Posted Sunday, 10 Mar 2019 by Chris Zebrowski
Terrorist attacks, infectious diseases, financial crises, and floods—what makes contemporary dangers so threatening is their tendency to suddenly materialize, rapidly escalate and quickly spread. So how might we respond to such threats?
In my recent article in Security Dialogue, I investigate how emergency responses are being reorganized in the UK to grapple with the speed and unpredictability of contemporary emergencies. Specifically, I focus on the framework of Integrated Emergency Management (IEM). IEM looks to accelerate the speed of emergency responses in order to hasten recovery. It does so by adopting new models of emergency organization rooted in the principles of communication and information exchange. Various information and communications technologies are relied on to circulate information between the diverse agencies (e.g. police, firefighters, ambulance, etc) involved in the response. The aim is to achieve ‘shared situational awareness’—that is, a common understanding of the nature of the event and the response’s progress by all responders.
Shared situational awareness is said to improve the integration of different response agencies cooperating within a response, enhance problem-solving and permit the devolution of responsibilities from senior commanders to front-line responders. The result is a model of emergency response governed from the bottom-up. As responders identify the extent of the challenges wrought by any given emergency (e.g. a road has been flooded, x number of hospital beds are needed, a cordon needs to be set up) then different response plans may be actioned, new levels of command and control introduced, and distinct specialist agencies invited to assist in the response. The result is a bespoke emergency response that can be quickly assembled and adapted to address the unique challenges arising from the often-unpredictable unfolding of an evolving emergency.$$cdnImage image=ac72555306004ceb9d8b57e906b875f0.jpg width=640 height=480 alignment=left
On the one hand, distinguishing event-suppression as a distinct form of security might encourage us to consider the very different modes through which security is achieved. On the other hand, we might consider the implications of this ‘need for speed’ for contemporary security politics. Does it undermine slow democratic process of debate and discussion? Is it sufficiently checked by slower processes such as training, planning, and the drafting of legislation? How does such an understanding relate to more spatially oriented analyses examining ‘state of emergencies’?