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Kristian Berg Harpviken
ABSTRACT:

This study builds on two theoretical approaches. Hechter's theory of Group Solidarity starts from rational choice assumptions. It emphasises that any group producing joint goods also produces private goods, further it points to the importance of monitoring goods distribution. Resource Competition theory has Barth, Hannan and Olzak as its major proponents. It argues that conflict erupts because political or economic shifts bring populations to compete over resources. Identity is essentially seen as dynamic, as shifts in environment affects which one is most relevant. Most often, modernisation promotes mobilisation around larger scale identities. I argue that the two theories, operating at different levels, are complementary and mutually enriching, and apply them to five cases of political mobilisation among the Hazara.

In 1978, PDPA made a coup in Afghanistan, followed up by severe repression. Local uprisings emerged throughout the country. In Hazarajat, people mobilised in existing patron/client organisation, centred on the mir, a secular, political/economic, leader. Massive external threat made people fight for survival. Period two runs from 1979. A regional resistance organisation was set up, headed by the Sayyid, the traditional clergy. The Sayyid operated a strong regional network, and mobilisation changed from local to regional in scope. The ethnic/sectarian boundary was reinforced by exclusion of the Shi'ia Islamic Hazara from the Sunni, Pakistan-based resistance.

The state had withdrawn from the region, but Soviet's invasion by the end of the year led to a perceived increase of threat. By mid 1981, governmental warfare in the region ceased, and internal competition over organisational foci intensified. The Sayyid ousted the mir from power. Construction of a state-like administration continued. Repressive, and demanding in matters of taxation and conscription, it got unpopular.
From mid 1982, the sheikh, a formally trained clergy, operating Islamist groups, challenged the Sayyid’s regional administration. They enjoyed strategic political, financial and military backing from Iran, and a dedicated core organisation. In 1984 they succeeded. However, civil war continued.

Next, from 1987, attempts at internal reconciliation intensified, and gained momentum with the Soviet withdrawal announcement, illustrating the need for consolidation before entering negotiations over new national power arrangements. Hezb-e Wahdat, the Islamic Unity Party is established in 1989. All existing Hazara groups joined, Islamists dominated. Ideologically Hezb-e Wahdat maintained a balance between Islamism and ethnicism.

The fifth and last phase deals with reactions around the fall of the PDPA government in April 1992. Among the Hazara in Kabul, the mujahedin overtaking was foreseen with fear. As the government’s fall looked inevitable, people mobilised, within any existing organisation. They helped themselves to arms, and took control over public buildings and quarters of the city. Initially, there was no overall coordination, Hezb-e Wahdat came in after a couple of weeks. Controlling an estimated half of the capital’s territory, it became a major player in the competition for national political influence.

The dynamics within each of the five periods above grants considerable support to the two theories applied, and to the utility of seeing them as complementary. Their ability to account for the initiation of mobilisation and collective action is central. I would argue that this theoretical combination could also provide major insights into other instances of political mobilisation. Two aspects stand out. This theoretical combination enables one to account for both structure and agency-level factors, and their inter-relation. Further, it draws attention to releasing factors for mobilisation, without failing to consider the influence of background factors of a more static nature.
The map locates the district centres in Hazarajat, and the major cities in Afghanistan and its neighbouring areas. (Adapted from Geokart, 1987, pp.5-6).

**Figure 1.1. Map of Afghanistan**

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**Front page photo:**
This illustration appears on a calendar for the Islamic year 1373 (1994/1995 in the Christian calendar). It is issued by the Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), which was established in 1989, and represent a broad political mobilisation among the Hazara. The man in front is late Abdul Ali Mazari, general secretary and the leading personality of Hezb-e Wahdat at the time of writing, who was killed March, 13th, 1995.
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Abstract ............................................................................................ 1
1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this work is to provide an explanation of political mobilisation processes within the Hazara ethnic population in Afghanistan from the communist coup in 1978 and through the Communist abdication in April 1992. Within this period of fifteen years, changes in political organisation among the Hazara were as great as the changes within the hundred preceding years.

When Kabul fell to a variety of resistance groups in April 1992, a majority of the Hazara stood behind Hezb-e Wahdat, an ethnically based unity party established in 1989. The sudden appearance of an organisation demanding political rights for the Hazara represented a rupture with the past. After the departure of the communists, Hezb-e Wahdat controlled an estimated half of the capital. Their military and organisational strength provided a favourable basis for launching political demands. The emergence of the Hazara identity as a basis for a broad political organisation was new. Hezb-e Wahdat came to symbolise what many saw as an ethnic turn of the conflict in Afghanistan.

Hezb-e Wahdat was only one of several groups to be based in an ethnic minority. Historically, the rulers of Afghanistan had come exclusively from within the Pashtun ethnic group. This also applied to the period of Communist domination, from 1978 to 1992. The removal of the government in April 1992 was initiated by the so-called Northern Alliance, which consisted of four groups, all representing ethnic or sectarian minorities. Among these groups, Hezb-e Wahdat was the most clear-cut ethnically based organisation. It represented a majority of the Hazara population, and it launched political demands aimed at overturning discriminatory practices. In studying the increasing relevance of ethnic organisation in Afghanistan, the Hazara stand out as particularly interesting.

At the end of the Cold War, armed conflicts between states have become rare. One overview presents 47 armed conflicts in the world in 1993, all taking place within states.\(^1\) Based on the same data-source, it is pointed out that of 82 armed conflicts in the period 1989-1992, at least 41 have been fully or partly ethno-nationalist.\(^2\) The sheer frequency of ethnic conflict is a major reason for undertaking case-studies of ethnic political mobilisation. The conflict in Afghanistan, as a classic Cold War conflict that turned ethnic, seems only to exemplify a broader tendency.

Adding to the general reasons for studying political mobilisation among the Hazara, there is one specific reason, which is highly important. In spite of the considerable international interest and publications activity resulting

\(^1\) Wallensteen & Axell (1993), p. 3
from the war in Afghanistan, political processes among the Hazara have scarcely been studied at all. Authoritative sources on the war in Afghanistan hardly touch the issue.\textsuperscript{3} The lack of documentation of political change among the Hazara is a prominent reason for making them subject to study.

Methodologically, the fact that Hazara politics has been left aside represents a major problem. The availability of reliable source material is restricted. It has proven necessary to invest considerable time and effort in further data collection, in addition to extensive literature studies. The data-problem has been so formidable that it has added a historical, exploratory task to the sociological, explanatory ambition of this work.

As already pointed out, the achievement of a political unity based in the Hazara ethnic identity is historically unique. This simple fact makes culturalist approaches to the current movement less relevant. Out from that starting point, I have chosen to base this study on instrumentalist approaches to ethnic mobilisation. Two clearly defined theories are applied: the theory of Group Solidarity, and the Resource Competition theory. The theory of Group Solidarity focuses on organisational processes from an agency perspective. The Resource Competition theory focuses on inter-group processes from a structural perspective. I have derived theoretical propositions from these theories, and applied them to empirical cases of political mobilisation throughout the study. A crucial point has been to try out an application where the two theories stand in a mutually strengthening complementarity. The period 1978–1992 has been divided into five distinct 'cases' of political mobilisation. The aim is to subject the theoretical apparatus to empirical test, always bearing in mind the limitation of having only five cases within one single population.

The two theoretical approaches are outlined in Chapter 2, where I derive theoretical propositions and establish areas where the theories conflict. Chapter 3 brings in elements from other theories in an effort to reconcile and refine the two theories. Chapter 4 presents a brief social and political background of the Hazara in Afghanistan, before going on to divide the period 1978–1992 into five distinct cases. Chapter 5 presents method. Chapters 6 to 10 deal with the individual cases, presenting empirical findings and discussing each case in relation to the theoretical propositions. The conclusion in Chapter 11 brings up some of the most promising avenues for further research. I then focus on the relation between empirical material and theoretical explanation, in order to evaluate the explanatory contribution of the theoretical application.

\textsuperscript{3} Bradsher (1983); Sen Gupta (1986); Urban (1990); Rais (1994). The exception is Roy (1986)
2. PRESENTATION OF THEORIES

Studies of nationalism and ethnicism tend to favour conceptualisation at the expense of explanation. In Göran Therborn's words, "(...) to explain something means giving a plausible account of why it occurred in a situation in which there was at least one other possibility." (Therborn, 1991, p. 178). Or, as Charles Tilly concludes a brief survey of theories of ethnic mobilisation: "(...) none of them takes more than a shaky grip on the negative question: of the thousands of possible bases for ethnic mobilization, why do only a certain few materialize?" (Tilly, 1991, p. 572).

Here I will present two theories. First, I introduce Michael Hechter's theory of Group Solidarity, a rational choice based approach, which has been applied to analyse the formation of a variety of groups, including nationalist and ethnic parties. It assumes that group formation depends fundamentally on the provision of private goods, but argues that any joint good has aspects of privateness. Goods provision is most effective where members are dependent on the group. Groups demanding much of their membership need control abilities. A weakness of this theory is its inadequacy in predicting actor preferences. Nor does it provide an account of the opportunity structure within which actors act.

Next, I introduce the theory of Resource Competition, based on contributions by Barth, Hannan, Nagel and Olzak. Applying ecological analogy, it focuses on groups in niches of economic or political resources. People have multiple identities, activated in relation to external factors. A dominant factor is political modernisation, which renders small-scale identities irrelevant but might enhance larger-scale ones. Ethnic mobilisation occurs when groups clash over similar interests within the same niche.

Resource competition theory may provide an account of opportunity structure, which was missing in the theory of Group Solidarity. However, the two theories have conflicting views on the role of challenging groups for ethnic mobilisation. They also disagree on which level of analysis is most feasible in analysing ethnic mobilisation. While Chapter 2 concludes that these are areas of conflict, Chapter 3 will bring in other theoretical approaches that might contribute to reconciling these theories.

2.1. THE THEORY OF GROUP SOLIDARITY

2.1.1. The free rider problem

The theory of Group Solidarity is based on assumptions of rational choice.¹ It suggests that members of groups will always attempt to consume the joint good without contributing to its production. This is the free rider problem,

and the claim is that dominant theories in social science fail to resolve it. Or, as Hechter says in his major work on group solidarity: "Whereas sociological analyses begin by simply assuming the primacy of groups, their existence in rational choice theory must always be regarded as problematic." (Hechter, 1987a, p. 33).

For nationalist groups, the free rider problem is severe, because the ultimate goal national autonomy will at an early stage appear as an unrealistic, or at least distant goal. Two mechanisms are instrumental in overcoming the free rider problem, production of private goods, and monitoring of members.

2.1.2. Production of private goods
The main way of attracting a membership is by supplying private goods. Nationalist movements often emerge out of existing groups which supply private goods, as exemplified by the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, or the Islamist movement in Iran. In welfare societies the potential is limited, because modern institutions produce many of these services more efficiently. An important source of private goods is patronage. Even though the sources of patronage will always be limited, the ability to offer key positions or other privileges plays a major role, simply because the sources of private goods tends to be so limited. The function of private goods can also be filled by negative sanctions: the prospects of being punished for not observing group obligations contributes to compliance.

Starting out with Mancur Olson's classic formulation, Hechter proposes a fundamental revision of the public goods concept. Such goods would be characterised both by jointness of supply and non-excludability. Hechter sees the concept of joint goods as more fruitful, and elaborates: "The key distinction relates to the publicness of the joint good. All joint goods can be placed somewhere on a continuum that stretches from publicness to privateness." (Hechter, 1987a, p. 34, italics in original.). Two things follow, modifying Olson's theory. First, groups are established basically in order to produce private goods. Production of joint public goods depends on the prior establishment of a group primarily producing private goods. Second, all joint goods have some degree of privateness. People join groups in order to obtain joint goods, but the more public a joint good is, the greater are the obstacles to its production.

The issue of private goods is closely linked to an argument about dependence. The individual's alternatives will be decisive for the willingness to join and

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2 Hechter (1987b), p. 420
3 Olson (1965); Hechter (1987a), pp. 34–39
sacrifice for the group in question. In Hechter's own words: "(...) the theory proposes that the prospects for solidarity will be maximal in situations where individuals face limited sources of benefit, where their opportunities for multiple group affiliation are minimal, and where their social isolation is extreme." (Hechter, 1987a, p. 54). For nationalist groups, the implication is that groups dependent on extraterritorial ties are less likely to mobilise than others, which is why workers in export-oriented production are less likely to mobilise than free professionals.4

**Proposition #1a): Production of private goods**

Any group produces private goods. Mobilisation for public goods production builds on existing private goods producing groups. Alternative supply limits group dependence and constrains mobilisation.

**2.1.3. Monitoring**

Dependence on private goods as well as the capacity to provide them, is not sufficient to ensure group solidarity. Hechter argues that a second necessary condition for the existence of solidarity groups is capacity to control the actions of members.5 Control is seen as particularly important at an early stage, when few sources of private goods will be available to the group. Similarly, control is crucial when group obligations are comprehensive:

> When a nationalist party demands extensive obligations of its adherents, then it is likely to rely on intensive monitoring that can be generated either in rural communities or in cell-like organizations in cities. Since this would be the best way to capture existing sources of private goods, I would expect that these kinds of organizations are the best suited for the initial period of the party´s development. (Hechter, 1987b, p. 423)

Members can free ride both by not contributing to the production of the goods, or by consuming more than their share of what is produced. Hence, control must address both production and allocation issues. Control costs vary considerably in different contexts; visibility of contribution and consumption play a major role. In some instances control might be so demanding that it becomes the major product of the group. The less realistic the aim of the movement appears, the larger will the control problem be.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

The ability to control is decisive for emergence of groups producing joint goods. Group viability depends on control costs, which again rests on the visibility of production and consumption.

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4 Hechter (1987b), p. 418
5 Hechter (1987a), pp. 49–58
2.1.4. Problematic preferences

A fundamental problem remains unsolved: What are the actors’ preferences, and how are they formed? Ultimately, predicting outcomes necessitates that preferences are specified. Modelling of preferences in retrospect runs the risk of tautology: one assumes the preferences that fit the observed outcome. Adding to the problem: "(...) preferences are both subjective and highly variable (...)" (Hechter, 1987a, p. 31)

Aggregation is a key in establishing the explanatory power of the theory of Group Solidarity. In any population there will be some preferences held by most people, and others held by only a few. The atypical preferences will tend to cancel one another out; the larger the aggregate is, the more relevant will the theoretical predictions be. The aim is not to explain individual behaviour, but aggregated individual behaviour.

This does not give a full answer to the question of preference formation, and Hechter insists that the hunt for solutions to the problem must continue. In the meantime: "(...) the persuasiveness of explanations based upon preferences will hinge on reader's perception of their intuitive appeal." (Friedman & Hechter, 1988, p. 203). As long as the theory is unable to account for preference formation, it is most suitable where preferences are stable and uniform.

2.1.5. Opportunity structure

Individual action is shaped not only by preferences, but also by the social setting in which it takes place.

Solidarity and social order derive not from the biology or personalities of individuals, but from the socially conditioned relations of individual actors to their circumstances. The path to the development of coherent theory lies in combining a concern for individual action with an appreciation for the structural constraints that these actors face. (Hechter, 1987a, p. 186)

Opportunity structures apply equally to everyone who is made subject to them. Their importance to rational choice theory lie in their inherent incentive structures, or in the control opportunities that they generate. Changes in opportunity structure do not affect individual action unless the actor is informed about the change. Several studies have successfully applied

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7 Hechter (1987a), p. 184
8 Friedman & Hechter (1988), p. 214
9 Friedman & Hechter (1988, p. 202) distinguish between opportunity costs and institutional constraints, arguing that the former vary between actors, while the latter apply more broadly. Their arguments and examples indicate that their primary aim is to avoid assuming similar opportunities within broad or imprecise categories. This difference is one of level, rather than subject matter. Opportunity structure covers both.
information as the independent variable, suggesting that as a minimum, any assessment of changed opportunity structure must also consider the information aspect.\textsuperscript{10}

The elaboration on opportunity structure underlines how action is shaped by endogenous factors, but, as Hechter notes, the theory of Group Solidarity does not give any guidelines for their interpretation. It is to theory that can attempt to give such guidelines that I now turn.

2.2. RESOURCE COMPETITION THEORY

2.2.1. Ethnic boundaries

Resource Competition theory has been developed within the tradition of human ecology.\textsuperscript{11} The basic concept is the niche, representing markets of for example labour, housing or marriage. The boundaries of the niche are demarcated by markers of language, racial characteristics, territory or political inclusion in the larger unit of the nation-state. Boundary definition emerges in contact with others, rendering boundary maintenance a necessity for ethnic group existence.

This theory was first introduced in Barth's presentation of ethnic relations in Swat valley, North Pakistan.\textsuperscript{12} He showed the distribution of three ethnic groups in a limited area with three distinct ecological zones that ranged from two-crop fertile valley floor, via one-crop hillsides, to highland pastures with no cultivation potential. The groups have settled according to their production technology, and their organisational and military capabilities. Here, ecology occurs in the direct sense, meaning the adaptation of ethnic groups to specific niches of natural conditions.

Barth's approach represented a turning away from the focus on cultural content in ethnic groups, towards a focus on their social organisation. Processes of boundary maintenance became crucial; ethnic group persistence is fundamentally dependent on the definition of actors, noticeably also actors outside the group. Hence, cultural content becomes important to the extent that actors see it as relevant for defining difference.

To Barth, the actor is rational. Ethnic identities are rational within the niches in which they emerged. This implies that as people cross ethnic borders, they make a strategic choice between the hardship of maintaining an identity from the old niche, or simply changing identity. The possibility of

\textsuperscript{10} Friedman & Hechter (1988), p. 204, p. 211, pp. 214–215
\textsuperscript{11} Major presentations: Barth (1969b); Barth (1994); Hannan (1979); Olzak & Nagel (1986); Olzak (1992)
\textsuperscript{12} Barth [1956], (1981a)
changing identity is a major theme in the case studies presented by Barth and his associates.¹³

2.2.2. Identity and scale

A crucial factor when there is competition over economic or political resources is the scale of the group understood as its size and its spatial extension.¹⁴ Everybody has multiple identities: within one and the same population, there can be different identities belonging to different domains of activity, and there can be different identities of differing scale within a single domain. The proposition here is that context is decisive for which identity one chooses to activate. One example of multiple identities within one domain is the hierarchy ranging from family to ethnic group, with intermediary levels of clan and tribe.

As long as low-scale identities remain functional, no motion towards higher-scale identities is initiated. However, political modernisation contributes to make larger-scale identities relevant. Political modernisation includes efforts by the centre to gain control over successively smaller units in society, leading to decreasing diversity among small-scale identities. While political modernisation renders small-scale identities irrelevant, it might also enhance the activation of larger-scale identities:

Sustained mobilization in opposition to further penetration by the center must be on a scale commensurate with that of the center. Therefore, successful penetration by the center alters the condition of competition among the various bases of collective action in a direction that favors large-scale identities. (Hannan, 1979, p. 256)

Hannan’s argument focuses on which identity is functional in getting access to scarce resources. Defining one identity as central brings the common interest to the fore, excluding whatever internal differences exist.¹⁵

A basic tenet of the competition theory is how the other becomes crucial in defining ethnic belonging. Hence a duality is involved also in the activation of identity:

While ethnic categories in a society are ascriptively delimited and the shifting or flexible ethnic boundaries may originate from forces outside the group in question (i.e. be ascriptive), shifts in ethnic boundaries may also

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¹³ See Barth (ed.), (1969a). Barth himself has demonstrated how persons who feel marginalised in the relatively egalitarian Pashtun society have ‘become Baluch’. The Baluch organisation is patron-client based, and provides to converts an acceptable position and interest maintenance.

¹⁴ Barth (1978); Hannan (1979). An interesting application is Grønhaug (1978)

¹⁵ “An example of shifting levels of ethnic identification may be found among the Pushtun in Afghanistan, who, since 1980, have conducted a guerrilla warfare against Soviet and Afghani military forces. The larger religio-linguistic boundary serves as the basis for Pushtu identification and organization vis-a-vis Soviet and Afghani government troops, but this larger boundary gives way to smaller clan divisions among Pushtu when issues of local importance are involved.” (Nagel & Olzak, 1982, p. 129)
originate from forces inside the group (i.e. be strategic). The coincidence of these two forces (ascriptive and strategic utility) is an especially powerful impetus to ethnic mobilization. (Nagel, 1986, p. 96)

The point is valid for categories and their relation to mobilization in general. Here, the standard example is the inflexible ethnic boundaries emerging when a mobilized ethnic group gains access to the state along ethnic lines.

Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale
The politically relevant scale of identity, chosen among the potential identities available, reflects the scale of the challenging group.

2.2.3. Competition and modernisation
When group boundaries and niche boundaries are the same, equilibrium exists. In the basic terms of the theory, competition occurs when the balance of niche-control is disturbed, leading to a situation of fundamental niche overlap, hence a potential for ethnic competition. After a period of conflict, groups will tend to find a new equilibrium, with ethnic boundaries drawn in accordance with the changed economic and geographical boundaries.

Building on Barth's approach, Hannan underlines that there is no logical necessity that only one group can occupy a given niche. An equilibrium between two groups within one niche is conceivable, but: "(...) the greater the niche similarity of two resource-limited competitors, the less feasible it is that a single environment or habitat can support both of them in equilibrium." (Hannan, 1979, p. 263)

To analyse the effects of modernisation on ethnic mobilisation, and how it enhances large-scale at the cost of small scale identities, Hannan insists, two processes have to be studied simultaneously. The competition between organisations that follow one particular identity, and the competition between different identities for members, are inherently interconnected.¹⁶

Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.
Mobilisation is most likely where economic and political shifts make intergroup competition over economic or political resources more frequent.¹⁷

¹⁶ Hannan (1979), p. 273
¹⁷ Propositions 2a) and 2b) are closely intertwined. The economic and political shifts that lead to intergroup competition (#2b), are the same shifts that makes one particular scale of identity relevant (#2a) Hence, the analytical distinction between the two is less clear than the distinction between #1a) and #1b), and an argument on #2a) will always depend on the argument on #2b), and vice versa.
2.2.4. Mediation

Hannan is occupied with mediation between micro and macro. He does not necessarily accept that the aggregation of individual actions at the micro level can constitute processes at the macro level. Introducing the idea of 'multilevel systems', Hannan questions the widespread practice of treating both organisations and individuals as rational actors when studying large-scale social systems. The question is derived from the fact that an organisation is itself the result of interacting individuals, but organisational processes do often have unintended consequences. Thus there are already three layers, further complicated by the fact that individual access to the macro level happens both through the organisation and directly. According to Hannan, sociological theory has shown little ability to deal with more than two layers, while most empirical macro-sociological problems would involve a number of layers.

The solution Hannan presents takes Barth as a starting ground, but rejects his insistence on individual orientation. In fact, Hannan's solution is the absolute opposite. Referring to recent game-theoretical work: "A major result is that slight variations in the rules of the game produce very large differences in equilibrium outcomes." (Hannan, 1992, p. 128). The uncertainty makes Hannan propose that studying macro phenomena directly in the form of selection mechanisms might be a better solution where there is uncertainty about the mediation from individual action.

2.3. CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THEORIES

The two theories outlined share views on several points. They both see ethnic mobilisation as a political phenomena, rather than being concerned with the emergence of a specific cultural content. Both are occupied with organisational processes, although the focus is on internal and external factors respectively. Lastly, both claim to have an inherent explanatory potential, although they both suffer from certain shortcomings.

Hechter's adherence to methodological individualism does not make it a theory of the individual. His aim is not to explain action at the individual level or on the small-group level, but to explain social outcomes of aggregated actions. For this, he needs to be able to account for preferences and for opportunity structures. Preferences prove problematic, and scant guidance is given, except that a plausible account is required. Concerning opportunity structures, there are several candidates of a certain reputation to choose from.

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18 Hannan (1992)
19 Coleman (1990), is a proponent of viewing organisations as actors in inter-organisational analysis.
20 Hannan (1992), p. 133
One candidate is the theory of Resource Competition. Its adherents have often applied aggregate data to account for factors conducive to ethnic mobilisation. The basic claim is that modernisation favours larger-scale identities, of which ethnicity is a favoured candidate in many contexts. Rational actors rally around larger-scale identities in order to obtain valued resources.

The two theory positions disagree on which level of analysis is appropriate, and both explicitly disregard the focus of the other. Hechter would argue against competition theory, in favour of relative deprivation theory. His rational choice approach does not justify this choice. Hannan does not necessarily see rational choice theory as wrong, but because the aggregation mechanisms that make societal consequences out of individual actions are so complex, he doubts its explanatory power. The two theories diverge on what the appropriate level of analysis is.

Hechter further claims that success is linked to the individual's dependence on the group, and the group's sanctioning capacity, both of which are facilitated by group isolation. Resource competition predicts the opposite: conflict emerges where one ethnic group gets challenged by another on its controlled niche, and that is when isolation is replaced by competition. The theories also disagree on intergroup relation: is it isolation or competition that promotes mobilisation?

In the following chapter I will try to resolve these two differences. Elements from other theories of political mobilisation will be brought in to reconcile the two theory positions.
3. RECONCILING THE THEORIES

The following chapter will place the two theories reviewed in Chapter 2 more widely within the field of ethnic mobilisation by bringing in elements from other writers. Two areas of contradiction were identified in Chapter 2, one dealing with intergroup relations, and the other with level of analysis. These two contradictions will be of primary concern here, and insights from other sources will be exploited in order to resolve these differences.

The resource concept will be further refined, drawing on Resource Mobilisation theory. Resources play major but differing roles in the two theories discussed either as incentive for action, or as focus of conflict.

Turning to the role of others, a line is drawn between the role of the challenging group, and the role of an audience from which support can potentially be drawn. It is proposed that the competition thesis needs to consider the existence of intergroup ties. Given this adjustment, there is no theoretical conflict over intergroup relations.

Lastly, I will discuss organisational aspects. Leadership issues play a central role in Hechter's writings; here I shall argue that the emergence of a new leadership is of major concern to a mobilisation process that starts out reactively. With a focus on mobilisation, the importance of existing organisation is emphasised. Establishing the importance of both organisation and context for an understanding of political mobilisation, I then conclude that the two theories are in fact complementary: the difference on level of analysis tends to be a strength, not a problem.

3.1. RESOURCES

Jo Freeman has offered a simple scheme of resource types, dividing them into intangible and tangible assets. The intangible are human resources, on which any social movement is dependent. The tangible are principally interchangeable, at least up to a certain point. Examples are money, space and media access, but any physical asset could be added to the list. The two kinds of resources are ideal types; for example the possession of territory is hardly interchangeable to the extent that money is.

A principal distinction between reactive and proactive mobilisation is outlined by Charles Tilly. He points out: "The poor and powerless tend to begin defensively, the rich and powerful offensively." (Tilly, 1978, p. 75). Further, he emphasises that while proactive mobilisation tends to be top-down, reactive mobilisation tends to be bottom-up. An extreme case of proactive mobilisation is preparatory mobilisation, where resources are

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1 Freeman (1979). For a survey of alternative schemes, see Jenkins (1983), p. 533
accumulated in preparation for a potential mobilisation opportunity. There tends to be a close relation between Freeman's scheme of resources and Tilly's scheme of mobilisation: Reactive mobilisation depends heavily on intangible resources, while proactive mobilisation is more dependent on tangible ones.

The theory of Resource Mobilisation is frequently applied in explaining political mobilisation. It sees the group's accumulation and investment of resources as the key to ethnic mobilisation. It assumes that grievances are always in rich supply. The likelihood of success depends on strategic factors. Resource mobilisation theorists most often operate with rational actors. The scope of the theory appears primarily to be instances of proactive mobilisation, as the ability to stockpile resources is in focus. However, the theory can handle reactive mobilisation, by seeing successful mobilisation under threat as dependent on the group's ability to mobilise resources for its defence.

While Resource Competition theory focuses on the resources which are subject to conflict, it does not reject insights from Resource Mobilisation theory. Olzak concludes that both "(...) hold that increased access to resources to ethnic populations increases the likelihood of ethnic collective action." (Olzak, 1986, p. 22, italics in original). Her main criticism of the Resource Mobilisation theory is different. Olzak wants to establish a distinction between solidarity and collective action, claiming that resource mobilisation is inadequate for explaining the latter. This distinction invalidates the assumption that collective action necessarily follows solidarity, and opens the way for explorations of solidarity as a consequence, not only a cause, of collective action. Olzak thinks this criticism is equally valid for Hechter's approach. I consider the distinction between group solidarity and collective action useful, but do not see it as invalidating the core argument of Group Solidarity theory. According to the competition argument, collective action is unlikely to occur unless there is conflict over valued resources. Further, according to group solidarity theory people are unlikely to act unless incentives are available, either in the present or as the outcome of collective action.

In empirical applications, resources might cause a different problem for competition theory: "The problem created by the role of resources stems from the fact that ethnic groups that are in a competitive situation with other ethnic groups generally have more resources than those that are segregated into lower class positions." (Medrano, 1994, p. 11) Hence, what appears to be an effect of competition on mobilisation might really be a spurious effect, caused by resources. The ideal research design would therefore control for the effect of resources.

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2 For influential contributions, see Oberschall (1973); McCarthy & Zald (1977); Tilly (1978)
3 Olzak (1992), pp. 5–7, pp. 182–183
3.2. RELATION TO OTHERS

Mobilisation makes sense only in relation to some other, as access to resources goes through depriving somebody else of their possession. The focus on the dynamics of intergroup relations is the strength of Resource Competition theory. But this extends further than the challenging group. The outcome of conflict depends to a large extent on the ability to foster support beyond the involved parties: "If a fight starts, watch the crowd, because the crowd plays the decisive role." (Schattschneider, [1960], 1975, p. 3). The outcome of conflict inherently depends on the ability to increase one's own resource base, through improved access to resources. An important distinction to bear in mind is the one between the other as a challenging party, and the other as a third party, although the concept of 'the other' as applied here covers both.

A crucial other is the state, either as dominated by the challenging group, or as influential on intergroup relations through its policies. For Resource Competition theory in its more recent variants, ethnic mobilisation is most commonly the result of state penetration, encouraging larger-scale organisation. A central concern is the political recognition of ethnicity. The Lijphart model of consociational democracy comes under attack, as it emphasises the historicity of conflicts. Granting of rights along ethnic lines will be at the expense of other boundaries. "To the extent that the political centre acknowledges and/or institutionalises ethnic differences, ethnic mobilisation is increasingly likely." (Nagel & Olzak, 1982, p. 137).

Meyer, Boli-Bennet and Chase-Dunn emphasise the fundamental duality of the modern state: "The modern state is both corporate and representative, both the state and the subgroups increase their power and participation in society. The question is, whose interests are reflected in this expanded power and participation?" (Meyer et al., 1975, p. 234). Resource Competition theory would agree that both state expansion and political participation are crucial elements in political modernisation. But, participation is not a process from within the group. It is principally initiated by external factors, and state expansion is a major contributor. This is not to say that participation is a mere reflection of state manipulation: once ignited it develops a logic of its own.

The insistence on isolation inherent in Hechter's framework needs clarification. If taken to its extreme it contradicts Barth's basic insight of the necessity of knowing something else in order to define oneself. What is in focus here is that the less intense the intergroup relations, the larger the

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4 Nagel (1986), p. 102, p. 107
5 Lijphart (1977)
potential for mobilisation. Oberschall has added that the existence of ties between elites across groups is counter-productive to mobilisation.  

Criticism of Resource Competition theory is often based on Deprivation theory. Mobilisation is explained by the source of discontent. Deprivation theory is reminiscent of the idea about reactive mobilisation: underprivileged groups mobilise when conditions worsen. It is assumed that such groups are segregated from other groups, and segregation is frequently applied as indicator in comparison of the two theories. Building on insights from Deprivation theory, Belanger and Pinard propose an amendment of competition theory: "(...) the competitors' relationship with each other must be as purely competitive as possible, or to put it another way, as uncomplementary as possible." (Belanger & Pinard, 1991, p. 449, italics in original)

Herein lies a potential solution to the theoretical conflict on intergroup relations noted in Chapter 2. For Resource Competition theory to make sense, it must acknowledge what is really a consequence of the theory. To the extent that separately organised groups compete over the same resource, mobilisation is promoted. Argued from an organisational angle, the more extensive relations members of one group have with members of another, the less will functions be exclusive to the group, and ultimately, the less will it be a group. To conclude, the apparent conflict between group solidarity and resource competition theory can be resolved by an additional qualification.

Addition to proposition #2a) Mobilisation scale
Complementarity in group relations affects mobilisation negatively.

3.3. ORGANISATION

3.3.1. Leadership
Hechter is occupied with the issue of leadership, which relates to his concept of private goods. He emphasises patronage as a major factor for recruitment to solidary groups. In this context patronage refers to positions within the movement, or positions under its influence. According to Hechter, goods that can only benefit the few can still play a major role. In a recent comparative analysis of the emergence of nationalism in Estonia and Ukraine the incentives of elites are crucial in the argument. Estonian intellectuals benefited greatly from language reforms, and from cultural reforms in general. Additionally, future political influence served as an incentive. In

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6 Elaborating on the analysis of Barrington Moore, Rokkan makes the same point, but from the perspective of integration within the nation-state; "The closer the ties of interaction and co-operation between rural and urban economic elites, the greater the chances for successful transition to a full-suffrage competitive democracy." (Rokkan, 1975, p. 586)
7 For influential contributions, see Hechter (1978); Nairn (1977)
8 Furtado & Hechter (1992)
line with the theoretical framework of Group Solidarity, a key factor of analysis is thus "(...) the effect that declining intra-Party solidarity had on local Party strategies towards nationalist groups." (Furtado & Hechter, 1992, p. 178)

The potential benefits of joining, or at least being accommodative to, the nationalist movement soon outmanoeuvred the Soviet Communist Party. It is noteworthy that the basic explanatory factor here is not immediate but expected benefits, depending on the success of the mobilisation.

Turning to more recent applications of Resource Competition theory, we find no direct treatment of leadership. Leadership is an issue to the extent that it is a part of pre-existing organisations and networks, and as such it is indirectly credited as a resource in the mobilisation process. This apparent neglect of leadership is not a denial of its importance. Rather it can be read as a logical consequence of the refusal to base macro-analysis on micro dynamics, as formulated by Hannan.

Oberschall has drawn a line between economic and intellectual elites. While intellectual elites are important for any social movement, the participation of economic elites will vary from zero to substantial. Oberschall bases this on a simple risk-reward model: the lower the risk and the higher the rewards, the higher the probability that somebody join a movement. Economic elites often have much to lose due to their attachment to immobile values. They might also have little to gain, compared to the benefits of 'business as usual'. By contrast, the capital of the intellectual is knowledge, which is less often at risk in unrest. On the other hand, the intellectual has a background in the elite in general, and these connections can serve as a safety net.\(^9\) Oberschall introduces the term 'social capital' for this network.\(^10\) The issue is that economic and cultural elites both benefit from the basically same social capital.

Reactive mobilisation often becomes proactive, once the population is mobilised it might opt for more than mere protection of what it has. Whereas reactive mobilisation tends to be bottom-up, its transformation into a proactive movement is unlikely unless it possesses a potential new leadership, likely to be recruited from the intellectual elite. Hence, Oberschall's propositions on elite conflict would relate mainly to mobilisations that are originally reactive.

