Gender Aspects of Conflict Interventions: Intended and Unintended Consequences

Case Studies on the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Tempo-rary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

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**Table of contents**

Executive Summary  
Chapter one: Introduction: Norms and Reality of Gender Interventions  
Chapter two: The United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia - Gender(ed) Effects  
Chapter three: The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Military Intervention Facing New Civilian Challenges  
Chapter four: The Temporary International Presence In Hebron: A Civilian International Observer Mission  
Chapter five: Conclusion: Implications for Norwegian Authorities  
Appendix A: Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action  
List of Abbreviations
Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to investigate ways in which gender dimensions shape and are shaped by international conflict interventions. In particular, the report seeks to outline the ways in which three particular interventions – the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) – fulfil the goals of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming outlined in core UN documents. Such documents can be considered as norm-creating and thereby constitute a relevant frame for the analysis provided here.

In the case-studies covered, specific attention is directed at the negative consequence of increased prostitution, the need to consider sexual violence and the positive effects that local women’s involvement in an intervention can bring about. By examining gender norms and the actual consequences of intervention, the report investigates ways in which the interventions examined have had both intended and unintended gendered consequences, both positive and negative.

As a result of the analysis contained in the report, the following policy recommendations are made:

The United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE)

1. Due to their vulnerable situation local women may look upon the peace operation as offering a possible solution to their problems because of the great imbalance in terms of material resources between the peacekeepers and the local population. Leaders must recognize this problem and encourage discussions within the mission on how to deal with the situation. Therefore the mission must:
   - prepare all personnel for the situation described above; and
   - ensure that personnel in leading positions recognize their responsibilities as models for behaviour.

2. Since problems caused by soldiers having sexual relationships with local women during long periods of service while may end up costing the mission more than sending the soldiers home more often, the mission should:
   - deploy troops for less than six months at a time or send troops home on leave at least once during this time.

3. When the mission is working directly with people in the border area, the issue of sexual relations is not as problematic as it is in the capital. Here, UNMEE women are very useful when communicating with local women. Therefore:
   - the Norwegian authorities should find new and better ways of attracting women to the military in general, and to peacekeeping in particular; and
   - specific posts within the mission should be allocated to women, especially when the mission works in direct contact with local people.
The NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR)

Sexual violence can be conceptualized as a security issue, and thereby a matter of concern for a military conflict intervention such as SFOR. A potential increase in the number of inter-ethnic rapes in Bosnia ought to be regarded as a security threat. It is therefore recommended that:

- as a part of an overall security assessment, SFOR headquarters and the three multinational brigades (MNBs) should include statistics on the number of inter-ethnic rapes in the regions in which SFOR operates.

If the SFOR leadership is to implement the above recommendation, a number of practical issues need be considered. The following further recommendations should therefore be read as ways of reaching the primary goal outlined above:

- CIMIC officers must be given basic education on the causes and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and in particular the forms it may take among victims of sexual violence.
- CIMIC units should establish close contact with women’s NGOs, psychosocial centres and social centres in their areas in order to create a network through which potential victims can receive adequate help.
- Gender Officers should be appointed at a minimum at the MNB level.
- Gender Officers ought be part of the Gender Coordinating Group (GCG) or similar associations in the area.

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH)

When contributing personnel to international interventions with a civilian component and/or close contact with local populations, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that military and police peacekeepers are educated prior to their departure on:

- gender dynamics and gender impacts in pre-conflict, armed conflict and post-conflict situations;
- international humanitarian and human rights law, with particular attention to the rights of women and girls.

The Norwegian authorities should also ensure that, immediately upon their arrival in the field, all peacekeeping personnel receive training on:

- the specific gender perspectives of the particular operation the staff are part of, including information on local gender practices, roles and traditions;
- what good gender-sensitive practice entails, with concrete examples from the field.

The following further recommendations are also made:

- The Norwegian authorities should ensure that relevant information about a mission – such as documents explaining its mandate and/or structure – are available in the local language to the users of the mission, and should disseminate these in different forms and through local channels in order to reach out to the entire local population, including women.
- Cooperation with local nongovernmental organizations and institutions should be encouraged in order to ensure a widespread flow of information, and there should be a focus on cooperation with local women’s organizations, in order to reach local women.
- The Norwegian government should strive actively for gender equity among its peacekeeping personnel, so that local women are ensured a female channel of communication to the international intervention.
• Civilian missions like TIPH should be encouraged to develop their relations with local communities through financial support to local NGOs, and should earmark a certain amount of their budgets for local women’s initiatives. Such activities stimulate mutual trust and openness between the members of the mission and the local users.

Conclusions

In conclusion, there are certain steps that Norwegian authorities can take in order to take the lead in pushing the intentions behind UN Resolution 1325 forward. Indeed, Norway is in a unique situation to push increased gender balancing and gender mainstreaming within conflict interventions. It is known for its involvement in challenging peace process around the world. Further, Norway also has a reputation as a country in which equal rights and opportunities for women have come a long way. Combined, these characteristics not only give Norway a favourable reputation, but also lead to a unique responsibility. Norwegian authorities are therefore faced with an expectation that Norway will be at the forefront of this development. We would therefore urge Norwegian authorities to implement the following recommendation:

• The Norwegian authorities should establish a database of women and men from the Nordic countries with knowledge of gender aspects of international issues to be recruited for international positions.

In addition, we urge the Norwegian authorities to form groups consisting of NGOs, members of parliament and other relevant individuals and groups to follow up on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) more closely than has been done so far. Such and effort has already been established in Canada, and one can envisage a Nordic–Canadian lobby promoting gender mainstreaming for future international interventions. Thus we recommend:

• A Nordic–Canadian lobby should be established to promote the intentions of United Nations Resolution 1325 in domestic countries as well as within the United Nations system.

One of the responsibilities of such a lobby ought to be the definition of ‘gender entry points’ in prospective missions in the future. It is clear from the studies in this report that gender concerns cannot be defined in the same way for each conflict. In some conflicts there are women’s networks that can be contacted, while in other conflicts there are not. In some conflicts women are fighters, while in others they are predominantly victims. It is therefore crucial that peacekeeping operations base their gender-mainstreaming efforts on gender analyses of the conflict in which they are deployed.

• The Norwegian authorities should assist and encourage research on gender dimensions of the conflicts in which Norwegian soldiers are likely to be deployed as part of multinational missions.

Such an approach would assist in creating gender balance and would likely increase the value of gender awareness as a skill. It is therefore further recommended that financial support be provided for the creation of a Norwegian network (cooperating closely with other networks in the Nordic region) for women working with issues of international security in order to increase women’s knowledge of – as well as encourage, women’s participation in – conflict intervention.
Chapter 1

Introduction: Norms and Reality of Gender Interventions

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Introduction

THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY is to investigate ways in which gender dimensions shape and are shaped by international conflict interventions. In particular, the report seeks to outline the ways in which three particular interventions – the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR), and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) – fulfil the goals of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming outlined in core UN documents. Such documents can be considered as norm-creating and thereby constitute a relevant frame for the analysis provided here.

In the three case-studies in this report, specific attention has been directed on the negative consequence of increased prostitution, the need to consider sexual violence and the positive effects that the involvement of local women in an intervention can lead to. Through an examination of the gender norms and the actual consequences of the interventions studied, the report investigates ways in which the interventions have had both intended and unintended gendered consequences, and how these can be both positive and negative.

Core concepts in the study are outlined as follows:

• Conflict Intervention. Until recently, the focus in research on interventions has been primarily on military interventions. However, in an attempt to expand the concept, Regan has defined intervention as ‘convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces’ (Regan, 1998: 756). He does, however, exclude both multilateral and diplomatic interventions in his study. In contemporary research, though, conflict intervention can include everything from unilateral, military intervention in a conflict1 – such as the USA’s intervention in the Vietnam War – to multilateral conflict intervention by both civilian and military units, such as the UN operation in East Timor in 1999.2 In this report, the discussion is limited to third-party interventions conducted in order to assist in resolving a conflict and that result from agreements by the warring parties. One common form of intervention is a peacekeeping operation, and this expression will be used interchangeably with conflict intervention in this report.

• Intended Consequences. The term intended consequences is used in this report to refer to aims outlined in core UN documents – including the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action (S/2000/693) and Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) – in which

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1 For a discussion on the former form of intervention and the reasons why states intervene, see Regan (1998).
2 For further discussion of research on interventions, see, for example, Stedman, Rothchild & Cousens (2002).
the strategies, intentions and goals for gender balancing and gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations are outlined (see the appendices to this report). However, it is important to note that of the interventions examined in this report, only UNMEE in Eritrea and Ethiopia has been deployed since the publication of the above documents. Nevertheless, we regard those documents as guidelines for how gender issues ought to have been considered in the deployment of all three interventions, and base our presentations on that assumption.

- **Unintended Consequences.** This term refers to gender aspects of the interventions that might be deemed non-desirable, but that need to be addressed if the issue of gender is taken seriously. Of course, both intended and unintended consequences may be positive.

- **Gender aspects.** This term is comprised of two sub-terms that run through most of the core UN documents as well as research on gender and conflict interventions:
  1. **Gender Balancing.** This term denotes efforts to ensure a fairly equal number of male and female participants at all levels of an intervention.
  2. **Gender Mainstreaming.** This term denotes efforts to consider gender issues in every part of an intervention.

The Case Studies

At the international level, the assumption appears to have been made that identification of the problem of unintended, negative gender consequences of conflict interventions will automatically result in a solution to that problem. However, as this report of contemporary developments related to gender and interventions shows, this is simply not the case. Today, we have considerable knowledge – within both research and policy – on the negative, unintended effects that peacekeeping operations may have – particularly for local women. All the same, although numerous reports and recommendations have been written, the problem of negative consequences remains. Therefore, the specific contribution of this study will be to discuss three particular cases in detail in order to identify practical problems and barriers to progress. Here, the goal will be to outline a number of recommendations on matters requiring urgent attention in these cases, and to provide a few tools that can be used to analyze the ‘gender needs’ of any given situation.

All three of the missions covered in this study display characteristics of traditional peacekeeping operations, defined by Doyle (1998: 3) as ‘military and civilian deployments ... as a confidence-building measure to monitor a truce between the parties while diplomats strive to negotiate a comprehensive peace or officials attempt to implement an agreed peace’. However, in the case of TIPH, developments in the conflict have severely altered the situation for the mission at the present time. The main discussion in the cases studies concerns the interactions of the interventions both with the local population and with other international actors, such as NGOs. The focus here is not on the success of the missions – which would entail a decrease in military activity by the warring parties – but is rather centred on the gendered aspects of these missions. Mandates, standing operating procedures and codes of conduct will be assessed to ascertain the intended consequences also with regard to gender aspects while all other consequences will be considered unintended. The case studies will examine the experiences and observations on gender of primarily Norwegian and Nordic peacekeepers or observers from the various missions (except in the case of UNMEE, where the study focuses primarily on Irish peacekeepers).³

³ In the case of UNMEE, the researcher was not able to obtain access to the Multinational Standby Force High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations (the SHIRBRIG Brigade) in Denmark. Instead, interviews primarily focused on Irish peacekeepers.
What Dimensions Must Be Considered in Studies of Multinational Conflict Interventions?

The subject of third-party involvement in conflict resolution has recently gained renewed interest in both policy and research, as Chester A. Crocker points out. Crocker establishes a set of tools to bring forth ‘best practice policy’ for interventions by analyzing four areas: (1) actors, (2) instruments and techniques, (3) types of societies, and (4) time of intervention in the conflict cycle. In this introduction, three of the elements in Crocker’s scheme will be used to discuss the different gender aspects that the above can involve. However, his considerations of ‘type of societies’ will be replaced by ‘gender dynamics of the conflict’, as this will be more relevant for this particular study (see Table 1).

Crocker notes that the general context within which interventions take place has changed. In terms of frequency, there has been a clear shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts, though many contemporary intrastate conflicts have a number of features in common with interstate conflicts. Moreover, it has been argued that international interventions in intrastate conflicts stand less chance of success, as such conflicts tend to be very complex. In this study, two intrastate interventions (SFOR and TIPH) and one interstate intervention (UNMEE) have been selected.

As Crocker notes, there are also different instruments and techniques that can be used. Traditional peacekeeping – with which the cases selected here share a number of traits – has taken a predominantly military form and was initially developed to guard border zones between states, not to handle security guarantees by controlling the entire territory of a state. As the operations during the Balkan civil war underline, interventions in an ongoing intrastate conflict require a large operation to halt the war and then a long-term commitment to conflict transformation. To some degree, this can resemble a military occupation, especially when military peacekeeping forces – in combination with civilian partners – remain in and control a country for a substantial period of time.

Table 1: Outline of Peacekeeping Dynamics, Including Gender Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Form of conflict</th>
<th>UNMEE</th>
<th>SFOR</th>
<th>TIPH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender dynamics of conflict</td>
<td>Interstate</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>Violence against women</td>
<td>Increased restriction on women’s mobility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International actors</td>
<td>UN (global)</td>
<td>NATO (regional)</td>
<td>Individual states (multilateral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruments and techniques</td>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping operation (including observers)</td>
<td>Traditional peacekeeping operation</td>
<td>Observer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time of intervention</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Post-agreement</td>
<td>Post-agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Crocker (2001) and further developed by the author.

When analyzing gender aspects of peacekeeping operations, issues of different levels and of competing – and, at times, clashing – cultures should be considered. As mentioned earlier, the mandates of the missions examined in this report are given on different levels. There are then different gender issues on the levels from where the mandate was taken to the decisions taken in theatre. Different cultures interact with gender issues in different ways. For example, troops from some countries do not drink alcohol, which means that those troops do not frequent bars and socialize with local women there.

There is a range of actors involved in conducting international interventions – from global actors (such as the UN) to regional (for example, NATO), multilateral, bilateral and unilateral ac-

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4 See Crocker (2001: 229). Though Crocker does not adopt a gender perspective or openly recognize gender as an aspect of peacekeeping operations in that work, the formulations at times display assumptions of a gender context (see, for example, p. 240, where a lesson to be drawn from the case of Sierra Leone is that a UN mission should be prepared and armed so that it does not appear to ‘tempt the parties to test the authority’s manhood at every opportunity’).


All of these different actors, often consisting of numerous subcomponents, have different sets of gender policies (though some have no gender policies at all), resulting in the potential for different intended and unintended consequences for women. Furthermore, interventions also often include a large number of NGOs and state organizations, which may have different agendas regarding gender. In this report, though, the primary focus is on the military components of interventions.\(^{5}\)

Interventions may also involve a number of different techniques and methods – ranging from diplomatic activities to full-scale military intervention.\(^{6}\) In this report, the focus is again primarily on military aspects. The UNMEE mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia can be characterized as a traditional peacekeeping mission. The mission monitors the border zone between the two countries, ensures the demilitarization of this zone, and assists in demining activities. It also has a mandate to coordinate with the UN’s humanitarian and human rights organizations operating in the demilitarized zone. The SFOR forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, operating under the mandate set out in Annex 1A of the General Framework Agreement that was formulated in Paris in 1995 (generally known as the Dayton Agreement), have primarily military assignments, such as the monitoring of demilitarization and observation and control of internal military parties. Thus, it is primarily a traditional peacekeeping mission, though within the framework of an intrastate conflict. Moreover, ‘within the limits of [SFOR’s] assigned principal tasks and available resources, and on request’,\(^{10}\) the mission is also mandated to assist in elections and the movement of organizations on humanitarian missions, to assist the UNHCR and to protect the civilian population from interference with their movements or threats to their lives and persons.\(^{11}\) TIPH, on the other hand, has a very limited mandate, determined by the warring parties themselves – that is, the PLO and the Israeli government – even if the establishment of the operation was not only outlined in peace accords aimed at settling the conflict between the two sides but also called for by UN Security Council Resolution 904 (1994). The mandate is primarily focused on observation and reporting of events. The mission has no military capabilities and no mandate to intervene in hostilities. Outside of their reporting, TIPH staff are also mandated to assist in projects conducted by the donor countries, as well as to encourage economic development and growth in Hebron.

The point within the conflict cycle at which the various missions intervene varies from case to case. UNMEE was the result of an agreement to end hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in June 2000, and the mission was partly launched while negotiations for a permanent, comprehensive peace treaty between the two countries were still in progress. (The final treaty was signed in December 2000.) SFOR’s mandate came out of the Dayton Agreement – that is, as a result of a comprehensive peace agreement. For its part, TIPH was first established in 1994. However, when the two warring sides were unable to agree on whether its term should be extended, it was dismissed, only to be re-established once again in 1995. The mission was formed as a result of the partial peace agreement between the PLO and the Israeli government, and has suffered seriously from recent events, which have seen a resumption of the conflict.

**UN Policies: Gender and Peacekeeping**

The UN Charter declares that discrimination on the basis of gender, race or creed is not permitted. Specifically referring to gender, one of the most basic conventions formulated and upheld through the UN system is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which sets the goal of complete gender equality. In order to achieve this, all gender relations in all areas are targeted. CEDAW claims that it is vital to change tradi-

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7 In the cases examined here, the UNMEE mission is a classical UN mission, while SFOR is part of the larger UN-guaranteed mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina but under regional control – that is, NATO control. And the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) is a multilateral operation involving six European countries, while operational control of TIPH has rotated among the contributing states (which include Norway).

8 For an extended discussion on NGOs role in peacemaking, see Aall (2001).

9 For a more detailed description of different examples of interventions, see Crocker (2001), pp.233ff.

10 General framework Agreement, Annex 1A, Article VI, paragraph 3.

11 Ibid.
tional feminine and masculine roles to effectively remove all forms of gender discrimination. The convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1979 and became an international treaty in September 1981, when it had been ratified by 20 countries. By 2003, 179 countries had ratified the convention, some with limitations of their commitments, and an additional three had signed but not ratified. Two of the last countries to sign and ratify are East Timor and Afghanistan. Afghanistan had signed the agreement in 1981, but failed to ratify it until 2003, after the arrival of the peacekeeping mission in that country.

CEDAW defines discrimination against women as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women irrespective of their marital status, on the basis of equality between men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.

Connecting the issue of equality to, for example, issues of peace and security, the convention specifies a number of measures in areas such as economics, law, politics and culture through which state signatories are to improve the situation for women. Constitutions and legislation should be based on the equality of men and women before the law, political representation and the right to vote should be ensured, and women and men should have equal opportunities to represent their governments at the international level. Women and men should have equal opportunities for education and are entitled to equal employment opportunities and social security. In addition to ensuring that women have the same rights as men in the public sphere, by specifying that conventions previously formulated in this field are also applicable to women, CEDAW also incorporates the issue of marriage and maternity not previously covered in, for example, human rights declarations. This area is central in removing discrimination against women, since maternity aspects concern both rights to work and economic opportunities. The convention also underlines that both men and women are equally responsible for family and home life. Without a change in these roles, equality can never be achieved. With regard to marriage, for example, the custom by which a wife might automatically take the nationality of her husband and lose her previous nationality is considered discriminatory. The state parties to the convention are obliged to submit a report at least every fourth year in which they describe what they have done to remove discrimination.

The UN has also framed the issue of equality within the context of peace and security, claiming that the full and effective promotion of women’s rights can best occur in conditions of international peace and security where relations among States are based on the respect for the legitimate rights of all nations, great and small, and peoples to self-determination, independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the and the right to live in peace within their national borders. (United Nations, 1985: para. 13)

However, given that a ‘positive’ definition of peace appears to be used, what this entails appears at times to be almost self-fulfilling. For example, in the same document it is claimed that peace includes not only the absence of war, violence and hostilities at the national and international levels but also the enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality and the entire range of human rights and fundamental freedoms within society (para. 13).

Thus, it is claimed that peace cannot be ‘realized under conditions of sexual inequality’, but ‘peace is promoted by equality of the sexes’ (para. 13). This appears obvious, as equality is a component of peace, but what is not specified is whether this is related to a more negative definition of peace, that is, just the absence of war. It is possible that a distinction is made between international peace and the general discussion of what peace includes: issues such as armed conflict, arms race and occupation are discussed under the section on peace. Here, however, the focus is again on breaches of the peace as a factor that can negatively affect the situation of women situation (United Nations, 1985: paras 232, 236). It is also claimed that a durable peace cannot be achieved ‘without the full and equal participation of women in international relations’ (United Nations, 1985: para. 13).
Nations, 1985: para. 235). In relation to this study, however, what is more important is that a UN document also points out that since women constitute a group which is among the most vulnerable during an armed conflict, this vulnerability needs to be particularly considered – particularly if the established objective of equality is to be achieved (United Nations, 1985: para. 243).

The present debate on gender and peacekeeping has its roots in developments leading up to the UN Decade for Women (1975–85) and the UN’s Third World Conference on Women, which was held in Nairobi in 1985. At that conference, the issue of women’s participation in the creation of peace was clearly emphasized. Later, the importance of gender for peacekeeping operations was expressed even more clearly in 1995 at the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and this conclusion was further supported by the Economic and Social Council’s decision in 1997 on gender mainstreaming (Gierycz, 2001). Furthermore, in 1999–2000 the Lessons Learned Unit of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) conducted a study of gender and peacekeeping. This reflects a new objective, one calling for gender analysis and the placing of gender in the mainstream of peacekeeping policy – in other words, adding gender aspects to the agenda of peacekeeping operations in order to contribute to the creation of peace. Although much debated, the goal of gender equality has been furthered as an international norm, one to be implemented in the work of UN operations (ChallengesProject, 2002: 132). When the gender equality norm is reinforced, this has an effect on the mandate of an intervention.

With regard to unintended consequences, one argument for conducting a gender analysis of conflict interventions is that, even if a mission’s mandate does not specifically mention equality or gender, comprehensive mandates will still affect gender relations merely through how the mandates of operations are implemented. This has consequences for gender relations in a host society (Gierycz, 2001). The UN Security Council has, for example, responded by specifically recognizing peace efforts by women’s organizations – for example, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. However, the UN has been criticized for not seriously conducting gender mainstreaming of its missions, which has resulting in many gender issues being ignored.

As we now move to discuss the cases, these general observations about norms and actual consequences will be discussed in more detail regarding UNMEE, SFOR and TIPH. These cases display interesting variations regarding gender consequences, both intended and unintended.

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12 The definition of peace as being more than simply the absence of war was also discussed in this setting. See Gierycz (2001), along the lines of Galtung’s (1969) positive peace.

13 That was also underlined in the conference report, ‘The Beijing Declaration and Plan of Action’; see in particular section 134 and Strategic Objective E3 in United Nations (1995).

14 The main results are summarized in United Nations (2000).

15 See, for example, the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action and UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) in the appendices to this report.

16 This can also be seen in many other related areas, such as development aid and human rights, where the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of Women is being emphasized more and more often.

17 Naturally, the form mandates for peacekeeping operations take does not only depend on the wishes of the UN Security Council. A mandate is often based on a peace agreement that the subsequent mission is to uphold or implement, negotiated by the warring parties with contributions from other local and/or external contributors; see, for example, Wallensteen (2002). The gender balancing and gender mainstreaming of these developments have therefore been considered monumental by those working for gender mainstreaming of peace processes and was included in the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). On this debate, see, for example, Lithander (2000), Gierycz (2001), Karam (2001), Rehn & Sirleaf (2002) and United Nations (2002).


19 See Barth, Hostens & Skjelsbæk (2003) and Kvinna till Kvinna’s (2001) analysis of the UNMIK mission in Kosovo.
References


Chapter 2

The United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia: Gender(ed) Effects

ELISE BARTH

Introduction

PROSTITUTION AND PEACE OPERATIONS seem to go hand in hand.¹ In Eritrea, a country of about 3 million people in the Horn of Africa, the most recent war against Ethiopia (1998–2000) led to the establishment of a UN intervention, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE). Since the end of 2000, 4,200 UN troops, observers and other UN staff have been based in Eritrea. This is a most unusual situation because hardly any foreigners were visible in the country before UNMEE’s arrival. Since then, UN personnel can be observed in restaurants and bars in Asmara together with Eritrean girls. Both men and women in UNMEE see this as soldiers having local girlfriends, something that is ‘not forbidden by their culture’,² and no one uses the word prostitution to describe the phenomenon. So, is what we are seeing prostitution, a destructive consequence of a military intervention, or has UNMEE created unique opportunities for some Eritrean women?

The present chapter will focus on gender aspects related to the presence of UNMEE in Eritrea. UNMEE is based on Eritrean soil, and this study covers only the effects of UNMEE within that country. The chapter is based on interviews with both male and female UNMEE peacekeeping staff, including two interviews (one in Oslo, the other in Asmara) with Special Representative for the Secretary-General and Head of Mission (SRSG) Legweila Joseph Legweila. The chapter also draws on conversations with a number of Eritrean men and women. In addition, it is based on documents, reports, newspapers and other written sources on relevant topics. The chapter aims first to give a picture of the conflict and the mandate of UNMEE, before going into details in relation to gender aspects. UNMEE has in some respects turned Eritrea upside down. Before UNMEE, there were hardly any tourists in the country, other than numerous diaspora Eritreans coming back to visit. These, and especially their children, often caused indignation. Their behaviour differs from that of local Eritrean youths. They have a lot of money to spend in restaurants, and they talk and laugh loudly in public.³ Little foreign investment has taken place in Eritrea, almost no foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have had a presence there, and in media terms the country has been

¹ The number of women working as prostitutes in Cambodia grew from 6,000 in 1992 to more than 25,000 in 1994 as a result of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).¹ Similar figures, if not quite as spectacular, are not unusual when peace operations and the numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that follow in their wake enter a war-torn country.
² Interview with male Irish soldier, Asmara, October 2002. When Irish soldiers comment in this manner, they mean in contrast with, for example, the Lebanese soldiers.
³ Some teachers in Asmara repeatedly told me how seeing these young people and their carefree ways was offensive to them. The clash between traditional ways of behaviour and the more ‘modern’ ways of young people coming from Europe or the USA can also be observed in tourist shops in Asmara.
pretty much isolated. Consequently, the arrival of UNMEE was an unfamiliar encounter with the outside world.

The government of Eritrea, which has become more and more totalitarian and has little tolerance for opposition, does what it can to protect the people from foreign influence. It follows a familiar path, often called the ‘crisis of the postcolonial African state’.\(^4\) The president justifies increasingly tighter government control by reminding the public of the vulnerability of Eritrea. As the pressure on traditional Eritrean values and ways of life increases, what will happen? And in what ways are Eritrean men and women affected differently by the presence of UNMEE? This chapter aims to analyse gender relations both within UNMEE and between UNMEE and the Eritrean people.

**Background to the Conflict**

Eritrea was an Italian colony from around 1890, until the British took over in 1941 as a result of the Italian defeat in World War II. During the last phase of Italian control, 50,000 Italian labourers prepared for the arrival and accommodation of more than 300,000 Italian troops. This last period under Italian rule turned the area upside down, creating a region with an identity that differed from that of ‘Greater Ethiopia’. The colony was transformed into a commercial and industrial centre, changing Eritrea forever. A huge indigenous wage labour market was created, which further separated the inhabitants from their Ethiopian neighbours (Tronvoll 1998: 40).

In 1952, after the British pulled out of Eritrea, the UN linked Eritrea to Ethiopia. Ten years later, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was founded. This was the beginning of a 30-year-long war of independence. In 1970, a small faction broke away from the ELF and was established in 1975 as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). These two liberation armies were in serious opposition to each other, and in 1982 the ELF was forced to leave Eritrea. The EPLF succeeded in forcing the Ethiopians out of Eritrea on 24 May 1991. Two years later, Eritrea was declared an independent sovereign state (Iyob, 1995).

The very high proportion of female fighters in the Eritrean conflict was among the factors that led to an increase in groups expressing interest in and solidarity with the Eritrean revolution in Europe and the USA. EPLF-established student groups – especially in Scandinavia and other countries in Europe – took the struggle of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to their hearts. Norwegian women and men visited Eritrea to learn about the EPLF and to support an independent Eritrea. Indeed, Christopher Clapham describes the EPLF as one of the most successfully organized insurgencies ever (Clapham 1998: 13). Because of the organization’s proficiency, expectations were high when the EPLF took over the government.

Since 1993, both Eritrea and Ethiopia have been ruled by the two guerrilla movements that fought together to reach government positions. The relationship between the two started cordially, as both governments promoted open borders and the possibility of future economic integration. Under such circumstances, neither country appeared particularly concerned about delineating formal boundaries. However, after relations grew strained in the mid-1990s over a range of economic and political issues, the precise location of the border became a pretext for renewed conflict. From the outset, many Ethiopians called for the recapture of Eritrea or, failing that, the seizure of its southernmost port, Assab.\(^5\) Full-scale fighting broke out in May–June 1998, with heavily armed forces of more than a quarter of a million men and women on each side fighting for more than two years until June 2000. Nevertheless, the war failed to make headlines in newspapers around the world:

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With more than half a million troops deployed along the disputed border and tens of thousands of casualties in fighting so far this year, the Ethiopia–Eritrea war is the world’s biggest war – although most of the world doesn’t seem to have noticed.6

Indeed, despite its size and the efforts of publications like the renowned journal quoted above to draw attention to it, the international community showed little interest in the war. The official Eritrean estimate of Eritrean soldiers killed in the war stands at 19,000, though the Ethiopian side considers this a ridiculously low number. Altogether, some 100,000 soldiers are estimated to have been killed in the war, and hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced. Not until Martyr’s Day (20 June) 2003, three years after the fighting stopped, were Eritrean families notified by the authorities of the deaths of sons and daughters who had been involved in the fighting. Until then, families that had not heard from their children for a long time assumed that they were dead, though they could not know for sure.7 The long-awaited message made a deep impression on the Eritrean society. Almost all families were affected, with some losing one and others losing many of their closest members.

Establishing UNMEE

Following the signing of the cessation of hostilities agreement on 18 June 2000, the UN Security Council (UNSC) voted through Resolution 1312 on 31 July 2000 for the establishment of UNMEE as a multinational peacekeeping force stationed between Eritrea and Ethiopia. A second resolution, Resolution 1320, was passed by the Council on 15 September 2000, calling for a peacekeeping force of 4,200 troops, including 220 military observers.8

The UN also set up a 1,000-kilometre-long and 25-kilometre-wide Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between Eritrea and Ethiopia to separate their armed forces. The TSZ is located on Eritrean territory all along the border to Ethiopia and is monitored closely by the UN. It is divided into three parts: the Western Sector, the Central Sector and Sector East. The UN has troops based in all three sectors.

Structure of UNMEE

There are five categories of people in UNMEE. First are the civilian international staff, which are partly stationed in New York. Then, there are two categories of military personnel: the observers (220 altogether) and the armed soldiers (almost 4,000). The fourth group is locally employed staff (260 civilians). And UNMEE also includes 236 international civilians. As of 25 August 2002, as many as 45 countries were contributing to UNMEE. It was not possible to find out exactly how many women were working for UNMEE when I visited the operation in October–November 2002.

Most of the contributing countries had only a few military observers or staff officers in UNMEE, while others contributed with troops. At that particular point in time, UNMEE had three battalions – the Indian, Jordanian and Kenyan battalions – stationed respectively in the Central Sector, Sector West and Sector East. The Indian Battalion is the largest, with 1,520 soldiers. In addition, there are troops from Ireland, Bangladesh, Italy and the Slovak Republic. Norway has contributed five military observers to UNMEE, Sweden six and Denmark four. Denmark also contributed troops when UNMEE was first established.

The Irish contingent in UNMEE was of particular interest for this writer because it included several women. Other countries had few or none at all. The Irish contingent consisted of 220 persons, 17 of them women, though none of these were officers. There were 24 male officers. This was the second Irish contingent to take part in UNMEE, and a third one followed later. Each contingent stayed for six months. The first Irish contingent had a few male officers and no female

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6 See ‘World-Class War’, Africa Confidential, 30 April 1999.
7 Interview with teacher, Asmara, October 2002.
soldiers; with the second, it was the other way around. The Irish contingent has had responsibility for the security of the headquarters building in Asmara, as well as for other security operations, all in the capital.

**Mandate**

UNMEE is both a military and a civilian peacekeeping operation. According to UNSC Resolution 1320, UNMEE has the following mandate:

- Monitor the cessation of hostilities.
- Assist in ensuring the observance of the security commitments agreed by the parties.
- Monitor and verify the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from positions taken after 6 February 1999, which were not under Ethiopian administration before 6 May 1998.
- Monitor the positions of Ethiopian forces once redeployed.
- Simultaneously, monitor the positions of Eritrean forces that are to redeploy in order to remain at a distance of 25 kilometres from positions to which Ethiopian forces shall redeploy.
- Monitor the temporary security zone (TSZ) to assist in ensuring compliance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
- Chair the Military Coordination Commission (MCC) to be established by the United Nations and OAU in accordance with the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities.
- Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine-action activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it.
- Coordinate the mission’s activities in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it with humanitarian rights activities of the United Nations and other organizations in those areas.

This means surveying the TSZ and the zone to the south where the Ethiopian forces are stationed. Only militia and the police are allowed within the zone itself, not military personnel. UNMEE observers are to check on weapons allowed within the TSZ. Heavy weapons are not permitted. Large movements by the militia – that is, more than 20 men – is not acceptable. The police, not the militia, are allowed to set up checkpoints.

Through Resolution 1430 of 14 August 2002, the UNSC adjusted the mandate for UNMEE to include assisting in the demarcation of the border. UNMEE’s mandate was then to be extended for six months at a time.

**Border Demarcation**

The unclear position of the border between the two countries was a central issue in the last war. On 13 April 2002, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission in The Hague issued its verdict on where the border is correctly located. To their own populations, the governments of both countries argued that the verdict had fallen in their favour, and that the other party had lost the case. Victory was celebrated in both countries. Rather being than an objective success, it appears that both governments used the occasion of the verdict to convince their own people of their abilities as leaders. Before the decision was made, both parties agreed that they would accept the final decision.

The border between Eritrea and Ethiopia has never before been marked on the ground, and with its extended mandate UNMEE will be involved in the demarcation that is to be carried out. Before this can be done, landmines will have to be removed. Thousands of mines were laid during the two-year war, in addition to the mines left from the long war of independence. Ethiopians living in the now-symbolic town of Badme – which is currently administered by Ethiopia, but falls inside Eritrea according to the independent boundary commission – have declared that they will fight rather than allow the town to become Eritrean.

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Tensions increased as the time of demarcation approached. After several delays, the process of demarcation was finally supposed to begin in October 2003. However, demarcation has now been delayed indefinitely. Ethiopia has refused to accept that Badme village is not within its territory.

Relations Between UNMEE and the Host Community

As with many other similar interventions, there was great optimism in Eritrea when UNMEE arrived. Gradually this optimism turned to disillusionment. The Eritreans felt that UNMEE did not set things right. For example, it could do nothing to improve relations with Ethiopia, which were at the core of the conflict. The Eritrean people have grown more and more dissatisfied with their overall situation. The economy is bad, and there is no development. Expectations for UNMEE proved too high, and Eritreans now voice their disappointment in UNMEE. Many UNMEE people report that they are not popular in Eritrea. The SRSG, Legweila, claims that even though UNMEE has been successful, there will always be criticism towards a peacekeeping operation, and little can be done about this. This observation is partly correct: UNMEE soldiers are criticized for just being in Eritrea. But they are also criticized for going out with Eritrean women.

This point is important to focus on and to analyze.

The length of UNMEE’s stay is important for how great its impact will be on Eritrea. During the first period of UNMEE, Eritreans did not believe that the mission would stay as long as it has. Today the situation is that UNMEE cannot leave until the demarcation of the border has been completed. At the time of writing this report, December 2003, demarcation looks as far away as ever, which means that UNMEE will remain in Eritrea for quite some time still.

The war devastated Eritrea’s already impoverished economy. In a population of about 3,000,000 people, as many as 1,000,000 are still internally displaced as a result of the last war. These people are living in camps around the border areas. They cannot return to their earlier homes because of various problems: landmines, destroyed dwellings or dwellings that are inaccessible owing to the border changes.

For some Eritreans, the arrival of UNMEE offered new opportunities. For example, foreign NGOs entering in the wake of UNMEE – like the demining organizations – have created work opportunities for inhabitants who otherwise would not have had a job opportunity. Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea have largely been deported to Ethiopia. However, many still remain, trying to survive without any rights. They belong to the enemy nation, and they clearly face a difficult existence in Eritrea. Some Ethiopians who could speak English were employed by mine action organizations. Unfortunately, in August 2002 the Eritrean government told the international mine organizations – except for British Halo Trust and Ronco, a private contractor with the US State Department – to leave the country. In June 2003, the two remaining organizations were also asked to leave.

Two groups of Eritreans in particular have had close contact with UNMEE: first, Eritrean women with UNMEE boyfriends; second, the many maids who work for UNMEE staff of higher rank who have their own apartments (though this group is to a large degree invisible). It is probable that some of the maids are also Ethiopians.

Sex Scandals

There have been a number of sex scandals related to UNMEE. In autumn 2001, three Danish soldiers were charged with having sex with a 13-year-old Eritrean girl. There was considerable focus on this episode in Scandinavian newspapers and on the Internet. Because the episode involved such a young girl, it was clearly a grave offence, and the soldiers were sent home. A few

10 UNMEE soldiers are criticized for everything they do: they are greedy, they do not care about Eritrea, they do not think that Eritreans have a beautiful culture, and so on.

11 No proper population survey has been carried out – neither before nor after independence. The Eritrean Statistics Office (NSO) roughly estimates the population size as between 2.5 and 3.5 million (Tronvoll, 1998).

12 See, for example, ‘Sexanklager mot FN-soldater’ [Sex Accusations Against UN Soldiers], Aftenposten, 25 August 2001.
months later, another scandal, now involving an Italian soldier, was publicized. This time, the two episodes together were described as threatening the entire operation, and the Eritrean community reacted strongly. On the Internet site www.asmarino.com, diaspora Eritreans accused UNMEE of trying to destroy their country by ‘bringing their sick nature with them’. On both occasions, the events behind the scandals had taken place in the port city of Massawa and had been filmed.

A third sex scandal occurred in December 2002 (Byrne, 2002). This time, an Irish soldier was caught making pornographic videos of Eritrean women. He was returned to Ireland to be dismissed by the Irish Army after serving a sentence of 16 days’ detention by a UN court. An Eritrean government spokesman said: ‘These people call themselves peacekeepers, when in fact all they want is a long holiday and a chance to fool around with our women. They did not respect our country, our culture or our people’. The main woman involved, a 22-year-old Eritrean, was sentenced to two years in jail. She was the girlfriend of the soldier and claimed that he had promised to marry her and take her to Ireland. Since then, several women alleged to be prostitutes have been arrested.

In June 2003, Reuters reported that Irish military police were investigating allegations that Irish peacekeepers used prostitutes who were as young as 15 while serving in UNMEE. The allegations, made in a confidential report by UNMEE, related to seven men who had served in Asmara six months earlier. The report contains the testimony of several Eritrean women that claim the men paid them for sex. Four Irish military police were in Asmara to investigate the case: ‘We are considering these allegations to be very serious, particularly if it’s shown to have been a 15-year-old woman,’ said Irish army spokesman Kieran McDaid. ‘It’s not acceptable, our troops are in a position of trust’.

**Girlfriends or Prostitutes?**

Is it just paying the women that is not allowed? It seems that a lot of double communication is taking place. On one hand, small buckets of condoms are located in all toilets in UNMEE headquarters. This is eye-catching and sends out signals that even if sex between persons who frequent the HQ or between them and other people is not encouraged, it is still unavoidable. At the same time, Reuters reports that investigations are taking place into allegations that Irish peacekeepers paid Eritrean women for sex.

The UN reacts strongly when soldiers are accused of breaking the law by, for example, having sex with underage girls. Making pornographic movies is also considered to be unacceptable behaviour. The UN takes such accusations seriously and investigates allegations that such events have taken place. The SRSG and Head of Mission Legwaila says that UNMEE has been eager to respect the laws, traditions and customs of the host country, and that all UN peacekeepers are bound by their code of conduct: ‘They should not indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population, especially women and children’. However, – what is prostitution and what is not? What does it mean that the soldiers are bound by their code of conduct? And what are immoral acts?

