The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation

Journal article

Turner, Stansfield (1998) The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation, Security Dialogue 29 (3): 293–301.

The world is not sufficiently concerned today about the slow pace of nuclear arms control. We need to acknowledge that the outlook for meaningful progress on nuclear arms reductions and controls through what is being done today is slim. If we can shake off the remnants of Cold War thinking, we open three avenues for supplementing the arms control process: placing weapons at lower states of readiness to help avoid accidents, downgrading the role of these weapons in our military strategy, and working toward the goal of permanently ridding the world of nuclear weapons. In succession these steps are de-alerting, devaluing, and disarming nuclear weapons. We neither can, nor need to, resolve the case for disarmament soon. What we should resolve is to supplement the traditional arms control process with de-alerting and devaluing, so as to be in position to evaluate whether disarmament is feasible.

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