Putin seeks People’s Republic of China’s support for war-to-victory stance

On Wednesday, September 3, there will be a massive and impeccably choreographed parade in Beijing, the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Russian President Vladimir Putin will be in attendance and will likely compare it to his own pompous show for the 80th anniversary of Victory Day on May 9 (RBC, August 29). Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping appears as keen as Putin to make history into a justification of high political ambitions (Kommersant, August 30).

The PRC is marking the 80th anniversary not only of the defeat of Japanese aggression during World War II, but also the end of the long century of perceived humiliation by various imperialist powers—one of which was, in fact, Russia. The parade on Red Square in Moscow on May 9 was supposed to draw a direct parallel between the victory over Nazi Germany and the resolve to bring the “special military operation” against Ukraine to a triumphant conclusion, which currently remains unattainable (see EDM, May 6, 8, 12).

The round mark of 80 years—a lucky number in Chinese culture—provided Xi an opportunity to illuminate the PRC’s central role in global affairs. A summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was organized for August 31–September 1 in the city of Tianjin, just days before the parade (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 31). The summit consisted of discourse on upholding the world order and promoting stability. Putin’s propositions on this topic are about undermining the system of global governance created by the “hostile” Western powers (Kommersant, August 28). With the summit held in Tianjin, it appears that the PRC holds a leadership role over the assembled leaders of the Global South, which included Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, among others (Izvestiya, August 29). Putin’s vision is likely centered on Russia’s pivotal role on the global stage, on par with the PRC and the United States. After the SCO summit, he stayed for two extra days for face-to-face talks with Xi and the military parade (RIAC, August 28).

Traditional lengthy salutations aside, the main topic of this conversation was probably on Moscow’s war against Ukraine, and Putin likely needed to take a precise measure of Xi’s opinion on his decision to sustain the offensive operations (Carnegie Politika, August 22; TASS, August 30). After his summit in Alaska with U.S. President Donald Trump on August 15, Putin made a series of calls to the leaders of eight “friendly” countries, including India, South Africa, and Kazakhstan, but not to Xi, whom he had called prior to the summit (Business Online, August 18). Beijing has remained noncommittal during the recent surge of diplomatic activity focused on compromises necessary for an armistice. Moscow experts speculate that the PRC has a perfect understanding of the “root causes” of the confrontation and is not interested in the success of Trump’s attempts to forge a “peace deal” (Valdai Club, August 29). Xi may be curious about Putin’s attempts at building a personal connection with Trump, but the PRC’s main interest is likely in exploiting the differences and disagreements between the United States and Europe (Republic.ru, August 21). Moscow is also eager to play on this discord, but it remains firmly against any deployment of troops from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states as a material security guarantee for Ukraine, while Beijing, as Russian experts suspect, might prefer the Atlantic alliance to be fully engaged in regional matters, hoping that it would not venture into the Pacific theatre (Expert.ru, August 27).

The question for Xi is about the risks of letting the war continue and the benefits of making it stop, which is entirely in his power, as the Russian war machine is heavily dependent upon supplies from the PRC (see China Brief, March 31, 2023; see EDM, May 6, September 10, 2024; The Insider, August 1). A key parameter in his calculation is likely the stagnation of the Russian economy, about which he may be better informed than Putin, who insists on positive dynamics (The Bell, August 15). In reality, official statistics report that the Russian economy grew by about one percent in the first two quarters of this year, which suggests a recession in all sectors, except those involved in weapons production (Nezavisimaya gazeta, August 28). Independent estimates on the Russian economy show an increase of war-related expenditures by about a third compared with the first half of 2024, so that half of all budget revenues is presently channeled to cover these costs (The Moscow Times, August 27; Radio Svoboda, August 28). The Russian Central Bank may be compelled to make another cut in the interest rates currently set at 18 percent in mid-September, but the scope of accumulated indebtedness will continue to press down on consumer demand (RBC, August 30).

The Russian energy sector continues to struggle with high taxes, curtailed access to modern technologies, and labor shortages. Additionally, efforts to revive the energy sector through recent talks about renewed partnerships with U.S. oil companies remain hypothetical (The Moscow Times, August 30). Another driver of this crisis is the series of Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries in various Russian regions, which creates shortages of diesel and petrol, and also prompts Rosneft and other companies to increase their crude oil exports, offering larger discounts to India (Carnegie Politika, August 21). The human cost of the war may figure less prominently in PRC assessments, and the estimates of casualties continue to show that the relentless attacks in 2025 have been deadlier than ever for the Russian army (Meduza, August 29). Putin may radiate confidence about holding the strategic initiative, but the commercialized recruitment yields manpower barely sufficient for replenishing the ranks of storm battalions, and tens of thousands of men mobilized in autumn 2022 have still not been released home (Interesnaya Rossiya, August 30).

It appears that the PRC has made it clear that it does not want Russia to lose the war, but the social impacts of attrition cannot be estimated with certainty, and Xi likely does not want to see a crisis for Putin’s regime. Putin may remain obsessed with subjugating Ukraine, but his senior strategic partner has other priorities and may have limited tolerance for the inflated ambitions of the war-degraded neighbor.

• Pavel K Baev is Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor