Putin’s war calculus keeps oscillating as spring offensive stumbles

Russian soldiers mobilized for the war against Ukraine. Moscow, 2022. Photo: Stringer/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images

The effect of the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf on Russia’s war against Ukraine grows more complex as the parties of both conflicts experience attrition of various kinds.

Russian commentators tend to exaggerate Iran’s capacity to withstand air assaults, but also suggest that the U.S. leadership cannot accept anything less than a convincing victory (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 24; TopWar.ru, March 28). Such an outcome can only be secured by a high-risk land operation, while some pundits speculate about the possibility of an Israeli nuclear strike (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 24; RIAC, March 27). Russia’s ability to benefit from the reduction in U.S. pressure on Moscow’s deadlocked and destructive war against Ukraine makes a peace deal is far from certain.

The spike in oil prices grants the most obvious benefit for Russia. The volume of additional revenues, however, cannot be calculated by simply multiplying an increase in exports by the new benchmark price (Carnegie Politika, March 27). For once, Russia’s oil and gas production cannot be increased measurably because the industry is severely affected by sanctions and underinvestment (Neftegaz.ru, March 25). Some sanctions relaxation could generate additional profits, provided Russia’s “shadow fleet” tankers operate without restrictions (Riddle, March 24). Ukraine, however, is firmly set to deny Moscow any windfall of petro-revenues and delivered a series of airstrikes at the end of March on the Primorsk and Ust-Luga oil terminals in the Gulf of Finland (The Insider, March 27; Fontanka.ru, March 29). Russia has not officially acknowledged the damage, which is visible from space. Mainstream Russian media, however, is full of opinions condemning the alleged “free passage” for Ukrainian drones through Estonian and Latvian airspace (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 26). No such claims can be invented to explain away successful Ukrainian strikes on port infrastructure in Novorossiysk and on tankers trying to deliver cargo to this terminal (RBC, March 14).

The trickle of additional income can only slightly alleviate Russia’s financial crisis. In February, the country’s financial crisis reached such intensity that Chief of Russia’s Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina warned that deep cuts in budget expenditures were inevitable (Meduza; The Moscow Times, March 24). Russian President Vladimir Putin still demanded that the government ensure a return to the “trajectory of stable growth,” but he could not avoid doubts about the sustainability of the war effort (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 23). Seeking to buy himself more time and assuming that extra oil revenues would not amount to much, Putin invited the richest oligarchs to make “voluntary” contributions to the war chest (The Bell, March 25). The rumors about this barely camouflaged extortion at a closed meeting have inevitably spread, and the Kremlin found them so embarrassing that an official repudiation was issued, presenting the proposition as a private initiative of one of the tycoons (Vedomosti, March 27). Only a few among Russia’s ultra-rich dare to hint at the destructive economic consequences of Putin’s war against Ukraine, but their silent discontent comes in tune with the louder public angst (Forbes.ru, March 26).

General wariness amid the war can turn local problems—such as the unannounced and brutally treated epidemic among the farm animals in Novosibirsk oblast—into triggers of mass protests (Novaya gazeta Europe, March 25). In Moscow and other major urban centers, the main driver of discontent is the recurrent attempt to limit Internet access and to shut down Telegram, the most popular messaging app in Russia (Meduza, March 25). Street protests against these crude measures have been swiftly suppressed. Still, the incompetence of officials who tried to invoke vague security reasons for thus suppression has become apparent to millions of participants in the digital economy, shocked by the sudden curtailing of their social networks (Radio Svoboda, March 25). The vexation is particularly strong among the younger generations, where support for the war is the lowest. The new army recruitment campaign targeting students as potential drone operators only adds to the critical mass of outrage (Re: Russia, March 23).

Visible success in the conduct of the war is needed for calming public ire. Without success, Putin’s goal of gaining control over the whole of Donbas—confirmed yet again to the seemingly rather unenthusiastic oligarchs—becomes a recipe for disaster (Kommersant, March 26). The start of the spring offensive is delivering the opposite effect, however, as the renewed Russian attacks yield fewer territorial gains than the positions lost to Ukrainian counterattacks (Novaya gazeta Europe, March 23). The strategic equation becomes a double negative as the system of commercial recruitment produces less fresh manpower than needed to compensate for the staggering losses (Carnegie Politika, February 10; Mediazona, March 27). Moscow’s conscription campaign starts on April 1, and while draft dodging is severely penalized, anti-war sentiment among youth inevitably translates into a desire to avoid military service at any cost (Komsomol’skaya Pravda, March 28). The low quality of Russian troops aggravates the problem of the depletion of stocks of key weapon systems, such as main battle tanks and tube artillery. The old Soviet strategy of amassing manpower and firepower does not work in the battle for Donbas (TopWar.ru, March 29). After months of slow Russian advances, Ukraine has gained a new edge in the drone warfare on the tactical level as the fast introduction of various innovations makes it possible to expand the “kill-zone” and target Russian logistics and reserves (Re: Russia, March 20).

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy offered Ukrainian technology and expertise for defending against Iranian drone strikes to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, and signed military cooperation agreements with these states, tacitly underscoring Russia’s strategic partnership with Iran (Gazeta.ru; RBC-Ukraine, March 28). Putin is clearly unable to counter either this diplomatic maneuvering or the resonance of Ukrainian strikes deep into Russia’s territory. He tries to demonstrate resolve in pursuing the immediate goal of defeating Ukraine and the greater desire of destroying the trans-Atlantic unity, but the resource base of his strategy is shrinking, and the credibility of his posturing is eroding.

Domestic costs of sustaining the unproductive war effort keep growing. The calculus of possible benefits to be derived from the war in the Gulf does not go up in parallel with its duration. Putin appears to keep hoping that some turn of global events would break the logic of his unwinnable war and eliminate the imperative of making a rational choice for freezing the hostilities. In reality, these hopes result in more missed opportunities to escape a dead end of his own making.