Does civil war breed authoritarian values?
An empirical study of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Croatia

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This article analyses how armed conflict affects individual support for liberal values. It is commonly assumed that the consolidation of democracy depends on individual values such as tolerance as well as aspirations of civil and political liberty. For post-conflict societies, consolidating democracy is also a means of reducing the risk of recurring violent conflict. However, democracy has shown especially hard to achieve and consolidate in ethnically divided societies. While previous research has centered mainly on institutions and political elites, I expand the focus to also include ordinary citizens. Using survey data from post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Croatia, I examine the effect of exposure to violence on a scale of authoritarian values. While the effects are small, the results show that war-related violence in some cases leads people to embrace authoritarian values.

KEYWORDS: authoritarianism, democratization, civil war, ethnic conflict, post-conflict.
INTRODUCTION
Democratic consolidation has proved especially hard to achieve in post-conflict societies. Yet, these societies would seem to be the ones most in need for developing peaceful mechanisms for coping with differences. The relationship between democracy and violent conflict is still disputed (Hegre et al. 2001; Krebs 2009; Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010). A large strand of literature investigates how different institutional arrangements can facilitate a working democracy in post-conflict society (Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Linz 1996; Höglund, Jarstad, and Kovacs 2009; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Hiroi and Omori 2009). Several studies point to the importance of individual values and attitudes for the consolidation and deepening of democracy (Sullivan and Transue 1999; Inglehart 2003). Yet, individual values have largely been absent from the debate. If warfare leads to the dominance of more authoritarian values in society and reduced demand for democracy, this could help explain why it is so hard for democracy to take roots in post-conflict societies.

In this article I analyze how individual values of authoritarianism and liberalism are affected by exposure to violent conflict. Does the fundamental insecurity induced by war lead people to embrace authoritarian values? Liberalism is here understood as the opposite of authoritarianism, i.e., values of self-enhancement, individual freedom, and autonomy. I develop a theoretical framework based on social identity theory to propose some mechanism through which war experiences can be expected to influence individual attitudes of authoritarianism. Other factors equal, I expect people who have been more exposed to violence to display more authoritarianism than others. To test this proposition, I analyze survey data from post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo and combine these with geo-referenced data on events of violence in the areas where the respondents live. I use multilevel regression analysis to include both contextual and individual level measures of violence. While there is some variation among the three countries, my findings show that exposure to violence tend to increase an authoritarian value orientation, mainly through symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). This, in turn, could partly explain the difficulties with democratic consolidation in the region. According to Freedom House of Democracy, Croatia went from “partly free” to “free” in 2000, and has stayed “free” on subsequent reports. The two more war-torn countries have a less successful record. Bosnia-Herzegovina went from “not free” to “partly free” in the 1996 report, and has remained so. Kosovo appeared as “partly free” in the 2009 and 2010 reports. In both countries, the government lacks legitimacy in significant segments of the population.

My study contributes to the literature in several ways. Theoretically, I combine social psychology theories with the general post-conflict literature. To my knowledge, this is the first systematic analysis of how pro-democratic values are affected by violence. It is also one of few studies to combine contextual and individual measures of threat exposure with individual level data on authoritarianism. I integrate the social context into the research design by examining

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1 According the Polity IV Project, Croatia went from a Polity score of -5 in 1998, to a score of 8 in 2000, and from 2005 to present with a score of 9. Bosnia-Herzegovina is coded as “under foreign interruption” since independence in 1995 and to present. Kosovo appears with a score of 8 from independence in 2008 and to present (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2010).
local variations in war exposure, which gives a high external validity, since the warfare some
of the respondents were exposed to, represented a very real danger which cannot be
reconstructed in the laboratory. A main criticism of the social psychology approach to
authoritarianism is that it studies a group phenomenon from an individual perspective.
Individual value formation does not take place in a vacuum, also the social context must be
taken into account (Duckitt and Fisher 2003). Most research on authoritarianism and threat on
the individual level are based on experiments. In the typical design, respondents are randomly
split into groups which get to read different “scenarios” and then answer the same questionnaire
(see e.g. Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005; Duckitt and Fisher 2003). While these studies have
high internal validity, the external validity is much lower, since the “exposure” to threat is much
lower than in a real world situation. In other words, we do not know how well these
experimental situations compare to “real world” threat.

Works on the collective level, on the other hand, often lack the direct link from societal
threat to individuals. For example, Doty and colleagues (1991) used a number of indicators of
authoritarianism, ranging from the number of registered “attack dogs” in the United States, to
variations in attempts of “removing offensive materials in public and school libraries”, to show
that authoritarianism rose in periods of higher threat. In a more recent study, Perrin (2005)
coded letters to the editor in 17 US newspapers pre- and post- 9/11 to estimate the effect on
authoritarian public discourse. He found that the national threat activated the authoritarian
cleavage in US political culture, as there were more letters of both authoritarian and anti-
authoritarian character after than before the terrorist attacks. Recent studies from Israel also
indicate that terrorism can increase anti-democratic sentiments and political extremism (see e.g.
to distinguish sufficiently between objective, real threat, and subjective, perceived threat. By
combining information on objective, contextual threat and individual authoritarianism, the
research design employed here overcomes some of the methodological weaknesses in previous
studies.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: First, I define main concepts and
outline a theoretical framework for understanding how war experiences can contribute to
increasing authoritarian political attitudes. Second, I discuss the cases and describe the data and
methods used, before I present the results. The final section provides some concluding remarks.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the study of public opinion, it is well known that individuals are affected by their
surroundings, and that their experiences help shaping their political attitudes. Previous studies
have pointed to the effect of fear and perceived threat on individual attitudes and behavior
(Quillian 1995; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Canetti et al. 2009). The inherent dangers in a
violent conflict with indiscriminate violence against civilians are not only perceived, but quite
real threats which could affect how individuals understand the world around them (see Cohrs
and Ibler 2009). In the following, I review two different strands of literature which help explain
how war exposure can affect individual values of authoritarianism, namely social identity
theory and the study of public opinion.
A full review of the large literature on authoritarianism is outside the scope of this article, as the purpose is to analyze the effects of war exposure on authoritarianism. However, some main controversies must be mentioned.

First, certain disagreement exists in the literature on how authoritarianism on the individual level should be studied. An influential, but widely criticized (see e.g. Martin 2001) study by Adorno and colleagues (1950) on The Authoritarian personality initiated a large literature within social psychology. In Altemeyer’s (1981) revised version, authoritarianism consists of three main components: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Authoritarianism is commonly measured through the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale and the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale. Duckitt and Fisher (2003) reviewed the literature on RWA and SDO and argue that both are better viewed as ideological orientations (ideological social attitude) rather than expressions of personality:

Both the RWA and SDO scales […] seem more appropriately viewed as measuring social attitude or ideological belief dimensions, rather than personality. Items such as those of the RWA and SDO scales express evaluative beliefs about the nature, structure, and organization of society and about individuals’ proper roles, conduct, and place within and in relation to society and other important social groups. In contrast, personality pertains to individuals’ relatively enduring dispositions to behave in consistent ways across situations. The items of personality scales are thus typically statements of how individuals habitually behave in or across situations (Duckitt and Fisher 2003, 101).

In line with this, I treat authoritarianism as a basic political orientation, not a personality trait.

Second, the prevalence of authoritarianism in society varies over time and across countries. It is no coincidence that the study of authoritarianism developed in the immediate aftermath of World War II. As such, it also started as a study of a group phenomenon. Still, much of the work following Adorno and colleagues (1950) focused exclusively on individuals, and the social context is often overlooked (Stellmacher and Petzel 2005). An exception to this is Duckitt (1989), who applied social identity theory on the study of authoritarianism to develop a group-based theory of authoritarianism. He reviewed Adorno’s (1950) classical theory and developed a new concept of authoritarianism based on social identity theory. Social identity theory, as developed by Tajfel and Turner (2004), explains how group identities develop and are maintained and how they affect individual behavior. As people categorize themselves into groups, they adopt the identity of their group and start conforming to its prevailing norms.

In Duckitt’s (1989) account, threatened social identities or insecure group identities should create stronger authoritarian sentiments:

[T]he greater the ingroup identification and consequent emphasis on and demand for group cohesion, (1) […] the greater will be the emphasis on behavioral and attitudinal conformity with ingroup norms and rules of conduct – that is, conventionalism, (2) […] the greater the emphasis will be on respect and unconditional obedience to ingroup leaders and authorities – that is, authoritarian submission, and (3) the greater will be the intolerance of and punitiveness toward persons not conforming to ingroup norms and rules – that is, authoritarian aggression. […] (Duckitt 1989, 70).