When observing the relationship between Eritrean girls and UNMEE personnel, it is reasonable to conclude that one consequence of UNMEE has been the creation of a greatly increased market for prostitution in Eritrea. Prostitution existed before the days of UNMEE, but not on any large scale. Now, a new group of young girls has entered the business. Spending a few days in Asmara, it is easy to observe exchanges between Eritrean girls and UNMEE soldiers. Girls openly pose and look around for opportunities to meet.

The situation in Eritrea appears to be a classical one in a war-torn society: a large group of soldiers, almost all of them male, socializing in a very poor community. The consequences of this are not easily countered. The government in Eritrea tries hard to confront what it sees as an un-

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14 According to several Eritreans, prostitution existed previously in Eritrea, but only a few engaged in it. Usually, it has been blamed on Ethiopians living in Eritrea.
fortunate development, seemingly to no avail. On TV, parents are encouraged to take better care of their children. In addition, the authorities have forcibly taken girls they pick up to carry out their military service at Sawa. However, after such incidents, the same or new girls are soon back in place.

The Irish women accept that their many male colleagues like to spend time with their local girlfriends: ‘Boys will be boys. At first we thought that they shouldn’t do it – some are married at home, they will have trouble when they return – but now we don’t discuss it. It’s their own business and choice’. The Irish women felt that the Eritrean girls (they are all young) did not like the female soldiers, as they were perceived as competitors: ‘The Eritrean girls are jealous of us and they see us as competitors. They don’t want us here because they want the men to themselves’.15 This particular gender dimension is prevalent in the capital – especially among soldiers who drink alcohol – where many Eritrean girls dress up and go to discos and bars.

The attitude of the Irish men is that as they are very outgoing, they like to get to know girls from Eritrea. They also want to help them economically. ‘A lot of us feel sorry for the local people.... Since time immemorial there are two things that have gone hand in hand: local women and soldiers. That happens everywhere. That’s the human animal. You can only to a certain extent control what a man does in his private time, but you can safeguard and give him information about how to protect himself.’16

However, what is prostitution and what is not? The fact that the soldiers have local girlfriends is not seen as prostitution, a term that was not used by any of the soldiers (men or women) interviewed. Clearly the position of UNMEE soldiers and local Eritreans are far from equal. Compared to the Eritreans, the soldiers are rich. And they do not understand the desperate situation many Eritreans are in. By having girlfriends and paying them now and then, they feel that they are helping them. The soldiers who spend time with local women see themselves as doing something beneficial. They believe themselves kind and generous, a self-perception that no doubt is reinforced by the Eritrean girls.

Eritrean informants told me that certain building complexes in the capital have apartments that UNMEE soldiers pay for and in which Eritrean girls live. UNMEE staff pays, and the girls live as prostitutes. It is not possible to confirm stories like these, however. Many Eritreans say that they know of girls who prostitute themselves because they hope to achieve a better future through the UNMEE soldier. The exact extent of prostitution in Eritrea as a result of UNMEE is not possible to ascertain at the current time. However, there are many factors present that contribute to increased prostitution.

In Asmara and in other towns like Massawa, UNMEE’s relations to the local population are different from those in the TSZ along the border, which is more rural. Urban settings spark off situations that rural ones do not. In rural areas, whatever people do is more visible and will be reported to the extended family. In Asmara, young Eritrean women are seen in restaurants and bars together with UNMEE boyfriends. In Massawa, by the Red Sea, this is also the case. Clearly, there are more opportunities for relationships in an urban setting than in a rural one. The Irish commander says:

I would prefer if we were not here in Asmara. Here, the females are readily available. You can see the changing atmosphere within the five months that we have been here in Asmara. This cloud over the city, locals are drinking more. Some get very aggressive and take out their aggressiveness. We have had a few incidents, but the others are mostly minor. The attitude towards UNMEE has changed. I think that they resent that the soldiers have money. They also resent that they are together with the local females. Especially when they drink. Then it causes friction.

It is not the UN peacekeepers alone that create prostitution in Eritrea. The economic problems and the lack of rights all contribute to what is overall a very difficult situation for many Eritreans. The girls themselves – and their families – know how limited the options for a better life are.

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15 Six women from the Irish contingent were interviewed; the comments quoted here were made during an interview with one of them, Asmara, October 2002.
16 Interview with male Irish soldier, Asmara, October 2002.
UNMEE represents an opportunity. The odds for a girl to actually succeed in achieving her goal of going abroad – which is the explicit hope of many of these girls – are very small. Today, it is extremely difficult for Eritreans to move away from the country.

In Eritrea today, a country so coloured by poverty – it appears that going out with UNMEE soldiers is a sensible thing to do for the girls, who manoeuvre themselves or are manoeuvred by others into this situation. It is easy to see that the women who associate with UNMEE staff can earn sums of money that significantly exceed what others are able to earn. For a person coming from the West, prices in Eritrea are extremely low.

It is difficult to analyze this relation between UNMEE and Eritrean women. Certainly, viewing what is happening from the perspective of gender-related violence confuses rather than increases our understanding of what is going on. Clearly, the women who are girlfriends of UNMEE soldiers are not the most poor people in Eritrea, though there are also more desperate women circling around certain hotels at night. This leads to a perception in which these women are seen more as agents of their own destiny than victims. We are used to feeling sorry for women who have sexual relations with men in exchange for money. Perhaps we are unable or unwilling to accept that local women who have relations with foreign soldiers can be anything but victims.

Local men may perceive the situation as threatening. This has been exemplified on a number of occasions when UNMEE soldiers have been beaten up. Young Eritrean men experience a loss of status in comparison to UNMEE soldiers. The women that are in close contact with UNMEE have access to resources that no other Eritreans have. Everyone had difficulties finding paid work prior to UNMEE, but this was especially true for women. Since the arrival of UNMEE, it has been possible for some Eritrean women to become the girlfriends of UNMEE personnel, while others have been able to find work as maids with them. Clearly, UNMEE has opened up opportunities. These opportunities are gendered, in that they can only be filled by the correct gender.

What will happen when the UN soldiers go home? Is it inevitable that large groups of girls will be marginalized? Are there other options? The question of prostitution is perhaps the one important question to be aware of when a peacekeeping operation arrives in a new area.

**Influence on UNMEE Soldiers**

In discussing the length of stay of Irish troops, the commander of the Irish contingent in UNMEE commented:

> We only deploy troops for six months because from a social and domestic perspective we think that six months is enough.

However, perhaps six months away from home is too long for many soldiers. Or perhaps they could save up their time off and travel home a couple of times during the six months instead of having lots of time off regularly. Maintaining their ties with the home country, with families and values at home, would possibly make it easier to stay away from temptation while serving in a foreign country.

Some men make their sexual debut while on a mission like UNMEE. One man employed by the Norwegian defence forces explained in a newspaper article how he was talked into buying sex from local women by his closest superior while working in a peacekeeping mission abroad.\(^\text{17}\) He was then 23 years old. Furthermore, he claimed that 90% of his fellow soldiers bought sex regularly while on this mission. The attitudes of the others towards buying sex convinced him that it was OK, and now he still buys sex back home, a few years later. He learned this attitude towards sex while he was in his formative years and susceptible to the influence of others. When confronted with the episode above, the Norwegian defence force claimed that it did not permit soldiers to buy sex while on a mission, and that such behaviour was considered grounds for being sent home.

However, how can anybody know whether a soldier pays a local woman for sex? Clearly, a rule that prohibits such behaviour faces serious obstacles. Several UNMEE soldiers told me that there

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17 ‘Ble Sexkunde på Fredsoppdrag’ [Became Sex Customer While on Peace Assignment], *Dagsavisen*, 13 February 2003,
is no way that UNMEE can decide what the soldiers do in their free time. Even though they are serving as part of a mission, they are allowed to go out and to socialize with the local population. As long as UNMEE allows social contact with locals, there is no possibility for control. The soldiers and the women cooperate – they have mutual interests – and neither is going to reveal that sexual relations may also involve financial transactions. Who can or will reveal such activity when the parties involved will not? Is it possible that criminalizing prostitution will lead to even more secrecy and to a sector that is even more invisible than is the case already today? It is important to focus on such questions, even though they cannot easily be answered.

**Female Servants**

An example of a gendered relation that is not (necessarily) sexual is the case of the UNMEE observer who lives in his own apartment and has an Eritrean maid. The maid may have had a similar job before the time of UNMEE, working as a maid for somebody else, but most likely UNMEE has brought about new prospects for a well-paid job. Some employers offer better conditions than others. UNMEE officers or observers have salaries that are much higher than those of Eritrean wage-earners.

It has been known for friendships to develop, and a maid in this situation can gain advantages that are denied most Eritrean people. For example, she can ask for an invitation to the country the man comes from. It has become extremely difficult for Eritreans to leave Eritrea. Both receiving a permit from the government to leave and obtaining the necessary permits to enter another country are much more difficult now than before 11 September 2001, partly because the tightened security situation. For most people, such travel is impossible. An invitation from a citizen of a foreign country can help an Eritrean to get into Europe or the USA, though it might not always help with getting out of Eritrea.18

The giving of presents – such as unusual equipment for the kitchen – is also a way in which an employer might show his appreciation of the work of a dutiful maid. These are human relationships – between men who have lots of material resources and women who have much less. Most (or all) of these relationships are reasonable, and both parties gain from them. Statistics about the number of Eritrean maids employed by UNMEE soldiers are not available. However, there is little doubt that the sector is large.19 Thus, UNMEE represents unique mobility opportunities for women. However, the temporary nature of an intervention such as UNMEE in Eritrea means that these women are unable to do any long-term planning. We can only wonder whether or not this mobility represents a threat to traditional Eritrean values.

**Female Soldiers in UNMEE**

One criticism made of the Brahimi Report was that it did not pay enough attention to the ways in which a peacekeeping operation influences local conditions and how peace operations ought to pay more attention to areas outside of their headquarters and specifically address the needs of local people (Zittel, 2002: 502). CIMIC, the civil–military cooperation unit within UNMEE, operates in coordination with the civilian population. CIMIC’s purpose is to facilitate the interaction between civilian aid agencies and the military component of a mission. Within CIMIC, so-called quick impact projects (QIPs) are defined as small-scale programmes provided at short notice and aimed at relieving human suffering caused by the effects of war. A QIP is limited in terms of time and budget, normally lasting for three months and with a maximum budget of $15,000. Problems such as a lack of adequate water systems and latrines as a result of war damage can often be helped by such actions. Through funds set aside in order for the mission to be able to solve immediate problems in the field, UNMEE has directly acted upon the experiences of earlier missions.

18 Interview with a representative at the Norwegian embassy in Asmara.
19 All families this author visited in Asmara have maids, many more than one. Even if UNMEE soldiers living in flats go to restaurants to eat, they will be thought to need a maid to keep their flat clean.
In Senafe, a town located within the TSZ in the Central Section, UNMEE is trying to help the inhabitants through a few QIPs. An UNMEE team is based here at the Cimic House. On this team, there is a woman soldier from Kenya, the sole woman among the personnel stationed there. She reported that being the only woman was no problem. She enjoyed her job, which was to assist the locals with their problems – for example, at the time of my interview there was no water available – and she did what she could. She felt that her experiences as a woman in a peacekeeping operation was important not only for herself, but also for the people that she met, dealt with and sometimes was able to help. She expressed the view that it is good for women to be in the army because ‘it prepares you for anything’. Women gain from this experience. She said that she was not afraid of going to Sierra Leone, for example, or to any other place where there might be a peace operation. She said that she felt strong and up to whatever the situation should demand of her.

This soldier is of great value to the military that she happens to be in. Through such women, an operation like UNMEE is better equipped to communicate with local women and thus gain access to information. In addition to the UNMEE team in Cimic House, the Indian battalion is also stationed in the Central Section of the Security Zone. At the time of my visit in November 2002, all of the personnel of this battalion were male, with the exception of a female dentist. A representative from the International Red Cross Organization (ICRC) complained that many women in the area did not get adequate help because of a lack of female translators. There were, she explained, not enough women professionals. Women could not benefit adequately from the provision of professional services such as medical consultations when they were provided only by men.

Another UNMEE woman, a major from Ghana, was stationed on the other side of the border. She explained to me that there was a purpose for women in the field: ‘women soldiers can reach local women. There are many things that the women cannot go to a man with. Also children and especially girls can approach a woman soldier in a different way than a male one’.

This woman had been part of several peace operations before UNMEE. In one of her former missions, Rwanda in 1995, she was able to care for a child, a girl, who had just been orphaned. In her opinion, she was able to help the child because she was a woman, and she insists that it was crucial that there were women in that particular mission. There are many similar situations in the field where women are important for how a mission functions, she said.

The Ghanaian major felt that because men and women were different, it was important that both genders were present in missions in the field because soldiers must deal with the whole population: ‘Women and men complement each other in the field. Including both makes the whole mission more operational’. In her opinion, there were far too many barriers to women’s involvement in the army: ‘They shouldn’t put unnecessary impediments on women’s participation. A woman has to prove herself three times over. This puts a lot of women off. Instead women ought to be encouraged. Because even for the system, it is good to include women.’

In this, the major was in agreement with the commander of the Irish contingent of UNMEE. According to him, women made a big contribution within the organization. In UNMEE, he explained, the Irish personnel did not come in contact with people through their daily work because their work was securing buildings. They were posted inside such buildings, where – according to many – they had nothing to do and where nothing was happening. But in Lebanon and other places there was much more contact with the local population. He then continued:

Women are important in the mission. They are good soldiers and well trained. Their training is the same as their male counterparts. They have all qualifications; they have every right to be here. They operate very well with their male counterparts. The platoons or sections they work in normally perform to a higher level than if there were no women. That is my experience. Before we came down here we did a lot of preparational exercises. Then I saw that the platoons that have females in them perform to a higher level than all male counterparts.

The commander suggested that most of his colleagues would agree that women raised the level of performance within their sections. This was his general experience.

Then the women do very well out here [In UNMEE] as well. Some of them are already way ahead of their male counterparts. There is competition, a selection process, an as-
assessment where they are selected on merit. There’s a physical side to it and then there’s an academic side to it. The academic side is knowledge of the military and so on. This is very valuable experience.

He explained that no one is selected for advancement back home unless they have served overseas in an operation like UNMEE.

I have a very positive attitude towards women in the military. I think they make a very significant contribution to the forces. You have to be a special type of person to fit in. Self-confidence is very important in the military. You have to be outdoory. Some more timid people might consider the way of the army too aggressive. Most of the females who have joined the military in Ireland have done very well. Also if they leave the military, it is a useful experience for them.

I was interested in whether increasing the number of women in the mission would reduce the numbers of men associating with local women, but this officer did not think that would matter very much: ‘If we had half and half with men and women we would have some more relationships within the group, but there would still be a lot of relationships with the local women.’

During October–November 2002, I mentioned to many UNMEE personnel that the UN was trying to encourage more women to become soldiers in peacekeeping operations. No one had heard this before. Nor had they heard anything to the effect that the inclusion of women in peace operations might be productive – neither from the UN nor from other policymakers. Apparently, neither UN Resolution 1325 nor the strong recommendations of the Secretary-General – to say nothing of various other reports stressing the importance of including women in peace operations – have reached men and women in missions like UNMEE.

It is hard to know how many women have served in UNMEE. It is clear that their numbers have been low, though the numbers vary from one month to the next. Several or most of the member-states do not have women at all in the mission. Do we expect to see an increase in the number of women joining peace operations?

Dorota Gierytcz, who has worked for the UN for 20 years, recently finished her work with the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and is now a Senior Political Officer with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). In her presentation at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) in October 2002, she argued that nothing points in the direction of an increase in the number of women in peacekeeping operations in the future. Heidi Hudson (2000) reinforces this opinion in her article in *African Security Review*. In spite of the UN’s apparent awareness of women’s crucial position in peacekeeping, both of these women claim that little or nothing is being done to recruit more women.

The UN has little or no influence over the personnel recruited for peace operations by the various troop-contributing countries. There is increasing tendency for developing countries to contribute troops to peace operations. Hudson (2000: 18) argues that ‘given such enormous challenges in Africa, it is doubtful whether the percentage of women in peace operations in Africa is likely to increase in the near future.... The political, economic and social turmoil on the continent further does not create conditions conducive to the mainstreaming of gender in society, in general’. If it is correct that African women are not participating to an increasing degree in such operations, this is a loss for peacekeeping in Africa. It was quite clear that African UNMEE women were able to communicate more easily with Eritrean women than, for example, the Irish women. In some cases, not only nationality but also age may be important.

**Self-Sufficiency and Eritrea**

The historic setting that UNMEE faces is important when one is trying to understand the reaction of the Eritrean people and the Eritrean government. The presence of UNMEE is not easy for the Eritrean government. The notion of self-sufficiency has been very dominant in the ideology of

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20 There have been women in earlier contingents; contingents from Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark have included women.
the EPLF, both prior to and since independence.\textsuperscript{21} That the fighters achieved their goals without any support from the outside is one of the more persistent myths of the EPLF. This myth makes no mention of the Eritrean diaspora community, which largely financed the building of the new nation. In addition, there were other solidarity organizations that supported the EPLF. And other organizations and solidarity groups outside the country supported the Eritrean struggle for independence. In Norway in 1987, \emph{Operasjon Dagsverk} – an annual in which Norwegian secondary school students take a day off from school to work for charity – was dedicated to Eritrea. The money raised was spent on building schools in EPLF-controlled areas. It is important that the myth of self-reliance is disputed, because the government and those who talk on its behalf constantly use it to argue that Eritrea does not need the support of anyone else. They claim that Eritrea does not need to cooperate with international society, and that Eritrea has the authority to make its own decisions on all matters. Such an attitude is of no help to the many groups that are not prioritized in Eritrean public discourse – for example, the Ethiopians from Tigray, who live under difficult circumstances in Eritrea.

Eritrea clearly \textit{does} need support from the international community. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission (SRSG) Legweila Joseph Legweila stresses this point and insists that both Eritrea and Ethiopia need outside support in order to avoid a new war.\textsuperscript{22} He argues, for example, that demining is clearly necessary and cannot be done solely by the parties themselves. Legweila insists that the international community must be involved if a successful peace is to last.

The former self-reliance during the Eritrean struggle is considered both as a fact and as something that is improper to challenge. However, this self-sufficiency has been interpreted as arrogance by the rest of the world. In 1997, Eritrea threw out most of the international NGOs working in the country, but soon realized that it needed them anyway and invited them back. Few have returned, and remarkably few white people stayed in or visited Eritrea prior to the war. Because of the government’s restrictions on open communication, the Eritrean population is cut off from information to an exceptional degree. All private newspapers were closed down in the autumn of 2001, and many journalists have been in prison since then. The only legal newspaper is state-owned and reflects the government’s view in all matters.

The rationale given for telling the mine organizations to leave was that they cost too much and that they were not efficient: ‘We can do the clearing better ourselves’, insisted the government. However, one of the more aggressive accusations levelled against the EPLF government has been that it would prefer that the mines along the border with Ethiopia remain. Indeed, some Eritreans have argued on the website www.asmarino.com that the mines act as a deterrent to prevent Eritreans from fleeing to Ethiopia, where some have already applied for asylum. Whether the Eritrean government has had such intentions or not remains unknown. However, all mine organizations have had to leave the country, and the UN’s Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) say that the monitoring of mining accidents in the buffer zone has suffered significantly as a result.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, this statement was uttered before the last two remaining organizations were also told to leave.

Through such actions, the Eritrean government has signalled that it cannot accept organizations that it does not control one hundred percent. This should be borne in mind when listening to the critical judgements passed on UNMEE by ordinary Eritreans. The isolation of Eritrea, the rarity of tourists prior to UNMEE and the lack of encouragement for increased communication with the outside world leads to the regular Eritrean having little knowledge of Western ways of behaviour. This is not to say that soldiers ought to be more modest and humble in their ways. Seen from the eyes of someone from the West, UNMEE soldiers that eat and drink in restaurants in Eritrea do not necessarily behave badly. Yet, they are still criticized – sometimes just for looking like they feel at home: ‘Here they are eating and drinking and enjoying themselves. They don’t belong here. They’re not really interested in Eritrea at all.’\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{21}See, for example, Connell, 1993.
\textsuperscript{22}Interviews with Legweila, Oslo, December 2001, and Asmara, November 2003.
\textsuperscript{23}See UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 2002.
\textsuperscript{24}Comment by male teacher in Asmara.
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Many Eritreans were happy when they were first told that UNMEE would arrive and during the mission’s first period. However, after some months the attitude of Eritreans towards UNMEE deteriorated. The concept of self-reliance has been unusually strong in Eritrea, and this makes it even harder to host a group of people with different ways who are in Eritrea because the Eritreans cannot help themselves.

The Effect of Continued Militarization

There are several reasons for the deep frustration and unrest felt by Eritreans in the wake of the last war. This has led to increased pressure among Eritreans seeking ways to improve their way of life. One of the factors that drives some Eritreans to try to flee the country is compulsory military service for both men and women. The end of the war did not lead to demobilization. In addition to keeping the soldiers who served during the war, the government has systematically made large parts of the country’s population perform military service for an indefinite period. Furthermore, the government has been extremely forceful with regard to recruiting men and women to do their military service. Everyone between 18 and 40 is required to do carry out military service, and there are numerous reports of how the military police drive around Asmara rounding up men and women and sending them off to Sawa, where soldiers receive their military training. In addition, it is difficult to understand why the government has insisted on continuous call-up of new recruits.

However, the Eritrean government does not view the present situation in Eritrea as ripe for demobilization. Some teachers in the Teacher’s Union claimed that: ‘Eritrea has such terrible neighbours and we may be attacked any time. We cannot demobilize because of this’. They sympathized with the government, but were also frustrated with their explanation given for why the country had to stay alert and ready to resist a sudden attack. Within this painful context, the Eritreans observe UNMEE peacekeepers enjoying a carefree lifestyle. UNMEE soldiers can visit bars and buy food and drinks for the local women. Young Eritrean men watch UNMEE soldiers, for whom there is never a question of not being able to afford an evening out.

In order to ease the transition from war to peace, the World Bank has agreed to support the Eritrean government with US$60 million for the demobilization and reintegration of soldiers. The aim of this project is to demobilize and reintegrate 200,000 of the approximately 350,000 soldiers currently under arms over a two-year period. This process, however, has been greatly delayed. So far, only a group of 5,000 soldiers – disabled, women and elderly men – have been demobilized during spring 2002.

These 5,000 demobilized soldiers provide an important indication of some of the ways that forced mobilization of large groups of society influence a population. In Eritrea, a large number of the soldiers have a peasant background; with the most able young men and women consequently absent from this sector, food production is greatly reduced. Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), whose aim is to provide information on events on the ground in sub-Saharan Africa, gives a relevant example:

Takalit Maashow was a farmer before he was called up four years ago. Now aged 40, and with a bullet still in his shoulder, he is about to return to his wife and four children who live near Asmara. ‘I do not want to be a farmer any more,’ he told IRIN. ‘The work is too hard, I am tired after four years of the military. It was very difficult. I want to find a job in Asmara, I will do anything.’

25 Several members of UNMEE, both soldiers and officers, mentioned that UNMEE’s relationship with the local population had worsened.
26 Many soldiers have been serving in the military against their will for up to five years. Since 2000, no one has been allowed to leave – unless because of sickness, pregnancy or a few other reasons.
Takalit is typical. Many of the men chosen for early discharge because of their age or injuries, talk of trying to find work in the capital rather than returning to their lives in the countryside. They say they have seen too much to ever be satisfied with such a simple existence.

There is a clear tendency for former combatants not to return to farming. This was discovered after the long liberation war in Eritrea. The fighters of the EPLF were mainly recruited from rural areas. As many as 80–85% had a peasant background. But, after the war, only 13.7% of all fighters wanted to settle in a rural area (GDI, 1995; Teclemichael, 1999). This is also well known from other revolutions: peasants make up large parts of such revolutions and are often reluctant to return to rural areas after a period as a soldier (Kriger, 1992). For some Eritreans who do try to return, there remains little to return to – many homes have been destroyed by the fighting, land has been neglected by families forced to move to safer areas or an area may be inaccessible because of landmines.

In relation to UNMEE, Eritrean soldiers represent a factor of instability. Eritrean soldiers have instigated episodes in which UNMEE soldiers have been attacked. The peace agreement was signed in June 2000. By not demobilizing its forces, the government of Eritrea is sending out a message that the war is not yet over. Few Eritreans believe that Ethiopia will ever accept that Eritrea is an independent state: ‘The Ethiopians will do what they can to obstruct it.’ As of November 2003, it looks as though such grim views may have been proven right.

Conclusion

The lack of a younger workforce is crippling Eritrean development. In general, apathy, lack of energy and pessimism dominate. Little activity is visible in Asmara. People sit around looking like they are doing nothing. At the same time, all economic sectors lack workers. In autumn 2002, Eritrea appealed for $105 million in humanitarian assistance. So far, only a quarter of that has been promised – a response rate far below that for appeals from Ethiopia. For the Eritrean government, this is proof that the country is being punished by the donor community. The war in Iraq has made things worse. Shipping costs to Eritrea’s ports on the Red Sea have risen steeply, and delivery times have slowed.

By mid-2000, about half of Eritrea’s active workforce was in the army (GTZ, 2001:7). This extreme militarization is an important factor in Eritrea’s lack of development, and it adds to the pressure on UNMEE soldiers from young women. This situation cannot be countered by UNMEE. However, it is important to raise awareness within UNMEE of the ways in which the soldiers may influence the reputation of the mission. When scandals are uncovered, the government of Eritrea points to the imperfection of UNMEE and to the negative influence that UNMEE has on Eritrean society. It argues that negative developments – such as increased prostitution – must be countered and that it is doing what it can to counter them. The government claims that to protect Eritrea from negative influences, unpopular measures – such as forcibly sending young women to do their military service – are necessary. One consequence of this is increased vulnerability for UNMEE, as the Eritrean government constantly needs scapegoats to blame for destructive developments in the country.

In addition to the various scandals that UNMEE has admitted may have taken place and has promised to investigate, UNMEE is also vulnerable because of the aggravation felt by Eritrean men and women because of the many Eritrean women who have UNMEE boyfriends. Socializing with local women is apparently not against the law for the soldiers, and UNMEE soldiers are regularly observed relaxing together with Eritrean women in restaurants. Eritrean men (and women) may dislike this situation without being able to do anything about it.

It is also interesting to observe Eritrean children and their attitudes towards the peacekeepers. Several female Irish UNMEE soldiers explained how they had tried to help local children. They had brought objects from home, including clothes and toys, and had cultivated relationships with

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29 Interview with female Irish soldiers in Asmara.
30 Comment from an elderly, well-respected man in Asmara.
certain children. However, after a while, these women became terribly upset and disappointed with ‘their’ children. The children had betrayed them, telling everyone what idiots they were. These women said that the local children could not be trusted: they just put on a show in order to get things, then turned around and talked badly about the person who had given such things to them. What could explain such behaviour?

The many Eritreans this author talked with expressed a distant and slightly negative attitude towards UNMEE. These Eritreans were relatively well off. They were not soldiers. Other groups – particularly Eritrean soldiers, and males related to or associated in other ways with women who have UNMEE boyfriends – may have an even more negative attitude towards UNMEE. The behaviour of the children towards persons who had been very generous to them reveals a disapproving attitude from the families of the children. The children signal that they put on a show in order to gain favours, but beneath the pretence, negative emotions exist. Despite gaining valuable objects, the children remained aggressive in their feelings towards UNMEE soldiers.

The high probability of relationships between Eritrean women and male UNMEE soldiers and the fact that such relationships may lead to increased vulnerability for UNMEE are not discussed. None of the interviewed soldiers mentioned that such relationships were avoidable or that they could possibly injure UNMEE’s reputation.

Finally, a couple of unintended consequence of UNMEE can be raised. First, in what ways is it likely that young troops taking part in a mission like UNMEE are influenced by what they experience? Could the experience of having many more resources than local women have lasting effects on the sexual preferences of these men?

Second, how will the situation of the maids who are employed by UNMEE be shaped by the mission? Given that many of these women are able to benefit considerably from their positions, will their accumulation of resources have any influence on relationships between Eritrean men and women? One can only speculate, but there is little doubt that the presence of UNMEE has had and will continue to have a profound effect on parts of Eritrean society.

**Recommendations**

1. Local women may look upon the peace operation as offering a possible solution to their problems because of the great imbalance in terms of material resources between the peacekeepers and the local population. Leaders must recognize this problem and encourage discussions within the mission on how to deal with the situation. The mission must therefore
   - prepare all personnel for the situation described above; and
   - ensure that personnel in leading positions recognize their responsibilities as models for behaviour.

2. Problems caused by soldiers having sexual relationships with local women during long periods of service while may end up costing the mission more than sending the soldiers home more often. The mission should therefore
   - deploy troops for less than six months at a time or send troops home on leave at least once during this time.

3. When the mission is working directly with people in the border area, the issue of sexual relations is not as problematic as it is in the capital. Here, UNMEE women are very useful when communicating with local women. Therefore,
   - the Norwegian authorities should find new and better ways of attracting women to the military in general, and to peacekeeping in particular; and
   - specific posts within the mission should be allocated to women, especially when the mission works in direct contact with local people.
References


The Bosnian Conflict of 1992–95 made headlines in the international media for the better part of the early 1990s. The conflict was so complex and so horrific that it left the international community baffled and bewildered. It was hard to imagine that there could be concentration camps in Europe, and even harder to know how to respond. Indeed, the first news reports of these horrors were met with scepticism and allegations of exaggeration. During the conflict years, we learned not only that there were concentration camps within this small territory, but also that there were systematic rapes and massacres taking place.

Violence against women, and mass rape in particular, became one of the hallmarks of the conflict, dominating the media coverage, political debates and humanitarian engagement in ways that had not been seen in previous conflicts. However, it is difficult to determine how widespread the use of sexual violence was during the war. In an article from 1998, Olujic illustrates the confusion by pointing out how different domestic and international bodies have come up with different estimates. Olujic (1998: 40) explains that the Bosnian government at the end of 1992 released a figure stating that the number of women who had been raped was about 14,000. Then, she quotes a report by the European Community that in December 1992 set the number of women of Muslim ethnicity that had been raped by Bosnian Serb soldiers at around 20,000. Finally, she quotes the Bosnian Ministry of the Interior, which estimated the number to be about 50,000. This diversity in figures is also seen when consulting reports by Human Rights Watch (1992, 1993, 1995), Amnesty International (1993, 1995) and the United Nations (1993, 1994).1

The notion of sexual violence as a weapon of war is a prevalent one among researchers and journalists commenting on the Bosnian war (see Allen 1996; Bernard 1994; Jordan 1995; Vranic 1996). In Salzman (1998: 356) this systematization of the use of sexual violence is even given a name: the RAM plan, which was drafted by the Psychological Operations Department within the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) in August 1991. In this plan, it was asserted that raping women and even children would crush the Muslim population’s morale and will to fight more easily. During the war years, the issue of sexual violence was at the forefront of political debate. According to Thorvald Stoltenberg, UN envoy to Bosnia from 1993 to 1995, almost all of the meetings he had with the leaders of the warring parties (Slobodan Milosevic, Alija Izetbegovic and Franjo Tudjman) began with the casting of allegations back and forth as to how many women the soldiers from the different warring sides had raped.2 It is clear, however, that the new thinking

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1 The same confusion regarding numbers is mentioned by Nikolic-Ristovanovic (1999: 43) and in IWPR (2002a).
2 Interview with author, 7 February 2002, Oslo.
about sexual violence that the Bosnian conflict brought about has been important for subsequent conflicts. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the conflicts in Kosovo in 1998 and in East-Timor in 1999 were marked by stories of rape and sexual violence, and the international community showed considerable interest in bringing perpetrators to justice and helping victims.

Given the enormous attention that sexual violence was given during the Bosnian war (and other conflicts in the immediate aftermath), it is therefore striking how absent gender issues in general and sexual violence in particular were in the peace agreement brokered by the warring parties in the Bosnian conflict and the international community. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) – which was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 – laid out how Bosnia was to be rebuilt as a new state after the war and how different international organizations and agencies were to play different parts in the puzzle. This chapter will investigate the possibilities for integrating a focus on sexual violence for the organization that was mandated to oversee the military aspects of the GFAP, namely the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). What will be discussed is not only how SFOR can integrate a focus on this particular form of violence, but also why SFOR ought to do so. Special emphasis will be made on how Norway can play an important part in setting this theme on the agenda.

The basis for this analysis is interviews with former SFOR soldiers in Norway, rape victims in Bosnia, NGOs in Bosnia, representatives of the international community in Bosnia and focus groups on the issue of changing gender relations in Bosnia during and after the war (which took place in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar), along with an extensive literature search.

Contextualizing SFOR Within the International Presence in Bosnia

The NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina came into place on 20 December 1996. The SFOR operation replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR), which had been deployed the year before as an immediate result of the GFAP. A United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) had preceded IFOR and was present in Bosnia during the war. IFOR was deployed following UN Security Council Resolution 1031 in December 1995. In December 1996, the UN Security Council authorized member-states to set up a multinational stabilization force to succeed IFOR. The main task of SFOR was to oversee the parts of the 11 annexes to the GFAP that addressed military issues (this will be discussed in greater detail in the next section).

The civilian components of the 11 annexes were to be overseen by international organizations within the United Nations system as well as others. In effect, Bosnia became an international protectorate in which the state’s military was monitored by the NATO-led SFOR forces, the police was monitored by the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), and elections and democratic institutions were monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). In combination, these different organizations made the international intervention in Bosnia the largest operation ever seen. The various individual operations have gone through changes of different kinds over the years. SFOR has been downsized from about 60,000 soldiers in the beginning to 12,000 at the start of 2003. The United

3 Sexual violence was perceived as an integral part of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. In the verdict against the mayor of Taba commune, Jean-Paul Akayesu, we saw the first case of this understanding being applied within international law (see the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Decision of 2 September 1998, available at: http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm).
4 See UNFPA (1999).
7 These interviews were anonymous.
8 These interviews were anonymous.
9 Medica, Zenica; Psiholoski Centar (Norwegian People’s Aid – NPA), Tuzla; Women for Women, Sarajevo; Center for Torture Victims, Sarajevo; Nansen Centers in Sarajevo, Banja Luka and Mostar; Kvinna til Kvinna, Banja Luka; Citizens Association of Former Concentration Camp Victims, Sarajevo; Forma F, Mostar.
10 Senior Democratization Officer, OSCE, Sarajevo; Deputy Head of Civil Affairs, UNMIBH, Sarajevo; Thorvald Stoltenberg, United Nations Envoy from 1993 to 1995.
11 While the role of IFOR was to implement the peace, the role of SFOR is to stabilize the peace.
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) terminated its engagement at the end of 2002, and its former responsibilities were taken over by the European Union. The clearest example of this transition is the fact that the IPTF now has been replaced by the EU Police Mission (EUPM), which has a slightly different mandate than the IPTF (it will focus more specifically on returning refugees and organized crime in the region). The transition to the European Union is also expected to be seen in the military sector, and a transfer of responsibility and personnel is expected in mid-2004. The general aim of these processes of transformation is to make the responsibility for development in the region a distinctly European issue and to ensure that developments in the country can lead up to membership in the European Union.12

In addition to the many international bodies present in the country, there has also been a blooming nongovernmental sector. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in the year 2000 listed 182 international nongovernmental organizations; in addition, there are 325 local nongovernmental organizations that are also mostly funded by foreign organizations. In recent years, however, many of these organizations have found that international funders are now much less interested in the situation in Bosnia than in other areas of the world. Consequently, many NGOs are forced to cut their activities and number of employees, and even to shut down.

The presence of internationals in Bosnian is overwhelming, and they constitute an important source of income for the local population. The internationals have more money than the local population and constitute an important consumer group in the country. In addition, their presence creates job opportunities for local Bosnians. One important job opportunity has been working as interpreters for internationals with little or no knowledge of the Bosnian language. This has proven to be a well-paid opportunity for many women, and in one of the focus groups this theme came up as a source of conflict within many Bosnian families. Jobs as interpreters are often fairly well paid vis-à-vis other jobs, and the fact that the woman in some cases has a higher income than her husband, or is indeed the only breadwinner in the family, may cause an increased level of tension. There are, however, no studies that confirm this, though it is a widespread perception among younger Bosnians today.

On a more general level, there is a strong sense amongst many Bosnians that the international presence is of such a nature that it has deprived many them of a sense of ownership over their own democratic and political development.13 According to Sumatra Bose (2002: 6), the international presence is so overwhelming that the internationals constitute yet another conflict line within this small country.

**Gender Consequences of the International Presence**

Mapping out the gender consequences of the international presence in Bosnia could form a study in its own right. For the purpose of this report, however, I will simply outline some of the most striking features.

First, the gendered outlook (i.e. the gender-balancing) of the many international and nongovernmental organizations in the country will affect the ways in which those organizations are perceived. However, getting an overview of the gender distribution within the major organizations is impossible. The engagements of the internationals are of varying duration, and there is constant change among personnel – including on the gender level. All the same, it has been important for some organizations to ensure that gender issues are addressed in their work, despite considerable variations in terms of personnel. For instance, both the IPTF and the UNMIBH administration

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12 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/bosne_herze/ on the EU’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13 The parliamentary election of October 2002 – the first election the Bosnian authorities organized without the immediate supervision of the OHR and the OSCE – showed that efforts to ‘educate’ the Bosnian population in democratic values and tolerance have not provided the result the international community had hoped for. Not only was voter turnout extremely low (less than 55 %), but it was also the case that those who did show up gave their votes to the nationalist candidates. In a recent critical article, Knaus & Martin (2003: 60) criticize the OHR – and the High Representative Paddy Ashdown in particular – for acting in a way that implied the ‘unlimited authority of an international mission to overrule all of the democratic institutions of a sovereign member state of the United Nations’. An example of this is when the third High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch dismissed the the elected Serb mayor of Drvar in 1999 (Knaus & Martin, 2003: 65–66).
have had gender officers. For the IPTF, the role of the gender officer has been to train local police on gender issues such as domestic violence and the role of the police in such situations. For the UNMIBH gender officer, the task has been to coordinate activities that focus on civilian gender issues. One such activity has been the Special Trafficking Operations Program (STOP), whose aim has been to combat human trafficking and the trafficking of women in particular. Within the OSCE and the OHR, there have been various projects and activities aimed at increasing the level of female participation in municipal and national elections and political life. In addition numerous seminars and workshops focusing on the empowerment of women within Bosnian society have been organized by these various international organizations, often in cooperation with local NGOs.

Second, the most striking gender implication of this massive international presence is of a more negative nature. Bosnia has become a transit country for the trafficking of women, and there has been an immense increase in prostitution in the country. In addition to the international ‘market’ in Bosnia, the geographical location of the country makes Bosnia very attractive for women seeking a better future in Western Europe. SFOR and other international organizations have been involved not only as customers, but also as organizers in the trafficking. In May 2000, Reuters reported on SFOR soldiers in Eastern Bosnia who were involved in trafficking women from Romania and Moldova. The issue was also addressed in a United Nations press release (Press Release SC/6973) in which the IPTF was encouraged to undertake robust operations against local and international organized criminal groups involved in prostitution and other kinds of crime.

In the interviews with female SFOR soldiers in Norway, the issue of prostitution was described as a ‘public secret’. Going to prostitutes clearly contravenes codes of conduct for international peacekeeping personnel, but everybody knows that such activities take place. Some of the women developed strategies to avoid finding out about the activities of their male colleagues, such as spending free time away from them. Despite efforts to ban the buying of sex by international peacekeepers, it appears that few strict measures are taken to ensure that the rules are obeyed.

Third, the international presence and the influx in prostitutes have created a new health hazard for many Bosnians. Among the local population in Bosnia, there is a perception that the issue of prostitution has been imported along with the internationals, and many blame the international organizations. One informant that the IWPR interviewed in April 2002 said that most of the East European victims of forced prostitution pass through a certain house in Belgrade and are put up for sale like animals. Further, she said that the women who are considered beautiful enough, however, are sent right away to Kosovo or Albania. In the human auctions, the women can be sold for €500 to €3000.

