I study international conflict and cooperation, focusing on strategic behavior and bargaining. This includes bargaining in more general settings without the possibility of coercion. I examine strategic behavior to understand better why some agreements fall through even though they seem like socially beneficial outcomes and why conflict occurs even when decision-makers have mutually improving outcomes available. Much of my recent and future research examines different aspects of bargaining to address questions such as: How and why are different bargaining arrangements expected to produce different negotiated outcomes? What is the nature of bargaining power? How can different types of bargaining power be incorporated into formal models of bargaining and how do these different types produce different negotiated outcomes? Are some combinations of bargaining power between different actors more conducive to reaching an agreement while other combinations are more likely to lead to a breakdown of negotiations and a resumption of conflict?
The University of New Mexico, Assistant Professor, 2001 - present
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, Participant at the Merriam Lab's Summer Workshop on Formal Political Modeling, 2000
Michigan State University, Visiting Instructor, 2000-01
Michigan State University, Teaching Assistant, 1996-2000
Michigan State University, Intern for the American
Political Science Review, 1995-97, 2000
Michigan State University, Graduate Assistant, 1994-95
Ph.D. in Political Science, Michigan State University, 2000;
M.A. in Political Science, Michigan State University, 1995;
B.A. in Political Science cum laude, University of Rochester, 1994.
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