Findings from the civil war literature suggest that cleavages increase and social identities are hardened and become less permeable during intrastate war (Wood 2008; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Gurr 2000). If social identity theory holds true, the stronger group salience should in turn increase authoritarian sentiments.
Violence could also increase authoritarian values directly. Davis and Singer (2004) argue convincingly that people’s support for civil liberties should be studied as a trade-off with other values like order and security. As Inglehart (2003) demonstrates, overt support for democracy is almost universal today, but the support does not always stick deep. Economists have long studied how people’s demand for a given good depends on their demands for other goods. Luxury goods will typically have a lower demand if other, more basic needs are not met. Assuming that safety is a more basic need than liberty, it seems likely that people who have seen their personal security threatened, care less about liberty and that they are more willing than others to embrace authoritarian values. A parallel argument to this is Inglehart’s modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart 1997), which suggests that with increasing security and material welfare, people’s preferences shift from mainly survival to postmaterialist values like self-expression and autonomy.

On the basis of this, I expect people who have been exposed to warfare, to show stronger support for authoritarian values.

**Hypothesis 1.** People who have been exposed to war-related violence display more authoritarianism than others.

Arguably, the individual ability to deal with war exposure may influence how strongly the threat is perceived. The most common way to study war experiences has so far been to look at symptoms of war traumas (see e.g. Laufer, Gallops, and Frey-Wouters 1984; Hobfoll et al. 1991; Hasanovic and Herenda 2008). A more traumatized individual has not necessarily been exposed to more violence, but is more affected by these acts. Thus, a person with stronger symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has also been less able to readapt and recover after the conflict, and might therefore perceive the current level of threat as higher. I therefore expect individuals with stronger symptoms of post-traumatic stress to show a more authoritarian orientation. In line with the liberty–security trade-off, these should be seeking for security rather than freedom.

**Hypothesis 2.** Individuals with stronger symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder express a stronger authoritarian value orientation.

Finally, threat also operates on a collective level. This means that individuals who were not directly, personally affected, but who live in a community that was severely hit by violence, could still experience threat and increased salience of group identities. I expect people who live in more war-affected communities to display more authoritarianism.

**Hypothesis 3.** People in more war-affected areas express more authoritarianism than others.

**THE CASE OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**
The cases examined are post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. With their history of recent, violent conflict they are theoretically relevant, and they are well-suited for...
comparison, since they are relatively similar in culture and recent history. Even if the conflicts differed in magnitude, duration and geographical extension, all the cases saw systematic targeting of civilians, as large areas were attempted “cleansed”, civilians were killed, expelled or forced to flee.

The transition from war to peace was quite short, and none of the cases have seen significant recurrence of violence after the wars ended. The cases are also interesting because people of different religious and cultural background have lived together peacefully for several decades within the same political entity. Pre-war interethnic relations have frequently been described as good, although others have questioned this. The transition from war to peace was quite short, and none of the cases have seen significant recurrence of violence after the wars ended. The cases are also interesting because people of different religious and cultural background have lived together peacefully for several decades within the same political entity. Pre-war interethnic relations have frequently been described as good (Sommer 2001; Massey, Hodson, and Sekulić 2006), although others have questioned this perception (Botev 1994). In the postwar area, ethnic segregation is the dominant pattern, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, even in cities or villages that have remained mixed.

Armed conflict broke out in Croatia in August 1991, when the country declared independence, and was finally settled in 1995. The number of casualties is still disputed, but it is estimated that several thousand lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands were displaced. In 1992, the conflict spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Here, the number of refugees and internally displaced people exceeded one million, or close to one fourth of the total population. In the Srebrenica massacre alone, more than 7,500 men and boys were killed, and the war of Yugoslav succession was the bloodiest war in Europe since World War II (Hoare 2010). In Kosovo, armed conflict broke out in 1998 after more than a decade of violent clashes and riots. The war ended in 1999 after massive bombing from NATO. Again, the number of casualties is not agreed upon. According to Trix (2010), 10,000 Albanians were killed, and 850,000 expelled from Kosovo.

