The policy determinants of migration:

What is the role of the Senegalese government in shaping patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe?

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Abstract

This thesis aims to understand what role the Senegalese government plays in determining migration from Senegal to Europe. By studying the government’s organisation of migration policies and current agreements on migration regulation between Senegal and European states, it seeks to assess three questions: 1) what is the Senegalese government’s approach to migration from Senegal to Europe?, 2) when and why does the Senegalese government choose to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration?, and 3) how can existing agreements on migration regulation affect patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe? The analysis is supported by empirical data from interviews with relevant contributors in Senegal migration policy making and statistical data on migration flows from secondary sources. Based on the analysis, the thesis reveals that numerous factors underlie the Senegalese government’s decision-making regarding migration regulation and cooperation with European actors. It is found that the Senegalese government has a potential to determine the geographical pattern of migration by affecting migration capabilities, while the government’s current role is less significant. The thesis’ focus on the Senegalese government contributes to the general understanding of what role the sending state can play in international migration management, and in which ways cooperation between sending and receiving states can determine patterns of migration.
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<tr>
<td>ARIDA</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture on the Agency of Reintegration for Agricultural Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFA</td>
<td>West African CFA Franc</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEMIG</td>
<td>Determinants of International Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAISE</td>
<td>Fonds d’Appui a l’Investissement des Senegalais de l’Extérieur</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAMM</td>
<td>Global Approach to Migration and Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAISD</td>
<td>Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLASEPRI</td>
<td>Plateforme d’appui au Secteur Privé et à la Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVA</td>
<td>Retour vers l’Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIVE</td>
<td>Integrated System of External Vigilance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKTEN</td>
<td>Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>WARC</td>
<td>West African Research Center</td>
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1 Introduction

Throughout the last decade, irregular migration from Africa to Europe has been subject to extensive attention. Political debates have been concerned with the perceived threat of immigration and how unwanted immigrants represent a burden for European societies. Images of desperate Africans in small, overfilled and sinking boats have become common newspaper material, fuelling the popular idea of an African invasion across the European borders (de Haas 2008). Irregular migration from Africa to Europe has been an ongoing phenomenon for decades, but it has more recently become a top-priority for European policy makers, seen as a grand problem to be solved (Kleist 2011). In order to avoid this feared mass immigration and ease the public concern about immigration, European states and the European Union (EU) have pursued numerous different measures aimed at shaping the flow of immigration and reducing the volume of irregular migrants.

While restrictions on entry and policies of repatriations and border controls have been intensified, such control policies have also been combined with other political strategies (de Haas 2008, Fekete 2011, Kleist 2011). Since the mid-1990s, a new policy avenue has been to reduce the ‘migration pressure’ by improving the socioeconomic situation in migrants’ origin countries (Carling 2011). In order to decrease migration aspirations, development aid and other financial assistance to African sending states have spurred. A popular conviction among policymakers and researchers has been that the combination of development and migration policies is a ‘win-win-win solution’ to the ‘problem’ of unwanted migration. It will decrease irregular migration to Europe, contribute to financial growth in Africa and improve the lives of the migrants themselves (Bakewell 2007). In efforts to improve European migration policy, including both control oriented policies and development oriented policies, the EU is currently pursuing an establishment of cooperation on migration regulation with African sending states. The EU has encouraged European receiving states to negotiate bilateral agreements with migrant sending and transit states since the early 2000s, and issues concerning migration have now become an integrated part of the European-African cooperation framework (Trauner and Deimel 2013).

Along with the rise of new migration policy strategies, researchers have set out to measure the effectiveness of such policies in reaching their goals (see for instance:; Brubaker 1994,
Freeman 1994, Brocmann and Hammar 1999, Zolberg 1999, Shanks 2000, Carling 2002, Bhagwati 2003, Castles 2004, Düvell 2005, Rudolph 2006, Jandl 2007, Huntington 2010). With a few recent exceptions, the large bulk of this has focused on the policies of the European states. The African sending states’ experience of and intentions with these policies have not been considered, but rather ignored in the discussion of migration policies (Hamilton 1997, Collyer 2009). This research gap is particularly striking given the EU’s increased focus on cooperation on migration policies between Europe and Africa. A broader focus of how policies act as one of several determining factors for migration is an additional gap in the existing literature on migration policy. Very often, the effects of migration policies are measured as successfulness in decreasing migration flows or reducing migrant volumes. However, the effect of migration policies can be complex and should be seen in relation to the different aims that different actors may have with the same policy (Czaika and de Haas 2013). The specific policy context and other factors that may influence acts of migration should also be taken into consideration, so to better understand what exact role policies play as determinants of migration. While we know that states and policies play ‘some’ part, less research has focused on this role in a more profound manner (de Haas 2011).

In order to understand how states and migration policies affect migration, it is vital to understand all stakeholders’ actions, interests and aims with pursuing different policies. With this focus in mind, I seek to study the context and effects of migration policies and cooperation on migration issues between Europe and Africa. I aim to contribute to filling the geographical gap by examining the migration policies of Senegal, an African sending state. Through an analysis of the Senegalese government’s organisation of migration policies, and effects of these, I aim to assess what power the sending state has in determining international migration patterns.

Based on empirical data from interviews in Senegal in combination with statistical data on migration flows, I will investigate the following overarching research question:

What is the role of the Senegalese government in shaping patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe?
In order to assess the different aspects of this topic, the research question is addressed through three sub questions:

1. What is the Senegalese government’s approach to migration from Senegal to Europe?

2. When and why does the Senegalese government choose to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration?

3. How can existing agreements on migration regulation affect the patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe?

To answer the first question and explore Senegalese approaches to migration, I will make use of previous literature as well as collected interview data from Senegal. Based on this, I aim to understand how Senegalese officials’ and ministries’ perspectives inform and affect the government’s actions regarding migration. When addressing the second question of when and why Senegal cooperates with Europe, I will put emphasis on two policy initiatives. Both of these are policy initiatives based on cooperation between Senegal and European countries, and the analysis of these will focus on how Senegal chooses to respond to these initiatives, both of which were initiated by European actors. The first of these two is the Spanish interest of establishing bilateral cooperation on migration regulation, a request Senegal accepted. The second is the European Commission’s invitation to agree on a Mobility Partnership, to which Senegal finally declined. Based on existing literature as well as information from relevant stakeholders in Senegal, I seek to use these two examples to understand Senegal’s approach to migration policy and cooperation with Europe. To assess the third question, concerning policy effects, I will use descriptive statistics from secondary sources as well as interview material to look into the outcomes of the Spanish-Senegalese cooperation on border control and see how it affected patterns of Senegalese migration.

1.1 Why the Senegalese case?

In 2006, images of deprived boat migrants arriving at the Canary Islands filled the newspaper headlines in Europe. Unexpectedly, there had been a sevenfold increase in the number of African migrants choosing this route to Europe, and thousands of migrants took the risk of
travelling the large distance across the sea from the West African coast towards the Canary Islands (Hernandez-Carretero 2008). It soon became known that the large bulk of boats came from the Senegalese coast, and European actors, with Spain at the forefront, increased their efforts of cooperating with Senegal in order to reduce the number of boat arrivals (van Criekinge 2008, Reslow 2010, Chou and Gibert 2012).

Efforts to stem this migration ranged from increased border control at the Canaries, risk awareness campaigns in Senegal, and controls of the coastline and particular beaches, in Senegal. In its annual and quarterly reports, the European border control agency, Frontex, has repeatedly highlighted the success of these border control measures. In the Frontex 2009 general report, it is stated that the border controls “led into a drastic decrease of migrants and contributed to the saving of human lives” (Frontex 2009:43). The number of boat migrants arriving at the Canaries truly decreased within the first four years after 2006, but the official framing of this decrease as a great success, however, has been a European phenomenon. As with other measures to regulate migration, it is the European policies and European viewpoints that remain at the forefront of the discussions on migration from Africa to Europe. During the last decade, Senegal has become known as a migrant sending state and the Senegalese government has introduced different measures to affect migration throughout this period. However, little is known about the Senegalese viewpoint on migration in general and these migration policies in particular. This is also the case for research on the cooperation between Senegal and Spain from 2006, in which Senegalese perspectives are remarkably absent. While other migration policies are also included in the analyses in this thesis, it is the 2006 agreement between Spain and Senegal that has been least investigated and which was the inspirational source for my choice of Senegal as a case of an African sending state.

In order to improve our understanding of international migration, one must include the perspectives of all stakeholders involved. By using Senegal as a case of an African migrant sending state, I seek to contribute to the production of knowledge on sending states’ migration policies. The crux of this study is the findings of why the Senegalese government is involved in migration regulation and how the migration regulation potentially affects patterns of migration. The analysis will be informed by a new theoretical framework about how states and policies affect migration aspirations and capabilities (de Haas 2011). By using this framework, and by focusing on the sending state’s role in determining migration, I hope
that this thesis’ findings will contribute to improving our knowledge about how migration policies can shape African-European migration.

1.2 A note on terminology

As large parts of this thesis will be devoted to exploring the ways in which governments try to influence migration, I believe it is important to define which words I use to describe this phenomenon and how I intend to apply them. When it comes to the issue of steering migration, this act has been labelled in several different ways both by the media, politicians and in academic literature. By definition, all of these terms concern nation states’ initiatives to affect the many aspects of migration, such as its pattern, volume, composition and direction.

Whilst ‘migration regulation’ has been the most widespread reference to this, it has long been used undefined. The term ‘immigration control’, however, has gained increased popularity over the last years. Brochmann and Hammar (1999) argue that the difference between the two terms is that ‘immigration control’ is a more broadly defined term than ‘migration regulation’. Since scholars started to use ‘control’ in the late 1990s, this term has become more common in discussions of migration policy. A simple Google Scholar search tells us that the literature uses the term to describe a number of different phenomena, and in particular that of border control. Due to the diverse practices of using the term, as well as its often anti-immigration connotations, several scholars are advocating the use of a new concept, namely ‘migration management’ (Jordan and Düvell 2002, Taylor 2005). This recent concept promotes a holistic approach to migration, and understands international migration as a natural process rather than a problem (Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

In academic work on the links between states, policies and migration, researchers tend to select one of these three terms that they use consistently throughout their work. I would like to suggest a new approach and combine the terms, since they all have slightly different connotations. I will base the different uses of the words on the dictionary explanations of ‘control’, ‘regulate’ and ‘manage’. According to the dictionary definition, the term ‘control’ implies “[t]o exercise authoritative or dominating influence over [something]” (T.F. Dictionary 2014a.) ‘Immigration control’ thus conveys an image of an unequal power relationship between the controller and what is controlled. Moreover, since ‘immigration
control’ is by far more widespread than ‘migration control’, it is likely to refer to states’ actions regarding border crossings into a country. Controls can be distinguished from other types of steering because it is linked to a more physical presence of a control measure, such as with border controls. However, since such measures can be applied at both sides of the border, I will not use ‘immigration control’, but rather ‘migration control’ so to include both destination and sending states’ migration control measures.

‘Migration management’ is a more encompassing term as it relates to the “numerous governmental functions within a national system for the orderly and humane management for cross-border migration” (IOM 2011). The dictionary definition of ‘manage’ is “[t]o direct or control the use of [something]” (T.F. Dictionary 2014b). Although this explanation does not differ much from that of control, it implies that management is the function that coordinates different efforts. As it has been used in the literature that defines migration as a natural phenomenon I will apply it in order to describe how migration policies and actions are coordinated at the governmental level, and not to describe specific types of policy measures.

The last term ‘migration regulation’ differs from the two other terms because ‘regulation’ has a juridical reference. It means “[t]o control or direct according to rule, principle, or law” (T.F. Dictionary 2014c). As such it reflects the act of regulating according to the set rules, and I will therefore use it in relation to all migration policy measures. In sum, I will understand ‘migration management’ as the most encompassing term relating to the organisation of the governments’ actions in the field, ‘migration regulation’ as a subfield that refers to all the different juridical policy measures that have been introduced, while ‘migration control’ as only referring to the measures aimed at affecting the cross-border movements of migrants.

1.3 Outline of the study

The content of this thesis will be organised as follows. The backdrop of the thesis will be outlined in chapters 1-4, and the analyses and conclusions will follow in chapters 5-9. Chapter 2 will comprise the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis. In order to explain the theoretical framework, I will first assess relevant previous theories on the causes of migration, based on which a more recent theoretical avenue has been suggested. It will thereafter be explained how this new avenue combines existing concepts and sees migration as a function of migration aspirations and capabilities. Chapter 3 will draw upon the existing
knowledge of migration and migration policies in Senegal. The theoretical frameworks’ relevance for Senegal will be explained through an overview of what is known about current determinants of migration in Senegal. In the latter part of the chapter I will present the general trends in European and African cooperation on migration, and indicate what role Senegal plays in this African-European partnership. In chapter 4 I will reflect on the fieldwork carried out in Senegal, and my overall methodological choices.

The analytical part of the thesis will investigate the three sub questions that guide my assessment of the main research question. Chapter 5 analyses the first question of what the Senegalese government’s approach is to migration from Senegal to Europe. The first part of the chapter will outline the organisation of migration management in the Senegalese ministries, and the second part will assess the different ministries and officials’ interests with migration. Chapter 6 will analyse the question of when and why the Senegalese government chooses to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration. In this chapter I will scrutinise the two cases of the Spanish-Senegalese agreement and the EU initiated Mobility Partnership, and thereafter assess how these two cases inform the question on Senegalese decision-making. In chapter 7, the last sub question will be analysed, asking how existing agreements on migration regulation affect the patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe. In this chapter I will apply descriptive statistics to understand how migration flows have changed over time, and how the Spanish-Senegalese agreement is thought to have affected migration to Europe.

Finally, chapter 8 will include an analytical summary of the three foregoing analyses. I will elaborate upon how the findings on the different sub questions inform the overarching question on the role of the Senegalese government in shaping patterns of migration. In conclusion I will suggest future research and present the key findings of the thesis.
2 Theoretical perspectives on migration

During the last decade there has been an increased level of interest in the issue of immigration, and in particular that of irregular immigration to Europe. The rise in publications, both academic and journalistic, has ensued what has been understood as an unprecedented increase in numbers of foreigners from under-developed countries crossing the African-European borders in the pursuit of their idealised ‘dream of Europe’. While the assumption of an invasion of immigrants has been challenged by many, there are several other assumptions and viewpoints on the causes and consequences of migration that should be put under academic scrutiny (de Haas 2008, McCormick 2012, Oberreuter 2012). In order to be able to discuss and create policies with the aim of affecting migration, it is very important to understand what migration is really about; why people seek to migrate and which factors function as determinants of migration.

The initial theorisation on migration as a phenomenon took place in the early days of the mass migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (Hatton and Williamson 1998). Since then, numerous academic studies have been carried out in order to explain migration at various points of time, resulting in today’s vast body of literature providing diverse answers to the chief question of why people move. The theoretical framework of this thesis will largely be based on a recent development in the theorisation on migration, where insights from different disciplinary theories are combined in a framework in which all forms of migration can be conceptualised as a function of capabilities and aspirations to migrate. In order to fully understand this framework and to assess its uses and limitations for my work, it is useful to consider earlier migration theories, herein understood as theories on the causes of why people migrate. In what follows I will present the main strands in migration theorising, with a main focus on the neoclassical approach. I will thereafter explain the shift towards an integrated theory, and explain how the framework presented can be useful for my analysis.

It must be highlighted that the following explanation of migration theories is deficient. With the aim and focus of this thesis it would be irrelevant to present a detailed overview of migration theories’ history. I therefore only include theoretical discussions of migration which are relevant to apprehend the theoretical framework of the thesis. A further note regarding the theoretical chapter is that it reveals the multileveled nature of migration
theorising. While causes of migration derive from macro, meso and micro levels, the decision to migrate is likely to be at the micro-level. While migration theories often have a multi-level approach to migration, I must underline that this is not the aim of this thesis. While the theories operate at different levels, my analysis has a state-level approach as it regards the government's role in influencing migration. While the act of migration and some theories of migration focus at the individual level, my focus is on the role and the acts of the state.

2.1 Theories on the causes of migration

In the 1850s, the geographer Ernest-George Ravenstein was the first to develop a systematic theory to explain why humans migrate (Castles and Miller 2009). In his “Laws of Migration” he explained migratory movement as a response to unevenly distributed processes. Because of this unevenness, migrants are impeded to leave from their origin societies and attracted to particular places with better opportunities (Stouffer 1940, Zipf 1946). Although his laws were harshly criticised at the time, Ravenstein’s ideas stood the test of time and became a starting point when scholars embarked on their mission to theorise migration in the 1960s and 1970s (Lee 1966, Zolberg 1999). In 1966, Lee revised Ravenstein’s laws and found that migration decisions were determined by ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ factors in addition to different intervening and structural obstacles during the migration process. His initial idea, that people are likely to move to less populated areas and to areas of higher income, explains migration as a development towards a spatial-economic equilibrium. This view on migration has become a general notion underlying what have been named push-pull theories (de Haas 2008, Castles and Miller 2009).

During the third quarter of the twentieth century, scholarly explanations of migration were starkly influenced by economic theories. Both economic theories and other academic perspectives on migration mirrored the concurrent changes in the international society (Skeldon 1997). Linked to the accumulation of economic growth, the internationalisation and liberalisation of economic activity, as well as the emerging development processes in newly independent states, global patterns of migration were changing (Arango 2000). The arising approaches that explained the new types of migration are known as neoclassical migration theories (Castles and Miller 2009).
By and large, these migration theories explain migration by geographical differences in expected income and wage levels (Lee 1966, Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro 1970). They still differ from each other, seeing that new theories were developed in response to critiques of others. Sjaastad (1962) refined Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro’s (1970) explanation of internal migration in developing countries by understanding migration as an investment in human capital. Another understanding of the causes of migration was the dual labour market theory, developed by Piore in 1979. He believed that migration was mainly driven by pull factors, since the segmentation of labour markets created a demand for immigrants to work in less popular sectors (Piore 1979).

Despite their differences, what most neoclassical theories have in common is that they have a functionalist understanding of the society as a system, and as a collection of interdependent parts with a gradual drift towards equilibrium (de Haas 2010). However, one of the major difficulties with these theories is that they do not provide an encompassing framework in which migratory movements can be explained. While it is evident that economic differentials are crucial factors in explaining migration, the theories are inadequate to explain migration in the absence of wage differentials or regarding for example return migration (Czaika and de Haas 2011). There are clearly a number of factors that cause and affect migration, and the functionalist equilibrium theories are not thoroughly explaining how all the different factors combine together to contribute to migration. As argued by Skeldon, “[t]he push-pull theory is but a platitude at best” (Skeldon 1990: 126).

Another critique of the neo-classical push-pull theories is that they fail to explain how macro-structural factors, such as states, governments, political frameworks and labour markets impact migration decision-making. These factors are important as they contribute to the structuring of migration, and they are important in explaining why migration often is a socially selective and geographically patterned process (de Haas 2011). Since the time of the neoclassical theories, numerous other hypotheses have been developed to explain aspects of migration, but no theories have provided an encompassing explanation of the underlying causes of migration. However, within the array of studies seeking to conceptualise the causes of migration, there is one theoretical model that has gained particularly much academic popularity, namely the migration transition model. I will describe this model since it is part of the thesis’ theoretical framework, which will be explained below.
The migration transition model is based on the theory of demographic transition. In contrast to the neoliberal idea that the process of migration will evidently lead to equilibrium with equal development levels and no need for migration, transition theories postulate that all societies go through a period of increased migration (Zelinsky 1971, Skeldon 1997). The migration transition has an inverted U curve in parallel to the demographic transition, where emigration rates increase in times of less constraints and increased aspirations in the society. The flow thereafter decreases when people no longer perceive better opportunities elsewhere and have less aspirations to migrate. As such, increased development in one particular place will not necessarily decrease the migration outflow, but may rather increase it (Stark 1991, de Haas 2010, de Haas 2011). These theories view migration as an integral part of broader development processes, and not as a feature differentiated from other societal processes (de Haas 2011). It must be acknowledged, however, the transition hypothesis is not likely to be applicable on all situations, since it does not take account of all structural factors that may affect migration, such as for instance changes in migration regulation. Despite this, the model can serve as a valuable analytic tool since it can provide a general explanation of the relation between a country’s socioeconomic level and the level of migration out of it.

Migration is a complex and extremely diverse process, which makes it difficult to create an all-encompassing theory to explain all aspects of it. Several migration scholars have therefore argued that a main model of the causes and continuation of migration never can be developed (Salt 1987, Castles and Miller 2009). Due to the absence of a major theory, studies on acts of migration still largely rely on out-dated and insufficient neoclassical models in order to explain the determinants of migration. However, as has been argued by numerous scholars since the 1990s, there is a need to move beyond this approach in order to explain current real-world migration (Skeldon 1990, Massey et al. 1993, de Haas 2011).

2.2 The act of migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities

In their seminal paper on migration theories, Massey et al. highlighted that theories on migration from different social scientific fields could be combined since they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (1993). The complex trends in migration cannot be explained by one discipline alone, nor by focusing on a few aspects or levels in the migration process. As they saw it, “the complex, multifaceted nature [of migration] requires a sophisticated
theory that incorporates a variety of perspectives, levels and assumptions” (Massey et al. 1993:432).

As part of a large project on the determinants of migration (DEMIG), a new comprehensive theoretical framework of the macro- and meso-level forces driving international migration movements has been developed. In the paper that serves as the conceptual backdrop for the determinants project, de Haas explores how the fragmented insights from different disciplinary theories can be combined in an encompassing framework by conceptualising all forms of migration as a function of capabilities and aspirations to migrate (de Haas 2011). In particular, it is the migration transition theory in combination with Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach that are synthesised in this perspective. In the following paragraphs I will elaborate what constitutes this framework and I will conclude by explaining how I will apply it to my research question.

A real-world oriented framework of migration should specify the different factors that still remain basic academic assumptions of the causes of migration. In order to understand why people choose to migrate, it is important to incorporate a sense of agency. The act of migration should not be perceived as a mechanic response to economic and geographically determined factors, since individuals make subjective decisions based on their personal aspirations and preferences. However, as migrants’ actions and choices are restricted by structurally determined factors, such as policies or information limitations, the migration framework must incorporate a sense of structure. In particular, in order to improve the understanding of the factors that drive migration, while combining prior theories, this migration model conceives migration aspirations as a “function of spatial opportunity differentials and people’s life aspirations”, and conceives migration as a function of peoples’ “aspirations and capabilities to migrate” (de Haas 2011:17).

In other words, people will seek to migrate if they aspire to do so. Migration aspirations will be dependent on people’s general aspirations in life, as well as the differences in opportunities between the place they live and possible places of destination. However, even if they have strong aspirations to migrate, these can be affected by their capabilities to migrate. Their capabilities will be shaped by their own personal skills and assets, but also by other structural constraining determinants such as states, policies, the societal organisation, and the available level of information. This understanding of migration sees it as a function of
opportunity. In opposition to a function of wage level differentials, it is increasingly important to understand how the different determining factors, such as social, economic and political conditions can affect migration processes on their own or at the same time.

It is particularly useful to understand which and how factors determine migration aspirations and which and how factors determine migration capabilities. In line with the migration transition model, migration trends will be partly dependent on what stage of the migration transition the society is in. While the migration transition is not a reason for why people choose to migrate per se, it is part of the framework in which the people and different determining factors for migrating exist (de Haas 2011). While the transition model is a useful lens in order to understand migration, it does not include all factors that determine migration. In reality it is always a mix of social, economic and political factors at both individual and structural levels that determine migration (de Haas 2010).

