Some recent authors have argued that Aquinas deliberately integrated a pacifist outlook into his just war theory. Others, by contrast, have maintained that his rejection of pacifism was unequivocal. The present article attempts to set the historical record straight by an examination of Aquinas’s writings on this topic. In addition to q. 40, a. 1 of *Summa theologiae* II–II, the text usually cited in this connection, this article considers the biblical commentaries where Aquinas explains how the Gospel “precepts of patience,” especially Matt. 5:39, “Do not resist evil,” should be interpreted in light of the doctrine of just war. The article concludes that Aquinas formulated a two-stage theory whereby pacifism was rejected as a suitable form of agency for the state (*respublica*), while it was affirmed as the appropriate response to evil for the agency of the church (*ecclesia*).

The first *articulus* of Thomas Aquinas’s seminal treatment of just war in *Summa theologiae* II–II, Q. 40 (“De bello”) bears the title “Whether waging war is always sinful?” This creates the impression that the article’s main purpose was to show that resort to force is usually sinful, although occasions may arise when it will be justified. Some commentators have thereby concluded that Aquinas sought to build a high fence around the idea of just war, restricting its application to all but the most urgent of cases. The title had been affixed by the learned saint in order to express a strong presumption against any resort to armed force, and in this fashion he discreetly voiced his sympathy for the alternative tradition of Christian
pacifism.¹ In other words, by “starting with the idea that war might be sinful, Aquinas seems to establish a burden of proof in favor of nonviolence and against war” (Miller 2002, 181).²

Developing this line of thought, Richard Miller has argued that the overall tenor of Question 40 (Article 1 especially) evinces Aquinas’s intent to engage positively with pacifism. Hence against James Turner Johnson and other proponents of the “presumption against injustice” view,³ Miller maintains that Aquinas “enshrine[s] nonviolent values” as “the basis for impelling moral inquiry into the ethics of war.”⁴

How Aquinas may be situated within the ongoing debate for and against a “presumption against war” will not be assessed here, as I have already taken up this theme elsewhere.⁵ My aim is rather to show how arguments in favor of this view, especially as advanced in Miller 2002, proceed from a mistaken reading of the medieval theologian’s writings on just war.

1. *An inquiry regarding the permissibility of war, not its sinfulness*

The title “Whether waging war is always sinful” is usually alleged as evidence that Article 1 of ST Q. 40 was expressly intended to discuss the sinfulness of war, with the implication that Aquinas came to the traditional doctrine of just war with strong reservations about its applicability. However, militating against this reading is the fact that the *Summa theologiae*, as it emerged from the pen of Aquinas (or was dictated to his secretary), originally showed no titles for the individual articles. These were indeed numbered, but, apart from those instances

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¹ For a particularly emphatic articulation of this reading, see Calvez 2005, 98.

² At this juncture Miller is summing up the interpretation of J. Bryan Hehir and David Hollenbach. (see n. 28, 181, for the textual references).


⁴ Miller 2002, 183.

⁵ Reichberg 2007.
where the author interpolated a prefatory comment, each began simply with an enumeration of opening objections. Thus, in Q. 40, A. 1, the objections begin with the statement “Proceeding to the first article, it would seem that waging war is always sinful” (...videtur quod bellare semper sit peccatum) An early editor of the Summa took the second part of this statement, and, with the addition of the interrogative “utrum” (whether) constructed the title that appears in the modern Latin editions of the work. While it does provide a succinct summary of the four objections, taken as a representation of the doctrine expounded by the author in the body of the article, the title is misleading, since the text says scant little about the sinfulness of war, either by way of affirmation or denial.

A more accurate representation of the article’s content is provided by Aquinas himself in the short prologue to Q. 40, where he outlines the topics to be discussed in the ensuing four articles. Article 1, he tells us, will inquire “whether any war is licit” (utrum aliquod bellum sit licitum). Licitum was then the standard term used by theologians and canon lawyers in evaluating actions whose normative status was in some measure open to doubt. Neither patently good (as say, loving God for God’s own sake, or donating alms to the poor), nor patently bad (for instance, detesting God, or committing fraud), a reasonable, educated, and well-intentioned person could have reason to be perplexed over the moral specification, good or bad, of these sorts of actions. In the face of such doubt, the problem would be to decide whether the said performance was allowable in the light of natural, human, or divine law. Should this question be settled in the affirmative, the further question might be raised whether the act could have the special dignity of virtue, or inversely, whether its goodness was

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6 The authoritative “Leonine” edition of the Summa theologiae (reproduced in Thomas Aquinas 1941-45) is no exception. However, in the most recent French translation (Thomas Aquinas 1985, vol. 3, 279) the editor wisely reverted to the topic specified in the prologue to Q. 40, so that the title to the article reads “Y a-t-il une guerre qui soit licite.”

7 The term does not share a common linguistic root with lex (law), hence it is best rendered by “permissible” or “allowable,” rather than “lawful.”
minimal, so that, despite the lack of any special prohibition, people intent on reaching higher levels of human perfection should voluntarily refrain from this course of conduct.

Of the over eight hundred articles in the *Secunda-secundae*, exactly fifty-eight have for purpose to determine whether a particular act ought to be judged permissible. The vast majority of the other articles are organized around the categories of virtue and vice. When Aquinas asks whether a certain act $x$ is sinful, aside from a single exception$^8$ he always responds in the affirmative. The same affirmative reply holds for nearly all of the articles that inquire whether a certain act $y$ should be counted a virtue.$^9$ Quite obviously then, in writing the *Secunda-secundae*, Aquinas did not approach his material from a neutral standpoint, as though the normative valence of the wide range of acts under evaluation was in each case equally up for grabs. To the contrary, by orienting the *utrum* question around the typology of virtue and vice, he indicated what positive or negative presumption was operative in each individual case. Thus, when the first objection of an article states that a certain act $x$ “is not a sin” (or “not always a sin”) this is a clear indication that Aquinas will demonstrate in the body of the article how $x$ truly is a sin. The same pattern holds for those articles wherein the objections assert that “$y$ is not a virtue.” This is a clear indication that Aquinas was himself certain, from the very outset, that the act should be classified as a virtue; hence the very burden of the article would be to demonstrate how such was indeed the case. We should accordingly approach with some caution Miller’s assertion (taken from Chenu) that a scholastic article was “meant to impel inquiry into a doubtful matter” (Miller 2002, 179). This

$^8$ Quite strikingly, this exception is Q. 40, A.1, where the question raised in the first objection, “whether waging war is always sinful” is answered in the negative. This, likewise, is one of the very few articles in which the topic of the articulus, as formulated in the prologue to the quaestio, does not correspond to the interrogative form of the first objection. This indicates that the “De bello” did not fit neatly into the rubric that Aquinas had established in the antecedent questions on charity. The special character of Question 40 is likewise reinforced by the fact that it represents the very first appearance of a licitum question in the *Secunda-secundae*.

