Putin stalling ninety percent complete peace deal

The recent surge in diplomatic activity intended to draft an agreement to end Moscow’s war against Ukraine has yielded U.S. and Ukrainian assertions that the deal is 90 percent ready. The content of the talks, which continued from Florida through the holiday season to snow-covered Paris in January and to the Davos Forum next week, has not been leaked, so discussions about the remaining 10 percent are not well-informed.

All negotiators are projecting optimism about a compromise that would be acceptable for Ukraine, agreeable for the Europeans, and reasonable for the United States (Vedomosti, December 29, 2025; Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 1). The gap between the draft agreement and the Kremlin’s stance, which remains far from the U.S.–European–Ukrainian position, barely featured in negotiators’ statements. Kirill Dmitriev—the Russian envoy who partook in the December 20–21 Miami talks and was present on the sidelines of the January 6–7 talks in Paris—may speak the same business lingo as U.S. negotiators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, but is not a part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision-making mechanism (Forbes.ru, December 26, 2025; Interfax, January 8).

Putin held an unusual series of meetings with his top military brass, approving their reports on sustained attacks and instructing them to keep the strategic initiative, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy traveled around Europe before and after meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Florida (RBC, December 27, 2025). Putin had a phone conversation with Trump before Zelenskyy arrived at Mar-a-Lago and, apparently, was not entirely satisfied with the call, despite exchanging compliments with the U.S. president (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 29, 2025). Putin prepared a different angle for his next conversation with Trump on December 29, 2025, claiming that a Ukrainian drone attack on his Valdai residence compelled him to take a tougher line in the peace talks (Kommersant, December 29, 2025). It took the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) less than a day to establish that no such attack actually happened, after which Trump reversed his initial indignation and decried Putin as the main obstacle to peace (The Insider, December 31, 2025). Admitting to the lie was not an option for Putin; instead, he retaliated for the fake Ukrainian attack with an intermediate-range Oreshnik missile strike on Lviv, which inflicted less damage than the first test-launch of this missile on Dnipro in November 2024 (Izvestiya, January 10).

The Oreshnik strike conveys that Putin finds the new peace plan unsatisfactory (Novaya Gazeta Europe, January 9). He had reservations even regarding the earlier “28 points plan” developed by Dmitriev and Witkoff, but the section proposing to end “all ambiguities of the last 30 years” was certainly to his liking (RBC, December 4). That thesis disappeared from the current document, as neither Zelenskyy nor his European supporters are willing to absolve Russia of the crime of aggression against Ukraine (Carnegie Politika, December 30, 2025). Putin needs a way to reject the new plan without alienating Trump—his apparent solution was to fake an attack on his residence to make the disagreement personal (Valdai Club, December 30, 2025).

Moscow also attempts to justify stalling negotiations by claiming that new evidence of corruption in Kyiv renders Zelenskyy’s presidential authority illegitimate (Izvestiya, November 29, 2025). Ukrainian negotiators have neutralized these attacks by agreeing to hold elections and a referendum on retreating from the occupied part of the Donetsk region in the months following the signing of a peace agreement (Meduza, December 31, 2025). This commitment means that a ceasefire needs precede Ukrainian elections or referendums on ceding territory to Russia, an order of operations that Trump demanded at the start of the negotiations process but remains at odds with Putin’s declared priorities (Re: Russia, December 26, 2025). Andriy Yermak’s November 2025 resignation as head of the Office of the President of Ukraine and the appointment of Kyrylo Budanov to this position minimized the effects of the Ukrainian corruption scandal on negotiations (TASS, January 2; Carnegie Politika, January 7). Budanov’s good reputation in Washington is bad news for Moscow, mainly because he was the organizer of several spectacular “special operations” inside Russia as Ukraine’s head of military intelligence (Radio Svoboda, January 3).

The U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on January 3 has made its way into Russian discourse about negotiations with the United States (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, January 4). The Russian Foreign Ministry issued two statements on Maduro’s apprehension and another on the January 7 U.S. seizure of a sanctioned Venezuelan oil tanker that tried to change its registration to Russia, expressing concern in more cautious terms than the condemnation coming from the People’s Republic of China (RBC, January 7). The Russian mainstream media primarily covered international reactions rather than offering expert analysis, except for speculation about the possible betrayal of Maduro by his security services (Argumenty i fakty, January 3; Kommersant, January 4). The violation of the sovereignty of one of Russia’s strategic partners is a matter of secondary importance in the opinion of Russian “patriotic” bloggers, who instead praise the effectiveness of what they term a U.S. “special military operation” (Meduza, January 3). These bloggers view the U.S. operation as a message from Washington to the Kremlin that it is willing to forcefully remove hostile foreign leaders (TopWar.ru, January 4).

Putin has not been seen since the publication of his pre-recorded and very short New Year’s message (Verstka, December 31, 2025; Meduza, November 4). He has a habit of disappearing during the holiday season, but his usual relaxation is likely spoiled by the news from Caracas and protests in Tehran (Radio Svoboda, January 10). Russian investments in Venezuelan oil are not of great interest to Putin, but the capture of Maduro, whom he met many times, evokes the death of Muamar Qaddafi in October 2011, which he believes was orchestrated by the United States (see EDM, September 8, 2011; RBC, December 15, 2011). Several failed dictators, including former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, have found safe haven in Moscow. Putin is likely reflecting on Maduro’s refusal to take this option and on the sudden breakdowns of regimes allied with Russia, including Iran (RBC, January 4; Vazhnie Istorii, January 5).

Putin is determined to continue his war against Ukraine, which has lasted longer than World War II, even though a growing portion of Russian society wants it to end. He may succeed in sabotaging peace talks, but prolonging the war could become a source of political risk, particularly as economic stagnation drives down Russian incomes and erodes loyalty in many elite groups. Putin’s fabrication of Ukrainian attacks to personalize his opposition to the peace plan may have seemed clever, but it has instead deepened his alienation from the broad coalition seeking to bring the war to an end.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor