. It witnessed substantial population movements between India and Pakistan during partition and later, with substantial Afghan
refugee populations living in Pakistan for the past three decades. Bureaucratically, efforts by the Pakistani government concerning emigrants are characterized by numerous initiatives and organizations, often targeting labor migrants in the Gulf. The Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis, established as its own ministry in 2008, is in charge of diaspora affairs. In 2013, its name became the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource Development, presumably due to the state’s desire to view national economic development more holistically. A paper on Pakistani diaspora policy was completed in 2013 and approved by the prime minister, though has not been put forward in Parliament. Pakistani diaspora engagement policies should be seen in this context, which is fragmented despite conscious efforts of diaspora building - seeking to expand and strengthen ties among a potential pool of people to engage, and diaspora integration - seeking to strengthen existing ties with co-ethnics across borders (Gamlen, 2008).

Pakistan has dual citizenship agreements with 16 countries. A National Identity Card for Overseas Pakistanis (NICOP) is offered Pakistani citizens working abroad and dual nationality holders. The Pakistan Origin Card (POC) is offered to persons of Pakistani origin, who are not Pakistani citizens (at present), but whose parents or grandparents were. The NICOP grants wider rights, to overseas Pakistani citizens, whereas the POC grants more limited rights to overseas Pakistanis who are non-citizens. However, in both cases, visa-free travel to Pakistan, indefinite stay, investments, such as purchasing land or property in Pakistan, and holding a Pakistani bank account, are permitted. The NICOP guarantees the same basic rights as any Pakistani citizen, despite not being a resident, with the exception of the right to vote, if holding dual nationality. The NICOP and the POC thus contributes to individuals’ mobility resources and to some economic rights, but limited political rights. Extraterritorial voting and the possibility to run for election for Pakistanis abroad have fueled heated debate and these rights so far remain exclusive to those holding Pakistani citizenship. The right to vote from abroad was only granted in 2012, and excludes overseas Pakistanis with dual citizenship from voting. Estimates suggest that about 3.7 million of the 7–9 million people in the global Pakistani diaspora hold only Pakistani citizenship.

Pakistani authorities are overall very keen on engaging the diaspora. They see the extension of extraterritorial voting as part of a wider strategy, which includes attracting remittances. The Election Committee of Pakistan is reportedly considering provisions along these lines for the 2018 national elections.

The proposed criterion for candidates [from the diaspora to run for election] was a minimum stay of three years abroad and remittances of at least $50,000. Those possessing dual nationality would have to surrender their foreign nationality to qualify as a voter.6

The linking of election rights with financial contributions may be understood in a neoliberal, capitalist logic. Yet, it is just as pertinent to cast the Pakistani case within the framework of an aspiring developmentalist state matching its ambitions to collect and redistribute Islamic alms to the poor through the institution of Bait-ul-Mal.7

Remittances to Pakistan have consistently grown, year after year and throughout the financial crisis of the late 2000s. They reached 18.4 billion US dollars in the fiscal year ending June 2015.8 According to the World Bank, remittances in 2013 accounted for approximately 6% of Pakistan’s GDP. The Pakistan Remittance Initiative (hereafter: PRI) is a joint effort of the State Bank of Pakistan, the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis & Human Resource Development and the Ministry of Finance. It was established in 2009, with the objective of attracting more remittances and doing so through the formal banking system by offering better remitting services. So far, the PRI has contributed to making bank remittance transfers to Pakistan more transparent and efficient. Its profile is of an organization focused on customer relations, offering a 24/7 helpline for senders and receivers of remittances. The continued growth of remittances to Pakistan since the PRI was established cannot be accounted for by its very existence, though the related public attention to remittances and their transfer may have played some role.