$^9$ The sole exception is Q. 29, A. 1, “De pace,” where the question, “whether peace is a virtue” is answered in the negative. The point is that peace is the product or outcome of virtue, rather than having the form of virtue itself.
claim holds true, not of the generality of articles in the *Secunda-secundae*, most of which raise merely rhetorical questions about matters that in Aquinas’s view are settled and thus not open to doubt, but only to the quite limited range of articles that examine whether a particular act should be deemed *licitum*.

Does an inquiry framed in terms of *permissibility* indicate a presumption against the moral goodness of the act under examination? In other words, when Aquinas takes up a topic under this rubric, does he mean to tell us that the burden of proof lies with the affirmative position (doing x is indeed permissible), with the assumption that, absent such proof, the act in question will pertain to the category of sin? Here again, we must take care not to over-generalize the pattern of questioning found in other parts of the *Secunda-secundae*. Unlike the hundreds of questions framed in terms of virtue and vice (which, as we have seen, almost invariably are answered in a single direction only) the fifty-eight licitness *quaestiones* are answered both affirmatively and negatively, without any discernable pattern one way of the other.

In addition to Q. 40, A. 1, “Whether any war is licit,” some other *licitum* questions in the *Secunda-secundae* receiving a positive reply are: Q. 60, “whether it is licit to judge [the actions of another person]; Q. 64, A. 2, “whether it is licit to kill sinners”; q. 64, A. 7, “whether licitly a man may kill another in self-defense”; Q. 65, A. 2, “whether licitly fathers may strike sons and servants”; Q. 66, A. 2, “whether licitly one may be at it were the private possessor of a thing”; Q. 66., A. 7, “whether licitly one may steal something out of necessity,” Q. 69, A. 3, “whether licitly the accused can escape judgment by appealing”; Q. 77, A. 4, “whether in trading one may licitly sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it; Q. 89, A. 2, “whether it is licit to take an oath”; Q. 108, A. 1, “whether vengeance is licit”; Q. 187, A., 1, “whether religious licitly may teach, preach, and the like”; Q. 187, A. 2, “whether religious may licitly occupy themselves with secular business; Q. 187, A. 4, “whether religious may
licitly live on alms”; Q. 189, A. 8, “whether it is licit to pass from one religious order to another.”

One might assume that a licitum question would arise apropos of acts that prima facie cause harm, in which case there would be at least an initial presumption against them. But a review of the articles above shows that this is not necessarily the case (for instance the issue whether religious may licitly teach and preach). Nor for that matter does Aquinas invariably raise such questions within a treatment of vice, which again might suggest a presumption against them, since several of the above articles are placed within quaestiones that discuss acts or conditions related to virtue: thus Q. 60 “on judgment” is part of a sequence on the virtue of justice; Q. 89 “on oath taking” pertains to an act of the virtue of religion; Q. 108 “on vengeance” details one of the virtues needed for civic life; while QQ. 187 and 189 consider the vowed state of religious perfection. And even when a licitum question is posited within the analysis of a vice, it should not be assumed on this basis that Aquinas thereby intended to suggest a presumption against it. An example would be private property, a practice he deemed legitimate, but which he nevertheless treated within a quaestio devoted to the vice of theft (Q. 66, A. 2).

2. Just war in the “treatise” on charity
Miller maintains that the overall strategy in Q. 40 was to establish a tight connection between just war and the exigencies of Christian charity. The pacifist objections that figure at the head of Q. 40, A. 1, were, he argues, reminders that just war must remain qualified “by considerations of charity,” such that it will reflect “the commitments that ought to inform a Christian approach to war” (Miller 2002, 177).

This interpretation of Q. 40 as demonstrating a bias in favor of non-violence (a “presumption against war”) will be further considered in part 3 below. At this juncture, we
need ask only whether the subordination of just war to the exigencies of Christian charity was Aquinas’s specific rationale for positioning his treatment of bellum iustum within the section of the Secunda–secundae that he devoted theological caritas.10

In his prologue to Q. 39 “On schism”, this is how Aquinas describes this sequence of questions of which Q. 40, “De bello” is a part:

Among the vices contrary to peace (pax), we must now consider those that involve outward deeds, namely schism, brawling, sedition, and war (bellum).

In Aquinas’s lexicon, pax designates an effect of charity. Hence, any vice that violates peace a fortiori will stand in opposition to caritas. Bellum, as it appears in this list, is unambiguously the name of a vice. This is borne out by its companionship with the other terms mentioned, each of which designates the sinful violation of a specific type of inter-personal peace (“concord”). And indeed, when one reads the articles devoted respectively to these three vices, the account in each case is directed squarely upon the sinfulness of the acts in question. Schism and sedition are termed “special sorts of sin,” while brawling is condemned as “always sinful.” In light of this treatment one would expect his account of war to follow the same path; yet upon reaching Q. 40 the author abruptly shifts course. Rather than detailing the contours of a sin he instead explains under what conditions a war might be deemed just.

Clearly, some special characteristic sets apart “war” apart from “schism,” “brawling,” and “sedition.” While it would be contradictory to speak of a “just schism,” a “just brawling” or a “just sedition” (the three terms denote sin and sin only) “war” alone permits sub-classification into good and bad kinds. Curiously, however, Aquinas does not work up a terminological contrast between “just” and “unjust” war. Despite the expectation created by its placement among the “sins against peace,” he says scant little about unjust war in q. 40.

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10 This section (which in the Thomistic literature is referred to as the “treatise” on theological charity) runs from QQ. 23–46; it includes a treatment of the virtue and its respective acts, its “fruits” (i.e., immediate effects such as joy and peace), the associated “gift” of wisdom, and a survey of the opposing vices (hatred, discord, and so forth).
Although Aquinas does note in A. 1 that a “depraved intention can render war illicit,” the term “bellum iniustum” does not itself figure anywhere in the quaestio.11 Instead, after announcing (in the prologues to QQ. 37 and 39) that he will discuss a sin called “bellum,” he proceeds in Q. 40 to describe a good act named “just war.” There is a patent discrepancy between, on the one hand, the theme of war as announced in the prologue to Q. 39, and the actual treatment of this theme, on the other.

It was thus the dynamics of unjust war (a sin he simply names bellum), rather than the exigencies of just war, that originally prompted Aquinas to take up the moral problem of war in his treatise on charity. In so doing his goal was to demonstrate how wrongful war, along with other conflict-causing vices such as discord and schism, stands opposed to the concordia that flows from charity. Of itself, this negative reason for including bellum among the sins against charity provides scant support for the claim that just war must in some special way (over and above what is required of any human act) be measured by the demands of Christian charity. Nor, for that matter, does this placement indicate that just war should itself be viewed positively as an act of charity, say to aid the innocent in their hour of need, if necessary by the sacrifice of one’s own life. While neither implication is expressly excluded (charity as a principle of just-war restraint, or inversely a principle empowering the use of force to protect the innocent from harm), it must be emphasized that it was not just war, but rather its opposite, unjust war, that dictated the inclusion of the former within the treatise on charity.

In fact there is every indication that when Aquinas initially formulated his design for the “sins against charity” (as indicated by his prologue to Q. 34), he was not even thinking of just war. His goal was rather to elucidate how the “fruits of the Spirit,” with charity at their head, and including peace, are contravened by a set of conflict-causing vices. In the process of

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11 Bellum iniustum is however introduced later, in II-II, Q. 69, A. 4, to designate a condemned prisoner’s forcible resistance against a just sentence of capital punishment.
enumerating these sins he eventually took up the problem of wrongful war (first mentioned in the prologue to Q. 37), and then realized, somewhat belatedly, that this sin could not be discussed without offering some comment on its opposite, bellum iustum.

In situating the quaestio on just war within the treatise of charity Aquinas sought to strike a delicate balance. On the one hand, if he had placed it within the treatise on justice, the theme of punishment would have taken center stage. Just war would then have been conceptualized first and foremost as a penal sanction against wrongdoing. Yet Aquinas himself seemed reluctant to proceed in this manner. Hence, when the theme of punishment is later taken up in the Secunda–secundae treatise on justice (QQ. 57–122), just war receives little or no mention in this connection. On the other hand, in Q. 40 “De bello” Aquinas never posits just war specifically as an act of charity. In his enumeration of the acts elicited by this virtue (love, mercy, almsdeeds, and fraternal correction), bellum iustum is nowhere to be found. Instead the link of just war to charity is assured indirectly, via the notion of concord and its opposite, the “sins against peace.” The implication is that just war represents a reactive use of force. It is a protective (and restorative) measure, exercised by and for temporal society, against grave violations of the peace.

Thus, while he had good reason to discuss the permissibility of just war in the quaestiones on charity (in order, specifically, to show how waging war is not per se inconsistent with charity, in contradistinction to schism, brawling, sedition, and so forth), the positive account of just war as a virtue was taken up only later, apropos of two natural dispositions: military prudence (Q. 50, A. 4) and battlefield courage (Q. 123, A. 5).

12 This was the approach later adopted by Aquinas’s commentator Cajetan. See Reichberg 2008, 27–29.

13 For instance, there is only oblique mention of just war in Q. 64, A. 7 (on self-defense) and no reference to it at all in Q. 108 on justifiable vengeance.

14 On the notion of reactive force, see Reichberg and Syse 2002.
3. **Assimilating pacifist arguments?**

We now turn to the second prong of Miller’s “presumption” reading of Q. 40, namely that the objections which appear at the head of article one were chosen by Aquinas specifically with the aim of assimilating a presumption against war into his doctrine of *bellum iustum*. As we have seen, Miller founds his argumentation on a hermeneutic of the *quaestio disputata* (disputed question), the literary genre that provides the basic building block of the *Summa theologiae*. According to this hermeneutic, the content of each article is oriented around its opening objections.

An article begins with its own specific question, which is meant to impel inquiry into a doubtful matter. ... Objections represent strong reasons that furnish a presumptive answer to the opening question.... The idea is not for the replies to destroy the objections, but, as Chenu writes, to introduce a set of distinctions that mark “off upon what share of truth [the objection] is founded.... There is an effort to embody the truth that the opposing position contains within a wider framework which, far from casting it aside, underwrites its truthfulness” (Miller 2002, 179-180). ... The fact that Aquinas... stacks objections to support the initial doubt ... indicates that he considers objections that enshrine nonviolent values to be the basis for impelling moral inquiry into the ethics of war (183).

On this understanding (drawn from Chenu 1964), a medieval *quaestio* was a dialectical procedure in which a collection of conflicting viewpoints, all taken from authoritative sources, were reconciled into a higher synthesis wherein the truth of each could be affirmed.¹⁵

Chenu makes much of the fact that a standard *quaestio disputata* contained not one, but two sets of objections; from the confrontation of the two, intellectual inquiry would be propelled “forward by rendering intelligible the problem’s various dimensions” (Miller 2002, 179). The point of the *responsio* (the master’s determination, presented in the body of the article) was not so much to choose between the two series, affirming one as true and the other

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false, but rather to coordinate their respective claims into a coherent whole. This dialectical process is obscured somewhat in the Summa, since what remains of the second series of objections is ordinarily the single quote that appears in the Sed contra [On the Contrary] section of each articulus. Chenu emphasizes how this streamlined procedure did not change the fact that a Summa article, as in any disputed question, was intended not to refute either of the two series of objections, but instead to assimilate these competing objections into the higher truth set forth in the responsio. Since the first two objections in Q. 40, A. 1 bring forward scriptural passages that had been alleged by pacifist authors in favor of nonviolent resistance to evil, Miller is able to conclude that “the value of nonviolence... generates the intellectual clearing within which he [Aquinas] develops his inquiry” (Miller 2002, 183).

Chenu’s description of a medieval quaestio, with application to the articles of the Summa, was formulated largely as a reaction to the Scholastic manuals that had become influential in Catholic teaching during the early part of the Twentieth century. Against the rigid dogmatism of these manuals (organized around “theses”), the French medievalist sought to emphasize the dialectical character of the quaestio. This however led him to downplay the special pedagogical aim of the Summa theologiae, which, as Aquinas tells us in the work’s prologue, was written, not for specialists, but rather for beginning students in theology. In adopting this aim, the Dominican master sought both to simply the complexity of the quaestio format as it had been developed in the lively debates at the Sorbonne, but also to distill for the students a vast collection of fundamental truths that the author had reached by dialectical argumentation, often in live settings, in disputations such as the De veritate, De potentia Dei, De malo – where he adheres closely to the quaestio format as it was then practiced at the universities.

A review of different articles in the Summa shows how Aquinas varied in his employment of the quaestio format. Sometimes he followed the format closely. This can be
seen for instance in articles where the *responsio* is very deliberately constructed as a synthesis of the opening objections and the competing viewpoint presented in the *sed contra*. On these occasions Aquinas may be found affirming, within the determination set forth in his *responsio*, conclusions from both the objections and the *sed contra*. This is the procedure followed for instance in Q. 95, “Whether divination by dreams is illicit.” The three objections detail reasons why divination by dreams is licit, while the *sed contra* cites a passage from Deuteronomy 18:10 that forbids the “observance of dreams” as a vain superstition. Drawing a distinction in the *responsio* between internal and external causes of dreams, Aquinas concludes that divination will be licit when it proceeds from a reliable source (God especially, but also certain natural processes), and illicit when its source are the demons.

Very different is the procedure followed in many other passages of the *Summa*, where Aquinas uses the objections merely as a heuristic devise to awaken reflection on the topic at hand; he therein makes little or no attempt to link the opening objections with his *determinatio* for each article. The absence of dialectical argumentation may be seen, for instance, in the famous article “whether God exists” (I, Q. 2, A. 3), where the first objection takes up the problem of evil, while the second offers a reductionist vision in which everything in the world can be accounted for by reference to immanent principles (nature and human reason). Neither of these two objections is taken up explicitly in the *responsio*, which focuses exclusively on showing how God’s existence can be demonstrated in five ways.

If we turn now to the objections that appear at the head of “De bello,” Article 1, it will be quickly apparent how these either are not addressed within the *responsio*, or reach conclusions that are rejected therein. The fourth objection is the simplest case in point, since

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16 For another example of this sort, where, in the *responsio* Aquinas moves dialectically between two lines of argument, adopting conclusions from each, see ST I, Q. 13, A. 5.
in comparing war to a practice excluded by canon law – bloody tournaments – it has no immediate bearing on the threefold criteria of just war discussed in the body of the article. The second objection, likewise, far from being assumed into the responsio, is expressly rejected with respect to its dual claim that it is sinful (i) to use force in resisting evil, and (ii) to avenge wrongs. Similarly, the point alleged in the first objection – all who resort to the sword will be punished by God – is overturned when Aquinas explains how temporal political leaders do not “bear the sword in vain” since they have received such authorization from God in order precisely to punish evildoing. Finally, the conclusion of the third objection – that war is necessarily sinful because is it contrary to peace – is similarly inconsistent with Aquinas’s express teaching in the responsio, where he asserts that the a just war is undertaken precisely with the intention of peace. In sum, then, on close reading we can see how the responsio to Q. 40, A. 1 does not bear out Miller’s claim that “Thomas’s four objections produce a presumption against war,” insofar as they “present weighty but not definitive reasons that must be considered when crafting an ethic of just war.”

In point of fact, Aquinas showed little interest in exploring the pacifist outlook on war within the confines of Q. 40. While he does cite the scriptural passages that pacifists had typically advanced in support of their position, in all of this quaestio there is not one direct quote from Tertullian, Lactantius, or the other early Christian authors who had sought to construct a doctrine of principled objection to war. Nor for that matter does he refer to the dualist movements in his own day (e.g., the Cathars) that had espoused a form of pacifism. Moreover, in his selection of these scriptural passages, Aquinas did not claim to any originality, as virtually all of them had previously been discussed by the canon lawyer Gratian,17 whose rejection of their pacifist interpretation Aquinas endorsed in full.

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17 See Decretum, Causa 23, Q. 1, Canon 1; English translation in Reichberg et al. 2006, 109-111.
4. Interpreting the Gospel “precepts of patience”

If Aquinas very emphatically rejected the pacifist conclusion that any deliberate use of armed force is incompatible with Christian morality, it does not follow that he thereby intended to reject the premises from which the pacifist authors developed their line of reasoning. Since these premises were supplied in large measure by certain stock phrases from the New Testament\(^\text{18}\), it was incumbent on Thomas to explain how these phrases might be understood differently, and, to his mind, more accurately, than in the pacifist interpretation whereby these precepts were thought to rule out the very possibility of a just war.

In proposing an exegesis of these “precepts of patience” (as Gratian had called them)\(^\text{19}\), Thomas, like Gratian, borrowed mainly from Augustine, but also from John Chrysostom some other Church fathers. The gist of this teaching was that violence could have no place whatsoever within the inner domain of the *ecclesia*. “Thus the Kingdom of God never takes up arms and never assumes responsibility for spilling blood.”\(^\text{20}\) By contrast, within the temporal sphere armed force could legitimately be used by civil authorities to maintain the peace. This split vision, whereby the justifiability of armed violence was both affirmed and denied, was derivative upon the distinction, central to medieval ecclesiology and political theory, between the things of God and the things of Caesar.

The single text where Thomas enunciates his thought concerning the permissibility of armed violence, with reference to the dual exigencies of church (*ecclesia*) and state (*respublica*), is his commentary to Matt. 5: 39, “Do not resist evil, if someone strikes you on

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\(^{18}\) In this connection, the verse most often cited by Thomas is Matthew 5: 39 “Do not resist evil, if someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the left also.” But as we shall see below, he also discusses the non-violence enunciated by related verses, including Romans 12:21 “Do not be vanquished by evil,” Hebrews 12:14 “If possible, live peaceably with all,” Matthew 26:52 “Put your sword back in its sheath.”

\(^{19}\) *Decretum*, Causa 23, Q. 1, Canon 2; Reichberg et al 2006, 111.