Mobilisation that starts out proactively, tends to depend on established leaders. At stake is normally a fight to defend existing order, or to improve

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\(^9\) Oberschall (1973), p. 165

\(^10\) For elaboration of the concept of 'social capital', see Coleman (1990), p. 300–325
the situation of a favoured group. In such cases, the balance between economic and intellectual elites is unlikely to be disrupted.\footnote{Field & Langley (1980) distinguish between unified and disunified elites in a manner resembling how elites are related to the distinction proactive versus reactive mobilisation here.}

3.3.2. Mobilisation

A new variety of the sociological dichotomy is brought in by Charles Tilly in his book 'From Mobilisation to Revolution' (Tilly, 1978, pp. 62–69). The idea goes back to an unpublished manuscript by Harrison White, and draws in particular on the work of George Simmel. The basic idea is that all populations can be described in the terms of category and network. A category describes a population which shares a certain individual characteristic that distinguishes the members from others. This theory presupposes that both holders and non-holders recognise the characteristic. Examples of categories could be Norwegian, Shi’ia Muslim, or subsistence farmer. A network describes social ties, direct or indirect ones. This can be the people who during a specific period are in face-to-face contact with one person, or with someone who this person has been in face-to-face contact with. Other examples of networks given by Tilly are "a chain of people who pass gossip or rumours", or "the web of debts among people who have borrowed money from one another." (Tilly, 1984, p. 29).

To the extent that a population fits the description of both a category and a network, it forms a 'catnet', resembling the common understanding of the word 'group'. Catnets are formed for example by the family, workplaces, companies, parties or states. But these examples also prove that most populations do not score equally high on both dimensions, as given set of individuals can get from zero to full on both dimensions. The two dimensions can be drawn on the x- and y-axes in a diagram, indicating its score on 'netness', the degree of network; and 'catness', the degree of category. Any point within the scheme could correspond to existing phenomena, the 'casual crowd' being the one that scores low on both catness and netness. Further Tilly points out: "The idea of organization follows directly. The more extensive its common identity and internal networks, the more organised the group. CATNESS x NETNESS = ORGANIZATION." (Tilly, 1978, p. 63). This concept of organisation emphasises the inclusiveness of the group, "(...) how close it comes to absorbing the members' whole lives." (Ibid., p. 64). Through this concept, Tilly underlines the crucial importance of existing organisation for mobilisation.

Hechter doubts the possibility of ethnic mobilisation on its own terms, as the success of any such movement will seem utopian to actors. At an early
stage, mobilisation can be enhanced only by the provision of private goods, and by strict membership control. This is facilitated by relative isolation of the group in question, as that will give few or no alternatives for action available in the marketplace. Hechter denies the possibility of direct establishment of groups seeking public goods:

If some public good-providing organization in a territory did not go through this first stage (that is, if it did not grow from the roots of some private good-producing institution), such evidence would contradict the thrust of this analysis. (Hechter, 1990, p. 21).

What then qualifies as a private-good producing group? Hechter's answer seems surprisingly close to one which could have been formulated by Tilly: "(...) propinquity and a common language are likely to be important for the emergence of groups." (Hechter, 1987, p. 33)

Resource Competition theory does not address the issue of organisational emergence in a form which makes it directly comparable to the catnet-thesis. However, the prediction is that with modernisation, people will turn towards larger-scale identities, in a process of "(...) competition among organisational foci for members." (Hannan, 1979, p. 273). This formulation points towards a situation where identities at different levels are competing for each individual. But, multiple identities can coexist over time; different levels are activated in different contexts. The emphasis on competing identities at various levels is different from the emphasis on competition for individual members among groups at the same level. Rather, identity at one level tends to decide which general level is of relevance. The catnet-thesis is not an implication of resource competition theory, but it is a proposition about organisational emergence which is in harmony with it.

The catnet is an archetypical intangible asset. Depending on established social relations, it is hardly interchangeable. As indicated above, reactive mobilisation is more one-sidedly dependent on intangible resources than proactive mobilisation is. This argument rests on assumptions about the structural location of the mobilising group. In line with rational choice reasoning, people who possess limited resources might have more to gain by mobilising. On the other hand, if they lose, they lose everything. The dependence on a narrow and unidimensional resource base makes it unlikely that such people will mobilise unless they are forced to. On the contrary, the rich and powerful can involve parts of their resources, maintaining something to fall back on if the action should fail. No mobilisation is independent of intangible resources; the catnet-thesis is central in both

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12 Hechter apparently applies the word propinquity in its double sense, meaning both closeness in space and in family, as does his main reference. (Simmel, [1922], 1955, pp. 128-130)
reactive and proactive mobilisation. Its role tend to be critical in proactive mobilisation building on reactive, as there would normally be no scarcity.

What is the interplay between leaders and people in mobilisation? How does it vary between different mobilisation contexts? Discussing 'poor people's movements', Piven and Cloward reject the idea that leaders create social movements: "Once protest erupts, the specific forms it takes are largely determined by features of the social structure. Organisers and leaders who contrive strategies that ignore the social location of the people they seek to mobilise can only fail." (Piven & Cloward, 1977, p. 36).

Hechter's theory would assume that no mobilisation can take place unless it goes through a first stage of private-goods production. This is why his theory is in harmony with the catnet thesis; the centrality of existing social relations for mobilisation must stand. Further, this is why the poor and powerless have problems in mobilising successfully. They tend to depend on relations that make them dependent of the established order; hence they are more likely to fall victim to 'divide et impera' than to have among their members the private-goods producing groups necessary for successful mobilisation.

The Group Solidarity approach has here been related to several central contributions within the field. It appears to be prepared to deal with the specificities of various contexts of mobilisation. Its propositions apply to both the mass and the leadership levels. Further, the emphasis on the necessity of pre-existing groups producing private goods enhances understanding of the problem that reactive mobilisation has in getting organised. The Resource Competition thesis does not address the details of organisational emergence, and my aim here has been limited to avoid formulations which would contradict that theory.

The principal compatibility of Group Solidarity and Resource Competition theory is now established. I would further argue that the debate above on intergroup relations underlines the usefulness of combining the two. Without an organisational focus, we cannot understand intergroup relations. Without a focus on factors affecting the conditions of intergroup competition, we cannot understand group processes. The apparent conflict at the level of analysis can be turned into a strength by being seen as complementary and compatible. The utility of this can be further appreciated through empirical studies.

#3 Theoretical complementarity

The theory of Resource Competition and the theory of Group Solidarity are mutually complementary in explaining political mobilisation.
4. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter is designed to give a historical description of political organisation among the Hazara, and to processes of state expansion, up to 1978. It provides a transitional framework towards operationalisation of the key theoretical concepts and issues that I have been considering in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

A first section deals with ethnicity and ethnic boundaries. I will introduce the Hazara ethnic group, focusing on the markers of its ethnic boundaries, arguing that distinct phenotype, territory, religion and social status have been crucial and mutually reinforcing factors. I also present the major ethnic groups of Afghanistan. This contributes both to the understanding of political power sharing, and gives further insights into the ethnic boundaries between the Hazara and other ethnic identities.

As to the resource situation of the Hazara, I argue that following state expansion, their key resources became subject to conflict. Political influence is central here, because state expansion implies that control over other resources depends on political decisions.

I then focus on the potential for competition between identities within the Hazara population, linked to a presentation of existing elites and leaders in Hazara society. In rural society there is an alliance between the worldly mir and the religious sayyid, both operating in patron/client relations, with limited potential for larger scale mobilisation. Recently there has emerged a Shi‘ia Islamic clergy, as well as a secularly oriented young intelligentsia. Both are politically involved, and build hierarchical organisations. The clergy can potentially activate the ultimate Islamic identity; the secular intellectuals can activate ethnic identity.

Next, a political history is given. I look at relations between the state and the Hazara since 1880, the starting point for state control of Hazara territory. Importantly, expanding state control has not been reflected in political influence. The political organisations emerging from the 1960s are presented: Islamist, leftist and nationalist. These are all marginal elite organisations with little popular support outside urban centres.

Lastly, the design for the coming chapters is presented. Drawing on elements from this chapter, my focus will be on the points in time when there was a change in the scale of political organisation. This is also the key to the periodisation into succeeding chapters.
4.1. ETHNICITY IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1.1. Ethnic boundary markers for the Hazara

Ethnic boundaries activate traits to distinguish between populations. This section will introduce five central features of the Hazara. Ranked by assumed degree of permanence, these features are phenotype, territory, religion, social status and dialect.

The strongly mongoloid appearance of the Hazara makes it easy to distinguish them from the neighbouring populations. Most Hazara have broad faces with flat noses and narrow eyes, scant facial hair, and are shorter of build than their neighbours. It remains unclear what their origin are, but Eastern Turkic or Mongol descent have been suggested.

Hazarajat, the land of the Hazara, comprises the mountainous central areas of Afghanistan. It has distinct boundaries; a traveller knows when the Hazara territory is entered. While other areas of Afghanistan are multi-ethnic, only the Hazara live permanently in Hazarajat. While other ethnic territories extend into neighbouring nation-states, Hazarajat is landlocked in the middle of Afghanistan. The geographical boundary arguably coincides with a political boundary between distinct populations.

The overwhelming majority of Hazara are adherents of Imami Shi’ism, although a few are Isma’ili Shi’ia, or Sunni. Ethnic boundaries are qualified by membership in religious sects, so that Imami Shi’ia Hazara would often deny their ethnic affiliation with the Isma’ili Hazara despite their shared language and phenotype. Sunni Hazara in Bamiyan reportedly describe themselves as Tajik, and to convert is described as to 'become Tajik'. As a religious minority in Afghanistan, the Shi’ia have oriented themselves towards Iran, particularly for religious guidance. Institutionalised in Islam, but most frequently practised by Shi’ia Muslims, is taqiyyah, the dissimulation of one’s religious beliefs to avoid persecution. The distinct phenotype of the Hazara has hindered widespread use of taqiyyah, however. Religion and politics are closely intertwined in Afghanistan, and the boundaries between religious communities have far-reaching effects. Disputes frequently revolve about questions of legal application. Islam, in its several varieties, is a law code. The law of Afghanistan refers to Islamic law, of the Hanafi Sunni variety. Any court decision will potentially actualise the

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2 Canfield (1972), pp. 2–3; Poladi (1989), pp. 47–53
3 Canfield, (1984b), p. 328. Similar ethnic categorisation is reported in the North (Tapper, R., 1984b, p. 240)
4 Dupree (1979b), Glassé, (1989,) p. 397
5 Canfield (1984b), pp. 222–224; Canfield , (1972)
sectarian domination, so law application becomes a major arena for boundary demarcation.

In the case of the Hazara, the implications of a social boundary are so severe as to function as an ethnic marker: "(...) there was the thoroughly effective subjugation of one ethnic group by another, and of one religious sect by another - a situation which, I suggest, progressively appears more like the social distinction between groups in a caste hierarchy." (Canfield, 1972, p. 6). The social boundary in itself has been nearly inescapable for the Hazara; even those who have managed to transcend it are constantly reminded of it. A good indicator on inter-ethnic status relations is marriage preferences. The Hazara intermarry with most groups, but mainly as wife-givers, not wife-takers. A Pashtun almost never gives a wife to a Hazara, and when a Pashtun marries a non-Pashtun woman, it is hardly ever his first wife.

Language is less distinctive, as the Hazara speak Persian, the lingua franca of Afghanistan. The dialect called Hazaragi contains, unlike Persian, many words of Turk and Mongol origin. Urban Hazara and those who frequently visit towns or markets have adjusted to Dari, the Afghan variety of Persian. Dialect boundaries do not necessarily coincide with ethnic ones: "What did seem to correlate with Hazaragi was the speaker's place of residence." and "(...) Hazaragi correlated with restricted contact with the central plains and the national society." (Canfield, 1973, pp. 1515–1517).

Phenotype, territory, religion and social status distinguish sharply between the Hazara and neighbouring ethnic groups, whereas dialect is easier to overcome. While each one of these features is important, the effect is multiplied when they act together. Especially the distinct phenotype acts as an hindrance to detachment from any of the other features.

4.1.2. Ethnic identities in Afghanistan
The three major ethnic identities in Afghanistan are the Pashtun, the Tajik and the Uzbek. I will also have a look at those particularly targeted by recent governmental nationality policies, the Turkmen, the Baluch and the Nuristani, as well as three categories that are significant to the boundaries of the Hazara: the Aymaq, the Farsiwan and the Qizilbash.

The Pashtun dominate in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country, and constitute about half of the population. An equally large Pashtun population lives across the Pakistani border. Many Pashtuns are nomads. Pashtu is a distinct language, which has lost out to Dari as the lingua

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7 Ickx (1992), pp. 15–16, p. 46. Tapper, N. (1984), p. 297 claims: "(...) making of marriages is the focus of most economic and political activity, and the principal means by which status is expressed and validated."
franca of Afghanistan. Tribal belonging is the primary loyalty of most Pashtuns, but historically they have formed strong tribal confederacies in response to outside threats. Different levels are valid in different contexts. The royal family of Afghanistan belongs to the Mohammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe, within the Durrani confederation of the Pashtun. Political power in Afghanistan has historically been in the hand of the Pashtuns: in fact Afghan means Pashtun, and Afghanistan means the land of the Pashtuns. However, whether the ruler ship was regarded as Pashtun, Durrani, Barakzai or Mohammadzai would depend on the context.

Tajiks are found primarily in the rural north-east, mostly as mountain farmers. Many have now settled in the cities, where they play important roles in business and in state administration, and are the only non-Pashtuns to have a position within the upper middle class. They have no tribal organisation, but normally refer to themselves by valley or region of residence.

The Uzbek live largely in the same areas as the Tajiks in the north, as farmers, traders or craftsmen. They maintain tribal designations for themselves, but defend their Uzbek identity in dealings with for example Tajiks. Many Uzbeks have fled Russian or Soviet expansionism. Uzbek is a distinct language, but most Uzbeks are also fluent in Dari.

A third group of North-Afghanistan are the Turkmen. Like the Tajik and Uzbek, they have their designatory population in a republic across the border. They have retained a semi-nomadic economy and a tribal organisation. Their role in national politics has been very limited.

The Baluch live mainly in the south-western part of Afghanistan, and larger Baluch populations are also found in Pakistan and in Iran. Most of those in Afghanistan are nomads, adept at exploiting their semi-arid environment. Organisation is tribal, but unlike the Pashtun principal egalitarianism, Baluch organisation is hierarchical, with powerful leaders who are not easily displaced.

The Nuristani of the mountainous eastern terrain, live from irrigated agriculture. They are still frequently described as kafir, infidels, as they were forcibly converted to Islam in the late 19th century. While their primary loyalty group is the village, they will present themselves as Nuristani to any outsider. The small Kalash population of Pakistan, still non-Muslim, originally belonged to the same people.

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9 Dupree (1984c); Snoy (1988), pp. 137–140
10 Dupree (1984d); Shalinsky (1979); Naby (1984)
13 Strand (1984); Snoy (1986), pp. 131–134
The map gives an impression of the distribution of ethnic groups. It has two principal limitations. First, there might be different criteria for what constitutes an ethnic group. Second, most areas are not unietnic. The map fails to display multiethnicity within a territory, as well as settlements of one group in a concentrated area within a larger area dominated by a different group. (Adapted from Klass, 1987, p. 194; Dupree 1980, p. 58)

**Figure 4.1.** Major ethnic groups in Afghanistan and neighbouring areas.

The Aymaq live mainly in the north-western areas. They are Sunni, like the other groups introduced above. Rather than an ethnic designation, Aymaq names a loose confederation of numerous, relatively independent tribes, defined in contrast to the non-tribal Tajik population. In the present context, the so-called Aymaq Hazara tribe is particularly interesting. Being Sunni Muslim, the population is not defined as Hazara, neither by themselves nor by others. This underlines the extent to which religious differences mark the boundary of Hazara identity.

The Farsiwan are by many authors regarded as Tajiks, while others see them as a distinct group. The major distinction is that they are Shi’ia. They primarily live in the western parts of the country, or in cities in the south. Their impact on national politics has been negligible.

The Qizilbash are a small group of urban Shi’ia, who came to

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14 Janata (1984); Snoy (1986), pp. 136–137
Afghanistan while the territory was ruled by the Persian king Nader Shah Afshahr in the mid-18th century. Later they have played important roles in state administration and in business. They have frequently been discriminated on religious grounds, and *taqqiyah* has been widely practised.

This attempt to present the major ethnic identities of Afghanistan highlights the ambiguity of the concept of "ethnicity". Designations have varying contents, implying different things in different contexts. Of particular interest here are those ethnic identities that contribute to draw up the line of Hazara identity. Sunni Hazara are defined as Aymaq, underlining the centrality of Shi’ia religion for the definition of the Hazara. The Shi’ia Farsiwan, however, have little to do with the Hazara, even though they are co-religionists. Also in contrast to the low status of the Hazara, the Shi’ia Qizilbash have maintained a good social standing in Afghanistan. They can offer goods in demand, namely knowledge, and partly overcome the religious difference.

4.2. RESOURCES

This section will survey resources crucial to the Hazara. They are all subject to conflict with others. I will operate on the basis of the terms land, labour market, market, education and political influence. While political influence might seem odd in this context, I would argue that it is a key variable. It is frequently when political processes affect control over other resources that the latter become subject to dispute, as we shall see.

Land is the primary resource for a population living from subsistence agriculture with animal husbandry. Conditions for agriculture in Hazarajat are difficult; the climate is harsh and the growth season short. While water is plentiful, irrigation is a problem because of the rugged terrain, making people more dependent on riskier non-irrigated cultivation. The land resource situation became substantially more difficult after the state imposed control in the late 19th century. Hazara populations were pushed back from the southern foothills. Hazarajat was opened up to Pashtun nomadism; and, while highland pasture is not a scarce resource, the flocks coming through the narrow valleys causes destruction.

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16 Dupree (1984b); Snoy (1986), p. 15
With limits to regional production, labour migration has become a major factor in Hazarajat’s economy. It grew in importance towards the end of last century, as a response to famine caused by the war during Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign. Permanent settlements established in Quetta, Pakistan and Mashad, Iran, were later to become crucial in facilitating labour migration. From the thirties, the Hazara went to the larger cities, or the larger agricultural zones. They got employment as unskilled labour, in the cities frequently in the jobs not wanted by others. Increasingly, Hazara settled in the major cities of Afghanistan, where they largely formed a new proletariat. It is estimated that 30% to 50% of the male population in the poorest villages practised work migration in the late 1960s. While this caused a severe dependency on financial sources outside the region, access to both international and national labour markets also provided a certain freedom of choice.

Traditionally, the Hazara have not played much of a role in the market. To the extent that agricultural goods produced in Hazarajat have reached any market, this has been as a result of occasional surplus, not cash production. Trade by Hazara has largely been limited to peddling by people who travel,

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19 Jung (1972), p. 9
20 Huwyler & Meyer (1979), pp. 50–53; Ferdinand (1962); Bindemann (1982), p. 34
trade within Hazarajat has been dominated by Pashtun nomads. A combined system of trade and credit allowed the nomads to acquire much land in Hazarajat, normally with the former owner cultivating it on a sharecropper basis. From 1960 the government imposed restrictions on nomad trade, then from 1975 the import of goods from Pakistan was banned, severely restricting the nomad trade. Nomad trade up to the mid-1970s not only made the Hazara dependent on external goods: more serious was the loss of property rights as a result of the extensive debts created.

Education has been an extremely scarce good among the Hazara. While six years schooling became compulsory in Afghanistan from 1931, access was limited by scarcity of schools. In Hazarajat the situation was particularly bad, due both to government priorities and the fact that poor people need their children's labour. When higher education was introduced from the late 1940s, access was restricted by distance, lack of resources, and lack of contacts, all factors contributing to multiply the effect of inadequate primary education.

Political influence took different expressions at local and national level. At the local level, state penetration meant that state agents imposed formal regulations or duties where local mechanisms of decision-making and conflict-resolution had previously functioned. Administrators appointed by the state had the same ethnic identity as the nomads, who were ever-present challengers for local resources, and they were seen to side with the nomads in the competition. In court cases, a law which referred to Sunni doctrines was applied, adding to the perceived discrimination. While the corporate side of state expansion was increasingly felt in Hazara areas, little was seen of the representative side. Also at the national level, Hazara representation was restricted: administrative divisions were tailored to make Hazara a minority in each district, or to make Hazara districts numerically large without compensating through a larger number of representatives.

Land, markets and education were essentially disputed resources, and these disputes were anchored in political decisions. Hence, the competition could be expected to ignite political expression among the Hazara, both the central and the local levels. However, the state administration had effectively penetrated Hazara society with administrators who related directly to local leaders of small units. Up to 1978 this represented a functional obstacle to the emergence of regional or ethnic political expression.

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22 Canfield (1972)
4.3. IDENTITIES AMONG THE HAZARA

The theoretical presentation in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggested that several potential identities of different scales, based in different institutions can exist in one and the same society. Actualisation of identities seems closely connected to the establishment of a new leadership. In this section I introduce the potential identity scales available to the Hazara population by focusing on four different elites: the mir, the sayyid, the sheikh, and the radical seculars.

The mir is the traditional leader in rural Hazara society. He might draw his power from two different sources, which occur in pure or mixed form. He can be in control of economic resources and social connections, such a person often being called a khan. He can also be an appointed representative of the people in relation to state officials, and is then often called arbab or malik. In general, a person who fills one of these descriptions, will partly also satisfy the other. So, political and economic power largely go hand in hand. Before the state expanded its influence in Hazarajat in the late 1800s, the Hazara were organised in independent and conflicting tribes, led by mir. When the state subjugated Hazarajat, the tribes were crushed but power remained in the same families. The mir changed from being an independent tribal leader to being a broker between the state and the local population. In recent times the mir has mainly reflected a small-scale, local identity, the primary solidarity group within the rural population. The mir institution has little potential for engagement in larger scale mobilisation.

The sayyid derive their authority from a central Shi'ia doctrine, the return of the twelfth imam, who is to bring about a divine order. He will come, it is believed, from the family of the Prophet, to which also the sayyid belong. The sayyid are bearers of miracle, karamat. They are seen as Arabs, not Hazara, are disconnected from the normal kinship system, and rarely intermarry with the Hazara. The sayyid network covers the whole of Hazarajat, and has both a local and a regional level. Frequently the sayyid also acknowledge Shi'ia religious authorities in Iran or Iraq. Financial contributions from the Hazara to sayyid-khums- is traditionally paid as one fifth of income. Some of this is passed on to higher levels, some is lent to sayyid of lower rank, as a large group of poor sayyid exists. Most sayyid have no religious education, but for those who have, this significantly enhances their prestige as religious leaders. Writing on the sayyid before the coup in 1978, Kopecky found their contribution to the integration of Hazara society crucial, particularly in times of crisis:

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26 Canfield (1984b); Kopecky (1982; 1986)
For it is not the Hazara who integrate the Sayyed population, but the Sayyed who manage to unite the continually contending and divisive groups and tribes of the Hazara, as well as all the other Imami groups, into a political unit. For the Sayyed, as descendants of the Prophet, not only have the highest jurisdiction for resolving conflicts within the Imami sect in times of peace, but in periods of crisis they provide the charismatic leadership who organize and coordinate these heterogenous forces. (Kopecky, 1982, p. 89)

The sayyid represent a religious identity, with the Shi’ia community as the ultimate boundary. However, their ties to followers are personal, and they are self-contained as a group. Hence they can represent the Hazara, but are not recruited among the Hazara population. The sayyid as a group can activate a regional, horizontal identity, while the Hazara client can only mobilise a vertical tie to the local sayyid. With regard to political representation, there tends to be an inherent limitation in the sayyid institution.

The sheikh has been of minor importance in Afghanistan. The Hazara brand of Shi’ism has emphasised tradition more than formal theology. In other Shi’ia communities the clergy has played a central role: in Iran, the clergy openly engaged in politics from the early 1960s, gradually affecting their standing in Afghanistan as well. In the cities the sayyid became increasingly challenged by the sheikh as religious leaders. The major Shi’ia educational centres are situated in Qum (Iran) and in Najaf (Iraq) and were attended also by students from Afghanistan. Those returning from abroad started small political circles from the early 1950s, and throughout the 1960s numerous religious schools were established. The Shi’ia clergy is a hierarchical institution. Every believer has to follow a mujtahid, a person well-versed in Islam. The uppermost clergy, ayatollah, is appointed by consensus among the lower clergy. The choice is important, because followers pay khums-e imam, considerable sums for the educational or charitable activities run by the clergy. In Afghanistan prior to 1978, the Shi’ia clergy had few links with these formalised religious networks. The openness to new theological interpretation, ijtihad, is a major difference between Shi’ia and Sunni Islam. This forms the basis for Shi’ia theologians’ openness to non-Muslim thought, and the Shi’ia clergy have a proven record of incorporating ideas of non-Muslim origin into their own thought. For the sheikh, the ultimate identity scale is the Islamic community, the ummah. As a political concept, ummah got increasing attention through ideas on Islamic internationalism voiced by several recent thinkers, for example Khomeini. The same applies for the sayyid, but from the sheikh perspective, it is inclusionary, everybody accepting the doctrines are welcome. The distinction between sayyid and

sheikh can be confusing, as many individuals are both, carrying a 'dual identity'. Increasingly, from the early sixties, the sheikh in Afghanistan became proponents of Islamism, a tendency that was greatly stimulated by the revolution in Iran. In Afghanistan from 1978 onwards, the sheikh were heading the Shi'ia Islamist movements, which are supported by the majority of the sheikh. 28

The radical seculars were dominant among the educated youth, emerging as an influential grouping within the Hazara community from the mid-1960s. 29 Those who had obtained education came mainly from relatively wealthy families, often the sons of the mir. Many of them became radicalised during their student days, and joined leftist or nationalist movements. Some also joined the Islamists. Familyties between radicalised youth and the mir were reflected in practical politics, as they often acted as allies. Some of these movements favoured an anti-Pashtun minority struggle. Being secular, they had few problems with cross-sectarian co-operation. Indeed, they were the only ones who saw the Hazara identity as their ultimate identity.

Figure 4.3. Identity and leadership among the Hazara, before the 1978 Coup. 30

Focusing on organisational implications, both the clergy and the educated youth refer to large-scale, hierarchical organisations. As such, both represent a modern challenge to established leadership, implicitly also linked to potential identities of a larger scale. By contrast, the mir and the sayyid basically build

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28 In the rest of this text, the concept of sheikh is used to designate the top leadership of the Islamist movements. Such an application is justified for the period in focus, but is not applicable to any historical period or to any other setting. While sayyid and mir are designations in common use, sheikh is only occasionally so. Throughout this text, however, sheikh will be used to designate the formally trained clergy.


30 The diagram illustrates the identity of potential leaders among the Hazara population, relating them to two identity variables. The vertical axis displays the scale of identity, ranging from local to ummah (international Islamic community). The horizontal axis displays the role of religion in defining the identity, ranging from secular to religious.
their followings on patron-client relations. The mir must be able to gather support both from his followers, and from his sovereign, the state administration. Support from below is dependent on his ability to mediate resources, whereas support from above is dependent on the degree to which he can prevent conflict and prepare the ground for state interference. The position of the mir depends on balancing these conflicting interests in a multi-tiered patron-client system. Similariy, the role of the sayyid is basically derived from the patron-client relation, the sayyid serving as the mediator of spiritual goods, while his followers prove their support through their khums payment.

These identities also differ as to whether their basis is religious or not. Both the sayyid and the clergy build on religion. For the mir and the educated youth, however, the basis for influence is secular. On the other hand, traditional politics in Afghanistan does include many religious elements, and the position of the mir is inherently dependent on religious legitimation. Among the young intelligentsia, however, secularity is likely to imply that politics should be de-linked from religion. Keeping in mind that secularity need not imply anti-religiousness, I will in the following maintain the distinction between secular and religious bases of influence.

4.4. POLITICAL HISTORY

4.4.1. Afghanistan, 1880 to 1978.

The borders of the territory that now form Afghanistan were established towards the end of last century. With the British and the Russian empires competing for control in the region, Afghanistan became instrumental for détente. With the establishment of new borders, the Pashtun became divided into two, one share living in British India. The undisputed Pashtun majority in Afghanistan was reduced to around half of the total population.

The Afghan state traditionally had negligible influence in Hazarajat. Abdur Rahman Khan, who acceded to the throne in 1880, set out for a change. Progressively, the state penetrated the region and established local administrations, initiating a harsh taxation practice.

The radical measures of the government affected all classes of the Hazara population to the same extent. This made it possible for the secular and clerical power holders to mobilise the vertically organised loyalty groups in joint resistance against the central government.

(Bindemann, 1982, p. 31, my translation)

31 Landé (1977)
32 Canfield (1984a), pp. 228–229
34 Kakar (1973); Canfield (1972), p. 3; Munshi [1900], (1980), pp. 276–285
The Amir mobilised against the Hazara confederation, benefiting from one religious and one tribal institution. First, he obtained a fitwa, a religious decree from the Sunni clergy, declaring the war against the Shi’ia Hazara to be a religious war against infidels - a jihad - a holy war. Secondly, and partly justified through the fitwa, he mobilised tribal levies - lashkar - in the Pashtun tribes. Besides the religious reward, fighters were also promised free disposition of the booty, including enslaved Hazara. Two years of full scale war ended in full defeat for the Hazara in 1893. The immediate consequences of the war were the destruction of villages and agricultural infrastructure, the enslavement of thousands of people, as well as severe loss of human life. The Hazara were pushed back from the southern foothills, and Hazarajat was opened up to other groups. Most important, its pastures were sold to Pashtun nomads. The state set up its own administrative system in Hazarajat. Loyal state administrators were placed in the district centres. The administrators were almost exclusively Pashtun, they established co-operation with local notables and effectively replacing tribal organisation with local entities.

The first quarter of this century saw some decisions with positive implications for the Hazara. Populations who left their country of origin under Abdur Rahman were allowed to return to their land by Amir Habibullah (1901–1919). King Amanullah (1919–1929) banned the practice of slavery, and changed land rights in the disfavour of the Pashtun nomads.

When the sole non-Pashtun ruler in Afghan history, Bacha-i-Saqao, took the throne in 1929, the Hazara largely remained loyal to the old regime. Hazarajat was practically independent for the few months that Bacha-i Saqao ruled. A regional government was established for Hazarajat, and presented a list of demands to the king. Central points were full autonomy for Hazarajat, cessation of land taxation and army conscription, and withdrawal of Afghan administrators. The demands led to nothing, as the reign of Bacha-i Saqao lasted for only nine months.

Bacha-i Saqao was removed by Nader Shah, who gained support from the Hazara. Nader Shah intensified efforts to gain administrative control in Hazarajat, escalating the conflict between local population and administration. After being killed in 1933, he was replaced by his son, Zahir Shah. From late 1929 up to the late 1940s, Afghanistan remained relatively calm, with foreign expertise and private trade contributing to an emergent socio-economic development. In Hazarajat, the state tightened its administration further, but there were no major counterreactions.

35 Bindemann (1989), p. 12, building on reports from (British) India Office.
From 1949, there came a tentative liberalisation in the country, responding to demands from the urban elites. Freedom of the press was introduced, and newspapers became focal points of political opposition. A central ambition was to strengthen the role of the parliament. The Hazara delegates united behind a list of demands, including the establishment of a distinct Hazara province with Panjao as summer capital and Bamiyan as winter capital, the closure of pastures to Pashtun nomads and restrictions on the powers of local administrators. Lastly, an end to discrimination of the Hazara was demanded, with emphasis on equal access to education. However the whole democratic experiment was strangled by the ruling family in 1953, when Prince Daud Khan, the King's cousin, was installed as prime minister. Many political opponents were imprisoned.

Daud Khan was prime minister up to 1963. This was a period of political authoritarianism. By establishing a strong army Daud made the state less dependent on tribal support. Further, the government gave priority to education and economic infrastructure. Foreign aid became a major source of state revenue. Hazara labour migration to the cities assumed substantial proportions. Daud invested most of the country's political prestige in pursuing the 'Pashtunistan-issue', claiming that the border with Pakistan lacked legal status, hence the Pashtun areas of Pakistan belonged to Afghanistan.

The 10-year period from 1963 is called the 'new democracy'. The new constitution of 1964 opened up for freedom of the press. It also included a political parties act, which had passed both houses of Parliament by 1967, but which the to king failed to sign. Newspapers and political parties sprang up, but the government soon started to clamp down on the most radical papers. Hazara parliamentary delegates repeated their demands from the early 1950s, adding that the Jaffari Shi'ia law school should be accepted on a par with that of the Hanafi Sunni. While these demands were not met, the open polity also benefited the Hazara. Informally, two ministerial posts were reserved for the Shi'ia. The government's attitude to ethnic differences seemed to be that economic modernisation would lead to their gradual erosion. In general, this democratic experiment was hampered by indecisiveness, and apparently fostered large expectations, but scant political influence for the new elites.

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41 Dupree (1980), p. 649
44 Interview 3, pp. 6–7; Hyman (1992), p. 70
In 1973, Zahir Shah was replaced by Daud Khan in a bloodless coup. The democratic experiment was definitely over. Many opposition leaders were driven in exile.\(^{45}\) Daud returned to his earlier course, with political authoritarianism and intense socio-economic development based on foreign aid, and the Pashtunistan-issue was returned to the agenda. This was an attempt to build an authoritarian and unitary state, which many observers see as doomed to failure because it was basically in contradiction to a traditionalist, fragmented and anti-authoritarian population.\(^{46}\)

### 4.4.2. The emergence of political parties, 1965–1978

With the growth in higher education from the 1950s, a sizeable group of young intelligentsia emerged. As restrictions on political activity were lifted in the 1960s, they engaged in establishing a number of political parties. Here I will focus on the coming rulers, and on groups with substantial Hazara involvement. The parties can be divided into two categories. First were Islamist movements, in which the sheikh were dominant. Second were the secular radicals, nationalist or leftist in orientation. These new parties had much in common. Being largely elitist, they remained distant from the average person. They also shared the attempt to build modern organisation, and the ambition to bring about radical social and political reform.

The Jawanan-i Musulman, Muslim Youth, became the major Islamist group in the country. Ideologically it was in line with the international Muslim Brotherhood. The movement was originally cross-sectarian, but a number of prominent Shi’ia members split off in 1969/1970.\(^{47}\) Another Islamistic intellectual group, Madrasah-yi Quran, was built up by Mawlana Faizani. Originally set up as a sufi order, it later turned into a political group, and had followers of both Shi’ia and Sunni belief. In 1973, the group joined a larger alliance, the Madrasah-yi Tauhid, and after an alleged plot, Faizani and several others were arrested. In 1978 these groups split along sectarian lines, and the Shi’ia faction under Asadullah Nuktadan’s leadership settled in Iran after Khomeini took power. Additionally, there were numerous small groups set up by the students at different madrasa, religious schools. A prominent example is the Sobh-e Danesh, a cultural organisation linked to Sheikh Asif Mohseni’s school in Kandahar.

The same period saw the emergence of several Hazara nationalist organisations. These groups did not take any particular political ideology as

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\(^{45}\) Bindemann (1982), p. 34  
\(^{46}\) Sierakowska-Dyndo (1990); Ahady (1991), pp. 172–173  
\(^{47}\) In the words of David Busby Edwards; "The overt reason for this split was the student group’s association with Jama’at-i Islami Pakistan and their advocacy of a foreign ideology which many students, Shi’a in particular, considered dogmatic in nature and inappropriate to the Afghan context." (Edwards, 1986, p. 218)
their starting point; they were "militantly committed to advancing the rights of minorities and the independent cultural traditions of the 'Mongol' peoples of Afghanistan." (Edwards, 1986, p. 219).48 Two such groups were Jawanan-i Mughal, the Mongol Youth, and Tanzim-i Nazl-i Nau-i Hazara, Organisation of the New generation of Hazara. Most important was the Tanzim, which was well-integrated in the exile community in Quetta. This organisation was supported by the Bhutto government in Pakistan, who saw it as instrumental for countering Daud's Pashtunistan policy.