In the draft National Policy for Overseas Pakistanis, the Government of Pakistan (2013) presented the state’s aims to use diaspora resources in Pakistan’s national development. The policy paper recommends that the diaspora population be referred to as non-resident Pakistanis, evocative of non-resident Indians (NRI), a group which Indian authorities have been targeting for investments and development engagements for a long period of time. It suggests further political rights for persons with dual citizenship, greater concern for returnees’ experiences, focus on the role of consular services abroad in maintaining the goodwill of the diaspora, sustaining ties to Pakistan through cultural activities abroad and continued focus on remittances and investments in Pakistan. Throughout the policy paper, the diaspora population is discussed within the national Pakistani framework, for example, being referred to as ‘nationals at home and abroad’ (Government of Pakistan, 2013, p. 2). This echoes what Collyer (2013) identifies as the state’s changing perceptions of peoplehood. The policy paper thus enacts a particular ideology of nationhood while displaying overlapping and disconnected conceptions of citizenship, where membership is defined by combinations of language, territory,

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4 On the difference between the NICOP and the POC: http://www.pakconsulatela.org/?page_id=1492.
birthplace, ancestry, time spent abroad and financial resources. Through this it lays the ground for what Raj (2015) refers to as ‘emigrant infrastructures’ which co-produce diasporic subjectivities. Totaling 38,000, migrants from Pakistan and their descendants are one of the larger non-European groups in Norway, even if numerically small in global scale. This group is part of a population of labor migrants whose immigration to Norway started in the 1970s and continued into the following decades through chain migration and family reunification; starting a couple decades earlier, a similar pattern occurred in the UK and a parallel pattern developed in Denmark (Bolognani, 2007; Ryttter, 2010; Shaw, 2000). Norway does not permit dual citizenship (exceptions do not include Pakistanis), and 77% of Norwegian-Pakistanis hold Norwegian citizenship (and thus not Pakistani citizenship) (Pettersen, 2012). Among non-European migrants in Norway, overall, the trend is to naturalize. This contrasts with the habit of many European and American migrants. It is associated with the mobility trend is to naturalize. This contrasts with the habit of many European and American migrants. It is associated with the mobility resources that a Norwegian passport grants Norwegian and American migrants. It is associated with the mobility resources (Carling, 2008). For many migrants from poorer countries, however, mobility may be the primary reason for choosing to naturalize and gain a particular countries’ formal citizenship. When dual citizenship is not an option, such as in Norway, most migrants from outside Europe and North America choose Norwegian citizenship, because this affords them mobility resources they are reliant upon in order to sustain transnational ties (Pettersen, 2012). They choose the citizenship of the immigration state precisely because it affords them mobility, which illustrates how mobility resources are at the heart of considerations about formal citizenship. They may be more pressing than political, social and economic rights, which in Europe are largely extended to resident non-citizens. Mobility may also even be higher on the considerations hierarchy than membership or belonging, neither of which need be perceived as contingent on formal citizenship (Mavroudi, 2008), and is reflective of pragmatic and flexible stances to citizenship as formal status.

So how do Norwegian–Pakistani migrants from Pakistan?). What functions does the card serve? Does the POC provide emotional ties to Pakistan, affirming membership in terms of peoplehood? In interviews, Pakistani migrants and their descendants reflected on reasons to hold the POC and not to. Key reasons to hold were: (1) it made travel easier and cheaper, as the NICOP grants visa-free travel to Pakistan; (2) it was a practical help, enabling investment in property in Pakistan and facilitating paperwork; and (3) it was necessary to secure inheritances and organize family matters (e.g., funerals, family businesses). Gendered dimensions of care work in transnational families were also often relevant (Ho et al., 2015a). Those who did not hold the POC said it was either because they travelled infrequently and therefore saw no need for visa-free expediency or because they felt getting the POC was too much of a hassle. The card’s issuance requires completion of a form in Urdu, listing the ID numbers of the applicant’s parents and other potentially linguistically or bureaucratically trying tasks. Interviewees did not assume that the POC automatically conferred identity or belonging. The card application’s Urdu-only form, however, sends a signal that could be interpreted as the articulation of peoplehood in linguistic terms – an ideology of nationhood placing language at its core. At the Pakistani state’s inception, the choice of Urdu as the national language was not based on what the majority spoke; it was a conscious strategy of nation-building in a postcolonial context where a linguistically plural society had to be governed.