14 In a press release in July 1999, the OSCE presents a study where Bosnian citizens had been asked about their wishes to see more women in politics. A clear majority, nearly 60%, did not think that political parties represented women’s interests (see http://www.oscebih.org/pressrelease/july1999/15-7-women.htm). In 1999, the OSCE in cooperation with the Norwegian government organized a series of seminars – entitled ‘Women Can Do It’ – aimed at helping women increase their presence in Bosnian politics. The goal for the OSCE and local women’s groups was to stimulate female political participation and to ensure that there were the election lists of all the political parties contained at least 30% women. As was the case in many post-communist states, free elections meant a decline in women’s political participation (see World Bank, 1999: 32), but the situation in Bosnia might be slowly changing.


16 In a November 2002 report from Human Rights Watch focusing on the trafficking of women and girls in post-conflict Bosnia, it is claimed that there is a clear connection between the war and the increase in forced prostitution in the region. Trafficking started to appear in 1995, incidentally when the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed and the internationals started pouring in. In October 2002, the United Mission in Bosnia suspected that 227 of the nightclubs in Bosnia were involved in the trafficking of human beings. Experts from the United National mission’s Special Trafficking Operation Program (STOP) stated at a press conference in 2001 that approximately 25% of the women and girls working in nightclubs and bars were trafficked. The majority of the trafficked women come from Moldova, Romania and Ukraine, and the Human Rights watch report tells of women who have been kidnapped off the streets in these former Soviet republics, while others have been lured with the promise of job opportunities in Western European countries. The situation for these women, who are between the ages of 15 and the early 30s, is devastating. Many have been robbed of their legal documents and therefore have very restricted mobility. The circle of people involved includes the local police, and in some cases also the international police, as well as local politicians and other officials. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that between 6,000 and 10,000 foreign women currently are being coerced into prostitution in the republic (see IWPR, 2002b: 1). The women become part of an intricate network of buying and selling of human beings that cuts across many of the former Yugoslav republics. One informant that the IWPR interviewed in April 2002 said that most of the East European victims of forced prostitution pass through a certain house in Belgrade and are put up for sale like animals. Further, she said that the women who are considered beautiful enough go to Bosnia, where they stay for one or two years before being sent to Italy, Greece of somewhere else in Europe. If they are not considered beautiful enough, however, they are sent right away to Kosovo or Albania. In the human auctions, the women can be sold for €500 to €3000.
community for the spread of venereal diseases in the country. In focus group interviews in Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka, this perception was confirmed. Levels of HIV and AIDS are not currently alarmingly high in Bosnia, but the business of trafficking of women as well as an increase in drug abuse might change this picture drastically in years to come. Still, HIV testing was described as taboo in the focus groups and as something that did not concern participants directly. Capitalizing on women’s sexuality has spread to many levels of society in Bosnia. One example is provided by a woman in Banja Luka who has relatives that run a brothel in their own home, and everyone in the family – both men and women – are involved in the ‘family business’: ‘It was really a shock how they, educated people, mother and father and women and sons, how they all spoke about it, like some kind of business, and it was not something they were forced to do ... they have ordinary jobs’ (woman, born 1968, Banja Luka). Local women know that their sexuality can be for sale – ‘Local girls do not want to become prostitutes, but sometimes they have to’, explained a man born in 1982 in Banja Luka – and the notion of local prostitution is euphemistically called ‘sponsorship’. This is a term used to describe local women who become ‘girlfriends’ with wealthier men. These women are highly stigmatized by other Bosnians. The assumption is that these girls/women are becoming prostitutes in order to get a better life under the guise of being the girlfriend of a wealthier foreign man. For many, this is seen as evidence of deteriorating moral values within the society.

SFOR’s Outlook and Mandate

Within the vast landscape of international bodies of both governmental and nongovernmental nature described above operates SFOR. The primary mission of SFOR is threefold: (1) to deter or

17 One woman explained to me that despite the very frequent use of rape during the conflict, it wasn’t until the SFOR soldiers came to the region that the spread of venereal diseases became a problem. She explained it in the following way: ‘It was not our men, but your men who brought the problem to us’.

18 The issue of the increasing and very visible prostitution in Bosnia was a central theme in the focus groups. This is perceived as being an antithesis to how things were before the war, i.e. when the ideals of female sexuality were those of innocence and purity: ‘Now you can see flyers with adds for striptease clubs and you know what is happening there. It was never like that before’ (woman, born 1974, Sarajevo). Another woman described it as follows: ‘It is a huge problem and tragically it is accepted. It was something that was unimaginable before. Today you know the houses and you know the bars and everything is known and it seems to be legalized’ (woman, born 1968, Banja Luka).

19 Customers of the trafficked women, as well as the Bosnian public, were, however, alarmed about the dangers of the spread of the HIV through a raid in the ‘Maza’ night club in Zenica in November 2001. Local police found 11 girls from the Ukraine, Moldova, Romania and Russia working as prostitutes. One of them, a 19-year-old girl from the Ukraine, was diagnosed HIV-positive. Local and national media urged local men who might have been in contact with this woman to contact health personnel and to undergo HIV testing (IWPR, 2001). This case was mentioned in all the focus groups when the issue of prostitution and HIV was addressed. It was described as an important instance of public awareness of the health risks involved in the sex industry in Bosnia.

20 One person put it as follows: ‘I think it is a huge problem because I think that our mentality is that this is something that happens to foreigners and not to me, and to gays, and people in Africa and all the time other people, but not to us’ (woman, born 1980, Banja Luka).

21 As one man put it: ‘Another thing that is far worse than regular prostitution is young girls dating married wealthy men – sponsorship – and I have seen that happening much more than prostitution. I know some girls, some of my friends, who have acquaintances, the girls are normally around 25 and are very good-looking, and she is dating a guy from a rich areas and he has a nice catholic family and she is from the village. His wife does not really want much from him because she has her nice family and her nice life, so he can have this relationship with the young girl very openly. And he buys her fur coats and mobile phones and then he beats her up from time to time’ (man, born 1970, Mostar).

22 The former Norwegian SFOR soldiers described this phenomenon as ‘field girlfriends’, which also covers relationships between wealthier internationals and local women. This is clearly a grey area in terms of prostitution.

23 For one young man from Banja Luka, this has meant that it is no much easier to get girlfriends than before the war because he is perceived as a potential sponsor. Some of the interviewees see this as a much greater problem than the increase in prostitution because it sets as standard for what women want from men: ‘many women feel that this is the right way to go’, explained one woman, while another saw it as ‘a reflection of dangerous values’. Another phenomenon linked to the sense of deteriorating values is the notion that the sexually debut age has gone down: ‘Kids are so young when they start their sexual life... I do not think it was like that 10–15 years ago ... and I remember when we heard statistics from other Western European countries we were shocked ... and now it has changed here’ (woman, born 1968, Banja Luka).
prevent a resumption of hostilities or a new threat to peace; (2) to promote a climate in which the peace process can continue to move forward; and (3) to provide selective support to civilian organizations within its capabilities. The operation’s headquarters are located in Sarajevo and consist of about 350 personnel. Most contributing countries have personnel based at the headquarters. In addition, there are three multinational brigades, which are located in Tuzla (North, MNB-N), Banja Luka (Northwest, MNB-NW) and Mostar (Southeast, MNB-SE). And, finally, there are so-called theatre troops located in various part of the country.24 In order to meet the non-military demands of the operation, each division and battle group has a Civilian–Military Cooperations group (CIMIC), and a joint coordinative task force in Sarajevo coordinates the CIMIC groups. CIMIC activities include helping displaced people,25 building schools26 and facilitating contact with other multinational and local organization for the local population.27 In addition to these activities, SFOR cooperates systematically with the following organizations: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH).

All NATO nations that have their own armed forces have committed troops to SFOR. In addition, non-NATO countries such as Albania, Austria, Argentina, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Morocco, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden, as well as Australia and New Zealand, have committed personnel. It is clear that with such a diversity of contributing countries the SFOR mission has an extremely heterogeneous military, social and gender culture. The duties and restrictions for men and women within the different contingents from different countries vary according to the rules and regulations of the respective national militaries. For example was it only in 2000 that Italy opened its doors to women in the military,28 while the USA and Canada have long traditions of having women in their armed forces. Norway also has a long tradition of women in the military, and in accordance with the 1985 law on equal opportunity women are permitted in all combat positions, though few women have advanced to senior rank. In 1999, a female infantry commander was serving in Bosnia, and it is worth noticing that the proportion of women in international missions is larger than the proportion of women on active duty in Norway.29

How the internal life of a multinational military mission such as SFOR is altered and challenged by an increase of women in both leading and supporting positions is a theme for further


25 SFOR Informer reported in June 2003 how Italian Carabinieri from the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) brought food, medicines, clothing, toys and hygiene products to a displaced person settlement in Moscanica, near Zenica. The initiative came from a female doctor working for the Italian Red Cross, but the distribution was carried out by SFOR. One woman who lives in the camp with her husband and a 21-year-old daughter who needed medicines told SFOR Informer that ‘since November 2002, when the Carabinieri visited us the last time, none has come here, not even to give us hope that it will get better. Everyone in this camp is thankful to the Carabinieri, because they are the only one who help us to survive’. See SFOR Informer, 9 June 2003, available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/030604a/030604b.htm.

26 One example comes from a 1999 cooperation between French and German SFOR (DFGFA) soldiers in the villages of Hasanovici and Bulatovici, where they rebuilt a school so that the children in the village could go to school in their local communities rather than walk to far-away schools on inadequate roads. This cooperation also involved close contact with the local population, who did almost most of the work according to German Sgt.-Major Helmut Schramm: ‘It was more a collaboration between the soldiers and the population of the village than us doing the work alone, as the locals have really been working hard during all the work’. See SFOR Informer, 15 September 1999, available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic/germ-sch/9909021e.htm.

27 One example of this can be found in the work of the Nordic–Polish Battle Group (NPBG). SFOR Informer writes that ‘in the most important towns some CIMIC houses have been opened in order to facilitate ready contact with the local population, to help find answers to their problems or to guide them towards the organisation which is most likely to be able to help them’. See SFOR Informer, 7 June 2000, available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/89/nopolcim/t000608p.htm.


research. However, some efforts have been made to map out where women are and what their duties are within SFOR, most notably by the Committee for Women in the NATO Forces (see the partial presentation and discussion in Helland & Kristensen, 1998: 94–101). It appears, though, that gender-balancing and mainstreaming is not seen as of high importance within the SFOR leadership. When Cockburn asked SFOR HQ about its gender policy within the unit and for CIMIC work, she received the following reply:

Gender integration is not an issue for peacekeeping operations, and therefore stats are not kept.... The inclusion of women in the peacekeeping forces is nation specific and based on their own internal national policies, not those of SFOR. As such NATO and SFOR do not have a policy on gender integration and certainly do not employ quotas for such (Cockburn & Hubic, 2002: 113).

As Helland & Kristensen (1998: 86) point out, the internal composition of men and women within a peace operation is important for the external outlook of the operation. It meets demands for democratic representation, increases trust and fosters confidence among the local population. These are indeed the intended consequences of gender-balancing that are spelled out in the appendices to this report. As will be argued below, gender-balancing and mainstreaming ought to be a priority for NATO and SFOR if the issue of sexual violence is to be dealt with within the framework of SFOR.

**Sexual Violence and SFOR**

The basis for the activities of SFOR is laid in the GFAP. The peace process and the final GFAP represent an extraordinary process, because this involved not only a framework for cessation of hostilities but also provided a document for the rebuilding of an entirely new state. It is therefore striking that gender issues were glaringly invisible in both the peace negotiation processes and in the wordings of the final document. There are several reason why women and gender issues ought to have been incorporated within the processes leading up to the final GFAP document.

First, central agreements that spelled out the ways in which the issue of gender ought to be incorporated in peacebuilding efforts were already in place at the time. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was the first major peace agreement adopted after the Fourth World Conference on Women (hereafter referred to as the Beijing Conference) in 1995. Central themes in the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action that ought to have been reflected in the DPA are described in chapters 4D (‘Violence Against Women’), 4E (‘Women and Armed Conflict’), 4G (‘Women in Power and Decision Making’) and 4I (‘Women and Human Rights’). Thus, at the time of the Dayton negotiations there were central documents available that stipulated the crucial implications of gender awareness in civil society rebuilding, most notably in relation to women services. In interviews with former female SFOR soldiers in Norway, a number of themes came up that were related to how daily life within the mission was different for female soldiers vis-à-vis their male colleagues. The women who have been interviewed for this study emphasized how few fellow female soldiers they had while on SFOR service. Although they stressed that this was not a problem in their day-to-day work, it could become a problem in social after-duty settings – such as ending conferences or meetings at strip clubs or spending leave in areas where male colleagues would visit prostitutes. One clear recommendation that emerged from these interviews was never to send only one woman on a mission. The interviewees emphasized the need to make sure there is always a minimum of at least two women (and preferably more than two) in the mission. This would ease after-duty settings because there would be someone to team up with. Another important factor was they would share ‘gender visibility’, that is, stand out as women in the group.

Many commentators point to the overambitious aspects of the GFAP. Chandler (1998: 35) asks why so few have questioned the diminution of sovereignty involved in the GFAP or raised questions about the difficulties involved in imposing democracy from the outside. In his account of the status quo, Bose (2002: 3) argues that ‘the degree of effectiveness of the enormously ambitious international experiments in state-making and democracy building in Bosnia ... is a matter of some dispute. But it is generally agreed, among people with widely divergent perspectives on wartime and post-war Bosnia that the situation of BiH remains precarious in almost every sense and that the shape of the future is uncertain’.

as active participants in decisionmaking, peace processes and in international peacekeeping interventions. In the Bosnian peace negotiations, however, there were a few women among the international delegates, but none in the regional delegations. Even on the day of the official signing of the peace accords, a number of international NGOs addressed a letter to US Ambassador Madeleine Albright to highlight the lack of gender attention, but this effort was unsuccessful (Kvinna til Kvinna, 2000: 20).

Second, women outnumbered male survivors of the war. Rees (2002: 55–56) claims that two-thirds of the surviving population in Bosnia were women. This means that there is a large number of female-headed households in the country, and the women have many responsibilities that would normally belong to the man in the family. Female Srebrenica survivors I visited in Vozuća (a small town in central Bosnia where the majority of the inhabitants are women and children who fled Srebrenica following the massacre in July 1995) have in interviews described the gender dimensions of rebuilding. Numerous organizations have offered these women bricks and other material to rebuild their homes in Srebrenica to facilitate their return. As friendly as this might be, the problem for many of these women is that they do not have enough male members left in their families to carry out the work. Many women do not know how to build a house, and in addition it would often be impossible for them to leave their children in Vozuća to travel to Srebrenica to do the job. This brief example goes to show that in peace agreements, such as the GFAP, where the reconstruction of civil society is a crucial part, the needs and voices of women need to be incorporated because women often constitute the majority of those who are left to do the work.

Finally, the fact that gender issues, and sexual violence in particular, were so important in the political discussions and media coverage of the conflict appears as a grossly mismatch to the way in which these issues were addressed – or rather ignored – in the GFAP. ‘The prosecution of sexual crimes’, argues Pilch, ‘is an indispensable part of norm recognition and institution building for the protection of human rights’. And, while ‘generalization concerning the mechanisms for dealing with crimes of sexual violence may not be possible. A recognition of their importance, however, is critical for the construction of norms and institutions that cement peace’ (Pilch, 2003: 91).

As we can see, the lack of gender focus in the GFAP, the absence of women during the negotiations, the lack of understanding for the situation of women after the war and the failure to recognize gender issues during the war lead us to conclude that the GFAP does not commit the various international bodies overseeing the implementation of the agreement to focus on issues of sexual violence specifically. Unfortunate as this is, however, arguments can be made that the mandate of SFOR indirectly opens up for an increased awareness of sexual violence.

As was outlined above, the mandate of SFOR is first and foremost of a military nature. SFOR’s mandate is primarily to oversee the military aspects of the DPA, as they are defined in Annex 1A. In addition, however, SFOR is mandated to provide support for civilian organizations, and it is obliged to cooperate with all entities involved in the civilian aspects of the DPA. To begin with the military aspects, the question that emerges is whether sexual violence can and ought to be conceptualized as a military security threat? This requires an analysis of the political implications of this particular form of violence.

**Sexual Violence as a Security Threat**

If we are to make the argument that sexual violence is a theme for SFOR by virtue of the military aspects of its mandate, we need to conceptualize how sexual violence poses a threat to security. It is obvious that sexual violence is a threat to individual security, but does it constitute a threat to security in political terms? In other words, can we conceptualize sexual violence within a militaristic framework? There is, as has been alluded to above, a discrepancy between the ways in which sexual violence was perceived during the conflict and how it has been dealt with in the af-
termath, seen most notably in the lack of specific mention of this particular aspect of the war within the framework of the GFAP.

The political implications of sexual violence was a theme in Yugoslav public discourse a decade before the Bosnian war. During the rise of ethnic conflict in Kosovo in the late 1980s, the perception had already become established – and was reflected in domestic law – that inter-ethnic rape was different from rape between members of the same ethnic group, that is, it was often used for political purposes. A pattern of rapes in Kosovo from 1986 to 1990, where Albanian men were accused of large-scale raping of Serbian women, led the Republic of Serbia to modify its penal code: ‘Sexual assault on citizens of different nationalities and ethnicities was considered more aggravating than “regular” rape’ (Meznaric, 1994: 86). According to Meznaric, this indicated that heterosexual rape had become a political act. If we now return to the military aspects of the SFOR mandate, we see that the operation is obliged to ensure that the warring parties ‘establish lasting security’ (Annex 1A, Article I, 2c), though this is defined as arms control measures. I would argue that such a definition is inadequate. The Bosnian war taught us that it is not only arms that pose a threat to security: in this conflict, sexual violence was also part of the security threat because it was used as a means of attack as well as a reason for attacks on opposing ethnic groups. It is the acknowledgement of this fact that changed the ways in which we think about sexual violence in war and that brought this particular form of violence into the realm of political discourse.

It is therefore striking that the SFOR is not mandated to oversee developments in inter-ethnic violence, and sexual violence in particular, in order to assess the security situation in Bosnia at any given time. With the elections of October 2002, we saw that nationalistic political leaders are on the rise in Bosnia, and it is therefore timely that the international community – and SFOR in particular – should pay attention to inter-ethnic hostilities, also in the form of sexual violence. This argumentation leads to the following policy recommendation:

- As a part of an overall security assessment, SFOR headquarters (HQ) and the three multinational brigades (MNBs) should include statistics on the number of inter-ethnic rapes in the regions in which SFOR operates.

There are many ways in which this information can be obtained, which brings me to a discussion of the civilian aspects of the SFOR mandate and the day-to-day activities of the SFOR operation.

**Sexual Violence as Treat to the Rebuilding of Civil Society**

One of the most important aspects of SFOR’s activities is safeguarding the environment so that other international agencies that are in charge of implementing the civilian aspects of the GFAP can do their job. The effort requires close cooperation with the UNHCR, the OHR, the OSCE, the European Union Police Mission, the ICTY, UNMIBH and others. These organizations address gender issues and the issue of sexual violence to differing degrees.

The ICTY is the organization that is perhaps the most clearly committed to investigating rape and sexual violence, and is making groundbreaking changes in the ways in which these crimes are conceptualized within international law. In this process, the ICTY requires close cooperation with other organizations in Bosnia, including SFOR. The SFOR operation (along with local NGOs and other organizations) provides the ICTY with assistance in locating witnesses and perpetrators, and considerable criticism has been voiced over why the mission has not yet managed to capture the Serb Bosnian leaders Radovan Karadzic and Radko Mladic. Leaving this aside, however, there are numerous examples of successful cooperation between the SFOR and the ICTY, for instance in the arrest of war criminals in different regions of the country. SFOR has detained 27 persons indicted for war crimes since June 1997. Another three have been killed in attempts to bring them to justice. SFOR’s activity in this area includes the provision of security.

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35 The most famous case from Bosnia is what has become known are the Foca rape case. In connection with the trial of Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic, Trial Chamber II announced in a press release on 22 February 2002 that the three men had been found guilty of crimes against humanity in that rape had been ‘used by members of the Bosnian Serb armed forces as an instrument of terror’ (ICTY, Press Release, The Hague, 22 February, 2001JL/P.I.S./566-e).
and logistic support to ICTY investigative teams, together with surveillance and patrolling of the sites of alleged mass graves.