**DATA AND METHODS**

To estimate the effect of violence on authoritarianism, I use a fixed effect multilevel OLS regression analysis with separate models for each country. The advantage of this technique is that it allows me to combine individual characteristics with characteristics of the community where the respondents live (Hox 2002; Goldstein 2003; Twisk 2006). In this case, individuals form the first level of analysis, while municipalities (Bosnia and Kosovo) and counties (Croatia) form the second level of analysis. Due to the different data structure, the three samples are analyzed separately.

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2 It can be argued that Kosovo’s different position in the former Yugoslavia and its more recent independence makes it different from the other two cases. In terms of political culture and recent political history, however, they are still closer than most countries.

3 The municipalities in Croatia are very small, and individual respondents could be identifiable; therefore, I use counties in Croatia. In Bosnia and Kosovo, the municipalities are larger.
The main source of data is the South East European Social Survey Project (SEESSP), directed by Albert Simkus and funded by the Western Balkan Program of the Research Council of Norway (Simkus 2007). The survey was conducted from late 2003 to early 2004 and covered most of the former Yugoslavia. I use data from the countries where the main conflicts took place, namely, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. This means that the survey was conducted approximately eight years after the war in Bosnia and Croatia, and four years after the Kosovo war.

At the time when the data were collected, no national registers or census data existed. In order to ensure sample representativity, the national samples were based on a stratified multi-stage geographical cluster sample design, where the smallest sampling units were 4-8 households. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the basic sample was supplemented by a small corrective sample to improve the representation of Bosniaks and Croats in Serb-dominated municipalities, Serbs and Croats in Bosniak-dominated municipalities, and Serbs and Bosniaks in predominantly Croat areas.

The final size of the sample used in the analyses is 1,407 (Kosovo), 2,575 (Bosnia) and 1,010 (Croatia). The median age is slightly above 40 years in all three samples, and women constitute 58 (Kosovo), 59 (Bosnia) and 53 (Croatia) percent of the population. The survey data from these three countries were combined with a dataset with incidents of violence that took place in these three countries. The dataset on violent events has the same format as the Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset (ACLED) and is available through the ACLED webpage (Raleigh and Hegre 2005), but was coded by a separate project.

**Dependent variable**

The survey did not include questions that directly tapped into people’s support for democracy, or an evaluation of democracy as a form of government (compared to an authoritarian regime). I therefore constructed a scale which captures people’s basic liberal or authoritarian orientation, not their view on democracy. One advantage of this is that one possibly avoids some social desirability bias that is likely to arise as democracy is increasingly perceived as the only legitimate form of governance.

The scale was based on seven indicators: (1) Total freedom of speech today leads to total disorganization of society, (2) In the last resort, the judicial system should serve the interests of the state, (3) There are two kinds of people in the world, the weak and the strong, (4) The most important thing for children to learn is to obey their parents, (5) The media should be more understanding of the state, (6) The media which do not care for national interests should

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4 The data was collected under the direction of Albert Simkus at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and funded by the Western Balkan program of the Research Council of Norway.

5 According to the CIA World Factbook (2011), estimates for the three countries are 51%, 52% and 48%, respectively. This means that even if the sex ratio has changed over the last eight years, women seem to be overrepresented. It should be noted, however, that for Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, no census data exist.

6 The project was led by Ola Listhaug at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. The main source for the coding was Keesing’s Record of World Events (2009). For Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, CIA’s (2002) Balkan Battlegrounds: a military history of the Yugoslav conflict 1990-1995 was also used. For Kosovo, two OSCE (1999b, 1999a) reports were also used.
be prohibited, and (7) The interest of the collectivity is more important than the interests of individual. These were selected because they appeared to tap into a basic authoritarian-liberal value axis and have been used in previous research on authoritarianism. A person of a more authoritarian orientation should be more inclined to restrict freedom of speech, more concerned about national interests, and more likely to agree that obedience is important.

The advantage of using a composite measure instead of one single indicator is that random measurement errors are reduced, which gives better reliability (Spector 1992). Principal component analysis showed that the indicators scale relatively well, with a KMO of 0.81 and Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.77. An additional item, “an independent media is necessary for the development of democracy” was initially included in the analysis but later dropped because of poor scalability. The remaining seven items were used to construct an additive scale of authoritarianism, which was rescaled to a range of one (strong disagreement with all the indicators) to five (strong agreement with all the indicators).