Four specific examples of factors influencing migration aspirations can be economic incentives, social networks, the wish for social prestige, and expectations about the destination, which are also the determinants for current migration aspirations in Senegal (see section 3.2 for a further elaboration on this). Capabilities are also affected by social, economic and political factors, and can in particular be affected by structural constraints, such as infrastructure, labour markets, states and policies. A relevant example is that while socioeconomic factors in Senegal stir migration aspirations, the structural factor of the strict regime of migration regulations in Europe, restrict these aspirations. As such, some factors are linked to the transition model and development processes in the place of origin, but some are structural factors that shape migrants’ capabilities. Due to the lack of specification in research on migration determinants, there is limited knowledge on how specific policies affect patterns of migration. This is difficult to investigate, since acts of migration are already driven by a multi-layered set of influencing factors. While it is evident that “macro-contextual economic and political factors, […] play ‘some’ role” in determining migration processes, there is no consensus on the different factors’ extent of influence or how they interact (de Haas 2011:2). In order to investigate this role one must study relevant policies and analyse how these affect people’s aspirations or people’s capabilities to migrate, and this is what I seek to do in the Senegalese case.
Part of the aim with the aspirations and capabilities framework is not only to consider migration policies, but also the greater role of states in migration processes (de Haas 2011). While specific policies can affect people’s opportunity to migrate to a specific place at a specific time, a state’s nature in regard to authoritarianism or democracy, and its extent of strong central power can be more important as a macro-structure determinant of migration. In line with what was originally hypothesised by Hollifield in 1992, the extent of liberalism in legal and political systems can affect a state’s possibility to pass restrictive migration legislation. The ability of governments to affect overall migration levels appears to decrease in accordance with the level of state authoritarianism, as non-democratic states have more power to curtail people’s freedoms to migrate, either by blocking exit or through creating bureaucratic obstacles (McKenzie 2005, de Haas and Vezzoli 2011). As such, it is not only specific policies, but also states’ positions that can affect people’s capability to migrate and the political desire and ability to manage migration (de Haas 2011). This aspect will be interesting to incorporate in my case, since the Senegalese government is balancing on a fine line between democracy and authoritarianism (Mbow 2008).

2.3 How to measure migration policy impact

With the rise of new policies to control migration, there has been a concurrent rise in the efforts to understand and measure the outcomes of such policies. However, these efforts have generally focused on measuring the effectiveness of the policies, in other words how successful the policies have been in fulfilling the objectives set out by the migrant receiving state (Czaika and de Haas 2013). As a result, migration policy analyses often conclude by stating; a) that migration policies can serve as successful tools for controlling migration (Brubaker 1994, Freeman 1994, Brocmann and Hammar 1999, Zolberg 1999, Carling 2002), or; b) that migration policies generally fail as measures to control migration (Shanks 2000, Bhagwati 2003, Castles 2004, Düvell 2005, Rudolph 2006, Jandl 2007, Huntington 2010).

In order to reach more fruitful conclusions, this perspective must be broadened. To gain more insights on the role of states and policies as some of the structural factors determining migration, it is important not only to regard policy measures’ effectiveness, but also other and not necessarily intended effects. Migration policies do not necessarily only affect the volume of the migration stock or the size of the migration flow, but different policies may have different effects. As suggested by Czaika and de Haas, migration policies are likely to also
have ‘substitution effects’, by for instance inducing a spatial diversion of migration to other countries, a categorical reorientation towards other legal or illegal channels, or a decrease in return migration if immigration restrictions limit the opportunity to travel back and forth (2013). It is important to acknowledge the effectiveness or successfulness of a policy in reaching its stated goals, but a policy analysis should go beyond this.

Another point to be mentioned concerning how to analyse migration policies’ is that there rarely is a single and objectively identifiable goal with a migration policy. Within a state, a policy can serve multiple interests and the same policy can be differently understood by different actors. While the main focus of my analysis will be on the government and its approaches to migration aspirations and capabilities, there will be a need to understand the various governmental actors’ perceptions. In order to do this I choose to discuss diverse understandings as different narratives of migration. My understanding of narratives is influenced by Boswell et al. and their perception of narratives as “empirical claims about the causes and dynamics of the phenomena in question” (2011). In this case this implies government officials’ empirical claims about the causes and dynamics of migration from Senegal to Europe.

Concerning multiple narratives and interests, actors within a democratic state can reach a ‘discursive coalition’, a notion applied to the migration policy discourse by Pian in 2010. This implies that migration policies are the outcome of a compromise among the different actors, and it therefore serves multiple interests (Pian 2010). Moreover, different stakeholders’ different objectives are possibly even more important to consider in cooperation on migration policies between states. In such cases it is not only internal differences that affect the policy understanding, but also differences between states’ stated, or sometimes unstated, objectives. Since the main policies to be analysed in this thesis are the outcome of agreements between states, this will be particularly important to keep in mind. The officially stated aim with a policy does not necessarily reflect all the different states’ and stakeholders’ multiple narratives and interests, and an evaluation of the policies’ effects and effectiveness should take this into consideration.
2.4 Analytical application of the theoretical framework

The theoretical framework presented above is a recent addition to the array of migration theorising and at the time of writing it has not yet been applied to any empirical cases. The application of this theory in my research is as such a pilot project. This can be valuable for theory development, and to understand the usefulness of the framework in explaining the role of states and policies. It is therefore particularly important to explain exactly how I comprehend the framework, and how I will apply it to my case.

As outlined, the framework sees migration as a function of opportunity, based on migration aspirations and capabilities. Several factors at both individual and structural levels can influence migration, and by doing so they influence migration aspirations and/or migration capabilities. This distinction is a useful tool for my analysis. When regarding the role of the government, I can use this distinction to achieve a more detailed understanding of the government’s approach to migration, and differ between how migration aspirations and migration capabilities are believed to be affected. This will hopefully improve the awareness of what exact role the state play in influencing the actions of prospective migrants.

The framework further emphasises how the current state of migration in a country can be seen in relation to the country’s stage in the migration transition. In Senegal, the socioeconomic context can serve as an explanation for the different determinants that at the given time influence migration aspirations and capabilities. As will be explained more in depth in the chapter on Senegalese migration, the migration transition serves as a useful model to understand the general level of migration from Senegal since migration aspirations and capabilities have risen along with socioeconomic development. However, as outlined above, it is not only socioeconomic factors that affect migration patterns. In my analysis, I will therefore use the migration transition to explain why there is a continued flow of migration from Senegal to Europe, but when analysing how the government influences migration, I will study how migration aspirations and capabilities are shaped by policies, and how this affects the continuation of migration from Senegal to Europe.

Originally, the framework presented is very useful to understand the logics of individuals in their migration decision-making, but it does not have a focus on the approaches of states. However, with this framework in mind, one can assess how a state takes individual logics
into account, and how its policies are aimed at influencing, and do influence, these logics. The way migration aspirations and capabilities are understood by the state bureaucracy, will improve our understanding of how states and policies seek to influence patterns of migration. Concerning the three sub questions of the thesis, these are vital to understand the internal dynamics of the Senegalese state and its policy making. I will therefore assess these questions in light of the framework, but it should be highlighted that the major contribution of the framework should be seen in relation to the main research question.

Regarding the question of the government’s approach to migration, the analytical framework induces me to concentrate on the government’s different narratives and approaches to migration aspirations and capabilities in Senegal, and the government’s potential power to reduce migration capabilities through policies. I believe that this approach will enrich the analysis by contributing to an increased understanding of how the government perceives migration, the causes of current migration, and its potential and desire to affect it. The second question concerns when and why the government seeks to agree on migration cooperation with Europe. In the analysis of this question, my focus will be less on migration aspirations and capabilities, and more on how the government’s different narratives of migration, as well as the government’s internal dynamics, affect policy cooperation and decision-making. Regarding the third question on whether the government can shape patterns of migration through its policies, the framework will be applied so as to focus on how policies can affect migration capabilities in particular, and how, if so, migration opportunities are decreased through cooperation on migration control with European partners. With the awareness that migration is influenced by aspirations and capabilities, the measurement of policy effects can be more detailed concerning what the policies affect. By applying this perspective and focus on policy determinants of both migration aspirations and migration capabilities, I seek to provide an in-depth understanding on the policy determinants of Senegalese migration.

With this theoretical backdrop, I aim to contribute to the academic discussions on how states and policies affect migration. By reflecting on the theoretical notions presented above in the ensuing analysis of the role of the Senegalese government and its policies, I seek to explore the ways a sending state and its policies can shape migration patterns. By applying the determinants of aspirations and capabilities framework to the analysis, I also seek to investigate the usefulness of the theoretical framework in studies on how states and policies influence migration.
3 Understanding migration in Senegal

Studies that cover both sending and receiving states’ perspectives on migration and migration policies have remained at the margins of academic literature. Despite previous research which has underlined the importance of putting sending states at the forefront, further studies have kept to a minimum (Hamilton 1997). A general trait in migration research is that sending states are portrayed as being less influential in creating and implementing migration policies, since states in the global north assumedly exert more power in the political relationship between the global north and the global south (Brown 2001, Gibney 2004, Rodier 2006). This imaginary relation, however, does not necessarily reflect the actual power relationship between the migrant receiving and the migrant sending states. The relatively few studies that have been conducted on negotiations between receiving and sending states do not reflect the image of a powerless sending state, but rather the contrary (Hamilton 1997, Paoletti 2011, Delano 2012).

Studies that consider migrants sending states’ positions in international negotiation have mostly considered a handful of states, such as Mexico’s role in the negotiations of migration with the USA, and Libya and Morocco’s roles when negotiating migration with European states (for an overview of the Mexican case, see Delano 2012. For an overview of these two African cases, see Paoletti 2011). In order to contribute to the geographical extent of this research, I will investigate the Senegalese government’s perspective on migration and migration policy. As it is important to be well aware of the context of migration from Senegal to Europe, I will review existing literature on this topic. In what follows below, I will describe the culture and history of migration in Senegal in brief, assess what is established about determinants of migration aspirations in Senegal and describe the structure of Euro-African dialogue on migration.

3.1 The culture of migration in Senegal – a brief historical overview

Located in West Africa, Senegal shares borders with Mauritania in the north, Mali in the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau in the south. Its western border is a 500 kilometres coastline facing the Atlantic Ocean. Macroeconomic indicators point to a generally healthy state economy and Senegal is considered a politically stable country (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). Regardless of this, Senegal is ranked at 154 of the 187 states at the Human Development
Index, which indicates that it is one of the least developed countries in the World. According to the Human Development Report of 2013, one third of the population of about 14 million live below the poverty line, with a purchasing power parity of $1.25 a day (UNDP 2013). Despite the poor developmental situation, Senegal holds a unique and central position in the region of West Africa due to its political and economic stability. As long as history can tell, migration has been a part of life for people in West Africa, and because of the geographic location and its socioeconomic situation, Senegal has long been an important pole of West African migration. Although there have been different patterns of migration at different times, Senegal has been labelled as having a ‘culture of migration’, and mobile and migratory lifestyles are permanent parts of the Senegalese society, along with more sedentary traditions (Diatta and Mbow 1999).

During the late colonial era, students and labourers migrated from other West African countries to Senegal to stay for shorter or longer periods of time. Most of the labourers came on a seasonal basis from the neighbouring countries in order to work in the agricultural sector (Fall 2003, Bruzzone et al. 2006, Ndiene and Broekhuis 2006). This pattern of migration, where immigration was more important than emigration, was typical for Senegal until the 1970s (IOM 2009). Events during the last decades of the twentieth century induced changes in Senegalese migration. After independence from France in 1960, Senegal was hit by extreme draught in the 1970s which, in combination with a top-heavy state, sent Senegal in a downward economic spiral. The 1980s austerity measures and drastic reforms demanded by the IMF and the World Bank did not improve the economic situation. Internal rural-urban migration intensified, and new patterns of emigration started to evolve (Lambert 2002, Linares 2003, Willems 2013). Generally most of the Senegalese who started to leave in the late 1970s did so in search of work (Diatta and Mbow 1999). As people in Senegal received more financial assistance from relatives and friends abroad, the Senegalese economy soon became dependent on migration flows and the migrants’ remittances (Chort 2012).

Migration from Senegal was not completely new, and initially most of these new flows were directed towards the countries where other Senegalese had gone in the past. In addition to the neighbouring countries, Senegalese migrants went to Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gabon and the two Congos in search of work (IOM 2009, Chort 2012). Similar to what had happened in Senegal, other African countries soon experienced social, economic and political crises, and from the 1990s much of Senegalese migration was directed northwards. Due to
the colonial ties, patterns of migration to France already existed, but new destination countries emerged. While unskilled people migrated towards Spain and Italy, skilled migrants went to Germany, the United Kingdom and even North America (Fall 2003, Chort 2012, Willems 2013). Along with the changes in destinations, new migration networks were developed. While migration networks had been important in the Senegalese culture of migration for a long time, they now became one of the main facilitators for migration to Europe. This is in line with migration systems theory, which postulates that social networks are important for the continuation of migration patterns once they are started (Bakewell 2014).

When new immigration policies were introduced in Europe in the 1990s, it did not only affect the geographical pattern of migration, but also the types and modes of migration. Whereas the restrictive policies concerned labour migration, low-skilled workers continued to arrive as irregular migrants, family members, or asylum seekers (Castles 2006). This was also the case for unskilled migrants from Senegal. Despite new and harsher restrictions on entry, an increasing number of Senegalese have migrated to Europe. In the period between 1988 and 1992 around 30% of Senegalese registered migrants went to non-African countries and in particular Europe. Between 1997 and 2001 the amount of migrants choosing non-African destinations had augmented to almost 50% (Bartolomeo et al. 2010).

Since the late 1990s, European countries have developed new strategies to control immigration from African countries and protective measures have been implemented at both the European and the African sides of the Mediterranean (Sakho 2013). As for irregular migration, the intensification has been evident as increasingly more Senegalese migrants have been apprehended and expelled from European countries (Bartolomeo et al. 2010). Although Senegalese migration destinations have changed, and most of the academic and popular focus is on migration to Europe, it is important to keep in mind that the largest part of Senegalese migrants are located in Africa (Chort 2012). Nonetheless, according to the UN Population Division, the number of Senegalese residing in Europe in mid-2013 was estimated to be as high as 265,000 (2013).
3.2 Socioeconomic determinants of migration in Senegal

In order to obtain insights about Senegalese migration policies and the government’s impact on migration flows to Europe, it is not sufficient to know the historical patterns of migration, one also needs knowledge about the underlying factors that spur migration to Europe. The literature on Senegalese migration has well covered why people aspire to migrate to Europe, and in this section I will use this literature to elaborate on current determinants of migration from Senegal to Europe.

A study done in four different research areas in Senegal in 2012 found that among 18-40 year old men and women, no less than 72% would migrate to another country if given the opportunity (Fall et al. 2012). Another study done in 2005 examined peoples' stated intentions to migrate out of Africa and found that 38% of all Senegalese intended to migrate (van Dalen et al. 2005). These numbers show that there is a high wish to migrate among Senegalese. However, as known from the theoretical framework, there may be a combination of multiple factors at play causing peoples’ migration intentions as well as their decisions to migrate (de Haas 2011, Arcand and Mbaye 2013). Most of the literature tends to highlight the importance of socioeconomic factors in stimulating migration aspirations in Senegal, and this is also what I will highlight below (Fall et al. 2012). While these determinants have been labelled differently in different parts of the literature, I choose to label them as four different determining factors, namely economic incentives, migrant and social networks, the wish of social prestige, and expectations about Europe.

As international migration from Senegal in the 1980s and 1990s happened at a time of increasing economic difficulties, this is often seen as the reason for the take-off in Senegalese migration. Due to the lack of other options, several individuals and households turned to migration as an economic survival strategy (Baizán et al. 2013). Economic inequality in Senegal and in particular how perceptions of economic inequality have been manifested as a fact, must be seen as one of the reasons why such large numbers of Senegalese want to travel to Europe (Fall et al. 2012). In a quantitative study of determinants of migration in Senegal, 76% of potential migrants reported that work was their main motivation for seeking to migrate to Europe (Baizán et al. 2013). The economic incentive is therefore major for determining migration aspirations in Senegal. Migration to Europe can still be considered as a strategy to gain economic and material access since resources in Senegal are scarce (Fall et
al. 2012). However, the importance of economic incentives should not be exaggerated. As found by Carling et al. in their large-scale study on migration aspirations in Senegal, the economic opportunities in Europe are highly admired, but so are also “other aspects of life in Senegal” (2013:7). The economic incentives can therefore not be seen as all-encompassing since, they are challenged by non-economic incentives to remain.

As briefly noted, empirical research has shown that networks are important impetuses for enabling migration from Senegal to Europe (Chort 2011). In general, research in different parts of the world has shown that networks can reduce the costs and uncertainty of migration by following the routes of previous migrants (Bakewell 2014, Massey and Espinosa 1997, Davis et al. 2002). In the Senegalese society, networks play an important role in people’s lives. Family and friendship bonds are very important, and this is manifested in tightly knit social networks. Such social ties have shown to play an important role in migration decision-making, and recent studies have argued that in particular migrant networks often act as weighty determinants of migration (Chort 2011, Liu 2011, Toma and Vause 2013).

Social networks within Senegal are in many ways systems of solidarity, where those who are in favourable economic positions are expected to support those who are less well off. While it is evident that this can influence migration aspirations among younger people on the ‘receiving side’ of the system, it is less explored how it can create migration aspirations on the ‘giving side’. As argued by Willems (2013), it can be unimaginable for people to refuse sharing their incomes with their networks, and in situations of economic constraints, the solidarity system can put enormous pressure on those who do have an income. From this perspective, migration might become a viable option, since it allows for the safeguarding of one’s social belonging as well as the possibility of making private investments.

While migrant networks in Europe can provide assistance to aspiring migrants, Senegalese abroad can also trigger migration aspirations in less direct ways. Twenty years ago, social recognition and prestige usually came with education, knowledge, French language or a typical ‘western’ lifestyle. Today, social prestige can also be gained through migration, since it can lead to financial independence and improve a person’s ability to support his or her family. A migrant has a new type of autonomy, and as such ‘the migrant’ has become a type of role model in Senegal (Willems 2013). When migrants are successful, this fuels the popular image of ‘the migrant’ as a hero who overcomes difficult challenges abroad in order
to support its families at home. This popular image also feed into the imaginations of potential migrants (Appadurai 1996, Riccio 2005). Migration has thus become a novel path to gain success, as well as a possible indicator of the transition to adulthood (Willems 2013).

This conviction about other migrants’ success is an important reason for the high aspirations for migrating to Europe. The upward social mobility of migrants originates from successful returnees and Senegalese imaginations of how life in Europe is (Hernández-Carretero et al. 2010). In a study of migration intentions in Senegal, it was concluded that, in sum, the reasons why people seek to migration out of Africa mainly come from “great expectations” about how their life will be post-migration (Van Dalen et al. 2005: 772). It should nevertheless be pointed out that there is no consensus in perceiving European lifestyle as the ideal. There are also negative perceptions about migration, and some indeed question the way the migrants earn their money and how they spend it (Riccio 2005). Despite minor disagreements concerning this, the dream of Europe, and the myth of the migrant remain as an aspect of contemporary Senegalese society (Fall et al. 2012).

Concerning the high level of migration aspirations in Senegal, one may wonder why not more Senegalese migrate. The main reason for this is undoubtedly that migration capabilities are lower than aspirations, most notably because of lacks in financial assets. Migration to Europe, and in particular irregular migration, is a very expensive action that requires significant resources. Migrants and their families often have to save money for years, or take up a loan to finance the project (Arcand and Mbaye 2013). It is less expensive to migrate legally, but the chances for Senegalese to obtain a work or tourist visa to visit a European country are limited (Hernández-Carretero 2008). As such current migration regulations in Europe should be seen as the major reason for why not more Senegalese migrate to Europe. While it is not certain that all who aspire to migrate would have done so given the opportunity, it is certain that most of those with aspirations do not migrate because of the lack of the opportunity to travel legally.

While we know that regulations such as visa restrictions or border control policies affect migration patterns, the link is not clear-cut or self-evident (Schoumaker et al. 2013). As demonstrated above, research in Senegal has covered the individual socioeconomic determinants of migration, and in particular how these affect migration aspirations and expectations. More often than not, this research has not fully considered migration
capabilities, and the role of structural constraints such as states and policies in affecting these capabilities has not been specifically examined (Báizan et al. 2013). As to my knowledge, the role of the Senegalese government in determining migration has remained at the outskirts of research on Senegalese migration, and it will therefore be particularly interesting to assess how the government affects migration opportunities.

3.3 The Euro-African migration dialogue

In the analytical part of this thesis I seek to explore how the Senegalese government and its approaches to and policies regarding migration. A large part of the analysis will be devoted to Senegalese cooperation with European actors, and in order to situate this cooperation it is important to know the structure of intercontinental cooperation on migration between Africa and Europe. In this section I will therefore describe the structure of Euro-African dialogue on migration, and in the following section I will consider Senegal’s dialogues on migration within this structure.

Following the dissolution of Europe’s internal borders and the introduction of visa requirements African nationals, a large part of the migration from Africa to Europe has become irregular (Cross 2009). While the EU has tightened the control of its southern external borders in response to this new type of immigration, the number of irregular crossings has increased. According to the International Centre on Migration Policy Development, between 100 000 and 120 000 people cross the Mediterranean without the required entry documents every year (Fischer-Lescano et al. 2009), and considering recent conflicts in the areas east and south of the Mediterranean, this number is likely to have increased since 2009.

The rise in the stock of irregular migrants has spurred logical challenges, financial costs, and new security concerns within the EU. This has called for effective policy measures, and the dominant European approach has been to introduce security measures to ‘protect’ Europe through control of its external borders (Huysmans 2006, Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011). In order to carry out new measures of border control, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) was established in 2004. One of Frontex’ main tasks is to coordinate all member states’ border control activities in the operational management of external borders (Jorry 2007, Papastavridis 2010), and
since its establishment, most of the agency’s operations have been carried out in the Mediterranean. While Frontex plan and coordinate interception operations at sea, it is the member states with the relevant authority and responsibility that execute the operations (Papastavridis 2010). In order to improve the patrolling of maritime borders, the EU has increasingly desired to carry out joint ventures with countries south of the Mediterranean. Patrolling at sea has consequently been carried out as collaborative projects including Frontex, EU member states and a number of African states, including Senegal (Wolff 2008).

The collaboration on border control with African states reflects a recent EU strategy, namely to discuss migration cooperation and build links with third countries (Jeandesboz 2008). A policy approach that focuses on migration ‘root causes’ and development in origin countries has been called for since 1999 (Geddes 2005), but it was not until December 2005 that a new EU approach incorporated an emphasis on origin countries. This ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ (GAMM) combined development and security measures in new ways, but despite the emphasis on linking migration and development, the approach has an overwhelming focus on the EU security agenda and control measures (Cross 2009, Carling and Hernández-Carretero 2011).

By inducing stronger cooperation with third countries, the borders of Europe have moved from the shores of southern Europe to the shores of North and West Africa. The EU initiated Mobility Partnerships and individual countries’ bilateral agreements with third countries demonstrate that cooperation with sending states has become a key component in European border control strategy (Kleist 2011). The dialogues between Europe and Africa on migration and mobility, including bilateral, regional and continental dialogues, happen in the framework of GAMM. At the continental level, the Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment functions as the basis for dialogue on migration issues between the EU and all African states, often represented by the African Union Commission. Cooperation at the regional level happens as part of the so-called ‘Rabat Process’, which is the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development launched in Rabat in 2006, and at the bilateral level, the EU has worked for the establishment of “Mobility Partnerships” with African origin and transit countries (Home Affairs 2014).

The GAMM framework has more recently been incorporated in African states and institutions. When negotiating with European actors, African states have focused on the
positive benefits of migration since, as highlighted by van Criekinge, well managed migration will bring developmental benefits to Africa (2010). Both migration management and the linking of development and migration issues have thus been welcomed among African states. The framework that guides migration policies in Africa is therefore clearly linked to possibilities for development, either by enabling migrants to contribute to development in their origin countries, or by encouraging European partners to invest in development supposed to decrease migration aspirations among young people.

While the interest in contributing to development in places of origin may seem equally important for both European and African actors, it is important to remember that the focus on development emerged in a context characterised by political concerns over an ‘uncontrollable flow’ of migration to Europe. Developmental aspects were therefore introduced as a mean to stem irregular migration. Accordingly, as underscored by Kabbanji, the implicit objective with development policies can be understood as mobilising origin and transit countries to induce migration control mechanisms in exchange for financial compensation and development aid (2010). The effect of this approach on migration, however, is scrutinised in recent migrating research. As illustrated in the aspirations and capabilities framework, increased development will increase migration capabilities and not necessarily decrease migration aspirations (de Haas 2011). As demonstrated by applying the migration transition model to African migration, the EU approach to stem migration by developing Africa, will not necessarily fulfil European objectives.