\(^{20}\) Journet 1998, 673. For more on the contrast between evangelical non-violence and just war, in relation to the distinction between church and state, see 508-514; 612-614, 617-618, 631-632.
the right cheek, turn to him the left also.” After noting that this utterance is part of a sequence on revenge (the passage begins with Jesus reminding his listeners, “you have heard what was said, Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth”), Thomas points out that non resistere malo had been wrongly interpreted in two opposing ways. First there was the error of some Gentiles who had maintained that the Gospel law, in prohibiting vengeance, would destroy public life (“sine uindicta nulla res publica conseruetur”), because society cannot be maintained against disturbances without the imposition of punishment against evildoers. On this basis they had concluded that the precepts of patience should simply be rejected. Then, on the opposing side, was the error of some Heretics (most likely a reference to the Cathars), who maintained that all vengeance should be ruled out in observance of the Gospel law, even if this should undermine the social order.

Thomas’s response was two-pronged. Against the error of the Heretics he argued that God did not intend to prohibit resistance to evil when it is undertaken for love of the public good (ex amore publici boni). The point of the evangelical command was rather to curtail the flaming up of revenge on behalf of one’s violated private good. “Nothing,” he concludes, “is more apt to conserve human society than removing from man the power of causing harm. 

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21 The Latin text of this passage is reproduced in Thomas Aquinas 1982, 178–179. The text reproduced in this edition is taken from a manuscript the authenticity of which was established only in 1956. The commentary to Matt. 5 that was printed in earlier editions of Thomas’s Lectura super Matthaeum is now recognized as due to the fraudulent interpolation of Barthélemy de Spina a 16th century Dominican (see Renard’s introduction to Thomas Aquinas 1982, 146).

22 In this connection, Thomas would almost certainly have had knowledge of the Summa de Catharis et Leonitis (ca. 1250) by the Dominican inquisitor Raniero Sacconi, who had been a Cathar perfectus for 17 years (see Stoyanov 2000, 107). Listed in Raniero’s Summa (part 1, 2nd paragraph, under the heading “De communibus opinionibus Catharorum”) among the errors of the Cathars, was the view that “secular powers sin mortally in punishing evildoers and heretics” (potestates saeculares peccant mortaliter puniendo malefactores vel haereticos). The text is reproduced in Dondaine 1939, 64–78.

23 This same point is made in ST II-II, Q. 40, A. 1, Ad 2, where Thomas argues that although obedience to the precepts of patience (Matthew 5: 39 is cited in the objection) can move us to refrain from resistance and self-defense, nevertheless “sometimes it is necessary to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom we are fighting.”
in private.” This last sentence is an allusion to the standard medieval teaching, identified with St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (chap. 13) that God had instituted a public authority (“princes”) to impose penalties for malfeasance, such that private individuals were prohibited from taking initiative in this domain. Hence, those who permissibly resist evil for love of the common good are first and foremost princes, judges, soldiers and others who have responsibility for maintaining public order.

On the opposing side, against the error of the Gentiles, Thomas notes how the Gospel precept “Do not resist evil” should be upheld for the utility of the Church (pro utilitate ecclesie). Christians should be inwardly prepared to desist from self-defense, and to refrain from retaliating for harm done\(^{24}\), thereby undergoing hardship and even death, if such will prove spiritually beneficial to the neighbor. In this connection he cites the example, mentioned by Augustine (De serm. Dom.I, 19, 57) of a caregiver who voluntarily refrains from using force in self-protection upon receiving blows from an insane person in his charge. In such a case, charitable concern for the assailant, wishing what is good for him, entails the voluntary assumption of harm upon oneself. Thus exposing oneself to harm does not stand contrary to the natural inclination of each thing to preserve itself from physical corruption, since it is altogether possible to view oneself as a member of a larger whole, a whole that is conserved by this self-sacrificing action.

Finally, the injunction “do not resist evil,” may stand either as precept or a counsel. The first obtains for prelates who, by virtue of their role are required to undergo loss of material goods and even life if such is necessary to protect their flock. The second obtains for individuals who are not yet bound by the special responsibility incumbent upon an office, yet

\(^{24}\) Although in this text Thomas uses the language of both defensive force (for example on lines 737-38, he notes that each thing has a natural inclination to repel harm from itself – “repellat proprium nocementum”) and retaliatory force (e.g., on line 732 he speaks of resisting evil in vindication of one’s private good – “in uindictam pro bono priuato”), he does not here expressly distinguish the one from the other.
who, by a commitment to the evangelical way of life, opt to forgo bodily and external goods for the welfare of others.

While the above commentary from his Lectura super Matthaeum represented Thomas’s most elaborate explanation of “do not resist evil,” he also discussed this theme at several junctures in the Secunda pars of the Summa. In two of these especially (I-II, Q. 108, A. 3, and II-II, Q. 188, A. 3) he offered further elucidations on the applicable scope of the precept.

First, in a passage on the New Law (I-II Q. 108, A. 3, Ad 2) Aquinas explains how purified intention is central to this discussion. The Scribes and Pharisees had assumed that the Old Law instructions on retaliation and warfare could allow for the cultivation of inward sentiments of revenge and hatred. To rectify this error, the New Law, which did not abrogate the judicial precepts of the Old (with the implication that the imposition of punishment, and engagement in warfare, both mentioned here as applicable under the Old Law, remained permissible under the regime of the New Law), made clear that the perpetration of wrongs should not be met, in each and every case, with automatic retaliation. Rather, aggrieved individuals should be inwardly prepared to waive their entitlement to address wrongs by the use of force.

On Thomas’s reading, the Gospel phrase “do not resist evil” was not meant to prohibit punishment altogether, since in particular cases resistance to evildoing might very well be apposite, for instance to prevent the perpetrator from hardening on the path of evil. The

25 The two Summa texts discussed below were written during Aquinas’s second Parisian regency, 1269-72. The Lectura super Matthaeum most likely dates from the tail end of same period (see Renard’s introduction to Thomas Aquinas 1982, 148)

26 The text refers specifically to the “slaying of one’s enemies,” an allusion to Deuteronomy 20: 13-19 (cited in Q. 105, A. 3, Obj. 4). The body of ST, I-II, Q. 105, A. 3, “judicial precepts regarding foreigners,” contains a set of rules on the inception and prosecution of war (that it should be waged only for a just cause, that besieged cities should be offered terms of peace, that women and children should be spared, etc.), all drawn from the Old Testament, that Thomas cites approvingly.
The purpose of the Gospel precept was instead to moderate the appetite for revenge by requiring victims of wrongdoing to entertain alternative courses of action before striking back at an assailant. Citing the example of Jesus, he acknowledged that Christians should remain open to the possibility that, under some circumstances at least, the good would best be promoted by suffering wrong patiently.

In a related passage Thomas notes that “loving the enemy” procures a twofold good. First, it benefits the doer, who is inwardly fortified against the temptations of hatred and revenge, such that his moral integrity is preserved from the stain of sin. But second, it also promotes another’s good, for in being shown love where he would expect hatred, the adversary is induced to respond in kind. Commenting on Romans 12: 21, “do not be vanquished by evil,” Thomas observes that when a good man, on account of the evil done to him, is drawn to do evil in return, he will allow himself to be vanquished by evil (“bonus a malo vincitur”). This one should never do, and in this respect St. Paul’s statement articulates an obligation strictly binding on all Christians. But, in addition, should the good man treat his persecutor with benevolence, acting with love where he is met by hatred, his enemy will be encouraged away from evil (“a malo trahas”). In this way the good man can vanquish over evil (“bonus malum vincit”) by drawing his enemy into the circle of love. Such supererogatory action pertains to the “perfection” of charity; and by this expression Thomas suggests that it takes the form of a “counsel.”

Working from the supposition that “do not resist evil” (taken precisely as a precept) was not meant to express a norm of external actions (exteriores actus), Thomas argued that it

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27 Lectura super Evangelium Ioannis, chap. 18, § 2321; cf. Epistolam ad Romanos lectura, chap. 12, § 1009.

28 ST II-II, Q. 25, A. 9: “Whether it is necessary for salvation that we show our enemies the signs and effects of love.”

was addressed at another level, namely to the orientation of one’s inner dispositions *(interiores actus).* In support, he cites the example of Jesus, who did not literally follow his own admonition “turn the other cheek” when he was struck in the face by a servant of the High Priest (John 18:22). Instead Jesus engaged in dialogue with the assailant, challenging him to justify his resort physical violence. This allows Thomas to conclude that “turn the other cheek” referred not to any specific outward action, but to the “inner preparation of the soul,” namely the willingness to forgo retaliation if such might be deemed “necessary” in view of the spiritual welfare of the assailant.

It must be admitted that apart from his exposition on Christ’s voluntary acceptance of death on a cross, a death Thomas justified on theological grounds as “necessary” for our salvation, he provided scant indication how we might go about measuring the necessity in question with respect to the sacrifice of our own, purely human, selves. Thomas did however acknowledge that even persons who are willing to set aside their own worldly interests (material prosperity and bodily integrity) out of fraternal charity for enemies, might still have good reason to opt instead for a forcible response to wrongdoing. Commenting on St. Paul’s

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30 As Thomas made clear in I-II, Q. 25, A. 8, this was parallel to the distinction, mentioned above, between precepts and counsels: “Those things which our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies and other similar sayings (Matthew 5 and Luke 6) may be referred to the mind’s preparation *(animi)*, and they are necessary for salvation; for instance that a man be prepared to do good to his enemies... when necessity requires this course of conduct. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus toward an enemy when there is no special necessity, is to be referred to the particular counsels....”

31 This reference to Jesus’ own action, with the intent of disproving any literal reading of his command “turn the other cheek,” occurs in *Epistolam ad Romanos lectura,* 12:19 (§1011).

32 The expression is from Augustine’s Letter (138) to Marcellius. Cited by Aquinas in *Epistolam ad Romanos lectura,* 12:19 (§1011).

33 In his analysis of the precept “love thy enemy” in II-II, Q. 25, A. 8, Thomas reproduces the same line of reasoning: It does not pertain to charity that we should have a special movement of affection toward every single individual who crosses our way, certainly not towards every person who might be considered an enemy. What charity does require, however, is a readiness, “a preparation of soul” to love our enemies individually should the necessity arise *(si necessitas occurreret).*

34 See ST III, Q. 46, AA. 1-3.
Admonition “if possible... live peaceably with all” (Hebrews 12: 14), he notes that “sometimes other people’s malice prevents us from having peace with them, namely, because no peace is possible with them unless we consent to their malice. Such peace, of course, is illicit: ‘I came not to send peace but the sword’ (Matthew 10:34).35

It was to expand on the conditions that might warrant “resort to the sword” that Thomas dedicated a second Summa passage to the proper understanding of the Gospel precept “do not resist evil.” The passage arises in an article (II-II, Q. 188, A.3) devoted to military-religious orders such as the Knights Templar. In the first objection it is alleged, by appeal to the words of Jesus in Matthew 5:39, that the Christian life is incompatible with military service (“repugnant officio militari”). In response (Ad 1), Thomas argues that

non resistere malum may be understood in two ways. First in the sense of pardoning injury (iniuriam) done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the welfare (salutem) of others. Second, in the sense of tolerating patiently injury done to others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the assailant in a suitable manner (potest convenienter iniurianti resistere). Hence Ambrose says in De offic. [Bk. I, Chap. 27]: “The courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice”....

Based on this reasoning Thomas is able to conclude that a religious order may justifiably be dedicated to the defense of the innocent by military means. This text is especially significant in the way that it contrasts two very different expressions of charity. On the one hand, charity may require us to renounce the use of force in defense of self, in view of the twofold good mentioned above (protecting one’s own soul from the disordered passions of vengefulness and hatred, leading the enemy into the circle of love). Thomas does not posit this renunciation as a strict obligation, binding on Christians in each and every case, for, in the passage above he takes care to speak conditionally (“may [potest] pertain to perfection”) with the

35 Epistolam ad Romanos lectura, chap. 12, § 1010.
supposition that, under some possible circumstances, perfection would be consonant with a forcible course of action.\textsuperscript{36}

By contrast, the above text is quite emphatic that the renunciation of violence is not an option when the target of injurious action is no longer one’s individual self, but rather “others” who are undeserving of such treatment.\textsuperscript{37} Failing to aid these innocent victims of violence, when the capacity exists, would violate the mercy by which we are called on to succor the poor and oppressed in the hour of their need. The point is amplified in the body of the article, where Thomas explains how the military function is rightly exercised by these religious knights not only for the occasional protection of civilians who have fallen victim to ambush or other criminal violence, but, in addition, they may avail themselves of arms even for the defense of the entire commonwealth (\textit{totius reipublicae defensio}) against the onslaught of its enemies. This they do, not in view of any “worldly purpose,” but rather “to support the neighbor and in the service of God.”

