What problems are third‑country asylum centres intended to solve?

The EU is considering moving parts of asylum processing out of Europe, and several countries are pushing for third-country solutions. The Norwegian government has also signalled that this could be a relevant option. But which problems are such asylum centres actually meant to solve – and which dilemmas do they raise?

The EU is working towards the establishment of asylum centres in so-called third countries – a move opposed by human rights organisations. The Norwegian government has expressed support for considering such centres in cooperation with the EU. But what problems are asylum centres outside Europe supposed to solve? And can states’ obligations under international law regarding legal protection and human rights be upheld when protection seekers are placed outside states’ territory and legal reach? Based on what we know today, it is unclear whether such arrangements can be reconciled with fundamental rule-of-law principles.

The arguments

The desire to protect borders is central in the “externalisation debate”. States have the right to control their borders and to act with that aim. There is also a desire to prevent dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean and deaths at sea. From a humanitarian perspective, this is critical: thousands of lives are lost in the Mediterranean, at our borders, every year.

The legitimacy of the asylum system is also raised as an issue: how can a genuine right to seek international protection be preserved, in orderly forms, all the while ensuring that people who do not qualify for protection are identified and returned efficiently?

At the same time, many of those who arrive so-called “irregularly” are granted asylum, and they do so based on strict assessment criteria.

Migration to EU countries

The vast majority of people who migrate to Europe do so with the necessary permits. Nevertheless, debates and policy developments are dominated by a focus on border crossings without prior authorisation. Proportions are difficult to establish, but FRONTEX figures show a sharp decline in recent years, with 239,000 registered attempts at irregular border crossings into the EU in 2024.

By comparison, EU countries issued residence permits to 3.5 million people from outside the EU. According to Eurostat, around 25% of residence permits in 2024 concerned international protection. The remaining 75% related to work, family reunification, and education.

Those who seek – and often obtain – protection generally cross borders into Europe irregularly. They do so because it is not possible to apply for asylum in Europe by other means. The exception is when someone has obtained a visa for other purposes, enters Europe, and then applies for asylum. It is impossible to talk about migration and protection in Europe in 2026 without mentioning Ukraine. Given Russia’s war of invasion, the EU decided in 2022 to grant temporary collective protection to (most) Ukrainians, with the expectation of eventual return. The question of return will become central once peace is achieved. This is also a matter of numbers: 4.3 million Ukrainians currently have temporary collective protection in EU countries.

Asylum applications and recognition

Let us look at the 25% who received international protection. In 2024, one million people applied for asylum in the EU, and over half were granted protection. Looking at countries of origin, we find, for example, that three out of four applicants from Syria and Burkina Faso were granted protection. This often concerns the processing of legitimate asylum applications that, following strict criteria, result in residence permits.

“Safe third countries”

Deaths in the Mediterranean, states’ border control, people’s right to seek asylum, and real labour needs in EU countries are different concerns which collide in migration policy.

The EU is investing heavily in the externalisation of migration control through agreements with third countries. The asylum centres are part of this, most recently driven forward under the Danish EU presidency in 2025. Before Christmas, a legislative proposal was presented that redefines the meaning of “safe third countries”. If adopted, EU states will be able to reject asylum applications both from citizens of “safe third countries” and from applicants who have travelled through such a country en route, and would pave the way for “returning” people to these countries.

What can asylum centres in third countries deliver?

It is unclear how the asylum centres are intended to function. Asylum seekers who arrive in Europe are to be sent to these centres while their applications are processed. But we know little about whether they would be allowed to enter the country they originally sought asylum in if their application is approved, or whether they are expected to receive protection in the “safe third countries”.

If the centres are intended to reduce dangerous crossings of the Mediterranean, the idea is presumably to direct asylum seekers straight there. Whether this will actually reduce or increase the number of applicants – or irregular border crossings – remains uncertain. There are many legal ambiguities involved: Who is responsible for ensuring that the right to asylum is respected? Which country’s authorities are to process applications? Which country’s jurisdiction should apply, and where? And who should be held accountable if fundamental human rights are violated in the centres, whether concerning, for example, torture or the right to family life?

Previous experience

Extraterritorial processing of asylum claims has been attempted. Australia has operated offshore centres on the islands of Manus and Nauru. These were shut down following extensive reports of rights violations: the UN Committee Against Torture recently concluded that although these violations took place outside Australia, they nonetheless fall under Australia’s jurisdiction. In recent months, reports indicate that the centre on Nauru has been reopened to house a group of rejected and non-returnable asylum seekers, after an Australian court ruled that they could not be detained indefinitely in Australia.

Italy has established centres in Albania for asylum seekers awaiting application processing. After the scheme was found to be incompatible with existing law, the centres were converted into return centres for migrants without legal right to stay, including but not limited to those who have had their asylum applications rejected. Like the UK’s Rwanda agreements, these centres have not contributed significantly in numerical terms, due to legal challenges and high costs.

The right to asylum is part of international law

Many Norwegian political parties support something akin to the Norwegian Labour Party’s slogan of a “controlled, sustainable and just immigration policy”. At the same time, prioritisation of the UN resettlement programme is at a historic low, with plans for only 100 quota refugees to come to Norway in 2026. Given the scale of the need for protection from war in our neighbouring region right now (not counted among the quota refugees), this is perhaps  understandable.

Meanwhile, we lack an informed debate on asylum centres in third countries. This is despite the fact that previous experience provides grounds for asking important questions – and a need for concrete answers – regarding how the ethical, legal and practical dilemmas of asylum centres in third countries are actually to be handled. Such questions must be answered by the Norwegian state if it is considering this option, and as parter of its involvement with migration- and border management policies in the Schengen area.

There are obvious challenges related to how the current asylum system functions. But it is not without reason that legal scholars at Norwegian universities are writing about an attack on asylum law and asking: Is Europe about to give up on public international law? This is a genuine cause for concern at a time when Norway and Europe are struggling to uphold an international legal order.