3.4 Senegalese bilateral dialogues on migration

Before the EU took on the leading role in European-African migration relations, individual states in Europe were in dialogue with African sending states on a bilateral basis (Kunz and Lavenex 2011). While the GAMM has created a new framework for bilateral dialogues, both receiving and sending states’ former bilateral negotiations on issues of migration have remained. Receiving states have attempted to influence migration flows by appealing to the sending states’ interests, and likewise, sending states have used the European concerns over migration as a bargaining chip to pursue other political objectives (Hamilton 1997). In bilateral relations between European and African states, such as for example between Spain and Morocco, migration issues have been used in a symbolic way, often to pursue other foreign and domestic policy objectives (Loescher and Monahan 1990, Paoletti 2011). Despite
the growing role of the EU, it is evident that a large portion of cooperation between Europe and Africa is still occurring at the bilateral level (Chou and Gibert 2012). A noticeable change has nonetheless been that migration issues have become even more prominent, and the linkage between development policies and migration policies has, as in the EU approach, become prevalent (Kabbanji 2013).

In the case of Senegal, bilateral dialogues have prevailed the multinational, or EU led, dialogues. In Europe it is France, Spain and Italy that receive the largest flows of migrants from Senegal, and during the last fifteen years they have negotiated and cooperated with Senegal in managing migration flows (Chou and Gibert 2012). As part of the colonial heritage, France has been the traditional destination country for many Senegalese and the two countries have negotiated agreements on migration for several decades (Fall et al. 2010, Chou and Gibert 2012). As Spain and Italy have become increasingly popular destinations, these states’ bilateral negotiations with Senegal have become important from a European point of view. It was particularly after the terrible incidents at Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 and 2006, when several migrants were killed in clashes with Moroccan forces during an attempt to enter the Spanish enclaves, that Spain began to advance its bilateral migration cooperation with Senegal (Collyer 2008).

Senegal’s extensive cooperation on migration issues with France, Italy and in particular Spain, makes it the first African country to engage to such an extent at the bilateral level. The Senegalese openness for dialogue has created an overall positive migration discourse both for Senegal and its partners in Europe (Panizzon 2008). As noted by van Criekinge, this intense bilateral cooperation on migration is also an important precedent for cooperation on other policy issues between Senegal and Europe (2008). The details of Senegal’s cooperation with France, Italy and Spain will be elaborated upon in depth during the analysis of when and why Senegal chooses to cooperate on migration regulation with Europe. Before I continue with the analyses of the thesis’ three sub questions, it is important to explain how I have found the empirical data the analyses are based on. The following chapter will therefore elaborate on the thesis’ methodology and my choice of methods during my fieldwork in Dakar.
4 Methodological considerations

With the aim of producing rich and relevant data to investigate the research questions that guide this thesis, I have mainly followed a qualitative research approach. In order to understand the Senegalese government’s migration policies and policy intentions, it is important to get the perspectives of the people that are included in the process of policymaking. Since qualitative research allows for an in-depth understanding of particular phenomena from the actors’ points of view (Sandelowski 2004), I believe this approach is the most suitable for the topic and aims of the two first questions asked in this thesis. However, in order to answer the third research question I have chosen to make use of quantitative data in the form of descriptive statistics. This does not take up considerable space in the thesis, and as the quantitative data only supplement the qualitative data, the thesis does not follow a mixed methods approach, but is rather a mainly qualitative piece of research. In this chapter I will first describe the research design and my choice of methods for the thesis. I then move on to reflect on the fieldwork carried out in Dakar, including considerations about its strengths and deficiencies. I am thereafter going to reflect on the quantitative part of the methods, before I finally discuss some overall aspects of the analytical process.

4.1 Research design and choice of methods

In this thesis project I have made use of four different research methods, three of which are qualitative and one which is quantitative. The qualitative methods will be described in this section, while I will elaborate on the quantitative method towards the end of this chapter. As already established, I chose the case study approach as the thesis’ research design and thus as a framework for my choice of methods. While many social research designs follow the logic of comparing groups, I sought to focus on one particular case, Senegal, in order to collect more detailed data on this single case, rather than collecting less satisfactory data on two or more different cases. Although this makes me unable to carry out a detailed comparison of the Senegalese case and other cases, I believe the single case focus was important to gather sufficient data to produce reliable research findings.

According to Gerring’s definition, a case study is the study of a single unit in order to understand a larger class of units (Gerring 2004). In conversations about my master’s thesis with migration researchers, some have reacted on my choice of Senegal as a case, since “so
much is already known about migration in Senegal”. This is indeed true, but for me it was not negative, but rather one of the reasons I chose Senegal as a case. I did not choose an intrinsic case that is interesting because of its uniqueness. I wanted to choose an instrumental case so to gain a broader understanding of the role of sending states’ migration policies. It was therefore an asset that much research has been done on migration in Senegal. As stated by Crowe et al., an instrumental case is used because there already exists much knowledge about it (2011).

The first method I carried out was a literature review of relevant migration theories and background information on Senegalese migration. This was important to gain an appropriate understanding and knowledge of existing discourses in the field, as well as to construct appropriate research questions. The theoretical framework for the study has therefore found its form after reviews of previous work. An extensive literature review was also important to enable me to recognise the different discussions within the migration theory and migration policy discourses, and to fully grasp the shortcomings in previous work on the topics. This coverage enabled me to address specific gaps in the literature, and thus to make an informed choice of relevant theory and a relevant case study.

The second method was semi-structured interviews with relevant actors both from Senegal and Europe. This choice of data collection was made in accordance with an aim to get information from a small number of informants with very rich knowledge on the subject. I selected the informants through convenience sampling, in other words that all the persons who agreed to participate and were representative for the population of interest were interviewed (Morgan 2008). As many of the policymakers, politicians, experts and other relevant actors in the filed knew about each other, I also relied on the snowball sampling technique to contact those I perceived as most key to interview. Both convenience sampling and snowball sampling can be criticised as sampling techniques since they make the samples non-representative and possibly affected by selection bias (Patton 2001). I nevertheless applied these techniques since they were convenient in order to establish contact with key actors within the relatively small target population.

All the interviews were semi-structured since this is a valuable method for gaining interpretive data in qualitative research. The use of predetermined, but still open-ended, questions allowed me to be in control of the interview, while also allowing the informants to
bring up additional topics. This allowed the informants to have a central role in determining what topics to emphasise (Mason 2004), and I believe this may have made some of them more comfortable with reflecting upon, and sharing, their opinions with me.

Due to the interviewees’ various backgrounds, I designed individual interview guides for all interviews. Although the angles of approach differed, most of the interviews touched upon the same key topics; the Senegalese government’s interests and approach to migration to Europe, the Senegalese government’s criteria for cooperation with Europe, their intentions with measures intended to regulate migration, and the assumed extent of effects and effectiveness with Senegalese migration policies. Although the various interview guides differed, the original and more general interview guide can be found in Appendix 1.

In total, sixteen interviews were carried out with informants seen as experts on, or key actors in the migration field in Senegal. The duration of the interviews ranged from one to three and a half hours, while the majority lasted for one and a half hour. Six of these were Senegalese government officials, and representatives for the migration activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Planification. Five represented the European side of migration collaboration, namely the European Union, the European Commission, the Spanish Ministry of Interior and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. One interview was carried out with a Senegalese migration expert based at Université Cheikh Anta Diop, and the last four interviewees worked in two relevant migration organisations in Dakar, namely the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Due to geographical distance, one of interviews had to be done by telephone, while the rest were conducted face-to-face in Dakar.

As informed consent and confidentiality are required in interview research (Warren 2004), I always introduced each interview with explaining the purpose of the study, and my position as a master student at the University of Oslo in Norway. I informed the interviewees about their right to remain anonymous, and assured them that I would make sure that their names and identifying details were to remain confidential. All interviewees agreed that I could make use of their positions to explain who they were, as long as I omitted their names. In retrospect I see this as a great advantage. As some of the interviewees’ uttered unexpected opinions it is highly relevant to highlight their position in the government in order to understand the
significance of the statements. A list of the interviewees’ positions and further details of the interviews are provided in Appendix 2.

As a third qualitative method, I used focus groups as a method to supplement the data from the interviews. I carried out two focus group discussions with some of the interviewees that I already had interviewed individually. The first focus group was an unplanned session at the Spanish embassy in Dakar where my three interviewees decided that they wanted to discuss some of the topics together. This discussion proved very valuable since their internal discussions and disagreements resulted in detailed information about the challenges they had met in their work on migration collaboration with Senegal. Due to the usefulness of this group discussion, I planned a focus group session with my three interviewees at UNODC. As the UNODC works on the issue of migrant smuggling from West Africa to Europe, the informants’ discussion on the Senegalese government’s interests and the impact of policies on migratory routes was interesting. Although most of the topics had already been touched upon during the interviews, the focus group discussion had a more political focus and contributed to my understanding of how their different opinions about the Senegalese government affected their beliefs about policy intentions. My experience from focus groups was, in accordance with Kreuger’s description of focus groups, that the use of open ended and demanding questions such as to compare, rate, and explain made the participants very engaged and improved my insights on the topics of discussion (2004). In my analysis I do not cite the focus groups, but rather the different individuals as I do from the interviews.

4.2 Fieldwork design

The fieldwork component of this project served to gain first-hand impression of attitudes to migration among Senegalese government officials and other relevant actors. I also sought knowledge about Senegalese migration policies in order to map the government’s different measures on migration. Since the available quantitative data on migration determinants and migration flows from Senegal to Europe do not hold the required quality to perform a statistical analysis, I also needed to understand how relevant actors in Senegal perceived the Senegalese migration policies’ effects in order to support my descriptive analysis.

Since Senegal was my case study and government officials were part of my target group, there was never any doubt that Dakar, the Senegalese capital, was the best place to carry out
my fieldwork. I spent six weeks in Senegal during February and March 2014, and was able to conduct as many interviews with relevant actors as I had hoped. During the preparatory phase of the fieldwork, I did comprehensive background research on relevant people, ministries and organisations in Dakar with whom it would be interesting to talk. However, for obvious reasons it was nearly impossible to find people’s contact details in advance. I contacted the relevant ministries by email while in Norway in order to plan meetings, but I never received any replies. This was also the case with the IOM Regional office in Dakar. Fortunately, after having emailed and called the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, they welcomed me to contact them once I was in Dakar. Through my acquaintance with Dr. Marie Laurence Flahaux, who has done extensive research in Senegal, I also got the contact details of several people who held important positions in Dakar’s network of people in the migration field. One of the people on her list replied to me, and we planned the time of an interview session in advance.

Although I had planned a preliminary strategy for fieldwork, I was not always able to follow this. I intended to have three interviews per week in order to have the time for transcription and reflection in-between, but I ended up with having two weeks without any interviews, and then some days with up to three interviews in a row. Luckily, this did not affect the quality of the collected data, and since I recorded all but one of the interviews I was able to finish all the transcriptions at a later point during the fieldwork.

During the first week in Dakar I focused on gaining first impressions of the local society, the different neighbourhoods, the places where the different ministries and organisations offices were located and the local realities of migration. As I had been advised to register with the West African Research Centre (WARC) I did this upon arrival, and the centre became my base for research where I could use the library facilities and get support and advice when needed. As an affiliated member of WARC, my application for research clearance with the Senegalese Ministry for Higher Education and Research was rapidly processed and I could therefore embark on the process of interviewing. Although it is arguably vital to test interviews and interview guides in a pilot study in order to adapt them to the interview setting (Mason 2004), I was unfortunately not able to do this. However, I nevertheless modified the interview guides constantly along the period, but as the main topics for the conversations proved to be both useful and purposeful, I did not have to amend my initial research topics or research questions.
4.3 Data collection during fieldwork

While I carried out the interviews I had planned in advance at an early stage of the fieldwork, these did not provide considerably more information about relevant people to contact. However, when I presented the list of people I wanted to speak with, but lacked the contact details of, to the Public Relations Officer at WARC, Mariane Yade, she kindly suggested helping me. Throughout my fieldwork, she contacted her acquaintances and was able to provide me with the contact details of some of the people I was most eager to interview.

Before I started to contact people, I wanted to make sure that my choice of sample would end up being representative, and moreover, that I did not spend hours of taking up people’s time if their knowledge and points of view were not valuable to answer my research questions. I therefore started with the interviews I had planned in advance, and first contacted the people as I saw as relevant when I had a long list of names and contact details.

With time, my list of relevant people and their contact details grew, and I had to reflect more on who to select for interviewing. Although I am glad I carried out my first interviews, I believe my selection of interviewees would have been more appropriate if I had had such an extensive list of possible candidates from the start. My interview subjects therefore become more relevant and interesting as time went, and in the very end I realised that it would indeed be profitable to have more time so to conduct all the interviews I wanted to. It must therefore be acknowledged that the interview data collected does not necessarily reflect all the viewpoints of the Senegalese government. While this will affect the outcomes of my analysis, I would argue that data representability is maintained since I spoke with as many interviewees as I did, representing different institutions in the Senegalese government.

As noted by Gubrium and Holstein (2002), we live in a society in which most people are willing to be interviewed and in which everyone's opinions are seen as useful to explore. This was indeed something I felt challenging, since everyone I met had points of views on migration and migration policies and were interested in being interviewed even though they did not actually have a governmental position in which they could affect policy outcomes. Due to the high interest in the topic of the thesis, I ended up with interviewing a man who did not have any links to the migration policy field. This man had the same name as a First Councillor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, and during our preliminary phone calls he confirmed that he was this person. However, when we met it was
in his office which turned out to be an office of agricultural affairs, and the man, who was a
director there, did not have any relation to the man I had planned to talk to. To be polite, I
nevertheless carried out the interview, although the man turned all my questions about
migration into questions on agricultural concerns. This interview has not been included in the
interview list and I have not cited it, but I nevertheless think it is interesting to mention since
it illustrates the challenge that so many, and different, people were interested in being
interviewed.

4.4 Interviewing in a second language

As highlighted by Borchgrevink, reflections on language, and in particular the difficulties
with inadequate proficiency in the language of the community that is studied, are habitually
overlooked in researchers’ methodological considerations of their fieldwork (2003). Due to
my experiences with interviewing in a second language, as well as working with an
interpreter, it is important to include some considerations on what role language barriers have
played during the interviews. For me, language deficiency has at times served as an obstacle,
but it has also been a positive contribution to carry out fruitful interviews.

In Senegal, about 39 languages are spoken. French is spoken by 15 to 20 % of the Senegalese
citizens, and as the only official language, French is used in the educational system and by
the government. Wolof is the language most Senegalese citizens speak, and 80 % of all
Senegalese speak it as a maternal or foreign language (Huntington 2009). Since my
population of interest had either governmental or other administrational relation, I did not
have to carry out any interviews in Wolof. Since I have a strong command of French, I did
not plan to engage an interpreter for my interviews, and I carried out the first three interviews
alone. However, I had not prepared well enough for the Senegalese French accent, and during
the third interview I had difficulties with understanding the interviewee in detail. Luckily this
man spoke nearly fluent English, and we could communicate in both languages to avoid
misunderstandings.

Due to my experiences from this interview, I decided I wanted to bring an interpreter to all
interviews as an assurance. This decision became valuable, as many of my later interviewees
were less fluent in French than anticipated. Through my affiliation with WARC I managed to
establish a contact with several master and doctoral students at the University with lingual
proficiency in both English and French. I selected three of them as candidates, and interviewed them in order to find out who I would prefer to work with. I wanted to work with one of them, and not more, in order to have time to train and establish a good relationship with the person.

I finally selected a young doctoral student in English literature. She had experience from semi-structured interviews, was fluent in French, English and Wolof, and was interested in the topics I studied. It is ideal that an interpreter has the qualifications of a competent interviewer (Kvale 1996), and I felt that Mame Khary Sene, my interpreter, had these skills. Another thing I considered positive was her formal style of clothing. In Senegal, it is very important to dress formally in meetings with important people and authorities to avoid being disrespectful. Considering that it may be difficult to find a suitable interpreter, I believe I was very lucky to find a person with all the qualifications I was looking for.

In advance of each interview, I met with my interpreter to read through and discuss the interview guide. I wanted her to have detailed knowledge about my research aims, the guiding research questions and the particular insight I wanted to obtain from the different interviewees. During the interviews, I had the main role as an interviewer, but when the interviewee and I had difficulties understanding each other, Khary entered the conversation and clarified what either of us had misunderstood.

During a fieldwork an interpreter can have more functions than only translating what is being said during the interviews (Bragason 1997), and this was I indeed what I experienced. It is a well-established fact that politicians rarely answer the questions they are asked, and rather speak about the questions’ topic in general. This was also the case among government officials in Dakar, and during my interviews it was often difficult to make them discuss what I actually had an interested in. I repeated the particular questions, but when these considered sensitive issues, the interviewees would simply reply in the same superficial manner twice. In these circumstances my interpreter knew what I was interested in, and she interrupted the conversation even though she knew we understood each other perfectly. At this point she told the interviewees that they, apparently due to my ‘poor language’, had not understood the question correctly. When she then repeated it for the third (or fourth) time, and in a more detailed manner, the interviewees did not have the same possibility to reply as generally. In most cases this led the discussion into the topics I wanted to get an insight in, without
creating an uncomfortable interview situation.

I am certain that some of the most sensitive information, and honest opinions, were given to me in circumstances where the interpreter joined into the conversation. As I see it, this was due to two things; firstly Khary’s cultural familiarity, in that she knew just how far we could pressure the interviewees to answer before being disrespectful, and secondly, the mutual understanding the two of us had developed during our conversations about my research aims. This can illustrate what has been highlighted by Kvale, namely that it is not only the interviewer that is the research instrument during interviews, but that the interpreter’s activity makes her an important part of the research instrument as well (1996).

4.5 Researcher positionality

While it is important to consider the positionality of the interpreter since this may affect the interview process, it is even more critical to consider the positionality of the researcher herself. During a fieldwork, it is vital that the researcher is aware of her own position as a researcher as well as her identity and previous knowledge, since this can affect the overall research process (Etherington 2004). The reflections I did on my own positionality helped me attain a critical understanding of the research outcomes during the process of analysing the data. During the interviews I was very aware of the differences between the interviewees and myself, and I believe my reflections on this were important to develop good relationships with both the interviewees and the interpreter.

The aspects of my personal identity and background that mostly affected my interaction with the interviewees were my European background, my sex, and age. As argued by many, it can both be easier and more difficult to do fieldwork in foreign places. Being an outsider can facilitate the questioning of what the interviewees take for granted, while large cultural gaps can have negative effects on the relationship between the researcher and the interviewee (Borchgrevink 2003). For me, I believe my role as a European was disadvantageous, since I often felt that my Senegalese informants sought to answer what they presumed I, as a European representative, wanted to hear. Particularly on questions concerning whether the Senegalese government has a genuine interest in discouraging migration to Europe, which turned out to be a very sensitive topic, many of my informants seemed to change perspectives
during the interview. Possibly because the differences between us were less prominent as time went by.

My position as a young female, only accompanied by another young female, was something I felt as an asset to establish a relaxed atmosphere during the interviews. With two exceptions, all my informants were male, and my clear positionality as a curious young female researcher did not create an uneasy power relationship between us. I did not intend to claim that I was more knowledgeable than them, and I was fully aware that most of my interviewees was in a more influential position than me. I believe the difference in sex between my male interviewees and I made it easier for me to ask critical questions, without making them feel that I challenged their knowledge and position.

In the one case where I interviewed a European woman, I noticed that the relationship between us was more distressed. She was both older and in a more influential position than me, and when I asked her the same critical questions she replied in a more annoyed manner, as if she threw away her time and had to explain obvious facts. During this particular interview I felt I had to establish my role as an informed researcher and not a ‘naïve’ curious student. I therefore professionalised my way of talking by using a more specific terminology as well as more examples I knew well. This change of attitude seemed to improve the uneasy relation between us, and established a more equal power relationship between the two of us.

### 4.6 Quantitative data and analysis

Although this thesis is not informed by inferential statistics, quantitative data forms the basis of the discussion on the changes in migration flows from Senegal to Europe and it is therefore a methodological aspect that is important to mention. The quantitative data that has been used has been collected from a number of databases: The OECD International Migration Database (2014), DEMIG C2C Database (2013), and the UN Population Division Database (2013). The DEMIG C2C database is one of the datasets compiled for the DEMIG project at the International Migration Institute. While all datasets will be made freely and publically available towards the end of 2014, relevant data has been very kindly shared with me in advance.
All these data sources are secondary, and they were initially collected for other purposes. The usage of secondary data must be carefully considered, as different databases often use various strategies for data collection and therefore have different assumptions tied to their categorical definitions (McGinn 2008). When using this data to answer my third research question, the aim is to provide a general overview of changes in flows over time. However, the major limitations of all the datasets are that both OECD and DEMIG data on Spain, Italy and France differ in their categorical definition of migrants. While all data on immigration to Spain covers registered irregular and regular migrants, data on immigration to France and Italy only covers registered regular migrants. This is a major drawback for the analysis, seeing that I have a main focus on irregular flows in the rest of the analysis, but only have knowledge on irregular migrants arriving in Spain. I nevertheless believe the data can provide an interesting overview of migration flows in general, which can contribute to the findings of my analysis. It would undoubtedly be interesting to have data on irregular migration flows to all countries, but to my knowledge there are no existing databases of irregular migration flows from Senegal to France and Italy. This difference in the datasets makes it difficult to compare the different flows, and I therefore have to be careful about what conclusion I can draw concerning differences in flows to the three countries.

The main aim of the quantitative analysis is to address whether existing agreements on migration regulation have an effect on patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe. Since illustrations can provide good indications of relevant changes, I will use graphs and maps to illustrate changes in flows over time. In the analysis I will reflect on how and if these changes may be related to the measures the Senegalese government has introduced concerning migration during the same period of time. I will further on compare the shifts in migration trends represented by the quantitative data, with the information collected in Dakar concerning my interviewees’ perceptions of policy effects on flows.

4.7 The analytical process
Before embarking on the thesis’ analysis, it is important to consider the process of data analysis and the production of knowledge. In order to analyse the qualitative data I had collected during the fieldwork, I read and reread all interview transcriptions to identify conceptual patterns, as this is a typical way of analysing semi-structured interviews (Warren 2004). However, due to the broad array of questions and topics, as well as the way in which
the interview conversations swiftly shifted topics, it proved difficult to grasp any conceptual patterns. I therefore rather gathered all the relevant information for the three different research questions in three different documents. While marking who had said what and in which context, I compared what they had said concerning the most relevant topics. A common critique of this method is that data collected from semi-structured interviews are not comparable in this manner. This is due to the lack of standardised questions, and it is believed that a comparison of answers therefore creates unreliable findings. However, this type of comparison can still be done when the logic of comparison is based on an extensive understanding of each interview, rather than a standardisation of the data across all interviews (Mason 2004). It was therefore important to keep in mind the interviewees’ position and the backdrop of their expressions during the analytical process.

Another sensitive aspect of analysing qualitative data is the fact that it is the researcher, and her power to study and write about others, that mediates the knowledge production. While the purpose of semi-structured interviewing in social science is to understand the interviewees’ interpretations of distinct topics (Kvale 1996), it is the researcher who decides how to understand the interviewees’ interpretations. As such, the research process is determined by the collaboration between the researcher and the interviewee (Thapar-Björkert and Henry 2004), as well as the researcher’s skill to understand what the interviewee seeks to express. The process of analysing qualitative semi-structured interviews should therefore reflect an ontological position concerned with people’s knowledge, interpretations and interactions (Mason 2004). Kvale has described this form of data collection as an interacting logic to generate data, and that the interview setting is a “construction site of knowledge” (Kvale 1996:2). These considerations have functioned as guidelines for my analytical process, and I have therefore been careful when interpreting the expressions of the interviewees straightforward without reflecting on what role I played in the production of those statements. As underscored by Mason, I agree that the data should be analysed as deriving from the interaction between the researcher and the interviewee, and not simply as the “answers” given by the interviewees (2004).
5 The Senegalese government’s approach to migration to Europe

With the theoretical framework of determinants of migration aspirations and capabilities, and the specific context of migration aspirations and capabilities in Senegal in mind, I seek to embark on the empirical and analytical part of the thesis. As part of the introduction, I presented three research questions that guide this thesis: 1) What is the Senegalese government’s approach to migration from Senegal to Europe?, 2) When and why does the Senegalese government choose to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration?, and 3) How can existing agreements on migration affect patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe? By assessing these questions I seek to understand how both domestic and international aspects affect Senegalese migration policies, and how the policies in turn can affect migration. In what follows, I analyse these three questions in three different chapters before I present an analytical summary as a final point. The analytical summary reflects upon how my findings can inform the main query of the thesis regarding what role the Senegalese government has in shaping patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe.