The robust military role assigned to these religious knights does however seem inconsistent with the division of labor established above, whereby civil authorities are entrusted with arms to maintain the peace of the \textit{respublica}, while, the \textit{ecclesia}, by contrast, steadfastly avoids any responsibility whatsoever for the shedding of blood. But despite this appearance to the contrary, it can be shown that Thomas did aim to uphold a careful distinction between the temporal and spiritual orders, precisely on the question of participation in licit violence. For one thing, he viewed the institution of these knightly

\textsuperscript{36} ST II-II, Q. 64, A. 7: “It is not necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing another [i.e., the assailant], since one is bound to take more care of one’s own life than of another’s.”

\textsuperscript{37} In (18:10-11; § 2289), his \textit{Lectura super Evangelium Ioannis}, Thomas asks what might have motivated Peter to draw his sword, striking the high priest’s servant, even though Jesus had earlier issued the command “do not resist evil.” In response, Thomas refers to a reason given by St. John Chrysostome (\textit{In Ioannem hom}, 83, 1-2), who maintained that the disciples had understood this precept to prohibit their own self-defense, while still allowing the employment of force “for the defense of masters.”
religious orders as a provisional measure that had been occasioned when secular princes failed to carry out their proper task of “resisting infidels in some lands” (an allusion to the Levant). Hence to his mind, it was an exception to the general rule that warfare pertains essentially to the temporal sphere. Moreover, implicit in Thomas’s treatment was the assumption that these knightly orders were in fact lay movements, for at that time consecrated members of the Church hierarchy (priests and bishops) were altogether prohibited from having any active part in the shedding of blood. The command “do not resist evil” applied especially to the latter, precisely by reason of their formal role as Christ’s spiritual representatives on earth.

The participation of clergy in war is the express topic of II-II, Q. 40, A. 2. Quoting the words of Jesus to Peter (Matthew 26:52) “Put your sword back in its sheath,” the sed contra affirms that “it is not licit for clerics and bishops to engage in fighting.” In the body of the article Thomas offers two reasons why they must refrain from “warlike pursuits.” The first is “general” as it could be advanced vis-à-vis other activities as well, for instance involvement in commerce, namely that such pursuits are “full or unrest” and hinder the priest from carrying out the religious duties proper to his state. By contrast, the second reason arises specifically in the context of war. By virtue of their ordination, clergymen symbolically (“sacramentally”) stand in the place of Christ when they perform the Eucharistic rite which re-enacts his voluntary sacrifice on the cross. On this basis, Thomas concludes that “it is unsuitable for them to kill or shed blood, rather they should be willing to shed their own blood for Christ.”

In the remainder of the same article, Aquinas emphasizes how the prohibition on priestly participation in fighting does not proceed from any moral censure of war as such. To the contrary, he states (ad 3) that “clerics are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a

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38 ST II-II, Q. 188, A. 4, Ad 5. The previous A. 3, Ad 3, had referred to those who “take up arms in support of the Holy Land” (ut militent in subsidium Terra Sanctae”). This may be the only express reference to the Crusades in Aquinas’s entire corpus.
sin, but [solely] because such an occupation is incongruent with their special role.” To elucidate this point he establishes a parallel between the military profession and the married state (Ad 4). The activities proper to each – fighting in a just war and engagement in the marital act – are “meritorious,” i.e., they render the doer fit for eternal life. 39 Despite the inherent goodness of these activities, clergymen are barred from them in order that they may “carry out works more meritorious still.” There exists a hierarchy of goods, achievable by a division of labor among persons devoted to secular and divine tasks respectively.

The parallel established here between the waging of just war and the conjugal act is instructive, as both had been dismissed by the Cathars as incompatible with spiritual purity. 40 Aquinas seems intent at showing in Article 2 of Question 40 that despite its agreement with the Albigensian heretics on the necessary renunciation of military combat and marriage by those vowed to perfection, the Church denied that either of the two practices had anything morally disreputable about them. In this respect a significant contrast emerges between the structure of articles 1 and 2 of Question 40. Arguing in favor of just war in article 1, some pacifist viewpoints are entertained in the objections, but as we have seen these receive little integration into the author’s thesis as outlined in the body of the article. By contrast, in article 2 where the point is to argue that non-violence is obligatory for ministers of the alter, and where the objections – all of which assert in one way or another the honorableness of just war – accordingly favor priestly participation in just war, we find Thomas dialectically engaged with these objections, the premises of which he carefully assumes into the body of the article.

39 Thus, in this reply, Aquinas does not disagree with a claim made in the objection, to the effect that “it is sometimes right (honestum) and meritorious (meritorium) to wage war.” Nor does he express disagreement with a passage from Gratian’s Decretum (Causa 23, Q. 8, Canon 9, in which it is said that those “who die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of Christians.” are promised “a heavenly reward” (in Reichberg et al. 2006, 124). 40 Hence, along with corporeal punishment, Raniero Sacconi includes the proscription of marriage in his summary list of Cathar opinions: “Item communis opinio Catharorum es omnium quod matrimonium canale fuit semper mortale peccatum” (Summa de Catharis et Leonistis, part 1, 2nd paragraph, in Dondaine 1939).
Hence, from a comparison of the two articles it becomes apparent that, if anything, Thomas proceeded from a presumption against pacifism, rather than, as has been alleged, from a presumption against war.

The main thread running through the objections in Q. 40, A. 2, is the idea that it is both right and meritorious to wage just war. In the remainder of the article Thomas explains how the Church’s teaching on priestly abstinence from warfare should not be interpreted so as to cast doubt on the honorableness of just war. The non-violence expected of priests results rather from the special tasks pertaining to their profession, tasks that are inconsistent with those demanded of other professions, particularly the military, but where all of the said professions are needed for the good ordering of society. In his response to the 2nd objection, he even allows that clergymen may participate in just wars, “not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them....” (Ad 2).

Upon reading Article 2 of Question of 20 one might readily assume that for Thomas the clergy should be excluded from military functions on purely formal grounds – the sacramental representation of Christ required for the celebration of the Eucharist – such that his teaching would have little or no ethical bearing. However, although it remains in the background, Thomas does hint that an ethic of love is entailed by this representational function, since, as he puts it, priests should “imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry.” Hence, just as Christ suffered a death that he could have impeded – being a

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41 See Bainton 1960, 109.

