Deadlocked war subtly changes to Russia’s detriment

Soldier in the trenches during Ukraine war. Photo: Nikoletta Stoyanova/Getty Images

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced this year’s 32-hour-long Easter truce in his war against Ukraine in the same manner as in spring 2025. It was, however, not a precursor to a lasting ceasefire, as Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy suggested.

Neither was it a signal of Moscow’s interest in resuming talks on a peace deal, despite some cautious advocacy in the mainstream media (Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 6). Putin merely sought to pacify public opinion, where support for continuing the war is very weak, particularly among younger generations (Levada.ru, April 2). He also found it opportune to move in step with the pause in the Gulf conflict, which Russian experts did not expect to last even two weeks (Kommersant, April 9). The talks in Islamabad and the consequences of their breakdown are attracting prime international attention, so little attention has lately been given to the changes in Russia’s seemingly static war against Ukraine, which could be decisive.

The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains and has even suffered several retreats driven by Ukrainian counterattacks (Meduza, March 31; Slovo i Dilo, April 9). Official Russian commentary ignores this setback, but jingoist bloggers have been making a lot of noise about the lack of reserves needed to regain momentum (TopWar.ru, April 8; Izvestiya, April 10). The main cause of this transformation of the battlefield is the new edge Ukraine has gained in drone warfare by combining saturation of the tactical zone with first-person view (FPV) drones and mid-range strikes, so that the effective “kill-zone” is expanded to some 120 kilometers (74.5 miles) (Re: Russia, March 20). The balance of territorial advances may have shifted imperceptibly, but it effectively undercuts Putin’s claim that the whole Donbas will be occupied either through a deal or by force (Kommersant, April 10).

The botched attacks and crippled logistics result in record numbers of casualties in the Russian army. The documented number of 208,755 fatalities hardly makes half of the real losses of life (Mediazona, April 10). Since the start of the year, Russia’s commercial recruitment system has been unable to attract a sufficient number of mercenaries to compensate for mounting losses, and this gap keeps widening (Important Stories, February 26; NV.ua, April 10). Neither the spreading campaign to recruit students, nor the pressure on the fresh draftees conscripted since April 1 to sign contracts for combat units can yield the required volume of manpower (Current time, April 3; Meduza, April 7). Regional authorities are compelled to raise bonuses for signing contracts, but the supply of “volunteers” still cannot meet demand (Agents Media, April 10). These payments add considerably to regional budget crises, and taxation increases bring widespread discontent, aggravated by the underfunding of responses to various local emergencies, such as the foot-and-mouth epidemic in Southern Siberia (Forbes.ru, March 25;Novaya gazeta Europe, April 8).

Ukraine in March managed to gain an advantage over Russia in the number of long-distance drone attacks, setting the mark above 7,300 strikes (The Moscow Times, April 6). The data on these activities is quite unreliable, but the devastating impact of Ukrainian drone hits on Russian energy infrastructure, including platforms in the Caspian Sea, is beyond doubt (Rubrika, April 10). Repeated attacks on oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga have effectively denied Russia the opportunity to profit from the spike in oil prices driven by the conflict in the Gulf (Re: Russia, April 7). A new feature of Ukrainian drone warfare is the increased targeting of Russian air defense systems, including radars, which weakens the protection of many crucial assets exactly when the intensity of the threat goes up (Radio Svoboda, April 11).

Russian attempts to resort to nuclear blackmail or demonstrate its strategic muscle have also notably declined. Putin has avoided any nuclear bragging in his infrequent public appearances, and “patriotic” social media has turned to debates over the prospects of arms control (TopWar.ru, April 11; Kommersant, April 12). Dmitry Trenin, an advocate for nuclear escalation, has been promoted to president of the Russian International Affairs Council and has transitioned to a more sober discourse (RIAC, April 3). Moscow has also cut down on its hybrid attacks on its European neighbors and has been refraining from any counter-measures against the arrests of its “shadow fleet” ships (Fontanka.ru, April 10). A demarch by the Russian Foreign Ministry was the only step taken after the claim that the Baltic states opened air corridors for Ukrainian drone strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and Russian media noted that it was flatly turned down (RBC, April 10).

The first quarter of 2026 officially registered a contraction of the Russian economy, which is the strategic center of gravity in the war of attrition (The Moscow Times, April 8; Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 9). The doctoring of statistics camouflages the true depth of the recession, but the sustained decline in investment activity guarantees that the crisis will only deepen (The Bell, April 9). Alarm bells about the unprecedented expansion of the budget deficit may be temporarily silenced by the expected growth in petro-revenues, but the volume of additional income is clearly insufficient to address the unfolding financial disaster (Forbes.ru, April 6). Putin has no plan to address the economic decline, and his proposal to tax extra-high profits clashes with the reality of losses reported even by corporations enjoying the most-favored status (Kommersant, April 11). The total of these changes amounts to a strong new incentive for Russia to end the unwinnable war. Kyrylo Budanov, the top Ukrainian negotiator, has accordingly suggested that a compromise peace deal can be reached soon and implemented quickly. His point was instantly picked up by the Russian media (Izvestiya, April 11). Putin, however, operates on a different rationale centered on ensuring his grasp on power. He is less concerned about the regime’s survival than, for instance, the Iranian leadership, which refuses to moderate its ambitions in the talks with the United States, but is much more obsessed with personal safety. He finds the risks of taking responsibility for ending the war—and, by extension, for starting it—and for standing in the way of the peace process equally disturbing. Fear exacerbates his usual reluctance to make hard decisions, but procrastination only adds to the gravity of his political dilemma.