**Exposure to war**

Exposure to war is measured in three different ways, which correspond to the three hypotheses. In the survey data, several measures of individual war exposure exist. The most general of them is a question which asks whether the respondent have “experienced or witnessed a war-related event that involved actual or threatened death or injury to which you responded with intense fear, helplessness, or horror”. To this question, about 25 percent of the respondents in Croatia answered. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, absolutely all the respondents answered “yes”. In other words, the variable is useless as an explanatory variable, since it has no variance in two of the countries, but it is a good illustration of the intensity of the war in these two cases. Here, everybody was affected by the violence in one way or another. To capture individual exposure to war (H1), I use the arguably most severe of these indicators, namely having a close family member or friend killed during the war, labeled personal loss. To this question, 11 percent of the respondents in Croatia answered yes, 22 percent in Kosovo and 31 percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Individual traumatization (H2) is measured through a set of 15 indicators that tap symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), like “have you had recurrent distressing dreams about a traumatic war-related event”, “have you had persistent loss of memory for important parts of a war trauma”, and “have you had persistent difficulty falling or staying asleep”. A PTSD scale is then computed as the mean score of all 15 items, where a score of 0 translates into no symptoms, and a score of 1 indicates strong symptoms of PTSD. The scale has a reliability coefficient of 0.91. The PTSD measure is the most common measure of war exposure, but has also been criticized (Karam and Ghosn 2003). In a meta-analysis of 161 articles on the effect of torture and traumatic events on mental health, Steel and colleagues (2009) found that PTSD assessments based on self-report symptom questionnaires yielded a higher PTSD prevalence than surveys that use diagnostics interviews. In my use of the measure,

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7 It appears that the scale suffers from an acquiescence bias, as the only contrait item does not scale as well as the protrait items.
a high PTSD score does not translate into a diagnosis of PTSD, but merely indicates that the respondent has strong symptoms of PTSD.

In Kosovo, only Albanians (no Serbs) were asked about their war experiences. Respondents of a Serb identity are therefore coded to 0 on both war exposure and PTSD, and accounted for by a separate dummy variable.\(^8\)

To test H3, I developed several different measures of local violence. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the second level of analysis is the administrative division of municipalities. To capture the intensity of violence in each municipality, I rely on a measure which captures the number of violent incidents within a radius of 30 kilometers from the population weighted municipality centroid.\(^9\) Since municipalities are small, and clusters of violent episodes do not always follow municipality borders, this seems like a better measure than relying on the number of events within each municipality. The mean value in Kosovo is 400, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina 60.

Due to a different administrative structure, community level violence is measured differently in Croatia than in Bosnia and Kosovo. Municipalities in Croatia are very small and could possibly be used to identify respondents. Therefore I use counties as the second level of analysis. Since these administrative units are relatively large, I simply use the number of events within each county to capture the local intensity of war. The mean number of violent events per county is 11.5, which is much lower than the corresponding values in Bosnia and Kosovo, reflecting the more limited nature of the violence.

In all three cases, the measures of violence correlate quite well. The correlation between PTSD and having lost a friend or family member is 0.21 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 0.24 in Croatia, and 0.49 in Kosovo. Of those who lost a friend or family member, 33 percent did not show any symptoms of PTSD. Of those with the highest score of PTSD (> .8), about 18 percent of them had experienced a personal loss. On the aggregate level, the correlation between local violence and the share of population who lost a close relative or friend is 0.63 in Croatia, 0.31 in Bosnia and 0.36 in Kosovo. The correlations between local violence and PTSD symptoms are 0.46 in Croatia, 0.36 in Kosovo and only 0.06 in Bosnia.

It is not so surprising that the correlation is strong in Croatia and relatively weak in Bosnia. In Croatia, the fighting was more limited geographically, which gives larger variation in local exposure. Most Croats were able to return to their homes after the war, and most Serbs fled the country, and are therefore not covered by the survey. The weak correlations in Bosnia can probably be explained by the low rate of returned refugees and the pattern of ethnic segregation after the war. Assuming that people fled from heavily affected areas to less affected areas, it is likely that more peaceful areas still have their share of traumatized inhabitants.

\(^8\) Imputation of values (see e.g. Allison 2002) would be misleading, since Albanians were more exposed to violence than Serbs.