42 II-II, Q. 40, A. 2, in corp. Russell 1975, 282, overlooks this sentence (repeated again in II-II, Q. 64, A. 4) when he claims that Aquinas never mentioned the “more extreme position, held by theologians such as Alexander of Hales, that based the prohibition on the clerical duty to be perfect in imitation of Christ himself.”
willing victim—likewise he called his disciples to follow his example in order to advance the salvation of human beings. Although he devoted an entire *quaestio* to the efficacy of Christ’s passion (ST III, Q. 48), Aquinas does not spell out in any detail how non-resistance to evil, when carried out by Christ’s disciples, may be efficacious in derivation upon his original redemptive action. He does state, nonetheless, in a parallel passage, that this priestly non-violence is in keeping with the economy of the New Law, “wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed.”

Apart from the commentary to Matthew 5:39, where in broad strokes he theorized about the scope of the Gospel precept “do not resist evil,” Aquinas never gave a systematic account of evangelical non-violence in relation to the traditional doctrine of just war that he had inherited from Augustine and Gratian. Hence it has been necessary to reconstruct his view from a variety of sources, drawing mainly from passages in the *Summa theologiae*. The main lines of his view can be summarized as follows.

Just war and evangelical non-violence are each valid in their respective spheres. Both represent ways of dealing with evil, the first by active resistance especially on behalf of the innocent under attack, the second by the voluntary acceptance of harm, assumed out of love for the spiritual good of the attacker. The first pertains first and foremost to the kingdoms (*respublicae*) of this world, each of which is a “perfect community” empowered to administer penalties for the maintenance of justice and peace. The second pertains to a kingdom that transcends this world, the Church (*ecclesia*), led by Christ, who directs the actions of all its

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43 Christ’s voluntary acceptance of a violent death was an instance of “indirect causation” (as happens, say, when someone who failed to close a window is indirectly the cause of another’s getting wet in an ensuing downpour – Thomas’s example). By not resisting this outcome, although fully able to do so, Christ indirectly brought about his own death, the direct cause of which was the malicious design of his enemies (ST III, Q. 47, A. 1).

44 II-II, Q. 64, A. 4, “whether it is licit for clerics to kill evildoers.” To the argument about the sacramental role of priests, he adds a second, namely that because they are ministers of the New law,”
members to the goal of eternal life in conformity with his redemptive mission. The first represents a communion according to reason as guided by natural law, while the second is a communion according to supernatural faith as expressed in the New Law of the Gospel.

The unity of the Church is constituted by the bond of charity; hence only what proceeds directly from charity, as poured into human hearts by the Holy Spirit, is properly speaking “of the Church.” Acts of violence, even licit violence, as with just war, cannot be attributed to the Church as such. The Church thus has a natural affinity, with respect its own proper order of activity, with a non-violent, “redemptive” response to evil. Aquinas typically frames this response by reference to the expectations incumbent upon ordained priests, since, on the sacramental rationale explained above, they especially represent Christ within the Church. Yet this call to non-violence, as embodied in the “counsels of perfection,” was not understood by him to be a prerogative of priests alone, for he was well aware of the numerous female and lay martyrs. As a consequence, the distinction between non-violence and just war does not neatly parallel the related distinction between clergy and laity.

5. Conclusion

In this article I have sought to show how Aquinas viewed non-violence and just war as distinct yet compatible doctrines. In relating these to the respective spheres of Church and state, the first of which is constituted by supernatural bonds of faith and charity, and the second by natural principles of justice and sociability, he was able to establish a division of labor in our human response to evil. By the same token however, it would be anachronistic to advance his teaching as support for the modern, political interpretation of the precepts of

45 In this connection, Journet (1998, 673) observes that Aquinas never employed the term holy war; thus “when he wants to characterize a war undertaken [by secular authorities] at the urging of the Church [citing II-II, Q. 40, A. 2, Ad 3], he is content to call it just.”
patience, whereby non-violence is made into a method for bringing about change within the social sphere of the state.

Nor for the same reason can it correctly be said that Aquinas elucidates an ethics of just war restraint, specifically by appeal to the exigencies of Christian charity. His preferred approach was to isolate the two orders of discourse – just war and Evangelical non-violence – so that each would have applicability according to the principles, natural and supernatural, proper to each.

In assessing Aquinas’s approach to just war, Miller has too quickly assumed that the Dominican theologian’s intent in q. 40 was to place his treatment in direct continuity with the exigencies of theological charity. However, a case can be made that the peace which forms the backdrop of Aquinas’s discussion of war signifies a condition of natural concord that can obtain between independent polities. This natural condition is understood by analogy with the supernatural friendship (the communion of human beings in the inner life of God) which is the raison d’être of the grace-given theological virtue of charity. In other words, although he speaks of the peace or concord of the temporal realm in a sequence of questions devoted to charity, Aquinas should not be taken to mean that peace at this level would be elicited directly by the virtue of charity, as for instance happens with supernatural joy and mercy. Temporal peace, the fruition of man’s natural existence, flows, proximately, from the exercise of the relevant acquired virtues. The same line of argument holds true for just war, which, having temporal peace as its correlate, would be measured not directly by supernatural charity but by the requisite proximate end and whatever virtues assure a proper ordination to it. Obviously,

46 A similar supposition may be found operative in de Solages 1946; see in particular chap. 1, “Saint Thomas et la pensée médiévale,” 9-26. But unlike Miller and other presumption against war theorists, who praise Thomas for treating just war in close coordination with charity, de Solages faults Thomas for proceeding in this way, since it lends his “De bello” account a confessional or inherently religious character that renders it alien to a modern context wherein war is normatively evaluated in terms of natural and positive (international) law.

47 Textual documentation of this point falls outside the scope of the present article; it is however covered in a book that the author is presently writing on Aquinas’s conception of peace and war.
here, as with any other natural act that is directed to its proximate end, theological charity will be needed to assure coordination with the exigencies of our ultimate end. But this coordination does not imply that acts of just war should in some special way be elicited by charity, no more than would be the case with other acts of our temporal, civil life.\footnote{Thanks are due to Matthew Levering (University of Dayton) and Henrik Syse (PRIO) who offered very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.}

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