Russia’s economic decay undercuts Putin’s global ambition

President Vladimir Putin at the Russia - Africa Summit in Moscow in Coctober 2026. Photo: Getty Images

Russian President Vladimir Putin held the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow on October 28–29. Amid a surge of high-level diplomatic activity throughout last week, Putin increased the scale of this event compared to the summits in St. Petersburg in July 2023 and in Sochi in October 2019.

Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the third Russia–Africa Summit in Moscow on October 28–29, meeting delegations from 48 countries and approximately 20 African leaders. The summit produced few practical results despite its significant scale and pomp.

Russia’s deteriorating finances are undermining its ability to finance foreign partnerships while sustaining its war against Ukraine. Signs of economic decline include Russia’s 2027 budget projecting a huge deficit, Promsvyazbank recently reporting major losses, and the Defense Ministry proposing postponing December military salary payments until January.

Moscow’s hopes for rapprochement with the United States remain uncertain ahead of the November 18–19 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen and the December 14–15 G20 summit in Miami.

Besides the extra-long plenary sessions with delegations from 48 countries, Putin held about 20 bilateral meetings with heads of African states, emphasizing Russia’s supposedly anti-colonial stance (Kommersant, October 28). This effort has yielded scant practical results, and the international resonance of the gathering was far below the Kremlin’s expectations (The Moscow Times, October 30). Even some mainstream pro-Kremlin media, such as Nezavisimaya Gazeta, opted to ignore the event, while others, like Fontanka, provided minimal coverage. Kommersant stood out with extensive features laced with a heavy dose of irony about the practical benefit of these meetings (Kommersant, October 30).

Russian involvement in Africa in recent years has yielded few benefits. Mali, whose military government has relied on Russian security assistance, has faced escalating violence despite Moscow’s support. During his October 30 meeting with Malian transitional president Assimi Goïta, Putin chose to highlight the growing popularity of Russian-language education and the expansion of scholarships for Malian students in Russia instead of addressing security concerns (Vedomosti, October 20; RBC, October 30). Russia’s arms exports have increased in 2026, but Rosoboronexport seeks to maximize profits rather than provide credits or donations to African partners (Novye Izvestiya, October 5). The transformation of the privately owned Wagner Group into the Africa Corps, controlled by the Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU), has curtailed Russia’s capacity for conflict manipulation as Moscow now tries to recruit mercenaries from African states such as Burundi and Zimbabwe for its war against Ukraine rather than increase the ranks of its armed “advisers” inside of Africa (The Insider, October 26). Pavel Prigozhin, the son of the late Wagner Group leader, has sought to preserve and expand his father’s security and commercial empire in the Central African Republic, including its lucrative gold-mining and trafficking operations. His influence within Russia’s military establishment remains limited, however, as he has reportedly cultivated closer ties with the Federal Security Service (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) than with the GRU, which oversees Moscow’s Africa Corps (The Moscow Times, October 19).

Russia has little investment capacity to offer African countries as its own financial crisis keeps deepening (Vedomosti, October 30). The 2027 state budget, which has been formally submitted to the newly formed State Duma, projects a substantial deficit of 5.44 trillion rubles, alongside cuts to numerous investment programmes (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 28). Even the banks channeling funds to the defense-industrial complex, such as Promsvyazbank, report big losses and demand re-capitalization from the federal government (The Moscow Times, October 30). Contraction in most civilian sectors is set to continue. Even agriculture, which used to benefit from grain exports to Africa, suffers from the Ukrainian blockade of the ports in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, and shipping from Murmansk adds heavily to the costs (The Bell; ProFinance.ru, October 29). State finances are under such pressure that the Defense Ministry has proposed postponing December salary payments for most military personnel until January, exempting those serving in the joint group of forces fighting in Ukraine (Verstka Media; Radio Svoboda, October 30).

High hopes in Moscow for a windfall of profits from the “diesel deal” announced by U.S. President Donald Trump on October 9 have evaporated as no significant relaxation of U.S. sanctions has yet occurred (Lenta.ru, October 28). Three tankers loaded with diesel in the Primorsk terminal have changed course from the United States to Brazil, where the fuel will likely fetch a lower price (Neftegaz.ru, October 30). Ukraine has ended the unofficial pause in long-distance strikes on Russian refineries, reportedly taken on Trump’s request, which Russia ignored. The last days of October were marked by huge fires in Ufa in the Republic of Bashkortostan, Novokuybyshevsk in Samara oblast, and Kstovo in Nizhny Novgorod oblast, sparing Moscow, where African leaders formed long lines for audiences with Putin (Novaya Gazeta Evropa; TopWar.ru, October 31). Russia’s inability to organize minimally effective air defense for its energy infrastructure provides the best explanation for its failure to build a naval base in Sudan, which was supposed to support the deployment of Russia’s Mediterranean squadron—now effectively canceled—into the Red Sea (Carnegie Politika, October 26).

Putin’s entertainment of African leaders was likely meant to strengthen his international profile before the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, People’s Republic of China (PRC) on November 18–19, where he hopes to partake in a trilateral meeting with Trump and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping (Kommersant, October 28). Neither this meeting nor Putin’s bilateral meeting with Trump is confirmed or guaranteed (Forbes.ru, October 24; Gazeta.ru, October 25). Putin also expects a follow-up to the conversations in Shenzhen at the G20 Miami summit on December 14–15, but the frosty reception of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov—particularly by European officials—at the G20 ministerial meeting on October 30–31 bodes ill for this trip, and Trump’s intention to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also adds to doubt in the Kremlin (Radio Svoboda, October 30; RBC.ru, November 1).

Putin reportedly prefers bilateral meetings with Trump to any multilateral format. Europe’s key role in supporting Ukraine has nonetheless engendered understanding among Russian pundits that engagement of Europeans is necessary for advancing a real peace process (RIAC, October 28). Russian opinions on the initiative of Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre to set up a channel of communication with Putin are mixed, but Putin expressed satisfaction with their call (Nezavisimaya Gazeta; TopWar.ru, October 28). For the Nordic politicians, a key question is about the beginning of shifts in Russia’s position on ending its unwinnable war against Ukraine, but the huge costs and mounting casualties have apparently not altered Putin’s aims yet (Re: Russia, October 13).

Putin has ostensibly not wavered from his goal to capture all of Donbas. The Kremlin is still searching for the limits of Ukraine’s resilience and Europe’s resolve, but may find the bottom of the barrel of Russia’s passive acceptance of Putin’s senseless war first. The delusion of Russia’s pivotal global role is fast evaporating, and each summit adds to this depreciation.