The ceasefire with Iran expires on 22 April. What happens then?

Since 28 February 2026, an estimated 3,068 American-Israeli airstrikes have reportedly hit targets in Iran. The attacks are said to have destroyed 7,563 buildings, killed nearly 50 high-ranking military and political leaders, and cost at least 1,701 civilian lives.

Yet the crucial question remains unanswered: What has actually been achieved politically?

On 2 March, President Trump announced four objectives for the campaign: to destroy Iran’s missile capability and production, to annihilate the Iranian navy, to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons, and to stop Iran from arming, financing, and directing terrorist groups abroad.

Mid-March we questioned whether airstrikes alone can change regimes—something research provides limited support for. Six weeks later, the regime still stands—and in some respects may appear more consolidated than before the bombing began. None of the objectives appear to have been achieved. The problem is not a lack of military effect, but a lack of political results.

Although the airstrikes have significantly weakened Iranian military capacity, considerable uncertainty remains about what is left. Early reports from the Israeli military and the Pentagon claimed that 70–90% of Iran’s ballistic missile launchers had been destroyed, but later assessments from U.S. intelligence conclude that “approximately half of Iran’s missile launchers are still intact”. After more than six weeks of sustained bombing, Iran’s remaining missiles and one-way drones still pose a real threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to neighboring countries.

Recent developments in the Gulf clearly demonstrate that the danger of regional escalation remains significant. The collapse of the Islamabad talks and Trump’s subsequent naval blockade suggest that escalation has not been stopped—it has merely been frozen and displaced. The ceasefire appears to be holding for now, and communication between Iranian and American leadership is described as “open”. But this cannot be interpreted as a solution. It is rather an acknowledgment that airstrikes alone were insufficient to achieve U.S. objectives.

The ceasefire opens a window for diplomacy, and it is crucial that it is maintained. But it does not legitimize the campaign that preceded it. Six weeks of bombing produced no solution—they produced the need for a ceasefire.

The limits of the bombing campaign’s value will be tested on 22 April, when the ceasefire expires. The U.S. will then face exactly the same choices as before the bombing began—but now without the element of surprise, and with significant civilian casualties and a far more unstable region in tow. Resuming the airstrikes would mean continuing a strategy that has not delivered political results. Extending the ceasefire—which is preferable—without a clear political solution will at the same time make it evident that the bombing campaign did not achieve its objectives. The U.S. is thus left with the same problem as before, but in a more unstable region and with fewer options for action. The Iranian regime is militarily weakened but may at the same time have achieved a form of political consolidation: external attacks tend to strengthen the regime’s grip by uniting even opponents against a common enemy.

Six weeks ago, we asked whether airstrikes could contribute to achieving American political objectives. The answer is now clear: Airstrikes alone do not provide political control. The problem remains—and the war is far from over.

• This Comment is published in Norwegian by Forskersonen
• This Comment is a follow-up of the mid-March Comment "The US may become trapped in its own escalation"