After a reconstruction process in 1999–2000, SFOR continues to provide support for civilian tasks, but with fewer forces at its disposal: ‘SFOR has had to prioritize its efforts and select carefully where they will be applied. To be effective, SFOR and the other organizations will continue to plan together and identify objectives to ensure that SFOR support is applied where and when it is needed’, according to SFOR Informer.37 A careful look at the activities carried out under the headings ‘CIMIC Missions’ and ‘Humanitarian Aid’ on the SFOR Informer website reveals that since the reconstruction most activities have focused on physical rebuilding of schools, roads and houses, and supplying water and food to people in need.38 Despite this main focus on physical reconstruction, there have also been efforts to meet additional needs. One example of such activity is the work of the NORDPOL CIMIC unit in Doboj. In addition to securing houses, food and shelter for returning IDPs, this group has established CIMIC houses in the most important towns in its area in order to facilitate contact with the local population ‘to help find answers to their problems or to guide them towards the organization which is most likely to help them’.39 To be even more effective and to improve the contact with the local population, a CIMIC officer visits every village at least once a day and tries to get to know every single inhabitant. Such valuable efforts ought to require a minimum awareness of the issue of sexual violence. There are at least two reasons for this.

First, refugee return is also potentially traumatic. Victims of sexual violence (and other traumatic events) may experience re-traumatization upon return to the site of the trauma.40 Even if the home town was not the site of the trauma, the mere sight of their home and the memories of life before the war can trigger a re-emergence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). For some victims of sexual violence, the mere sight of a man in uniform – an SFOR soldier or others – can be a trigger for re-traumatization. The symptoms of PTSD vary greatly, but for many mothers PTSD can involve neglect of their children and their children’s needs, aggressive behaviour towards their children, depression and passivity. In extreme cases, it can even lead to killings.41 It is therefore crucial that both victims and their families receive adequate help in order to avoid the potential spiral of violence that can emerge from serious PTSD. This leads to the following recommendation:

- CIMIC officers must be given basic education on the causes and symptoms of PTSD, and in particular the forms it may take among victims of sexual violence.

Second, there appears to have been an increase in domestic violence in post-conflict Bosnia.42 There are several organizations in Bosnia that deal with this particular phenomenon, and there

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36 On October 25, 1999, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided, having taken into account the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to implement, between November 1999 and April 2000, a revised structure for the Stabilisation Force (SFOR). This process has continued with a re-structuring to about 12,000 troops by the very beginning of 2003. In the new structure SFOR continues to have its HQ in the Sarajevo area (transferred in 2000 from the Sarajevan suburb of Ilidza to Camp Butmir). Below this are three multinational brigades each of which is commanded by a Brigadier and contains distinct battle groups (BGs). These BGs can be multinational and are essentially reinforced battalion task forces with their own organic capabilities. In addition there are now dedicated Tactical Reserve Forces able to intervene anywhere within the Theatre of Operations. These can in turn be augmented by the Operational Reserve Force, which is principally composed of Over-The Horizon Forces, mainly deployed in Kosovo, and U.S. helicopter assets.’ See SFOR Informer, available at http://www.nato.int/sfor/docu/d981116a.htm.


38 For humanitarian aid links, see http://www.nato.int/sfor/humanitarian/humanita.htm; for CIMIC activities, see http://www.nato.int/sfor/cimic.htm.

39 See http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/155/p08a/t02p08a.htm.

40 Interviews by the author with health workers at the Medica psychosocial centre in Zenica (2–9 September 2001) and at the Psiholoski Centar in Tuzla (28 January–3 February 2002) confirm this.

41 See http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/155/p08a/t02p08a.htm.

42 It is impossible to determine whether there has been an actual increase in domestic violence or whether more attention is being given towards this particular form of violence. There are no statistics from prewar Bosnia regarding this particular phenomenon with which we can compare current figures. There is an emerging consensus, however, that it is likely that there has been an increase due to the traumas of the war and the high unemployment and social problems that follow in its wake.
are SOS hotlines in various cities that people can call for help regarding this particular issue (in contrast to before the war, when there were none). CIMIC officers need to be made aware of these problems and to know where to direct possible victims of sexual violence – whether this be a result of war violence or domestic violence. This leads to the following recommendation:

- **CIMIC units should establish close contact with women’s NGOs, psychosocial centres and social centres in their areas in order to create a network through which potential victims can receive adequate help.**

In establishing contacts with women’s NGOs, it is crucial that someone is given responsibility for follow-up activities. Some international organizations – such as the OSCE and the EUPM – have gender officers whose main tasks are to ensure that the mandates of their respective missions integrate a gender perspective and to ensure a minimum level of gender awareness in their different projects. The SFOR operation, however, has no officers of this kind. In order to meet the demands of UN Resolution 1325 and goals agreed upon by UN members-states in relation to mainstreaming gender within peacekeeping operations, it would therefore be appropriate to appoint gender officers at a minimum at the multinational brigade level. The role of such gender officers ought to be to oversee how gender concerns are addressed at the various levels of the mission, and vis-à-vis the local population. This would mean that the SFOR operation would have three gender officers, which leads to the following recommendation:

- **Gender Officers should be appointed at a minimum at the MNB level.**

With regard to sexual violence, an important task for the gender officer might be to provide CIMIC officers with help and information on how to coordinate a network of organizations, as well as information on whom to contact for help for victims of sexual violence.

In 1999, a Gender Coordinating Group (GCG) was established on the initiative of the Council of Europe, the Democratization Branch of the OSCE and the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Its aim was to ‘ensure that institutions introduce a gender analysis of all their programs and policies, exchanging information about them, and co-coordinating their gender activities’ (Rees, 2002: 59). SFOR, however has not been a party to this group because it was considered distinct from the international community. Had the SFOR operation had Gender Officers, these might have been considered natural partners in such a group. As a result of its exclusion, SFOR is not given access to vital information about the situation for women in Bosnia, and not least is deprived of a network of contacts for gender-related issues that might be encountered in the field, such as sexual violence. Therefore, the following recommendation can be formulated:

- **Gender Officers ought be part of the Gender Coordinating Group (GCG) or similar associations in the area**

### Conclusion

The crucial point of this case-study has been to argue that sexual violence can be conceptualized as a security issue and thereby as of concern for a military conflict intervention such as SFOR. The argument has been made that a potential increase in inter-ethnic rapes in Bosnia ought to be regarded as a security threat, and the following main policy recommendation war formulated:

- **As a part of an overall security assessment, SFOR headquarters (HQ) and the three multinational brigades (MNBs) should include statistics on the number of inter-ethnic rapes in the regions in which SFOR operates.**

Implementation of this recommendation by the SFOR leadership would provide an example of how gender issues were made relevant for a military organization, and would assist the organization to comply with the goals and intentions in relation to gender mainstreaming that were spelled out in the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action (S/2000/693) and in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). In order to follow this recommendation, however, a few practical issues need be considered, and the following four recommendations should therefore be read as ways of reaching the main goal outlined in the recommendation above:
1. CIMIC officers must be given basic education on the causes and symptoms of PTSD, and in particular the forms it may take among victims of sexual violence.

2. CIMIC units should establish close contact with women’s NGOs, psychosocial centres and social centres in their areas in order to create a network through which potential victims can receive adequate help.

3. Gender Officers should be appointed at a minimum at the MNB level.

4. Gender Officers ought be part of the Gender Coordinating Group (GCG) or similar associations in the area.

The recommendations also outline who would be best suited to do the job of gathering information on inter-ethnic rapes: namely, CIMIC officers who are already engaged in civilian–military relations. If these are to be aware of the effects of this particular type of violence, minimum education in the symptoms of PTSD is crucial. Further, the CIMIC officer should be encouraged to seek contact with women’s NGOs and psychosocial centres in their respective areas. To implement this recommendation, it is clear that CIMIC units need to be gender-balanced. In some cases, it might not be possible for a man in uniform to have access to organizations that work with women victims of sexual violence, and it might therefore be essential to have women who can facilitate this contact. An unintended positive consequence of recommendations 1 and 2 would be that SFOR personnel would become resource people who could help victims of domestic violence because they would have basic skills to recognize symptoms of PTSD and an overview of people and organizations in the area that could help. In order for the work of the CIMIC officers to be effective, SFOR must have a structure for the coordination of information. It is therefore vital that gender officers be appointed at the MNB level. These gender officers might have responsibility for training CIMIC personnel on gender issues while also being contact people for other organizations that are in charge of gender projects in the region. Finally, the gender officers would report to SFOR HQ on the issue of inter-ethnic rapes.

These recommendations pertain to the SFOR organization as whole, and it might prove difficult for Norwegian authorities to push these issues at this point in time. However, there are possibilities for further influence when the European Union takes over the SFOR mission, most likely in latter part of 2004. Norway expects to be invited to take part, and according to Gunnar Heløe at the Norwegian ministry of defence it is important for Norway to participate. This will provide a renewed opportunity for Norway to be in the forefront of promoting gender awareness in international peacekeeping operations.

References


43 Also because Norway terminated its main SFOR engagement in July 2001.

44 See ‘Norge vil delta i EUs Bosnia-styrke’ [Norway Will Take Part in EU’s Bosnia Force], Aftenposten, 4 October 2003.


Chapter 4

The Temporary International Presence In Hebron: A Civilian International Observer Mission

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Introduction

Exploring the gender aspects of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) will unavoidably lead us two in two directions: First, we will have to look at how Hebron society has traditionally defined its gender roles. Second, we will need to examine the impact of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in general and the second intifada in particular on those gender roles. What role do the local women of Hebron play in the conflict? Are they mere victims, or are they an integral part of the conflict resolution process to which TIPH aims to contribute? In either event, how are they approached and reached, if at all, by this international mission? Are their specific needs and wishes respected, and do they have a voice through this international presence? Also, what can members of TIPH do to optimize empowerment of the local women? What skills do they need to learn, and what rules should be put in place? In order to find a few tentative answers to the questions posed above, I examine the current situation on the ground for this mission. This chapter is based on in-depth interviews with both members of the TIPH mission and members of the local community in Hebron. In addition, a number of former Norwegian observers were interviewed about their past experiences within the mission. The chapter also draws on the existing documents on peacekeeping and gender issues, as well as on publications on TIPH and Hebron in particular and Palestinian society in general.

Contextualizing the Conflict in Hebron

The Palestinian town of Hebron is one of the major cities on the West Bank, with over 120,000 inhabitants. It is situated 50 kilometres south of Jerusalem and has traditionally been one of the hotbeds of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.¹ The main reason for this is that alongside its primarily Palestinian population, Hebron also hosts a Jewish community of about 400 inhabitants. These ‘settlers’ live in the centre of the old city, surrounded by their Palestinian neighbours and protected by over 2,000 Israeli soldiers. In addition, another 4,000 or so live in settlements in the immediate vicinity of the city, the most important one of these settlements being Kiryat Arba, whose inhabitants are predominantly orthodox right-wing Jews,² often from the USA. The conflict in Hebron has a religious background: Hebron is the location of the Ibrahimi mosque for Muslims, or the Tomb of the Patriarchs for Jews. Both groups believe that their forefather Abraham is

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¹ As far back as 1929, the entire Jewish community of Hebron was massacred by the Palestinian population in a rebel attack. Since then, there have been continuous riots and clashes between the Jewish and Palestinian inhabitants of the town.
² In general, Jews from the right-wing camp do not recognize Palestinian sovereignty and claim the West Bank as an integral part of Israel (referring to it as ‘Judea and Samaria’).
buried here, along with his wife Sarah. This makes the city a holy place for both Muslims and Jews, and thus a highly contested area.

Throughout the past 2,000 years, Hebron has been continuously inhabited by both Jews and Muslims, at times living peacefully side by side, often at war with each other. On 25 February 1994, however, events took a turn for the worse. On this day, an Israeli citizen and resident of the Kiryat Arba settlement, Baruch Goldstein, opened fire at a crowd of Muslims praying at the Ibrahimi mosque, killing 29 worshippers and wounding dozens of others. The reactions from the world came soon: the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution (UN Security Council Resolution 904) condemning the massacre. Resolution 904 furthermore called for measures to be taken to guarantee the safety and protection of the Palestinian population of Hebron through, inter alia, the creation of an international temporary force. In addition, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat announced the PLO’s withdrawal from any further peace negotiations with Israel unless the latter agreed to such a presence immediately. This was the start of what was to become the so-called Temporary International Presence in Hebron.

The Temporary International Presence in Hebron: Chronology and Mandate

Following the above-mentioned Goldstein massacre, Israeli and Palestinian officials commenced bilateral talks that resulted in the signing of an agreement on 31 March 1994, after which TIPH came into existence. During the months of May to August, personnel from Norway, Sweden and Denmark were based in the city to monitor the daily situation, but had to withdraw when the Palestinian and Israeli governments failed to reach an agreement on a possible extension of the operation.

In 1996, in the aftermath of the Interim II agreement, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, the political atmosphere was such that a second international presence in Hebron was made possible and an accord was reached by the two sides with regard to the mission’s functions and areas of responsibility. These remained largely the same as those of TIPH I (as the first mission is called), with the addition that the observer force was to report, in the case of specific events and on a bi-weekly basis, to a so-called Joint Hebron Committee, comprised of Palestinian and Israeli representatives from the army and the authorities.

The TIPH mission was extended on a monthly basis throughout 1996 with the consent of the Israeli and Palestinian authorities, until the partial redeployment of Israeli troops from Hebron on 17 January 1997. A new agreement was then signed by the Israeli and Palestinian authorities on 21 January 1997, calling for Norway (which continued to coordinate the mission), Denmark, Sweden, Italy, Turkey and Switzerland to provide personnel to the city of Hebron. The mission has since had its mandate renewed every three months and continues to provide an international presence on the streets of Hebron aimed at ‘observing, monitoring and normalizing the situation’ in the city.

Apart from this, TIPH’s mandate states that ‘in response to the unique situation created in Hebron in the aftermath of the massacre, a Temporary International Presence will be established in the City of Hebron.... The TIPH will assist in promoting stability and in monitoring and reporting the efforts to restore normal life in the city of Hebron, thus creating a feeling of security among Palestinians’. The text then further outlines the mission’s mandate, as well as the tasks of the force personnel. The personnel are to ‘have no military or police functions’, which is particularly important when we contextualize the mission as an international non-military peacekeeping operation.

3 The call for some kind of international presence in the West Bank and Gaza is not new, and had already been provided for in the so-called Declaration of Principles, a document signed by Israel and the Palestinian authorities on 13 September 1993.
The TIPH mandate was drafted and approved by the contributing states and the two local parties (Israeli and Palestinian), and issues related to gender were incorporated neither implicitly nor explicitly within it. Thus, when the mandate states that the TIPH will create ‘a feeling of security among Palestinians’ (see above), no distinction is made between male and female parts of the population. However, the two may have very different needs and expectations, as will be examined below. It is therefore crucial that gender expertise is applied at the planning stage of the mission.

**Gender Aspects of TIPH**

**Recruitment Policies and Gender Division**

Responsibility for the recruitment of TIPH personnel is held individually by the six contributing countries, in accordance with a quota system and rules governing the allocation of certain posts. Therefore, candidates are selected in very different ways depending on their nationality. An further consequence is that the gender quota and (im)balance within TIPH is wholly dependent upon and inseparable from the recruitment policies of the six countries.

When striving for a gender balance and gender mainstreaming of an international mission, leaving selection processes to individual participating countries is not unproblematic. As a result, two immediate recommendations for the Norwegian government would be that:

- **The Norwegian authorities should coordinate with the other contributing states in relation to gender mainstreaming and gender equity (50:50).**
- **This coordination should strive to ensure that women and men are appointed to leadership positions in an equal fashion and that women are represented in the leadership of the peacekeeping operation.**

Italy, for example, recruits its TIPH members exclusively from the so-called *carabinieri*, the Italian special police force. These Italian carabinieri have a specific background. They are used to working in an all-male environment. In addition, back in Italy, they work in a strict military structure where the chain of command is clear and undisputable. The Italian members of TIPH bring this background with them when they travel to Hebron. Furthermore, the carabinieri have not directly chosen TIPH as a mission. They are approached by their commanders and ‘asked’ whether they are willing to serve in Hebron for a period up to a year, and ‘no’ is neither accepted nor acceptable. The Italian contingent is all-male, apart from one woman, who traditionally filled the post of nurse for the mission. However, when in April 2002 the mission was severely diminished in size due to security threats, this particular position was eliminated. When I asked members of the TIPH management about why it was mainly women who were sent home in staff reductions, I was given no clear answer as to whether this was the result of a conscious policy to pick out women or just a coincidence. The Head of Mission denied in an interview that gender motives played a role, suggesting rather that it was ‘people who had only served a short time in Hebron and thus did not know the situation very well’ that were selected to be sent home. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that these were indeed mostly women.

The Turkish contingent has the same recruitment policy as the Italian one. All members of the contingent come from the Turkish military and serve part of their compulsory service in Hebron, again not out of choice. There is a strong chain of command in the Turkish contingent in Hebron,

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6 Some posts are designated to certain nationalities. For example, the Head of Operations is always a Dane. These so-called ‘allocations’ mainly concern the senior posts in the mission, and the distribution among the various nationalities is agreed upon by the six nations.

7 In 2002, the carabinieri decided to let women into their ranks, but when asked about the very low number of women among them, the male carabinieri present in TIPH responded that they believed the application process ‘appears to be too physically challenging for many women’ (interview with Italian carabinieri, Hebron, October 2002).

8 Statements made in interviews with two carabinieri, Hebron, October 2002.

9 Interview with Head of Mission and Deputy Head of Mission, Hebron, October 2002.

10 Interview with Head of Mission, Hebron, October 2002.
with some positions in the mission held by Turkish commanders or colonels. Recently, however, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a female observer to TIPH, who serves in the Community Relations division and is co-responsible for project work with the local population. She is the only woman in the Turkish contingent.

The recruitment of Norwegian observers is split: the Norwegian police are selected by the Politidirektoratet, while civilian Norwegians wishing to serve in Hebron apply to the Norwegian Refugee Council. Once a year, the Norwegian police announces new positions in TIPH internally and circulates the announcements to all police districts in the country. Applications are submitted to and handled by the Politidirektoratet. The Norwegian police force can use up to 19% of its total staff (numbering 8,000 persons) for peacekeeping operations. Police officers interested in serving abroad can either apply directly for posts within a specific mission or send in a general application for service abroad. Those who apply under the latter procedure are contacted when there is a need for personnel.

Police officers wanting to serve in international interventions must fulfil a number of criteria. One of these is that they must have completed at least six years of service in the Norwegian police. An immediate consequence of this is that possible candidates will be well over 30. This has been cited several times as being one of the main reasons why there are so few female applicants.\textsuperscript{11} Many women over 30 are already ‘established’, with families and steady jobs, and have expressed reluctance to leave these behind to serve in conflict-ridden zones.\textsuperscript{12} However, the Politidirektoratet tries to overcome the gender imbalance through an active policy of hiring as many actual women applicants as possible – thus maintaining a policy of positive discrimination towards women.\textsuperscript{13} The main reason given for this policy was the strong message from the United Nations to actively hire more women for peacekeeping operations and international interventions, as stipulated in UN Security Council Resolution 1325.\textsuperscript{14}

The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) is responsible for hiring the civilians working in TIPH. These civilians apply to the Council directly and often have a background in Middle Eastern studies, have lived or worked for longer periods in the region, or have an Arabic background (but with Norwegian nationality). They therefore have the advantage of being familiar with the Middle East conflict, its history, background and politics. In addition, what used to be a plus in applications – knowledge of the Arabic language – has now become a prerequisite for those wanting to work in TIPH. Given that the need for Arabic speakers familiar with the conflict in the mission’s work is indisputable (see below), it is fortunate that the NRC has been successful in finding suitable applicants. The gender quota is much more equal among personnel hired by the NRC, with at times even more civilian Norwegian women serving in TIPH than their male counterparts. The main reason for this is that there is a relatively even gender distribution among students of Middle Eastern studies (Arabic language and political and historical studies of the region). The women hired by NRC are often very young (in their early twenties), and they are often either still studying or have recently graduated. In the past, several personal or relationship conflicts have arisen between these younger girls and older military personnel in TIPH. In response to this, NRC has been forced to rethink its recruitment policy, and in recent months more weight has been attached to the maturity of the applicant.\textsuperscript{15} This is reflected in the average age of current female observers, which is higher than it was two years ago.\textsuperscript{16}

The NRC recruitment policy has primarily focused on candidates’ motivations (as opposed to the Politidirektoratet’s demand of six years’ service, for example). According to an NRC official, it is crucial that the persons sent to Hebron have the ‘right’ motivation,\textsuperscript{17} especially in the light of recent political developments in the region, which have meant that security aspects are stressed

\textsuperscript{11} Interview at Politidirektoratet, August 2002; interview with two police, Hebron, October 2002.
\textsuperscript{12} Interview at Politidirektoratet, August 2002; interview with two female police officers, September 2002.
\textsuperscript{13} Interview at Politidirektoratet, August 2002.
\textsuperscript{14} See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{15} Interview with NRC official, September 2002.
\textsuperscript{16} Based on author’s own counting.
\textsuperscript{17} ‘Right’ motivation: when interviewed about reasons for working in Hebron, some civilians have cited ‘improving language skills’ as their main motivation. Wanting to improve one’s Arabic skills should perhaps not be the primary reason for serving in a mission like TIPH.
much more. Young civilian observers are to be made aware of the security risks involved and how to act and react in periods of extreme unrest and even danger.