Norwegian-Pakistani migrants, however, have no real choice. If they want to be able to travel relatively freely around the world, they need a Norwegian passport. The fact that they then have to renounce their Pakistani citizenship may affect how they consider the passport as a document and relate to citizenship as a concept. This is a matter of pragmatism and flexibility, where transnational citizenship practices are enacted with formal, quasi-formal or informal status (Bauböck, 2010). Such approaches to citizenship highlight the potential for citizenship constituting a form of capital, in this context in particular of mobility. This further underscores the continuing significance of the passport itself, as a symbol of formal citizenship, which remains important to migrants who experience territorially bounded nation-states, and their border controls, as key challenges to leading transnationally mobile lives (Torpey, 2000).

Migrants’ attitudes toward passports could be explained in terms of general pragmatism: they are simply a means for mobility. However, another explanation could stem from migrants’ perspectives on the Pakistani state and its institutions, which are riddled with distrust; reflecting a perception to those living in Pakistan itself (Lall, 2012). This distrust has clear implications for how the Pakistani state can enact citizenship and nationhood vis-à-vis the overall population and its diaspora. Migrants’ pragmatism toward the Pakistani state and their functional view of the POC (much like of Norwegian citizenship) highlights mobility and citizenship rights as an important dimension in conceptualizing citizenship (Bauder, 2013a; Spinney et al., 2015). Among academics and policymakers placed in the Global North, access to mobility resources may be taken for granted, and its significance about acquiring such resources can be underestimated in discussions about citizenship.

Belonging, identity and nationhood seem simultaneously connected and disconnected to citizenship. This becomes apparent when drawing on a territorialized conception of citizenship, where pragmatism and flexibilization emerge from the state and from its targeted diaspora members. Juxtaposing the POC as a diaspora engagement measure with reflections among Norwegian-Pakistani migrants and their descendants, it would seem that the POC is a great asset to those seeking to engage more with Pakistan. Yet, for those not already engaged, the POC makes no difference. However, another explanation could stem from migrants’ perspectives on the Pakistani state and its institutions, which are riddled with distrust; reflecting a perception to those living in Pakistan itself (Lall, 2012). This distrust has clear implications for how the Pakistani state can enact citizenship and nationhood vis-à-vis the overall population and its diaspora. Migrants’ pragmatism toward the Pakistani state and their functional view of the POC (much like of Norwegian citizenship) highlights mobility and citizenship rights as an important dimension in conceptualizing citizenship (Bauder, 2013a; Spinney et al., 2015). Among academics and policymakers placed in the Global North, access to mobility resources may be taken for granted, and its significance about acquiring such resources can be underestimated in discussions about citizenship.
as a central motivation, through offering visa-free travel. The POC then becomes a quasi-citizenship status, formally affirming membership and granting particular territorial and citizenship-related rights, while withholding other, mainly political rights. A measure connected to citizenship, the POC is ostensibly being offered with the ambition of increasing investments and remittances; affirming membership and actively including the diaspora in notions of peoplehood that serve financial and developmental purposes.

The POC highlights how membership is a matter of definition. Here the absolute boundaries of territory can actually be negotiated. Formal citizenship is also negotiated and new forms of quasi-citizenship are developed. The POC points to the salience of mobility resources in discussions of diaspora policies and citizenship, membership and the spatialities of transnational citizenship(s). States' and migrants' perspectives may differ, and migrants may make pragmatic choices that focus more on mobility resources than other dimensions. At the same time, while the POC may be perceived as a Pakistani state instrument applied for pragmatic gain from the diaspora, the Urdu-only application form signals unequivocal membership prerequisites. Beyond citizenship and territory, a particular linguistic heritage is expected. Thus, overlapping and disconnected conceptions of citizenship and nationhood emerge when state policy and intentions surrounding the POC are juxtaposed with migrants' and descendants' transnational citizenship practices.

5.2. Remittances

Economic investments and transfers through the formal banking system are key aims of many countries' diaspora policies, as the significance of remittances for particular countries' GDPs makes evident. A majority of Pakistani migrants send remittances to family and extended kinship networks back home, and are likely to do so again, whether regularly or on an ad hoc basis (Erdal, 2012). Economic engagements with the emigration country through remittances may be private and individual, at the family level or embedded in religious practice or humanitarian involvement (Erdal and Borchgrevink, 2016), and are differentiated between men and women, and across migrant generations. Remittances may be more or less voluntary; however, they are not a response to an obligation to the state, as is paying taxes. Usually, states' outreach for funds from diasporas are based on members wanting to contribute voluntarily, through a sense of duty to their emigration country, and usually their family. States may seek to enhance diaspora attachments to the emigration country by organizing diaspora festivals, hosting study tours for diaspora youth, showing symbolic appreciation of the diaspora or offering institutionalized services (e.g., extraterritorial voting, consular services and extending property rights).

However, there is an apparent mismatch in scales here, as migrants' remittances are primarily operating at individual and family levels, whereas state's remittance initiatives operate at national and international levels, the PRI is an example par excellence. Among Norwegian-Pakistanis, remittances are largely sent between individuals, within or beyond households, and often within families and broader kinship networks (Erdal, 2012). Nevertheless, the state's role is also relevant, and remittance senders are aware of this. Tayyab, a mid-40-year-old, small business owner in Norway, relayed this when conveying his choice of transfer mechanisms.

There are problems with the Pakistani system, corruption, it's slow, and everything, so you want to avoid all that. Some use the banks, if you want to go into direct investments... if you have money in the banks then there isn't the same level of confidentiality in the banking system in Pakistan as you have here [in Norway] so maybe, in a village or small town, it will soon be well known what you have in the bank.

Tayyab's reflection on corruption in Pakistan, with a deep-seated distrust in this state-operated system, was common. It was particularly directed at the Pakistani state. While the PRI was rarely cited by research participants, their reflections on remittance-sending to Pakistan points to some of the very challenges the organization was set up to deal with, such as quality and efficiency of remittance services in Pakistani banks. Remittance senders and receivers raised serious reservations about placing trust in the banking system whatsoever. Efficient or not, Pakistan's state institutions were generally distrusted. Corruption was one concern, but so was overall trustworthiness. Both issues the PRI is not equipped to handle, though they undoubtedly have implications for the Pakistani state's broader diaspora engagement ambitions. This reflects a disconnection between ideologies of nationhood and conceptions of citizenship, where for many Pakistanis, nationhood less depends on the state, than citizenship policies might assume.

State distrust and frustration with corruption signal the diaspora's disassociation from Pakistan. This, however, runs parallel to a self-identification as Pakistani diaspora thus affirm their membership in one sense, while simultaneously opposing the institutional aspects to the Pakistani state. However, their opposition mainly translates into pragmatism and distancing, rather than political activism for change. Notions of citizenship are primarily challenged by distrust in the emigration state, plus the fact that the diaspora hardly relies on it, therefore displaying scarce loyalty to it. Membership gets articulated by physically affirming belonging in particular local communities through economic investments and, more abstractly, by continuing to see oneself as Pakistani. Thus, shared ideologies of nationhood are confirmed, while citizenship in a formal sense is pragmatically and flexibly taken or left. That leaves the state with fewer tools with which to affect migrants' transnational citizenship practices.

The juxtaposition of migrants' remittances with state diaspora engagement policies reveals a scalar mismatch between private, familial exchanges and national, macro-level economic needs. Migrants' strong senses of attachment, affirming membership, attachment to territory and citizenship practices instead are illustrated. The bonds, however, are tempered by a distinct distrust in the state system. The resulting pragmatism to a large extent matches overall sentiments among people in Pakistan (Lall, 2012). With regards to remittances, there is a glaring disconnect in conceptions of membership; migrants seek to disengage from state involvement, for fear of corruption or delays. The scalar mismatch concerning remittances also points to how membership within and across territorial borders may unite citizens (and non-citizens) in how they see themselves in the vertical state-citizen relationship, in this case being marked by a high degree of distrust and pragmatism. The overlap in conception of nationhood is as striking as is the disconnect, revealing the need to approach these as negotiated and processual constellations that are inherently plural (Bauböck, 2010).

