Ukraine’s expanding strike campaign undercuts Putin’s claims of steady progress

Russian President Vladimir Putin has a reputation for lashing out when cornered. According to some analysts, Putin’s pattern of responding to setbacks with escalation has made many Western leaders hesitant to supply heavy-impact weapon systems to Ukraine.

Presently, however, domestic Ukrainian designs for medium- and long-range missiles and drones, developed and scaled up in cooperation with European and U.S. partners, have made it possible for Ukraine to deliver devastating strikes on Russian energy infrastructure and combat logistics (Re: Russia, June 25). Putin, nevertheless, ignores changes in the character of his war against Ukraine so resolutely that even jingoist Russian pundits who normally demonstrate absolute loyalty to the commander-in-chief have started to question his insistence on maintaining his military strategy (TopWar.ru, June 27).

Putin has increased the frequency of his public appearances in the last few weeks. His message remains consistent—Russian troops are advancing every day in all directions, and Ukrainian long-distance strikes are merely Kyiv’s attempt to distract attention from this trend (Kommersant, June 23). Russian forces are continuing attacks in the Donetsk oblast, taking enormous casualties for every minuscule territorial advance, but in most other sectors of the 1,200-kilometer (746-mile) front line, they are unable to gain any ground and are increasingly often in retreat (Meduza, June 25). For most Russians, the prospect of complete capture of the Ukrainian city of Kostyantynivka is of little relevance, while attacks on Russia by Ukrainian drones have become the most important news item (Levada Center, June 18). Russian state media is claiming that Ukrainian-made drones are manufactured in Europe and that countermeasures will soon be deployed by the Russian air defense. These narratives are not convincing, given that Ukraine recently struck the large gas processing plant in Orenburg and the Titan-Barrikady plant producing artillery systems and missile launcher components in Volgograd (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 26; Current Time, June 27).

Ukraine has effectively cut Russian-occupied Crimea off from crucial supplies, particularly petrol and diesel, in the last couple of weeks (Meduza, June 27). Ukraine’s high-precision strikes on bridges are interrupting Russia’s rail connections to the peninsula, and the main road along the Sea of Azov, which also supplies the grouping of Russian forces in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, is a hunting ground for Ukrainian Hornet drones, which the U.S. company Perennial Autonomy designed (RBC, June 1; The Insider, June 23). Putin took note of this problem and instructed the government to “minimize” the impact of drone attacks, but the only measure the regional authorities can take is to announce a state of emergency (Forbes.ru, June 23; Kommersant, June 26).

Local businesses have been bankrupted because tourists have escaped by any available means, and children have been evacuated from the famous Artek and other summer camps (Radio Svoboda, June 25; The Insider, June 26).  Crimea’s fuel crisis is an extreme example of the shortages affecting a growing number of Russian regions as Ukrainian drones strike refineries, oil depots, and pumping stations (Carnegie Politika, June 18). The Kremlin forbids local authorities from conveying the real extent of damage, but the squeeze is directly experienced by so many people that Putin’s approval ratings, even in official data, are declining (The Bell, June 26). The top priority in supply distribution is granted to the military, and the notoriously corrupt “rear echelons” are the main source of fuel in the blossoming black market (Novaya Gazeta Europe, June 27).

Elvira Nabiullina, the chief of the Russian Central Bank, mentioned fuel prices as one of the drivers of inflation, explaining her decision to make an extra-small cut in the key interest rate (The Moscow Times, June 24). Even “patriotic” commentators have stopped blaming her for the rigid fiscal policy necessitated by the new surge of expenditures for the war needs (TopWar.ru, June 25). Industrial output has also registered a new slump (Vedomosti, June 25). Russia’s energy complex is suffering from underinvestment, and the military-industrial complex cannot utilize the inflow of resources because of breakdowns in supply chains (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 24).

The economy is the center of gravity in any war of attrition. Ukraine certainly has huge problems in every economic sector, but external support remains strong, as the fifth Ukraine Recovery Conference, covered briefly and acerbically in Russian mainstream media, confirmed last week (Novaya Gazeta Europe; Izvestiya, June 26). Russian commentators appear worried by the apparent shift in U.S. President Donald Trump’s views on Ukraine’s capacity to turn the tide of war in its favor, which could alter conditions for a still-hypothetical peace deal (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 24). Russian pundits seek to identify exploitable cracks in trans-Atlantic unity, arguing that Europe is preparing for an escalation with Russia, while the United States seeks to minimize the exposure to such risk (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 23). These pro-Kremlin commentators hope for a spike in disagreements at the upcoming North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Ankara (MK.ru, June 27).

Putin’s inability to manage any aspect of the complex crisis into which Russia is sinking contrasts sharply with his unwavering rhetoric of a steady march to victory. Putin’s grasp on power was once secured by the widespread perception that his rule was based on proper assessments of the scale of imminent dangers. Now, however, his narratives depart so radically from the increasingly worrisome reality that belief in the steadfastness of his leadership is fast evaporating. Crimea has become an exhibit of a sudden transformation of a long-brewing and firmly denied problem into a full-blown disaster. Neither of the overlapping problems that Russia is currently facing has reached the scope of catastrophe, but their combination produces unexpected interplays and multiplicators, and Putin appears unwilling to break this accelerating trend by the most obvious step—ending his war against Ukraine.

• Pavel K Baev is Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Review