Several leftist groups emerged in the same period. The coming ruling party, People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), was established in 1965. It consisted of two factions, in constant conflict. In reality they operated as independent groups, although allied under the heading of PDPA for limited periods.49 The Khalq was most doctrinaire, consisting primarily of Pashtun intellectuals with a rural background. Parcham was relatively pragmatic, recruited among children of established Kabul families of different ethnic backgrounds. Parcham joined Daud's government after 1973. Both factions gave priority to recruitment among students, and infiltration of the army. It is estimated that by 1978 Khalq outnumbered Parcham by three to one. Among Hazara intellectuals however, few were Parcham and almost none were Khalq.50 The maoist-oriented Shula-i Jawid had a larger membership than Khalq and Parcham combined around 1970. It grew out of confrontations within PDPA which led to a split in 1967. The motivation for those who established Shula was as much the fear of Pashtun hegemony as differences of political ideology.51 Shula was largely dominated by Hazara, with considerable support from other ethnic minorities as well.52 The party emphasised minority, rather than class discrimination, in their propaganda. Shula published a paper under the same name, and arranged numerous strikes in the late 1960s and 1970s. Another initiative in the pro-maoist camp was Setam-e Milli, set up by Taher Badakshi, a former PDPA activist, in 1968. Badakshi, a Shi'ia Tajik from the remote north-eastern province of Badakshan, presented himself as a Tajik nationalist, rather than a strict maoist. The Setam group was more practically-oriented than Shula, and ran armed campaigns in Badakshan during Daud's period in the 1970s.

Most of these groups had limited importance outside the Kabul arena of politics. To the extent that they enjoyed broader support, this was a result of

48 Roy opposes this view, and sees these groups as maoist. (Roy, 1986a, p. 140)
50 Two out of twenty-eight founders in 1965 were Hazara: Sultan Ali Keshtmand, a leading Parchami, and Abdul Karim Meeqaq, Khalq. This is substantial, but apparently not representative of the broader situation.
51 Edwards (1986), p219
traditional ties. The example of the Akram Yari brothers, Hazara from Jaghori in Ghazni, is illustrative.\(^{53}\) Being among the leaders of Shula, they also had a large local following, based on locality and family ties. It is further noteworthy that all secular parties were multi-ethnic and cross-sectarian. Even within the Islamist movements, sectarian split was not a necessity.

### 4.5. A KEY TO COMING CHAPTERS

This work focuses on the period 1978 to 1992, a period of extreme change in the political environment of the Hazara, and among the Hazara themselves. I will present and analyse processes in five separate chapters, after first having discussed methodological issues in Chapter 5. The periodisation into chapters is determined by the points in time where the major mobilisation process changes fundamentally in terms of identity.

As we have seen, efforts were made to build modern political organisations by the new intelligentsia prior to the PDPA coup in 1978. These organisations remained largely urban, with little ability to mobilise broadly. In rural Hazarajat, political organisation was local in scope, centring on the *mir*, who functioned as a political middleman towards the state. This system had scant potential for large-scale mobilisation.

One of these urban radical groups, the PDPA, carried out a coup in 1978. Its repressive implementation of radical policies ignited resistance throughout rural Afghanistan. Uprisings were simultaneous, but local in scope. Mobilisation took place within existing groups, in Hazarajat with the *mir* as the focal point and the *sayyid* providing religious justification. Within a year most of Hazarajat was free from government control.

The creation of Shura-e Ittefaq in the summer of 1979 represented something new.\(^{54}\) This was a political organisation of regional scope, a unity opposing government offences. With the arrival of Soviet forces in late 1979, popular support for the Shura increased further. The *sayyid* increasingly gained control of the organisation, which gradually evolved into an authoritarian, and increasingly unpopular, regional administration.

By 1982, several Islamist groups were operating independent of the Shura. Collaborating with radicals within the Shura, the Islamists attempted a coup. Fighting continued, and the Shura was overthrown in 1984. Government operations in Hazarajat had ceased. The Islamists enjoyed major Iranian backing. Their ultimate scope of mobilisation was the Islamic community, while the short-term ambition was to replace the Shura as regional power.

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\(^{53}\) Bindemann (1987a), p. 43

\(^{54}\) In the following I will apply Shura when I refer to Shura-e Ittefaq.
As Iranian foreign policy took a more pragmatic turn by 1987, Iran sought to establish unity among the Shi'ia groups in Afghanistan. Initial efforts were unsuccessful. Then, with the announcement of the Soviet withdrawal, and the failure to obtain Shi'ia representation within the Pakistan-based interim government, most Hazara politicians came to see unity as essential if they were to play a role in post-communist Afghanistan. The Islamic Unity Party, Hezb-e Wahdat, was established in 1989. The Islamist clergy dominated here, but its political scope was primarily Hazara ethnic.

When the PDPA government fell in April 1992, the Hazara population in Kabul acted to get control over arms, public buildings and areas of the capital. People mobilised within a variety of established organisations and networks, this was mobilisation through collective action. Basically, the scope of mobilisation remained the ethnic group: the fundamental change was the opportunity to mobilise broadly in the urban population as the demarcation line between government and resistance lost its former relevance.

After having presented the five periods separately, I will compare the mobilisation between the periods, and assess the relevance of the theories. I will also attempt to transcend the limitations imposed by this periodisation, and discuss the theoretical relevance in a larger time-span. Throughout these deliberations, I will draw extensively on the issues introduced in this chapter.
5. METHOD

In the following chapter, I present the major methodological considerations applied in the study. Sources and analysis are emphasised, while verification issues are focused upon in the final section.

Both quality and quantity of sources represent problems for this study. I will look first at written material, discuss some of its weaknesses, and establish criteria for application. Next, I will turn to interviews, and discuss some of the issues involved in applying open-ended elite interviewing. A set of criteria for weighting the interviews is established. Combination of sources is seen as crucial, both to gain a more complete coverage, and to strengthen verification.

The section on analysis discusses the usefulness of applying theoretical propositions, and deals with the implications of presenting theoretical analysis separate from the empirical account. Techniques applied in data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing will be defined.

Finally, I discuss the issue of verification. Here, I focus on three varieties of triangulation: sources, theory and analysis. I then conclude on the relation between methodology and the overall contribution of the study.

5.1. SOURCES

5.1.1. Written sources

Three categories of written material have been applied; primary, secondary and supplementary sources. Secondary sources are by far the most important. I will here at the types of written material one by one, discuss their reliability, and establish standards for their application.

Primary data comprises documents and archival records. The availability is limited by lack of storage as well as intended destruction. For me, language also restrains access, because I do not read Afghan Dari. However, excerpts of a few texts have been translated. A limited number of documents in the English language are used. Primary sources are used only in combination with secondary sources or oral sources.

Books and articles written by historians and social scientists are defined as secondary sources. They are the major sources describing events up to 1987,

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1 The greater part of the material was collected during a one week stay at Bibliotheca Afghanica in Liestal, Switzerland in January 1993. This library appears currently to have the most complete collection of Afghanistan-literature in the world (Jones, 1992, p. 227). Additional material was collected through two visits at the Resource and Information Centre of Agency Co-ordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) in Peshawar, Pakistan, and through correspondence with Centre de recherches et d'études documentaires sur l'Afghanistan (CEREDAF) in Paris.

2 The best collection of resistance documents is in Bibliotheca Afghanica, collected and systematised by Syed Hamed Elmi and Jan-Heeren Grevemeyer. (Bucherer-Dietschi, 1990, p. 102). A collection of similar, possibly newer material is at the Deutsche Orient-Institut (Grevemeyer, 1993).

3 Tuchman (1994), pp. 318-319
and are important for events on the national and international levels up to 1992. Western academics' interest in Afghanistan grew throughout the 1960s, resulting in a number of high quality publications. Publications increased dramatically after the 1980 Soviet invasion, paralleled with a cessation of proper fieldwork. Many wartime analyses are severely biased, with an ideological rather than analytical scope. Concerning developments among the Hazara, there is a restricted number of texts. Finally, most publications lack a description of their sources and research method. For these reasons, formal criteria for assessing literature, like quotation frequency, have been less suitable. Texts have been applied entirely out from my own judgement of scholarship. My basic strategy has been to get every published item, and then through reading, questioning and comparing ascertain which text meets acceptable standards of scholarship. The authors of the major sources on the Hazara have all done substantial fieldwork, and have a basic command of local language.

The third type of written material applied is what I here call supplementary sources. It is primarily news publications, but does also include some material from humanitarian agencies working in Afghanistan. Supplementary sources are used when primary or secondary ones are not available, mainly on events which took place after 1988. Establishing a coherent set of criteria for assessing supplementary sources has been difficult. In general, the quality of the publication where the material is presented, or knowledge of other works by the same author, has guided the selection.

Going through all those written sources, still left me with gaps in data collection, given the subject of investigation. Much of the material bearing on the subject is not publicly available, and a number of events are not documented. This applies in particular to the changes within the Hazara population after 1988. A major motivation behind using interviews, has been to alleviate these shortcomings.

5.1.2. Interview sources
The primary purpose of the interviewing has been to gather information on issues not covered by written sources. Furthermore, through interviews and fieldwork, the ability to understand and interpret all data is greatly enhanced.

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4 A notable exception is Olesen (1995), pp. 313–317, containing "notes on sources".
5 The limited number of publications on the Hazara reflects the limited international interest. It might have had the fortunate effect that the existing publications are less biased than general works on Afghanistan from the period. The major works are Bindemann (1987); Edwards (1986); Farr (1988); Grevemeyer (1985), (1988), (1989); Roy (1986a)
6 News-sources applied are listed in Appendix 5, material from aid agencies is included in the bibliography.
7 The majority of the interviews were performed during a travel to Afghanistan and Pakistan, July 25th to September 2nd 1994. I spent 19 days in Pakistan, 19 days in Afghanistan. In Pakistan, twelve days was
I will here discuss three aspects of the interviewing process; interview strategy, selection of and access to contributors, and evaluation of the material. Finally, I will look at some general problems with the material from the interviews.

In choosing a strategy for interviewing, I had to consider how to cover both a relatively large time span and a broad range of issues with limited resources. This made me choose the strategy of 'elite interviewing'. With the ambition to gain overview over social processes as they relate to efforts at political organisation, it proved to be a constructive approach. The interviews have roughly been performed in line with Robert K. Yin's description of open-ended interviews:

Most commonly, case study interviews are of an open-ended nature, in which an investigator can ask key respondents for the facts of a matter as well as for the respondents' opinions about events. In some situations, the investigator may even ask the respondent to propose his or her insights into certain occurrences and may use such propositions as the basis for further inquiry. (Yin, 1989, p.89)

The interviews were guided by a list of themes, initially based on a literature review, but continuously revised throughout the field period. After presentation, I started the interview with sketching a theme, then the informant spoke rather freely. This initial part contributed to establishing trust. It gave an actors' perspective on which events were crucial, and it was a good basis to evaluate where follow-up would be most fruitful. At a later stage, I presented more focused questions, often linked to elements of the initial free part of the session. In general, I asked questions on the present before questions on the past, straightforward questions before sensitive questions. Key contributors were asked for a second interview when possible. Eleven interviewees were met twice. Informants were encouraged to deal mainly with events of which they had firsthand experience. However, second-hand experiences could not be refused, and they often proved valuable, as they made me aware of issues that proved interesting to follow up on. Most sessions were planned one or two days in advance, but in some instances it proved necessary to start interviews without prior notice. Preferably interviews were arranged in the informant's house or office. Registration was by pen and paper. Initially, I asked three informants about tape-recording, all refused. I then assumed that most respondents would be uncomfortable with it, even if accepting, and the issue was dropped. I emphasised getting notes as close to the informant's presentation as possible, and to get quotations. Normally I transcribed the

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8 Moyser (1988); Marshall & Rossmann (1989), pp. 94–95
9 Patton (1990), pp. 294–318, pp. 324–333. Patton's advice on wording of questions has been appreciated.
notes on a computer the same day, within two days at the latest. During transcription, I supplemented the notes with memorised pieces of information, and edited them according to subject.\textsuperscript{10}

Concerning the selection of informants, the strategy of interviewing elites served as a framework. It was not possible to select individual informants before travelling to the area. Still, I knew what kind of people I would like to meet. The interviewees covered a broad range of perspectives on mobilisation among the Hazara. It might have proved useful to interview more representatives of Wahdat's top leadership, but this was restricted by my choice not to go to Kabul under the prevailing security situation. The contributors are mainly present or previous political leaders at various levels, ranging from local commanders to party leaders. The majority are Hazara who were chosen because they had a personal experience with the events relevant to the study. A majority of the Hazara contributors expressed full support for Wahdat, but some admitted that their membership is motivated by personal security, and several took distance from the party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of interview: (number of interviews: 32)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan: 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic background of contributor: (number of contributors: 38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hazara: 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, Afghanistan: 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign: 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party affiliation, Hazara contributors:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wahdat: 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Wahdat': 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major residence from 1978 to 1992 for contributors from Afghanistan:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural Afgh.: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad: 14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Table 5.1: Categorisation of interviews and informants.}\textsuperscript{11}

The success of the interviewing effort depends on the ability to get access and establish trust.\textsuperscript{12} Lofland & Lofland has systematised advice on 'getting in' under four keywords: Connections, Accounts, Knowledge and Courtesy.\textsuperscript{13} All keywords proved relevant in my fieldwork. I will start with 'connections'. It proved extremely important, being a curious foreigner, in a highly politicised situation, to have people to recommend and introduce oneself. Contacts are particularly important when one approaches elites. However, there were also three instances were somebody's introduction of me and my project created a

\textsuperscript{10} The material is with the author. It is, in anonymized form, accessible on request.

\textsuperscript{11} There are more contributors than interviews, because six of the interviews were with two persons at the same time. 'Wahdat' designates contributors who were members, but expressed fundamental disagreement with Wahdat's policy, and stated that protection was their sole reason for membership. The fact that eleven contributors were interviewed twice, is not reflected in this table.

\textsuperscript{12} Here, I benefited greatly from my personal background. I was working as a project coordinator for the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) in Peshawar in 1990–1992. In my fieldwork, I could benefit from a personal network, a basic ability in spoken Dari, and a certain familiarity with the political and social realities of Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{13} Lofland & Lofland (1984), pp. 25–27.
mistrust that made the interview largely worthless. On 'accounts', I spent considerable time before starting the interview to describe the purpose of the study, emphasising its potential contribution to increased understanding, nationally and internationally, of the current political crisis. Furthermore, I presented my personal background. 'Knowledge' constitutes a dilemma. Demonstrating insight is crucial to enhance good responses. Elites tend to expect two-way communication. However, knowledge does also affect the content of the answers. The only remedy for it is awareness. The last of the four Lofland-point, 'courtesy', concerns both demonstration of general respect and knowledge of the codes of the culture. My personal background from working in the area was a considerable asset in this regard.

Prior to analysis, I have weighted the interviews on four indicators: co-operativeness, frankness, disturbance and language. The criterion of co-operativeness refers to how adequate the responses are for answering the research problem. Frankness refers to willingness to describe own political past or current political conflicts. While lack of co-operativeness was a restraint only in two cases, six were restrained by a lack of frankness. Serious disturbance in the middle of an interview occurred only in four instances, represented by its own indicator. The presence of others during interview sessions could be a minor problem, but on six occasions, it was turned into an asset, as I ended up interviewing two persons at the same time (see table 4.1). Finally, a criteria is included in the weighting to account for the language problem. Fourteen interviews took place with interpretation, which is considered to affect the quality. The same applied to four interviews in languages not fluently spoken by either contributor or myself. The maximum score with the weighting is four. As a rule, only interviews with a score of three or more has been applied as sources. There are two exceptions to the rule. Both exceptions serve as references only once. Out of totally thirty-two interviews, six are not used.

While weighting accounts for problems with individual interviews, some general problems with my application of oral source material deserves to be mentioned. This work has its primary interest in extraordinary events, on which memories can make larger alterations than it does on everyday

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14 Anonymized overview over interview, with weighting, in Appendix 3. See Miles and Huberman (1994), pp. 267–269 on 'Weighting the evidence'.

15 The criteria of co-operativeness and frankness are inspired by Hunt et al., (1964), pp. 63–64

16 An interpreter was at my disposal for most of the fieldtrip. Considerable time was spent on going through the aim of my research, in order to prevent misunderstanding during sessions, in particular on key concepts. We also went through basic rules of interpretation, such as facilitating direct contact between informant and interviewer, translating questions and replies in complete, limiting the length of sequences to be translated, and taking notes to help memory. The interpreter's personal background is of importance. My interpreter was young, not politically active, and Tajik. This was the best possible background, as most other combinations of characteristics could have hindered access to at least some of the informants.
events. Major remedies here have been the selection of informants with varying perspectives, the use of questions dating further back than the period of primary interest, and systematic use of follow-up questions. Another problem encountered had to do with the difficulties of gaining insight into phenomena on a micro level, for example political conflict within the village. Informants were somewhat hesitant to elaborate on the details of conflict within their own local community. Therefore, my descriptions of local political processes build on a combination of what is given by insiders, and the second-hand information given by people who have insights into societies other than their own. For example political leaders are less hesitant to comment on the situation in other localities. The problem relates to another, more general issue, namely short time in the field. A short field-trip limits the time for revising the interview themes midway, and the possibility to arrange follow-up interviews.

In spite of the limitations, the interviews have been of crucial importance to this work. First, I gained information on events and processes not covered by other sources. Second, I formed my own comprehension of how actors related to events and processes at a macro-level. Thirdly, the interviews were crucial for gaining a larger overview: through interviews I was enabled to judge the importance of individual events, and to gain insight into what one event signified in a broader context.

5.1.3. Combination of sources.
The most important sources applied in the study are secondary written sources and oral sources. In table 5.2. I present the sources of primary importance in the different periods and at different levels. Furthermore, 'triangulation of data sources' has been used to enhance verification. First, applying various sources on the same phenomena has been a major strategy in the empirical presentation. Second, assessments of the reliability of one source has often rested on the insights gained through a different kind of source. Most frequently oral sources are used to check on written ones.

\[17\] Oral history assumedly has high reliability dealing with everyday life events (Caunc 1994, pp. 20–21)

\[18\] Mordal (1989), p. 150; Patton (1990), p. 324

\[19\] Patton (1990), pp. 467–468
Table 5.2. Main sources according to setting and time period.

A particular problem occurs when sources conflict. In cases where there are substantial and irresolvable disagreement between various sources, it has either been reflected directly in the text, or the view opposing mine is referred to in a footnote. Again, given the extent of the present problem formulation, it is unavoidable that such conflict occasionally appears. It is a problem worth bearing in mind as I now turn to the issue of analysis.

5.2. ANALYSIS

5.2.1. Relying on theoretical propositions

The method of analysis reflects the underlying research strategy. This study is guided by a set of theoretical propositions, developed out from a review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature. By relying on theoretical propositions, the analysis gets a deductive character. Theoretical choices guide which elements to consider. Within the actual research process, this is counterbalanced by an inductive element. This element slides into the background in the final unilinear presentation, but the actual research process is one of going back and forth between evidence and theory. As Charles Ragin has pointed out, the strength of comparative research on a limited set of cases is that it permits the selection of theory out from examining the empirical material.20

Building on theoretical propositions, this study goes one step further, and draws a line between empirical data and theoretical analysis in each case. The solution has the benefit of allowing the empirical material to be confronted with several theoretical propositions, without any prior assumptions of primacy or complementarity. However, the form presents the author with

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20 Ragin (1987), p. 45
two challenges. First, the reader might be led to assume that the material is not guided by theory. In my presentation, the issues focused are dominantly the ones favoured by the theories presented in Chapters 2 and 3. The application of multiple theories does reduce the tendency to present data selected out from one single perspective. Most importantly however, the choice of theory was not finalised prior to data gathering. In practice the research process is one of going back and forth between the two. A second risk is that as one presents analysis at distance from the data, the relation brought forward as supportive of the theory might be only apparent and not real, and the reader can only discover it at great difficulty. The measure applied to counter this problem has been to engage in detailed cross-checking of empirical material against any argument used in theoretical analysis.

5.2.2. Method of analysis

In discussing the tasks of analysis, I will elaborate on three distinct issues separately: data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing. Data reduction does not start with analysis. It is important to be aware that decisions on every stage of research has reductionary effects: "(...) study design decisions can, in a real sense, be seen as analytic - a sort of anticipatory data reduction - because they constrain later analysis..." (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p.16, italics in original) The registration of interview data by pen and paper is a further reduction, because unavoidably one selects what is seen as most relevant at the time. After the collection of data comes the distinct phase of data reduction. My approach has been to sort out events and processes from chronology and level, according to the disposition of the chapters. Verbal labels have been used for coding; each being given an index card where all references were registered. A standardised set up for every chapter has facilitated overview and changes in periodisation as analysis proceeded.

Displaying data has principally been in text. Working with empirical material that proves to be far from complete, it was necessary to maintain flexibility throughout the process. Sizeable accounts of developments in each period has been worked out, modified through analysis, and worked into the empirical sections of chapters 6 to 10. Additionally, I have applied various forms of displays; relational, chronological and by level. A main display placing major events in relation to level and chronology has been developed for each period.

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22 Miles & Huberman (1994) pp. 10–12
23 Moyser (1988), p. 130
When I was drawing conclusions, limitations in the source material has led to certain problems. For example, written sources on the developments within the Hazara population from 1989 to 1991 are scarce, and the value of oral sources is impaired by distance. I have applied a moderate version of what the historian calls interpolation, in the sense that the necessary connection between phenomena described by the source material has been constructed. In such instances, the assumptions made will be reflected in my textual presentation. Conclusion drawing builds on the theoretical propositions developed in Chapters 2 and 3. The set of propositions is applied to the processes of each period in an analytical section of chapters 6 to 10. I have aimed at applying a modified comparative methodology. By treating each period of mobilisation as one case, comparison can be applied both within and between the cases. During each period, groups and localities are compared to establish the mechanisms behind mobilisation. The possibility to perform internal comparison has been restricted by insufficient information on single groups or localities. Comparison between periods is the major subject of the overall conclusion in Chapter 11. The five cases are compared on each of the dimensions represented by the theoretical propositions. One criticism of this approach is that because cases are interdependent, there might be one or several factors which have had effects in all or several of the cases. Taking this into consideration, I started by casting a wide net in search of empirical material; as a result the periodisation and factors in focus have been subject to many alterations. Limitations in the nature of empirical material gathered are also a problem. In spite of applying relatively robust theories, the material is not always sufficient for firmly establishing the necessary causes. In this context it is worth noting that I have been aware of the possibility of multiple causation, both in the empirical presentation and the theoretical analysis. I think the applied method of analysis, in spite of the weaknesses inherent in the data, has enabled me to ask focused question based in the theoretical propositions, without loosing out of sight the broader landscape of elements potentially important to the issue of political mobilisation among the Hazara.

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25 The theoretical propositions are jointly presented in Appendix 1.
26 The failure to strengthen the argument by applying internal comparison is one of Tilly’s criticisms of Skocpol’s work on revolutions. (Tilly, 1984, pp. 112–113; Skocpol, 1979; Skocpol & Somers 1980, p. 190)
27 In a debate on interdependence of cases, Skocpol’s study of revolutions has been criticised for comparing Russia 1917 with Russia 1905 (Kiser & Hechter, 1991, p. 13; Skocpol, 1979)
28 Some of the implications of this problem are discussed in the conclusion, section 11.1. and 11.2.
5.3. VERIFICATION

To alleviate the methodological problems described above, I have applied certain verification mechanisms. Three forms of triangulation have been used, on sources, theories and analysis. I will round off this section by asking how this methodology has permitted me to answer the research problem.

Source triangulation is the use of various sources on the same phenomena. Oral sources are frequently used to get cross-references on written ones. Furthermore, by including issues that were established in the literature, I was able to judge the quality of interviews better. Theory triangulation is mainly aimed at hindering the chosen theory from excluding alternative explanations. It is partly maintained by keeping the two theories in focus. In addition, each period has been made subject to propositions derived from resource mobilisation and deprivation theories, and the outcomes of these analyses are only accounted for in the conclusion chapter. Finally, a variety of analyst triangulation is applied in an effort to counter my own eventual bias. A late draft of the work has been presented to several people who know the empirical field, and they have commented on my interpretations and emphasis. Furthermore, the bearing that the empirical presentation has on analysis has been checked by qualified social scientists.

How well has the methodology applied enabled me to answer the research questions, as presented in the theoretical propositions from Chapters 2 and 3? I will briefly answer the question, relating it to the concepts of events, preferences, and structural processes. I will argue that the combination of sources has been favourable to obtain an overview over events, as well as to determine which ones are crucial to explanation. Further, every Group Solidarity explanation hinges on a reasonable account of preferences, as pointed out in section 2.1.4. My understanding of preferences has rested primarily on the interviews, while the interviews have also enhanced my understanding of the account of preferences inherent in the written sources. Finally, I will argue that accounts of structural processes, such as the explanations sought by Resource Competition theory, rests on reasonable accounts of how people respond to changes in the opportunity structure.

To conclude, the two key elements of the applied method are the combination of sources, and the guidance by theoretical propositions. Based on these two elements, the study has made two significant contributions. First, it has organised a disorganised material, in particular it has bridged the larger scale processes at the national and international levels with processes within the Hazara population. Second, it has employed theories with an explanatory ambition to a case that has hitherto been subject only to descriptive accounts. The nature of the contributions on these two points is inherently dependent on the methodology chosen.
6. ELITE COUP, REPRESSION AND REVOLTS, 1978–1979

The marginal PDPA party seized power by a coup in April 1978. Attempts to initiate dramatic political reforms with repressive measures led to revolt throughout the country. In Hazarajat people revolted within local networks centred on the mir, and by early summer 1979 the government was effectively driven out.

With the exception of the Soviet union, who got engaged in backing the new regime, and Pakistan, who supported the resistance, the international community took little notice of the coup. Foreign support to the opposition was marginal. The Islamic revolution in Iran was, however, an inspiration for the Shi'ia of Afghanistan.

The new regime started out with a pragmatic attitude, but after three months in power, Khalq expelled Parcham, and initiated radical reforms. The reforms themselves were not necessarily unpopular, but the extreme brutality with which they were implemented gave people no alternative to opposition. In Hazarajat, the PDPA had neither supporters nor allies.

In this period, the uprisings were largely spontaneous and uncoordinated. Ethnic or sectarian differences were unimportant at the ground level. However, in exile, resistance parties were built up along sectarian division lines, in the longer term contributing to conflict. Political elites, whether traditional or modern, religious or secular, were all targets of a governmental extermination campaign. Hence, all members of the elite were forced to resist, disregarding internal differences.

In Hazarajat, the government failed to build alternative organisations, and its reform implementation could only foster resistance. The major uprisings in this period took place within established patron-client networks centred on the mir. Islamist groups played a minor role in supplying lower level leaders to the resistance in certain localities. Secular radical groups were active in the cities, but being easily monitorable, they were rather successfully countered by the regime.

The major argument in this chapter is that the government challenged all sections of the society in Hazarajat simultaneously. It was threatening access to a whole range of vital resources, including political influence at the local level. Further, it frequently threatened life itself. These threats ignited spontaneous resistance. The uprisings appear to have been inevitable, given a regime that was capable of running systematic campaigns of extermination, but incapable of offering alternative channels for political influence.
6.1. RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

6.1.1. Other states: Support channelled elsewhere

Generally, international reactions to the PDPA coup in 1978 were mild. Two neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Iran, provided limited support to certain political groups. More important, political turmoil and eventual revolution in Iran set a precedent for the Shi'ia in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's relation with Daud's regime had been haunted by the Pashtunistan-issue. In his effort to counter Daud's Pashtunistan policy, Pakistan's Prime Minister Ali Bhutto had supported the Hazara-nationalist Tanzim in Quetta, as well as the Islamist organisations, which were dominantly Sunni. All of these had established contacts with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), during the mid-seventies, and continued to receive limited support from it in the period after the PDPA coup.

In Iran, the opposition entered a new phase early in 1978. It started with protest marches, which were met by repressive countermeasures, and numerous participants were killed. Gradually, actions got stronger, by late summer they had evolved into riots and strikes, and by December: "(...)as many as one-fourth of Iran's population took to the streets against a regime still capable of brutal repression." (Cottam, 1986, p. 58) The whole Iranian opposition participated: Islamist, nationalist or marxist. On February 11, 1979, the Shah left the country, and the revolution was a fact.

Iran's outgoing regime had been committed to extensive aid programs with President Daud, and had not had time to redesign its Afghanistan policy after the PDPA took power.¹ The new power holders consisted of a variety of groups. Moderate and traditional forces favoured broad support to the Afghan resistance. The Islamists were publicly criticising the Soviets, but behind the scene they were careful not to alienate them. Iran's Islamists preferred a limited engagement in Afghanistan, promoting the radical Islamist groups, particularly Shi'ia, whose leadership they knew from before.² Reportedly, some military training for adherents of the Khomeini-oriented Hazara groups took place in the early spring of 1979.³

It is tempting to link events in Hazarajat to the Iranian revolution. The first uprisings in Hazarajat occurred in autumn 1978, at the same time as the intensity of Iranian protests increased. The numerous local uprisings in Hazarajat came in spring 1979. By then Iran had experienced a successful revolution. Events in Hazarajat prove that there was little physical contact.

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¹ An agreement for USD 2000 million had been signed in 1974, being a direct challenge to Soviet influence in Afghanistan (Hyman, 1992, p. 51) This contribution never materialised. (Khalilzad, 1987, p. 260)
² Khalilzad (1987), pp. 261–264
It was the success of a religiously justified revolution among co-religionists in Iran that served as an inspiration among the Shi'ia in Hazarajat. It appears that the Iranian revolution was contagious by demonstrating opportunities for action.

The Iranian revolution was probably the international factor that most significantly affected mobilisation among the Hazara. Material support from abroad to the resisting groups in Hazarajat was negligible.

6.1.2. State: Radical reforms and repression
The PDPA coup in 1978 initiated an era of extensive armed conflict in Afghanistan. Here, I will primarily focus on the regime's political reforms and their implementation, which is the key to understanding the first uprisings. Secondly, the Soviet-type nationality policy, a single issue which became important in the longer term, will be discussed.

The PDPA party carried out a coup d'état in Afghanistan on the 27th of April 1978. The coup involved military personnel exclusively. The killing of Parcham ideologist Mir Akbar Khyber had led to anti-government demonstrations. Daud started a badly coordinated detention campaign. Within twenty-four hours PDPA-leaders had initiated the coup, which was probably planned for July or August. The incumbent government handled the threat rather clumsily, and many observers have called it 'the accidental coup'.

The issue of political reforms is importantly linked to the PDPA factionalising. The Khalq was at the lead in the PDPA government. Khalq and Parcham were reunited as late as 1977. Soon after the coup, conflict re-emerged, and on July 1st, Taraki and Amin, the Khalqi strongmen, removed the Parchami ministers from their posts. It was a blow for the Soviets, who preferred the pragmatic line of Parcham. Soviet backing saved the lives of the Parchami top leaders, some were exiled as ambassadors, others arrested. Hyman comments on the conflict in the party:

(...) the decisive reason for the split in the Cabinet following the Saur coup is certainly connected to the vital question of strategy, of how to proceed to further the revolution once power had been gained. While Parchamis had long been in favour of gradualism, or the more delicate or diplomatic approach for gaining public support, the Khalq leaders, in particular Amin, favoured a vigorous and immediate onslaught on all the problems of the

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4 Soviet policy will here be treated under the same heading as that of the PDPA government. While it is a fact that the coup itself was planned and implemented without Soviet involvement, it is similarly clear that as soon as the coup was a fact, the Soviet leadership got heavily engaged in securing its success. (Kornienko, 1994, pp. 2-3)


6 Westad (1994), p. 54; Dupree (1979a), pp. 40–42
country, without concessions and with no holds barred. (Hyman, 1992, p. 82)

The initial pragmatic line was replaced by more radical measures, as represented in three decrees, described as the "crux of the revolution" (Ahady, 1991, p. 174). Decree nr. 6, announced on July 17th, concerned rural debt. It cancelled all outstanding debts for landless peasants; interest payments on mortgages older than four years were ordered to cease; and payments on newer mortgages would be amortised at one fifth annually. The effect was not as expected. Bindemann comments on Hazarajat:

The measure, which was meant to win the support of the impoverished peasants, could not succeed, as no alternative means of credit (access to cash) was at their disposal. Lacking means of control made dependence within frames of client and tenant relations survive secretly within village- and family networks. (Bindemann, 1982, p. 34, my translation)

Decree nr. 7 of October 18, aimed at ensuring equal rights for women, by banning customary gifts to the family of the bride at religious festivals, and setting a limit for the price of the bride. Many saw this as interference in private relations. The fact that these transactions took place within the family made control impossible. Overall, decree nr. 7 did not lead to strong counter-reactions. A follow-up on the rural debt decree concerned land reform, and was announced in decree nr. 8 of November 29. It operated with an estimation of land quality, where the best arable land was 1, and the lower category was 0,1. Maximum limit for land holdings was set at 30 jerib of best quality land. The surplus was expropriated by the state without compensation. Plots of five jerib would be redistributed to landless peasants. As land would still be scarce, a number of agricultural collectives should be established. The government expected the land reform to foster massive support among landless peasants. In many areas the implementation of land reform programs actually initiated resistance. In Hazarajat the importance of the land reform was smaller, because the government had a capacity problem and land reform program reached the remote areas last.

Another important element in the policy of the new regime was its literacy campaign launched in May 1978. The campaign was seen as fundamental to foster support for the revolution, and the element of indoctrination was evident. The campaign as such was met with a certain interest, but the propagandic content, the use of force on old men and above all the

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7 Decree no. 1 (April 30) announced Taraki as Chairman and Prime Minister, decree no. 2 (May 1) announced the 21 members of the new cabinet, decree no. 3 abrogated the former constitution and established interim regulations, decree no. 4 announced a new flag, decree no. 5 cancelled citizenship for members of the royal family (Dupree, 1979a, p. 39, p. 42). Content of decree 6 to 8: Edwards (1988); Roy (1986a); Ahady (1991).
inclusion of women in mixed classes, fostered strong reactions. The ideological analysis behind the policies of the government is summed up by Roy:

For the Khalq, Afghan society is feudal. The peasants (dehqan) are exploited by a handful of feudalists (the khan) with the support of the clergy. The peasants are alienated by religion and do not see where their true interests lie. It follows that all that was necessary was to make a sudden break with the past and give them their own land (agrarian reform) and provide them with enlightenment (the elimination of illiteracy), and their support for the revolution would be total. (Roy, 1986a, p. 85)

It should not be disregarded that the political content of the reforms was welcomed in many areas. It seems that the basis for resistance was not primarily the political ideas, but rather the means for implementing them. The PDPA was a marginal organisation, with an estimated 5000 members from the technocratic elite of bureaucrats, officers and students, and an estimated 200 only within the armed forces. It inherited a state administration which was dependent on alliances with traditional leaders to govern. The inability to understand own resource-scarcity proved fatal:

(...) one of the major miscalculations of the Khalq-Parcham regime has been its failure to realise that the government bureaucracy that it inherited was designed only to administer and not to implement reform programs. (Shahrani, 1984, p. 24)

PDPA replaced qualified military and administrative leaders with party members, who were generally young and inexperienced. When the first uprising occurred, the PDPA had not yet presented a communist ideology. This suggests that the behaviour of government agents rather than ideology sparked off conflict. On their role in Hazarajat:

Most of the very young Khalqis, who participated in the land redistribution committees, in the local administration and as teachers in the campaign for literacy and materialism, were inexperienced, over-zealous, and additionally discredited as communists, in opposition to Islam. (Bindemann, 1982, p. 35, my translation)

Hence, it was not primarily the programmatic content of PDPA's reforms that ignited resistance, but rather the failure to implement the programme in such a way as to maintain support. The reaction was largely the same all over rural Afghanistan. Once resistance had started, the regime was weakened further by mass defections from the army. At least half of the officer corps had defected

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8 Dupree, N. H., 1984, pp. 320–321
9 Bindemann (1987a), pp. 83–89
11 Dupree (1979a), p. 40
by autumn 1979. The situation for the regime was disastrous. A majority of the population was opposing it to the extent that they supported armed resistance, while its own repressive capability, the army, was disintegrating.