5.3. Return mobilities

States may approach return mobilities with a desire for return, reluctance to return or ambivalence, depending on economic and political circumstances. Research on considerations about and experiences with return mobilities reveals migrants' often simultaneous attachments to their countries of emigration and immigration (De Bree et al., 2010). This is indicative of how mobility...

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9 Exceptions include taxes levied from diasporas; on Eritrea, see e.g. Koser, 2003.
frequently is seen as a continuing option by migrants (Bailey and Law, 2013). Much like emigration, return migration is not final, at least for migrants with adequate mobility resources (White, 2013), which is why I chose the term return mobilities. For the majority of Pakistani labor migrants to the Gulf countries, mobility is a highly managed phenomenon. However, for the global Pakistani diaspora, with longstanding transnational ties to Pakistan, this differs entirely. The majority of them are privileged; they live in the global North and have access to mobility resources granted by their country of immigration through citizenship.

Norwegian-Pakistani migrants’ considerations about, and experiences of return mobilities, are closely intertwined with practicalities of everyday life in Pakistan, and as such relate to its state and its diaspora engagement initiatives. My research among Norwegian-Pakistanis shows that few migrants will return on a permanent basis to Pakistan, though many consider spending longer periods of time there while retaining permanent residence in Norway (Erdal et al., 2015). This reveals how both citizenship and residency is flexible. Among return migrants from Norway in Pakistan, a common theme was the idea of return to Norway. This is an interesting backdrop for juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora strategies of return mobilities with migrants’ practices. The practices may be as return migrants, as prospective re-emigrants or as a category of people living in a particular transnational social field, where citizenship, membership and territory is defined in relation to not only one state and one national community, but to two or more. Here there might be multiple conceptions of citizenship and ideologies of nationhood, which frame citizenship acts as situated practices.

This was apparent in what Anjum, a 50-year-old woman who spent eight years in Pakistan before re-migrating to Norway, told me.

I never wanted to move to Pakistan in the first place. I had to go there to look after my mother-in-law, and my four children moved there with me. We had so many problems finding the right school and sorting out everything there... But then it gradually worked fine. Still, I was waiting to move back to Norway.

Juxtaposing Pakistani diaspora engagement policies, which encourage and seek to facilitate return with migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, in the form of everyday decision-making about return mobilities, underscores two points: First, many migrants experienced everyday inconveniences and hardships while settling in Pakistan. Securing a good school for children was often mentioned, but so were paperwork and bureaucracy, prices of services and the inevitable corruption (see also Paasche, 2016). Second, returnees (from Europe, in particular) were a group who often seem to lead transnational lives. They made use of their citizenship and residency rights in countries other than Pakistan and held a long-term perspective on mobility (Erdal et al., 2015). This highlights the elusive nature of residency in practical and territorial terms. Many of these returnees may be neither Pakistani citizens nor residents in any permanent sense, yet were spending significant amounts of time (and resources) in Pakistan.

Experiences and consideration of return mobilities underscore similar perceptions of the state as was found in the previous analysis sections, exploring the POC and remittances: lacking trust in state institutions and frustration with corruption. However, the role of the Pakistani state is often (and at best) invisible in considerations about and experiences of return mobilities. So, despite active policies on embracing the diaspora – as nationals at home and abroad – there are few actual experiences of this among those considering return or those having returned for shorter or longer periods to Pakistan. Pakistan as an emigration state is only to an extent enacting citizenship in a way that is inclusive of the potential diaspora it wants to engage through return.

