Russia’s maximalist demands undermine peace talks despite mounting domestic strains

The key goal of the most recent round of talks between Russia and Ukraine, held on Monday, June 2, in Istanbul, is supposed to be an exchange of memoranda on the conditions for ending the war. The expectations of any progress from this juxtaposition, however, are nearly non-existent.

Ukraine has sent its document to Moscow well in advance and shared its position with U.S. and European partners. Keith Kellogg, U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy for Ukraine and Russia, has conveyed his positive assessment of it (RBC, May 30). Moscow has opted to keep its demands secret until the meeting. This concealment makes productive discussions rather improbable, even in the opinion of Russian commentators (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 29). Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov is leading the Ukrainian team and plans to consult with security officials from the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, while the Russian delegation is again led by Vladimir Medinsky, one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s less influential aids, and Moscow insists on a strictly bilateral format of talks (ser EDM, May 19; Rossiiskaya gazeta, May 30).

The differences in pre-negotiation diplomatic maneuvering suggest that Ukraine is prepared to make compromises but believes that Moscow will adhere to its maximalist demands. Russia is likely to simulate flexibility but seeks to block every path leading to a ceasefire (Meduza, May 30). Russia’s key condition for pausing its offensive operations, which in recent weeks have yielded a few more square miles a day than the minuscule gains in early spring, is a complete halt to all types of Western military aid to Ukraine (Republic.ru, May 29; Izvestiya, May 30). This demand clashes with the reality of the expansion of European military support for Ukraine, which Germany now leads, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy secured a new surge in this support during his recent visit to Berlin (Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 29; The Moscow Times, May 30). Russia is likely most worried about the possibility of an increase in the delivery of U.S. weapons, particularly air defense systems, purchased for Ukraine by European states (TopWar.ru, May 31).

Another Russian demand centers on the discontinuation of mobilization in Ukraine. This may appear disingenuous since Moscow certainly has no intention of limiting its own efforts to strengthen its armed forces (Forbes.ru, May 30). Russia’s deepening problem of compensating for the heavy losses in relentless attacks by recruiting “volunteers” and dragooning convicts, as the pool of available manpower is shrinking, while the quality of reinforcements is deteriorating, probably underpins this clearly unacceptable condition (The Insider, May 22; Radio Svoboda, May 30). The severity of the demographic crisis in Russia worries Moscow so much that official statistics have discontinued publication of data on mortality across the regions, which even the “patriotic” pundits interpret as evidence of the campaign’s failure to stimulate population growth (TopWar.ru, May 27). Propaganda cannot deliver progress on the incompatible aims of persuading young men to sign contracts for serving in the killing zone and of promoting “family values.” Additionally, the sharply disproportional distribution of wealth and income in favor of elites aggravates social problems in the inflation-affected majority (The Bell, May 26).

The confluence of demographic and economic problems in Russia erodes its ability to sustain the war effort, and no amount of discourse on achieving a decisive victory can help Putin mitigate the looming recession to a “soft landing” (The Bell, May 30). This accumulation of domestic weaknesses makes the Kremlin more sensitive to threats of new sanctions and more concerned about alienating Trump (Re: Russia, May 30). The impacts of the gradually expanded sanctions regime continue to grow, despite Moscow’s proficiency in camouflaging supply chains. Putin’s ire, aimed at enterprises that fail to deliver on war-related orders, particularly in the aircraft- and ship-building industries, highlights the diminishing returns on investments in import substitution (Forbes.ru, May 30). The vague threats of mega-sanctions and “really bad things” from the West may not be that worrisome for the Russian government, but a new sequence of calibrated measures targeting the stress on state finances may trigger a full-blown economic crisis (The Insider, May 29).

The progressive decline in revenues from oil, natural gas, and coal exports is the primary cause of this stress, and the government faces the dilemma of raising taxes and providing subsidies (Vedomosti, May 30). Saudi Arabia has dismissed Russian objections to raising production quotas in the OPEC+ (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cartel, and the inevitable decline in the benchmark price will exacerbate the Russian budget deficit to an extreme level (see EDM, May 15; The Moscow Times, May 31). The investments of Russian oil exporters in building a ”shadow fleet” of tankers are undercut not only by falling prices but also by tighter measures of control over these ships in the Baltic Sea, with Sweden taking the lead (see EDM, February 5; Kommersant, May 29; Svoboda.org, May 31). The Baltic Fleet tries to discourage these “hostile” activities by staging a series of exercises, but its combat order is clearly inferior to the combined naval capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Baltic states (Izvestiya, May 28).

Putin’s intention of reinforcing tall diplomatic demands with relentless military attacks cannot amount to a winning strategy due to its economic weakness. Ukraine tries to exacerbate this by drone strikes targeting industrial facilities and infrastructure (Novaya gazeta Europe, May 28; Meduza, June 1). The devastatingly effective Ukrainian attack on bases of Russian long-range aviation on Sunday, Jun 1, has exposed the vulnerability of many high-value assets in Russia (Kommersant, June 1). Putin’s fake deference to Trump, contrasting with furious propaganda condemnation of the European support for Ukraine, can postpone punishment for only so long (RIAC, May 29; RBC, May 31).

The talks in Istanbul are certain to demonstrate yet again the huge gap between the Ukrainian position on terminating the hostilities and the Russian position on maximizing the gains from the protracted war. The illumination of Ukraine’s readiness to compromise and Russia’s intransigence, however, is more important. Moscow may hope that this inflexibility amounts to asserting its position of strength, but it disappoints many states interested in an armistice, including Türkiye, which will host and mediate the talks, and even the People’s Republic of China, which notes that its clearly expressed preference for ending the war is ignored (The Global Times, May 30). Collective effort is hard to orchestrate, but various actors can prove in different ways that time is not on Russia’s side.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professsor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor