Workshop at PRIO, 21-22 August 2006
One of the most commonly prescribed methods of achieving stable governance in divided societies is power-sharing. Advocates champion it as a means of reconciling the goals of self-determination of a group and democracy in a multi-ethnic society. Power-sharing thus serves as a means of distributing power across groups through broad-based coalitions. Skeptics respond that since conflict resolution may require entrenching the interests of certain segments of society, power-sharing institutions may themselves undermine the stability of the political system. In some cases, such instability may even lead to violent outcomes. This fundamental dilemma is the focus of this workshop.
How can institutions provide immediate conflict resolution, while continuing to maintain flexible and competitive institutions? In particular, we seek analyses highlighting the role of delegation (such as principal-agent relationships) in the success or failure of governance and conflict management.
Program and downloadable papers