Colaresi, Michael; & Carey, Sabine C. (2008) To Kill or to Protect: Security Forces, Domestic Institutions, and Genocide , Journal of Conflict Resolution 52(1): 39–67.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between military capabilities, executive constraints, and genocide. We suggest that military capabilities can serve two opposing purposes. First, military capabilities are necessary for a state to remain viable and provide both internal and external security to the public. Yet, simultaneously, military personnel can be deployed to repress, menace, and destroy segments of the public. In a country under threat, what conditions are likely to lead an executive to use the military for public protection rather than private-interest killing? Building on previous work relating domestic institutions to public goods provision we hypothesize that politically constrained executives are more likely to utilize the military for public benefits and stability while unconstrained and unaccountable leaders are more likely to use the military to stay in power. An analysis of state failures that lead to genocide robustly supports the idea that the effect of military personnel is conditional on institutional executive constraints. Our findings have both theoretical and practical implications for international and comparative politics.
Associate Professor, Michigan State University
CSCW Working Group Leader; Chair in Political Science, University of Mannheim
The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) conducts research on the conditions for peaceful relations between states, groups and people.