With regard to citizenship in the emigration context, return mobilities experiences highlight the elusive nature of residency, whereby territory – as a result of mobility – becomes more or less significant, depending on available mobility resources (see Fig. 1). Building on the elusiveness of residency, it may be argued further that return mobilities accentuate the challenge the state faces in negotiating the inclusion of permanent residents and others within its peopled. Which ideologies of nationhood get selected and how they map onto conceptions of citizenship become important. A peoplehood inclusive of emigrants may be something migrants are themselves willing to engage. It lets them sustain membership over time and fulfill any possible nostalgic inclinations, as they, as part of the people stay woven in the fabric of the nation. However, non-migrants may be more ambivalent, as indicated in heated debates about Pakistanis abroad with dual citizenship being allowed to vote in Pakistan. Their ambivalence relates to economic inequalities and may be seen as resistance to the attention the numerically small (and wealthy) diaspora in the global North receives. More profoundly, it also addresses ideologies of nationhood as negotiable (or not). Pakistani English-language media tends to discuss citizenship in essentialist terms. For instance, a report on the number of Pakistanis who have renounced their Pakistani citizenship says these individuals ‘want to give up their association with the homeland’. Migrants and the state’s more pragmatic, flexible approaches to citizenship (cf. Mavroudi, 2008), which are partly disconnected from nationhood, may therefore not be in sync with the sensibilities of most Pakistanis. The discrepancy can be seen when the connection is drawn between holding Pakistani citizenship and as questions of membership in the nation.

6. Conclusion

Juxtaposing diaspora engagement policies with transnational citizenship practices reveals how states and migrants conceive in different ways the relationships between citizenship, territory and membership. It also uncovers varying ideologies of nationhood, which like conceptions of citizenship, are approached pragmatically, with varying degrees of flexibility. There are, however, clear overlaps and disconnects between the state’s approach and migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, and how they concern various segments of the Pakistani population.

Obtaining or not obtaining the POC, sending remittances and returning are all choices that index concrete obstacles related to distrust and corruption, both of which disrupt the potential for state-diaspora engagements in Pakistan. Comparing diaspora policy with migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, the multi-scalar, formal, semi-formal and informal, nature of citizenship as everyday practice becomes apparent (Staeheli et al., 2012), highlighting the multiplicity of transnational lived citizenship (Kallio and Mitchell, 2016; Ho et al., 2015b). How citizenship, territory and membership are conceived of and interrelated in sometimes contradictory ways causes friction. This is highlighted by how the state and migrants invoke a quasi-citizenship status via the POC, with an ensuing scalar mismatch pointing to the

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10 There are notable exceptions to this, with Pakistani migrants without regular status, especially in Southern Europe. Their experiences and practices, however, are not the focus of this article.
11 See also Erdal et al. (2015).
salience of membership beyond or despite the state in the case of remittances, and through the elusive nature of residence, exposed by return mobilities (see also Erdal et al., 2015).

Pakistani migrants’ transnational citizenship practices identify distrust and inadequate or poorly functioning state institutions as stumbling blocks to furthering diaspora engagement in Pakistan. This is the case in many other states with weak governance (Collyer, 2013). Having experienced mistrust and corruption, many migrants are pragmatic in responding to the state’s diaspora engagement initiatives. Still, many Pakistanis abroad are highly engaged with Pakistan, both personally – staying connected to family, friends, village or neighborhood, but also at a collective level evoking a sense of national identification and membership. The lack of action beyond spheres associated with the personal is often connected to distrust in the state and distrust in the system of governance.

These challenges and their ensuing pragmatism liken the diaspora more to the Pakistani population at large, rather than distance it in view of broader state distrust (Lall, 2012). Trust is key for building stories of peoplehood (Smith, 2003), not only in diasporas, but generally within nation-states. Still for non-resident and often non-citizen diaspora members, the state’s outreach requires no response; the diaspora can choose to not engage, thus distinguishing them from the archetypal citizen. This raises questions about how membership among the people is understood and the specific relevance of particular spatialities, for instance when there are few situated practices of transnational lived citizenship, which thus only to a limited extent, as acts, frame transnational citizenship(s) (Staeheli, 2011; Staeheli et al., 2012; Kallo and Mitchell, 2016). In several ways, the diaspora seems to appreciate the efforts by the Pakistani state, for example, the POC as an option to avoid visa hassle and fees. Meanwhile, many diaspora members call themselves Pakistani despite what the state might do, suggesting that membership in terms of ‘peoplehood’ goes beyond citizenship or residency – and that defining nationhood is not (entirely) up to the state.

