Putin–Trump call stalls Tomahawks but reactivates ceasefire discussions

Putin and Trump in Alaska, August 2025. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

On October 16, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to meet in Budapest, Hungary, to discuss Russia’s war against Ukraine. Putin timed his phone call to occur while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was in the air on the way to Washington, D.C., for a meeting with Trump on October 17. Anticipation of a new round of talks with Russia likely affected U.S.–Ukraine talks.

Russian mainstream media has eagerly announced that Zelenskyy “yet again” failed to establish common ground with Trump on expanding support for the Ukrainian war effort (Izvestiya, October 18). This self-congratulation is based on Trump postponing a decision about whether to supply Ukraine with long-range offensive weapons, namely Tomahawk missiles, but conveniently plays down re-energized U.S. pressure to stop the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine (RBC, October 18). Putin may have scored a tactical win, but renewed diplomatic pressure to stop Russia’s war against Ukraine means he will have to contemplate a wider scope of compromises.

Zelenskyy has persistently requested U.S. BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which Trump highlighted ahead of October 17 talks but never committed to supplying (Meduza, October 14). Some Russian experts argued that Trump’s public consideration of supplying Tomahawks to Ukraine was merely a “bluff” because there are very few ground launchers for this primarily sea-based weapon (Business Online, October 12). The Tomahawks have nevertheless become a major political discussion in Russia’s war against Ukraine, so Putin had to take a stance on the issue, including at an October 2 Valdai Club meeting (Kommersant, October 3). Putin has downplayed the threat of Tomahawks and refrained from drawing any “red lines,” while warning that the damage to the Russia–U.S. relations would be heavy should Washington supply the missiles to Kyiv (Vedomosti, October 10; TopWar.ru, October 14). Putin argued, publicly and directly to Trump, that Tomahawks would minimally impact the battlefield, which is technically correct as Ukraine would primarily use Tomahawks on strategic long-range targets inside Russia rather than on the front lines of battle. Putin prefers to omit that Kyiv could use these weapons to significantly increase the Kremlin’s fuel supply crisis caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian refineries (The Moscow Times, October 17).

Putin presented his October 16 phone call as a congratulations for the peace agreement on Gaza, which does not facilitate Russia’s interests in the Middle East nor its global ambitions (Carnegie Politika, October 15; President of Russia, October 16). Trump’s readiness to put Tomahawks on the back burner is a major concession, which Putin could respond in kind during the upcoming U.S.–Russia talks in Budapest (Forbes.ru, October 18). Trump’s main agenda for the summit in Budapest appears to be the same as it was in Anchorage on August 15, centered on the demand for an immediate cessation of hostilities (Novaya Gazeta, October 18). Putin did not agree to a ceasefire in Alaska, instead giving Trump a protracted lecture on his vision of history and a harangue on his grievances, causing proceedings to be cut short (RBC, October 17). Putin keeps extolling the “spirit of Anchorage” despite the meeting’s lack of concrete results. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserts that Trump is the only Western leader who maintains a balanced position and accounts for Russia’s interpretation of the so-called “root causes” of the war (Kommersant, October 15; TopWar.ru, October 16).

Putin’s extensive demands and various territorial swap plans appear complicated and politically tenuous. Trump seems to have shifted toward a simpler plan—stopping fighting along the current lines of battle as a basis for further negotiations (Meduza, October 18). In the deluge of Russian commentary on the forthcoming Budapest summit, even the far-fetched plan of connecting Alaska and Chukotka by a tunnel under the Bering Strait is being discussed at great length, but few words have been uttered about a ceasefire (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, October 18). Minor deviations from Putin’s discourse on relentless attacks against Ukraine and irreducible goals are allowed, but the possibility of freezing hostilities remains off limits for pundits (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 16). Kremlin-approved discourse departs far from the reality of Russia’s exhausted offensive push and the expansion of “grey areas” dominated by hundreds of drones (Radio Svoboda, October 18). Moscow’s advantage in the number of troops is dwindling as recruitment yields decrease, as many Russian regions reduce the bonus for signing contracts (Republic.ru, October 16).

The Kremlin’s deepening financial crisis is the main domestic driver for ending the war. Even in the stalemate phase, the war demands more funds not reflected by the recently approved federal budget (Carnegie Politika, September 30). Recession is accelerating in many civilian sectors of the stagnant economy, and even if the Central Bank makes another small cut in the interest rate this week, it will be too little, too late (The Moscow Times; The Bell, October 17). The gradual decline of incomes adds to the general tiredness of the prolonged “special military operation” in Russian society, where the desire to bring Moscow’s war against Ukraine to an end is increasingly pronounced (Riddle, October 16). Russians are not prepared to grant concessions to Ukraine and are worried about reintegrating thousands of traumatized veterans into regular society, but a majority wants to see the fighting end (Re: Russia, October 10; Levada Center, October 14).

Putin used to have keen instincts for the public mood, but his politics have become centered on a continuation of his war against Ukraine by any means. Agreeing to a ceasefire amounts to a radical revision of these politics, and nothing in his recent performances indicates that he is ready to abandon his ambition to subjugate Ukraine. Repeating his approach to Anchorage talks would likely go against common political sense, but nobody among the Kremlin courtiers dares to hint to the war-fixated autocrat that mistakes were made. Putin may slightly reduce immediate territorial claims, but such a “compromise” remains incompatible with the firm demand for a ceasefire asserted by Trump, accepted by Zelenskyy, and supported by most European leaders.

The only incentive for Putin to agree on an armistice is the supposition, informed by his ever-wishful political thinking, that it would plunge Ukraine into a deep political crisis. The corresponding disincentive is a fear of domestic turmoil triggered by the unanswerable question about what the war of Putin’s making was really about.