\(^9\) The choice of a 30 kilometers threshold is somewhat arbitrary, but seems to fit the size of the median municipality in both Bosnia and Kosovo. As a robustness check, I also use the number of events within a radius of 10, 20, 40 and 50 kilometers from the population-weighted centroids for each municipality. I am grateful to Jan Ketil Rød for providing me with these variables.
Similarly, there are areas which were violently “cleansed” for people of one ethnic group, and which are now mainly inhabited by people who were not targeted. In Kosovo, the return of refugees was much faster, which gives a higher correlation between the different measures. However, many Serbs fled to Serbia and still live there, and they are not covered by the sample. To control for this, I include a set of dummy variables which capture whether the respondent stayed throughout the war, fled but returned, or has still not been able to return.

**Control variables**

Ethnic identity has shown to be a strong determinant of various attitudes in the region. Also studies from other areas have shown that ethnicity should be taken into account when explaining authoritarian attitudes (Lühieste 2008). Moreover, exposure to violence correlates with ethnic identity, since some groups were harder hit than others. From a policy perspective, it is also important to know if there are ethnic differences in authoritarian value orientations. If large differences are found across ethnic groups, this indicates that regime legitimacy is lower in some segments of the society. This is likely if some groups, like ethnic minorities, feel excluded from the political system. To capture this, I include a set of dummy variables of the respondents’ self-declared ethnic affiliation.

The purpose of the article is not to investigate all possible determinants of authoritarianism, but to estimate the effect of various types of war exposure. Therefore, I only include a set of standard socio-demographic variables like age (measured in years), gender, education (in years) and self-reported income (standardized with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1). I also include a variable that captures the size of place where the respondent currently lives (8 categories where a value of 1 represents a capital city and 8 “just a place or a family farm”), since previous research has shown that urban-rural cleavage of values has been quite strong in the region (see e.g. Ramet 1996).¹⁰

**ANALYSIS**

The purpose of the analysis is to estimate the effect of war exposure on people’s authoritarian value orientation. After a simple comparison of the distribution of the dependent variable in the three countries, I present multilevel regression models for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, and subsequently some extensions to the baseline model.

First, it is worth noting that Kosovo has a much higher mean score on authoritarianism than the other two countries. The mean value of the dependent variable in Kosovo is about 4.1, which means that on average, Kosovo respondents agreed to all the statements that were included in the dependent variable. In comparison, the mean value in Bosnia is 3.1 and in Croatia 2.8, which both translate into a mean response of “neither agree nor disagree” to the statements. In practice, the high mean value and limited variation in attitudes in Kosovo mean

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¹⁰ A variable of the size of the place of residence at age 14 was also included initially, but did not contribute to the model and was therefore excluded.
that it will be harder to obtain statistically significant results, as there is less variance to be explained.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the dependent variable for each country through a box plot. The figure shows that authoritarian values are much more common in the population in Kosovo than in Bosnia and Croatia. The first quartile of the Kosovo sample is well above the third quartile in the other two samples. The only “free” country according to the Freedom House index, Croatia, is also more liberal than Bosnia-Herzegovina. The median value in Croatia is only slightly higher than the first quartile in the Bosnian sample, but there is more variation and a larger liberal segment in Croatia.

Figure 1. Distribution of dependent variable, by country

Initial testing of empty multilevel regression models with only the intercept showed a substantial part of the variance in the dependent variable is found between the geographical units, and the intraclass correlation is relatively high. This confirms the hierarchical structure in the data and indicates that multilevel regression provides a better fit than simple linear regression. Table 1 presents the full model with explanatory and control variables for the three cases.
Table 1. Multilevel regression of authoritarianism and war exposure, by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants</th>
<th>Kosovo</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
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<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.079**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>-0.019***</td>
<td>-0.037***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Rural residence</td>
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<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.050***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
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<td>Albanian*</td>
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<td>(0.230)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.279)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.127***</td>
<td>0.311</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
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<td>Croat*</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>-0.098**</td>
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<td>(0.044)</td>
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<td>0.311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.206)</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.047)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned refugee</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.109***</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
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<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
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<td>(0.088)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.063*</td>
<td>-0.138***</td>
<td>0.097</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.037)</td>
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<td>0.286***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local violence</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>(0.133)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
</tr>
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Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test. Sigma_u: variance at level two (municipality/county), sigma_e: variance at level one (individual level). * The largest population group in each country is set as reference category: Albanian (Kosovo), Muslim (Bosnia) and Croats (Croatia). Coefficients for some minor ethnic groups excluded to save space (effects not statistically significant).

According to H1, exposure to violence makes people express a stronger authoritarian value orientation. This finds no support. In Kosovo and Croatia, the personal loss of a close relative or friend has no statistically significant effect. In Bosnia, the effect is statistically significant on a 0.01 level, but the effect is contrary to the expected: having experienced a
personal loss actually reduces authoritarianism. The effect is not large, but still surprising, given the clear expectation of a negative effect.

H2 proposed that individuals with stronger symptoms of PTSD display more authoritarianism than others. This hypothesis finds clear support. While the effect is not very large, the coefficient remains positive and statistically significant in all three countries.

For H3, the evidence is inconclusive. According to H3, people in more war-affected communities are more authoritarian than others. This holds true only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the difference between the most- and least affected communities is about 0.4 on a 5-point scale.

Turning to the control variables, education and rural residence seem to be the most important factors determining authoritarianism. Not surprisingly, people with higher education, and people living in larger cities, are more liberal than others (see e.g. Mishler and Rose 2001; Luhiste 2008; Dalton 1994). Gender, age, and income have only minor effects or no effect at all. Interestingly, there is little difference between the ethnic groups. The exception is the Serb population in Kosovo, which expresses more liberal values than the Albanian majority.

While none of the war exposure variables has any large effect, it is important to keep in mind that they should in part be interpreted together. Those who experienced a personal loss during the war, as well as the most traumatized individuals, most likely lived in a community severely hit by violence. Living in a war-torn community should also help keeping memories alive, especially among the most affected individuals. Table 2 presents an extension to Table 1 and includes interaction terms between PTSD symptoms and local violence (Model 1), and personal loss and local violence (Model 2). For Croatia, this extension does not represent an improvement of the original model, but for Bosnia and Kosovo, where violence was more widespread, the interaction effects contribute significantly to the models.
<table>
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<th>Determinants</th>
<th>Kosovo (1)</th>
<th>Kosovo (2)</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina (1)</th>
<th>Bosnia-Herzegovina (2)</th>
<th>Croatia (1)</th>
<th>Croatia (2)</th>
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<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
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<td>(0.016)</td>
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<td>(0.011)</td>
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<td>-0.010**</td>
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<td>-0.020***</td>
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<td>(0.004)</td>
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<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
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<td>-0.125***</td>
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<td>Returned refugee</td>
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<td>0.258***</td>
<td>0.235***</td>
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<td>-0.133***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.003</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.001**</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
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<td>(0.001)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTSD*Local violence</td>
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<td>-0.002</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
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<td>Sigma_u</td>
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<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.165</td>
<td>0.167</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sigma_e</td>
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<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.604</td>
<td>0.606</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
<td>0.206</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, two-tailed test. Sigma_u: variance at level two (municipality/county), sigma_e: variance at level one (individual level). * The largest population group in each country is set as reference category: Albanian (Kosovo), Muslim (Bosnia) and Croats (Croatia). Coefficients for some minor ethnic groups excluded to save space (effects not statistically significant).
According the estimations in Table 2, the net effect of losing a close relative friend and living in the most war-torn municipality is 0.33 in Kosovo and 0.23 in Bosnia (model 1). This means that with a more precise model specification, H2 finds support in both countries. The net effect of showing strong symptoms of PTSD and living in the most war-torn municipality is 0.28 in Kosovo and 0.34 in Bosnia (model 2). All these net effects are statistically significant or very close to significant on a 0.05 level, so H1 and H3 are also supported.