This chapter seeks to answer the question of what approach the Senegalese government has to migration from Senegal to Europe. During the preparatory phase of the fieldwork in Senegal, I learnt that it would be more challenging than I had anticipated understanding the viewpoint on migration within the Senegalese government. The reason for this was that, as I will elaborate upon later, there is no existing overview of who does what regarding migration within the Senegalese governmental system. While some academic work has presented parts of the governmental organisation of migration (Reslow 2010, IOM 2009), the work has not been all encompassing. In order understand the approaches to migration policy, and migration aspirations and capabilities, within the government it is vital to understand how the management of migration issues are organised. Therefore, since there to my knowledge does not exist any overview of how migration is dealt with in the Senegalese government, I have included a mapping of this system as part of my analysis.

After an introduction to how the term migration policy is understood in the Senegalese setting, I will present an overview of the administrative organisation of migration policy within the government. As a part of this I will list all the relevant ministries and assess what roles they have and how they cooperate on issues of migration. Building on this work I will
analyse Senegalese political concerns on migration aspirations and capabilities, its interests with migration to Europe, and elaborate on the most pressing concerns of the government regarding its migration policy approach.

5.1 Understandings of migration policy in Senegal

During the initial interviews I had with Senegalese government officials, I soon understood that the interviewees and I had different understandings of the term migration policy. When I asked them to tell me about the government’s approach to migration and migration policies, I received a number of different answers, and few of them concerned migration policies in the way I understood the term. I was interested in information about the policy measures Senegal had introduced that concerned migration, but the interviewees’ responses either concerned the development of one migration policy or the issue of border control only. I thus changed my question formulation, and rather asked about specific political measures, rules, regulations, and agreements on migration. By doing this I received replies stating the different approaches and policies Senegal had concerning migration, which was what I was initially interested in.

I later realised that this understanding of ‘migration policy’ was tied to a recent project within the Senegalese government of creating ‘a migration policy’. With the creation of such a migration policy they sought to establish an overarching framework for all the state’s migration regulations and the aims and procedures of those. The idea of creating such a migration policy document, as many labelled it, was influenced by recommendations from the IOM, who has played an influential role in the organisation of migration regulations in Senegal for some time. Both at the IOM and the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, I was told that there was no official overarching framework for migration policies and no single approach to deal with migration within the Senegalese government, and that this absence was part of the reason for the difficulty of cooperating with Senegal on migration management.

Because of this “lack of an integrated strategy on migration”, the IOM initiated a project to support the Senegalese government with creating a ‘migration policy’ (Interviewee 8). Most of the people I spoke with referred to this as something being “on the way”, although they differed in their opinions of which ministry was in charge of the project. This issue of who was in charge of what, turned out to be a predominant issue during discussions with
representatives from the different ministries, since most of them argued that their department was in charge of the most important migration issues. However, according to the IOM, a migration expert, and the ministry itself, it was the Ministry of Planification who had the lead role in this project (Interviewees 5, 15 and 16). As my interviewee there explained it himself: “We are the focal point [of developing a migration policy], and we coordinate it with the other ministries. But this coordination is limited. It is not sufficient, we need a bigger instance where we can coordinate and document all the migration activities that are implemented in Senegal” (Interviewee 15).

The way different people, both in the ministries and in organisations, explained the creation of an encompassing migration policy illustrate the complexity in the Senegalese administration of migration issues. Due to this complexity and the current lack of an encompassing migration policy, it was challenging to get a comprehensive picture of the Senegalese government’s approach to migration. However, as pointed out by my interviewee at the European Union’s Delegation in Dakar, this would not necessarily be improved by the creation of an encompassing migration policy. In her opinion, the issue of migration in Senegal was too complex, and it would be difficult to create a functioning and encompassing strategy for migration. While she highlighted that improved coordination of these issues were needed, she did not see any added value of creating one main migration policy (Interviewee 16). While there clearly were disagreements concerning the way forward for Senegalese migration policies, all the people I spoke to agreed about one thing; that there was a lack of organisation on migration issues among the ministries. The technical councillor at the Ministry of Interior was particularly upset with this, and explained it to me saying “you know, sometimes we do the same thing without being aware of it, and the actions become pointless!” (Interviewee 14).

Due to the lack of a coherent strategy, there are numerous actors that are involved in the creation and implementation of migration policies in Senegal. In 2009, the IOM wrote a report on the organisation of migration issues in Senegal, but the report’s explanation of what the different actors do and what their aims are is unfortunately quite superficial. Although it does not provide detailed information about the different aims and measures implemented by the different ministries, it remains the most encompassing explanation of who does what on migration in Senegal. In order to understand the Senegalese government’s approaches to migration from Senegal to Europe, I have found that it is vital to have a profound
understanding of what the different ministries actually do. In what follows I will therefore elaborate on the activities carried out by the relevant ministries. This assessment will be based on information gained during interviews, as well as the information provided in the 2009 IOM report. While non-governmental actors also play a role in effectuating Senegalese migration policy, I will only include an analysis of the Senegalese ministries’ activities, as it is the Senegalese government’s approach to migration that is of importance to this thesis.

5.2 Administrative organisation of migration policy

At the time of writing there are 31 ministries in the Senegalese government of which nine deal directly with issues concerning migration. These nine ministries are the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, the Ministry of Armed Forces, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Women, Family and Children, the Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values, the Ministry of Planning and Local Government, the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, Social Dialogue and Professional Organisations, and the Ministry of Justice.

In order to understand how the Senegalese government approaches issues of migration and migration regulation, I will assess the different ministries activities related to migrants, migration aspirations and migration capabilities, and discuss the various aims of these activities. Of the nine ministries mentioned above, three are particularly involved with migration in the sense that dealing with issues of migration is one of their main responsibilities. In what follows I will firstly assess the activities of these three ministries, and thereafter describe how the other ministries’ activities supplement these three.

5.2.1 Ministry of Interior

The Ministry of Interior is concerned with several issues linked to migration. It has originally been in charge of immigration policy, but its engagement with emigration policy has increased along with the increase in emigration during the last decades. Through its directorates, that is the Directorate of Public Security, the Directorate of Budget and Materials, the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance, the Directorate of the Judicial Police, the Police Directorate of Foreigners, and the Police Directorate of Air and Frontiers, it is concerned with creating a strategy on migration management. In line with this project, the Ministry is in charge of signing bilateral agreements on legal migration with European
countries, such as France and Spain. In the implementation of legal migration policies, the Ministry deals with the early migratory process, that is visa applications and the issuing of travel documents to prospective migrants.

The Ministry has also negotiated the issue of irregular migration with European stakeholders. Since the Ministry deals with most activities concerning migration management, this also includes restrictions that affect migrants’ capabilities. The Police Directorates and the Directorate of Territorial Surveillance work on border control activities including terrestrial surveillance and border control agreements with external partners, such as the Frontex-led activities in the coastal areas. A recent development within the Ministry is the focus on providing information on migration to the public. With a major awareness of the high migration aspirations in the country, the Ministry has opened up labour offices in the regions in order to provide information about the risks of irregular migration as well as the possibilities of legal migration to Europe. This project is a part of a post-2007 awareness campaign, and is carried out together with the Ministry of Youth and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad. It is not entirely clear which stakeholders do what in this collaboration (Interviewees 6, 7, 9 and 14, and IOM 2009).

5.2.2 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad works on issues of migration through two different branches within the ministry. Issues of migration come up as part of the ministry’s original role in working with diplomacy and international relations. However, the former Ministry of the Senegalese Abroad was incorporated into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2001 (Interviewee 7) and the ministry is therefore also concerned with the diaspora, through the General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad. In order to provide a comprehensible explanation of the ministry’s working, I will first explain how its role in diplomacy deals with migration, and thereafter how the General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad is engaged with the diaspora.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of the management of all state affairs, including agreements and partnerships, with other countries. It has negotiated agreements with countries of destination concerning Senegalese labour migration, and it is also concerned with the issue of readmission. While the Ministry of Interior also does this, it is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has the main responsibility of signing bilateral agreements. When the
Ministry of Interior is in charge of bilateral negotiations, it supposedly has to include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the discussion. As highlighted by many of my interviewees this rarely happens, and it has created a tension in the relationship between the ministries regarding migration issues (Interviewees 7, 10 and 14).

The General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad has one major objective, and that is to create a functioning system for the management of migration, which again echoes the objectives of the Ministry of Interior. As a part of this, it aims to support and communicate with all Senegalese residing abroad (Interviewee 9). There are two Directorates within the General Directorate that deals with this: The Directorate of Health Promotion and Social Welfare of Senegalese Abroad, and the Directorate for the Protection of the Rights of Senegalese Abroad. These directorates work on the promotion of assistance and protection for the Senegalese abroad (Interviewee 9 and IOM 2009). Another aim of the General Directorate is to include the diaspora in efforts of development in Senegal. The Directorate of Support and Investment Projects deals with the director’s goal of “maximising the positive effects of migration on economic and social development”, and organises possibilities for investment and other projects for and by the diaspora. As a part of this, the directorate leads what is called the General Directorate’s Support Fund for the Investment by the Senegalese Abroad (FAISE 2014).

Over the last two years, the General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad has also been increasingly engaged in issues concerning irregular migration (Interviewee 9). Within the Directorate there is a sub-department in charge of the reception, re-orientation and follow-up initiatives for returning migrants. According to my informant in this directorate, this sub-department is also engaged in the awareness campaigns, and provides information to prospective migrants in order to make them aware of the risks of travelling irregularly. The extent of the work on the awareness campaign was difficult to map, since none of the ministries involved in this could confirm the contributions by the other ministries, but the overall main was to decrease aspirations to migrate irregularly (Interviewees 7, 9 and 14).

A major development project within this directorate is the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) project. The TOKTEN project aims to “reduce the impact of brain drain by utilising the services of highly qualified national expatriates”, and it is a cooperation between the Directorate and the United Nations Development Programme in
Senegal. Another ministerial development project is a partnership agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture on the Agency of Reintegration for Agricultural Development (ARIDA). This project was initially financed by Spain under the project title “The Return to Agriculture Plan” (REVA), but was re-launched as ARIDA in 2012. While REVA focused on reducing migration aspirations by creating employment opportunities in the agricultural sector, ARIDA is currently concerned with the provision of agricultural land to the diaspora and returning migrants. The project has not yet been implemented, but it is supposed to be realised during 2014 (Interviewee 13). In addition to the abovementioned projects, the Directorate of Senegalese Abroad is partaking in several other initiatives that link the diaspora to Senegalese development projects. Interest groups and organisations are in charge of numerous projects, and some are also part of agreements with the EU or individual European states (IOM 2009).

5.2.3 The Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values
The Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values is mainly involved in migration issues through its involvement in labour migration and the creation of employment opportunities for young people. It is a strong belief among policymakers in Senegal that the creation of jobs would lower migration aspirations, and the Ministry of Youth works to promote the employment of young people (Interviewees 7, 8, 10 and 15). Together with the two ministries that have agreed bilateral agreements on labour migration, it manages the selection of who will be employed and given the opportunity to migrate, and takes care of the management of departures. As a part of this work, it plays an active role in establishing cooperation with European companies, and despite several ministries’ claim of doing the same, they do not work closely together with the Ministry of Youth on this (Interviewee 7).

The Ministry of Youth is also involved in the intra-ministerial work on awareness campaigns. As part of this project, it has established labour offices in the different regions to spread information about the possibilities of travelling abroad through legal routes. Concerning people who have already migrated, the ministry works to promote social security for the migrants and their family members, and to provide financial assistance to projects concerning the employment or education of returnees (Interviewees 7 and 15). It thus plays a major role in all types of employment, spreads information, and works to create labour opportunities both within Senegal and abroad. However, the principal task of the Ministry is to develop
local initiatives to decrease aspirations to migrate irregularly, and make more young people stay in Senegal.

5.2.4 Other ministries
While the three ministries elaborated upon above have issues of migration as a major policy area, several other ministries are either involved in their work, or they work independently on smaller projects that involve migrants or migration matters. The Ministry of Armed Forces works closely together with the Directorate of the Police within the Ministry of Interior, to carry out border control activities such as the surveillance of the coastline. They also work with border control at the terrestrial borders together with other directorates within the Ministry of Interior (Interviewee 6).

Due to its relation to the Senegalese governments’ expenditures, the Ministry of Economy and Finance is involved in several projects concerning migration, although its minor role only concerns the economic aspects of the projects. However, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese abroad, it plays an important role in promoting diaspora funds, assisting migrants in transferring funds and creating opportunities for migrants to contribute to development in Senegal. This was exemplified by the position of one of my interviewees, who himself was affiliated with both the directorate of Senegalese Abroad and the Ministry of Economy and Finance while working at one project (Interviewee 13).

The Ministry of Family, Women's Entrepreneurship and Microfinance is involved in the issue of migration through its activities on child trafficking. It has set up a National Committee on Childhood, which consists of all the stakeholders who are involved in the fight against child trafficking. Although this work is mostly concerned about child trafficking within Africa, it also works for the return of trafficked children from Europe (Interviewees 7 and 12). A ministry working on similar matters is the Ministry of Justice. Through its Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons, it is involved in the fight against irregular migration and one of its objectives is to formulate a national strategy to fight against crime, including the smuggling of migrants, together with the support of the United Nations Office against Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Interviewees 10, 11 and 12).
Together with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Service, Labour, Social Dialogue and Professional Organisations is involved in the process of exploring and promoting foreign employment opportunities. Its main role is to manage and secure transparency in the offering of jobs in European countries. The Ministry is also involved in the work of securing the rights of the Senegalese abroad, and it is therefore involved in the other ministries’ work to increase migrants’ capabilities to migrate legally (Interviewee 14). As swiftly mentioned, it is the Ministry of Planning and Local Government, and particularly the Directory of the Population, which lead the work of developing a national migration policy. Through this, it is supposed to coordinate all the ministries’ activities, as well as supporting the ministries to implement their policies. Due to the challenges of discussing and agreeing upon a national policy, this work has not come very far (Interviewee 15).

As becomes clear during an assessment of how issues of migration are managed within the Senegalese government, and which was very often highlighted during the interviews, there is clearly a lack of agreement on which ministry and directorate does what. Although there is an original structure of ministries’ areas of responsibilities, individuals within these ministries do not adhere to the framework (Interviewees 7 and 15). One major consequence of this is that they elaborate upon or engage in projects that are dealt with by other ministries. While some of my interviewees spoke about this without explaining why this was the case, others argued that this was due to a lack of political consistency. People working in the ministries were changing posts on a regular basis, and people did not have knowledge on what they worked on, and they did not know the responsibility areas, or the restrictions, of their new positions (Interviewees 8, 12 and 14).

Based on the empirical findings, I summarise what the different ministries’ saw as their responsibilities in the organisation of migration policies in Table 1. By viewing the table, one can easily notice how many ministries that regard the same areas as their responsibility. This reflects the general finding of a deficient coordination on migration approaches and policies within the Senegalese government.
Table 1: Senegalese ministries with responsibility of key migration policy issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Sphere of responsibilities</th>
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</table>
| Ministry of Interior                                    | • Immigration policy  
• Bilateral agreements on legal emigration  
• Territorial surveillance and border control  
• Bilateral agreements on migration control  
• Migration awareness and information campaigns        |
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad       | • Bilateral and international agreements on migration  
• Bilateral agreements on readmission  
• Migration awareness and information campaigns  
• Diaspora health and welfare policies  
• Diaspora protection and rights policies  
• Diaspora investments in Senegal  
• Reintegration of returning migrants                   |
| Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values | • Migration awareness and information campaigns  
• Manage the employment of Senegalese through bilateral labour migration agreements  
• Promote social security for migrants and their families  
• Provide financial assistance to projects concerning the employment or education of returnees  
• Develop local initiatives to make more young people stay in Senegal |
| Ministry of Armed Forces                                | • Border control activities  
• Surveillance of the coastline                                                                          |
| Ministry of Economy and Finance                         | • Financial responsibility of migration policy projects, e.g. border control improvements  
• Creation of diaspora funds  
• Diaspora funds transfers  
• Diaspora for development projects                                                                      |
| Ministry of Women, Family and Children                  | • Fight against child trafficking                                                        |
| Ministry of Public Service, Labour, Social Dialogue and Professional Organizations | • Secure transparency in the process of managing the employment of Senegalese through bilateral labour migration agreements  
• Secure the rights of the Senegalese labourers abroad |
| Ministry of Planning and Local Government               | • Lead the development of a national migration policy  
• Coordinate all the ministries' activities in the migration field |
| Ministry of Justice                                     | • Fight against irregular migration  
• Prevent migrant smuggling                                                                          |

Despite this deficiency, some ministries have successfully cooperated on some projects. These projects were therefore often brought up in interviews, and particularly amongst those who stated that the governmental administration of migration was well functioning.
(Interviewees 6 and 7). The cooperation on border control between Senegal and Spain, in which the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Armed Forces took part, was highlighted as a successful project of collaboration. The migration awareness and information campaign, in which the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad took part, was also seen as a successful collaboration. In the explanations of the campaign work, however, it seemed like the different ministries worked on an individual basis, and it is therefore unlikely that it was the cooperation per se that caused the alleged success of the project.

Due to the complexity within the administration of migration, as illustrated in Table 1, one can indeed understand why there is a strong will among different actors to create one main, national migration policy. However, as explained by the leader of this process, it proved difficult to coordinate it, since none of the ministries had any power to decide what the others should do. Moreover, it seemed like all the three ministries who are mostly involved in migration policy were reluctant to cooperate on this, since voices within all the ministries uttered that they were the natural focal point for this process, and not the Ministry of Planning and Local Government (Interviewees 7, 9, 14 and 15). This was a major conflict of interest in the government, and I believe it is a clear indicator on the general lack of knowledge on the responsibilities of other ministries and the lack of good communication between ministries.

5.3 Senegalese concerns and interests with migration to Europe

Despite the complexity and disagreement concerning the management of migration in the government, I experienced that many of the government officials were well aware of why they pursued the policies they did, and what they wanted to accomplish with them. However, as with the interviewees’ thoughts about the distribution of responsibilities, their thoughts about what they wanted to achieve with their policies also lacked consistency. While some of the interests the interviewees discussed are reflected in the different migration policies and activities the ministries have carried out, others were presented as future policy aspirations.

It was clear from the interviews that both a number of individuals as well as different ministries had different understandings of the level of migration aspirations in the country,
and the government’s measures to affect migration capabilities. When the interview touched upon current cooperation with Europe, the control of irregular migration was highlighted as very important, but concerning the topic of the importance of remittances, all interviewees stressed the importance of continued migration while focusing less on the legal aspect of it. This complicates the study of the Senegalese government’s approach to migration, because there are few single approaches. The interviewees had different understandings of the government’s main approach to migration, although several of them confirmed what others had said concerning the interests of specific ministries. This exemplifies what was touched upon in the theoretical chapter, namely that migration policy-making are affected by numerous actors and their numerous viewpoints and interests (Czaika and de Haas 2013). However, what makes this case different from what was explained as the norm in “democratic states” is that the actors do not seem to reach a discursive coalition where all actors’ interests are included in policy approaches (Pian 2010). It is rather the opposite, where competing interests do not lead to consensus, and overlapping policies are created by different ministries.

Despite the interviewees’ different narratives of the government’s approach to migration, some interests were more clearly expressed than others. There were particularly four interests in relation to migration and migration policy that were predominant: An interest in continued migration to Europe and increase in legal migration to Europe, interest in diaspora remittances and investments, interest in establishing good international relationships through migration cooperation, and interest in European development initiatives and economic investment. In the following sections I will discuss these different interests. The table below (Table 2) I present an overview of these interests, and of which ministries that pursued them. The table includes the three ministries that are most involved with migration issues as well as the Ministry of Finance, which organises diaspora transfers and investment.
Table 2: Key Senegalese ministries’ expressed interests concerning migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Expressed interests</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>● Maintain emigration to Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Establish new possibilities for legal migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Maintain irregular migration</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Decrease irregular migration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Build strong diplomatic ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Use migration as a mean for development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad</td>
<td>● Maintain emigration to Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Establish new possibilities for legal migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Decrease irregular migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Increase diaspora remittance flow</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Build strong diplomatic ties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values</td>
<td>● Maintain emigration to Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Establish new possibilities for legal migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
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<td>● Establish new possibilities for legal migration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Increase diaspora remittance flow</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Increase diaspora investment flow</td>
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</table>

5.3.1 Interests in continued migration to Europe

It clearly emerged from all the interviewees in Dakar, that there was stark interest in the continuation of migration to Europe, and therefore maintenance of migration aspirations. As most of the interviewees were eager to explain, the aim was that people’s capabilities to migrate legally should be enhanced, while aspirations to migrate irregularly was deemed unfavourable by the government (Interviewees 7, 9, 14 and 15). Two of my interviewees, however, explained to me that aspirations concerning both legal and irregular migration were interesting. They described that the legal aspect was not so important for the Senegalese government, but that it was important for their European partners (Interviewees 6 and 13). According to them, the importance of the European objective, in addition to the humanitarian risks with irregular migration, seemed to be the main reasons why the government discouraged irregular migration.

During the interview with the commissioner of the Police Directorate, we discussed the topic of cooperation with Europe and the “problem of irregular migration” thoroughly. At one point he leant over his desk and whispered, “we can handle the brain-drain here, since irregular migrants will send resources. If I am honest, we want to keep on the irregular migration, but this is not something we can say out loud” (Interviewee 6). He rejected to explain more in depth about this, but highlighted that his European counterparts would agree to this in secrecy as well, since Europe in general needed both regular and irregular migrant
workers. The financial crisis in Europe was interestingly not mentioned as a possible intervening factor for the alleged need of labour.

Although I cannot interpret only two interviewees’ points of view on irregular migration as reflecting the Senegalese government’s approach to irregular migration, it can be seen as a sign that migration to Europe, in general, is important. Moreover, while legal channels for migration remain the strongest desire, I cannot ignore that some deem irregular migration as profitable as well, especially seeing that this was expressed by the commissioner of the police, who has a leading role in the implementation of border control. While it is difficult to know, I would believe that the successfulness of policy implementation may be affected by the different stakeholders’ opinions regarding the policy. This assessment of the situation was also reflected in the focus group discussion with UNODC’s Smuggling of Migrants Group, during which one of the coordinators stated, “regarding the mechanisms of border controls, I’m not really sure that there is an interest in implementing it […], but for the remittances it’s different, when it comes to money (laughing), then there is an interest” (Interviewee 12).

The interest in the maintaining migration aspiration and increasing legal migration capabilities in the Senegalese government should be seen in relation to two major factors. Firstly, knowing that diaspora engagement and financial transfers are of great importance to the developmental processes in large parts of the African continent, it is not a surprise that the government is interested in migration. The interviewees’ approach that continued migration was important should be seen as a result of the stark interest in diaspora contributions, which are provided by both regular and irregular migrants. Detailed information about these contributions will be provided in the section below. The other major reason the government is interested in the continuation of migration is because the people are interested in migration. As was highlighted by many, and which has also been confirmed in the literature review, aspirations to migrate from Senegal to Europe are high (Interviewees 7, 14 and 15). If the government had not aimed at improving opportunities of migration to Europe, it would have been political damaging for the President (Interviewees 7 and 13). With this in mind, it may be because of the different audiences the government has to please, that the officials conveyed several different understandings of migration during the interviews. While it is important to satisfy its voting population, it is also important to satisfy its European partners, and to do this, the government has to walk a fine line between contrasting opinions on and approaches to migration.
5.3.2 Interest in diaspora contributions

Although remittances have been an important source of income for household economies for decades, it was first in the 2000s that involvement with the diaspora to promote remittances became a priority for the government. The diaspora oriented measures currently carried out by the Senegalese Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad, include activities in four broad areas. These are remittances, investments, diaspora engagement for local development, and transfer of knowledge. Of these, it was the proliferation of remittances and investments that were pointed out as the main priorities for the two ministries involved (Interviewees 7, 9, 11 and 13).

Remittances are certainly an essential part of the Senegalese economy. According to data from the World Bank, Senegal received a total of €1301 million in remittances in 2013, making up 10% of its GDP (World Bank 2014). The large bulk of financial transfers from the diaspora are private remittances to improve household economies, but an increasing amount also goes to the building sector. This is particularly due to migrants who aim to secure better housing for themselves and their families upon return (Interviewee 9 and IOM 2009).