The application of a Soviet-style nationality policy was announced by President Taraki already in May 1978, building on the original PDPA program. The constructed word melliat, meaning nationality, was taken into use. It was derived from mellat, which means nation. The nationality policy addressed four areas: government participation, education, newspapers and culture. Government participation along ethnic lines was not implemented. It was decided to offer education in Pashtu, Farsi, Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluch from autumn 1979. Newspapers in the same languages were launched. The changed status of minority languages was primarily demonstrated through their application in education and press.

Governmental publications in Nuristani appeared just after the coup; a surprise given that this language so far was exclusively spoken. Most probably Soviet experts had been working on the Nuristani language before the coup. No concessions were aimed at the Hazara, who were described by the Soviet advisers as an ethnic group who had lost its ethnic identity. Naby believes that there were rather political considerations behind it all:

(...) first, the Hazaras have kept aloof or rebelled against the pro-Soviet regimes in Kabul; second, since the increased Shi‘ite success in the Muslim world, Hazaras have become emboldened to run their affairs independently of Kabul; third the Hazaras are located along the central spine of the county, and have very limited overlap into Iran. (Naby, 1980, p. 244)

The latter argument is built on the assumption that the Soviets wanted to exploit transnational ethnicities to challenge established states. The Hazara had no such strategic potential. The nationality policy was hampered by the PDPA’s lacking ability to distance itself from being pro-Pashtun. Lacking popular support, the new rulers attempted to foster support from the Pashtun by launching ethnic appeals. President Taraki arranged a number of jirga, mainly inviting elders from the Pashtun tribes in the eastern region. In June

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13 Collins (1986), p. 66
14 Naby (1980), pp. 245–251
15 Centlivres (1990), p. 10
16 The informal arrangement on Hazara in cabinet continued as before. The first government had two Hazara ministers: Abdul Karim Meezaq as minister of Finance and Sultan Ali Keshtmand as minister of Planning (Dupree, 1979a, p. 40) The latter was expelled in July 1978.
17 Naby (1980), p. 251
18 One exception to the overall neglect of the Hazara within PDPA’s nationality policy was radio-broadcasts in Hazaragi. (Huwyler & Meyer, 1979, p. 28)
1979, the first militia was organised among the Kharoti Pashtun, Prime Minister Amin's own tribe.\textsuperscript{21} It was an experiment in accommodation of those who had traditionally been opposing any foreign interference or attempts at state expansion. The Pashtun domination, at its extreme within the Khalq-faction, contributed to giving the new regime a strong ethnic bias, and undermining the nationality policy. The ambiguity of the nationality policy is likely to have prevented any immediate effects. Furthermore, the Hazara were not targeted. In the long run, however, it is likely that the change from ethnicity being a political taboo, to ethnicity being politically relevant, would have implications.

Summing up, the regime attempted to implement a nationality policy that would upgrade the status of the minorities, but proved unable to distance itself from the Pashtun bias of former governments. It engaged in a number of radical political reforms with a potential for political support, but applied repressive measures in the implementation of the reforms, which led to opposition from the majority of the population.

\textbf{6.1.3. Resistance: Separate parties for Sunni and Shi’ia}

The outbreak of civil war in 1978 marked a new era in Shi’ia-Sunni relations, represented by a full sectarian split on the organisational level. Cross-sectarian co-operation remained as before at the local level.

The Sunni resistance groups set up exile organisations in Peshawar in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The Shi’ia resistance was set up in Quetta of Baluchistan province, later also in Mashad and Teheran in Iran. The choices of location reflected where Hazara settlements existed, and where there was a potential for political contacts with the host country. In the past there have been both Shi’ia and Sunni members in most of the political parties, but the establishment of exile parties initiated a new era of sectarian split in politics.

The split at the party level had no immediate repercussions at the local level. Sectarian or ethnic tensions are reported within the resistance, but at this stage they were the exception rather than the rule. The absence of large scale multi-ethnic resistance reflected the overall pattern: a resistance consisting of local groups with a low level of co-ordination and mobility. In localities with mixed Sunni and Shi’ia population, the uprising was a common effort.\textsuperscript{22} The following incident has taken on a symbolic value:

\textsuperscript{21} Dorronsoro & Lobato (1989), p. 95
\textsuperscript{22} Bindemann (1987a), p. 58
(...) Pashtun elders from Wardak (on the eastern border of the Hazarajat) went to Kabul to petition for weapons from the communist government to use against the Hazaras. Seeking to exploit traditional animosities, the government turned over a large number of weapons to the Wardak elders, who immediately turned them on the government upon their return from Kabul. (Edwards, 1986, p. 224, n.35)

All in all, local conflicts along ethnic or sectarian lines were rare. On the party level, however, a split between Sunni and Shi’ia evolved. The establishment of different centres of exile politics, gradually also different sources of support, tended to establish a boundary between Shi’ia and Sunni. Hence, it also affected the Hazara perception of their own role within the overall resistance.

6.2. AMONG THE HAZARA

6.2.1. Leadership: The Mir mobilises clients
The focal point of rural resistance was the mir, who was deprived of his role versus the state, and was under personal threat for belonging to the 'feudal class'. The PDPA targeted Shi’ia religious leaders of any kind. In addition, secular elites opposing the PDPA were prosecuted.

The government's control in Hazarajat had been based on a delicate political balance where the mir functioned as a middle man. His position was based on patron-client relations. He obtained the larger part of his resources from the state, effectively himself being a client in a system where the state served as the patron. The mir was taking care of his clients' security. As part of his function, the mir used to negotiate with state officials when a client had complaints, or to deal with the nomads in matters of dispute. It is argued that the mir to a large extent had victimised the balance of a patron-client relation prior to the war. The mir had been unable to obtain satisfactory political influence from the state, while he was experienced as violent, exploiting government agents by their clients. Still, at the local level, the mir was the only functioning channel for political influence. There existed no alternative leadership, and horizontal solidarity was limited. Although it had no alternative leadership to promote, PDPA challenged the status of the mir. First, there was no room for the mir in the new administrative set up; he was deprived of his major resource. Second, the government engaged in a campaign to eliminate the 'feudals', leaving the mir with no alternative to protest. The mir could only follow his ultimate self-interest, survival. As ties

23 This was the dominant model of political control all over rural Afghanistan. (Grevemeyer, 1989, p. 15)
between the state administration and the *mir* were cut, it became evident that the PDPA had no alternative institution that could serve as their link with the local communities. In addition it had no alternative means for control. Unlike in most other areas, there was almost a total absence of PDPA members in Hazarajat. The *mir* operated within established organisations, which were functional in providing a variety of goods, private and public.

The first uprisings were local in scope, with the *mir* at centre of mobilisation. Other groups supported these uprisings. The *sayyid* were providing important religious justification for the struggle. Radical seculars and *sheikh* participated, mostly by providing a lower level leadership for the fighting units.

**Figure 6.1.** Identity and leadership in Hazarajat, 1978–1979.25

Shi’ia religious leaders, whether *sayyid* or *sheikh* were threatened, and a large number of them were led away by the government forces. Many people simply disappeared, and nothing was reported. Most did not resist being captured at this stage, and why should they, as they had nothing to hide?26 Unlike the *mir*, the religious leaders were not dependent on the state. The government attacked religion ideologically, and religious leaders physically: "For this period, the aim was the total elimination of certain social categories (the clergy and people of influence), rather than genocide. (...) The Shi'ite clergy were a particular target." (Roy, 1986a, p. 97). Religious leaders soon found, like the *mir*, that they had to resist. As earlier in history, they got a major role in legitimising the resistance, and in organising it.

The next major social group was the young intelligentsia in the secular radical movements. The PDPA support among the Hazara was negligible. The leftist or maoist oriented groups were primarily active in urban resistance

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25 The circles with designation represent self-ascribed (ideal) identity of potential leaders among the Hazara. Circle with thick line illustrates the focal point of mobilisation. Circles overlapping the emphasised circle illustrates alliance or unity with the leading category. Dotted lines connecting two circles signifies the connection to the ideal identity of the group that has entered an alliance. Full lines connecting two circles signifies that the dominant leadership has made certain adjustments in its ideal identity. The figure applies the variables and positions from figure 4.3. In the following, figures 7.1, 8.1, and 9.1. builds on the same variables and symbols.

26 Roy (1986a), p. 96
against PDPA, and faced a massive attack by the government. Seemingly the erosion of these groups can be explained by the success of the government in these early years. Having been parts of the same political environment facilitated repression.

The PDPA government fully challenged all existing elites. It succeeded in repressing the urban radical movements. Rural resistance, centred on the *mir*, with support from the *sayyid*, mobilised successfully within a frame of existing local organisation.

6.2.2. Mobilisation: Fighting for survival

In this section, I will focus on the massive rural uprising in Hazarajat that succeeded in liberating most of the region from government control. In addition, I will comment on the Islamist groups that emerged, and on the weakened secular radical groups.

In 1978 the Hazara population had no mode of social organisation other than the patron-client institution with the *mir* at the lead. The different social segments in a village or a valley formed a unity for all practical purposes. The structure of patron-client relations leaves little room for horizontal solidarities to develop. Hence, a threat to the patrons in the village will be a threat to its other inhabitants, as long as no alternative organisation with a proven capability of delivering the goods that the patrons used to deliver, exists. The PDPA emphasised ideology, and failed to appreciate the importance of organisational capability. The government saw a solution in using its trusted cadres for spreading the revolution, and thus replaced established state administrators with young Khalqis. The party cadres were out of touch with the local community, and resorted to violence when they met the slightest opposition: "(...) it seem that what inspired the first antigovernment reactions were the actions of local officials rather than those of the distant policymakers in Kabul." (Edwards, 1986, p. 222). Government agents challenged local forms of political power, but did not offer any alternative forms, thus resulting in political repression.

The actions taken by government agents threatened control over basic resources. I will illustrate this by presenting two examples of disputes over resources that evolved into major armed conflict. The first dispute took place in Darra-e Suf when government agents wanted to implement literacy courses among the local population of Chardeh.27 The people of Chardeh lived from cattle-breeding, which is extremely labour-intensive during the summer. Accordingly, they requested training in the winter months. The request was turned down, and the inhabitants responded by driving the administrators

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27 Bindemann (1987a), pp. 83–89
away with stones and sticks. The administrators reported serious rebellion to the province centre, armed forces arrived and arrested 43 people who were killed in custody. This was effectively a declaration of full war. The second dispute took place in Darra-e Turkmen.\textsuperscript{28} Government controls made travel to and from Kabul extremely difficult. Ultimately food supplies were blocked from getting through. Undermining local access to resources facilitated the mobilisation of the local people, eventually evolving into major armed conflict. This conclusion by Bindemann is representative for the major analysis of the first uprisings in Hazarajat:\textsuperscript{29} "Summing up, it can be established (...) that individually and collectively perceived life threatening measures of the government threw the inhabitants of Hazarajat into resistance." (Bindemann, 1987, p. 57, my translation).

While there had been minor uprisings in the autumn of 1978, the resistance did not gain real momentum until the spring of 1979. As the snow disappeared in March/April 1979, administrative quarters in Hazarajat were attacked by local residents who hardly knew anything about the events in the neighbouring valley, and even less about what was going on in Kabul. Uprisings started in the areas which were not most easily accessible, like Daykundi. By late April the local population had taken over the administrative centres in most of the districts within Hazarajat. There was an uprising in the city of Bamiyan involving defectors from its garrison. The uprising was knocked down when Kabul sent reinforcements.\textsuperscript{30} By late May, the government administration was expelled from Hazarajat, but not from Bamiyan. The early uprisings in Hazarajat took place within established forms of organisation. To mobilise against outsiders through the joint effort of mir and sayyid was well established in Hazara communities. Grevemeyer sums up this early resistance as follows: "The liberation of Hazarajat can be seen as an extreme, spontaneous popular uprising, and was effectively a peasant rebellion within the framework of a patron-client organisation." (Grevemeyer, 1985, p. 18, my translation)

While resistance was largely a defensive exercise, it still resulted in establishing local control over various other goods, mostly due to the expulsion of the state’s administrative apparatus. One example will suffice. With the administration out, Pashtun nomads were largely hindered from using summer pastures in Hazarajat.\textsuperscript{31} In addition the debt, written off by the government that the Hazara opposed, was practically invalidated. Now that

\textsuperscript{28} Described by Nirvani, Hosein Ali Hajji Kazem in 'Tashayyo dar Hazarajat' (The Shi'ia of Hazarajat), approx. 1985, presented in Bindemann (1987a), pp. 53–55, and pp. 57–58
\textsuperscript{30} Grevemeyer (1985), pp. 13–14
\textsuperscript{31} Rathjens (1988), p. 133; Roy (1986a), p. 145; Interview 27, p. 1
the administration was out, one could enjoy benefits which were worth defending and fighting for.

Two Islamist organisations actively resisted the PDPA revolution, Nasr and Harakat-e Islami. Nasr was set up among Hazara in Iran, and adhered to strict Khomeinism. Still, it had floating boundaries towards the Hazara nationalist grouping Jawanan-e Moghul. It has been suggested that Nasr represented an effort by Iranian Khomeinists to gain control over Hazara nationalism.\(^{32}\) Nasr played a role by providing an Iranian-trained leadership for resistance in some localities.\(^{33}\) But, while the Islamists were operative leaders for small armed groups, overall command was normally by a military committee, with a mir in command, and a good representation of sayyid. Harakat-e Islami was established by the non-Hazara Asif Mohseni, growing out of his madrasa in Kandahar. He preached a moderate Islamism, opposing Khomeini's emphasis on the unity of religion and politics. The party recruited primarily from the educated urban Shi'a, dominantly Qizilbash, but also Hazara. The party was less clergy-dominated than other Islamists. Its role during this first period was limited.\(^{34}\)

The secular radical movements in 1978 were largely limited to the capital and other major cities. Their network within the army and the party apparatus made them a threat to the government, who prioritised eliminating the competing communist groups. After the Khalq had executed their leader, Taher Badakshi, the remaining leaders of Setam-e Milli joined the PDPA in 1980. Prior to that, the group had got famous through a hostage affair which ended with the killing of the American ambassador, and a number of Setam-activists.\(^{35}\) Shula-i Jawed, the major leftist party before the coup, established groups in cities. Like Nasr, it provided a dedicated leadership to some of the resistance groups in the countryside.\(^{36}\) Akram Yari, a Hazara from Jaghori and a leading member of Shula, was executed by PDPA in 1978.\(^{37}\) Shula joined SAMA, an union of radical groups opposing the regime in the spring of 1979. SAMA was led by Majid Kalakani, who had been engaged in anti-governmental struggle since 1968. He enjoyed a mythic status enabling him to establish a broad union of radical organisations, including some Islamic radicals.\(^{38}\) SAMA was active in the cities, but played only a minor role in rural uprisings.

\(^{32}\) Roy (1986b), p. 6
\(^{33}\) Bindemann (1987a), pp. 53–55
\(^{34}\) The Sunni Islamists were important at this stage, first of all because they were organised in advance.
\(^{35}\) Anwar (1988), pp. 154–155
\(^{36}\) Hyman (1992), p. 141
\(^{37}\) Emadi (1995), p. 6
The government was successful in crushing the radical secular resistance, particularly in the urban areas. In the rural areas, attempts to implement reforms met severe resistance, as people mobilised within local patron-client relations centred around the position of the mir, supported by the sayyid. The Islamists played a marginal role in these early uprisings.

6.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

I will here apply the theoretical propositions from Chapter 2 and 3. in an analysis of the mobilisation in this period. But first, I will attempt to place this case in a broader context.

The uprisings in Hazarajat in 1978 and 1979 fit the ideal type of reactive mobilisation. Without any prior preparation, the local population was forced into resistance by the actions of the government. In Chapter 3, I made a distinction between collective action building on mobilisation, and mobilisation that results from collective action. The case at hand is clearly an example of a population mobilising through collective action. The resources that this mobilisation builds on are almost exclusively intangible. Considering the scarcity of tangible resources, arms in particular, the strength of the reaction is astonishing, and it indicates a population that saw resistance as inevitable.

*Proposition #1a): Production of private goods*

The resistance of the mir is straight forward. Not only did the government threaten his resource base through new administrative routines and political reforms, it also threatened his life.

Mobilisation in this case builds on established, private good producing, groups. The patron/client institution centred on the mir is the crux of the uprisings. This is an institution which has developed mechanisms for producing joint goods, most importantly security and political representation. At the same time, it is an institution whose mode of goods distribution is essentially private; a client relates to his patron as an individual. However, the goods provided by the mir, first of all resistance, is relatively public in character. In accordance with the theory, mobilisation might have a public character as long as it builds on groups established for private good production. But, there will be larger requirements for control. (see #1b below)

On the other hand, why was there an unanimous rejection of a government committed to redistribute goods to the benefit of most Hazara? The government failed to develop alternatives to existing group affiliations. Even if one had an intention to benefit from political reforms, there existed no opportunity to do so. In accordance with the theory of Group Solidarity, it
was impossible to mobilise people by promising joint goods, if mobilisation was not linked to existing private good producing groups.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

People in Hazarajat live in small villages, with the *mir* network satisfying most of the needs of life. Multiple loyalties are rare. In the villages, the collective has substantial knowledge of and authority over the individual. Participation in producing the joint good, in this case political and military resistance, is highly visible. There exists few, if any, alternatives for group adherence. While the character of the good in question is favourable to free riding, the local organisation, being socially tight and functionally irreplaceable, is ideal to hinder free riding through control.

Does a focus on control give insight into how the government had been able to maintain administrative control prior to war, and how this was lost after the revolution? Former governments solved its control problem through local relations with the *mir*. The *mir* were few enough to be effectively controlled, but so many that none commanded a challenging force. This balance was violated by the revolutionaries, who failed to see that their few inexperienced, implanted cadres could not achieve even marginal control.

**Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale**

At first sight, it appears that the proposition on the scale of mobilisation is contradicted. The challenging group controlled the state, while resistance remained local. Going one step further, the theory argues that given a large scale external threat, internal competition over organisational following will cease. At this level, the theory is confirmed. I will argue that mobilisation around larger scale identities takes time. The uprisings dealt with in this chapter all took place in a period less than a year. Towards the end of that period organisation around the larger regional/ethnic identity were underway. During this period the government launched a large-scale operation to expand state control. The operation hit all localities simultaneously and in a similar manner. Consequently, counterreactions were similar, even though they were mostly uncoordinated. However, with a basis in Resource Competition theory, one would predict a large potential for mobilisation around larger scale identities.

**Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.**

The new government set out to modernise the Afghan state, and to penetrate local communities by installing loyal officials, bypassing local leaders. The aim was not only to strengthen existing state domination, but also to undermine the existing alliance with local leaders. The way reforms were implemented indicated to everybody that the little political influence they
enjoyed was threatened. For people in Hazarajat, the PDPA was seen as an expansion of already established forms of state domination, rather than a rupture in government. State expansion had been gradual since the 1890's, but what happened now was an immediate and dramatic escalation. The fact that there was massive expansion in a short period of time, is essential for understanding of the strong counterreactions to the government's effort.

Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity
In line with the analytical points above, I will argue that the combination of theories proposed in Chapter 3 accounts well for this case of mobilisation. Drawing on Resource Competition arguments, it is suggested that challenges over resources, principally political influence, ultimately also on life itself, ignited collective action. Threatening the life of established political leaders is unlikely to have ignited such massive revolts if there had been a credible alternative for political influence. The lack of any network encompassing government agents and sections of the Hazara population, made the task of the government agents impossible. In spite of internal conflicts in Hazara society, the arrival of this other, could only foster concerted resistance.

Linking up with the Group Solidarity theory, the argument just above is a reasonable account of how an opportunity structure within which most people would resist, emerged. There was no alternative to the existing private good producing group Therefore a threat to the group's leader was a threat to each person's supply of private goods. The focus here is on the opportunity structure. I would argue that this is a case where the preferences of actors are relatively unproblematic (see 2.1.4. and 2.1.5), because people are likely to mobilise in order to maintain access to crucial resources.

Summing up on theoretical complementarity, by combining the Group Solidarity theory and the Resource Competition theory it is possible to account for the uprisings in Hazarajat in 1978 and 1979.

6.4. CONCLUSION
By early summer 1979, the PDPA government had withdrawn from Hazarajat. For the first time since Abdur Rahman's campaign in the 1890's, political decision making was left to the local population. For the government this was a major defeat. Not only had the government failed to implement its reforms, but it had also lost administrative control over the whole region.

In this chapter I have attempted to explain how this could happen. I have argued that the government misjudged the society it wanted to reform, and its own capability to do so. The government assumed that the promise of distant benefits would motivate large-scale support, even if it engaged in
massive campaigns to wipe out the local elite. The core of the matter was, in the language of Resource Competition theory, that the government challenged the local population on control over crucial resources. The attack on local elites were seen as an attempt to deprive people of the little political influence that they had.

The emphasis on disputed resources gives a reasonable account of why the opportunity structure was changed, so that it made sense for the individual to engage in protest. According to Group Solidarity theory, people mobilised within existing, private good producing groups; the mir and his followership. Furthermore, these groups were already equipped with a considerable control capacity, which is crucial in a situation where the disputed resource is of a joint character, favourable to free riding.

I have argued that the same theoretical framework could be applied to understand the causes behind the failure of the government. The government confronted all established leaders in the region simultaneously, without establishing any alliance with any elite or group. The thrust in the effect of promising a brighter political future seemed unrealistic, particularly when the immediate experiences with government agents was characterised by brutality and repression. Cutting ties with the local power holders, the mir, the government lost its only means of control.

Mobilisation was mostly local in scope. This could be seen as a contradiction to the Resource Competition argument that a large-scale threat would promote mobilisation around larger scale identities. I have argued that the fact that internal competition for membership ceased in the period of external threat was more relevant. Organisational processes around larger scale identities take time. But already by Summer of 1979, efforts at establishing such organisation were under way. The organisation of the region-encompassing Shura is the subject of the next chapter.

The chapter deals with the period from the establishment of a regional alliance, the Shura, in mid-1979, up to the alliance was challenged by the Islamists in 1982. The mobilisation behind the Shura was initially a response to large scale external threat. The sayyid gained control over the top positions. The conflict in Afghanistan changed character with the Soviet invasion at the end of 1979. As the new regime cut armed operations in Hazarajat, internal splits occurred in the Shura, between religious and secular elites.

The Shi’ia groups were excluded from the international support to the resistance. Iran was an exception. Its support was restricted, and increasingly going to the radical Islamists.

Afghanistan’s conflict changed character as the Soviets invaded by the end of 1979, in Hazarajat the invasion was perceived as an aggravation of threat. Armed action in the region was stepped down, and ceased by mid-1981. Iran was stimulating the religious turn of the Shura. A number of resistance organisations were established in Pakistan. They were all explicitly Islamic and exclusively Sunni. Hence, a sectarian boundary divided the Shi’ia from the overall resistance, limiting the Hazara resistance to have a regional scope.

The Shura was dominated by the sayyid, whose leadership in times of crisis was institutionalised. As traditional religious leaders, their network was limited to Hazarajat. This became decisive for the scope of organisation. In the Shura’s first phase, all elites were accommodated. In the second phase, after the withering of external threat, the sayyid, depending on the sheikh, turned against the secular groups, and established full control. The loosing party was first of all the mir, who had lost all sources of private goods, and did not have the necessary abilities to lead an administration of a regional scope.

The period of Shura domination is seen as consisting of two distinct phases, one of unity, and one of competition. The establishment of the Shura built on the uprisings in Hazarajat in 1978 and early 1979, and can be seen as a mobilisation based on spontaneous collective action, with all categories united against external threat. However, from the very beginning the Shura started to build a state-like regional administration, placing heavy obligations on its citizens, particularly taxation and conscription. Gradually, the Shura established more formal systems of control. In the second phase, external threat withered, and internal conflict erupted, with Hazarajat as the most relevant boundary. An era of internal competition over political loyalty between different categories in Hazara society was initiated. Increasingly, the sayyid leadership lost popular support due to an increasing imbalance between what it demanded from its citizens, and what it offered them.
7.1. RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

7.1.1. Other states: Support strengthen sectarian split

International interest exploded after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December 1979. Most international support was channelled through Pakistan, which chose to exclude the Shi'ia. The fragmentation in Iranian politics prevented Iran from becoming a major actor. Furthermore, the war with Iraq restrained engagements elsewhere.

Until the Soviet invasion on December 24th, 1979, the Afghanistan issue received little international attention.\(^1\) Soviet presence changed that dramatically. The UN General Assembly demanded the withdrawal of 'foreign troops'. The US applied the strongest imaginable diplomatic reactions. It also started shipping small arms to the resistance, as did Saudi Arabia, Egypt and China.\(^2\) All sent their arms via Pakistan, who played a key role in the distribution.

Pakistan had established relations with several of the Afghan resistance groups in the seventies, particularly the Islamist opposition. After the Soviets arrived, six parties were quickly recognised. Their leaders already had a working relationship with Pakistan's Foreign Office and intelligence.\(^3\) These parties were all Sunni.\(^4\) Pakistani policy effectively excluded the Shi'ia resistance from the major international sources of support.

Iran's leaders were more in favour of Afghanistan's Shi'ia parties, but conflicts at home limited the leaders capability to engage abroad. The alliance of moderate modernists and traditionalists supported an active approach to Afghanistan. They regarded Mohseni of Harakat-e Islami as their closest ally. Shura-e Ittefaq received limited financial support, which was cut around the end of 1981.\(^5\) As the Islamists gradually strengthened their position, support for a broad Afghan resistance faded. Mohseni was placed under house-arrest. He was accused of receiving US support. In August 1980, his party, Harakat, was banned.\(^6\) Some Iranian support was channelled to the Sunni Islamist, Hezb-e Islami. In general, Iran did not provide major support to any group, rather conflicting Iranian groups provided marginal support to their own favourites in Afghanistan, mostly Shi'ia.

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3. Clandestinely, the Shura continued to receive minor support through the Quetta-based, Hazara nationalist, Tanzim. (Bindemann, 1987a, p. 48; Interview nr. 23, p. 5)
4. It was a failure not to ensure Shi'ia representation, admits Riaz M. Khan, a senior Pakistani diplomat. He argues that at the time it was understandable. First, there was a mushrooming of political groups. Second, there was fear that Iran might see it as mixing into their domain. Third, Shi'ia opposition to Zia-ul Haq's Islamisation program, made Shi'ia politics unpopular. (Khan, 1991, p. 76–79)
5. Interview 19, p. 2
In September 1980, Iran faced Iraqi armed attack, which was provoked by Khomeini's encouragement of the Shi'ia opposition in Iraq to rise up and demand autonomy.\(^7\) The war placed a heavy burden on Iran's economy, and on the capacity of its new administration. The war soon became Iran's primary foreign policy issue, and improving relations with Moscow, who supplied arms to Iraq, became crucial for Iran. When the Islamists effectively gained control in Iran by June 1982, the relation with the Soviets became a priority. Support to Shi'ia Islamist groups continued with care, in order not to provoke the Soviets.\(^8\)

Altogether, the Shi'ia parties of Afghanistan were denied access to the major external resources. Iranian support increasingly focused on radical Islamist groups, and remained rather marginal up to 1982.

### 7.1.2. State: The Soviets take control

From mid-1979 most of Hazarajat was freed from the government. The army was busy elsewhere, in general there was an escalation of conflict. The Soviet invasion led to full scale war in Afghanistan, but Hazarajat was increasingly spared. The Soviets installed a new government. They tried to foster popular support, by granting minor concessions to the Hazara.

Throughout 1979 the conflict intensified, following the Herat mutiny in March, when a division of 10 000 soldiers turned against the government.\(^9\) Soviet increased shipments of military equipment and advisers. Still, in 1979, it remained a low-intensity conflict. It is crucial to note that government presence in Hazarajat nearly ceased, starting from the summer of 1979.

The "Christmas coup" of 1979 involved the deployment of 85 000 Soviet soldiers in a one month period. President Amin was killed on December 27th, most probably by Russian elite soldiers.\(^10\) On the same day, Babrak Karmal was installed as prime minister. His inauguration speech was broadcasted from a radio station in Dushanbe, Soviet Tajikistan.\(^11\)

Karmal was one of PDPA's founding fathers, and the major figure of its Parcham branch. After Soviet forces had secured the capital, the Parcham elite returned from exile. An indiscriminate power struggle within PDPA's Khalq-faction predated the Soviet invasion. The Soviets had always disregarded Khalq, but relations between the two worsened after the demonstration of incompetent governance. In September 1979, the Soviets tried to reconcile the expectedly moderate Taraki with the Parcham faction, and get rid of Amin.

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\(^7\) Savory (1986), pp. 414–415
\(^9\) Urban (1988), pp. 30–34
Amin, however succeeded to remove Taraki, and emerge as the undisputed leader, contrary to Soviet plans. The wish to change the regime was a major motivation behind the Soviet invasion. The new government was a forced alliance of Parcham and Khaq, strictly controlled by Soviet advisers. Initially, the Soviet strategy was to launch medium scale military operations jointly with Afghan forces, focusing on the eastern border provinces. As recognised throughout 1981, this failed due to an underestimation of the strength of resistance, and an overestimation of the capacity of the PDPA and its army. Soviet forces had to take a far more active role than intended. In the revised strategy, political efforts drawing on open and potential conflicts in Afghan society were emphasised. Warfare in Hazarajat was discontinued in 1981, with the exception of the garrison in Bamiyan.

Politically, efforts to distance the policy of the new government from that of the earlier PDPA was initiated immediately after the invasion. An interim constitution was drafted. It introduced political representation and downplayed socialism by emphasising the Islamic character of the regime. In government-controlled areas, economic and political freedom increased considerably. The new regime attempted to demonstrate a more favourable attitude towards the Hazara. Installing Sultan Ali Keshtmand as prime minister in 1981 was considered a milestone. No Hazara had ever held such a position before. But Keshtmand was discredited by his past. He was one of the founders of the PDPA, and served in Taraki's first government. PDPA did not succeed in fostering political support from the Hazara: "The communist party is still perceived as Pashtun, the Kabul regime as a 'foreign' regime, or even infidel." (Roy, 1983, p. 12, my translation)

Summing up, the conflict escalated throughout 1979, with Soviet invasion at the end of the year it became a real war. At the same time, there was a cessation of armed action in Hazarajat. The Soviet-installed government tried to foster political support, including concessions aimed at the Hazara. Still, it had minimal domestic support, and got increasingly dependent on the Soviets.

14 For example, a Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities was established in June 1981, a direct extension of KHAD, the intelligence agency supervised by KGB. It infiltrated groups and stimulated existing conflicts within the resistance. Lack of PDPA-supporters in Hazarajat hampered attempts to fuel internal differences. (Alawi, 1988, p. 182; Ziring, 1987, pp. 120–121; Amin, 1987, p 329; Roy, [1992] 1993, p. 12)
15 Olesen (1988), p. 167
16 Interview 4, p. 1; Interview 7, p. 1; Interview 21, p. 4. A Hazara engineer who lived in Kabul tells about large improvements in economic and political liberties for the Hazara from 1980. (Interview 7, p. 1)
7.1.3. The resistance: Sectarian split reflected by parties

The Shi'ia were excluded when the groups representing the resistance were set up. Somewhat paradoxically, cross-sectarian and multi-ethnic co-operation was fairly common on the ground.

Seven resistance parties were formally established in Pakistan throughout 1980–1981, based on existing groups. They were all Sunni parties with an explicit Islamic orientation. There were two alliances: one Islamist and one traditionalist. Disputes between the Sunni parties were common, making the unity in Hazarajat an outstanding phenomena. The exclusion of the Shi’ia had serious effects. It marked a sectarian boundary that made it difficult for the Shi’ia to see themselves as part of one joint resistance. Although it is clear that Pakistan opposed Shi’ia representation in the resistance alliances, there are no indications that the Sunni resistance parties did anything to accommodate Shi’ia political organisation. Most importantly, exclusion meant that the Shi’ia were denied access to the international community and to the resources available for the resistance.

Co-operation was normal among resistance groups in the country. Many analysts thought the common struggle against a foreign invader would greatly enhance nation-building in Afghanistan. Shi’ia and Sunni were co-operating, first within the secular organisations which were active in urban resistance, and second between groups on several locations on the fringes of Hazarajat. Still, it is misleading to see the resistance to the regime as one unit. The resistance did not operate on a national scale. On the contrary, the scale was local, with functional alliances being established, even across ethnic and sectarian boundaries.

The major development was the establishment of the resistance parties in Pakistan, with the explicit exclusion of Shi’ia parties. This organisational split was not necessarily reflected in the local resistance.

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18 Rubin (1991a), pp. 78–79.
19 There exists small Hezb-affiliated groups in Shi’ia environments, probably remnants of an early Hezb-attempt to foster Shi’ia support. Examples are the groups of Sayyid Qaseem in Jaghatu, Ibrahim Abaasi in Jaghori, and Tomasiki in Darra-e Suf.
20 Grevemeyer, while seeing the exclusion as an effect of diverging religious and political orientation, also holds earlier discrimination of the Hazara responsible, they lacked education and the connections necessary for getting in. (Grevemeyer, 1985, p. 27)
22 An exception is apparently the Sunni Islamists, who were well organised in advance, and engaged in modern, mobile guerrilla war. (Roy, 1986a, p. 107)
7.2. PROCESSES AMONG THE HAZARA

7.2.1. Leadership: sayyid in charge of Shura

As the Shura was established, the sayyid got most of the top positions, still in alliance with the mir. The second phase of Shura domination occurred after the government had cut operations in Hazarajat and the sayyid formed an alliance with the sheikh against the mir. The first phase changed the resistance in Hazarajat from being local to being regional in scope. The second phase represented a major rupture in Hazarajat's social order.

The traditional role of the mir was based on a delicate balance between exploitation and loyalty. The loyalty rested on the ability to provide private goods, either in the form of resources obtained from the state, or by resolving conflict with the state. When the PDPA government cut all ties with the mir, they undermined the local political dominance of the mir. Furthermore, the mir suffered grave losses in economic and social resources, such as loss of herds and emigration of dependents. Adding to the loss in resources was the mir lacking ability to satisfy the organisational requirements of a long term regional resistance. In particular, the mir did not command a network with a trans-local scope, as the sayyid did. On the other hand, many mir had relatives in Pakistan, some business experience and some convertible capital. These resources gave them an alternative to life in Hazarajat. When the sayyid turned against the mir in the Shura's second phase, many mir left.