All the above findings are robust to several modifications of the model. A set of models with a disaggregated dependent variable confirm the results reported in the tables. In all the countries, the war exposure variables have a quite uniform effect on the single indicators that were used to construct the dependent variable. Multicollinearity between the various measures of violence does not appear to be a problem, as their effects remain stable when included one by one in a stepwise regression. However, the effect of personal loss becomes slightly smaller when the measure of PTSD is excluded from the model, indicating a partially mediating effect. A random effect specification where the intercept and the level of local violence are allowed to vary across the level two units does not improve the model fit or otherwise alter the results. I also changed the measure of local violence in Bosnia and Kosovo with the number of events within a radius of 10, 20, 40 and 50 kilometers. In Bosnia, the effect remains positive and statistically significant across all the specifications. In Kosovo, where the original effect was weaker, a radius larger than 30 kilometers gives no effect at all. The results also remain stable when the models are run as simple ordinary least square regression models with respondents clustered on municipalities (in the case of Croatia, counties).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The structural problems of democratization in divided societies and post-war contexts are well described. In the words of Joshi (2010, 829), “democracy is likely to emerge in an environment characterized by a certain level of economic development, a well-developed civic culture, diffusion of wealth, and a certain degree of elite agreements” – precisely the factors that are absent in most post-war societies. Others have pointed to the fact that war actually can “open to a window of opportunity of regime change” and in that way be conducive to democratization (Grimm and Merkel 2008, 468). I started out this article arguing that also individual values should be taken into account when trying to understand the process of democratic consolidation in post-war societies. My proposition was that exposure to violence and the insecurity induced by civil war could increase people’s demand for safety at the expense of their desire for liberty and democracy.

Consolidation of democracy is said to be complete when democracy has become “the only game in town” (Linz 1996). According to Freedom House, both Kosovo and Bosnia have a way to go before they can be considered to be fully democratic. Authoritarian regimes often leave behind a legacy of weak civil society, lack of democratic experience, and in many cases an authoritarian value orientation (see e.g. Barnes 2001). The longer the duration of the regime, the stronger is its legacy on political culture and individual values and attitudes. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the emerging democracies have to deal not only with the legacy of communism, but also with the legacy of civil war and violence against civilians. Previous
research from Israel and the United States have found that exposure to terrorism and other national threats tend to increase anti-democratic sentiments and political extremism (Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Perrin 2005; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Canetti et al. 2009; Halperin et al. 2009).

The above analyses show that authoritarian values are quite predominant in the three countries examined, particularly in Kosovo. At the time when the survey was carried out, the status of the former Serbian province was still not settled. Taking into account the very recent conflict in Kosovo and the violent clashes that have continued until today, it is not surprising that people continue to give priority to order and security rather than personal liberties. Croatia, which is the most democratic of the three and which saw less damage during war, has larger liberal segments than the other two countries. Of course, it is not possible to determine the exact relationship between democratization, liberal values and violent conflict based on three cases observed at one point in time, but especially in Kosovo, there is a cluster of authoritarian values, troubled democratization, and recent violence which should not be overlooked.

My findings, although not completely consistent, show that exposure to war leaves behind a legacy of authoritarian values which lasts several years after a peace agreement is signed. The main mechanism seems to be through symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Rather than violence per se, it is the individual’s ability to cope with the traumatic events that ultimately affects a person’s value orientation. The obvious implication of this is that the post-war recovery of society, including how well the society is able to take care of the most affected individuals, also affects its political development. This is analogous to findings from previous research on reconciliation and war traumas, where scholars have advocated the importance of addressing human needs in the aftermath of violent conflict in order to avoid conflict recurrence (Nadler, Malloy, and Fisher 2008; Hewstone et al. 2008; Staub 2000, 2006).

Finally, it is also worth noting that there is little difference between the ethnic groups. The exception is the Serbs in Kosovo, which in average are more liberal than the Albanian minority. Also Croats in Bosnia are significantly less authoritarian than the other groups, but the difference is minimal. This means that at least, authoritarian values do not overlap with ethnic divides. Caution should be taken, however, as this is a relatively new research field. Still, little is known about how political values are affected by war and violent conflict. Improved data quality and an expansion to other war-affected areas are necessary to improve our understanding of the dynamics between civil war, authoritarianism and authoritarian values. In particular, it would be useful to have better measures of authoritarianism, as well as measures of support for democracy, so that one could estimate the relationship between the two. The very widespread fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo also make them less than ideal cases, since most people were affected in one way or another by the wars. To see if these findings hold also for other types of civil war, for example civil wars aiming at removing a political regime, data from other recent conflict areas would be needed. With more data, it would also be possible to examine whether there are differences between the winning and the losing side of a war, and how the duration of violence affects individual attitudes.
REFERENCES


