The UN Security Council Resolution on Gaza: Age of Consent or Recipe for Conflict?

On 17 November, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued Resolution 2803, endorsing US President Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza. The resolution envisages a Board of Peace (BoP) to govern Gaza as an interim administration, as well as the establishment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) mandated to ensure stability, demilitarization and the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups.

The fundamental problem with both the UN resolution and the Trump plan is that they are not grounded in the consent of the people and political actors in Gaza. They sidestep the essential task of promoting local cooperation and legitimacy. Consequently, the BoP and ISF will be viewed by many Palestinians as instruments of coercion and occupation. They are likely to be met with violent resistance.

This is not a viable path to peace, security and stability. It is a recipe for further conflict.

Coercive disarmament: mission impossible

Resolution 2803 asserts that “the parties have accepted” Trump’s plan. This is patently false. In October, Hamas officials stated that they had not agreed to disarm and that the mediators had not discussed the ISF with them. Senior Hamas members have repeatedly expressed opposition to disarmament.

Hamas’ response to the UN resolution was consistent: “Any discussion regarding the issue of arms must remain an internal national matter linked to a political process that guarantees the end of the occupation, the establishment of the [Palestinian] state and self-determination.” Making the ISF responsible for “disarming the resistance” strips the international force of its neutrality and “turns it into a party to the conflict in favor of the [Israeli] occupation”.

Although Resolution 2803 claims that “the parties” have accepted the Trump plan, it also recognizes the untruth of this claim and anticipates Palestinian resistance: it empowers the ISF to "use all necessary measures", which is UN-speak for employing force.

But force is unlikely to succeed. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) has waged war against Hamas for over two years, deploying thousands of troops and dropping over 100,000 tons of ammunition on Gaza. By October 2025, according to Amnesty International, the IDF invasion had led to repeated mass displacement, extensive destruction of civil infrastructure, deliberate starvation, over 65,000 people killed and over 200,000 injured.

Despite the scale of this violence, the IDF failed to disarm Hamas. How, then, is the ISF expected to do better? Unlike the IDF, the ISF will lack the cohesion of a unified national army. It will instead comprise a group of countries (not yet unidentified) that have no partisan desire to perpetuate further violence in Gaza. For the ISF, coercive disarmament is not just improbable; it is mission impossible.

Occupation by other means

The BoP will be chaired by President Trump and is expected to include former British prime minister Tony Blair. It will constitute the primary governing body of Gaza. Subordinate to this body, according to the Trump plan, there will be a “technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities”.

It remains to be seen whether any credible Palestinians are willing to serve on this technocratic committee and report to a non-Palestinian political overlord. It also remains to be seen whether they have any local legitimacy. Hamas has already rejected the BoP as an “international guardianship mechanism”.

For Palestinians deeply frustrated, infuriated and humiliated by decades of Israeli occupation, the BoP and ISF will look like the continuation of the occupation through new structures. The UNSC’s endorsement does not legitimize these structures; it only discredits the Council.

The imperative of consent

The Trump plan and the UNSC resolution ignore the rich experience of disarmament in other conflicts. One of the disregarded major lessons is that disarmament in places emerging from conflict is not a stand-alone activity. It is a component of a broader process of ‘disarmament, demobilization and reintegration’ (DDR), which in turn is part of the broader field of ‘security sector reform’ (SSR).

The point is that DDR and SSR are fundamentally interconnected, political and complex, with intersecting security, economic, social and technical dimensions. A superficial approach to disarmament is naïve and dangerous.

Another major lesson is the principle of ‘no ownership, no commitment’. This is an eminently pragmatic imperative: if disarmament and security reform do not have the consent of local actors, including armed groups, the process will be haphazard and resisted.

Successful disarmament in Colombia, Northern Ireland and South Africa was not imposed by external powers. It was the product of protracted negotiations among the main conflict parties. And it succeeded because it took place in the context of negotiations that were intended to achieve, and did in fact achieve, a political resolution of the conflict.

The path to peace

The Trump plan and the UNSC resolution are plagued by flaws. The so-called Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict is not remotely comprehensive; it is one of weakest ceasefire plans on record from a technical and political viewpoint. The UN resolution violates the UN Charter and international law, and does not provide an unequivocal commitment to Palestinian statehood and self-determination.

Any serious attempt to implement the plan, and to make the adjustments that are required, must be based on negotiations with Palestinian political actors. Such negotiations will be difficult and will not guarantee success. But without them, failure of the plan and enduring misery for the people of Gaza are almost certain.

The elusive grand bargain remains the only viable path to peace and collective security: disarmament and demilitarization in return for Palestinian statehood.

Professor Laurie Nathan is Director of the Mediation Program of the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He has written extensively on mediation, ceasefires and security arrangements.