The three most important remittance sending countries are the same as the main destination countries, namely France, Italy and Spain. In 2013, remittances sent amounted to €233 million from France, €199 million from Italy, and €124 million from Spain. The fourth country on this list was the USA, with €49 million. Despite the large number of Senegalese migrants living in other African countries, Senegal receives more than half of its remittance flow from European countries (World Bank 2014). It must be remembered that all these estimates are based on data on private transfers through formal channels. It is difficult to say how much remittances are sent via informal channels to Senegal, but the total amount may indeed be higher than the official numbers. Regardless of what channel the money are sent through, remittances are important for the Senegalese economy. The continuation of this flow is therefore a central aim within the government, and in particular for the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Interviewee 9).

While private transfers are indeed important, the government is constantly engaged in finding new ways to make the diaspora engage in development in Senegal (Interviewees 7, 9 and 13). Examples of such measures are the encouragement of diaspora investment in the banking
sector, diaspora engagement in local development, and the proliferation of mechanisms for knowledge transfers from experts in the diaspora to Senegalese residents. The government is currently focusing on encouraging the diaspora to invest in Senegal by building up businesses. An example that was mentioned several times was the General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad’s investment fund FAISE, which was set up to promote the development of human resources and the capital accumulation in the diaspora. The aim with FAISE is to encourage productive investments through, for example, the creation of enterprises in the migrants’ areas of origin. Investments in the productive agricultural sector are another example of such investments, where the aim is to increase and diversify farm incomes (Interviewee 13 and IOM 2009).

The government’s major involvement with the diaspora exemplifies what was told during most of the interviews, that involvement with the diaspora is political priority. In reply to a question of whether he deemed the diaspora as important for development processes in Senegal, the project manager of a Co-development diaspora initiative with Italy replied: “The diaspora is more than important for the development! The government can’t ignore its contribution. We are talking about large amounts of money transfer here, about 700-800 billion each year” (800 billion CFA is equivalent to €1.21 billion) (Interviewee 13). Although he may have overestimated the diaspora contributions, his opinion on the topic was not unusual. All interviewees from the different ministries confirmed that the diaspora contributed immensely to the economy, and some pointed out that the continuation of migration was very important because of this. While some had been more reluctant in their support of migration in the initial part of the interviews, they were more supportive of migration when discussing diaspora contributions. This exemplifies how the different narratives of migration influenced different opinions about it throughout the interviews. However, concerning diaspora involvement, the policy framework was fully developed despite the different interests and viewpoints. This is likely to be the case because it was only one ministry in charge of the economic side of diaspora involvement, namely the Ministry of Economy and Finance. While the policy framework regarding other migration issues was hampered because of the involvement of several ministries, this was not the case with regard to remittances and diaspora investments. This also indicates that the interest in economic growth is an important aspect of the government’s approach to migration.
5.3.3 Interest in foreign development assistance and economic growth

One of the instances when the government officials expressed their fear concerning high migration aspirations was when the migrants’ age was mentioned. Some interviewees highlighted that the country’s loss of young people could become a large problem, since young people constitutes the main part of the Senegalese workforce (Interviewees 13 and 15). Others did not share this opinion, and rather thought that migration would be more profitable since it would give the young an opportunity to earn an income and support their families (Interviewees 6, 7, 9 and 14). As expressed by the councillor in the Ministry of Interior “migration goes back a long time, no country can stop young people from going abroad, they will always go, [but] we want to promote legal migration and decline clandestine migration” (Interviewee 14).

This issue of whether it was best that young people migrated, or if it was better for the economy to discourage migration seemed to depend on how the interviewees perceived the future of Senegal. When asked, one of my interviewees explained why it was the case that he himself had changed in his opinions on migration depending on the topic that we had been discussing. When considering Senegal as it was now, as a less developed country with few domestic opportunities for the young, he would highlight continued migration as a solution in order to profit the economy. When speaking about his idea of the idealised Senegal, however, he underlined the necessity to have an adequate workforce to take part in the agricultural sector (Interviewee 6). As such, while migration aspirations are deemed positive by the current government, this approach may change in years to come. If the socioeconomic situation improves in future years, both migration aspirations and capabilities may increase until post transition. The idea that increased economic growth would increase capabilities to migrate was not reflected upon by my interviewees. Some, however, believed that increased economic growth would decrease migration aspirations (Interviewees 10, 11, 15), while others acknowledged that it would not necessarily affect aspirations at all (Interviewees 6 and 13).

5.3.4 Interest in good international relationships

As swiftly mentioned, a part of the Senegalese government’s approach to migration should be seen in relation to European stakeholders approach to migration. Over the years, Senegal has negotiated with several different European actors on issues of migration, and it is appropriate to discuss the possibility that the European aim of decreasing irregular migration has
influenced Senegalese considerations of migration. As the interviewee at the IOM expressed it, it was Europe who had introduced the idea that migration was negative (Interviewee 8). As explained by another interviewee, Senegal only accepted to cooperate on policies to decrease migration “due to the huge need for money, and, as you know, European countries often propose money in exchange for migration control” (Interviewee 9).

While it was clear from the interviews that the economic incentives are important for agreeing to cooperate on migration with Europe, another reason was linked to the general importance of good diplomatic relations. Many of the interviewees highlighted that Senegal already had well established relationships with their European partners, but when it came to migration, “Senegal don’t want to be represented as the country that doesn’t do anything” (Interviewee 15). It was, however, understood as a paradox that while European states highlighted their intentions to promote legal migration and decrease irregular migration, very few states introduced channels through which Senegalese could travel legally. If no legal avenues for migration were created, it would be difficult to decrease aspirations to migrate irregularly (Interviewees 10 and 15).

The link between development and migration was also discussed in relation to bilateral cooperation, in addition to the linkage between development and diaspora contributions. Concerning bilateral cooperation on migration, the main political goal seemed to be economic growth and development, while the migration aspect of it was of less importance. My interviewee at the IOM confirmed this prioritisation when she spoke about the government. She highlighted that in discussions about the diaspora and development, the government officials spoke positively about migration, while in discussions on international cooperation they negotiated how to stem the “migration pressure” (Interviewee 8). The other Senegalese interviewees that did not represent the government correspondingly highlighted that migration was far down on the government’s priority list (Interviewees 10, 11 and 12). Although Senegalese officials discussed migration management with the IOM, the Spanish Embassy and the UNODC, the interviewees from these institutions had the perception that what happened with migration was not so important for the government, as long as the suggested measures contributed to development.

According to previous analyses of African states’ migration cooperation with European stakeholders, the possibility for increased economic growth and development stands out as an
important incentive for cooperation (Reslow 2009, Paoletti 2011). This should therefore be seen as one of the reasons why development initiatives or other economic incentives often are included in international agreements on migration, such as in border control agreements or readmission agreements (Paoletti 2011, Janmyr 2014). The establishment of good international relationships is as such important for Senegal to secure development support and investments. Senegal expressed an interest in managing migration in cooperation with Europe in order to establish good bilateral relations and secure future financial support. As one of my interviewees expressed it, “there is a big gap between what is being said at the international level and what is the reality […] Sometimes [in Senegal] they don’t know, and sometimes they don’t care. One thing is to have a framework, another thing is to implement it. On migration policies, because of the donations, they want to give a good face to Europe. They do not really have an interest in enforcing it” (Interviewee 11).

5.4 Conclusions: The Senegalese government’s approach to migration to Europe

As established in the literature review there is a high level of migration aspirations in Senegal, and a large part of the population would have migrated to another country if given the opportunity (Fall et al. 2012). With this backdrop in mind, it is interesting to understand what approaches there are to migration within the Senegalese government. How does the Senegalese government reflect on migration aspirations and capabilities? What approaches does it have to migration to Europe? And how does this affect the role of the government in shaping migration patterns?

As reflected above, the wish to decrease migration capabilities is undoubtedly strong among European policymakers. The interview material demonstrates that Senegalese officials were aware of this strong wish, but also aware of the realities of the context in Senegal. Both of these stances, the international and the domestic, must be seen as influential for the approaches the Senegalese government has to migration. As found in this analysis, there were certain approaches to migration that were more clearly conveyed than others. The five most prominent interests that guided the government’s approaches to migration were continued aspirations to migrate to Europe and improved opportunities for legal migration to Europe, diaspora remittances and investments, domestic politics and political support for the
government, international politics and good international relationships, and development initiatives and economic growth. Whereas these interests are also clearly related, such as the interest in migration aspirations relates to the interest in increased remittances, it makes sense to list them as separate interests for the sake of clarity. It is also interesting to note that while these interests were mentioned in relation to the government’s approach to migration and migration policy, not all are related to migration, but rather towards more general political aims such as for instance the objective of development and economic growth.

While these different interests were reflected by many of my interviewees, different ministries and individuals also had apparent different opinions on some aspects of these interests, such as the regular or irregular nature of the continued migration. Some, as for instance the previous first councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese abroad, had diverse opinions about migration and could mention several viewpoints in different parts of the interview. These differences in speaking about migration, as previously noted, reflect the complexity of migration approaches within the government. After having conducted several interviews, I became increasingly aware of this manner of expressing inconsistent viewpoints on migration.

This extent of inconsistency is interesting to highlight. As mentioned in the theoretical chapter, it is important to acknowledge how different actors may have different interests with a policy. However, in the Senegalese case it is not only interests that differ, but the different actors’ narratives of migration. In the European context, Boswell et al. (2011) argue that politicians and policymakers not only have different interests, but also different narratives of migration. These narratives are not only informed by knowledge, but also by individuals’ patterns of thought and beliefs, and in sum it is the most persuasive narrative that influences what type of policy interest that is pursued. This idea of contrasting narratives is transferrable to the Senegalese case. A very evident example is the statement by the commissioner of the Police Directorate, who suddenly confessed that irregular migration was pursued by the government after having discarded the idea until that point. His narrative of migration depended on what topic we discussed. When speaking about cooperation with Europe he would highlight that irregular migration was negative, but when speaking about diaspora contributions in Senegal, he had a much more positive understanding of the issue. The lack of a clear narrative of migration among Senegalese officials may indeed play a role in the difficulties of reaching common objectives and policies. As such the lack of consistency in
Senegalese migration policies is related to the ministries’ various interests, which again are related to the diverse narratives of migration. One of my interviewees explained this by saying: “Without coordination of interests, the policy suffers. You cannot benefit from the aims of other ministries and if they have similar projects, you cannot benefit from their resources. Therefore it is difficult to effectuate your policies” (Interviewee 15).

Concerning the main topic in this thesis, namely the state’s role as a determining factor for migration, the findings of this analysis suggests that it is not possible to generalise on the role of states and policies in general. In order to understand how a state may influence both migration aspirations and migration capabilities, one must first understand how these issues are narrated within the government. Thereafter, as in the Senegalese case, one can start to understand how the different narratives and interests in a particular government, or even ministry, may affect migration policymaking and the policies’ effect on migration.

With this in mind, I would like to return to the discussion of the creation of a national migration policy in Senegal. As all the interviewees clearly stated, there was a lack of coordination and structure in the way migration issues were dealt with by the different ministries. This was particularly emphasised by the IOM, who acted as an important promoter of the creation of a main policy. As I experienced myself, my interviewee at the IOM explained that the government spoke about migration policy in a different way than they did. While the IOM wanted the government to have a document where all the migration issues where filed together with aims, solutions and operational activities clearly defined, the government currently had “border management in the ministry of armed forces and interior […], labour in the ministry of labour, finance in the ministry of finance. And they say it is the way they are functioning” (Interviewee 8).

After having analysed the different aims of the policies regarding migration aspirations and migration capabilities in Senegal, I would question the value of the creation of an overarching migration policy. This is particularly evident because of the multiple narratives of migration that coexisted at the same time. As argued by the representative at the EU delegation, there may be no need for a new migration policy in Senegal for the time being. As there are many divergent understandings and strategies, it would not be profitable for Senegal to gather them in one strategy document (Interviewee 16). It is arguably, however, very profitable for some
European partners, and possibly also the IOM, who also stressed the importance of creating a national strategy on the topic.

In this regard it is interesting to point out that the absence of a single approach to migration and the distribution of migration issues among several ministries, are not restricted to the Senegalese case. This is also a typical way of organising migration policy in Europe, where there rarely is one major aim with all migration policies or a specific ministry that deals with migration issues solely. It is therefore peculiar that the IOM and European states advise Senegal to organise migration issues as if it was a single policy area, when migration policies in Europe consists of various jurisdictions attributed to different ministries (see for instance Faist and Ette 2007, Callia et al. 2012). With the aim of cooperating with Senegal on migration issues, it is clearly profitable for the IOM and European states to have the Senegalese aims with and organisation of migration issues clearly stated. As I argue, however, this is not necessarily profitable for the Senegalese government itself, since the issue of migration is as complex as it is. Nevertheless, while there apparently is an on-going process of creating this policy “within the year”, the different opinions about who was in charge and what it would contain tells a different story (Interviewee 15).

To some extent, the project of creating a national migration policy portrays the way the Senegalese government work on, and approaches, migration issues. There is a great will to agree to and sign new migration measures, but less interest in fulfilling what has been agreed upon (Interviewees 6, 10 and 16). The lack of interest in implementing migration policies may also be connected to the lack of belief in the power of such policies to actually affect migration aspirations and capabilities. Moreover, the different understandings of and approaches to migration symbolises that migration management is not high on the Senegalese governments’ policy priority list. Overall, the government’s approach to migration can be seen as dependent on its approach to more important state policy aims, such as economic growth and development.
6 When and why the Senegalese government chooses to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration

While the preceding chapter examined the different approaches to migration aspirations and migration capabilities within the Senegalese government, this chapter will focus on how these approaches inform the process of negotiating cooperation on migration policy with European states. What types of policies are being pursued, and why does Senegal choose to cooperate on some measures while disagreeing on others? Throughout this chapter I seek to answer the question of when and why the Senegalese government chooses to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration. After a general introduction to the existing European-Senegalese migration agreements, I will analyse Senegal’s choices based on their responses to two different agreement propositions; the Spanish wish to cooperate with Senegal on border control in 2006, and the European Union’s suggestion of a Mobility Partnership in 2008. Based on an analysis of the negotiations processes of these two policy agreements, I will conclude on the underlying factors that influence the governments’ decisions concerning migration cooperation with European actors.

6.1 Senegal’s agreements concerning migration to Europe

As mentioned in the literature review, Senegal participates in international dialogues on migration with Europe within the framework of GAMM. Senegal has been particularly active in the African-European Rabat Process and Dakar has been the host city of two of the process’ meetings. Since 2006, the Rabat Process has revolved around three pillars: The reinforcement of legal migration, the fight against irregular migration, and the creation of a synergy between migration and development. Through these dialogues, unofficial promises of opening legal channels of migration from Africa to Europe have been made, but this has not resulted in any juridical binding agreements between the EU and Senegal (Interviewee 6). Since the mid-2000s, “Mobility Partnerships” have been a priority for the EU, and to date three African countries have signed such agreements with the EU. That is Cape Verde in 2008, Morocco in 2013 and Tunisia in 2014 (European Commission 2014). Initially, Senegal was one of the states that the EU sought to establish a Mobility Partnership with, but, as will be explained at a later point, these negotiations did not turn out successfully.
Although there are no agreements between the EU and Senegal on migration regulation, there are several EU funded programmes in Senegal that aim to reinforce the regional dialogue on irregular and transit migration, improve border control systems, raise public awareness on migration and promote voluntary return and reintegration (van Criekinge 2008). However, none of these programmes entail a legal commitment by any of the parties to cooperate on migration relates issues. Despite the lack of formal agreements on the regional level, Senegal ranks highly on the list of African states with bilateral agreements on migration with European states. As previously noted, Senegal has well-established dialogues on migration issues with France, Italy and Spain. There are nevertheless large differences between the types of agreements it has with these different states, as it depends on the states’ relations and the patterns of migration from Senegal. In order to understand the scenery of Senegalese bilateral cooperation on migration, I will present a short overview over the agreements Senegal has with these three major migration destination countries; France, Italy and Spain.

6.1.1 France

The first bilateral agreement between Senegal and France was a general convention on social security benefits adopted in 1965. It was later replaced by a second agreement in 1974 and renegotiated in 1989 and 1991 (Cleiss 2014). According to my interviewee at the Ministry of Interior, these agreements did not affect the migration flows. Furthermore, the 1991 agreement had severe shortcomings on providing social security to Senegalese in France, and it is currently in the process of being redefined. In 2000, another agreement, the “Convention Générale de Co-Développement” was signed. It had two main objectives: To encourage Senegalese in France to contribute to development in Senegal, and to contribute to “the mobility of persons”, primarily in response to the training needs in Senegal (Interviewee 13). In 2005, the objectives of this agreement was fulfilled when France agreed to fund the project “Initiatives de Co-Développement” with € 2,5 million. This initiative achieved positive results, and was refinanced with € 9 million for the period from 2009 till 2011. The scope of the project was enlarged, and its name was changed to “Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement” (PAISD).

The last noteworthy agreement between France and Senegal on migration issues is the 2006 “Accord Relative à la Gestion Concertée des Flux Migratoires”. During the interviews, this agreement was referred to as “the readmission agreement”, although it included legal
migration opportunities in addition to the readmission clause. While the 2006 agreement only targeted high-skilled migrants, it was amended in 2008 to include other categories. Any Senegalese who can present a job offer for one of 105 listed professions may obtain a visa. In addition, France issues 1000 residence cards annually for people with particular skills and talents. Concerning readmission, the agreement made Senegal accept the deportation of Senegalese undocumented migrants from France to Senegal (La Cimade 2009). According to my interviewees, this part of the agreement has not been truly implemented. The signing of the agreement had been very controversial, and many argued that the Ministry of Interior “just did it”, without informing the public or asking for approval from the Senegalese president. This was “very problematic” (Interviewee 7) for the government, since the public and particularly the diaspora were wary about readmission agreements (Interviewees 7, 8, 10 and 11).

6.1.2 Italy
Concerning Senegalese bilateral relations with Italy, there are several agreements that link migration and development, but no agreements on migration control. Similar negations to those with France concerning legal migration have recently been paused, since Italy wanted to include a readmission clause. As explained by the previous First Councillor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad; “the Italians were ready to take up to 4000 Senegalese per year, but they said: you have 80,000 irregular Senegalese here, and they have to return home first’. This was a very poignant proposal!” (Interviewee 7). According to Dia (2009), Italy permits an annual quota of work permits which in 2008 was fixed at 1000. These quotas were not mentioned by any of my interviewees in Senegal, who said that all migration related agreements between Italy and Senegal focused solely on development and diaspora initiatives. Since I have not found any other documentation on such an agreement, I cannot be certain on whether it exists or not.

The First Councillor also explained that the Italian project “Plateforme d’appui au Secteur Privé et à la Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie” (PLASEPRI) had supported Senegal with €2 billion since it was initiated in 2008 (Interviewee 7). The project objective is to increase the volume of productive investments by the diaspora in Italy, so to generate employment opportunities especially in areas with a high migration rate. However, according to the Director of the Support and Investment Projects, the PLASEPRI project have not functioned as they wanted, and very few investments have been made by the diaspora in Italy.
(Interviewee 9). Therefore, parts of the finances have been transferred to the Senegalese diaspora support fund, FAISE (Interviewees 7 and 9). Another current Italian-Senegalese agreement concerns a project aimed at training, accompanying and providing technical assistance to Senegalese migrants in Italy. This “Cooperazione Internazionale” has concerned Senegalese development issues since 1969, but it was not until 2011 it developed a specific focus on migration (COOPI 2014).

### 6.1.3 Spain

In contrast to France and Italy, Spain has arrived at Senegal’s bilateral agreement scene more recently. In relation to the sudden large-scale irregular migration to the Canaries in 2006, Spain’s interest in controlling migration from Senegal spurred. In August 2006, Senegal and Spain signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), in which the states agreed to jointly patrol the sea to deduct migrants travelling by boat towards the Spanish islands (Panizzon 2008). By signing this agreement, Senegal allowed for the presence of European coastguards in its territorial waters, and once the legal basis was set, Frontex, by the request of Spain, could patrol within the Senegalese territory. While the Frontex operations HERA and HERA I had already been launched to support the Spanish coastguards in the waters of the Canary Islands, Frontex were now able to patrol the Senegalese coast. This initial operation was called HERA II, and in 2007 both naval and air surveillance was included in what was to become the third HERA operation, HERA III (Papastavridis 2010).

While these Frontex-led missions were control mechanisms aimed at decreasing irregular migration to Spain, the two countries also concluded an agreement that included a readmission clause. The procedures of the negotiation process, and the actual content of the agreement, have been difficult to obtain any information about. Some academic researchers refer to an agreement that was signed between Spain and Senegal on 5 December 2006, but this agreement only concerns underage immigrants and was not implemented in 2006 (BOE 2008). According to the Spanish government it was not effectuated until 1 July 2008, after it had been changed in accordance with both states’ internal requirements. Nevertheless, as reported by Frontex itself, more than 6000 people were returned from the Canaries to their countries of origin during the fall of 2006 (Frontex 2006). Some of my interviewees argued that at least 4000 of these had been Senegalese (Interviewees 6 and 10), others supported the fact that returns had happened, but they did not know to what extent.
In Dakar, there were clear disagreements concerning the legal basis of the returns that had been carried out. Two of the interviewed Senegalese government officials stated that the returns had their legal basis from a readmission agreement that was signed in May 2006, two other Senegalese officials, as well as one of the employees at the UNODC argued that it was an unofficial agreement without any signed documents. Two of my Senegalese interviewees also claimed that there was no readmission agreement. However, no one denied that the returns had taken place, and many saw it as a mystery that the Senegalese President had allowed for this mass deportation. The context and reasons of why Senegal took part in the 2006 agreements will be analysed more closely in the next part of this chapter.

In the following summer of 2007, the two states negotiated a different agreement concerning work recruitment from Senegal to Spain. To begin with, about 750 low-skilled Senegalese were supposed to work in Spain’s strawberry agriculture for five months before returning. The Senegalese government warmly welcomed the ‘strawberry campaign’, as it was nicknamed, but after a few months the project did not turn out to be very successful. One of the main problems with the agreement was that it did not include any social security for the migrants, and there was no fair selection process (Interviewee 7). The Spanish government had been interested in young women, and all Senegalese young women could therefore apply for a job. However, most applications that were selected came from the wives and other family members of government officials (Interviewees 8, 10 and 11). They did not have any experience with agricultural work, and they did not receive any information on life in Spain before leaving (Interviewee 8). Most of the girls left the farms in Spain and moved elsewhere, or had to receive help to return home. The apparent reason for the failure of the programme was that the negotiations were carried out by officials in the Ministry of Youth, Employment and the Promotion of Civic Values, who did not have experience with negotiating bilateral agreements. They signed it without seeking advice from other ministries, and lead the implementation process themselves. This was the story as it was told during four of the interviews, and the interviewees agreed that it exemplified the typical Senegalese failure; that the lack of communication on migration issues, as well as corruption within the government, lead to poorly negotiated agreements, lack of communication between people and ministries, and therefore also failure in the implementation process (Interviewees 7, 8 10 and 11).

While the lack of coordination was something most of my interviewees pointed out, most also highlighted that Senegal never said no to sign an agreement if given the opportunity.
However, as this short overview of Senegal’s bilateral agreements on migration shows, Senegal has not agreed to all initiatives from Europe, unlike what the interviewees’ jargon would imply. European stakeholders have had a higher interest than Senegal in signing migration related agreements, and particularly agreements concerning readmission. Despite the GAMM framework’s stark incentive to improve cooperation on migration and development issues, no multilateral and few bilateral agreements on migration have been concluded between Senegal and European states within this framework. This is in many ways remarkable, since the two actors in theory have similar objectives of increasing capabilities to migrate legally and decreasing capabilities to migrate irregularly.

6.2 Negotiating migration policy with Europe: Senegalese decision-making in two cases

In 2008, the European Commission invited Senegal to negotiations concerning a Mobility Partnership. While the Commission initiated dialogues concerning Mobility Partnerships with both Cape Verde and Senegal at the same time in 2008, the talks with Senegal were stalled as early as in 2009. As part of the Mobility Partnership, legal migration opportunities would be offered to Senegal as well as EU commitments to improve domestic social and economic conditions (Reslow 2013). Despite these incentives, the negotiation process with Senegal did not advance, and it is now considered a failure (Chou and Gibert 2012).

Before the Mobility Partnership was initiated, the EU already financed migration and development related projects Senegal. Whereas the EU was the main financial contributor to most of these projects, it was the individual member states that were the lead implementers. One of these projects was the Frontex’ HERA operations along the Senegalese coastline (Papastavridis 2010). As noted, the legal basis of the Frontex operations was an agreement signed between Senegal and Spain that allowed for the presence of EU Member States ships and airplanes in Senegalese waters (van Criekinge 2008). In addition to increased migration control mechanisms, the agreement included development incentives in Senegal, such as technical capacity building assistance and provision of military equipment to enable improved border control, rural development initiatives such as the REVA project and the establishment of new avenues of legal migration as through the ‘strawberry campaign’.
What is interesting concerning the agreement between Senegal and Spain versus the one between Senegal and the European Commission is that they had different negotiation processes and contrasting outcomes. Both of these agreements initially included several similar initiatives on both migration control mechanisms and development initiatives, but Senegal chose to cooperate with Spain while refusing to cooperate with the Commission. Seeing that both these two agreements would bring positive benefits to Senegal through development initiatives and possibilities for legal migration routes, it is relevant to wonder why the Senegalese government rejected one and agreed on the other.

In order to understand the underlying notions of the Senegalese decision-making in these two processes, I will examine how the negotiation processes were organised within the Senegalese government. I will base the assessment on interview data combined with previous research on the agreements. The examination of these two particular negotiation processes will enlighten the understanding of the underlying factors that inform the Senegalese government’s choices regarding cooperation on migration management with European actors. As the Spanish-Senegalese agreement was the first of the two agreements to be negotiated, I will firstly elaborate on this and thereafter assess the Mobility Partnership negotiations. In the final part my focus will be on how the comparison of the two cases shed new light on migration policy formation in Senegal.

6.2.1 The Spanish agreement on border control: why did Senegal agree?

As mentioned, the agreement between Senegal and Spain on border control was a result of the steep rise in irregular migrants arriving at the southern and eastern coasts of the Canary Islands in 2006. Since 2002, the number of unauthorised boat migrants arriving at the Canary Islands has been higher than the number of those who reach the Spanish mainland (Carling 2007a). Spain, however, could not have foreseen such a sudden increase in the migration flow as the one that occurred in 2006. At the time, the situation was labelled a “migration crisis” both in the media and by Spanish authorities (Interviewees 2, 3 and 4). According to numbers compiled by Spanish authorities, the number of irregular migrants that were intercepted at the Canary Islands varied from 5 000 to 10 000 in the early 2000s while it rose to a total of 31 000 in 2006 (Carling 2007a).

At the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, the Embassy councillors explained that the process of negotiation between Senegal and Spain in 2006 had to be seen in relation to the Spanish
“state of crisis”. While the 2006 agreement clearly was important to Spain in order to deal with this migration crisis, it is more difficult to understand why the Senegalese government wanted to cooperate on deterring migration capabilities to Spain as well as accepting the return of thousands of young Senegalese who had already arrived at the Canaries. In order to study this, I will firstly present the views on the negotiation process as presented by the Spanish government officials in Dakar, and thereafter comment on how the process was presented by my interviewees in the Senegalese government. However, it must be acknowledged that few of the agreements studied herein are well documented. It is clear that there were different types of agreements between Spain and Senegal, in which Frontex also played a part, but neither Spain, Senegal or the border control agency have confirmed the official nature or the content of the different agreements. In particular, to my knowledge, there are no government statements about the date, type or content of the bilateral agreement on readmission. As a result, the analysis is largely based on interview material and it must therefore be highlighted that the presented factual information concerning the agreements is eligible for contestation.

During my first interview at the Spanish Embassy in Dakar, I got the impression that my interviewee sought to defend his government’s actions in 2006. When I asked if he could explain the processes around the agreement, I was first met with a justification: “I’m saying, the context is very important [...] it was really a human catastrophe that affected our social consciousness”. He thereafter argued that the type of approach that the Spanish government had pursued at the time, was “no longer the case”. As part of the agreement on border control, Spain had suggested to engage in new agricultural development projects in order to decrease migration aspirations, and prevent young Senegalese in migrating from the countryside to larger cities or abroad. This approach of development and migration was encouraged by the EU, and “[…] therefore we tried to stop the flux of clandestine migration and at the same time create better economic and social conditions in Senegal” (Interviewee 3).

Although I had planned to ask about whether development initiatives were part of the migration control agreement, I had not expected that it would be as easily confirmed. In email correspondence with the Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs in advance of the fieldwork, I did not receive any confirmation on my queries about whether Senegal had received promises of development initiatives as part of the border control agreement. However, according to
Senegalese newspaper sources from June 2006, the President announced that he had signed an agreement with Spain in which Spain promised to provide Senegal with 100 billion CFA to finance a new Senegalese agricultural development project (Seneweb 2006). This project, Retour Vers l'Agriculture (REVA), was created to promote modern agriculture, and reduce illegal migration and rural exodus (GFMD 2013). Although I have not managed to obtain official documentation that the Spanish development assistance was part of the border control agreement, the link between the two was unexpectedly confirmed by all the three officials at the Spanish Embassy.

During the interviews, it was repeatedly underlined that the context had been vital for what had happened during the negotiations in 2006. The Spanish government was in a pressured situation. “What was happening was intolerable for Spanish public […] therefore, the Spanish authorities were mobilised and took diplomatic contact with the Senegalese authorities […] it was the Spanish that had most reason to be there” (Interviewee 2). During these initial talks, Spain introduced three mechanisms that would be profitable for Senegal. In addition to the REVA development project, the negotiations concerned the opening of new avenues for legal migration to Spain “which started to work after a few years”. This implies that the 2007 strawberry campaign, as well as other labour schemes provided by Spain, were informally agreed upon in 2006 (Panizzon 2008). Finally, the third component of the agreement was based on Spanish support to the Senegalese security forces and police, by providing equipment and training in order for the Senegalese forces to enhance their ability to control state borders (Interviewees 2 and 3).

In explaining the effects of their agreements with Senegal, the Spanish government officials underlined the great success of the new Frontex-led border control. Concerning a question on the effects of providing development as an incentive for border control, one interviewee concluded his answer saying: “Sometimes it works, sometimes not […] In any case, what we did at that time was the fashionable approach in the EU. We had the idea of developing them, and they wanted to collaborate with us to control” (Interviewee 3). Based on the Spaniards’ accounts, it was clearly the case that Spain had been the initiator and facilitator of the negotiation process. They would most likely have carried out the negotiations differently if this had happened today, but the situation in 2006 was extreme and the Spanish government found themselves in a position where they had to find a solution to the immigration problem in a short amount of time (Interviewees 3 and 4).
Although the Spanish Embassy employees confirmed most of the information I had gathered from elsewhere concerning the agreements, they did not confirm that Spain had any readmission agreement with Senegal. When I told them what I had been told by others; that thousands of migrants had been put on a flight directly back to Senegal from the Canaries without having had the chance of entering mainland Spain to apply for residence permit or asylum, all the three of them stated that this was impossible, it was something they knew nothing about. This silence may have been due to instructions of confidentiality, lack of knowledge, or that there in fact was no agreement on readmission. However, according to the information I received from their Senegalese counterparts, it is unlikely that the latter was the case.

The interviews in the Senegalese government indicate a significant contradiction between the Spanish and Senegalese incentives with cooperating through migration agreements. From the information gained at the Spanish Embassy, it was clear that the Spanish government was desperate for a solution. In 2006 they were therefore ready to accommodate requests from Senegal, in order to get on top of the unusual immigration situation, and accordingly, the Senegalese government’s incentives for negotiating became very different. If the 2006 migration wave is seen in the context of the Senegalese government’s interest in continued migration to Europe, the sudden increase in Senegalese youth entering Spanish territory was not necessarily undesirable. However, as acknowledged by my interviewee from the Senegalese Ministry of Interior, they understood how difficult this situation was for their Spanish counterpart (Interviewee 14). As a result, they entered the process of negotiation from a completely different stance than Spain, and the two governments’ aims with the negotiation processes were to a large extent unrelated and divergent. Since the Senegalese government did not have any initial wish to deter Senegalese migrants on their way to Spain, it had a powerful position during these negotiations.

When asked directly about why Senegal chose to cooperate with Spain on border control in Senegalese waters in 2006, most of the Senegalese government officials answered that it had to do with the humanitarian catastrophe of lives lost at sea. However, when speaking more about the content of this and the other Spanish-Senegalese agreements, this aspect was no longer mentioned as an important element during the negotiation processes. It is undoubtedly true, however, that it was very important both for Spain and Senegal to decrease the number
of young migrants dying on their way to Spain. There would be no point in misjudging the altruistic aspect of the Spanish and Senegalese agreement on border control. Nevertheless, based on how the agreement was spoken of in all my conversations, the humanitarian aspect was clearly not the only, and seemingly not the main, motivational factor for collaboration.

The exact content of the “Frontex agreement”, as it was popularly called by the Senegalese government officials, was not well known by the majority of my interviewees. However, they acknowledged the fact that Spain had increased the amount of development assistance as part of the negotiation processes. It was also clear that this agreement should be seen in relation to the strawberry campaign migration programme. As was reported during the interviews, European states’ attempts to decrease immigration through border control initiatives were met with scepticism in Senegal. Most interviewees expressed that European states, such as Spain, should have dealt with this issue by focusing on developing the origin areas of the migrants, rather than through increased border control. It should be noted that although they preferred development-enhancing migration policies, some of my interviewees also underlined that they did not believe that this actually would lead to a decrease in migration aspiration, since “the young will migrate anyway” despite agricultural improvements (Interviewee 13).

Faced with the Spanish request of border control cooperation, Senegal sought to enter the negotiations with a major focus on how Spain could contribute to enhance the issue of migration from a different stance, and not necessarily through border control. As explained by the former representative manager of Senegalese abroad, the Senegalese President Wade had firstly answered Spain’s invitation to cooperate on control with a joke, saying that it was impossible to stop the boat migration. However, the President would be willing to find solutions through other ways of cooperating, but because of the pressing situation it had allegedly not been enough time to develop a good policy. “The President signed that agreement on a whim, on a hurry. Had we thought about terms of the agreement, we could have done a good job acknowledged by everybody” (Interviewee 7).

Under normal circumstances, the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad would have led such negotiations, but in this case no one knew exactly who had carried out the different parts of the negotiation. Most interviewees, however, were certain it had been done within the Presidential office. It was only one of my interviewees
who said he had been part of the negotiation process with Spain, although he did not elaborate on his role in detail (Interviewee 7).

According to the assembled information I received from the interviewees, it is clear that the dialogue between Spain and Senegal at a certain point in time was at least partly conducted in secrecy. This secrecy was particularly present when it concerned the readmission clause. While it cannot be contested that thousands of Senegalese migrants were deported from the Canaries to Senegal in 2006, the legal basis for it remains difficult to confirm. Different researchers have found different explanations for the readmissions in 2006. According to Panizzon, the Memorandum of Understanding on border control included an EU-sponsored Rapid Reaction Mechanism plan for Senegal, which set the legal frame for the readmissions in 2006 (2008). Van Criekinge, on the other hand, found that the Rapid Reaction Mechanism was implemented in April 2007, and it can therefore not have been the legal frame of the 2006 readmissions (2008). The latter was recently confirmed by Ceccorulli, who explains that the Rapid Reaction Mechanism programme envisaged readmission from Senegal and Mauritania, but that it was only Mauritania that cooperated with Spain and Frontex on readmissions in 2006 through this programme (2014).

According to the uncertainty concerning this in previous research, in combination with the information gained from the interviews Dakar, it may be the case that these readmissions were in fact based on an unofficial agreement between the President of Senegal and the government of Spain. Two of my interviewees claimed that some money had been given directly to the President from Spain in order to make him approve the deportations from the Canary Islands (Interviewees 11 and 12). However, all of the interviewees I asked to confirm this thereafter, contested that such a thing could have happened without them being aware of it.

As suggested by the interview material, the Senegalese government’s decision to agree on cooperating with Spain can be seen in relation to three main factors: The pressure of the situation and the favourable negotiation position Senegal had at the time, the government’s objective of development support and increased legal migration capabilities, and the government objective of establishing good bilateral relationships with European states. The first of these findings reflects what was suggested in the introductory part of this thesis; that sending states can be in a favourable negotiation position because of their counterparts’
strong interest in curbing migration (Hamilton 1997, Paoletti 2011). The context of the 2006 agreement played an important role in the discussions of the border control aspect, and the receiving country’s strong interest in the agreement. The “migration crisis” made the situation strained, and the Spanish eagerness for a quick solution provided Senegal with a possibility to be on top of the negotiations. Senegal could therefore promote additional clauses, such as development support and new programmes of legal migration. While the Spanish provision of equipment and military training was mentioned as an important asset by the commission of the police, this was not something required by Senegal, but rather induced by Spain and the border control agency (Interviewee 6).

In accordance with the power of the sending state hypothesis, Senegal was able to use the destination country’s wish to control migration as a way to advance its own agenda. On the other hand, while these incentives indeed were important for Senegal to agree on border control, it is questionable whether this played into the agreement on readmission. The Senegalese government has an openly expressed opinion regarding readmission, and it is not something the government pursues. This is particularly so because of the national political scene, since both the diaspora population as well as the majority of the domestic population is highly negative to the forced return of Senegalese abroad. The reason why the government agreed on the readmission clause with Spain in 2006 should therefore not only be attributed to the content of the agreement, but also the context and the form of the negotiations.

According to some of my interviewees, the unilateral nature of the decision-making may have been vital in this relation (Interviewees 7 and 14).

As explained in the theoretical framework of this thesis, the form of state governance may affect migration aspirations, people’s capability to migrate, and the political desire and ability to manage migration. While specific policies can affect people’s freedom to migrate to a specific place at a specific time, the nature of the state in regard to authoritarianism or democracy, and its extent of strong central power can be more important as macro-structure determinants of migration (de Haas 2011). While Senegal certainly is not an authoritarian state, it is neither a perfect democracy (Mbow 2008). If the President did take the decision to agree on readmission by himself, this is a more authoritarian trait of nature, and it confirms the theory that a less democratic governmental structure makes the state more powerful with regard to controlling migration flows. In this case, the implementation of the readmission was
carried out by the Spanish partner, but it was the Senegalese President’s consent that enabled it.

Although two interviewees argued that the President had received private financial support from the Spanish government in order to agree on readmission, I do not deem this as a viable probability. Rather, it may be that the graveness of the situation made it strategically wise for the President to agree on readmission, in order to strengthen the bilateral bond between the two states. Nevertheless, the secrecy surrounding return and the authoritarian nature of the decision is probable to have been a prerequisite for the Senegalese government to agree upon a readmission clause with Spain.

6.2.2 The European Mobility Partnership: why did the negotiations fail?
Launched in 2006 by the European Commission, the Mobility Partnerships were the new tools to manage migration into the European Union. These partnerships are agreements between a group of EU member states and a third country, with the Commission as an additional signatory (Chou and Gibert 2012). In June 2008, Senegal was among the first cohort of countries with whom the European Commission sought to negotiate Mobility Partnerships. With the formal support of Spain, Italy and France, the Commission would establish a common platform for migration related activities and agreements that already existed with Senegal at a bilateral level. In addition to this, the Mobility Partnership would contain two components; a political component where all governments were to declare a mutual interest to pursue closer cooperation, and a programmatic component, which would enlist particular activities concerning migration regulation such as integration, border control, and human trafficking. At the centre of all migration activities was the goal of improved mechanisms for circular migration, so that Senegalese nationals could gain increased possibilities to enter, exit and return to European states with fewer restrictions (Schou and Gibert 2012).

The exact content of the proposed agreement between the Commission and Senegal has not been made publicly available. However, based on interview data, van Criekinge (2010) and Chou and Gibert (2012) have found that it in most ways was similar to the Cape Verde agreement. The activities entailed in these agreements were categorised in six sections: 1) monitoring and developing an awareness of migration flows; 2) employment, management and facilitation of legal migration and integration; 3) mobility and short-stay visas; 4) links
between migration and development; 5) asylum and immigration; and 6) the fight against illegal migration (Chou and Gibert 2012).

In May 2008, the Commission contacted Senegal with the intention of launching a pilot Mobility Partnership. The EU and the Commission did not consult the Senegalese government during the process in which Senegal’s eligibility had been discussed and agreed upon. This was a different process to that with Cape Verde. In 2007, Cape Verde knew that the EU was looking for potential pilot partners for the Mobility Partnerships, and the Cape Verdean government took direct contact with the presidency of the EU to discuss these matters. As found by Reslow, this was one of the reasons the Cape Verdean negotiations were so successful, since Cape Verde took part in initiating the negotiation process. It may be that the negotiation process with Senegal had evolved differently if Senegal had been invited into the process at an earlier point in time (Reslow 2013). While none of my interviewees explained this as a cause, it may still be part of the reason why Senegal was uninterested in a Mobility Partnership.

The first official meeting between Senegal and the European Commission was held in Dakar in June 2008. During the meeting, the Senegalese government expressed a keen interest in participating in a Mobility Partnership, and in succession to the meeting the Commission sent a draft declaration of a Mobility Partnership to the Senegalese government (Interviewee 1). Despite several reminders of it during other meetings, such as during the Rabat process where the Senegalese government assured its interest, the Commission never received a reply. When a European Parliament delegation once again forwarded the request and nothing happened, the Commissioner for Development Cooperation sent a letter to President Wade. This letter was replied, expressing that there was an interest, but it did not include any specific information on how Senegal sought to proceed. The Commission did not receive any replies to its request for Senegal’s specific wishes for the agreement, and therefore it finally discarded the idea of a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Interviewee 1, Reslow 2013).

The reason why the Senegalese government abandoned the negotiation process with the Commission is clearly multifaceted. As noted above, Reslow found that the Senegalese government saw the unilateral actions and decisions taken by the EU as inappropriate. Despite the possibility of improving the framework for development assistance and the facilitation of legal migration, the government insisted on not accepting decisions on
migration cooperation that were being imposed on it. Former research by Chou and Gibert also indicates that the manner in which the EU approached Senegal was destructive for the negotiation. The Commission contacted Senegal with “a finished project, and did not consider it necessary to consult the Senegalese views” (2010:8).

In their research paper on Mobility Partnerships, Chou and Gibert discuss other factors that may have caused the suspension of the talks. These findings are based on information collected from 20 interviews with Senegalese government officials and EU officials between 2009 and 2010. It is interesting to see that while most of the information I collected on the same case corresponded to the findings of Chou and Gibert (2012), some of my interviewees expressed contrasting points of view on why the negotiations had stalled. This may have to do with differences in opinions between interviewees as well as the time lag between the two sets of interviews. Although not all memories of the process were as clear during my interviews in 2014, I believe the extent of time and thus the post-negotiations perspective may have contributed positively to the interviewees’ ability to evaluate the overall process.

As highlighted by Chou and Gibert, the Mobility Partnership invitation from Europe was not possible for Senegal to reject outright. Seeing that the EU, as well as the three countries which supported the negotiations, are some of Senegal’s major aid donors and political partners, Senegal would have to express a keen interest to negotiate the matters (Chou and Gibert 2012). While this was not mentioned by my interviewees, it may indeed be a reason for why the European partners firstly believed that Senegal intended to sign the partnership. This would exemplify what I learned about Senegalese diplomacy in general, that Senegalese officials had ease with negotiating and signing most international agreements although they did not aim to fulfil their obligations (Interviewee 6, 10 and 16).

An aspect that was mentioned by my interviewee representing the Commission was that while the agreement would be clearly profitable for the EU, it was not as clear from the beginning how exactly it would profit Senegal (Interviewee 1). While the Mobility Partnership did include aspects of legal migration and development assistance, they were not defined as clearly as the aim of controlling irregular migration. The negotiation process could have evolved differently if the agreement included clearly stated political and financial aims of significance for Senegal. Chou and Gibert appropriately argues that this example confirms
previous research on EU relations with third countries, in which EU’s “one-size-fits-all” or “our-size-fits-all” approach has obvious limitations (2012:423).

An additional matter that was clearly conveyed as important was the value of multilateral versus bilateral agreements with Europe. This aspect was mentioned in both Chou and Gibert (2012), and Reslow’s (2013) studies, and the argument seems to have been strengthened by time, since several of my interviewees saw it as the major reason for not cooperating on a Mobility Partnership (Interviewees 7, 9, 14 and 15). They argued that since Senegal already has good bilateral relationships with European states, a multilateral framework for these agreements would not necessarily provide any added value. From the Senegalese point of view, it is profitable to negotiate issues of migration bilaterally and discretely since negotiations often entail development assistance and other financial support (Interviewees 7 and 14). As revealed in the preceding chapter on the Senegalese governmental organisation of migration matters, the Senegalese authorities deal with migration through a number of different ministerial actors. Due to the poor communication between these actors, projects with corresponding aims may be initiated by different actors at the same time. According to my interviewee representing the EU, this can be compared with European state actors; if one European partner decides to financially support one migration and development related project, this is not necessarily known by other European partners who are also looking to support similar development projects (Interviewee 16).

Moreover, during negotiation processes, it was apparently preferable to negotiate with a partner at the same level. Particularly concerning negotiations with the EU, some of my interviewees pointed out that the relationship was imbalanced. While Senegal was one sole actor, the EU was made up by and supported by several state actors. Speaking of the Mobility Partnership in particular, one of my interviewees expressed great dissatisfaction with the unequal basis for the negotiations, saying; “well, the European Union is a continent! So if it wants to discuss with us about the Mobility Partnership, why not speak with our continent?” (Interviewee 7). He, as others, expressed that it would not benefit Senegal to have an agreement at the continental level. At an aggregated EU level, it was believed that issues of repatriation and migration control would be stressed, while less attention would be put on how increased development in Senegal could improve the situation. As such, from the perspective of the Senegalese government, Senegal would receive substantially more
financial support through its existing and future bilateral agreements than it could if all were to be regulated within one major EU led framework (Interviewees 7, 11, 14 and 16).

Following the control agreement with Spain in 2006, the domestic debate in Senegal was highly contentious in 2008. The government was trying to balance its different aims concerning migration and migration management. While seeking to demonstrate its ambitions to decrease people’s capability to migrate irregularly to important European partners, it wanted to convey the correct image to the public and the diaspora, meaning that the President supported migration aspirations and did what he could to proliferate migration to Europe (Interviewees 7 and 15). This “double discourse” was also mentioned during the interviews made by Chou and Gibert, where one interviewee promptly stated that whilst it was important with an official anti-migration position, one could not deny that irregular migration “indirectly solved one of Senegal’s deepest political problems” by providing “an escape door to an angry and frustrated youth” (2012:416). 2008 was not seen as the appropriate time for negotiation any further agreements on migration control. As explained by the advisor at the Ministry of Planification “at this moment, the President was very careful. [He] wanted to avoid a second mistake. So that’s why he said that Senegal would not engage in this kind of agreement. It was a difficult moment” (Interviewee 15).

While the interviewed Senegalese government officials’ accounts of the Mobility Partnership process are indeed the most important for this analysis, the EU officials’ perspectives are also of value. Although I only spoke with one of the Commission officials that were involved in the negotiations with Senegal, his views on the case reflects the findings of the previous studies on the Mobility Partnership. As my interviewee explained, the Commission had concluded by attributing the failure of the negotiations to the inefficiency and lack of coordination within the Senegalese government. At the first meeting in Dakar in 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Planification and the Ministry of Interior, as well as some other government representatives had been present. In his experience, it was evident that the people present were not informed about what would be negotiated and they had not prepared a common viewpoint. When the issue of a partnership came up in other meetings it was always with different people, and the people who had participated in the original meeting were not present (Interviewee 1). According to a Commission delegate interviewed by Chou and Gibert, the involvement of so many governmental actors, representing different ministries, had created considerable confusion in identifying an interlocutor for the
negotiations (2012). This was believed to be one of the main reasons why the Commission never received a proper reply from Senegal, and only a single statement of interest from the President without any added information. However, the Commission officials also acknowledged that the Senegalese lack of interest could have to do with a belief that it would not be of added value for the country (Interviewee 1, Chou and Gibert 2012).

That there had been some problems with the communication in this case was also confirmed by a representative in the government itself. Because of the high number of ministries involved, it was difficult to decide which ministry that would supervise the project (Interviewee 14). While this may not necessarily have been the main reason that Senegal never responded to the Commission’s request, it may have had an impact. Knowing that most other migration control agreements had been negotiated by a small group of people within one Senegalese ministry, it is clear that the involvement of several ministries made it difficult for any Senegalese actor to make an independent decision. With the number of ministries involved in mind, it would even have been difficult for the Presidential office to “just do it” and sign the agreement, as was done with the Spanish agreement in 2006 (Interviewee 15).