For the sayyid, a prominent role in times of crisis was historically established. The credibility of a religiously based leadership in politics benefited further from the Iranian revolution. It was expected that a struggle led by religious leaders would receive large scale Iranian backing, financially and militarily, ultimately a new source of private goods. On this basis, the sayyid domination of the Shura in its first phase was not surprising. For the mir, the preference was, as before, to rule from "behind the scenes". There was no reason to expect the old alliance with the sayyid to break. The leadership of the sayyid was deemed fit in the first phase of the Shura, because they were alone in commanding a network of a regional scale. Prior to the war, this network primarily dealt with religious matters. After the mir-state relation broke down, the network took on a political function. Then, in the second phase of Shura domination, the sayyid turned against the mir. There

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24 Grevemeyer (1986), p. 14. The changing role of the mir is a dominant theme in all of rural Afghanistan during the first years of resistance. Although the war kicked off a dramatic change in the situation for the mir, it must be pointed out that their power position was already in danger before the war, as more people got independent through education or migratory work. (Bindemann, 1989, p. 7)

25 Grevemeyer (1985), p. 20

26 Farr (1988), p. 56
is a considerable overlap between the identities of *sayyid* and *sheikh*. The latter, motivated by the successful Iranian revolution, aimed at escalating the political struggle, and they had considerable influence among the *sayyid*. An alliance of the two religious elites emerged, with the objective to oust the secular power holders, the *mir*, from Hazarajat. The initiative received considerable political, and some material, backing from Iran.

The *sheikh* were improving in terms of political influence, primarily because some of them were also *sayyid*, and held top positions in the Shura. Beyond that, the Shura leadership was careful not to let the Islamists into positions. The Islamists' role was in mid- and low-level posts of command, where there was a real need for their qualifications.

The same kind of posts were available for the secular radicals in the first phase of Shura dominance. However, as the Shura turned against the *mir*, the radical seculars lost all their influence. The destiny of the radical seculars was linked to the destiny of the *mir*, since they were subject to the same threat as the *mir*, they were inevitably expelled.

The period of Shura domination had two distinct phases. First, the *sayyid* dominated in traditional alliance with the *mir*. The *sheikh* and secular radicals held minor posts. Next, the *sayyid*, in alliance with the *sheikh*, turned against the *mir* and the secular radicals, and took full control.

### 7.2.2. Organisation: Shura governance, unity and conflict

As above, the period of Shura domination will be seen in two phases. The first period, a period of unity, encompassed its establishment and administrative build-up. The second period is characterised by internal conflict, when the Shura leadership turned against all secular elites. Having
gone through the two phases of the Shura, I will add a few lines about the Islamist and secular radical organisations.

In the summer of 1979, the initiative for a regional co-ordination was taken, apparently by Tanzim-supporters in Pakistan who mobilised further support in Jaghori. They invited representatives of all districts of Hazarajat to a meeting in Waras in September 1979. Around 1200 representatives participated, mostly sayyid and mir. There were also some young intellectuals. The meeting resulted in the establishment of Shura-e Inqelab-e Ittefaq-e Islami (Council of the Islamic Revolutionary Alliance), which would serve as an umbrella organisation for resistance groups in Hazarajat, aimed at facilitating a common understanding both on resistance and on local governance. Sayyid Behesti was elected as the leader of the Shura. He had a religious education from Najaf, and had set up a madrasa at his home place in Waras. Sayyid Jaglan got overall military responsibility. Belonging to a family that was both sayyid and mir, he was an unusual man. He was one of the few Hazara who had made a career in the army.

The Shura was initially an alliance, but it quickly developed into a party. It emphasised that it was not in principle a Hazara organisation. However, the dominating sayyid had few contacts in other ethnic groups, and no position outside the Shi‘ia community. The scope of their network was largely confined to Hazarajat. The regional boundaries of the organisation was enforced as it got excluded from ‘the resistance’ in Peshawar. While distancing itself from secessionist ambitions, the Shura's political demands for a post-war Afghanistan centred on two issues: administrative independence for Hazarajat, and the application of the Jaffari rite for the Shi‘ia in Afghanistan.

Grevemeyer regard the early period as crucial for the emerging nationalist ambition among the Hazara:

The events of 1978/1979 ended this pariah existence: in the Hazarajat the oppositional groups were able to remove the administrative authorities and to establish an autonomy; at the same time the ideological elements of a pariah people took shape during the beginning process of re-interpretation of political and religious ideas. (Grevemeyer, 1988, p. 214)

Seemingly, there was a high degree of popular support behind the Shura in its early days. The Soviet invasion, which was expected to lead to increased military activity, led to temporary increase in support.

The Shura developed a state-like administrative apparatus, which became operative during 1980 and 1981. Hazarajat was divided into 9

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28 It is a paradox that the mir, who lacked a regional network, had a larger potential for inter-ethnic ties.
29 Roy (1983a), pp. 10–12
provinces and 36 districts. The civilian provincial administrations, headed by a governor, had branches for justice, education, finances and culture. All provincial governors were sayyid, and originated from areas other than those they were set to administer. On the local level, traditionally organised councils were responsible for civilian administration. 20% of the surplus of production had to be paid in tax. Frequently, 20% of the production was demanded. Corruption was considerable. For those in position, there were wide opportunities to enrich themselves. Other parties operating in Hazarajat had a far milder taxation policy. A military structure paralleled the civilian one. There were eight military regions. In addition to a militia consisting of one volunteer for every tenth family, compulsory military service was introduced. The population was responsible for equipping and supporting the volunteers. With its harsh taxation and conscription policies, the Shura was both more demanding and less just than the former administration. Unlike any other resistance organisation, the Shura copied the state it had ousted from the territory. It even used the same administrative quarters. The Shura effectively demobilised the population, and went as far as to disarm people. The major good that the Shura had to offer its population was security. Given the potential threat of the government and its Soviet allies, security was important in this early phase. The shura also took care of the relation to the few Pashtun nomads who kept wandering to Hazarajat. However, as the perceived threat from the outside failed to materialise, the Shura’s demands from its citizens far exceeded the goods it offered. This is confirmed by the construction of formal controls, a major element of the administrative expansion. Finally, the dominating sayyid formed an endogamous group, giving the Shura a low score on representativeness, because political leadership was effectively closed to the public.

Military operations by the government soon ceased. The last major action taken was the unsuccessful summer operation of 1980, and by mid-1981 the government had effectively introduced a unilateral cease-fire in Hazarajat. The external threat had effectively eroded. Popular political interest had already decreased considerably. Dissatisfaction with the Shura accelerated, and so did conflicts within the Shura leadership. The stage was set for the second phase of Shura domination. Roy introduces the emerging internal conflict:

The Shura was split three ways. At one extreme there were the secularists, which included the mir and the left (the alliance of Maoists and families of influence is an underlying theme in the Afghan resistance movement, the

32 'Entretien avec Habibullah', (1982), p. 8–9
33 Bindemann (1987a), p. 61
34 Roy (1986a), p. 143–145
former often being the sons of the latter). This group had its own organization, known as *tanzim*, based at Quetta. Another extreme group comprised the radical Islamists, and included *shaykhs* who supported the Iranian revolution, and who accused the *mir* of "feudalism" and the *sayyads* of corruption and nepotism (a charge which was not far from the truth). There was also a traditionalist and clerical centre dominated by the *sayyad*. It was this centre, at first in the majority, which was the dominant force until 1983, a position which was achieved by supporting first the one and then the other of the two extremes. (Roy, 1986a, p. 141)

It appears that Iran had a part in igniting the internal conflict in the Shura. According to Bindemann, the targeting of the *mir* started in Daykundi by Sheikh Saddiqi Nilli, after he returned from a visit in Iran. An anti-Iranian campaign was launched by seculars who had repeatedly lost supplies in armed assaults by Nasr and Harakat. The campaign was counter-productive, because it facilitated the move against the seculars. A number of *mir* got killed, and many fled to Pakistan. By 1982, with the secular leadership outmanoeuvred, and a *sayyid*-based leadership controlling affairs, the tendency of the Shura became more radical. The tightening of administrative control continued, and what is said before on the administrative structure as it developed from the outset is equally true for this second phase. The command remained in the hands of the *sayyid*.

Turning to the radical secular groups, SAMA also had a following of Hazara, mostly former Shula-members. In 1980, SAMA had many people infiltrating the army. It had a Kabul guerrilla which was very active in the first months of the Soviet invasion. In late February 1980, it arranged massive demonstrations in Kabul. After that, its founder and leader, Majid Kalakani was arrested and later executed. The loss of Kalakani was important, but a number of other factors contributed to SAMA’s rapid decline. First, organisations seen as maoist were heavily targeted by the Soviets. Second, SAMA failed to obtain foreign backing, the supplies expected from China went to the parties accepted by Pakistan. Third, groups seen as leftist had a problem gaining popular support. By the summer of 1980, the maoist organisations had largely disappeared from the scene. Some of the radical secular groups, however, adapted to the new situation by concentrating on exile politics, mainly in Quetta. Several aid organisations operating from Pakistan are rooted in this radical environment.

35 Bindemann (1987), p. 62
37 Emadi (1993), pp. 114–115
38 Puig (1983), p. 27
Two Islamist groups, Harakat and Nasr, had followers throughout the region. Although both had Islamist ideologies in a broad sense, these were very different parties. Harakat, led by Sheikh Asif Mohseni, espoused moderate Islamism, and opposed many aspects of Khomeini’s doctrines. The party was initially under the umbrella of the Shura. Militarily Harakat was strong. In spite of its limited size it might at the time have played a more important role in resistance than any other Shi’ia group.\(^{40}\) Harakat’s strongholds were along the eastern and northern borders of Hazarajat. The Nasr party was radically Islamist, following Khomeini’s line. It stepped up its activities in Hazarajat in the spring of 1980. Nasr was a merger of numerous groups. Some of them were established in Kabul in the seventies. At least one was established in Najaf, Iraq, and consisted of activists, mostly the students of Khomeini. The recruits mainly included Hazara labour migrants, religious students and theologians returning from Iran.\(^{41}\) Nasr concentrated on building up local organisation. It might be that elements of the secular radical groups have been influential in Nasr already at this stage. If that was the case, it would contribute to make the ethnicism of Nasr in the last half of the 1980s more understandable. Unfortunately, information is lacking, both on Nasr’s emergence, and the fate of various radical secular groups. However, some of the smaller Islamistic groups, such as Niru and Hizbollah demanded relative autonomy for the Hazara already in the early 1980s.\(^{42}\)

Summing up, the establishment of the Shura in 1979 was a joint effort by all elites in Hazarajat. It evolved into a copy of the state, with harsh taxation and conscription policies. As the external threat largely disappeared by 1981, internal splits occurred. The sayyid, in alliance with the sheikh, engaged in a campaign to oust the seculars. Outside the Shura, radical secular groups largely eroded. In the Islamist camp, Harakat was active in resistance, and Nasr concentrated on organisation building.

7.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

In this section I will mainly focus on the second phase, which represents a major rupture in the social order in Hazarajat. I see the mobilisation around the sayyid in times of crisis, as in the first phase, largely routine action. Hence the need for explanation is smaller (section 4.3.). Having said this, it is clear that the establishment of the Shura had important implications. By filling most power positions, the sayyid were able to monopolise political power.

\(^{40}\) Roy (1986a), p. 146
Furthermore, by establishing the Shura, with the sayyid network at the core, the scope of political mobilisation among the Hazara was largely set.

The Shura establishment is a reactive phenomena, a mobilisation around the maximum identity available to counter large scale threat. However, as the government withdrew, new opportunities for political influence evolved, locally and regionally. Building on the reactive mobilisation, the Shura evolves proactively into a regional government.

Throughout both phases, the Shura is largely a mobilisation of intangible resources. In the second phase however, it seems that the wish to deprive the mir of controlling tangible resources have been central.

**Proposition #1a): Production of private goods**

In this case there is a shift away from the mir-affiliation, which formerly was crucial for delivery of most private and public goods. An explanation must deal with two issues: First, why did the sayyid want to take over? Second, what goods did the supporting population expect from the power shift?

Data only permits a sketchy answer to the first question. One could argue that the sayyid saw an opportunity to increase political power, and ultimately, after the cessation of government hostilities, to monopolise it.

Political power is the key to control numerous other goods. Here, tax and personal security for the sayyid are the primary goods. Indirectly, a new opportunity emerges because the state undercuts the control that the mir had over goods from the outside. The sayyid expected alternative external resources, primarily from Iran, to come through to the resistance.

From the people's point of view, it is clear that as the mir was undercut by the state, they violated a vulnerable balance. Proving unable to deliver the goods they had formerly controlled, people saw little reason to continue accepting their dominance. I will argue that the major reason for mobilisation behind the sayyid, was the wish to replace the mir, and the sayyid was the only candidate. Goods potentially controlled by the sayyid also played a role, as there was a widespread expectation that extensive Iranian support would go to religious-political struggle in Afghanistan, thus in turn permitting the sayyid to deliver private goods to followers.

Altogether, the emphasis on private good is not contradicted, but the data does not permit the drawing of any firm conclusions.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

In the initial phase of the Shura, the basic argument on 'Control' runs largely like the one in chapter 6. Being integrated in small villages, population and new power holders had the best starting point for controlling each others contribution to the joint good. In addition, the trans-local network of the sayyid was favourable to control on a larger scale.
Interesting enough, as the obligations of the followers increased, more formal controls were considered to be necessary. The administrative expansion of the Shura was to a large extent the construction of a control system to ensure that the population fulfil requirements of taxation and conscription. Hence, the two phases of Shura domination provides an eminent demonstration of control dynamics. Informal control is functional in mobilisation against external threat, while less legitimate demands on citizens require the construction of formal controls.

*Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale*

Regarding the mobilisation scale, it is necessary to look at both phases. First, what did unified mobilisation under the *sayyid* leadership mean in terms of scale? Second, why was there a change from unity to internal competition?

In accordance with propositions from Resource Competition theory, large scale external threat promotes mobilisation around larger scale identities. In Hazarajat, only the *sayyid* represented a large scale organisation, although their organisation was primarily fulfilling religious functions. As large scale threat arise, their quality of being regional in scope gains salience, and the organisation takes on political functions. However, being religious leaders, the *sayyid* had no potential to mobilise beyond the sectarian boundary. Effectively, being traditional religious leaders, their potential was also minimal in the non-Hazara Shi’ia populations, who largely disregarded traditionalist religious practices (section 4.3). Exclusion by the Pakistan based resistance contributed to draw a boundary of a regional/ethnic character.

By turning Resource Composition theory inside out, an answer to the second question is indicated. As the external threat disappears, mobilisation turns inward into internal competition between various identities over organisational following. Tangible and intangible resources mobilised to face external threat is exploited in internal competition. Phase two rests on the mobilisation in phase one.

I would argue that the case at hand not only supports resource competition arguments, this case also contributes by illustrating how the erosion of external threat might stimulate a turn from unified group mobilisation into internal competition over followership.

*Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.*

The initiative to establish the Shura was taken at a time when the government was attempting to expand its political control over the communities. The massive pressure was directed at everybody simultaneously. This adds little to the arguments presented in chapter 6, #2b) and in #2a) above.
More interesting is the competition generated in the second phase. As the state withdraws, the opportunity structure is changed to an extent making the \textit{mir} unable to regain the political power from the past. The new situation, under which external political power approaches zero, reveals the extent to which the \textit{mir} position was dependent on a certain mode of state dominance. It is changes in the niche of political influence that spark internal competition. The pre-war conditions for exercising political influence was defined by the ubiquitous presence of the state that effectively blocked any trans-local structures (section 4.3). With the state absent, the niche of political influence changed from local to regional, favouring a different set of abilities, in particular a different scope of identity. This argument fundamentally rests on #2a, and is fully in line with a standard Resource Competition argument.

\textit{Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity}  

The establishment of the Shura is seen as a response to massive external threat, and the internal split as a response to the withdrawal of threat. The large scale mobilisation ignited by the external threat became the major element in making it possible for the \textit{sayyid} to rise to dominance. Resources mobilised to face government forces were turned inwards. The \textit{mir} lost, in accordance with Group Solidarity theory, because he was unable to provide private goods. In accordance with Resource Competition theory he lost because his local scale identity had become inadequate faced with large scale external threat.

This case contains a shift from external to internal focus of competition. As such, I would argue that the case provides a strong argument for combining agency- and structure- oriented theories. Resource Competition theory explains both the initial mobilisation and its shift to internal competition. Group Solidarity theory accounts for the organisational implications of this shift, particularly by pointing out how the shift affects the distribution of private goods in the disfavour of the \textit{mir}. The combination carries well on this case.

\textbf{7.4. CONCLUSION}  

Building on the factual autonomy achieved, all political forces joined in an effort to protect the gains against external threat. What was seen as a co-ordination of various groups, evolved into a one-party regional administration, that exercised heavy obligations on its citizens. The main goods provided by the party were security and warfare. While temporarily being more appreciated than ever after the Soviet arrival, these goods were loosing in value as the government proved no will to regain control in Hazarajat. In line with tradition, the leadership of the Shura was granted to
the sayyid. In a second phase of Shura dominance, the sayyid used this position to free secular elites of all political influence. The main focus of explanation has been this second phase.

Evidence on why individuals, whether sayyid or the population in general, acted as they did, is scarce. This is an obstacle to strong conclusions out from Group Solidarity theory. I have argued that the sayyid succeeded in monopolising power primarily because the mir had been undercut by its major resource provider, the state. Furthermore, when political influence changed character, from local and dependent on the relation to the state, to regional and state-like, the mir did not possess the necessary abilities. I have also argued that Group Solidarity theory gains credit by the change from the first phase where informal control worked satisfactory, to a second phase with extensive formal controls.

The establishment of the Shura is crucial, because it defines a ethnic/regional scope for the resistance in Hazarajat, which largely sets the stage for a long time ahead. The sayyid were poor in inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic ties. This weakness was strengthened by the exclusion from the Pakistan based resistance. The Resource Competition argument is strongly supported by the development of the Shura from a first unified stage, responding to external threat, to a second stage of internal conflict, as external threat fails to materialise. The inability of the mir to respond to the need for a regional leadership, is also in harmony with the theory.

The combination of theoretical approaches chosen has been useful in this case. While a Resource Competition approach might have been sufficient to predict the change from external to internal focus of mobilisation, a complementary approach is needed to deal with organisational processes, such as inter-elite conflict.

Finally, some factors of major significance to the following chapter can be emphasised. The case just dealt with implied a religious monopolisation of political influence. Furthermore, the scope of mobilisation became ethnic/regional. In the Shura an increasing disparity between the corporate and the representative side the organisation developed rather quickly. As we will see, the era of sayyid dominance was a short one.
8. ISLAMIST CHALLENGE AND CIVIL WAR IN HAZARAJAT: 1982–1986

In 1982, the Islamists challenged the Shura, and initiated civil war in Hazarajat. By 1984, they had defeated the Shura in battle, and had taken over as the dominant political force in the region. Armed conflict continued.

The Shi'a resistance received little international attention, with the exception of Iran, whose Islamists saw a chance to establish a foothold in Central Afghanistan. The Iranians drew on networks with the Iranian-affiliated clergy at centre, and targeted financial and military assistance to the Islamists. At the same time they were careful not to provoke the Soviets.

By 1981, the government had its last armed action in the region. In its attempts at political reconciliation, the Hazara became an important candidate. Nevertheless, success was minimal because the government did its best not to alienate its Pashtun constituency.

The Pakistan-based resistance established the 'seven-party alliance' in 1985. Still no Shi'ia groups were invited to co-operate. The parties of the alliance dominated distribution of military support and humanitarian relief.

The challenging force in Hazarajat was dominated by the Islamic clergy, the sheikh. They benefited from the change from the following of sayyid to the following of mujtahid, a religious modernisation process. Many of the Shura leaders, who had a sayyid background, were educated in religion. Most of them chose to support the Islamist opposition. The Islamists fought for a dominant position for the new clergy in religion and politics alike. This was an incentive for the sheikh to join. The sheikh formed a strong network, and had a large recruiting potential among labour migrants in Iran. Their organisations had a tight core, and were established prior to the war in Iran. The Islamist parties proved capable of applying violence to achieve their political ambitions.

Crucial, however, was the potential for change created by the repressive policy followed by the Shura, which was constantly violating the popular expectation of an improvement from former state domination. The Islamists were the only credible challenging force. In areas under their command, they had already demonstrated a more reasonable line than the Shura, for example in taxation. Furthermore, their standing was enhanced by the success of the Iranian revolution, and they commanded important supplies from Iran. In areas where the Islamists were stationed before the war, they gained popular support relatively easily, while in other areas conflict with the local population was normal, thus suggesting that local networks are crucial for popular mobilisation.
8.1. RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

8.1.1. Other states: Iran ignites Islamist insurgency

Pakistan continued to ensure that all resources went through the Sunni parties. In Iran, the Islamist rulers emphasised a good relation with Moscow, while supplying radical Shi'ia groups in Afghanistan. The Shi'ia groups were in practice not recognised by the broader international community.

The initial line of no contact with Afghanistan's Shi'ia resistance was maintained by Pakistan. Membership in one of the seven parties was made obligatory to get refugee status. All military support to the resistance was channelled to the same parties. In sum, Pakistan ensured that all international support, humanitarian relief and military supplies, went to the Sunni parties. Pakistan was instrumental in establishing the seven-party alliance in May 1985. It was aiming at building an international profile for the Afghan resistance. The Shi'ia remained unrepresented.

In Iran, the radical Islamists got full control in 1983, and the support to the radical Shi'ia resistance in Afghanistan was strengthened. Nasr and the newly established Sepah-e Pasdaran were the major instruments. Nasr had been co-operating closely with Iran's Foreign Ministry at least since 1980. Pasdaran was established after an evaluation mission to Hazarajat in the summer of 1982 that found Nasr insufficient for fulfilling Iranian aims. The new party was under the authority of the Iranian Pasdaran, based in Qum. Iran provided training for Islamic militants. In the period 1982 to 1986, Iranian arms transfer reached its peak, although it was still comparatively limited:

(...) it concerns a very selective transfer aimed at certain Shi'ia groups, and the objective is not guerrilla warfare against the occupant, but to try to assure an ideological control in the central zones of Afghanistan - Hazarajat. (Puig, 1986, p. 58, my translation)

The increasing concern over the relation to the Soviet union was a major reason for the restricted Iranian involvement. From early 1985, Iran took further steps to improve the relation with the Soviet union, and an understanding that the Iran-supported resistance and the government forces

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1 Shura-e Ittefaq received minimal arms support from Pakistan, through the Pakistan-based NIFA, a traditionalist Sunni party. (Interview 5, p. 3; Interview 23, p. 5)
2 Khan (1991), pp. 80–81
3 Apparently, there were major conflicts between various factions within the Iranian Islamists on foreign policy issues. It appears that the major conflict line was between The Bureau for Islamic Propaganda in Qum (Pasdaran), headed by Ayatollah Montazeri, and the Foreign Ministry in Teheran. (Roy, 1990, pp. 68–70) Although such conflict expectedly have had effects on relations between Afghan Shi'ia groups, I have not succeeded in establishing how.
should not engage in armed action against each other developed. A basic contact developed between Teheran and Kabul. In the autumn of 1986, the arms transfer from Iran ceased, most probably as a consequence of Iran-Soviet rapprochement. In addition to the military and political support from Iran, the very example of the Iranian revolution was important. The Hazara had always been oriented towards their fellow religionists in Iran, and the success of a revolutionary ideology based in Shi’ia Islam was impressive.

UN-led negotiations between the Afghan government and Pakistan started in Geneva in 1982, with major US and Soviet involvement. The Pakistan-based resistance was not party to the negotiations, but gained some recognition by being routinely briefed on the talks. The Iran-based, Shi’ia resistance had no representation and very little information.

In sum, the Shi’ia resistance’s exclusion from major international contacts continued, because access was controlled by Pakistan. Iran backed Islamist parties, in an attempt to gain power in Hazarajat, but took care not to provoke Soviet.

8.1.2. State: Ambiguous attempts to accommodate the Hazara.

Hazarajat continued to be spared by the army's campaigns. In 1984, the government intensified attempts to accommodate the Hazara, and arranged a Hazara nationality Shura. In 1986, Dr. Najib replaced Karmal, and initiated a campaign called National Reconciliation for broadening support.

In Afghanistan, there was an escalation of military activity starting in April 1984. It involved new deployments of Soviet troops, increased use of government forces, and heavier targeting of civilians. Hazarajat, however, had not faced governmental warfare since 1981.

Nationality policy had not been a major concern after the Soviet intervention, but was now taken up. A major effort was the establishment of the 'Hazara shura' in 1984, which was organised by the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. It consisted of forty to fifty people, two from every district. A former parliamentary member, Khadem Beg, served as president. Sheikh Uruzgani, Dr. Sarabi and Sayyid Mansoor were vice presidents with various

6 Roy (1990), p. 70
8 Iran refused to participate, insisting that talks could only be run with Moscow, but was informally kept updated. (Wakil, 1991, p. 108)
10 Interview 3, pp. 4–5, Interview 8, p. 1, Interview 28, p. 4. The full name was Shura-e markazi-e millayat-e samadkash-e Hazara (Central Council of the toilers of the Hazara nationality) It appears that the Persian word for toiler, samadkash, had been heavily used in Afghan communist propaganda, making the government affiliation of the new effort very clear.
responsibilities. Beg and Uruzgani were seen as KHAD-contacts. Dr. Sarabi held a doctoral degree in economics, and had been a politician since Zahir Shah's government in the sixties. Sayyid Mansoor was the spiritual leader of the Isma'ili Shi'ia, and used his position to build up the powerful Isma'ili militia. The Hazara shura published a magazine, 'Gharjestan', which dealt with history, culture and social conditions of the Hazara.\textsuperscript{11} Issued in 5000 exemplars, it was widely read among Kabul's Hazara intellectuals. The Hazara shura was involved in transportation and distribution of relief goods, particularly food, in Hazarajat. Furthermore, it promoted education among the Hazara, and influenced access to academic education in Kabul or abroad. The Hazara shura opened up a public arena for discussing issues with a particular reference to the Hazara as a unity. For the first time the state made Hazara ethnicity politically relevant. It influenced distribution of important resources, such as business opportunities, relief shipments and educational access. The government's ambitions to foster political support and create difficulties for the guerrilla seems not to have been satisfied.\textsuperscript{12}

Efforts to increase the popularity of the government increased throughout 1985. Gorbachov, newly installed, intended to put an end to Soviet's engagement.\textsuperscript{13} An illustrative event was the "High Jirga of the Frontier Tribes" in September 1985.\textsuperscript{14} One third of the participants were Pashtuns from the Pakistan, who were used to disturb resistance transports. This Pashtun Jirgah demonstrated a basic problem for the regime. It was dependent on its traditional Pashtun support, which would suffer if major concession were given to the minorities. Roy sums up the basic ambiguity:

\begin{quote}
At present they waver between the creation of a great number of different nationalities (which would work to the disadvantage of the Pashtun, who provide the major source of communist support) and support for a greater Pashtunistan (which would mean running the risk of antagonising the other ethnic groups, who today are more militant in their opposition than the Pashtun) (Roy, 1986a, p. 146)
\end{quote}

Hence, the nationality policy failed to foster support for the regime.

The replacement of Karmal was announced on May 4th, 1986. Soviet wanted a leader who could bridge the Khalq-Parcham split, and make PDPA survive the withdrawal of Soviet forces.\textsuperscript{15} Dr. Najib, the new general secretary of the PDPA, came from the post as director of KHAD, the secret police. Roy

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Interview 3, p. 5; Interview 7, p. 3; Interview 8, p. 2; Interview 21, p. 1
\item \textsuperscript{12} Interview 3, p. 5; Interview 8, p. 1
\item \textsuperscript{13} Hyman (1992), p. 223–225
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hyman (1992), p. 224–225. The frontier tribes are Pashtun tribes, and using their support actively in a governmental campaign is reminiscent of the basis for former power holders in Afghanistan. It is a strategy which runs the risk of being seen as strongly ethnocentric.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Hyman (1992), p. 225; Westad (1989), p. 288
\end{itemize}
described him as a 'technocrat of pacification' and a 'specialist on tribal problems'. Najib made democratic accommodation and sophisticated use of the intelligence the major components of his strategy. He declared his 'National Reconciliation' policy in late December 1986. It included a unilateral ceasefire, invitation to exiled politicians to participate in government, prospects for a new constitution, free and fair elections and wide reaching amnesty. Still, credibility was not high, and Najib maintained that the leading position of the PDPA should be maintained within any future political arrangement.

The government abstained from military action in Hazarajat. In 1984, it invented the Hazara shura, thus acknowledging for the first time, the political relevance of the Hazara ethnicity. In 1986, Karmal was replaced by Najib who intensified efforts at political accommodation, but with limited success.

**8.1.3. Resistance: Continued exclusion of Shi‘ia**

Exclusion of Shi‘ia parties from 'the resistance' continued. The Peshawar based parties entered an alliance in the spring of 1985, under strong pressure from its main sponsors: the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who found unity among the mujahedin groups crucial to strengthen international pressure on the Soviets. While being internationally important, the unity's effect on internal relations was limited. Arms distribution remained under the control of individual parties. Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaff was elected as the leader of the alliance. Sayyaff was the head of Ittehad, an Islamist group with a leaning towards Wahabism, which is strongly against any kind of Shi‘ism, and is also a major inspiration for Saudi policies. The alliance had no formalised co-operation with any Shi‘ia group. This could be explained by Iran's general hesitation to co-operation. With the exception of Pasdaran, the Hazara groups were not fully dependent on Iran. The Shura-e Ittefaq was denied support when they turned to Pakistan in 1984 to 1985, and was encouraged to get support by linking up with other resistance groups. In practice, the international backers of the resistance were disfavouring closer relations with the Hazara groups.

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18 Hyman (1992), p. 231
19 Urban (1990), p. 170; Rubin (1991b), p. 79
8.2 PROCESSES AMONG THE HAZARA

8.2.1. Leadership: sheikh versus sayyid

The political domination of the sayyid soon got challenged by an alliance of Islamists from within and outside the Shura. After two years of civil war, in 1984, the sheikh-dominated Islamist alliance overthrew the Shura.

The political prominence of the sayyid was short lasting. The sayyid failed to obtain Iranian or any other foreign backing. Practices of the Shura increasingly alienated the population. It demanded substantial individual contributions to the organisation, but failed to develop means of representation. In Hazarajat under the mir, it was at least thinkable that any individual could gain political position. The sayyid, on the other hand, constituted a self-contained caste, setting representation at zero.

The trained clergy had marginal influence in Hazarajat; it was the traditional institution of the sayyid that counted in religious matters. The Iranian way to practice religion by the imitation of a mujtahid, was mainly restricted to the cities, and was frequent among the non-Hazara Shi’ia population. However, the number of Afghans who took higher Islamic education had been steadily increasing since the 1950’s, and was reflected in the establishment of several Shi’ia madrasa in Afghanistan, for example the ones established by Wa’es in Kabul, Behesti in Waras, Sadeqi in Nilli and Zahedi in Yakaolang. Frequently, those trained in Islam, were of a sayyid family background. Hence, many of those described as sheikh, also had sayyid descent, which is a key element to the internal differences of the Shura. While all its higher officials were sayyid, many of them were religiously educated, and eventually chose to follow an Islamist path and oppose the Shura. With the sayyid holding both political and religious power through the Shura, an unacceptable situation was created for the sheikh. They were politicised through studies, organisational activities, and the radicalising impact of Iran’s revolution, and were expected to play a role in politics. Still, many of them might have found it acceptable to restrict themselves to religion, but the power of the sayyid effectively closed off the possibility for a mujtahid-system of religious practice to develop, which would have undermined their political position. Ultimately, a role acceptable to the sheikh, in religion or politics, became dependent on the success of the Islamists.

Discussing the preconditions for Iran’s export of the revolution, Roy points out that an international Shi’ia clergy is not a result of the Iranian revolution. It existed prior to it, but became the primary resource for exporting the

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22 Except Wa’es, who was killed by the Khalqi government, all these became influential figures in the resistance. (Dorronsoro 1991b, p. 6)

23 The argument is reminiscent of a ‘blocked career’ argument. But here, not only is there a blocked career, the very institution that could provide the career opportunity is blocked from emerging.
revolution. The Shi’ia clergy of Afghanistan shared their educational background with Iranian colleagues, many had studied in Najaf under Ayatollah Khomeini. Political groups were established among the Hazara students, who later became building blocks in the resistance organisations. Grevemeyer thinks the emergence of the sheikh illustrates a 'modernisation from below', arguing that the PDPA rule ignited a massive traditionally based revolt that turned modern out from the functional requirements of modern warfare. Grevemeyer’s argument has some value, but fails to account for the elite dimensions of the conflict. The incoming leaders, the sheikh, did not emerge from below. They existed well in advance as a non-intended shadow administration. After dramatic changes had prepared the ground, they could come in and take over.

Elements of the Shura allied with the Islamist sheikh. Strongly supported by Iran, the new Islamist alliance turned against the remaining Shura leadership in 1982. The latter relayed with some of the secular elements. A civil war was initiated, which the Islamists largely won in 1984.

**Figure 8.1.** Identity and leadership in Hazarajat, 1982–1984.

Since the coup in 1978, Hazarajat were first ruled by a broad unity, then a religious alliance challenged by secular elites. In the period at hand the religious alliance cracked. For the sayyid, the former alienation of the seculars proved fatal. Both mir and sayyid operated in patron/client relations, and the change to Islamist rule also implies a change of organisational mode. Islamists operate in hierarchic, modern organisation, where individual achievement replaces ascribed status. As such, the change can be seen as a transition from a non-representative to a representative system. An aspect of ‘modern’ organisation as opposed to a patron-client based relation, is a larger potential to generate large scale solidarity. While the latter builds on individual, vertical relations, the former emphasises non-personal,

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24 Roy (1990), pp. 65–67
horizontal relations. Both the *sayyid* and the *sheikh* were seeking regional political dominance, but the *sheikh* might have had a comparative advantage through their mode of organisation.

The *sayyid* administration contained an imbalance between its corporate and representative aspects. For the *sheikh*, the *sayyid* dominance blocked opportunities in both politics and religion. Their rise to prominence implied a transition from patron/client relations to modern organisation.

### 8.2.2. Organisation: Hazara fights Hazara

The Shura got increasingly unable to maintain popular support. In 1982, the Islamists of the Shura allied with Nasr and attempted a coup. Hazarajat became a scene of civil war. In 1984, the Shura was driven out of its headquarters and the Islamists emerged as the major force. The Shura allied with Harakat, and continued to resist. Other groups were marginal.

The Shura of early 1982 was the government of a free Hazarajat. After a trip in the summer of 1982, Roy estimated that Harakat controlled 10 to 15%, Nasr (and Pasdaran) about 25%, and the Shura about 60% out of Hazarajat's territory. The popular support of the Shura gradually eroded as their administrative control tightened. Important were its harsh taxation practices, its conscription policy, and above all its organisational style:

Unlike the remainder of the resistance movement this administration is far removed from the people and has developed into a petty bureaucracy, complete with red tape, inefficiency and often corruption, specific office opening hours, official stamps and so on. (Roy, 1986a, pp. 142–143)

Hence, the Shura, within three years from its establishment had distanced itself from the population. The *sayyid* had presented a brighter future when they ousted the *mir*, but as their administration expanded, it became clear that it was not much of an improvement. Rather it was a threat to people's welfare. The Shura leadership failed to see that as the government left the area on its own, the basic reason for supporting the Shura, namely security, was gone. By 1982, the Shura was so unpopular that Hazarajat was in a state of emergency. In pre-war Hazarajat, distribution of goods had been extremely biased, in favour of the *mir*, the state administrators and the Pashtun nomads. The *sayyid* had violated its promises of securing distributive justice.

There is a social question to be resolved in Hazarajat, which either does not exist or has been resolved in the other regions. Hazarajat is a society whose evolution has been met with an impasse, and the Shi'i contribution (clericalism, hierarchical structure, respect for authority) had made divisions worse. (Roy, 1986a, p. 145)
These issues had been repeatedly actualised by radical groups prior to the war, by the PDPA propaganda, and lastly by the sayyid themselves. Now, an alternative with a credible program challenged the sayyid domination.

The Islamist groups had gained credibility through practice. Their toll on citizens in the areas they controlled were reasonable. They set up welfare offers, primarily in education. Furthermore their mode of organisation was, at least compared to the Shura, open with representative mechanisms. In addition to these internal aspects, the Iranian connection provided control over strategic resources. Political, financial and military backing was important. Indications are also that these parties influenced access to the Iranian labour market, by job opportunities in Iran being directly linked to participation in Islamist organisations. A major asset in the first phase was the strongly integrated core organisation, which was centred around a higher leadership of clergy often organised in Iran. The Islamists further commanded a mid-level leadership of educated youth. Their fighters consisted both of young students of religion and former labour migrants who had become involved with Pasdaran during their stay in Iran. The members depended on the organisation for most aspects of life, which facilitated control of members. Like the Shura, the Islamists had a professional army, but unlike the Shura, one that was both ideologically committed and strongly integrated. In the summer of 1982, the Islamists challenged the Shura. A coup attempt against Behesti was arranged by the most radical branch of the Shura in collaboration with Nasr. The latter had just supposedly got a contingent of one thousand military trained talib, religious students, from Iran. The breakaway faction of the Shura comprised half of its governors and Behesti's second in row. These defections severely weakened the Shura. In a rescue-operation Sayyid Jaglan re-engaged the mir, mobilised the farmers of Nawur, and succeeded in driving Nasr back. As Roy pointed out after his 1982 travel: "(...) Hazarajat has in this summer experienced a political crisis without equal (...) A genuine civil war has developed." (Roy, 1983b, p. 40, translation by Grevemeyer, 1988, p. 216) After the failed coup, the Islamists withdrew to their strongholds; Daykundi, Darra-e Suf and Turkmen.

Sepah-e Pasdaran was established in 1982, and was organised as a branch of the Iranian Pasdaran. The decision to form another Islamist organisation in Hazarajat was taken after an Iranian evaluation mission, which was not satisfied with Nasr. Pasdaran was based on an existing movement, Ruhanyat-e mobarez, 'the Fighting clergy'. The Pasdaran leadership consisted

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26 Among non-Hazara, only Islamist groups operated professional armies.
largely of people who had seceeded from the Shura.\(^{29}\) It was primarily recruiting among labour migrants in Iran. The recruiting base of Nasr was partly the same, and its leadership was dominated by clergy with educational background from Shi'ia institutions. But the Nasr fronts in Hazarajat were more varied, because the party was based on pre-existing groups.\(^{30}\) Ideologically, there were differences between Nasr and Pasdaran. The latter was most radical, demanding that the Shi'ia of Hazarajat should be placed under Iranian rulership, which meant under Imam Khomeini.\(^{31}\) Nasr also promoted the realisation of an Islamic ideal-society. In addition the party insists on the integrity of Afghanistan, and gives attention to ethnic discrimination, as here, from their 1984 program: "(...) any kind of use of force, or conditions of racial, religious, linguistic, regional or other similar discrimination is forbidden." (after Grevenmeyer, 1989, p. 39, my translation) The minority politics of Nasr's program stands far from Khomeini's doctrines. It can be seen as contrary to Islamist internationalism, and it occasionally strained relations with Iran.\(^{32}\) Nasr apparently pursued a more pragmatic political line than Pasdaran, and saw regional political dominance as the major target. The party was less concerned about the world Islamic revolution. In spite of the differences, Nasr and Pasdaran maintained a tactical alliance, first in challenging the Shura, their common enemy and later in sharing political power in Hazarajat and promoting a broader alliance.

Throughout 1982 and 1983, the Islamists were not able to significantly reduce the power of the Shura which continued its administrative expansion. In the spring of 1984, the Islamists succeeded to drive the Shura away from its headquarters at Waras.\(^{33}\) The Shura leadership withdrew to Nawur. While Roy estimated that Nasr controlled about 15% of the territory in Hazarajat in 1982, his guess was for two-thirds after the victory at Waras.\(^{34}\) The Islamists were decisive that their goal was the control of Hazarajat, which meant out-ruling the remnants of other parties, as well as taking necessary steps against local opposition. In Hazarajat the civil war costed more lives than the war against the government.\(^{35}\) In Nawur, the remaining stronghold of the Shura after the great loss at Waras, there were a continuous struggle between Sayyid

\(^{29}\) Bindemann (1987a), p. 64; Roy (1986a), p. 144; Roy (1986b), p. 8
\(^{30}\) Roy (1986a), p. 144
\(^{32}\) The differences between the two groups reflects differences within the Iranian clergy. Apparently, not only those, but also the smaller groups in Hazarajat continues to be supported by different patrons within the Iranian administrative or religious set-up.
\(^{34}\) Roy (1983b), p. 11; Roy (1986a), p. 144
\(^{35}\) Bindemann (1989), p. 13
Jaglan’s forces and the unified forces of Pasdaran and Nasr. The use of violence to resolve an internal social issue, had its doctrinal justification, and got its strategic expression by representatives of the parties:

In an Interview which I had in October 1984 with representatives of the Nasr-party, they admitted point-black that there were two wars raging in Afghanistan - one against the Soviet invaders and one between the various resistance movements themselves; the latter is almost more important as it must now be decided how the future Afghanistan is to look politically and socially. (Grevemeyer, 1988, pp. 216–217)

Roughly described, the Islamist groups gained control out from two distinct patterns. The first is where the Islamists were naturally seen as defendants of civil society against the Shura excesses. This pattern dominated where some of the leaders of the movement were established in the locality, often running a local madrasa, as Saddiqi of Nilli or Zahedi of Yakaolang did. These leaders operated within a pre-existing local network, and had a proven record in providing certain goods, such as education. Familiarity with the community facilitated monitoring of compliance. The other pattern is where the Islamists had no local position. This was the case in Lal-wa Sarjangal or in Daykundi, where the locals were hostile, and regarded the Islamists as occupation forces. There were big problems in establishing a working local administration. The problems were solved by resorting to repressive measures.

Harakat was also drawn into the conflict. In Nawur, the mir of the Shura got protection by Harakat, and after the Islamist attacked the Shura in 1982, Harakat and the Shura allied, bringing also the mir back in. Harakat maintained that the primary task was to resist the invaders. But also Harakat propagated a different role for minorities. Other groups lacked the potential to cover the region, and established various local alliances. The most important role was played by those along the Iranian border. Many of them were instrumental in facilitating communication between Iran and the resistance. Hizbollah in Herat province stands out between these. It was under the command of the Iranian Pasdaran, and served as a link between Iranian authorities and the Jamiat-dominated, Sunni, resistance in Herat.

Islamist groups with major Iranian backing challenged the Shura in 1982. The latter was steadily loosing popular support, as it was more repressive than the previous state, and did not implement the reforms it promised. In

36 Interview 9; p. 1; Interview 19; p. 4.; Interview 23, p.; 4; UNHCR (1990), p. 53
37 Dorronsoro (1991b), p. 6
38 From the program: ‘(...) the religious minorities should in the practice of their religious rites and the fulfilment of their religious instructions be granted all rights given by religious law.’ (after Grevemeyer, 1989, pp. 36–37, my translation)
39 Roy (1986a), p. 147
1984, the Islamist succeeded in overthrowing the Shura. Armed conflict continued to haunt the region, although at lower intensity.

8.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The focus here will be on the mobilisation of the Islamist organisations, largely taking place in opposition to the Shura, but also crucially dependent on other external factors. The mobilisation of the Islamists was proactive. The Islamists were working to bring in new ideologies, new political institutions, and new leadership in a society affected by, but not directly subject to, war. To achieve the goal, internal warfare was accepted. Among resources making this possible, tangible assets supplied by Iran were crucial, but so were also intangible assets, namely the educational networks established abroad since the 1960's.

Proposition #1a): Production of private goods
The private good proposition will first be related to the population mobilising behind the Islamists, and then to the leaders of the movement.

The popular support of the Islamists was first of all reflecting that the Shura's primary good had lost in value while the Shura failed to deliver other goods. Simultaneously, the Shura was claiming extensive contributions from its citizens. Where Islamists ruled, they had proven their policies to be more reasonable. They had a credible program for redistribution. They also commanded valued goods, particularly arms, by enjoying the backing of Iran. Still, the Islamists had problems in mobilising in localities where it was not part of existing private good producing groups. On these locations, they resorted to extensive repressive measures, which in theoretical terms can be seen as a different private good.

For the educated clergy it became unbearable to work within the Shura, where the *sayyid* monopolised both political and religious affairs. The ultimate goal of the *sheikh* was to be members of a trained clergy, in accordance both with their training and their institutional belonging. For the *sheikh*, the *sayyid* blocked career opportunities, and represented unacceptable religious practices. Iranian authorities actively encouraged the Islamists to challenge the Shura. For the *sheikh*, the best incentive of all was the knowledge that Islamists in power would mean an institutional set-up with clergy in all important positions.

The private goods proposition relates well to this case. The goods that motivate action are identifiable both for population and leaders. Further, the importance of existing private good producing groups is confirmed.
Proposition #1b): Control

Two control issues will be dealt with. First, the control mechanisms involved in fostering popular support. Second, the control mechanisms functional within the organisational core.

The argument on the first issue is only suggestive, as is the empirical material. It is established that mobilisation was smooth in locations with a pre-war network, and strained elsewhere. A major reason might be that in the former, control was facilitated by the Islamists' integration in society. The transparency achieved permitted more targeted application of sanctions. In other localities, where transparency for the Islamists were low, it was harder to apply incentives, thus there was a temptation to resort to repression.

The core of the Islamist organisations were cell-like structures. The group as such satisfied most needs of life. Members were often disconnected from family or other complementary groups, greatly enhancing control. In other words, belonging to the organisational core meant that category and network largely coincided, implying a high score on 'groupness' (See 3.3.2. on the catnet concept). Hence, the organisations were ideally suited to secure that no 'free riding' would take place. This is particularly important in the establishment of new organisations with high demands on members.

The control proposition gets strong support by the initial organisation building, while evidence is less conclusive on popular mobilisation.

Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale

As argued in Chapter 7, with external threat disappearing, diversity of identities get new relevance and internal conflicts develop. The dividing line between Islamists and the Shura becomes crucial in internal competition.

It is particularly interesting that many of those holding multiple identities as sayyid and sheikh, chose to activate the latter at the cost of the former when the Islamist parties intensified its efforts at gaining power in Hazarajat. This was the case for the defectors from the leadership of the Shura. One could suggest that the choice was motivated by strategic Iranian resources, or by individual preferences for a modern clergy institution, or because any alternative was attractive given the withering support of the Shura.

The sheikh would argue that their scale of mobilisation is neither regional nor national, but it is the world Islamic community, the ummah. In practice however, this definition of scale is not accepted neither by followers nor enemies. In the language of Resource Competition theory, one would say that a strategic definition of scale failed to get established, as it was not conforming to the ascriptive definition given by 'the other' (see 2.2.2.) The scope of the actual mobilisation remains ethnic/regional, as in the last period. At one level, the ummah identity definition works. It gives access to
resources aimed at promoting the international Islamic revolution, a crucial factor in the Islamist overtaking. It is also worth pointing out that like the sayyid, the sheikh had minimal inter sectarian ties in Afghanistan.

Here, resource competition arguments provide interesting insights, on how individuals might have some choice in activating identity, and how strategic identity definition also needs an ascriptive opposite pole.

**Proposition #2b): Resource Competition.**
The argument here runs largely like the one in Chapter 7. When external threat disappeared, attention turned inward, and a conflict between different identities for organisational following emerged. The principal disputed resource is political influence. The major explanation for the defeat of the Shura, is its failure to establish a reasonable balance between its corporate and representative side, reaching its ultimate expression in the caste-like monopolisation of political power by the sayyid. As was the case with the mir, the sayyid were unable to build a viable political government without any foreign backing. When a challenger appeared, which took the representative aspect more seriously and had external backing, the Shura had in effect lost. The basis of Resource Competition theory applies well: As external challenge on political influence disappears, it gets subject to internal competition.

**Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity**
The reasoning here is to a large extent parallel to that in Chapter 7. Resource Competition theory accounts for how the opportunity structure changed, and promoted different sets of actions accounted for by Group Solidarity theory. This is exemplified in Grevemeyer's quote of Nasr-leaders that pointed out the duality: there is a war with Soviet invasion forces that provides the opportunity for an internal war in Hazarajat. (section 8.2.2.)

The emphasis on scale is insufficient in accounting for the change in internal competition. It is interesting to combine the scale argument with an organisational argument, because while the sheikh refer to a large scale identity, they also operate in a different organisational mode. Their hierarchic and modern organisation can arguably be seen as having a better capacity for organisation building on a large scale, than the patron/client based organisation of the sayyid.

I will conclude that the theoretical combination is strongly supported, and it points out interesting organisational issues for further exploration.
8.4. CONCLUSION

The Islamists' overthrow of the Shura is a dramatic chapter in the history of Hazarajat. It signifies the emergence of a new elite. It also implies that political modernisation becomes principally important in local and regional organisation, not only as external factors. A crucial role is played by other states, Iran in supporting the Islamists, Pakistan in hindering international assistance to reach the Shi'ia groups. This underlines how war has contributed to undermine the state in Afghanistan.

I have argued above that this case is particularly interesting when it comes to the subjects of scale and identity. The emergence of an Islamist challenge to the Shura is reflected as those holding a multiple identity of sayyid and sheikh activate the latter at the cost of the former. The scale of identity in practice remains unchanged, because the regional scope of conflict is more important for definition than the global scope of Islamist ideology. In Resource Competition terms, this case is a continuation of the argument on the overtaking of the sayyid. Internal competition follows the disappearance of external threat. However, I have in the present case argued that the resource provision by Iran has played a crucial role.

Turning to the actor-oriented explanation, it is clear that the Shura failed to fulfil popular expectation for redistribution of goods, and placed the population under severe strain. For those belonging to a formally trained clergy, it was unacceptable to remain under the command of the traditionalist sayyid. The Shura blocked opportunities for the sheikh, while Iran actively encouraged conflict. Furthermore, in support of Group Solidarity theory, I have argued that the Islamists had efficient mechanisms of control, both in the cell-like organisational core, and as means of ensuring compliance from the local populations.

A focus on theoretical complementarity turned the attention to an interesting link: As external factors make larger scale identities more relevant, it might also be that the identities competing for internal dominance are of an organisational type capable of building viable, large-scale organisations. In the next chapter, focus is on the moderation of the Islamist program, which is linked to expansion of the power of the sheikh.
The formation of Hezb-e Wahdat in the middle of 1989 largely put an end to internal struggle in Hazarajat. Hazara politics was reoriented towards a discussion about political participation on the national level in general, and the question of regional autonomy in particular. After the Soviet withdrawal announcement in 1988, the communists were expected to fall soon. As the Sunni parties failed to accommodate the Shi'ia in the interim government in early 1989, the only opportunity was in forging a strong alliance.

The UN became a factor in Afghanistan's internal politics, to the advantage of the Hazara. Pakistan continued its ignorance of the Hazara, supporting exclusion from the Interim government. Iranian foreign policy took a pragmatic turn in 1989. Iran supported Shi'ia unity, and attempted to build Sunni contacts.

The Kabul government intensified its efforts at accommodating the Hazara, and arranged a large Hazara meeting in 1987. An offer of autonomy for Hazarajat, forwarded by Vorontsov, the Soviet ambassador, was turned down. The government was threatened by internal divisions, but succeeded to stay in power. By late 1991, the Soviet union and the US agreed to cut arms supplies.

In February 1989 the Sunni parties set up an Interim government in Rawalpindi. A preparatory agreement granted participation to the Shi'ia. The Sunni parties could not agree on the issue, and finally, they failed to give the Shi'ia a role in the interim government. To the Shi'ia, this was a clear message that political participation would not come without struggle.

Responding to the threat of political exclusion, the Hazara parties joined together and formed a single party, Hezb-e Wahdat. Groups that were in conflict merged and the Islamist parties, mainly sheikh, dominated. The new party re-integrated people who had been forced out of Hazara politics due to internal struggle. Both negative and positive incentives were important in motivating leaders to join: positively the potential for future political career, negatively the possibility to become subject to violence. The integration of the parties was a response to the foreseen disintegration of the Kabul government and the exclusion from the Interim government that followed. Organisational attempts among Hazara political elites in Kabul took place simultaneously. Altogether there was a gathering around the Hazara identity.
9.1 RELATIONS WITH OTHERS
9.1.1 Other states: A broadening of Iran’s approach

By 1988, the UN-led negotiations resulted in an agreement. The UN became an important factor in internal politics. Pakistan maintained its established line, while Iran turned more pragmatic in its foreign policy.

The Geneva accords were concluded in 1988, making the UN more involved in the politics of Afghanistan. The UN also became a major aid operator. Hazara organisations, Hezb-e Wahdat in particular, gave high priority to establishing good relations with UN officials.1

Pakistan's policy regarding the Afghan Shi'ia remained the same, which implied no support and minimum contact.2 Pakistan and the US were central in establishing the Interim government, which consisted of Sunni parties only.

In Iran the pragmatist approach to foreign policy continued to gain influence.3 The pragmatism propagated improved relations with both the West and the Soviet union.4 By July 1988, it had become possible for Iran to initiate an end to the war with Iraq. The pragmatist turn gained momentum with the death of Khomeini in June 1989. The relations with the Soviets improved. Diplomatic relations with Kabul was established in 1987, and arms supplies to Hazara resistance groups had been minimal since 1986.5 The Iranians started to focus on inciting unity among the Shi’ia resistance groups. The first attempt was the 'Eight party alliance', Shura-e Ittelaf, which was established in June 1987.6 The Eight party alliance included all the major parties in Hazarajat except Shura-e Ittefaq. The alliance had little impact on the ground, but served the purpose of making the Shi'ia resistance visible internationally. The major breakthrough for Iran came in 1989, with the establishment of Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami, under which the resistance groups in Hazarajat merged, thus ending internal warfare. The establishment of

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1 An illustrative excerpt from the report of a UN associate, after a mission to Hazarajat: "The potential for reconstruction and development in central Afghanistan has probably never been brighter since the war began than it is now. The new power broker in Hazarajat, Hezb-i Wahdat, is keen not to squander the opportunity for outside humanitarian assistance, it is also intent on using such assistance to bolster its own position, and to obstruct it vehemently if aid begins to threaten the unity that has taken the Shia parties years to nurture." (Lenderking, 1991, p. 20)
2 A minor exception was the presence of Shi’ia commanders in the ‘Council of Commanders’, most notably Sayyid Jaglan. The Council was initiated by the US in March 1990, to bypass the parties, it had a co-ordinating role in the eastern provinces, but failed to become a major factor.
3 In October 1987, the government arrested Mehdi Hashemi, leader for the World Islamic Movement in Qum, crucial in 'export of the revolution'. He was charged for activities undermines the government. (Wright, 1990, pp. 151–152; Halliday, 1990, p. 259; Interview 7, p. 2; Interview 19, p. 5)
4 Ashraf (1994), pp. 131–133
5 Roy (1990), p. 70; ‘Iran’s Middle East Policy. Active role in Lebanon and Afghanistan’, Mushahid Hussain in Frontier Post, 21 October 1989
Wahdat is commonly seen as Iran's response to the Soviet withdrawal announcement: "From this moment the priority of Teheran became to avoid marginalisation in the conclusion of the conflict, as well as the installation of a Sunni fundamentalist government in Kabul." (Dorronsoro, 1991b, p. 5, my translation) But the change of attitude on the Afghanistan issue can only be understood against the background of the pragmatist turn in policy. At the national level, Iran found itself still with a poor influence. It intensified its efforts to establish contacts with Sunni groups, focusing on parties dominated by ethnic minorities, particularly the Tajik, who were both linguistically and culturally close to Iran. A cultural agreement was signed with the Tajik-dominated Jamiat in 1991. Iran's efforts to gain influence on Sunni parties were restrained by the multiple international contacts of these parties.

While Pakistan mostly maintained its former line, two new factors emerged. The UN became a political factor. Iran promoted a broad Shi'ia alliance, and at the same time attempted to foster influence among the Sunni.

9.1.2. State: Withdrawal of Soviet forces

The National reconciliation program continued. A major effort to accommodate the Hazara was the Hazara Jirgah in 1987. The Soviets announced the coming withdrawal by early 1988, signalling a major political shift. An offer for regional autonomy was turned down by the Hazara resistance.

National Reconciliation was also implemented by intelligence based means. From 1985 there had been substantial clandestine contact with resistance groups. KHAD had been expanded and upgraded to the Ministry of State Security shortly before Najib left it. While intelligence contacts could not contribute to foster political support, agreements with resistance groups were efficient for economising on military resources.

Accommodation of the Hazara was an important element in National Reconciliation. The efforts around the Hazara Shura were stepped up, and a National Jirgah of Hazaras was arranged in Kabul in September 1987. Najib opened the meeting by declaring that the Hazara should organise in self-defence groups to defeat the resistance. Consequently, the Hazara were granted: substantial economic aid; establishment of Shi'ia educational

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7 Although the Soviet withdrawal decision was important for Iran, the parallel process Iran ran for Lebanon illustrates that the bottom line was a reorientation of foreign policy. Throughout 1989 Iran together with Syria ran a negotiation process between fourteen of the opposition groups operating in Lebanon, including Shi'ia, Sunni and secular groups. ('Iran's Middle East Policy. Active role in Lebanon and Afghanistan', Mushahid Hussain in Frontier Post, 21 October 1989)


9 In the words of one of my informants, who was centrally placed in the resistance in Hazarajat; "They succeeded to establish contact with every political group, without exception." (Interview 10, p. 3) In 1989, the government claimed to have contact with 575 groups, containing 45 000 men (Hiro, 1994, p. 255)
institutions to prepare the ground for applying the Jaffari rite; and revision of administrative boundaries to increase Hazara representation. Keshtmand elaborated on these points in his speech:

The numerous demands of the representatives of the peoples of Hazara populated provinces have been considered and new provinces mostly of Hazara inhabitants would be established. In these provinces you can manage to solve your problems according to democratic self-administration. (National Jirgah of Hazaras, 1987, p. 27)

In his speech Keshtmand repeated Najib's point on administrative reorganisation, but Keshtmand went further, and brought up the issue of regional autonomy. Even though the government proved willing to meet the major demands of the Hazara resistance organisations, the support gained by the Hazara jirga was marginal.

On the 11th of January 1988, Gorbatschov declared that withdrawal of Soviet forces would start by the 1st of May and be completed within one year. The withdrawal announcement was a watershed. While there was some doubt as to whether and how quick the Soviets would withdraw, the perception was that the government would fall soon thereafter. Soviet forces started their withdrawal in mid-May, and completed it by February 15th 1989.

At the very beginning of 1989, political autonomy for Hazarajat was offered to the representatives of the Shi'ia eight party alliance. The offer was first presented at a meeting in Teheran by Yuri Vorontsov, a Soviet deputy foreign minister sent as ambassador to Kabul. The offer was turned down. This did not come as a surprise, because by that time the fate of the government was seen as sealed, and Hazarajat was de facto autonomous.

Najib stepped up the efforts at National reconciliation, and arranged the second congress of PDPA in June 1990. The congress represented a turn towards Pashtunism: "Najibullah projects himself as the only remaining nationalist, Pashtun-led politically effective force in the country..." (Rubin, 1992, p. 30) Friction within the government intensified. The old Khalq-Parcham divide re-emerged, and Parcham split along ethnic lines. A leading

The Hazara Jirga in 1987 further actualised Hazara ethnicity. Being offered autonomy in early 1989, the Hazara turned it down. By then, Soviet had already announced its withdrawal. The fall of the regime was seen as imminent. Najib fell back on trying to foster support among the Pashtun.

9.1.3. Resistance: Interim government formed, no seats for Shi’ia
The Peshawar-based resistance continued to turn down Shi’ia representation. Even Harakat, who frequently co-operated with the Sunni parties and had an impressive record of fighting the government, was not allowed in. Sayyid Hadi, one of Harakat’s major commanders, said at a press conference in Peshawar in the summer of 1988: "Our leader, Ayatollah Mohseni, spent six months in Peshawar and tried to establish contact with the leaders of the seven-party alliance. He never got any response. Nobody cared about consulting him." (‘Shia-muslimer vil inn i 7-partialliansen’, Astrid Morken in Afghanistan-Nytt, nr. 3–4, 1988, p. 7, my translation)

The Soviet withdrawal announcement initiated efforts to broaden cooperation in the resistance. In February 1989, the Sunni alliance arranged a shura in Rawalpindi in order to establish an interim government. Initially, a number of groups not belonging to the Pakistan-based resistance, including Shi’ia, would be represented. Nevertheless, the formula of the Peshawar parties later on suggested that each nominated sixty people. This would give the Islamist parties a majority over the traditionalists, if no other group was represented. Rubin elaborates on the exclusion of the Shi’ia:

The ISI, the Saudis and the Islamist leaders wanted the function of the shura to be limited to approving an "interim government" chosen the previous year which had attracted virtually no support and was headed by a Wahhabi, Eng. Ahmad Shah, in deference to Saudi financial power. Hence they wanted to be sure of a majority in favour, which they could only have without the Shi’a, given the four-to-three distribution derived from the structure of the alliance. However, even though the Shi’ia parties recognized by Iran were also Islamist, they would be sure to oppose any government headed by a Wahhabi; the Wahhabis are among the most anti-Shi’a of all Sunni Muslims, and Saudi-Arabia, the patron of the

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18 Keesing’s Record of World Events (1991) p. 38437
Wahhabis, was the major opponent of Khomeini’s Iran within the Islamic world. (Rubin, 1991, p. 81)

Mojaddedi, head of the moderate ANLF, had negotiated an agreement with the Shi’ia resistance in early February. As a result, the latter were granted 120 seats. Iran backed this solution. The Sunni alliance opposed it, claiming that Mojadeddi had no authority to enter an agreement. Eventually, the shura was arranged with no Shi’ia parties represented. After discussion, the Sunni parties had not been able to agree on an offer for representation. As no offer was ever presented, they effectively denied the Shi’ia access on any terms. The exclusion of the Shi’ia could be considered a symbol of Pashtun arrogance. Rabbani was the only non-Pashtun party leader, but Jamiat was one of the major parties. Rabbani got the second smallest share of votes, which granted him an unimportant minister post. The Shi’ia parties had been excluded by the resistance since the Khalq coup. Still, the exclusion from the Rawalpindi shura was a major event, because the future political arrangement of Afghanistan was at stake. The sectarian boundary in resistance politics was severely strengthened.

9.2. AMONG THE HAZARA

9.2.1. Leadership: Clergy accommodates old foes

The new unity party was not a result of a change in elites, rather it was a strategic decision taken by established elites in a changed situation. Hezb-e Wahdat became dominated by Pasdaran and Nasr. The clergy became as dominant in Wahdat as it had been within these parties. It can be argued that the establishment of Wahdat was the Islamists’ final victory. For the leadership of the other parties, the perspective was different. Opposing the Islamists had been their major goal for years. But, it was a real risk for them to be marginalised when the new state was formed. It seemed unlikely that marginal Shi’ia groups would be able to obtain political positions in the new order. In Hezb-e Wahdat’s set up, former leaders were granted central positions. The content of the enduring negotiations prior to the establishment were not made public. Still it seems that the accommodation of political leaders was a major issue. Furthermore, the groups that dominated Wahdat's establishment had a proven record for applying violence against

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19 Rubin (1991a), p. 81. Keesing’s Record of World Events, (1989), p. 36449 reports on the deal between Mojadeddi and Karim Khalili, saying it was on 100 seats and 7 minister posts. Interestingly, population statistics formed a major argument in this debate. While the Shi’ia alliance claimed to represent 25 % of the population, the Peshawar alliance argued it is 8 % only. (Centlivres, 1990, p. 9)

20 Wakil (1991), p. 109, states that there were leaders among the fundamentalists who refused any representation, ruling out any offer from the consensus based alliance.

21 Rubin (1989), pp. 155–156
enemies. As the unity-formation gained strength, it was not attractive to remain on the outside, getting increasingly isolated and vulnerable.

The establishment of Hezb-e Wahdat in 1989 ended years of internal warfare in Hazarajat. The sheikh remained the dominant force. Other elites got accommodated, and gained political positions in the party. Although the sheikh were dominant, the program of Wahdat was practically more nationalist than Islamist.

**Figure 9.1.** Identity and leadership in Hazarajat, 1989–1991.

The new party opened up for reintegrating the mir. Land confiscated during the war were given back, and the return of the mir facilitated, although they did not acquire former status as political leaders. In addition, many from the radical secular group were rehabilitated. There was a great need for their qualifications, and many of them got administrative posts. Since they were part of an international political network, by incorporating them, Wahdat was able to guarantee itself working offices around the world. Even when disregarding these groups, the Hazara nationality formed the core of Wahdat, and it was that, not Islamism, that gave the partners to the unity a common platform.

Altogether, Wahdat accommodated formerly conflicting groups around a common core of ethnicity, dominated by the Islamist leaders. For the others, effectively being beaten, Wahdat offered political opportunities, while the effects of standing outside could be grave.

### 9.2.2. Organisation: The formation of Hazara political unity

An alliance of Shi’ia parties was established in 1987, but in practice the alliance had little effect. Two years later, in response to Soviet withdrawal, the Hazara parties joined in Wahdat, with a strong nationalist tendency. The multi-ethnic Harakat split, and the Hazara-dominated factions joined Wahdat.

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22 A majority of these had a background in leftist groups, the former enemies of the Islamists. To what extent these groups still represent a coherent policy is subject to speculation.
The Shura-e Ittelaf was established in 1987 as an alliance of seven Shi’ia parties. The alliance did not affect the conflicts on the ground, but it marked a difference on the international level, as the majority of Afghanistan's Shi’ia were represented and they gained international exposure. However, consisting of the seven parties with the best Iranian connections, the alliance was internationally regarded as an Iranian puppet.23

After Gorbachov's withdrawal announcement, it became urgent to secure future representation in national politics, which was considered the only way to secure a relative autonomy for Hazarajat. After Shi’ia representation in the Interim government was turned down, the only alternative was to build a strong organisation of Shi’ia. The initiative led to enduring negotiations involving Iranian officials and the leaders of the resistance parties. The top leadership in Nasr and Pasdaran was crucial in running the process. A key figure in Nasr suggests the initiative was taken at a meeting in Panjao in the summer of 1988, with only Pasdaran and Nasr leaders present.24 A more widely known meeting was held in July 1989 in Bamiyan. This meeting is considered by Hezb-e Wahdat as the founding meeting. Representatives from all the parties in Shura-e Ittelaf, except Hizbollah, were present. The meeting resulted in the signing of a 'declaration of unity', which stated that the existing parties would be dissolved, and that a new party, Hezb-e Wahdat, would be the only representative of the Shi’ia in Afghanistan. In November 1989, the remains of Behesti’s shura joined.25 The official proclamation of the party's establishment took place in Teheran on June 16th, 1990.26 Signboards of individual parties were replaced with those of Wahdat all over Hazarajat. Iran had an important role in setting up the Hezb-e Wahdat. Most of the preliminary negotiations took place in Teheran. Both the leading parties, Nasr and Pasdaran, had strong Iranian connections. By facilitating Shi’ia unity, Teheran was aiming at establishing a political instrument for post-Soviet Afghanistan. But, Wahdat would not have been established if it were not for a number of internal factors. The upper leadership of the Islamist parties were the major proponents of unity. They were often in conflict with their local commanders. The long internal war had led to war-fatigue among the people, a threat to party legitimacy, and hence, an incitement to seek conciliation.

23 There is a certain irony, when even a genuine expert on Afghan political relations like Robert Canfield describes the Sunni-parties as "The Peshawar-based Mujahedin Parties", but the Shi’ia as "The Iranian Supported Alliance of Shi’ia Mujahedin Parties" (Canfield, 1989, p. 642–643). It is hard to see why the Sunni parties should be seen as being less dominated by their host country than the Shi’ia.
24 Interview 14, p. 1
26 Pakzad (1990), p. 21
The central organisation was established in Bamiyan. Its ultimate power is the Supervisory Council, 'Shura-e Ali Nesarat', with 24 seats occupied by former leaders of the parties that joined Wahdat, mainly sheikh.27 There is a Central Committee, ‘Shura-e Markazi’, with 75 seats, which in principle should be occupied by elected representatives. This is the decision making body. The Supervisory Council can veto any decision. The role of the Supervisory Council reflects an emphasis on religious competence in political decision making that is inherent in radical Shi’ia doctrines. It is important to take notice that, during the early phases of establishment, the promise of future positions proved to be an asset in accommodating the leaders of the merging groups. A well-developed intelligence service was inherited from the Islamists.28

Hezb-e Wahdat's program had an Islamistic framing. The program stressed that Wahdat is not an exclusive party, the reference is the ummah, the international Islamic community. As one local leader expressed it: "We want to bring unity not only in Hazarajat, but in the whole of Afghanistan, not only in Afghanistan, but even on the level of the whole world." (Interview 18, p. 1) This is a central Islamist argument, crucial in Khomeini's thinking. In Hazara politics, however, the establishment of Hezb-e Wahdat was interlinked with decreased emphasis on pure Islamism, such as the one represented by the Pasdaran. First, the following of mujtahid was largely institutionalised. The clergy was granted a key position in Hazara society, thus gaining more freedom for political manoeuvring. Second, with the death of Khomeini, the argument on seceding to Iran lost its attraction. Khomeini had been the rare combination of religious authority, marja-e taqlid, and the ultimate political leader, but his successor, Khamenei, was not. Third, with a reoriented foreign policy, Iran did not support Pasdaran's secessionism. Lastly, Hazarajat had effectively been autonomous for the past ten years; a fact political leaders had to relate to, given that this autonomy was now under threat.29 In Wahdat's program, there is no reference to secession. Instead, there is an emphasis on the rights of all groups within an integrated Afghanistan.30 However, there is no reason to doubt that the major ambition of Hezb-e Wahdat is to secure the rights of the Hazara:

27 Interview 18, p. 2; Interview 20, p. 2; Dorronsoro (1991b), p. 5
28 Interview 22, p. 3
30 From 'Declaration of the Hezb-e Wahdat', April 25th, 1990, "In the framework of an independent, united, indivisible and Islamic Afghanistan, all nationalities, tribes and categories of the population should benefit from the prosperity, liberty and social justice with full security. No group or individual should arbitrarily exercise a domination of dictatorial character." and further: "We condemn every interference from the government of a foreign power into our internal affairs. Our Muslim people has the authority to resist any foreign guardianship." (from Pakzad 1990, p. 22, my translation)
The absence of demands of autonomy still does not signify that the Hazara resistance limits itself to guard the holy war (jihad) against the Soviet invaders. Radical institutional and political changes in every domain of social, economic and cultural life of the country is demanded. In reading the demands one observes that the Hazara resistance is on the one hand the expression of the claims of a national minority who wants to rediscover its place and role in Afghanistan of tomorrow, on the other hand it represents the character of a movement for progress, with an Islamist and national character. (Pakzad, 1990, p. 22, my translation)

Even though the program holds the balance between Islamism and ethnicism, practical politics tends to suggest that there is a tilt towards ethnicism: "The ambiguity of Hezb-e Wahdat is that in its official discourse, the religious aspect is in front, while in its practice it is essentially a Hazara movement, with a strong undertone of nationalism." (Dorronsoro, 1991b, p. 6, my translation) In general, Wahdat was furthering the ideological stance of Nasr, perhaps with a further ethnicist turn. Its political aims represented a common core where almost anybody could agree to at least something. The strongest opposition came from dedicated Islamists, mainly people from former Pasdaran. Principally important, and organisationally weak, were the opposition who would prefer Hazara nationalism forwarded in a secular framework.

