Inequality, Lobbying and Resource Allocation
Peer-reviewed Journal Article
Esteban, Joan & Debraj Ray (2006) Inequality, Lobbying and Resource Allocation, American Economic Review 96(1): 257–279.
This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatment. The government—even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency—may be confounded by the possibility that both high wealth and true economic desirability create loud lobbies. Broadly speaking, both poorer economies and unequal economies display greater public misallocation. The paper warns against the conventional wisdom that this is so because such governments are more “corrupt.”
Authors
Research Professor, Institute for Economic Analysis, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Julius Silver Professor of Economics, New York University