In sum, multiple factors appear to have affected the government decision of not agreeing on a Mobility Partnership with the Commission. While these are undoubtedly interrelated, I suggest that four factors have been revealed as the main reasons why the government did not agree. These are: The top-down approach of the Commission by presenting a finished proposal to Senegal, the major emphasis on control aspects and vague suggestions for legal migration development projects, the lack of added value for Senegal by negotiating migration at a multilateral, rather than bilateral level, and the number of ministries and people involved and the inability for anyone to make an independent decision.

Regarding the first of these, the top-down approach of the Commission, in which it approached Senegal with a finished document, was not very appreciated by some members within the government. While this may have been of significance, it is not likely to have served as an obstacle for the negotiations. If this matter had been of high importance, the Senegalese government would not have been as positive to the negotiations as it was in the early phases, when the Mobility Partnership idea was presented.
Secondly, the Mobility Partnership proposal included promises of legal migration opportunities as well as possibilities for financial assistance to migration and development projects in Senegal. While such incentives are of importance to the Senegalese government, the proposed agreement lacked detailed and precise suggestions for such mechanisms. In the eyes of the Senegalese authorities the Commissions put most emphasis on the control aspects, and to Senegal’s role as a “gate-keeper” (Chou and Gibert 2012). This was in disagreement with what the Senegalese would have wanted from such a partnership. Despite this, Senegal did have the possibility to suggest amendments in the Partnership contract, but none of the ministries involved in the process presented any suggestions for change. This implies that the lack of details concerning legal migration and financial support were not the only reasons for the government not to reply.

A third influential cause is likely to have been that the Senegalese government prefers to deal with migration issues, as well as other international issues, at a bilateral basis. It was clearly stated by both representatives from Senegal and the EU that, financially, Senegal profited from having several bilateral agreements rather than structuring them within one multilateral framework. This can arguable be one of the main reasons that none of the different ministries responded to the request made by the Commission. As revealed by the analysis of the ministerial structure of migration policies, the ministries dealing with migration issues already had valuable bilateral agreements with different European states, and no individual ministry is likely to have perceived that an EU partnership could be of value to them (Interviewee 7).

The last aspect to be highlighted is that the timing and the form of the negotiations are likely to have played an overarching important role. Whether the President in reality would have wanted to sign a partnership with the EU or not, it would have been difficult for him to go on with the negotiations due to the high number of ministries and government officials who had been included in the negotiation process. If an individual decision were to be made, it would have had to be done as discretely as in the 2006 border control agreement. If the Presidential office had proceeded with this, the nature of the information flow in Senegal would have made not only the Senegalese government aware of it, but also the Senegalese population. As highlighted, restrictions on migration capabilities were not very popular among the population at this point in time, and in order to maintain political popularity the President could not have agreed on a Mobility Partnership including a migration control aspect. In this
sense, due to the form of the negotiations and the number of ministries involved, the process had to be open and democratic. This stands in clear contrast to the 2006 agreement, where the secrecy and urgency of the negotiations enabled a more authoritarian style of the decision-making.

6.3 Conclusion: Senegalese decision-making when negotiating migration with Europe

In this chapter’s analyses of the Spanish-Senegalese and the European-Senegalese negotiations it has been clearly demonstrated that the Senegalese government's approach to migration cooperation with Europe will vary depending on the situation. It has become evident that the when and why of the Senegalese government's decisions making is highly dependent on the context of the negotiations, and both the international and the domestic context will affect how the government perceives the situation. In correspondence to what Paoletti (2010) and Hamilton (1997) has established concerning migrant-sending states, Senegal can be capable of using migrant-receiving states’ wish to control migration as a way to advance its own agenda. As already noted, however, the migration related policy agenda in Senegal is not always straight forward and the power of the Senegalese government to front Senegalese policy objectives is affected by the lack of a coherent internal structure of migration issues in the government. The fact that the different ministries’ narratives of migration are diverse also reflects the difficulty for the government to form adherent goals with its migration policy. This clearly has an impact on the negotiation processes with other states, and keeps Senegal from developing its potential of having a powerful position in negotiations on migration. While the difficulty of reaching clear aims with different migration policies has an overarching effect on Senegalese decision-making when negotiating migration with Europe, there are also other and more context specific factors that play into the decision-making in these two cases.

In 2006 Senegal agreed to Spain’s request of a border control agreement which also contained a readmission clause. The reasons why Senegal chose to agree on this, should be seen in relation to the favourable negotiation position Senegal had at this time, the pressed time-frame, the promise of development and economic incentives, the opportunity of establishing good bilateral relationships with a European state, and arguably also the confidential and autonomous nature concerning the readmission clause. In similarity with the
Spanish border control agreement, there were a number of different reasons at play when the Senegalese government decided not to agree on a Mobility Partnership with the European Commission. As suggested by the analysis, the main factors were the top-down approach of the Commission, the lack of focus on legal migration and development projects, the government’s favouring of bilateral agreements, and possibly also the inability for anyone to make an independent decision due to the number of people and ministries involved.

Some of the factors that played into the government's decision-making were similar in both processes. By signing the Spanish agreement as well as if signing the Mobility Partnership, possible policy outcomes included some of the Senegalese government’s major policy aims. The migration and development projects that were suggested in both of the agreements would contribute positively to the, in particular agricultural, development process in Senegal. The opening up of new avenues for legal migration, whether vaguely presented in the agreement or not, would contribute to the policy objective of enhancing the migration capacities to migrate legally to Europe. Additionally, both the agreements would have contributed positively to the establishment of good international relationships, although the different nature of the agreements would have led to differences in the quality of the relationship between Senegal and individual EU states.

This links to one of the major differences in the two agreements, namely the bilateral versus the multilateral framework. Another difference lies in differences in the time constraints; while the Committee did not put pressure on the Senegalese government to reply or potentially agree within a set date, the Spanish government was in continuous contact with Senegal, and stressed the importance of acting fast. A third difference between the two processes was that the Spanish government took directly contact with the Senegalese President, and thereafter only involved the Ministry of Interior in the process, while the Commission contacted several ministries in the initial phase, and therefore disabled the possibility of less formal and confidential negotiating. Of all the underlying factors it is clearly the differences between the two cases and not the similarities that shed light on what factors are important for the Senegalese government.

In contradiction to what one could assume after having analysed the government’s management of and approach to migration and migration policy, it is not only the fulfilment of the government’s aims that seems imperative for agreeing on new migration regulations.
While increased development assistance, improved systems of legal migration and advancement in international relations are important interests for the government, the analysis of these two cases shows that other issues, such as the government’s negotiation position, the number of Senegalese actors involved, and the timeframe, are equally important factors that affect Senegalese decision-making. All these factors are part of the context of the negotiations, and they do not concern the actual content of the agreement. Moreover, while the correspondence of the contents of migration agreements and the aims of the Senegalese government is obviously vital for an agreement, this will also depend on the ability of the Senegalese government to form coherent aims. As such it can be argued that the lack of systematic cooperation on migration issues between the different ministries, in correspondence with the contrasting but coexisting narratives of migration, will affect the government’s decision-making.

In sum I reason that it is a combination of factors that affect Senegalese decision-making when negotiating on migration with Europe. In particular, Senegalese decision-making will depend on the combination of any agreement’s coherence with the interests and approaches to migration within the Senegalese government, and the form and the context of the negotiation process. While the relevance of any agreement’s content is vital for Senegalese policy interest, this also depends on how coherent the involved Senegalese ministries are in their policy aims. When there is a lack of clear coherence in the government’s approaches to migration and other policy issues included in an agreement, the decision-making outcome can be dependent on the form of the negotiations. As in the agreement with Spain, the form of the negotiations allowed few people to make a decision without engaging others, while the number of ministries involved in the Mobility Partnership did not allow the President or any single ministry to take a more authoritarian decision. With the latter point in mind, one may infer that the persistence of numerous narratives of migration aspirations and capabilities may be of interest to the Senegalese government. Since contradictions among government ministries and officials hamper negotiation processes on migration issues with Europe, it allows, and possibly demands, a more authoritarian decision-making. This may serve as an example of how, as suggested in the very beginning of the thesis, a state’s nature in regard to authoritarianism or democracy can affect the state’s power to affect people’s capability to migrate (de Haas 2011).
7 How existing agreements on migration control affect Senegalese migration to Europe

If it was effective? Well, people take other routes. They go through Mauritania and Morocco, or Mali. But then again it was effective, because it was not so many people who left. It ended the crisis (Interviewee 6).

The third research question of this thesis concerns how Senegalese cooperation with Europe on migration control can affect migration. In order to assess this question, I will focus on the agreement between Senegal and Spain concerning border control from 2006. As part of this agreement, Senegal has played an active role in the border control and surveillance at sea and it therefore serves as an interesting case to analyse in order to shed light on how the Senegalese government can influence migration aspirations and capabilities, which is an underlying query in this thesis.

As stated in the theoretical framework, it is clear that migration policies play ‘some’ part in affecting migration, but less research has demonstrated the role of policies in a more profound manner (de Haas 2011). In particular, it is the effectiveness of migration policies that has been widely discussed in academic literature on migration, and it has been suggested that it is fruitful to incorporate an assessment of migration policies broader effects in order to understand the outcome of any migration policy change (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Further on, the framework of seeing migration as a function of aspirations and capabilities suggests that one should distinguish how policies affect aspirations or capabilities. In this study of the effects of the Spanish-Senegalese agreement, I aim to reach conclusions not only concerning the intended effects of the agreement, but also on other consequential effects. Based on this I intend to shed light on what role this policy has played as a determining factor for migration capabilities to migrate from Senegal to Europe. Through a descriptive analysis of migration flow data, I first seek to present an overview of general migration trends from Senegal to the three main destinations of Senegalese migrants, namely Spain, France and Italy. I thereafter analyse how the agreement may have been effective in fulfilling the Spanish aim of decreasing irregular migration to the Canary Islands, before I finally demonstrate how the cooperation on control may have had an unintended consequence, namely a geographical diversion of the Senegalese migration flow. The analysis is based on secondary data from the
OECD’s International Migration Database, the UN Population Division migrant stock data and the DEMIG project’s bilateral migration flow data. I will complement the data analysis with information gathered during the interviews concerning the interviewees’ perceptions of the effects and effectiveness of the Spanish-Senegalese agreement.

### 7.1 Migration flows from Senegal to Europe 1990-2013

During the 1990s and 2000s, the patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe have undergone several changes. While the flow has steadily increased, it has gradually become more geographically dispersed and the types and modes of migration have been subject to change. Before elaborating on how one specific migration policy may have impacted on migration flows, it is important to understand not only the latest change, but also the overall changes in migration since migration patterns from Senegal were directed northwards in the end of the 1980s (Fall 2003, Willems 2013).

The UN Population Division has collected data on trends in international migrant populations every decennium since 1990. Since this data indicates the migrant stock, that is the migration population in a country, it does not reveal the complete nature of migrant arrivals throughout the period. While the OECD’s International Migration Database has yearly data on migration flows to Spain, France and Italy, they do not go back to as early as 1990. I therefore use the UN Population division migration stock data to indicate the general evolution of migration from Senegal to these countries from 1990 to the last year of data collection, 2013.

The size of the Senegalese migrant stock in Spain, France and Italy in 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2013 is presented in the figure below (Figure 1). What is evident concerning the year 1990 is that there are major differences in the stocks of Senegalese migrants in Spain, France and Italy. While only 3 367 Senegalese migrants were in Spain, the stocks of Senegalese migrants in Italy and France were at 44 973 and 73 801 respectively. Knowing the historical trait of Senegalese migration, this comes as no surprise. As elaborated earlier, migration to France has been high for several decades due to the two states’ colonial history. It was first in the late 1980s that migration to France was reduced. When France introduced new visa legislations in 1985 it became difficult for Senegalese to enter France legally, and many sought other destinations. Italy became a popular destination, and Senegalese migrants were able to find work in the tourist sector and at industrial sites in the northern parts of the
country. In the very end of the 1990s, Spain also became an attractive destination, particularly since the construction and agricultural sectors provided good job opportunities for Senegalese migrants at the time (Gerdes 2007). These migratory trends are reflected in the UN Population division stock data. While France still has the largest stock of migrants, the increase from 1990 to 2013 was as large in Italy, and even larger in Spain.

![Figure 1: Changes in the stock of Senegalese migrants in Spain, France and Italy 1990-2013. Source: UN Population Division Migration Stock Data 2013.](image)

During the decade following year 2000, both France and Spain’s stocks of Senegalese migrants increased considerably, in France by 33,058 and in Spain by 48,968. While there was a major increase also in the French setting, the stock of Senegalese in Spain in 2010 was more than fivefold to that of 2000. It is evident that the main destination country for Senegalese migrants changed from France to Spain, although the stock still remained highest in France. Spain also passed Italy in the size of the Senegalese immigrant stock in 2010.

Due to this major change in stock numbers one could assume that the general trends in migration from Senegal has changed, but the data from 2013 displays a different reality. Although the data from 2013 only presents the changes that have occurred during three, and not ten years, one may nevertheless argue that it demonstrates a new shift in migration patterns. After having increased with about 4,500 per decade in 1990-2000 and 2000-2010, the stock of Senegalese immigrants in Italy has increased with 25,000 over the course of only three years. In both France and Spain, the increase from 2010-2013 has been minimal compared to that of 2000-2010. This is particularly interesting in the Spanish case, since the
stock had increased by more than 14 000 in average per third year in the period between 2000 and 2010, and only increased by 2 000 from 2010 to 2013.

While this thesis assesses how migration policies determine migration flows, it is important to keep in mind that migration flows are not only a result of specific determinants such as economic incentives, social networks, expectations or migration policies. In line with the migration transition model, Senegal is going through a period of increased migration in parallel to processes of socioeconomic development (Skeldon 1997, de Haas 2011). In this perspective, one could contend that migration policies do not have any significant impact, since there has not been any major halt in the Senegalese migrant stock increases since 1990. However, as previously hypothesised, the structural conditions of migration policies will to some extent impact people’s capabilities to migrate. In the Senegalese case we thus see a pattern of increasing migration, in line with increased aspirations and capabilities to do so, while policy changes in both Senegal and Europe is likely to have affected the patterns of the flow, but not necessarily the overall volume.

In order to examine this line of thought, I will explore the changes in stock data from 2000 and onwards and investigate how the Senegalese agreement with Spain may have played into this. To do so I will make use of migration flow data from the DEMIG and the OECD databases, from 2000-2010. Unfortunately, since parts of these datasets only covers the years up to 2010 I cannot include the most recent changes in the migration flows. Still, since the main focus of this chapter is to analyse the effects of the 2006 agreement between Spain and Senegal, the lack of data on post 2010 migration flows is not a major drawback.

7.2 The rise and fall in flows to Spain in 2008-2009

As was reported by several interviewees, the border control agreement was “very effective”. It was particularly highlighted as a success by the interviewees representing the Spanish government and the Senegalese interviewees involved in diplomacy with European partners. The head of the Population and Planification Directorate explained that “in 2006, many young men died at the sea, and the number has really decreased [since then]. So Frontex, with the service of our border surveillance, was effective. Many are informed about the dangers of going by boat” (Interviewee 15). The Commissioner of the Police highlighted the importance of Senegal in this effectiveness: “It was more effective because of Senegal’s forceful contribution […]”, and its facilities that enabled improved border control. So it was in the
power of Senegal to make it effective” (Interviewee 6). The acknowledged effectiveness was based on the interviewees’ perceptions of the changes in the flow to Spain in the years following the agreement. All the people I spoke with in Senegal, also including other people than my interviewees, agreed that the flow to the Canaries had plummeted after 2007.

Figure 2: Flows of migration to Spain with Senegal as last residence. Source: DEMIG data 2013

The DEMIG data on migration depending on country of last residence shows that there indeed was a significant decrease in the number of migrants with Senegal as their last residence entering Spain from 2007 to 2008. This data covers both Senegalese and other nationals with Senegal as last residence, which is useful in this analysis since the border control did not only affect Senegalese nationals, but all migrants travelling by boat from Senegal. As seen in Figure 2, the number of migrant arrivals in Spain reached an ever high of 10,261 in 2007. In 2008 the number decreased, and in 2010 only 3093 immigrants were registered at arrival. A popular, while not necessarily the main, route for irregular migration to Spain has been the route crossing the Ocean to the Canary Islands. Both the increase and the subsequent decrease in numbers of migrants with Senegal as last residence may therefore indicate the beginning and the end of the “migration crisis” in the Canary Islands. Although not demonstrated by data, it is believable that the decrease was particularly present in the flow to the Canaries, and not to Spain as a whole. These datasets do not differentiate between Spanish regions, but we know from Frontex and Spanish government officials’ statements that the flow to the Canaries nearly stopped after the implementation of border control in the area (Interviewees 2, 3, 4 and Frontex 2009). This should be linked to the more general decrease as demonstrated by the data.
As can be stated from the figure above, my interviewees were correct in stating that there had been an extreme change in people’s capabilities to migrate to the Canaries after the 2006 agreement. However, one cannot exclude the possibility that also other factors were crucial in explaining this decrease. As elsewhere in Europe, the financial crisis emerged in Spain in the late 2000s, and, as became apparent during my interviews, this was very well known in Senegal. One of the major reasons for migration aspirations in Senegal is the aim of attaining increased income, and this would be particularly difficult at a time with a growing unemployment rate in the country of destination. On the other hand, the financial crisis did not only strike in Spain. As shall be demonstrated in Figure 3 below, it did not seem to affect migration aspirations to neither France nor Italy although these economies were also marked by the financial crisis.

7.3 Geographical diversion of flow

In research on migration policy and policy effects, there tends to be, as highlighted, a narrow focus on policy effectiveness. It has been suggested that other effects should be taken into consideration, such as categorical change and geographical diversion (Czaika and de Haas 2013). A possible change in migrant category is difficult to investigate based on the data available on Senegalese migration to Europe. It is further on not as relevant in this case, since the part of the flow likely to be affected by migration control policies are irregular migrants with limited possibilities to change into another, or legal, migration categories. The other suggestion, of an unintended substitution effect of geographical diversion, is on the other hand interesting to examine.

As was argued by many of my interviewees in Senegal, it is not possible to hinder the young Senegalese from leaving the country. They highlighted that while it might be possible to affect migration capabilities through border controls, people would always find new routes due to their high aspirations. This was also pointed out by one of the Spanish officials at the Embassy. “African migration is like a water balloon, right. If you press on one side, it will expand on the other”. He continued by saying that if the Spanish government really wanted to stop all irregular migration to Spain, they would have to invest in Frontex services all over the African Sahara (Interviewee 3). Also members of the Senegalese government highlighted that future migrants would not decide to stay based on migration control policies, but they
would seek other destinations and other routes. This was described in more detail during the group discussion at the UNODC, where I was explained that there had been an increase in smuggling and also trafficking of migrants from Senegal via Niger during the last years. While they did not acknowledge why this was the case, they stated that it was likely that part of the reason was the closure of the route across the Atlantic Ocean.

In the data on flows of Senegalese migrants to Spain, France and Italy in the period from 2000 till 2010, there are several noticeable changes in the different flows at different times (Figure 3). While keeping in mind that the Spanish flow also includes irregular migrants, while the two other do not, we can still draw general conclusions based on apparent changes in the flows. As already noticed, the flow to Spain is increasing towards 2007 and 2008, before it plunges in 2009 and 2010. In the Italian case, the flow is not increasing, but rather fluctuating in these years. Following a regularisation programme in Italy in 2002, the peak in 2003 must be seen as an abnormality, since the large majority of these migrants were registered this year, while actually having arrived irregularly earlier (Bonifazi et al. 2009). In 2005 the flow to Italy is halved, before it doubles in 2008 and 2009, and quadruples in 2010. While there are major changes in the amount of migrants arriving in Italy and Spain, the flow to France has a stable increase. It is seemingly unaffected by the factors that cause the changes in migration flows to Europe’s southern shore.

![Migration from Senegal to Spain, Italy and France 2000-2010](image)

**Figure 3**: Migration from Senegal to Spain, Italy and France 2000-2010. Source: OECD International Migration Database 2014.
While it is likely that the agreement affected the specific flow towards Spain, this graph demonstrates that it may possibly have affected the flows to other European destinations. It is particularly the flow towards Italy that is interesting in this respect. If following the balloon example as presented at the Spanish Embassy, migration from Senegal to Europe did not decrease as a whole due to the control mechanisms at the Senegalese shores, but it may have expanded to other migratory routes.

In the map below, I demonstrate how the size of the migration flows, illustrated by the size of the arrows, from Senegal to Spain and Italy changes during this time. As demonstrated by the flows in 2005, before the increase in migration to Spain, in 2007, at the peak of migration to Spain, and in 2010, when the flow had more than halved, the migration flow to Italy is changing correspondingly, although in the opposite direction. At the time of the peak in migration flows to Spain, the flow to Italy is at a low, and in 2010 when migration to Spain has decreased, it has increased to an all-time high for Italy (Figure 4).

![Figure 4: Flows of migration from Senegal to Spain and Italy in 2005, 2007 and 2010. The size of the arrows indicates the size of the different migration flows. Source: OECD International Migration Database 2014.](image)

It is interesting to underline this particular change in routes, because it reflects one of the possible unintended effects as it was theorised by Czaika and de Haas, namely a geographical
effect (2013). Although not often empirically proved, geographical diversions of flows have been suggested in other cases. A relevant example is the change in flows that led to the initial increase in migration to the Canary Islands. As argued by Carling, the installation of a technologically advanced surveillance structure called “Integrated System of External Vigilance” (SIVE) at the strait of Gibraltar, led to changes in the migratory routes to Spain in the early 2000s. The major geographical response to this was a decrease in the flows via the Strait of Gibraltar and an increase in flows to the Canary Islands (Carling 2007b). This may also explain the decrease in the migration flows to Italy in mid-2000s, as seen in figure 3. When migration to Spain in the areas around the Strait of Gibraltar increased in popularity, fewer migrants followed the eastern route across the Mediterranean to Italy. And similarly, when migratory routes via Morocco were constricted, boat migration from Senegal to the Canaries became increasingly popular, leaving Italy as a less attractive destination. With this in mind one may challenge Czaika and de Haas’ notion of geographical changes in migration patterns as unintended effects. With Spain’s former experience of changes in flows, it is not unlikely that they had foreseen that the migration flow would not stop, but simply be geographically changed. As the burden of the migration pressure was moved from the Canaries to Italy after the introduction of the border control policy, it can be seen as a success for Spain, at least in the short run. However, with the EU approach of a common migration policy in mind, one may ask what benefit was brought to the EU when moving the immigration pressure from one shore to another.

An important issue to reflect upon concerning the apparent geographical diversion in flows is, as mentioned, that the flow of migrants to Italy only includes regular and not irregular arrivals. While the decrease in Spain mostly regarded irregular migrants, as reported, a possible increase in irregular migration to Italy is not demonstrated by my datasets. It may be the case that the increase in flows would have been even higher if it included irregular arrivals, but since I do not have the relevant data, I cannot speculate on this. However, since the significant increase in migration flows to Spain during the 2000s was also apparent in the stock data (Figure 1), it may also be possible to use the stock data to reflect on changes in the flows to Spain and Italy after 2010. In 2010, the stock of Senegalese migrants in Spain exceeded the Italian stock, which historically has been major in comparison to the stock in Spain. However, by 2013, the Italian stock has again exceeded that of Spain over the course of three years. This latter increase in the migrant stock in Italy, which includes all registered migrants whether arrived irregularly or regularly, may imply that the border control
mechanisms introduced as part of the 2006 agreement did have some effect on the geographical pattern of the irregular migration flow from Senegal.

7.4 Conclusions: How agreements on migration control can affect Senegalese migration to Europe

It becomes clear from the data that the agreement on migration control between Spain and Senegal did affect Senegalese migration to Europe. This is most significant in the flows directly to Spain, as was also repeatedly argued by my interviewees in Dakar. It may be that control in the Spanish waters only, without an agreement with Senegal, could have led to a similar decrease in the migration flow to the Canary Islands, but on the other hand it is likely that the control mechanisms became far more effective when carried out along the shores of departure, in Senegalese waters.