The differences in recruitment policy within Norway are interesting when we examine the results of these policies in the field, namely a diverse pool of peacekeepers, each contributing from their own specific background. Even though linguists and police personnel are assigned the same roles within the mission, namely observing the situation in the field and reporting on it to the parties involved, the fact that they have different skills and backgrounds could be used to ensure a more mainstreamed mission, not least when we look at gender mainstreaming. For example, ensuring that there are sufficient civilians/linguists, given the higher percentage of women among this group, would be one way of contributing to gender equity within the mission. Therefore, a further recommendation to the Norwegian government would be:

- **The Norwegian authorities should investigate closely the recruitment policies of TIPH, and apply these policies on a larger scale to all of the peacekeeping missions that Norway contributes to.**

Of course, when sending troops to a mission with such diverse backgrounds and preparing them for the situation in the field, one element is extremely important: training. What training do TIPH personnel receive? What could be improved?

### Gender Aspects of the Training of TIPH Personnel

#### Before Departure

All Norwegian police wishing to serve abroad in a peacekeeping operation have to attend the United Nations Police Officer Course (UNPOC), which is organized three times a year in Oslo and lasts for 14 days. This course is standard for all United Nations peacekeeping personnel, and participants from all over the world attend. Norway has played a role in gathering and selecting the course material, which focuses on how to perform as a police officer in an international intervention in relation to international human and humanitarian rights. The course, however, has no specific gender element and is very broad in its scope. There is no specific focus on any of the missions Norway participates in. Therefore, even after having attended this course, police officers may still have little knowledge of the specific conflict and intervention they are subsequently sent out to. This is experienced by many police as a shortcoming of the course.

In addition, the case of TIPH is a special one. TIPH is not directly comparable to other missions in which Norway is involved, owing to its unique civilian observer-only mandate. Because the mission is unique, it is essential that TIPH observers receive adequate training. In the past, a lack of knowledge about local gender roles has lead to problems between the mission and the local community. There were reports of several incidents involving gender insensitivity on the part of mission staff that offended the local population in such a way that it harmed their trust in the working of TIPH. To avoid similar incidents, recommendations to the Norwegian government might include:

- **When contributing personnel to international interventions that have a civilian component and/or close contact with the local population, the Norwegian authorities should insist on pre-departure education of military and police peacekeepers on**
  - gender dynamics and gender impacts in pre-conflict, armed conflict and post-conflict situations;
  - international humanitarian and human rights laws, with particular attention to the rights of women and girls.

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18 Information obtained from the Politidirektoratet.
19 Interview with police officers at TIPH, October 2003.
20 One incident that was related to me both by local people in Hebron and by a former observer (who had been present at the time of the incident in 1996) involved a young policewoman who decided to go for a jogging tour late at night wearing a tight top and shorts. This violated the local dress code and was witnessed by many locals. The leadership of TIPH was subsequently questioned about this by the local municipal authorities, and it was pointed out to TIPH that this kind of behaviour was unacceptable.
With regard to the other Norwegian employer, the Norwegian Refugee Council, it is notable that the Council organizes a two-day course for candidates that have been accepted, and this takes place in Oslo before departure to Hebron. The course focuses mainly on the history and background of the conflict in Hebron and the Middle East in general, and on the TIPH mission in particular. However, many of the civilians, as mentioned earlier, are already familiar with the Middle East. For them, the more interesting part of the course is the information about TIPH, its work and everyday policies. Nonetheless, specific gender-related topics are not part of this course either. Even though the civilian personnel may be aware of Middle East society in general, a specific gender unit or course highlighting gender relations in Hebron, on the one hand, and gendered relations between the local community and mission members, on the other, would be beneficial.

What is also lacking in the course for civilians is any kind of information regarding security matters, such as when and how to wear flak jackets, helmets and other security gear – information that is vital given the current state of unrest in Hebron and the West Bank. Specific gender elements should also be highlighted in a security course. Should women and men behave and react in similar or different ways during an acute crisis when the situation becomes volatile? How are women targeted differently during a violent episode? Are they victims of a different kind of violence? How can members of TIPH ensure that targeted women are also given an element of security by TIPH’s presence?

Upon Arrival in TIPH

All new observers must take part in the introductory course given at TIPH upon their arrival. This course is organized by TIPH itself and consists of a number of different elements, from security matters to lectures in the history of Hebron and its conflict. The observers also learn their way around the mission and the area of responsibility (‘AOR’) in Hebron, and grow familiar with the cityscape and the traditional hotspots of the conflict.21

This introduction to the mission is vital for its members. It aims at giving all newcomers the same basic information necessary for the carrying out of their function in the mission. The question that needs to be asked here is whether this training also fills in the gaps and is complementary to the training the different members received prior to their arrival. For example, is the security element stressed enough so that civilians with no military or police background receive sufficient information on how to (re)act should they find themselves in the midst of riots? Are the lectures on the history and society of Hebron redundant for those who are already familiar with the conflict, yet perhaps insufficiently thorough for the others, whose knowledge will remain limited?

The introductory course has been provided since the beginning of TIPH. It has been under continuous evaluation and is modified and improved in response to feedback and assessments. Yet, it seems that some elements are still missing. Interviews with observers show that levels of satisfaction with the course vary enough to raise questions. Many of the interviewed former observers have expressed their wish for more information on the local customs and culture of the Hebron society. An understanding of the host community, in this case Hebron, can only ameliorate the workings of an intervention such as TIPH. The interaction between the mission and the society is dependent on mutual respect and understanding of local codes and customs. If no insight is gained or given in these local traditions, one cannot expect the observer, upon arrival, to understand and incorporate them in his or her daily behaviour. Here, the gender aspect is vital. Most of those arriving at TIPH have no knowledge about the gender roles and behavioural patterns of the local society. In order to work as an observer and interact with the local community in the best possible manner and optimize communication, there is a need to understand such roles. A concrete example here is that of dress codes, as mentioned earlier. Another one mentioned to me by observers in the field is the daily greeting pattern between men and women. A foreign man should not shake the hand of a local, Muslim woman – such behaviour is considered too intimate and offensive. Unless an observer is made aware of this, he might act in a way that makes it impossible for a woman to communicate with him, and thus disempower her.

21 Information obtained from Staff Division, Hebron, October 2003.
Consequently, a further recommendation would be:

- **The Norwegian authorities should also ensure that, immediately upon their arrival in the field, all peacekeeping personnel receive training on**
  - the specific gender perspectives of the particular operation the staff are part of, including information on local gender practices, roles and traditions;
  - what good gender-sensitive practice entails, with concrete examples from the field.

There has also been a call for more information and education among Hebronites. Even after over six years of TIPH’s presence in its streets, many of Hebron’s inhabitants are unaware of the role and function of the mission. This leads to misunderstandings and often to frustration with and anger at mission members. TIPH’s mandate is not sufficiently well known among Hebronites, and this leads to expectations that the TIPH observers cannot fulfil.

In order to resolve this problem, TIPH has been making efforts to sponsor education programmes, to provide lectures on its work and role, and generally to try to make its mandate more visible and understandable. For example, observers have gone to local children’s schools to teach the children about security issues in general, and the presence of TIPH in particular. A concerted effort has been made to reach girls and young women by sending female observers to girls’ schools. In addition, TIPH has tried to disseminate Arabic copies of its mandate to the local population, to improve knowledge of the mission and what it can and cannot do for the local population. In view of how this has contributed to the workings of the mission, a recommendation that will further strengthen this relatively new awareness would be:

- **The Norwegian authorities should ensure that relevant information about the mission – such as documents on TIPH’s mandate and structure – is available in the local language. These should be disseminated in different forms and through local media channels in order to reach out to the entire local population, including women.**

- **In general, the Norwegian authorities should encourage cooperation with local nongovernmental organizations and institutions to ensure a widespread flow of information. Here, there should be a focus on cooperation with local women’s organizations in order to reach local women.**

**Gender Consequences of TIPH’s Presence in the Local Community**

It is not easy to measure the impact of the international presence on the local community’s gender dynamics. Here, there are several elements at play. First of all, one must see the Hebron community for what it is – and for what it has become. Hebron is traditionally a predominantly Muslim society, and the majority of its population are practising Muslims. This means that the rules and codes of Islam apply to the cityscape of Hebron. For example, the vast majority of women will be veiled in the traditional hijab, some of them covering their entire faces. Furthermore, relationships between men and women are conducted in ways that are different from what one might see in the West. For example, boys and girls (from their teenager years and upwards) will not be seen together in public, unless a ‘couple’ is officially engaged, which will be arranged by their parents.

Many of the women do not have jobs and are full-time housewives, often with large families to take care of. Often, several generations live under the same roof (especially during times of hardship, like the past two years, with the additional complicating factor that many houses have been

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22 Interview with local family, Hebron, October 2002; interview with the Director of the Hebron Rehabilitation Committee.

23 In one example, the mandate was attached to a small diary and address book that was distributed widely.

24 For example, Ramadan, the fasting month, is strictly observed. Other towns in the West Bank, notably Ramallah and Bethlehem (which has a Christian minority), are known to be more free and Westernized.
destroyed by the Israeli army in reprisals for Palestinian suicide and other terrorists attacks), with separate women’s quarters.

Another important element in this analysis is that Hebron’s social services – such as hospitals, schools and aid to the poor – are predominantly run not by the municipality, the civil society’s elected body, but by Hamas, a right-wing Muslim movement. The influence of Hamas is felt in all spheres of the society, and the organization is widely supported by the population, mainly because of the social services it provides to the community.

However, it is important to note changes that have taken place in recent years. According to several interviewees, both local inhabitants and mission members who have served repeatedly as observers in Hebron, Hebron has become more ‘liberal’. One sign of this is that one can now see girls and women walking the streets in trousers. More women are also working outside of the home. TIPH currently employs one female staff member from the local population, who works in the so-called procurement office as a secretary. In an in-depth interview, she observed that her working at the mission was no longer frowned upon by her mother and girlfriends. However, she pointed out that it would not have been possible for her to work for TIPH four years ago.

The changes in the local society are due to a number of reasons. In many cases, women are forced to work outside the home because their husbands, fathers or other traditional male caretakers are either unemployed, wounded as a result of fights with Israeli troops, in prison or, in the worst cases, dead. The past three years – during which the second intifada, or Palestinian uprising, has led to almost continual violent flare-ups in the city – have brought about many changes. Traditional roles, whereby the women stay at home and care for the children and elderly, are no longer viable. Women have had to redefine their roles in order to survive – and to provide for their families. Changes that have resulted from the warlike situation confronting the Palestinian population have been particularly hard on the women, and cannot be viewed simply as the development of a more traditional ‘emancipation movement’. As Cynthia Enloe has argued, wartime experience is not a liberating force on women’s issues (Enloe, 1998). Many of these Hebronite women have been forced out into the unstable and dire conditions of the local labour market as widows and/or the sole breadwinner of the family. Others are seeking to escape a situation at home where having an unemployed husband can lead to a higher chance of domestic violence and general patriarchal oppression (Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2002)

In conclusion, one can see that Hebron society is undergoing significant changes. However, it is extremely important to see these changes and shifts of mentality in the light of the ongoing conflict. Therefore, the international mission TIPH must approach these dynamics, which have an intrinsic gender element to them, with considerable care. Here, what is needed is gender expertise and knowledge of the local society.

It is difficult to measure exactly the impact of TIPH on the above processes of change in traditional gender roles and attitudes. Some members of the local society in Hebron have in the past accused TIPH of ‘loose morals’. When TIPH first arrived as a gender-mixed mission with no obvious segregation between men and women, this provoked reactions from local society leaders. More specifically, the TIPH leadership was called into several meetings with Hamas leaders from the municipal governing body, who ‘told us that, until they got used to the fact that we had female observers ... these (women) should cover their hair, they shouldn’t walk around like that, it doesn’t fit our culture ... and you should adhere to our customs when you come and visit here’. However, interviews during November 2002 with local Hebronites and the head of a larger local NGO revealed that such attitudes are no longer prevalent. Whether TIPH has contributed positively or negatively to the gender roles and patterns of the local community in Hebron will only become clear over time. In the meantime, however, the question that must be asked is how the international peacekeepers can reach the female part of the population, which is after all half of the target group of the mission, while respecting local gender patterns. How can contact between the

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25 Interview with local family head, Hebron, October 2002; interviews with several TIPH staff members, Hebron, October 2002.
26 Interview with former Norwegian observer, Oslo, October 2002.
internationals from Norway and the other TIPH member-states and the local women – key ‘users’ of the mission – be ensured and optimized?

One practice implemented by TIPH in order to encourage local women to report incidents etc. is that of gender-mixed patrols. TIPH members have been patrolling the streets in a gender-mixed fashion, and over time the local population has accepted this. The patrols most often consist of one woman and one man, and the advantages of gender-mixed patrols have come to be understood by the locals too. Through the presence of a woman in the patrol, local women are given the possibility to report any incidents or frustrations they have experienced. Furthermore, TIPH women are also allowed into houses to talk to the women, something that is prohibited for foreign men. Moreover, Hebronites have come to realize that if TIPH is to carry out its mandate (see above), they must accept the inevitable cultural differences concerning gender roles. The result is that foreign women working as part of TIPH are overall treated respectfully. Significantly, local men will also often choose to talk to a female observer rather than her male counterpart. The reason given for this is that the women are perceived as being more ‘approachable’. Especially when cases of harassment are reported, female observers are considered more desirable as spokespersons. Thus, the following recommendation is made:

- **The Norwegian government should strive actively for gender equity among its peacekeeping personnel so that local women are ensured a female channel of communication to the international intervention.**

Another means of contacting local women and girls is through the work of the mission’s Community Relations division, which is in many ways the most important axis of communication between the mission and its host society, Hebron.

In the mandate for TIPH, it is stipulated that the tasks of TIPH personnel will include:

- to help promote stability and an appropriate environment conducive to the enhancement of the well-being of the Palestinians of Hebron and their economic development;
- to observe the enhancement of peace and prosperity among Palestinians;
- to assist in the promotion and execution of projects initiated by the donor countries; and
- to encourage economic development and growth in Hebron.

Furthermore, the agreement in which the mandate is set out states that ‘development projects ... will be identified by the Hebron municipality and the relevant Palestinian ministries in cooperation with the members countries of the TIPH’.

TIPH’s Community Relations division aims at developing cooperation and deepening the relationship with the local Palestinian community, especially targeting poorer areas and less privileged groups in Hebron. Over the years, there has also been a specific focus on reaching local women, either directly through individual project support or through financing local women’s groups. In general, TIPH supports and implements projects in cooperation with established local institutions, such as schools, universities, cultural centres, women’s centres, local NGOs, sports and youth clubs, labour and handicap organizations, charitable societies and the local media. TIPH also cooperates with other international organizations in Hebron, such as People to People, Save the Children, Defence Children International and Terre des Hommes. As mentioned above, the Community Relations section is also responsible for disseminating information about TIPH’s mandate and work to the local Palestinian population.

During interviews with local families in Hebron during October and November 2002, what became clear was the importance of the Community Relations projects. Indeed, these have contributed enormously to acceptance of and respect for TIPH and its work, and they are highly regarded by the local community. Even though the budget for such activities is limited, and therefore the number of fundable projects relatively small, the goodwill that results is of great value for TIPH. Since TIPH is a purely civilian mission, and thus not able to provide Hebron’s popula-

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28 Interviews with local Hebronites, Hebron, October 2002.
tion with a ‘feeling of security’ (as stated in the mandate) in the strictly military sense, TIPH has and should cultivate its good contact with the local population in alternative ways. The Community Relations section of the mission provides a valuable gateway to the local women in particular, since its budget can be used specifically for women’s projects.

Many women are active within the Community Relations division (one of these being the Turkish lady mentioned above). Often, they are in charge of the projects related to schools, nurseries and women’s organizations, which brings them in touch with many local women. Generally, female Community Relations officers reported that they felt accepted by all parties. For example, the rector of Hebron University and male headmasters of schools are respectful towards the women of TIPH, though they will not always shake hands with them, which would be customary in Hebron. One female officer stated that there were no problems at all ‘as long as you behave the way you are supposed to, according to local codes’.

The different women active in the Community Relations division that were interviewed all expressed dedication to helping the local women of Hebron through support for various programmes and projects. Over the past years, TIPH has contributed to and worked closely with the following women’s organizations:

- The Women’s Charitable Society of Hebron (WCSH), which was founded in 1956 and currently has two branches in Hebron. This organization offers a variety of courses for women – such as sewing, wool-weaving and hairdressing – so that they can learn a trade and earn some extra money. In addition, the WCSH also provides aid in the form of money and food donations to poor women, such as widows etc., especially during the most recent intifada. And in the old city’s centre there is a clinic where women and children can get almost free medical treatment and advice. TIPH has supported the kindergarten and the sewing centre.

- The General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), a nongovernmental grass-roots organization established in 1965 as one of the main bodies of the PLO, with branches in every Palestinian community. The goals of the GUPW include promoting the role and contribution of women in the development process, and providing them with education, training and skill-acquiring opportunities. The Hebron branch opened in July 2000. TIPH has sponsored its furniture, and a curtain-sewing course for 15–20 currently unemployed women (a so-called income-generating project). TIPH has also contributed to an English course for local women.

- The Women’s Development Unit (WDU) of the Centre of Agricultural Services, a nongovernmental organization located in the H2 area of Hebron. The WDU aims at activating Palestinian women through a wide range of developmental projects in the fields of education, health, agriculture, economics, legal rights and family planning. The WDU also starts small income-generating projects, mostly directed towards agriculture. The project funded by TIPH focused on embroidery, to be sold at major tourist sites throughout the West Bank. The main aim is to provide the women involved with a small income, and if the project turns out to be successful it will be expanded to include more women.

In view of the successful cooperation between the mission and the women’s organizations mentioned above, a more general recommendation to the Norwegian authorities would be:

- The Norwegian authorities should encourage civilian missions like TIPH to develop their relations with the local community through the provision of financial support to local NGOs, with a portion of their budgets being earmarked for the funding of local women’s initiatives. This will stimulate mutual trust and openness between members of the mission and local users.
Conclusion

TIPH is a particularly interesting mission to study in the light of gender and gender mainstreaming, first and foremost because of its unique mandate, which is all-civilian. The members of TIPH are present in Hebron to ‘provide a feeling of security to all Palestinians’ living in Hebron. However, in view of the volatility of the local conflict and the limited nature of the mission’s mandate, the provision of such a feeling of security cannot be interpreted in a more traditional military way. It is the search for a new interpretation of the mandate that has left TIPH with continuing challenges, such as to ascertain how the local population can best be reached.