What implications, then, arise when conceptualizing citizenship and ideologies of nationhood from an emigration state’s outlook? The notion of peoplehood as articulated by Collyer (2013) allows for the encompassing of all categories of individuals that the state relates to beyond its territorial borders (see also Fig. 1). As Gamlen (2014) notes, states diaspora strategies may be seen as tapping the diaspora for resources (e.g. remittances) and embracing the diaspora as part of the nation (assuming that enables tapping later). Another perspective appears, however, when the policy level is juxtaposed both with migrants’ situated transnational citizenship practices and with non-migrants’ experiences and reflections. As for embracing, the state holds some formal power, it grants citizenship and other permissions (Martin and Paasi, 2016; Torpey, 2000). However, the state still depends on the people to uphold the collective identities of peoplehood as a nation from within and outside its territories, reflective of the relational, processual and dynamic nature of citizenship as horizontal and vertical ties. Being included in the people signals membership within the community, where exclusion is no likelier than for any other member of that community, regardless of residency. Yet, in the Pakistani case, as has been shown, while the state’s ideology of nationhood may promote inclusion and full membership, in interpersonal exchanges and practical everyday encounters, diaspora Pakistanis are not seen as equal members – at least not by resident Pakistani’s. This calls into question the extent to which a state’s embracing of the diaspora is actually something the state holds the powers to enact. It indicates, moreover, the need for continued dialogue between studies that focus on state institutions and those that look into migrant practices, both in relation to studies of diaspora strategies and of transnational lived citizenship. It also begs for the inclusion of non-migrant populations’ perspectives and subjectivities (Ho et al., 2015b). However, in the Pakistani case, migrants’ and non-migrants’ shared experiences of corruption, which contribute to distrust in the state, create, perhaps counter-intuitively, a common battle to join forces over, across the migrant/non-migrant divide (Lall, 2012).

Considering the case of Pakistani diaspora policy and Norwegian–Pakistani transnational citizenship practices, it may be argued that the term non-resident citizen is not particularly helpful for describing the group of people whom the state is targeting. By and large, they are non-resident non-citizens and, increasingly, have never been citizens (migrants’ descendants). Meanwhile, many draw on conceptions of other-than-formal citizenship, associated with family ties and connections with particular places. As such, diaspora–Pakistanis are negotiating ideologies of nationhood over time and over their life courses, in relation to the Pakistani state, but also in relation to local communities in Pakistan. Thus, neither conceptions of citizenship, nor ideologies of nationhood, remain static. Rather, they are pragmatically, flexibly, produced through transnational citizenship practices.

Shifting the perspective to countries of immigration; migrants may officially be welcomed as part of the people in their countries of immigration, following naturalization and citizenship acquisition. However, in everyday life, this may be quite different, with concerns echoing the ambivalence of transnational living, found in emigration contexts: of always not being here or there, being almost a member, and almost having full citizenship (Ho, 2011: Leitner and Ehrkamp, 2006; Smith, 2003). Migrants may experience this feeling of liminality as citizens and residents, here and there.

As a result of transnational mobilities and ties, and the elusiveness of residency, a state’s nationhood ideologies must be in sync not only with us here (e.g. in Pakistan) and us there (e.g. in the diaspora), but also with us as transnationally mobile and present both here and there. A focus on spatialities, foregrounding the particular politico-spatial contexts which frame situated practices of engaging in transnational lived citizenship, becomes important for understanding the interplay between the state’s nationhood ideologies, and the perspectives of different segments of the people.

States redefine boundaries of belonging – in connection with changing notions of peoplehood. People’s responses are spatially situated, and tied to the (nation-)states where they are citizens or residents. The interplay of actors is crucial, foregrounding that citizenship, nationhood and residence should not be understood in static terms. Drawing on the juxtaposition of Pakistani diaspora policies and migrants’ transnational citizenship practices, the negotiation of citizenship(s) and nationhood(s) is produced across co-constitutive scales. These are produced in relation to the state, rather than by the state, and involve overlaps, friction, and disruptions, in how emerging stories of peoplehood are articulated, justified and enacted.

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