To locate the political boundary of Wahdat, it is helpful to look at Harakat. It had a large Hazara following, but was dominated by non-Hazara. Most of its local groups had good contacts among the Sunni. The party was represented in the initial meetings on establishing Wahdat. Mohseni expressed his goodwill, but posed conditions. One of Mohseni's demands was that the initiators of internal conflicts in Hazarajat should be prosecuted. Wahdat representatives claim his conditions were met, but is hard to see that the request could be accommodated by leaders who were themselves largely responsible.\(^{31}\) It is more realistic to see Mohseni's demands as a refusal to join. His followers were split. Several commanders presented themselves as Wahdat, although maintaining their Harakat affiliation. One of these were Hadi of Behsud, the military responsible of Harakat. Harakat's multiethnic following became problematic. Many of its Hazara followers saw Wahdat as promising: "The commanders who have left are all Hazara, the reclassification takes place on an ethnic basis." (Dorronsoro, 1991b, p. 6, my translation) In addition, other parties, like Nahzat were split on the issue of Hezb-e Wahdat. In Jaghori, Ghazni, the group under commander Wasiq refused to join, and engaged in conflict against the local Hezb-e Wahdat. Nahzat's people seems to be relatively well off, and they are well-integrated

\(^{31}\) Interview 14, p. 1; Interview 20, p. 1
in the multiethnic regional economy. The pressure to join was strong. The Mustaz' afflict, based in Bamiyan was the only existing group in Hazarajat who had clearly distanced itself both from nationalism and Islamism. In 1991 it joined Wahdat, as standing outside seemed too risky, not the least for a party known to be sternly anti-Islamist. For the smaller groups, violence was a real threat. Wahdat was fully dominating the political scene, and undoubtedly leading forces of the unity saw violence as an instrument for achieving their political aims.

Co-operation among the Hazara groups evolved from an alliance in 1987, into full-scale unity in 1989. Hezb-e Wahdat encompassed all Hazara groups. Harakat split along ethnic lines, and many Hazara fronts joined Wahdat. Most smaller groups also joined, since being left out seemed a risky strategy.

9.2.3. Organisation in Kabul: Preparing for post-communism

Many of Kabul's Hazara made economic success during the war. Khosaran, an economic organisation with political aims, was set up in 1988.

Kabul's Hazara business community started to expand in the seventies, and experienced explosive growth during the war. Family networks served as channels for import and transport through Hazarajat, and were favoured by war. Because of the war much of Kabul's established business elite left, thus clearing the way for newcomers. Furthermore, the government led an active policy to promote private business from 1980. A number of Hazara were centrally placed to canalise possibilities and financial encouragement from the government, and often favoured people within their own networks.

Towards the end of 1988, Shirkat-e Khosaran was established. It was a joint-stock business company established to run industrial production, import and export. The initiative was taken by a group of politically influential Hazara, most of them affiliated with the Hazara Shura. Among them were Dr. Sarabi, Sultan Ali Keshtmand and Kareem Mezaq, the latter a minister in the historic Khalqi cabinet. Ghulam Mohammad Yailaqi, president of the important Export Promotion Bank from 1978 to 1985 and a key figure in Kabul's business community, got involved. A meeting including around 200 people from the Hazara business community took place at his residence. Yailaqi and Dr. Sarabi were now the main figures. The leaders of Wahdat and Harakat were contacted, and supported the initiative.

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32 Dorronsoro (1991b), p. 6; Interview 6, p. 2
33 Mustaz' afflict were originally followers of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, a strong opponent of clerical rule.
34 Interview 6, p. 1; Interview 8, p. 2; Interview 10, p. 2
35 Interview 21, p. 1, p. 4; Interview 22, pp. 2–3; Interview 28, p. 1
36 Interview 3, p. 9; Interview 21, p. 1; Interview 26, pp. 1–4; Interview 28, p. 2
Khosaran was defined as a business effort. Each shareholder could hold a maximum of 10 shares, and many held only one. The organisation engaged in large scale business transactions. Official permissions and credits were facilitated by good contacts in the administration. But the ambitions were, according to one of its initiators, nothing less than "(...) to bring together the Hazara people of Kabul." (Interview 26, p. 2) Business dominated these first years, but there were also activities of a more social profile. One program was geared to support women in setting up self-employment production of handicrafts, with Khosaran taking care of marketing and export. Another program was a one year course with a curriculum of business economics, banking, foreign trade and English language.

Building on the economic expansion within Kabul's Hazara community throughout the war, Khosaran was a conscious attempt to get politically ready to face the challenge when Najib's government eventually would abdicate. Many of the Hazara who had worked for the government were worried about the future.\(^{37}\) Having been on the wrong side politically, they expected their problems to be aggravated because they had the wrong ethnicity. Khosaran was openly a Hazara organisation. It is important to note that the perceptions of the future of those establishing Khosaran in Kabul were largely the same as the perceptions of those establishing Wahdat in Hazarajat.

9.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

The primary development of this period is the merger of the parties in Hazarajat. This analysis will concern the change from internal conflict to unity, that is the establishment of Hezb-e Wahdat. The dominant Islamist groups and the other groups joined the alliance for entirely different reasons. The unity might be seen as the ultimate victory of the former over the latter. Here, I will focus on why the latter joined the alliance.

I would argue that the new party formation is a proactive mobilisation. It is, however, a reaction to an expected external threat, which will almost undoubtedly materialise. Prospects of a change of the regime following the Soviet withdrawal threatened the autonomy gained by Hazarajat throughout the past ten years. The best means of securing this autonomy was to secure substantial political participation at the state level. The mobilised resources were primarily intangible, in the form of human support and organisational capability.

*Proposition #1a): Production of private goods*

The leaders of the smaller parties that chose to join Hezb-e Wahdat faced a dilemma. For most of them opposition to the Islamists had been the major

\(^{37}\) Interview 3, p. 5
aim. But, in a post-Soviet Afghanistan, it seemed unlikely that small groups would be able to play a significant role versus the state. Representing a larger entity, Wahdat was their most credible avenue to future political influence. Wahdat's use of negative and positive sanctions was instrumental. A major positive sanction was to grant positions to leaders that joined. A major negative sanction was inherent in the undoubtable capacity of Wahdat's dominant forces to apply violence against those who did not comply.

Evidence of popular mobilisation is less complete. However, it seems that when leaders joined, many followers also joined, which is in accordance with an emphasis on the utility of existing private-goods producing groups in organisation building. It is further indicated that a popular war-fatigue made people pressure their leaders to cut internal warfare. Although evidence on this latter point is less comprehensive, what is available implies an interesting suggestion that people might have been strongly motivated for unity, while leaders needed some additional incentives. The private goods proposition is supported particularly for leaders.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

There are two factors concerning Wahdat that makes the role of control less vital. First, there is Wahdat's ultimate aim, that a semi-autonomous Hazarajat is no longer an unrealistic one. Second, the dominant parties in Wahdat control considerable goods, which enables them to depend more on private-goods provision (#1a), less on control. Having said that, the attempt to merge several organisations contains a paradox. On the one hand, Wahdat took over existing groups, most of whom had functioning mechanisms of control. On the other hand, there are control problems at the higher levels of organisation. There are different building blocks representing divergent interests, and each block might have an internal coherence making it difficult to penetrate (Appendix 3). It is known that issues related to control received considerable attention from the leaders of Wahdat. This is demonstrated through the intelligence service it was running, even though evidence on how the control mechanism was functioning is insufficient. However, because emphasis on control is confirmed and control has a less decisive role in this case, there is no reason to invalidate the control proposition.

**Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale**

The common core for Wahdat's members is the Hazara nationality. As a consequence of the Soviet withdrawal announcement and the exclusion of the Shi'ia from the interim government, there was a change from internal to external focus of mobilisation. Out from the theory, one would expect mobilisation on the maximum scale available. So, why is the Wahdat
emphasising Hazara-ness, not Shi’ia-ness? The non-Hazara Shi’ia were mainly supporting Harakat. Their common interest with the Hazara was limited, because they were integrated in multiethnic economic networks. For the same reason, the risk by mobilising in an anti-Pashtun or anti-Sunni direction was larger. I would argue that this supports the Resource Competition theory, given the qualification that complementarity in group relations is counterproductive to mobilisation (see 3.2.) As formulated, the proposition is strongly supported in this case.

**Proposition #2b): Resource Competition.**

The Soviet withdrawal announcement played a crucial role. It was followed up with exclusion of the Shi’ia from the Interim government.

While the Shi’ia had always been excluded from the resistance, this decision marked a watershed. The message was that the Shi’ia would not be granted any influence in the future political arrangement of Afghanistan. Hazarajat had basically been left to itself for the past decade. The future of this autonomy could only be secured through a role in national politics. The political elite in Kabul had similar perceptions of the future, and initiated Hazara organisations independent of the government, most notably the Khosaran. The establishment of Wahdat took place as a response to change in the conditions of competition over political influence. While Hazarajat had been spared of major extra-territorial influence since 1981, it was likely that a new government would want authority in the region. To adapt to the re-emergence of external challenge to political influence, the Hazara groups had to transcend internal differences, and face the challenge with maximum resources. The Resource Competition proposition, as applied to political influence, has a strong bearing here.

**Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity.**

The prospects for a resistance-based government seeking influence in Hazarajat reduced the viability of the smaller parties, and stimulated proactive mobilisation within a Hazara based unity party. This lends considerable support to Resource Competition theory (#2a and #2b). Does it also account for the changes that made individuals choose to join the new party, at the cost of the existing ones? I would argue that it does, because the small scale organisations would be unable to resist large scale threat. Hence, individuals see that their power will perish. However, I have earlier emphasised the role of private goods for motivating individual leaders to join. If this argument plays a crucial role, the conclusion is that Resource Competition theory is insufficient here, the theory is able to explain certain conditions which were favourable to mobilisation, but it can not explain the success or failure of mobilisation. None of the theories can explain the whole
dynamics. But, I would argue that together they contribute to a reasonably complete picture.

9.4. CONCLUSION

With the Soviet withdrawal announcement in 1988 everybody expected the Kabul government to fall quickly. The Shi’ia were concerned after the Sunni parties turned down representation in the interim government. Responding to new factors, the Hazara parties joined in the formation of Hezb-e Wahdat. The new party was dominated by the Islamists. Still it succeeded in accommodating smaller political parties, except Harakat. It was also successful in accommodating alienated social groups, namely the mir and the young intellectuals. The former received back confiscated property, the latter got into administrative positions. The new party was largely a defendant of the rights of the Hazara in the coming administration of Afghanistan, but its Islamist component was strong. This was a program reminiscent of Nasr. Those recruited from other parties saw a potential contradiction between Hazara nationalism and Islamism.

The incentives for joining the union were large for all parties, given the changed context. Leaders of existing groups were offered key positions in the set-up of the new party. The prospects for small Hazara groups to make themselves heard in national politics were not bright. The potential to become subject to Wahdat's negative sanctions provided another incentive to join. Material on how the control issue was dealt with is less conclusive, although considerable use of intelligence services suggests that control was seen as important. Control is, however, less crucial given the extensive private goods. Altogether, I argue that Group Solidarity theory contributes to explain the success in establishing Hezb-e Wahdat.

The contribution of Resource Competition theory is equally important. In response to the expected large-scale threat from a future government, people rallied around a common identity. Because the non-Hazara Shi’ia are integrated in multi-ethnic networks, they hesitated to join the unity. Hence, the ultimate scope of mobilisation remains the Hazara, not the Shi'ia. The relevance of the resource competition thesis rests on its ability to account for how structural changes shaped opportunities for the actors. It is here argued that theoretical complementarity gains considerable support: expected threat of large-scale changed actors' opportunity structure, and encouraged preparatory mobilisation.
Cessation of Soviet supplies served as a catalyst to the disintegration of Najib's regime, which fell by mid-April. Fearing the emergence of a government from the resistance movement, the Kabuli Hazara mobilised, and took control over public buildings and sections of the city. When Wahdat arrived, it could take over already obtained resources, which would be a good basis for forwarding political demands.

As the US and the Soviet union cut arms supplies, the UN launched its transition plan. Iran and Pakistan continued to support their main client, still they both became more open to the resistance groups they had formerly excluded. However, with Saudi Arabia becoming the major financial source for the new government, the sectarian boundary once again got reinforced from outside.

Key players in Kabul politics intensified their contacts with resistance groups, further stimulating the disintegration of Najib's government. Najib declared his will to abdicate in favour of a transition arrangement on March 18th. It was too late; the government lost control before any transition power was in place. A Pakistan-brokered arrangement did not give the Shi'ia any representation. Fighting between Wahdat and Ittehad erupted soon after the installation of the transition regime, and an era of ethnic conflict erupted in the capital. Wahdat got political representation in the form of government seats, but were not accommodated on other points.

The shift brought a new group of Kabul politicians into Wahdat's elite. Wahdat encouraged their participation, and appointed them to cabinet posts. Since the secular elite was a new resource for the party, it became a difficult balance to accommodate them without alienating the Islamists.

With Najib on his way out, the Hazara in Kabul mobilised within existing organisations or networks. Ultimately, the mobilisation was in favour of Hezb-e Wahdat, but in its early phase neither Wahdat nor anybody else were coordinating the actions. A number of existing Hazara organisations served as channels for locally taken actions. The massive engagement in collective action within a wide variety of organisations, underlines the common perception of grave threat. Wahdat served as the ultimate guarantor, both on security and future opportunities in politics or business. The party lived up to its obligations by establishing an overarching administration, providing for people's security and welfare, and by voicing political demands in the political process.
10.1. RELATIONS WITH OTHERS

10.1.1. Other states: Superpowers withdraw, regional powers dominate.

The UN saw its transition plan as ready for implementation. Soviet support had disappeared. Iran continued to back Wahdat, while aiming at broader contacts. Pakistan became more open to the Shi‘ia, but as Saudi Arabia became a major financial source, the Shi‘ia remained blacklisted.

By the end of 1991, the UN transition plan had gained the support of the neighbouring states, the Kabul government, and most mujahedin parties. Implementation was to start from May 1992. But, Najib’s government started to disintegrate, and the UN attempted to establish an accelerated settlement plan announced on April 2nd. By then, events had overrun the plan. The government had lost control in the North, and new alliances were created.

Military support from the US and the Soviet union stopped from January 1st 1992. Simultaneously, the Soviet union got dissolved. Establishment of new Islamic states in Central Asia altered the regional balance. Most importantly, Pakistan saw new economic opportunities in Central Asia, which would require access through a stabilised Afghanistan. The significance of Afghanistan in the struggle for political influence in the Islamic world increased, as both Saudi Arabia and Iran intensified their efforts to gain influence.

Early 1992 Iran played a major role in forming the Northern Alliance, consisting of Wahdat, Jamiat, Dostum's Uzbek militia and the Ismaeli militia, all non-Pashtun groups. With sections of PDPA’s elite, this alliance set off a coup removing Najib in April 1992, thus making Iran a major player in Afghan politics. As the alliance disintegrated in August, Iran’s influence was significantly reduced. However, Iran's support to Wahdat continued, mostly in the political field.

Pakistan adjusted its attitude to Afghanistan's Shi‘ia parties starting in 1992, apparently in response both to their increased visibility after the Wahdat establishment, and to a wish of improving relations with Iran. A softer stand from Pakistan was not reflected among its client Sunni parties.

The resistance-based government got heavily dependent on Saudi support, which was maintained through a close relation to Sayyaff’s Ittehad. Saudi Arabia had the resources and the will to provide both military and financial support. Developments in Kabul lend support to the assumption that Saudi grants played a major role in initiating conflict between the

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2 As the unity became threatened when Akbari challenged Mazari on leadership in late 1993, Boujerdi, of Iran’s foreign ministry, engaged in mediation between the two. (‘Iranian official to mediate between Afghan factions.’ Frontier Post, June 5th, 1994, Interview 11, p. 2)
government and Hezb-e Wahdat. Paradoxically, diplomatic relations between Saudi and Iran improved. The two countries co-operated in facilitating several agreements throughout 1992 and 1993.4

UN presented a transition plan. The Soviet dissolution undercut the old regime, and led to a new regional balance. Iran and Pakistan both looked beyond former clients, and Saudi money restrained cross-sectarian relations.

10.1.2. State: Mujahedin government fails to accommodate Hazara demands

Najib's government faced increasing internal problems, and was brought down by a coup in April. Wahdat was again excluded from the transition arrangement. Wahdat and Ittehad got involved in armed conflict, with strong ethnic overtones. Wahdat got seats in the government, but conflicts continued. The cessation of Soviet supplies was the final blow to Najib's rule:

The discontinuation of Soviet aid to Kabul shifted the correlation of forces decisively in the Mujahideen's favor. The regime lost access to resources it needed to buy the loyalty of a range of militias; and the main resistance commanders, freed of the threat of attack from Scud missiles and manned bombers, were left with no compelling reason to compromise with the regime. (Maley & Saikal, 1992, pp. 27-28)

Officers at the Hairatan garrison on the Afghan-Uzbek border led a mutiny in January. They protested against Najib's effort to install a Pashtun leadership. Najib desperately tried to regain control, but on March 18th, Mazar, the economic and political centre of the north, fell to the Northern alliance.5 The division line between the Pashtun and the non-Pashtun was augmenting. UN's chief negotiator, Benon Sevan, had convinced Najib that he should step down in favour of the proposed interim government. Najib announced his abdication on March 18th, the day that Mazar-e Sharif was lost. Expectations that the regime could survive the summer vanished. High-ranking officials of the Kabul regime intensified contacts with the resistance and built new alliances, thus undermining the UN plan. Najib was caught trying to escape in the night of April 15th. Effectively, Afghanistan had been through another low-key coup.6 Authority in the capital collapsed. Groups composed of government defectors and outsiders in alliance took control over a number of official buildings. Still, few members of the resistance had entered the city.

The relatively complex UN transition-plan was unlikely to be implemented, and Pakistan took the initiative in brokering an alternative

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4 With the change from superpowers’ to regional powers’ influence, it gets more difficult to estimate the importance of foreign support. It is not unlikely that crucial contributions remain undocumented.
6 From Marxists to Mujahedin’, Mushahid Hussain in Middle East International 1 May 1992, p. 10; Keesing’s Record of World Events (1992), p. 38847
transition regime. All resistance groups; Saudi Arabia Iran and UN, were involved in the negotiations. No detailed account of the negotiations is available. Wahdat participated in the meetings, as did Iran’s representatives. The accords were signed in Peshawar on April 24th. New York Times reported:

The announcement was delayed when Hezb-i-Wahadat, or Unity Party, a coalition of eight guerrilla groups based in Iran, as well as Hezb-i-Islami demanded a consensus to form an interim government. (...) During the news conference, no mention was made of the dissenting parties. ('Rebels Agree on Interim Rule for Kabul', Donatella Lorch in New York Times, April 25, 1992)

Apparently every party had been offered an equal share in government, but Wahdat requested the double. Only six Sunni parties signed. Hekmatyar rejected the prime minister post and was busy organising a capture of Kabul in collaboration with elements of Khalq. The agreement established a 51 member commission to be led by Mojaddedi. The commision was authorised for two months. Power would then be transferred to an interim government headed by Rabbani, with Massoud as a defence minister. Hekmatyar was offered the prime minister post. Mojaddedi arrived in Kabul on April 28th. The lack of Shi’ia representation in the new set-up was a problem. Forces loyal to Wahdat controlled an estimated 50% of Kabul. Iran, with its role in establishing the Northern alliance, expected its major clients to be accommodated.

Already, the new coalition government of Sibgatullah Mojadedi is facing wrangling over the government, with the country's Hazaras-who are Shiite muslims, (...) voicing unhappiness over their share of the pie. ('Afghanistan: Healing a Broken Land', Edvard A. Gargan in New York Times, April 30, 1992)

Mojadeddi announced a new government after one week, although it was contrary to the Peshawar agreement. Wahdat was not represented. By May 15th negotiations between Mojadeddi and Hezb-e Wahdat started. The latter demanded twelve seats in the council, but they were offered five. By the end of May, the General-secretary of Hezb-e Wahdat, Mazari, made it known that eight seats in the council and four in the government were granted, while the issue of a 'key post' to Wahdat remained unresolved.

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Armed struggle between Hezb-e Wahdat and Ittehad erupted on June 2nd. The Kabul situation was tense at the time of eruption. It is difficult to establish how the conflict started. This fighting was largely considered ethically based. Reporters estimated that 100 people were killed, 400 wounded and upwards of 1000 taken hostage. Many victims were civilians, who were made victims only because of their ethnic identity. Reportedly, city buses were searched for civilians, ambulances carrying wounded civilians were attacked. After four days of fighting, a cease-fire was established. An agreement was reached over Hezb-e Wahdat representation in government on June 10th. The agreement has been seen as a direct result of Wahdat's proven fighting ability. Wahdat was granted eight seats in the Council, and three ministerial posts, including the 'key post' of the minister of Security. General Khodaidad was appointed minister of security after two weeks. He was the first minister of the transition government to have held positions with the former regime. Rabbani was installed as president on June 26th. His first speech focused on the disbanding of all 'militia and nationalist forces' from the city. Wahdat and the Defence ministry had already been into serious battle. Apparently the campaign to expel forces predated its announcement. The process of disarmament was becoming problematic. The role of military power in political bargaining had been demonstrated by the success of Wahdat in obtaining seats in the cabinet. Furthermore, government forces were seen as party to the conflict, claims of impartiality had little credibility. After announcements on the formal entrance of Wahdat in government, fighting between Ittehad and Wahdat blurred up by mid-July. Ethnic violence became an issue. Reports told how people were killed by nails being driven into their heads, or being burnt alive locked in a

10 Three theories about what triggered the conflict have been presented: 1) A car with four leading members of Hezb-e Wahdat, former leaders of Mustaz’affin, were shot and killed, in an area allegedly controlled by Ittehad, behind Silo. (Interview 3, p. 10, Interview 8, p. 2, Interview 10, p. 1); 2) The government demanded control of the SCUD-base at Darulaman, being controlled by Hezb-e Wahdat. The latter refused, and Ittehad attacked. (Bulletin du CEREDAF, No. 81, June 1992, p. 3); 3) Hezb-e Wahdat launched an attack on Haqqani, commander of Hezb-e Islami (Khales) and interim justice minister. He had proposed that Dostum’s militia and Hezb-e Wahdat’s forces left the capital. (‘Rival Mojahedin Groups Clash in Southern Kabul’, Hong Kong AFP, FBIS-NES-92-106, 2 June 1992, pp. 45-46)


Such stories created widespread fear among the population, who were held responsible for the actions of their ethnic brethren. People avoided those of an ethnic origin different from their own, and started moving towards areas controlled by their own group. Fights continued throughout 1992, interrupted by short-lasting cease-fires. The government's attempts at demilitarisation intensified the conflict, and sparked off heavy fighting between the government and Hezb-e Wahdat in early November. The government's orientation towards Ittehad, linked to Saudi support, made relations to Hezb-e Wahdat increasingly difficult.

It soon became clear that Wahdat had emerged as a major player in the politics of Afghanistan. However, getting concessions on Wahdat's political demands proved difficult. Wahdat focused on three issues: participation on the national level; reorganising of administrative boundaries; and application of the Jaffari rite for all Shi'a. The first demand was accommodated in June 1992, as the party got seats in Mojadeddi's government. Government participation was reaffirmed in later agreements. No minister could function without physically controlling a building and that created a problem. The issue of Wahdat's representation remained disputed. Experience from the Rawalpindi shura showed how agreements could be easily violated. On the second issue, reorganising administrative boundaries, little was done to accommodate Wahdat's demands. In some places, districts were reorganised, but in a way favouring those who supported the government. On the third issue, the application of the Jaffari rite, demands were consequently turned down.

Najib's regime split up, as key people lost faith in its survival. Wahdat gained control over much of the capital, and became involved in a largely ethnic conflict with Ittehad. While gaining government representation, demands on administrative reorganisation and Jaffari rite were not met.

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16 Interview 4, p. 6; Interview 8, p. 2; Interview 11, p. 1; Afghan League of Human Rights (1993), p. 10; 'Hezb, Ettehad Factions Continue Kabul Fighting', Hong Kong AFP, FBIS-NES-92–140, 21 July 1992, p. 52
17 Rubin, (1994) p. 190
18 Interview 20, p. 2–3
19 Interview 20, p. 3; Interview 24, p. 2; ‘Shiite Rebel Leader on Prospects for Lasting Peace’, Hong Kong AFP, FBIS-NES-93–048, 15 March 1993, p. 46.
20 In Jaghatu, Ghazni, new administrative divisions has apparently been used by the government to reward its supporters. Status of the larger part of the district, which is under the control of Wahdat, remained unclarified from the governments side by September 1994. (Interview 20, p. 3; Interview 32, p. 1)
21 The most prominent treatment up to date of writing was by a commission set up to draft an interim constitution in September 1993, headed by Maulawi Nabi, with Sayyaf as general secretary. It gave no recommendation for Jaffari rite. Wahdat and Harakat immediately decreed that the new constitution was illegal.('Decree Forms Body to Draft Interim Basic Law', Kabul Radio, FBIS-NES-93–177, 15 September 1993, p. 47; 'Shiite Leader: Rabbani Trying to Destroy Nation.', Hong Kong AFP, FBIS-NES-93–186, 28 September 1993; ACBAR News Summary on Afghanistan, 1993, p. 20
10.2. AMONG THE HAZARA

10.2.1. Leadership: Reconciliation of elites

In Kabul, the joining of Hazara elites with Wahdat was crucial. A formal Shi’ia clergy is operational in Afghanistan, and it is important in the party. Wahdat has a problem accommodating both seculars and Islamists. The most recently recruited is the Kabuli Hazara. Many from the Hazara elite worked for the regime. As its fall became inevitable, they were in a difficult situation. Expectedly, they were personally at risk for having collaborated with the enemy. The perception was that ethnic and sectarian discrimination could be a direct security risk for the Hazara, and for prominent Hazara in particular. Most of the Hazara in Kabul had informal contact with people in the resistance, through family or common place of origin.22 Wahdat was quick to emphasise its openness to these people. Former government officials played a key role in securing for Wahdat the position it gained in Kabul in April 1992. Wahdat appointed a former Khalqi, General Khodaidad as its first minister in June. Later Dr. Sarabi, Eng. Lali and Ghawari, who all had held high positions in the former government, were assigned ministerial posts. Building on how things had worked during the war, it was assumed that the party could be helpful for doing business. All in all, the incentives for joining Wahdat were large.

The emergence of a Shi’ia clergy in Afghanistan is crucial. With the head clergy in the leadership of the party, religious and political power are overlapping. Among the Hazara, many now regard Ayatollah Mohaqiq-e Kabuli as their religious guide.23 Ayatollah Fazel headed Wahdat’s Control Commission. Both had been affiliated with Pasdaran, and had spent most of the time during the war in Qum.

Relations between Islamists and seculars are not without conflict. The party had lately been broadened by giving a larger role to former government officials. It had turned towards focusing on a nationalist rather than Islamist line. Those sheikh who used to support Pasdaran opposed this policy, and backed Akbari as a challenger to Mazari’s leadership. Akbari is one of the few Qizilbash in the party, he is trained in Islam and is a strong proponent of Shi’ia Islamism. The increasingly ethnic character of the party is expressed through a reduction of non-Hazara leaders, at a time when many Hazara from Harakat have joined Wahdat. Harakat was now commonly seen as a party for Qizilbash and sayyid. This might be true for its leaders, but there are many Hazara among its followers.24 So far, the Mazari line in Wahdat,

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22 Interview 9, p. 1; Interview 18, p. 1; Interview 27, p. 3
23 Interview 17, p. 2
24 Interview 1, p. 1; Interview 3, p. 11; Interview 7, p. 2
combining Hazara nationalism and moderate Islamism has gained support from a broad spectrum of Hazara elites, transcending former enmity after Hazarajat's civil war and the conflict between resistance and government. The broad support could only be maintained by promoting the Hazara cause first, and the Shi'ia Islamist cause second. Still, there was a clear risk for split. So far, the elite who spent the war in Kabul was not let into the governing bodies of the party, of which the clergy was still in control. Many observers underline Mazari's role in reconciling conflicting parties, creating unity and accommodating former government officials. Being a sheikh with good contacts also among the secular elite, Mazari was regarded important. The emergence of such a political leader among the Hazara has few historic precedents.

Urban Hazara elites had no alternative to Wahdat, neither for their protection nor future career. The sheikh kept party power. Seculars and Islamists agreed on Hazara nationalism, but conflict potential was large.

10.2.2. Organisation: Hazara fight for political influence

With Najib's expected fall, the Kabuli Hazara mobilised, and secured control over considerable resources. The Wahdat party came in later, and proved to its followers that their security and welfare was a priority for the party. Najib's announced abdication initiated intense preparations in Kabul.

The arrival of the mujahedin aroused great fear. The prevailing view was that ethnic belonging would be decisive. Looting campaigns were expected, as happened earlier in cities fallen to the mujahedin. Key people in the administration worked to arm and organise their own followers in the city. There were many Hazara in the administration, but few with authority to release arms in any quantities. The Hazara in Kabul gained control over large parts of the city, partly because they were numerous, but mainly because they started early. The first step was to take control of a public building. In the days before Najib's departure, many public houses fell to groups of government employees co-operating with outside forces. This tactics was also adapted for capturing police-stations or KHAD-offices, which were particularly important as they were a source of guns and ammunition.

The army's role became important. There were two Shi'ia tribal regiments in or around Kabul; the 95th stationed in Kabul, and the 96th in

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25 Interview 3, p. 6
26 Interview 1, p. 1; Interview 3, p. 6; Interview 23, p. 2
27 Pashtun pre-war dominance related to their numerical strength. Any population statistics is very unreliable, but figures from a study comparing pre- and post-war ethnic composition are at least illustrative. Due to relatively larger outflux from Pashtun areas, they are considered to have formed 39% of total population in 1978, but only 22% in 1987. For the Hazara, numbers in this study are 10% and 14%, respectively, for the Tajiks, 26% and 34%. (Sliwinski, 1988, p. 18)
Maidan to the Southwest. The 95th joined Hezb-e Wahdat in full, while a part of the 96th joined Harakat. The 10th Division at Bagh-e Daoud in Western Kabul split between Hezb-e Wahdat and Ittehad. Before Najib's fall, the Hazara military were careful not to be seen as supporting Kabul's Hazara, when distributing arms in co-operation with government people. After Najib's fall, the army units became important. A report on its disintegration, concludes:

The upshot was that many officers opted to serve the mojahedin according to their ethno-political ties, and those who could afford to pay. The main beneficiaries were Massoud's Defence Ministry, Hekmatyar's Hizb, and the Shi'ite Wahdat, all of which attempted to use officers of the old regime. (Davis, 1993, p. 135)

Khosaran also engaged in preparations. Its leaders tried to get access to arms, and enlisted people in a defence force. Attempts at getting arms were not effective. The attempts to organise apparently became more important, as people got informed about how critical the situation was. The lists of people were later relied on in arms distribution. According to one of the central figures of Khosaran, the list encompassed twenty groups of fifteen to twenty-five people each from the day Najib abdicated to the day the mujahedin arrived. Some of the self-defence groups in Hazara neighbourhoods joined Khosaran. Of the twenty groups just mentioned, five were supposedly pre-existing self-defence groups. Such groups were set up around a work-place or a neighbourhood, organised and armed by the government. Groups in neighbourhoods dominated by the Hazara, like Qala-e Shuda and Dasht-e Bachi, joined Khosaran's force. In ethnically mixed Shi'ia areas groups either joined Harakat, or were dissolved.

Hezb-e Wahdat were also involved in organising among the Kabuli Hazara. One informant explained how he was setting up lists of people who volunteered for action at his family's house, as one of his relatives was known as a Hezb-e Wahdat member. Requirements were simple. One should be Hazara and between 18 and 45 years old. This organisation started a few days before Najib's attempt to flee. By then, many were already in action. They were taking control over official buildings and obtaining arms. Wahdat sent a group to co-ordinate organisation in Kabul. The group consisted of around 10 people, and was led by Ustad Zahedi. Under the chaotic conditions

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28 Interview 3, p. 8
29 Interview 3, pp. 8-9; Interview 21, p. 1; Interview 26, pp. 3-4; Interview 28, p. 5
30 Interview 26, p. 4
31 Interview 3, p. 9; Interview 14, p. 2; Interview 26, pp. 3-4
32 Interview 21, pp. 3-4
it was difficult for the group to establish contact.\textsuperscript{33} Still, Wahdat was a crucial factor, because it served as a guarantee for those who acted. A larger organisation would come in and take responsibility, meaning that preliminary gains would be taken care of, and that security would be granted for those involved.

As Najib's attempt to escape became known, the actions taken to get armed and to organise intensified. There was no more need for secrecy. It became self-evident that it was useless to fight for the sitting government. Within a few days there were armed groups in control of all sections of Kabul. Among the Hazara the groups were still formed by young civilians who had lived in Kabul throughout the war, and had become engaged during the recent upheaval. Within a couple of weeks, Wahdat took charge of the operation, and by late April the Hazara party controlled about half of the capital.\textsuperscript{34} The Hazara mobilisation in Kabul throughout April 1992 had its major strength in the ability to mobilise a variety of people, both politically active, or politically dormant. The strong, united reaction reflects the perceived threat of a mujahedin government.

This period represented a peak in the popular backing of the Hezb-e Wahdat. The Hazara were first able to take control over a major part of Kabul. They were successful in unifying themselves including those of different political background. Compared to other organisations settled in Kabul, Hezb-e Wahdat appears as an efficient organisation.\textsuperscript{35} While other groups focus on military affairs, Hezb-e Wahdat functions as a civilian organisation. Wahdat's administrative efficiency has been instrumental for popular support, and has contributed to a positive image among international organisations such as the UN. While a majority of Kabul's population has left as a result of the battles fought in Kabul, far less people have left among the Hazara.\textsuperscript{36} One reason is clearly that in a climate of ethnic hostility, it is difficult to leave because of the danger in travelling through non-Hazara territory. But then, many of the wealthy also stayed behind. The incentive to stay for those who must not, rests on the capacity of Hezb-e Wahdat to assist them when needed. If one has a protective network, there were business opportunities in war struck Kabul. Control capacity got priority in Wahdat's administrative apparatus.\textsuperscript{37} The party has proven its will to punish those who act contrary to party interest. In late 1992, when some posts were sold to Ittehad, the enemy,

\textsuperscript{33} Interview 3, p. 8; Interview 14, p. 2; Interview 21; p. 3, Interview 26, p. 4
\textsuperscript{34} Interview 9, p. 2
\textsuperscript{35} Interview 11, p. 2; Interview 29, p. 1
\textsuperscript{36} Interview 4, p. 5; Interview 9, p. 5; Interview 30;, p. 1; Interview 31, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{37} In general, evidence is insufficient on control mechanisms within the various organisations and networks taking part in the Hazara mobilisation in Kabul in 1992.
two people were hanged. The event was widely published.\textsuperscript{38} Wahdat's presence in Kabul is of crucial importance for the demands of participation in national politics.