While the agreement may have been effective in the sense that it decreased irregular migration to a particular country, it cannot be seen as being a far-reaching success. At the EU level, the possible ‘water balloon effect’ of a geographical diversion of the migration route cannot be seen as an impeccable policy outcome. While it certainly was a success for Spain in the midst of its ‘migration crisis’, it is not certain that the policy has led to a long-term decrease in Senegalese migration flows to the country.

When it comes to the successfulness of this agreement, it may be that the Senegalese government has scored the highest. While the government agreed to Spain’s terms of controlling migration, the Senegalese government has not had any major interest in curbing the irregular flow of migration. It has not had any major expenditure with the policy, but rather the opposite through the REVA agricultural development initiative included in the agreement. While not being significant for the Senegalese government, the possible geographical spread is likely to have been detrimental for the Senegalese involved. This is particularly important to recognise in relation to the increased risks involved with new and alternative migration routes. The interviewees at the UNODC were very eager to underline this point. As they saw it, the closure of the sea route had led irregular migrants to the more dangerous route of crossing the Sahara. This route did not only include a riskier terrestrial route, but also the risk of being stuck in transit in northern Africa, without managing to cross the Mediterranean or to return to Senegal (Interviewees 10, 11 and 12).
In general, the steady increase in the flow from Senegal to Europe should be seen as a sign of generally high migration aspirations in Senegal. This can again be seen as a consequence of the socioeconomic context. While the flow has increased, it has gradually become more geographically dispersed and the types and modes of migration have been subject to change. As found in this analysis, the agreement on migration control in 2006 could be seen as one of the determinants of the geographical diversion in flows between 2007 and 2010. It is therefore sensible to suggest also other changes in the flow may have been determined by state or policy changes elsewhere.

As mentioned in the methodological chapter, it would have been preferable to undertake a statistical analysis of migration flows including several factors, and in particular other policy factors, that may have determined the migratory changes. However, due to the difficulty of obtaining relevant data, this was not a possible option. The descriptive analysis presented above nevertheless demonstrates a number of important aspects, and based on the data, it can be concluded that the cooperation between Spain and Senegal may have affected Senegalese migration patterns in two ways; most importantly by reducing the number of immigrants arriving at the Canary Islands, and secondly, by possibly contributing to a geographical diversion of the migration flow from Senegal to Europe. These findings shed light on what power a state can have in influencing migration. As mentioned, migration cooperation between sending and receiving states focuses on migration control. While this can affect migrants’ capabilities to migrate, although to different extents, this strategy will not affect migrant’s aspirations to migrate. Knowing that migration is a function of capabilities and aspirations, and is likely to increase along with socioeconomic development, both sending and receiving states eager to manage migration, face a challenge. In order to manage migration, also migration aspirations, and not only capabilities, must be taken into account.

During my interviews, particularly two of the government’s projects were highlighted as successful. In addition to the cooperation on border control between Senegal and Spain, the migration awareness and information campaign were seen as imperative. This was government project to decrease aspirations to migrate irregularly. In the explanations of the campaign work, the different ministries spoke about the project as an accomplishment, and one of my interviewees pointed to the information campaigns as part of the reason for the decrease in irregular migration to Spain (Interviewee 13). This however, is not very likely to
be the case. The information campaigns did not only concern aspiration of irregular migration to Spain, but irregular migration in general. Since the flow to other destinations such as France and Italy did not decrease in the same period of time it is unlikely that the information campaign had any impact on the changes in the flows to Spain. On the other hand it may be the case that the information campaigns did affect some people’s aspirations to migrate irregularly. While it is doubtful that this initiative had a major impact on migration aspirations, it is an example of a different avenue through which migration policies can affect aspirations and not only migration capabilities.
8 Discussions and concluding remarks

By addressing the three foregoing questions, I have sought to shed light on the overall topic of the thesis, namely the policy determinants of migration and the role of the Senegalese government. In this final chapter I will firstly offer a discussion of the findings in the three foregoing chapters in light of the thesis’ theoretical underpinnings. As part of this I will discuss how the different analyses shed light on the discussion of policies as determinants of migration aspirations and capabilities. Secondly, I will reflect on the uses and limitations of the theoretical framework, and suggest future research that could build on this research. Finally, I will return to the overarching question posed at the outset of this thesis, namely the role of the Senegalese government in shaping patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe.

8.1 Analytical reflections: the policy determinants of migration

As stated in the thesis’ theoretical framework, much is hypothesised but less is established regarding the role of states and policies in determining migration (de Haas 2011). In the case of Senegal, the role of the state and its policies has been omitted from analyses on the determinants of migration as well as from studies on migration policy cooperation between Europe and Africa. By analysing the government’s approach to migration from Senegal to Europe, when and why the government cooperates with Europe on migration regulation, and how existing agreements on migration regulation affect patterns of migration, this thesis has reached a number of different conclusions regarding the policy determinants of migration in the Senegalese case.

8.1.1 Absence of coherence in the government’s approaches to migration

In the chapter on the Senegalese government’s approach to migration, the analysis of the government’s migration management revealed that there are numerous actors involved in the creation of migration policies. With a clear lack of communication between the ministries, the ministries carry out both similar and divergent activities (see Table 1), and the narratives and approaches to migration from Senegal to Europe also differs within the government (see Table 2).

In the analysis in chapter 5, five interests were found to be more significant than others. These interests were: An interest in continued migration aspirations and capabilities to
migrate to Europe, and particularly an increase in migrants capability to migrate legally; an interest in increased diaspora remittances and investments; a domestic political interest in gaining political support for the president; an international political interest in establishing and maintaining good international relationships, and lastly; an interest in increased foreign development initiatives and economic investment.

While these interests are listed individually, they were clearly interconnected. In particular the government’s interest in continued migration through enhanced migration capabilities should be seen as a natural consequence of two other interests: to satisfy the voting population, who in general has high migration aspirations, and to secure future remittances and investments from the diaspora. On the opposite side, the interest in increased legal migration, and therefore indirectly decreased capacities of irregular migration, should be seen in relation to the importance of good international relationships, which again is seen to serve the overarching objective of increased foreign development initiatives and investment.

The lack of a clear narrative of migration among Senegalese officials must be seen as an essential factor for the difficulties of finding common goals and policies within the government. In the theoretical framework, migration is understood as a function of aspirations and capabilities, and states and policies are presented as determinants of migration aspirations and capabilities. The assessment of the government’s approach to migration revealed that there is a link between the extent to which a state can influence migration aspirations and capabilities, and the level of convergent interests within the state, which will affect its ability to create policies with clear and coherent goals. This ability, as briefly noted, could also be seen in relation to the level of democracy within the government (Pian 2010). While different actors with different narratives would compromise and reach a discursive coalition in democratic states, this has not been the case in Senegal. The lack of clarity in the government’s approach to migration is likely to affect policy outcome. Therefore, knowledge about the narratives of migration aspirations and capabilities within a government is found to be significant in order to understand the role the government can play in shaping migration patterns.

8.1.2 Linkages between the negotiation forms and the government’s decision-making
Regarding the analysis of the second research question, when and why the government cooperate with Europe on migration regulation, several aspects have implications for the
overall research question. As found by the comparison of the two different negotiation processes, the one between Senegal and Spain and the one between Senegal and the European Commission, an interplay of factors affect Senegalese decision-making. A vital prerequisite for Senegal to agree on migration control policy with European partners is that the agreement is of added value to the government. The added value is not only dependent on the incentives in the agreement, but also the government’s negotiation position, the context of the negotiations, and the number of Senegalese actors involved.

The findings in chapter 6 reflected the finding of chapter 5, namely that it is important to know how migration, and migration aspirations and capabilities, are narrated within a government too understand what policies it will pursue, and also what agreements it is capable to agree upon. The different ministries’ narratives of migration shed light on what power the sending state has in negotiations of migration policy with receiving states. As mentioned in the introduction, recent research has found that while cooperating on migration policies, sending states are capable to use the receiving states’ wish to control migration as a mean to advance their own political agendas (Hamilton 1997, Paoletti 2011). In the Senegalese case, the negotiations on migration control between Spain and Senegal exemplifies this power. By agreeing on migration control, the government was promised financial assistance and other political prioritised incentives. In the negotiations of a Mobility Partnership, however, the government was not able to advance its own agenda, due to the lack of coherent objectives. This points to a crucial factor omitted in the literature on migration cooperation between sending and receiving states, namely that the governance structure and the ability of a government to form coherent objectives in the migration discourse is a key condition for the sending state to have strong bargaining power in international negotiations.

In sum, Senegalese decision-making will depend on two aspects; firstly, the combination of any agreement’s coherence with the interests and approaches to migration within the Senegalese government, and secondly, the form and the context of the negotiation process. When there is a lack of clear coherence in objectives, the decision-making outcome can be dependent on the form of the negotiations. Regarding the question of the importance of policy determinants, it is self-evident that the Senegalese government has a major role in affecting patterns of migration through its decisions of how and when it creates or agrees on policies. While the role of the government also is dependent on the actual policy outcome, as
will be assessed below, the role is first and foremost depend on what policies it pursues, and particularly what decisions it take concerning cooperation with European actors on measures aimed at decreasing people’s capabilities to migrate to Europe.

8.1.3 Senegalese migration control can affect migration capabilities

The third question in my analysis concerned the impact of existing agreements in shaping patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe. As demonstrated in the descriptive analysis, there was a drop in the number of migrants arriving in Spain from Senegal after the implementation of the migration control policy. However, the flow of migration from Senegal to Europe in general was not necessarily affected by the agreement, and the flow to Italy suddenly increased. While it is not certain, it is plausible that this was influenced by the agreement on migration control.

The fact that the agreement did affect the migration flow to Spain, and that it possibly affected the geographical diversion of the flow, highlights three aspects in the discussion on the role of the Senegalese state in shaping patterns of migration. Firstly, it points to the fact that the Senegalese government has a potential to affect migration capabilities, by imposing migration control mechanisms to influence the geography of the flow. Secondly, it points to how this impact should be measured. In opposition to what is usually pointed out in the literature, such policies should not only include one actors’ view of effectiveness, but also other viewpoints and other changes in migration patterns, such as possible geographical diversions or other substitution effects (de Haas 2011). Thirdly, the policy determinants should not only be measured as having an impact on migration in general. When a migration policy affects the diversion of the flow but not the size, it points to it being effective in shaping peoples’ capabilities to migrate through a particular route, but it does not affect the migration aspirations.

The migration policy that has been assessed in order to conclude on migration policy effects, must be seen as only affecting the capabilities of people to migrate. However, other aspects of the approach to migration in the government concerned migration aspirations. As mentioned, several of the ministries were involved in the creation of awareness campaigns in the rural districts of Senegal. The objective of these campaigns was to inform the public about the risks with irregular migration, and as such change their aspirations to migrate into aspirations to migrate legally. Another type of policies aimed at affecting migration
aspirations, are the development initiatives included in the government’s agreements on migration with Europe. The combination of development and migration policies is part of the aim with the GAMM framework for European-African cooperation, but the objectives with the development aspect differs among the partners. While Senegalese officials clearly conveyed that they were interested in development and economic growth in general, they did not believe it would decrease the young population’s aspirations to migrate (Interviewees 13 and 14). The European partners’ involvement with the development and migration initiatives should be seen as a mean to decrease the alleged ‘pressure to migrate’ from Senegal, but the possibility of these policies to decrease migration aspirations can be contested. In line with the transition model, increased development does not necessarily decrease aspirations, but it does increase migration capabilities (de Haas 2011). Since the Spanish officials were eager to underline that they no longer pursued to combine migration and development issues, it may be that the linkage of development and migration policy is up for discussion within the EU.

8.2 Theoretical reflections and suggestions for further research

To my knowledge, this study has been the first to apply this particular theoretical framework, and the first to explore the internal approaches to migration within the Senegalese government and the government’s role in shaping patterns of migration. Due to this preliminary aspect of the thesis, there are several topics herein that would deserve increased attention and further research.

First of all, the application of the determinants of aspirations and capabilities framework to my case was a pilot study. Whereas the framework is very applicable to an individual-level analysis, its applicability to a state-level study was less obvious. However, seeing that the state is a determining factor for migration, it should be possible to apply the framework to my case and thereby reach more in-depth understandings of the state’s role in affecting aspirations and capabilities. As for the main research question, I believe the theoretical framework was useful in order to distinguish between different modes through which the government could shape migration patterns. Similarly for the third sub-question, the framework was valuable in order to shed light on how migrants’ geographical capacity was affected in particular. However, the framework presented did not originally take governmental internal dynamics into account, but in order to understand how the state was a determining factor for migration, I had to assess this determining factor more in-depth as I
did with the two first sub-questions. I therefore included aspects of policy narratives into the framework, in order to understand the internal dynamics of the state.

This choice was clearly valuable for my analysis. While the framework original’ individual level focus was useful to have in mind, the introductions of the narratives perspective made it possible to apply the framework at a state-level. It has been acknowledged that the narratives are likely to depend on the different audiences of the government, but based on my interpretations of the narratives, and particularly how the interviewees seemed unaware that they changed their opinions during the interviews, I did not consider the option that the government was conscious of its diverging narratives. For future research, it could be interesting to investigate the level of awareness of conveying such different narratives, by for example including notions of doublespeak, front stage versus back stage narratives, or conflicts of interests’ theories into the theoretical framework (see for instance Goffman 1967 and Browne et al. 1984). This could shed new light on the understandings of how different types of narratives and interests inform policymaking.

Overall, it was stimulating to apply this recent framework to my case, and I believe it enhanced the level of detail in my analysis and findings. However, for future students considering applying this framework to other cases, I believe it would be interesting to incorporate other disciplinary insights. In particular, it would be useful to merge the theoretical framework, with political science theories and theories on the politics of policies, or as suggested, with other perspectives on narratives (see for instance Cohen and Layton-Henry 1997, Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Since this approach would be yet another amendment of an existing theory, it is sensible to consider what has been argued by others, namely that it is impossible to create an all-encompassing theory of migration (Salt 1987, Castles and Miller 2009). However, does such a theory have to take the form of an unchanging law? Seeing that migration is a constantly changing phenomenon in a constantly changing society, it may be that such an encompassing theory would have to adapt to such change. In my view, this is a useful way of approaching studies on migration, and in this sense the framework developed by de Haas (2011), can be a useful starting point. The understanding of migration as a function of opportunity is an open-ended theory, possible to build upon depending on the topic, and timing, of future research.
In addition to this theoretical note, I will include a note on terminology. In the beginning of the thesis, I outlined how I understood the terms migration control, regulation and management. Throughout the text I have applied these terms accordingly, where migration management has regarded the organisation of the governments’ actions in the field, migration regulation has referred to all different juridical policy measures, and migration control has referred to the measures aimed at affecting the cross-border movements of migrants. In retrospect, this understanding has proved useful in my case. Particularly when discussing the internal dynamics in the government, it was valuable to be able to differentiate different government actions with these different terms. I believe it contributed to enhancing the clarity of my analysis, and I would argue that the inclusion of a description of the application of these terms in academic papers is important, although it may be others that do not agree with my specific understanding of the terms.

In relation to the quantitative analysis of the agreement between Senegal and Spain, it would be very interesting to compare my analysis to analyses of other sending states’ migration policies and the changes thereafter. If similar conclusions regarding the policies role in determining capabilities had been made, it would have been possible to generalise about the role of the sending state to a larger extent than what I can do based on a single case. If future students wish to elaborate on the findings of this thesis, I therefore suggest undertaking similar analyses of different, and several cases. Moreover, since deficiencies in data on migration patterns and migration policies make it difficult to carry out valuable statistical analyses, further engagement in the collection of relevant data is important. While recent projects, such as the DEMIG project, have contributed to improving databases of migration patterns and policy (see for instance Vezzoli et al. 2014) increased data coverage would highly improve options for statistical analyses of states and policies’ determining role for migration.

While this thesis has shed light on some of the ways in which states, through their policies, can influence migration aspirations and migration capabilities, I believe it would be valuable to move beyond the particularity of the Senegalese case. Since Senegal, as found, does not have a large array of different migration policies, I believe that qualitative analyses of other types of sending state migration policies, moving beyond migration control policies, could have reached broader and possibly complementary findings to those of this thesis.
8.3 Concluding remarks

In this thesis I have aimed to understand what role the Senegalese government plays in determining migration from Senegal to Europe. By studying the government’s organisation of migration issues, its migration policy interests and current agreements on migration regulation between Senegal and European states, I have assessed the three guiding sub-questions; 1) what is the Senegalese government’s approach to migration from Senegal to Europe?, 2) when and why does the Senegalese government choose to cooperate with Europe on measures intended to regulate migration?, and 3) how can existing agreements on migration regulation affect patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe? Based on the analyses of these questions, the thesis reveals that numerous factors underlie the Senegalese government’s decision-making regarding migration regulation and cooperation with European actors. It is believed that the Senegalese government has a potential to influence the geographical pattern of migration, while the government’s current role is less significant.

This thesis’ focus on the Senegalese government contributes to the general understanding of what role a sending state can play in international migration management and in which ways cooperation between sending and receiving states can determine patterns of migration by affecting migration aspirations or migration capabilities. Through the analyses presented, it is demonstrated that Senegal, as a sending state, may have the capacity to shape the geographical pattern of migration through control policies that affect migration capabilities.

As suggested by this thesis, regulation of migration to Europe is not a major political objective in Senegal, and migration control policies are therefore most likely to be the result of agreements between Senegal and European states. The role the Senegalese state plays in shaping such agreements could have been more prominent than it currently is. The absence of a well-functioning system of migration management in the Senegalese government limits the government’s possibility to create clear and coherent objectives with its migration policies. The deficits in the current government structure, where areas of responsibility are overlapping, are due to the numerous different interests with and narratives of migration, and a lack of ambition to reach compromises democratically.

Another finding of this study is thus that a sending state’s role in shaping patterns of migration is not only dependent on the policies that are pursued, but the structure of
migration organisation within the government. This will also impact the sending state’s bargaining position in negotiations of migration cooperation. This points to a shortcoming in the current European-African framework for migration cooperation since moral considerations of the capability of sending states to negotiate migration based on a democratic process of decision-making are, to my knowledge, absent. While my interviewees representing European states and actors acknowledged that there was a lack of a functioning democratic governance structure on issues of migration, they did not reflect on this as a matter to take into account when negotiating migration management with Senegal.

For the time being, migration from Senegal to Europe is likely to continue due to socioeconomic developments that maintain migration aspirations and increases migration capabilities. Senegal, particularly in cooperation with European states, can shape migrants’ geographical opportunities through policies, but such policies are not likely to affect the overall size of the irregular migration flow. A possible avenue of shaping the patterns of migration would be to increase people’s capabilities to migrate legally, which is also a major aim for the Senegalese government. Legal migration opportunities, however, are dependent on European states’ will to cooperate on this, and it is not always within the power of the Senegalese government to affect the matter.

Based on the findings of my analysis, the Senegalese government has the potential to play a powerful role in determining patterns of migration from Senegal to Europe, but its current role is limited. The demonstrated outcome of the Spanish-Senegalese agreement points to the government’s potential to shape migration capabilities through migration policies. The creation of such policies will be dependent on the government’s will to create or sign, and implement a policy. However, since the management of migration is not high on the Senegalese priority list, the creation and implementation of migration policies is likely to be dependent on initiatives from European states. The Senegalese government’s decision-making will depend on the form of the negotiations and the proposed agreement’s coherence with Senegalese interests, which again will be dependent on the coherence within the government and the narratives of migration among the people and ministries that are included in the process. As suggested by the findings of this thesis, sending states have the potential to influence migration through migration policies aimed at affecting migration capabilities. The extent of impact will be dependent on the internal governance structure of the state, existing
socioeconomic and political determinants, and current aspirations and capabilities to migrate among the population.
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Appendices

Appendix 1

Interview Guide

This initial interview guide was changed depending on the context and the different interviewees background. The interview guide is in English, although the interviews were carried out in French.

Introduction

Thank you very much for taking the time to meet me.

I am a master student at the University of Oslo and I write my thesis about migration and migration policies in Senegal.

My main aim is to find out how Senegalese authorities approach migration control, and how they seek to cooperate on issues of migration with the EU and European countries.

It important to receive your consent that the interview will be recorded. This will only be done for the purpose of transcribing the interview. Are you fine with this?

It is likely that I will use the information I receive today in my thesis. If so, you will remain anonymous and I will only describe you with the name of your position, such as (example). Is that ok for you?

Cooperation about Frontex

Could you tell me what you know of the cooperation between Spain and Senegal regarding Frontex?
(What does it include? Surveillance at sea, at the coast, land, where, how and by whom)
(e.g. Readmission in 2006)

Could you tell me about the MOU between Senegal and Spain in 2006 that allowed for the Frontex operations?

Do you think the Frontex activities would be just as effective if Senegal did not cooperate? Or is it thanks to Senegal that it was effective?

Who were participating in the negotiations from the Senegalese side?

Why do you think the Senegalese authorities at that time wanted to cooperate on this?

What where the benefits for Senegal in this cooperation? (How important was the other incentives, such as development aid (REVA), and the legal route of migration (Spain gave visas to Senegal)
Do you think the cooperation had something to do with the government at that time, and that President Wade wanted to gain support? (Because of visas, legal routes for migration and development?)

I have been told there was a written MOU between Senegal and Spain, would it be possible to access this?

**Migration policies and border control**

What different border control activities are carried out in Senegal?

What is the aim of these activities? (To decrease/stop irregular migration?)

Do you think they are effective in decreasing migration?

After the Frontex initiative, the flow towards the Canary Islands decreased. Do you think the migrants started to take a different path?

What routes do most irregular migrants take now?

How has the composition of the irregular flow, the direction of the flow and the number of migrants changed over the past ten years?

What is the link between these changes and changes in migration policies?

**Senegalese intentions and European cooperation**

How do different directories and ministries work together on issues of migration control?

What do you think is the main approach of the Senegalese government to emigration control?

Do they have an interest in continued irregular migration, e.g. due to the money sent back from the diaspora?

In general, I feel that the government both tries to curb irregular migration through border control, and also try to make young people stay at home through development projects such as REVA. Do you agree with this? Do you think it works?

Would you say Senegal has any power to determine emigration to Europe?

Would you say the Senegalese management of migration has changed much after 2006, and particular with the new president?

Have you heard of the negotiations of a mobility partnership between the EU and Senegal in 2008? (Why do you think Senegal did not want to cooperate on this?)

What are the Senegalese government’s intentions when they cooperate on migration issues with Europe?
What types of policy cooperation does Senegal have with Europe?

How do you think this will evolve in the future?

**Other contacts**

Considering what we’ve discussed and what you know about my interest, do you think of any other topics I should know about?

Do you know any others I could speak to in other ministries to understand what these ministries do to determine migration? Would you be able to put me in contact with these?

Thank you for your time. It was very helpful.
### Appendix 2

**List of informants and details of interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NR</th>
<th>RELEVANT POSITION</th>
<th>ORGANISATION / INSTITUTION</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Head of Sector</td>
<td>European Commission, Immigration and Asylum Directorate</td>
<td>24.01.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>First Councillor</td>
<td>Spanish Embassy in Dakar</td>
<td>05.02.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Councillor for the Spanish Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Spanish Embassy in Dakar</td>
<td>05.02.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Homeland Security attaché</td>
<td>Spanish Embassy in Dakar</td>
<td>05.02.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Professor and researcher on Senegalese migration</td>
<td>Université Cheikh Anta Diop</td>
<td>07.02.14</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Commissioner of police</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior, Police Directorate of the Air and Borders</td>
<td>12.02.14</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Previous First Councillor</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad</td>
<td>13.02.14</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Project Manager, Senegal Country Office</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration (IOM)</td>
<td>17.02.14</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Director of the Directorate of Support and Investment Projects in the General Directorate of the Senegalese Abroad</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad</td>
<td>18.02.14</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Associate Expert, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Group</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Regional Office for West and Central Africa</td>
<td>19.02.14</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Project Manager, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Group</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Regional Office for West and Central Africa</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Project Coordinator, Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Group</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Regional Office for West and Central Africa</td>
<td>19.02.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Programme Manager of “Programme d'Appui au Secteur Privé et à la Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie” (PLASEPRI)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad/ Ministry of Economy and Finance</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Technical councillor</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>21.02.14</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Head of the Population and Social Planification Directorate</td>
<td>Ministry of Planification</td>
<td>25.02.14</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Project leader on issues of border management</td>
<td>The European Union’s Delegation in Senegal</td>
<td>27.02.14</td>
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