This workshop aims to clarify the ways in which resources and governance structures may contribute to or prevent civil war and to answer a number of related questions. What institutional arrangements are more prone to groups taking up arms in opposition to the state? What is it about democracy that dampens the threat of armed violence? Are certain democratic institutions more stable than others? Are certain institutional structures more conducive to peaceful democratisation than others? Do certain kinds of resources and resource distributions motivate and/or enable groups to take up arms against the state? And how do resource distributions and regime characteristics interact in fostering peace or war? To address these questions, we welcome a broad range of research, ranging from the analysis of rebellion to studies of democratisation, resource distribution, and political stability. The workshop will be open to scholars with an international relations background as well as to those who are working in the field of comparative politics. Methodologically, we welcome a broad range of approaches, including game-theoretic models, historical case studies, and quantitative statistical analysis. Papers may be theoretical, empirical, or both.