Understanding that Najib's fall was inevitable, the Hazara in Kabul mobilised within a variety of organisations, effectively taking control over large parts of the city before Wahdat arrived. As the party took over, it conveyed considerable interest in civilian matters, and it was well-organised.

10.3. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
The focus here will be the mobilisation among the Hazara in Kabul, which can be seen as the last phase in the process towards Hazara unity. I will argue that this mobilisation is reactive, it is a spontaneous effort among the Kabuli Hazara population as Najib's fall looked inevitable, and the new government had already signalled an exclusionary line. However, mobilisation crucially builds on a proactive element: the political organisation which is built up prior to the disintegration of the government, expecting changed opportunities. Here, I will mainly deal with the reactive element, as the proactive predates this period, and is largely dealt with in Chapter 9. For both the proactive and the reactive element, resources were first of all intangible, while the mobilisation itself is to a large extent geared towards securing control of tangible resources, such as arms, public buildings and territory.

\textit{Proposition \#1a): Production of private goods}
The change to mujahedin government was foreseen with fear by many Hazara. The fear was strengthened by the increasing ethnic character of politics, and the failure of the Hazara parties to achieve representation in the interim government. For those who had in any way been involved with the regime, prospects were even bleaker, as they could also expect persecution by the winning party. For a Kabuli Hazara, the only potential protector was Hezb-e Wahdat. Due to the need for individual security, participation in the Hazara movement stood forward as the most promising strategy.

But also the possibility for future career counts. Wahdat demonstrated willingness to accommodate former government officials. For the Hazara elite, affiliation with Wahdat seemed the most promising way to obtain future goods from the state, for example in the form of jobs or business opportunities. The party actively encouraged this, and followed up by appointing former PDPA officials when it obtained seats in government.

Evidence also suggests that people mobilised within established groups producing private goods, be it army units, the Khosaran or extended family networks. It seems that the elite mobilisation was crucial for igniting a

\textsuperscript{38} Interview 1, p. 1; Interview 3, p. 10; Interview 23, p. 4
broader reaction. As such it was little potential for alternative group affiliation, people acted in compliance with their leaders. While leaders’ incentives are more easily identified than people's incentives, I see the private goods proposition as receiving strong support.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

The lack of an overall organisation co-ordinating action would expectedly lead to large control problems. How could it be that those involved did not choose to pursue other private ends, or simply abstain from participation? For the leaders, the answer is primarily given above. They were personally at risk, and they had to contribute to gain protection. Furthermore, Wahdat was the only possibility for a future career.

For ordinary people, it is a different situation. There should be little risk in being a free rider, still, many apparently volunteered for action. The information here suggests that those who volunteered, mostly did so within existing organisations, where arguably a degree of informal control exists. Only at a later stage, when Hezb-e Wahdat controlled the operation in the capital, more formal mechanisms of control emerged. Again, it proves difficult to get any firm conclusion on the control issue. It is worth noticing however, that the theory assumes control to become less critical as the ultimate aim of nationalist movements becomes less utopian. This applies, both because Hazarajat had effectively been autonomous for ten years, and because there existed a strong organisation representing the Hazara. While support to the control proposition here builds on suggestive evidence only, I do not see that as invalidating the theory, given the strong support on #1a), and the qualifications just mentioned.

**Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale**

The definition of identity is largely ethnic as in the former period. However, the boundary between government and resistance used to have primacy over ethnic boundaries. It is interesting that within a few weeks, it seemed largely irrelevant, as demonstrated by Wahdat's appointment of general Khodaidad in June. The major dividing line became the difference between being Hazara and non-Hazara. As in the establishment of Wahdat, there is a large scale external threat to political participation, posed by the Sunni/Pashtun dominated Interim government, and Hazara-ness is the largest counter-identity available.

It has in an earlier chapter been pointed out that Hazara nationalist tendencies gained less support in multiethnic areas, due to complementary relations with other groups (Chapter 9, proposition #2a). Accordingly, one would expect that nationalist mobilisation in urban areas was hampered by interethnic dependencies. Evidence is weak, but tentatively I will argue that
except for the elites, the Hazara in Kabul depended mainly on ties of an extended family, in practice restraining multiethnic contact. Furthermore, once ignited, the violent conflict helped to strengthen nationalist loyalty because personal security could only be granted by Wahdat. An initiated local conflict escalates quickly in a situation where all power is vested in conflicting organisations, representing divergent group interests.

The issues of complementarity are insufficiently dealt with. Still, the overall dynamics of mobilisation lends support to the proposition on scale.

**Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.**

The Kabuli Hazara had gained substantial political and economic freedom under the Parcham governments (See Chapter 9). This freedom was threatened by the expected change in government. Both the Rawalpindi shura in 1989 and the Peshawar agreement of April 1992 failed to give a role to resistance parties representing the Hazara. The Hazara population of Kabul could only expect continued exclusion from political representation. At the same time, a substantial organisational capability had been built up, both in Hazarajat and Kabul. By not being accommodated by the dominating parties, the alternative to non-representation was obviously action. A Resource Competition argument is validated in this case.

**Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity**

It is argued above that the threat to political influence for the Hazara stimulated collective action in Kabul. The incentives of the elites are easily identifiable. Strong negative and positive incentives enhance support for Wahdat. Looking at other participants, I have argued that mobilisation took place within existing private good producing groups, maintaining requirements of both incentives and control. Seemingly, organisation could easily become ethnic based because most Hazara in Kabul were integrated in family- or locality-based organisations, which implicitly were also uni-ethnic. One implication is that existing organisational resources are crucial, and they might suddenly take on different functions. In this case, the family based economic and social ties suddenly got instrumental for political mobilisation as Hazara. Although organisational resources are emphasised, I will argue that resource competition alone is able to account for why collective action was taking place when it did, and why there was a rallying around the Hazara identity, once the boundary between government and resistance fell. While making a minor reservation for insufficient data on the issue of inter-group relations, I think theoretical complementarity applies well.
10.4. CONCLUSION

The Kabuli Hazara were worried about the mujahedin's take over. So far the Pakistan-based resistance had rejected accommodation of the Shi'ia. Any existing organisational capability was activated. When Najib abdicated on April 17th, many public buildings were already under the control of armed groups. Without any overall co-ordination, the Hazara in Kabul had taken command over large sections of the city. Later, most of the Hazara groups declared loyalty to Wahdat, and the party gained control over large parts of the capital. In early June, fighting between Wahdat and Ittehad erupted, with both parties involved in ethnically justified violence. The conflict became a proof of Wahdat's strength. Soon after the Wahdat was granted seats in the government. Still, armed conflict with Ittehad, and with the Jamiat-dominated government forces intensified. Political representation was granted, but demands on application of the Jaffari rite, and reorganisation of administrative districts were not met.

I have argued that Kabul's Hazara mobilisation was motivated by a need for individual security. Furthermore, focusing on the political elite, prospects of a future career was an incitement. In the long run, Wahdat was the only possible guarantor. The existence of control mechanisms is harder to ascertain, but informal control in existing organisations have probably been instrumental here. Since control is less likely to be crucial when the organisation's aim appears realistic, I see Group Solidarity theory as broadly complying to this case.

Further, Resource Competition theory is given support. The theory is compatible with a process where mobilisation is a response to perceived external threat. For the Hazara, it seemed likely that both security and political participation would become dependent on ethnic and sectarian boundaries. As soon as the dividing line between the government and the resistance fell, ethnic identities became dominant, for the Hazara in particular. I also argue that the limited integration of the Kabuli Hazara in multi-ethnic networks facilitated mobilisation.

Finally, I argue that Resource Competition theory sensibly accounts for the changed opportunities encouraging the individual actors. It was not until the division wall between government and resistance is broken, that Hazara political mobilisation could be realised in full. With the expected threat from the new government, there was every reason to mobilise as broadly as possible.
11. CONCLUSION

This concluding chapter consists of three sections. First, I take up again some of the loose ends in the empirical presentations issues that I see as important despite of not having managed to establish how they relate to actual mobilisation processes. In particular I point to possibilities for further research, by discussing possible unexploited sources. Second, I return to two theoretical approaches dealt with in Chapter 3. The purpose is to challenge the periodisation chosen, and the explanations given, by viewing the evidence from different perspectives. Lastly, each of the five theoretical propositions is discussed in relation to the data, looking at differences and similarities between the different cases, relating to one proposition at a time. I round off with a discussion of the utility of the proposition on theoretical complementarity.

11.1. AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In working on this thesis, I have encountered considerable data problems. Some issues that would appear to have a bearing on the subject have been dealt with in the text, but it has proven difficult to establish their implications. As I have deliberately chosen not to exclude such issues in the foregoing, let me here briefly point to those I consider most important, which are: the Soviet-inspired nationality policy; development among the Kabuli Hazara throughout the war; development stories of individual political parties or areas; and spill-over from Iranian political conflicts. This ranking reflects the assumed relation between the amount of work likely to be required, and the potential outcome.

The nationality policy was a crucial element in the PDPA's reform program, repeatedly brought to the fore throughout the PDPA period of dominance. The Hazara shura has been emphasised in this study (sections 6.1.2; 7.1.2; 8.1.2; 9.1.2), and some effects on political organisation have been pointed out. Numerous questions remain unanswered, relevant both to mobilisation among the Hazara and ethnic mobilisation in Afghanistan in general: What were the resources channelled out from ethnic boundaries? What reforms were implemented, for example concerning administrative divisions? What sort of popular response was there in government-controlled areas? To what extent was the nationality policy imposed on the PDPA by the Soviets? For further documentation on these issues, one possibility is to interview people who were involved, either in the Soviet union or in Afghanistan. A second source is written Soviet documentation, now potentially available in archives in Russia.
The Kabuli Hazara community obviously saw great changes during the war. Many Hazara had success in business. There was a tremendous increase of Hazara in the administration. Many gained access to higher education. Still, indications are that political support for the government was minimal among the Hazara. The issue is possibly linked to the nationality policy issue. Crucial questions are: What was the basis for economic progress? What was the basis for increased influence in the administration? What organisational implications did the changes have? How did the changes affect inter-ethnic relations in the capital? As most written documentation in Kabul has been destroyed, interviews would have to be the central source. Further documentation here would also bring new insight into events in Kabul from early 1992.

A study like the present one would have benefited greatly if evidence had permitted systematic internal comparison. Life-stories of individual political parties would have provided a fuller picture of various factors in political mobilisation throughout the war. The same applies to descriptions of change in restricted areas. Crucial question are: What were the central resources in the area/organisation? What were the central social categories involved? What factors were instrumental in igniting political change? An extensive survey of resistance material and historic publications on the war in Dari, might yield new insight into several of these issues, as might interviewing.

Iranian politics remained conflict-ridden throughout the period. It is clear that Iranian political conflicts have had spill-over effects in the form of conflicts among the Shi’ia parties in Afghanistan. Although we know a little about the Iranian conflicts, little is known about their implications in Afghanistan. What relations existed between various Iranian groups and groups in Afghanistan? What sort of resources were involved militarily, financially, politically? To what extent did Iran exploit its role as a host country for refugees to gain influence over the resistance, as Pakistan clearly did? Such information might be obtained from interviews with sources both in Afghanistan and Iran. Written documentation, however, is unlikely to be accessible in the near future, if indeed ever.

Our understanding of political mobilisation among the Hazara, or ethnic mobilisation in Afghanistan in general, is still restrained by the availability of data. I have indicated some key areas, and potential sources. At present, the most promising seems to be Soviet sources, crucial for insight into the nationality policy. Further, interviews could add to our understanding of the nationality policy, as well as the changes among the Kabuli Hazara throughout war. Interviews is also a potential source of insight into stories of individual political parties or areas in Hazarajat, possibly also into the spill-over effects of Iranian internal conflicts.
11.2. ASSESSING ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Five instances of political mobilisation have been analysed on the basis of two theories. The periodisation chosen has implications for which theories are supported, and there is a real risk that periodisation itself can make one blind to other approaches. Let us here take a brief look at the mobilisation processes over a longer timespan, and discuss them in relation to two other theoretical approaches: Resource Mobilisation theory, and Deprivation theory.

11.2.1. The role of mobilised resources

I have already argued that there need not be a conflict between Resource Mobilisation and Resource Competition theory, as also the latter allocates an important role to mobilised resources. (section 3.1.) However, it might be that Resource Mobilisation in itself is sufficient for explanation, without bringing in the competition element, and it is this angle I will discuss here.

Going back to the pre-war conditions (section 4.2), it is astonishing how little the Hazara commanded of resources that could enable them to challenge any external force. Furthermore, their resources had one thing in common: they were all subject to dispute with an outside force. Thus it is scarcely surprising that the first rebellions in Hazarajat (Chapters 6 and 7) were mainly dependent on intangible resources, and could not rely on any political organisation beyond the local level. The crux to explanation is external threat to resources, not internal possession of resources. It would be difficult to use the Resource Mobilisation framework in explaining how resistance was possible under such conditions. Further, the pattern of the uprisings in 1978, when the most remote and poor areas rallied first, tend to invalidate the theory of the primacy of resources.

Looking at the period 1978 to 1992 in full, we note that a major change came with the emergence of the sheikh into positions of political power, with most other categories of the Hazara population eventually joining organisations dominated by the sheikh (Chapters 8 to 10). Here Resource Mobilisation theory receives considerable support, as tangible resources in the form of military and financial support from Iran were crucial. Intangible resources both in the form of a clergy developed prior to the war, and a core organisation trained and set up in Iran, played a major role. While I have argued that the withering of external threat opened the way for this internal competition, the emergence of a challenging force rests on access to strategic Iranian resources. Hence, Resource Competition theory can account for how internal competition became possible, but Resource Mobilisation theory is more useful in explaining why it happened exactly when it did, and in the form it did. However, the Group Solidarity theory is also able to deal with these organisational processes.
While the argument rests on a limited number of cases, certain indications are given. First, Resource Competition theory is better than Resource Mobilisation theory in dealing with the interplay of processes within a population, and shifts in the environment. Second, by combining Resource Competition arguments and Group Solidarity arguments we can obtain a fuller account of complex mobilisation dynamics than by Resource Mobilisation theory alone.

11.2.1. The role of deprivation

We have applied insights from Deprivation theory to modify the thesis of resource competition, by emphasising that ties between groups are counterproductive to mobilisation. However, since the Hazara are a deprived group (section 4.2), and their recent political organisation is justified by emphasising historical and current deprivation, a look at the classic Deprivation thesis is appropriate.

Empirical applications of Deprivation theory often compare groups within the same population, taking ethnic mobilisation as the dependent variable, and various deprivation indicators as the independent variable. In the case of the Hazara, data problems rule out such an approach. But, in comparing deprivation theory with Resource Competition theory, a decisive question would be: Is it probable that the population would have mobilised if they had been resource-rich, and their control over resources had been challenged in an equal manner? I will argue that the material at hand suggests the answer is yes. The most clear-cut example is the involvement of the economic elite in organisational establishment in Kabul prior to 1992, most notably with Khosaran (section 9.2.3). However, the Nehzat seems to be a negative case. Rich in resources, it was one of the few Hazara groups not to join Wahdat (section 9.2.2). Still, the Nehzat example can also be explained by its integration into multiethnic economic networks in the region where it operated (proposition #2b).

To conclude, it is impossible to refute deprivation theory due to the nature of the empirical material. However, I would argue, also with reference to the discussion above on resource mobilisation, that Resource Competition theory is superior to Deprivation theory in explaining mobilisation among the Hazara. It is better able to account for the timing of mobilisation, and for the shifts from one scale to another. Further, as mobilisation seems to take place both within resource-rich and resource-poor groups, Resource Competition theory has the advantage of not excluding either a priori.
11.3. SUMMARY ANALYSIS

**Proposition #1a): Production of private goods**

In analysing the private goods aspect, I have distinguished between leaders and followers, and will do so systematically in this section. Two aspects of the theory should be recalled. First, positive and negative sanctions are both seen as private goods. Second, a group producing private goods can evolve into one producing joint goods, but no group is initially established to produce joint goods.

In the first case, the PDPA government targeted the leaders, both physically and by undercutting their resource basis. The mir and all other elites had to fight for survival. In case two, the sayyid took over power in the Shura. I have argued that the sayyid sought resource control, in particular political influence, and grasped the opportunity as the state undermined the mir. Next, the sheikh challenged the sayyid. The former had a preference for a prominent position in the religious domain, increasingly also the political domain. The Shura was an obstacle to both, and the sheikh chose to oppose its rule. Period four saw the establishment of the Hazara unity, Wahdat, when leaders of other parties effectively surrendered to the sheikh-dominated Islamists. I have argued that their alternative was potential extermination, while Wahdat also used patronage to encourage compliance. In case five, the Kabuli elite was faced with an imminent, threatening change in government. Hazara elites expected to come under double fire, both for having been collaborators, and for belonging to a disfavoured ethnic group. Individual security and future career were their prime motivations for mobilising.

If we then focus on followers, the effect of the targeting of leaders after the 1978 coup, was a threat to everybody, as the only existing organisation was attacked. People, like leaders, fought for survival. As the sayyid turned against the mir, popular support became less important. On the other hand, the overthrow was possible because the mir had been unable to fulfil their obligations towards their followers after they were undercut by the state. Case three is parallel: the sayyid demanded much, but delivered little, in their relation to the Shura's citizens. The sheikh provided an alternative, but the takeover was smooth only in areas where they had a prior position, hence where a private goods producing group existed. Case four, establishing Wahdat, was largely an elite undertaking formed principally on the basis of existing private goods producing groups. In the last case the Kabul uprisings people mobilised within a variety of existing private good producing groups, as the theory predicted.

Concerning leaders, we may say that incentives have been fairly well identified, and there is support for the theory. As to followers, the data
situation has been more problematic, but the proposition is supported, particularly the emphasis on existing groups that produce private goods.

**Proposition #1b): Control**

Showing how control was maintained within the cases of mobilisation has proven difficult. In itself, this might be an interesting finding, as it suggests that the control issue is crucial in putting the Group Solidarity theory to further test.

In the first case, spontaneous uprisings took place in local organisations, with highly dependent membership, and high visibility of contribution and consumption. Case two parallels the first one, adding that the *sayyid* enjoyed the benefit of a trans-local network, instrumental also in control issues. The administrative expansion of the Shura included the increased use of formal control. Next, the Islamists built similar systems of formal control when they took over, while they also benefited from less formal systems where they were locally established. Within their core, a cell-like, all-encompassing organisation ensures control. In the two last cases, evidence on control is less clear. In case four, the establishment of Wahdat, integrating strong organisations into one unity seems likely to involve considerable control problems. Wahdat’s use of extensive intelligence services indicates that control issues were given high priority. For case five, the Kabul uprisings, control is likely to have taken place within each group, while the lack of overall co-ordination logically includes a lack of overall control. Weaknesses in data on the two last cases are less of a problem, because the theory assumes that control becomes less crucial as the ultimate aim looks more realistic.

The control proposition has been the most difficult in terms of getting the evidence to have a bearing on the theory. On the other hand, there is nothing to suggest it is invalid, although its importance should probably not be exaggerated, at least not in the two last periods. I would suggest that considerable attention should be given to the control problem in future applications of the theory.

**Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale**

Throughout the period in focus there were major shifts in the scale of political organisation among the Hazara. Each period under scrutiny included distinct processes, whether mobilisation was a response to external or internal threat.

Before the war, political organisation in Hazarajat was local in scope, centred on the *mir*, who had minimal horizontal loyalty between themselves and were often in competition with one another. In the first case, after the PDPA coup in 1978, massive threat from the national government led all local units to rise simultaneously, but without any trans-local co-ordination.
The *mir* was the crux of local rebellions. In case two, within a year of the first rebellions, a regional co-ordination, the Shura, was established. I have argued that this lends strong support to the proposition that large-scale threat promotes mobilisation around larger-scale identities. The *sayyid* became politically dominant. They were the only regional-level category of leaders, and formed an existing organisation capable of taking on a political function. Once the *sayyid* were established in power positions, government threat withered by mid-1981, and the *sayyid* turned against the *mir*. According to the theory, as external threat withers, internal competition will emerge. In the third case, the Islamists challenged the *sayyid*, in a new round of internal competition. An entirely new leadership became established. Ideally the *sheikh* see the *ummah* as their ultimate identity, but once engaged in competition over political influence in Hazarajat, the identity began effectively shrinking towards a regional/ethnic scope. Period four saw the establishment of a new political unity in Hazarajat. Hezb-e Wahdat meant continued *sheikh* domination, but now encompassing all groups in the area. Initially a mainly Shi'ia group, the non-Hazara Shi'ia soon disassociated themselves, making it an essentially ethnic group, with *sheikh* domination. The establishment of Wahdat was primarily a response to external factors, especially the exclusion from the Interim government which was seen to signal that future national representation would not come without struggle. In the fifth period, the boundary between resistance and government fell with Najib's abdication. The mobilisation of the Kabuli Hazara in favour of Wahdat gave the organisation a more clear-cut ethnic scope, with almost a perfect overlap between its boundary and the boundary of the ethnic Hazara.

Proposition #2a) emphasises that complementarity in group relations is counterproductive to mobilisation. If we focus on political mobilisation among the Hazara, a crucial question is: why did it limit itself to Hazara scale, and fail to include non-Hazara Shi'ia? The question is actualised by the central role played by the Shi'ia clergy, the *sheikh*, throughout periods three to five. I have argued that in period four, non-Hazara Shi'ia were, at least in the economic domain, to a higher degree incorporated in multi-ethnic networks. Turning to the urban mobilisation in period five, I have indicated that for most Hazara, family and locality based networks were the functioning organisation also in the economic or political domain; hence multiethnic relations were restricted. While data are insufficient, this line of reasoning is in harmony with the proposition.

Looking at the emergence of a uni-ethnic organisation in a longer-term perspective, we could argue that it is a response to extensive political modernisation, in the form of state penetration. The responding group has successfully replaced a local leadership based on patron/client relations with a
new leadership which operates with a larger-scale identity, and in hierarchical organisations. Both the consolidation facing external threat, and the internal change in leadership suit the scale proposition. In conclusion, we find strong support for the proposition on scale, which has contributed with crucial insights into the case of Hazara mobilisation.

*Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.*

Arguments on Resource Competition are closely linked to arguments on scale, because the niche under dispute changes as scale changes. Here, my basic focus has been on competition over political influence. In line with the arguments presented in Chapter 2, and in section 4.2, political influence is crucial, because it determines who has power over other resources.

Prior to the 1978 coup, a decentralised administration depended on the *mir* for contact with the local population. This meant that a local niche for political participation existed among the Hazara. In period one, after the 1978 coup, the state threatened to take control over the local niche, and this ignited resistance. Realistically, this attempt at state penetration could only lead to revolt, as no alternative for political affiliation was presented by the government. In period two, a regional co-ordination, the Shura, was established, as a response to the large scale threat that the government represented (#2a) Hence, what had been a local niche of political influence was transcended by a regional niche. Simultaneously, the *sayyid*, who commanded a regional religious network entered this new larger scale niche of political influence. As the external threat lessened, they went on to oust the *mir*, whose local-scale identity was in effect already irrelevant. In case three, the *sheikh*, forming part of a trans-regional Islamist network, challenged the *sayyid* for control of the regional niche of political influence. An important aspect of their larger, international Islamist identity was the affiliation with Iranian Islamists, who provided them with essential resources to win the internal struggle. Both period two and three were characterised by internal competition over regional political influence. In period four, expectation of renewed external threat was created by the Soviet withdrawal announcement, and the exclusion from Interim government. This enhanced an internal consolidation, as all groups united in Wahdat, a regional/ethnic party, under *sheikh* dominance. Clearly, to maintain Hazara control over the regional niche, it would be necessary to take part in the coming competition over political influence at the national level, and Wahdat was indeed geared towards the coming contest. In period five, as Najib's government went out, the Hazara in Kabul mobilised and took control over crucial resources in the capital. While the competition now took place on a national arena, the demands launched by the Hazara organisations have demonstrated that their
primary aim was to maintain political influence within the established ethnic/regional niche.

Summing up, I would maintain that the Resource Competition theory has helped to highlight the major changes in political mobilisation among the Hazara in the period. In particular it can add to our understanding of how external and internal changing factors affect one another.

Proposition #3: Theoretical complementarity

In the first case, external threat ignited concerted resistance, in line with a classic Resource Competition argument. However, Group Solidarity theory introduce several nuances. First, political reforms undercut the mir's access to private goods. Second, their organisational mode lacked a potential for unified large-scale organisation. Both factors are crucial for understanding the limits to mobilisation in the first case, as well as the organisational change of the second case. Then, in the establishment of the Shura, a large-scale resistance organisation is well accounted for by Resource Competition theory. However, the sayyid's monopolisation of political power is better accounted for by focusing on private goods production, on how changes in access to private goods affect the relation between mir and sayyid. Resource Competition arguments can account for how continued internal competition was possible in period three, by emphasising the absence of external threat. However, it cannot account for the sheikh 's challenge of the sayyid. Here, the focus on existing groups that produce private goods, and on incentive structures for leaders and followers in the competing organisations is crucial to understanding. Resource Competition could only indicate that there was an opportunity to compete not whether and how competition actually took place. In case four, the formation of Wahdat, more weight is on resource competition arguments. Expecting external threat, small groups unite. In addition, I have argued that Wahdat's will to provide further private goods to joiners, and punish non-joiners, was important to the success of the effort. In the final case, mobilisation in Kabul can in a competition perspective be seen as parallel to what happened in case four, but delayed due to the boundary between resistance and government. While Resource Competition arguments dominate, I have argued that possibilities for private goods were crucial for mobilising elites among the Kabuli Hazara, and those elites were important in getting existing groups that produced private goods involved in the uprisings.

Throughout these cases there is high correlation between presence of external threat and concerted mobilisation. This correlation should not be taken for granted. Looking at Hazarajat prior to the war, we see that it was under continuous external political domination, but the dominating party applied private goods to local leaders, and successfully hindered major
opposition. Here, a private goods argument seems to rule out a Resource
Competition argument, in what is largely a repetition of the old story of 'divide
and rule'. However, to the support of the Resource Competition argument, this
system had remained stable for a long period, whereas the argument of
external threat presupposes a relatively sudden escalation.

The theoretical combination has been borne out well in the five cases of
ethnic mobilisation among the Hazara. Combining the theories has helped to
give a more detailed understanding of the mobilisation dynamics, particularly
in periods two and three where differences in the production of private goods
proved crucial in a battle between sayyid and sheikh. Let me conclude by noting
how fruitful it has been to have had at hand a theory apparatus capable of
dealing with change both at the structure and the agency level.
Appendix One

THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

The theory of group solidarity

Proposition #1a): Production of private goods
Any group produces private goods. Mobilisation for public goods production builds on existing private goods producing groups. Alternative supply limits group dependence and constrains mobilisation.

Proposition #1b): Control
The ability to control is decisive for emergence of groups producing joint goods. Group viability depends on control costs, which again rests on the visibility of production and consumption.

The resource competition theory

Proposition #2a): Mobilisation scale
The politically relevant scale of identity, chosen among the potential identities available, reflects the scale of the challenging group.
*Complementarity in group relations affects mobilisation negatively.

Proposition #2b) Resource Competition.
Mobilisation is most likely where economic and political shifts make intergroup competition over economic or political resources more frequent.

Reconciliation of the theories

#3 Theoretical complementarity
The theory of Resource Competition and the theory of Group Solidarity are mutually complementary in explanations of political mobilisation.
Appendix Two
GLOSSARY

'Alim Religiously educated leader. Normally refers to a person who has completed a higher degree in a madrasa.
Amir Former title for the ruler of Afghanistan. Prince, Lord or nobleman.
Arbab Village leader, prior to the war normally the representative of the village in relation to the government. Malik refers to the same, but arbab is preferred in the centre and the north of Afghanistan.
Ayatollah An honorific title for the high-ranking authorities in Shi'ia Islam.
Dihqan Peasant, usually restricted to share-cropper.
Fiqh Islamic law.
Fitwa Islamic legal pronouncement, provided by a qazi of superior rank.
Hanafi One of four schools of Sunni law interpretation, named after its founder Abu Hanifah. The most widespread and most liberal school. Dominant among Afghanistan's Sunni population.
Hezb Party.
Ijtihad Personal interpretation. Within Sunni Islam reserved for the founders of the four schools. Within Shi'ia Islam, open for the 'ulama.
Imamat Central Shi'ia doctrine, particularly for the twelve Imam Shi'ia. The Imam descends from Ali, who the Shi'ia see as the Prophet's legitimate successor. The Imam has supreme religious authority, and is an intermediary between man and God.
Inqelab Revolution.
Ittefaq Alliance, confederation.
Jaffari The religious law followed by Twelve Imam Shi'ia. Named after Jafar as-Sadiq. The majority of Shi'ia in Afghanistan, and in the rest of the world, follows the Jaffari rite.
Jirga The assembly in Pashtun areas (see shura).
Jirib Land measure, equals 0.2 hectare.
Jihad Islamic war of liberation; holy war for the case of Islam.
Kafir Infidel.
Karamat Spiritual or psychic powers held by a Saint. It brings blessings to others through contacts. A sayyid carries karamat. (means: 'acts of generosity').
Khan Normally a landowner being the head of a large family. Patronises a large number of dependants, for whom he provided physical goods and general security. Leader of a tribe or clan.
Khums The financial contribution followers pay to their religious authority, traditionally one fifth of income. Part of khums is passed on to higher level within the religious hierarchy.
Lashkar Armed forces mobilised out from tribal loyalties.
Madrasa Higher religious school.
Maktab Primary religious school (opposed to madrasa), or school in general.
Malik See arbab.

Transliteration is done according the system used in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. Diacritical marks are omitted both in the text and the glossary. Explanations are gleaned from Shahrani & Canfield (1984), Roy (1986a), and Glassé (1989).
### Mawlawi
Religious scholar (*Alim*).

### Mir
Local or tribal chief, economic and/or political power base. (In this text, *mir* is used both in the sense of *khan* and *arbab*).

### Muhajir
Refugee. Refers to the group of Muslims who left Mecca for Medina to avoid religious persecution.

### Muharram
Mourning by the Shi’ia for the death of Husayn. The tenth day is the anniversary, where a passion-play representing his martyrdom is performed, including ceremonies of whipping and wounding oneself. *Muharram* is also the first month of the Islamic calendar.

### Mullah
Muslim priest at the local level.

### Mujahid
Muslim freedom fighter, fighting *jihad*, Islamic holy war.

### Mujtahid
Those authorised to practice *ijtihad*, personal interpretation.

### Qasi
Islamic judge, who applies *shari’a*.

### Qawm
Group of primary loyalty, which basis could be extended family, clan, village, ethnic groups or profession.

### Sayyid
Religious dignitary who descends directly from the Prophet.

### Sheikh
Among the Shi’ia it refers to someone who has studied religion in Iran or Iraq.

### Shari’a
The total law of Islam.

### Shi’ia
Followers of the Shi’ia branch of Islam. The largest part are ‘Twelvers’, while there is also a branch of ‘Seveners’, also called Isma’ili.

### Shura
Consultative assembly, council.

### Sunni
The branch of the majority of Muslims. Divided into four schools.

### Sufism
Islamic mysticism.

### Tanzim
Party.

### Talib
Student of Islam at the *madrasa* level.

### Taqlid
Imitation. The Shi’ia practice of following a spiritual guide.

### Taqiyyah
Self protection by dissimulating one religious beliefs. Legitimised only by real persecution.

### Tariqa
Brotherhood of Islamic mysticism.

### Ulama
Plural for *alim*.

### Ummah
Community or brotherhood of all Muslims.

### Ushr
Religious tax on property, literally ‘one tenth’.

### Waqf
Property controlled by the religious states or the community of religious leaders.

### Zakat
Almsgiving, might be paid directly to the poor, to travellers or to the state. One of the five pillars of Islam.
Appendix Three

WEIGHTING OF THE INTERVIEW MATERIAL

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INDICATORS:

Co-operativeness 1: Co-operative
0: Not co-operative

Frankness 1: Frank
0: Not frank

Disturbance 1: No major disturbance
0: Major disturbance

Language 1: Shared language contributor and interviewer, both fluent
0: Use of interpreter/Language not fluent by both parties
Appendix Four

OVERVIEW OVER ACTIVE SHI'IA PARTIES IN AFGHANISTAN, 1988.

SHURA-E ITTELAF

The Major Parties

Harakat-e Islami (Islamic Movement)
  Leader: Ayatollah Mohseni
  Ideology: Shi'a, in favor of Islamic republic

Sazman-e Nasr ( Organisation of Victory)
  Leadership: by Commitee
  Ideology: Shi'a Hazara separatists

Pasdaran-e Jihad-e Islami (Guard of Islamic Holy War)
  Also known as Sepah-e Pasdaran
  Leader: Hojatul-e Islam Zahidi
  Ideology: Shia Hazara Khomeinite, in favour of union with Iran

The Smaller Parties

Nahzat-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan)
  Leader: Akhlaqi (from Jaghori)

Niru-e Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Force of Afghanistan)
  Leader: Zahir Mohaqiq (from Behsud)

Da'wat-e Ittehad-e Islami Afghanistan (Invitation to the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan)
  Leader: Rahman Ali Mohaqiq (Angori, Jaghori, Ghazni province)

Hezb-e Islami Rad-e Afghanistan (Party the Islamic thunder of Afghanistan). Also called Hezbollah
  Leader: Qari Ahmad, known as Qari Yekdasta
  Ideology: Shia Hazara Khomeinite, in favour of union with Iran

Jebh-e Motahed (United front) Formed in 1983 from four small fronts.
  Leader: Hasan Ruhollah

SHI'IA PARTIES NOT IN THE ALLIANCE

Shura-e Ittefaq (Council of the Union)
  Leader: Sayyed Ali Behesti
  Ideology: Shi'a, in favor of autonomous Hazara region

Sazaman-e Mujahedin-e Mustazafin-e Afghanistan (Organisation of the Holy Warriors of the Oppressed of Afghanistan)
  Leadership: by Committe, principal representative: Sayyed Hoseyni
  Ideology: Secular, originally an offspring of the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq

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Appendix Five

NEWS SOURCES.¹

ACBAR News Summary, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), Peshawar (monthly)

Afghanistan-Nytt, Afghanistankomiteen i Norge, Oslo (irregular)

Bulletin du CEREDAF, Centre de recherches et d'études documentaires sur l'Afghanistan (CEREDAF), Paris. (monthly)

FBIS-NES (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East & South Asia), Washington (daily)

Frontier Post, Peshawar, Pakistan (daily)

Keesing's Record of World Events, Cambridge, (monthly)

Middle East International, London (forthnightly)

New York Times, New York (daily)

Wahdat News Bulletin, Wahdat Party of Afghanistan (UK), London (irregular)

¹ References to news sources are always given in text or footnote, containing full title, author, issue and date.
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Shahrani, M. Nazif, & Robert L. Canfield (eds.) 1984. Revolutions and Rebellions in Afghanistan, University of California, Berkeley, CA.


Tapper, Richard, 1984b. 'Ethnicity and Class: Dimensions of Intergroup Conflict in North-Central Afghanistan' in M. N. Shahrani & R. L. Canfield (eds.): Revolutions & Rebellions in Afghanistan, pp. 230–246, University of California, Berkeley, California


All sources for this work are stated.