This chapter has focused on the mission’s gendered interaction with local civilians, and with the women in particular. It has analysed the dynamics at play and the traditional roles and positions of the Hebronite woman, while also acknowledging the changes that have been taking place in these roles. The chapter has furthermore investigated the gender dynamics at work within the mission, juxtaposing these with local gender roles, as it were. This has resulted in a list of recommendations that, while drawn directly from a specific study, are of a sufficiently general character to permit them to be applicable to other international interventions. In the light of the changing nature and tasks of today’s peacekeeping operations, where the focus is increasingly on the civilian side of interventions, the TIPH case can contribute immensely to our knowledge through an exploration of the intended and unintended consequences of an international, civilian-oriented, peacekeeping mission.

References


Chapter 5

Conclusion: Implications for Norwegian Authorities

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THIS STUDY, with its goal of investigating the manner in which gender dimensions shape and are shaped by international conflict interventions, has highlighted a number of issues and variations in relation to the three interventions it examines – the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE), the NATO Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) and the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), particularly in terms of how these missions meet with the goals of gender balancing and gender mainstreaming outlined in core UN documents. Based on the lessons learned from these cases, policy recommendations have been formulated that may assist Norwegian foreign policymaking in the field of international interventions.

The cases studies contained in this report provide examples of how examinations of conflict interventions from a gender perspective can take a number of different forms. In the introduction, it was argued that in order to achieve the best use of gender analysis, studies ought to consider the form of the conflict covered, the international actors involved, and the instruments, techniques and time-frame of the particular intervention, as well as the gender dynamics of the conflict. This has been done in this study, and details have been included in the report where relevant. The importance of considering the context of each case has also resulted in the choice of a different gender focus for each of the three cases covered here. First, the study of the UNMEE mission in Eritrea demonstrated that the issue of prostitution – a negative unintended gender effect of the mission – has damaged the reputation of the mission as a whole. Second, the study of the SFOR mission in Bosnia showed how violence against women could and should be a concern for the military components of the Bosnia intervention. Lastly, the TIPH study focused on how cooperation with local women – especially through governmental and nongovernmental organizations – can increase the effectiveness of an observer mission. These are three very important aspects that have been discussed but not sufficiently studied previously. The present report also shows that these different aspects are part of a complex reality that needs to be better understood if we are to fully come to terms with the relevant issues. The study underlines the urgent need for increased knowledge within the operations themselves, particularly in terms of competent gender training and gender-aware leadership, which would require the provision of sufficient financial support.

Crosscutting Themes

The case studies demonstrate that gender mainstreaming is a question of bringing gender awareness into all levels of a conflict intervention. This requires not only new attitudes, behaviour and skills among conflict intervention personnel, but also a new way of talking and thinking about military issues. There is considerable support for such an approach in research on gender aspects of the military and armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the decision to make these alterations is situated at the political level. At a workshop to discuss the suggested policy implications – held at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo on 4 December 2003 – Cynthia Enloe urged
policymakers and academics to develop their language in order to give gender issues the central place in conflict interventions they so urgently need.\(^1\) For example, Enloe argued that there is an inherent danger in labelling gender issues as ‘soft’: this increases the risk of their being considered trivial, as possible to postpone and even as luxury items – in stark contrast to concerns described as ‘hard’ security issues, which are seen as urgent, rational and requiring expertise and unique skills. As a result of such labelling, the second category is likely to receive considerably more attention and resources that the first. Therefore, a major challenge is to describe and frame gender issues as urgent and rational and to ensure that personnel assigned to handle intervention issues have necessary gender skills and gender knowledge. It is also important that such an approach is financially supported, and perhaps even rewarded, particularly in the early stages. Often a new policy, even one formulated with the best of intentions, can encounter resistance from the staff of relevant organizations since it increases their workload without sufficiently increasing the financial support to enable the change.

The cases studies of UNMEE, SFOR and TIPH in this report can be read as different ways of bringing gender issues into a militaristic language and culture, and thereby making gender one of several core concerns for the conflict interventions. Furthermore, UNMEE is the only mission which has come into existence since UN Security Council Resolution 1325(2000) and is therefore obliged to address gender issues in a way in which the other two conflict interventions in this study are not. In keeping with the spirit of Resolution 1325, gender-training courses that involved both military peacekeepers and local men and women were established in the spring of 2001 (see the brief discussion in Mazurana, 2002: 48). Mackay (2001) found that these courses were, for many, the first time that military peacekeepers had spoken to local people in Eritrea and Ethiopia.\(^2\) This demonstrates how bringing gender issues into a peacekeeping operation can open up new channels for communicating with the host population. Despite this promising development, however, the UNMEE operation has also been affected by sex scandals that have seriously tarnished its reputation. This has become a serious political problem, and in the long run has perhaps even affected the very efficiency of the mission. The SFOR case also provides an example of how gender mainstreaming brings new understandings of military issues and can change military language. The core argument in the SFOR study presented here is that sexual violence can and ought to be defined as a security issue, not a ‘soft’ issue, and is therefore of military concern for SFOR. To accomplish this, it is necessary to expand our understanding of security. For example, a focus on sexual violence can be of relevance as part of an early warning system. By ignoring potential increases in inter-ethnic rape in the region, SFOR is not fully able to assess the security situation that it has been assigned to oversee.

A more positive conclusion can be drawn from the TIPH mission, which highlights how contacts with local women’s groups should be central in attempts to improve community relations (though this conclusion can also be observed in the cases of UNMEE and SFOR). Such contacts have enabled the TIPH observers to obtain a more comprehensive overview of the security situation in Hebron, thereby making its information-gathering mission more effective. Moreover, owing to their different situations, men and women in a host society have different opportunities for gathering and discussing information relevant for interveners. Information on how women and men experience their situation within the society can also be relevant for early warning of an increased risk of escalation of the conflict. The three cases also display the need to support developments at the global level in order to achieve a more effective implementation of gender mainstreaming.

Regardless of the advantages of considering gender and the importance of having both men and women involved in conflict interventions, on a practical level the case studies reveal that much remains to be done to improve gender balancing. Developments at the UN level also need to be given support if they are to have a positive effect on this issue. African states have increasingly become targets of the UN’s peace operations. Most likely, Africa will continue to present major challenges for the UN in the foreseeable future. Policymakers claim that women ought to be pre-

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1. Presentation at the PRIO workshop on ‘Gender And Humanitarian Military Interventions & Developing A Gendered Analysis Of The Small Arms Trade’, Oslo, 3–4 December 2003. The workshop was organized by PRIO and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Cynthia Enloe is a leading researcher in the field of gender and armed conflict.

sent in all levels of peacekeeping, for example as police officers in peace operations. However, developments are not exactly moving in this direction at the present time. Indeed, a senior gender adviser for the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) has stated that despite the serious need for women military and civilian police officers, their proportions have steadily decreased.\(^3\) And UN Senior Political Officer Dorota Gierytcz, currently working with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), has argued that nothing is pointing in the direction of an increase of women in peacekeeping operations in the future.\(^4\) Heidi Hudson (2000) also reinforces this view in her article in *African Security Review*. Despite the UN’s seeming awareness of the crucial position of women in peacekeeping, both these women claim that little or nothing is being done to recruit more women. The UN has little or no influence over personnel recruited for peace operations by individual troop-contributing countries. Furthermore, there is an increasing tendency for developing countries to contribute troops to peace operations. Hudson argues that ‘given such enormous challenges in Africa, it is doubtful whether the percentage of women in peace operations in Africa is likely to increase in the near future.... The political, economic and social turmoil on the continent further does not create conditions conducive to the mainstreaming of gender in society, in general’ (Hudson 2000: 18). If it is the case that African women are not participating to an increasing degree in such operations, this is a loss to peacekeeping in Africa. It was clear, for example, that African women in UNMEE were able to communicate with Eritrean women more easily than, say, the Irish UNMEE women.

In relation to SFOR, an increase in the number of women in the mission would facilitate contact with women’s organizations in Bosnia and thereby provide SFOR with a broader network through which it could monitor and assist victims of (inter-ethnic) sexual violence. Of the three studies, the only exception to a low level of female personnel is the latter part of the TIPH case, where an unintended positive gender effect increased the gender balancing of the operation. This shift came as the result of a change in the recruitment policy in Norway, whereby language skills were upgraded as being more important than police training. This resulted in an increase in Norwegian female observers in the intervention, revealing also how the perception of what is considered a required skill has direct effects on the gender balance – as the opportunity to acquire different skills is often affected by gender constructions. An increase in female personnel also enables more effective argumentation for gender issues at the international level, as calls for a raised focus on gender are given increased credibility when countries follow their own arguments and guidelines.

Another finding in the present study was that the mandates of the three missions were not formulated in ways that made gender issues a core concern. With UN Resolution 1325 and gender mainstreaming guidelines now in place, the challenge for existing and new conflict interventions is one of sufficient and competent implementation. International interventions face a complex set of dynamics. This often results in a double effect: in some regards, missions contribute to peace, and in other regards they risk causing further harm. Whether gender mainstreaming and gender balancing will significantly improve this situation remains to be seen, because as yet no operation has received sufficient funding or competent staff to implement gender mainstreaming as it was intended. At present, gender is more a slogan than an actively enforced norm.

**Implications for Norwegian Authorities**

In conclusion, there are certain steps that Norwegian authorities can take in order to take the lead in pushing the intentions behind UN Resolution 1325 forward. Indeed, Norway is in a unique situation to push increased gender balancing and gender mainstreaming within conflict interventions. It is known for its involvement in challenging peace process around the world. Further, Norway also has a reputation as a country in which equal rights and opportunities for women have come a long way. Combined, these characteristics not only give Norway a favourable reputation, but also lead to a unique responsibility. Norwegian authorities are therefore faced with an

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\(^4\) Presentation at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), October 2002.
expectation that Norway will be at the forefront of this development. We would therefore urge Norwegian authorities to implement the following recommendation:

- **The Norwegian authorities should establish a database of women and men from the Nordic countries with knowledge of gender aspects of international issues to be recruited for international positions.**

In addition, we urge the Norwegian authorities to form groups consisting of NGOs, members of parliament and other relevant individuals and groups to follow up on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) more closely than has been done so far. Such and effort has already been established in Canada, and one can envisage a Nordic–Canadian lobby promoting gender mainstreaming for future international interventions. Thus we recommend:

- **A Nordic–Canadian lobby should be established to promote the intentions of United Nations Resolution 1325 in domestic countries as well as within the United Nations system.**

One of the responsibilities of such a lobby ought to be the definition of ‘gender entry points’ in prospective missions in the future. It is clear from the studies in this report that gender concerns cannot be defined in the same way for each conflict. In some conflicts there are women’s networks that can be contacted, while in other conflicts there are not. In some conflicts women are fighters, while in others they are predominantly victims. It is therefore crucial that peacekeeping operations base their gender-mainstreaming efforts on gender analyses of the conflict in which they are deployed.

- **The Norwegian authorities should assist and encourage research on gender dimensions of the conflicts in which Norwegian soldiers are likely to be deployed as part of multinational missions.**

Such an approach would assist in creating gender balance and would likely increase the value of gender awareness as a skill. It is therefore further recommended that financial support be provided for the creation of a Norwegian network (cooperating closely with other networks in the Nordic region) for women working with issues of international security in order to increase women’s knowledge of – as well as encourage, women’s participation in – conflict intervention.

To sum up, what this report suggests is that the time has come for the political implementation of measures such as those described above. Furthermore, owing to the complexity of integrating gender issues, this should involve close cooperation between research and policy development to establish how this process is best to be accomplished.

**References**

Enloe, Cynthia, 2003. Presentation at the PRIO workshop ‘Gender and Humanitarian Military Interventions & Developing A Gendered Analysis Of The Small Arms Trade’, Oslo, 3–4 December. This workshop was organized by PRIO and funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


Appendix A

Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action
(S/2000/693)

Windhoek Declaration

In a world driven by war, women and men yearn for peace and are everywhere striving to resolve conflict and bring about peace, reconciliation and stability in their communities, their countries and through the United Nations and regional organizations.

United Nations peace operations have evolved from peacekeeping, in its traditional sense, towards multidimensional peace support operations. So far, women have been denied their full role in these efforts, both nationally and internationally, and the gender dimension in peace processes has not been adequately addressed.

In order to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations, the principles of gender equality must permeate the entire mission, at all levels, thus ensuring the participation of women and men as equal partners and beneficiaries in all aspects of the peace process – from peacekeeping, reconciliation and peace-building, towards a situation of political stability in which women and men play an equal part in the political, economic and social development of their country.

Having considered these matters in Windhoek, Namibia, at a seminar on ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’ organized by the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and hosted by the Government of Namibia from 29 to 31 May 2000, participants looked at practical ways in which the UN system and Member States can bring the aims set out above closer to realization. In that regard, the Seminar recommends ‘The Namibia Plan of Action’ and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that appropriate follow-up measures are taken to implement it, in consultation with Member States, and that periodic progress reviews are undertaken.

Namibia Plan of Action on ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’

1. Negotiations in Furtherance of a Ceasefire and/or Peace Agreements
   • Equal access and participation by women and men should be ensured in the area of conflict at all levels and stages of the peace process.
   • In negotiations for a ceasefire and/or peace agreements, women should be an integral part of the negotiating team and process. The negotiating team and/or facilitators should ensure that gender issues are placed on the agenda and that those issues are addressed fully in the agreement.

2. Mandate
   • The initial assessment mission for any peace support operation should include a senior adviser on gender mainstreaming.
   • The Secretary-General’s initial report to the Security Council, based on the assessment mission, should include the issue of gender mainstreaming, and should propose adequate budgetary provisions.
   • Security Council resolutions setting up and extending peace support operations should incorporate a specific mandate on gender mainstreaming.
   • All mandates for peace support operations should refer to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, as well as other relevant international legal instruments.
Follow-on mechanisms should be established within the mission’s mandate to carry over tasks to implement fully gender mainstreaming in the post-conflict reconstruction period.

3. **Leadership**
   - In accordance with the Secretary-General’s target of 50 per cent women in managerial and decision-making positions, more determined efforts must be made to select and appoint female Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and senior field staff for peace support operations.
   - A comprehensive database with information specifically on female candidates with their qualifications, both military and civilian, should be maintained.
   - An Advisory Board should be set up within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), preferably with qualified external participation, to ensure that this database and existing lists of female candidates are given due consideration.
   - Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and senior mission personnel should receive an in-depth briefing on gender mainstreaming issues prior to deployment.

4. **Planning, Structure and Resources of Missions**
   - A gender affairs unit is crucial for effective gender mainstreaming and should be a standard component of all missions. It should be adequately funded and staffed at appropriate levels and should have direct access to senior decision-makers.
   - The DPKO-led operational planning teams at United Nations Headquarters must include gender specialists and representatives of other United Nations agencies and organizations dealing with gender issues.
   - All DPKO and Department of Political Affairs briefings to the Security Council, as well as formal and informal briefings to the General Assembly legislative bodies, Member States and other relevant bodies, should integrate gender issues related to that particular mission.
   - There is a need for the financial authorities of the United Nations, particularly the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to give priority to the funding of gender mainstreaming.
   - Lessons learned from current and prior missions on gender should be incorporated at the planning stage of a new mission. To this end, the compilation of good practices on gender mainstreaming should be constantly updated.

5. **Recruitment**
   - The United Nations must set an example by rapidly increasing the number of senior female civilian personnel in peace support operations in all relevant Headquarters departments, including DPKO, and in the field.
   - Member States should be asked to increase the number of women in their military and civilian police forces who are qualified to serve in peace support operations at all levels, including the most senior. To this end, a stronger mechanism than the current note verbale to troop-contributing nations should be developed. Requests to troop-contributing nations could be tailor-made to nations that are known to have suitable female staff, while other potential troop-contributing nations could be encouraged to develop longer-term strategies to increase the number and rank of female personnel in their respective forces.
   - The terms of reference, including eligibility requirements, for all heads of mission components and their personnel should be reviewed and modified to facilitate the increased participation of women, and, depending on the outcome of that review, special measures should be taken to secure this goal.
   - All agreements and individual contracts governing the assignment of personnel, including arrangements for United Nations Volunteers, should reflect the gender-related obligations and responsibilities of those personnel. In particular, the code of conduct should be addressed in all of these documents.

6. **Training**
   - Troop-contributing nations, which are training military, police and civilian personnel specifically for their participation in peace support operations, should involve a higher percentage of women in that training.
- Gender issues should be mainstreamed throughout all regional and national training curricula and courses for peace support operations, particularly those sponsored directly by the Training Unit of DPKO.
- In order to meet United Nations standards for behaviour, DPKO should provide gender awareness guidelines and materials so that Member States can incorporate these elements into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment. Such training should be enhanced by United Nations Training Assistance Teams and train-the-trainers programmes.
- Obligatory induction training with regard to gender issues held upon arrival at mission areas should include the following:
  - Code of Conduct;
  - Culture, history and social norms of the host country;
  - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and
  - Sexual harassment and sexual assault.

7 Procedures
- DPKO should consider the gender mainstreaming mechanisms currently used by United Nations agencies and adopt an appropriate version for their field operations. DPKO directives should be amended to include gender mainstreaming.
- The reporting mechanisms between the field and Headquarters on gender mainstreaming need to be clarified.
- A post for a Senior Gender Adviser in DPKO, to serve as gender focal point for field missions, should be funded under the regular budget or the peacekeeping support account and filled as a matter of urgency.
- The terms of reference of the Senior Gender Adviser should ensure a proper interchange of information and experience between gender units in individual missions.
- The functions and roles of mission gender units/advisers should be announced to all personnel.
- Standard Operating Procedures applying to all components of missions should be developed on the issues of sexual assault and sexual harassment.

8 Monitoring, Evaluation and Accountability
- Accountability for all issues relating to gender mainstreaming at the field level should be vested at the highest level, in the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, who should be assigned the responsibility of ensuring that gender mainstreaming is implemented in all areas and components of the mission.
- The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and other concerned legislative bodies should submit recommendations to the General Assembly promoting gender mainstreaming in peace operations.
- Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to assess the implementation of the United Nations gender mainstreaming objectives should be established at United Nations Headquarters and at peacekeeping missions, in consultation with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women.
- The current format of reporting, particularly with regard to situation reports and periodic reports of the Secretary-General, should include progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions.
- There should be periodic and end-of-mission evaluations, led by an independent external team, of the degree to which the United Nations gender mainstreaming approach and objectives have been integrated into all policies and activities of each peace support operation. The first studies should be on East Timor and Kosovo.
- Reporting mechanisms should be established to monitor the effects of the implementation of the peace agreement on the host country population from a gender perspective.
- Research should be encouraged on the short- and long-term effects of the gender dimension of peace support operations on the host country population. Such research should be designed to strengthen host country research capacity, in particular that of women researchers.
9 Public Awareness

- All possible means should be employed to increase public awareness of the importance of gender mainstreaming in peace support operations. In this connection, the media should play a significant and positive role.
Appendix B

adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,
Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled ‘Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century’ (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,
Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,
Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,
Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,
Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),
Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,
Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,
Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,
1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;
2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decisionmaking levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;
3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children’s Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

   (a) The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

   (b) Measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

   (c) Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;


10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population,
bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate hu-
manitarian exemptions;

15. *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender 
considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and 
international women’s groups;

16. *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women 
and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace proc-
esses and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to submit a report to the Security 
Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the 
United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Secu-
rity Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all 
other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil Military Cooperation unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (UN); see UNDPKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCG</td>
<td>Gender Coordinating Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFAP</td>
<td>General Framework Agreement for Peace (Dayton Agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Red Cross Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICVA</td>
<td>International Council of Voluntary Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPTF</td>
<td>United Nations International Police Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilization Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNB</td>
<td>Multinational Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFLS</td>
<td>Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORDPOL</td>
<td>Nordic Polish Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRIO</td>
<td>International Peace Research Institute, Oslo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>NATO Stabilization Force, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIRBRIG</td>
<td>Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Secretary-General and Head of Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOP</td>
<td>Special Trafficking Operations Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCAS</td>
<td>Centre of Agricultural Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>TIPH</td>
<td>Temporary International Presence in Hebron</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSZ</td>
<td>Temporary Security Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDPKO</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFEM</td>
<td>United Nations Development Fund for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMACC</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission Eritrea/Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIBH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission Bosnia/Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>Observer Mission Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPOC</td>
<td>United Nations Police Officer Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCSH</td>
<td>Women’s Charitable Society of Hebron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDU</td>
<td>Women Development Unit</td>
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