Russians appeal to Putin that he is misinformed about reality

After 50 months of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine, Russia is facing accumulating military, economic, and social problems. Russian President Vladimir Putin prefers to address these problems in a mode strikingly reminiscent of the last years of the Soviet Union, when only “minor shortcomings” were officially acknowledged, with stern instructions for improvement (The Moscow Times, April 14).

Such self-serving discourse is natural for the 73-year-old autocrat, who prefers to keep his contemporaries in key positions, including Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Aleksandr Bortnikov, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, and Sergei Chemezov, the CEO of Russia’s largest military-industrial corporation, Rostec. There is a dissonant, but increasingly loud, choir of Russian voices of different persuasions trying to alert Putin that Russia’s crisis is far larger than his minions dare tell him (Radio Svoboda, April 20).

The economy is the root cause of each manifestation of Russian discontent. Russia’s economy has sunk into a recession spreading from the long-depressed investment sector to the military-industrial complex (BFM.RU, April 21). Putin attempted to explain the decline in Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) in January and February due to seasonal fluctuations and weather, but his order to return to GDP growth can only be carried out through doctoring macro-statistics (Kommersant, April 14;RBC, April 24). The real depth of the recession may be greater than a couple of percentage points, and some Russian tabloids dare to cite Western assessments, including an evaluation by Lieutenant-General Thomas Nilsson, the director of Swedish military intelligence (MK.ru, April 20; The Bell, April 23). Some Russian economists have abandoned caution and say there has been an “epic fail” of economic policy. Mainstream media, meanwhile, castigates rigid fiscal measures (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 19; RIAC, April 23). Governor of Russia’s Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina conceded only the smallest possible cut in interest rates, but promised that four percent inflation would return to Russia “much faster” than 50 years (Kommersant, April 24).

The credibility of this promise is shaky, as Putin has changed his mind about curtailing federal expenditures, seemingly expecting a windfall of oil revenue from the Strait of Hormuz blockade (Riddle, April 24). The volume of extra profits, however, has been significantly reduced by continuing Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian energy infrastructure (Carnegie Politika, April 16; OilCapital.ru, April 21). The Kremlin instructed regional authorities to deny the effects of these attacks, though the governor of Leningrad oblast grudgingly admitted that his region has essentially become a “frontline” (RBC, April 15). The Kremlin’s inability to repel Ukrainian attacks and denial of their effectiveness have fueled public angst, particularly as rumors about environmental and health consequences of massive fires, such as the one that raged for five days at the oil refinery in Tuapse, spread over social networks (Novaya Gazeta Europe, April 23).

Russian authorities see the Kremlin’s throttling of the internet as a security issue. The FSB is attempting to shut down this discourse and limit internet access, triggering public outrage of quite unexpected proportions (Meduza, April 24). An emotional appeal to Putin by a beauty influencer garnered millions of views on Instagram—which is currently banned in Russia—providing a focal point for Russians’ widespread anxiety about crudely interrupted social networks and the connectivity they provide to small businesses (The Insider, April 24). Putin found it necessary to assert that the restrictions were needed to block “terrorist” communications, but clearly does not grasp the economic costs of rolling back digitalization, which has become a crucial means of business activity in Russia, particularly in Moscow (see EDM; Kommersant, April 23). Bloggers may be a tiny minority in the complex urban social organization, but their angry voices have a greater impact than those of professional propagandists because they align with other drivers of discontent (Re: Russia, April 20).

Widespread weariness of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine is generating a longing for change among Russians. These sentiments are accentuated by disappointed prospects of a peace deal, which has seemingly slipped down in the list of U.S. priorities (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 22). Russia’s jingoist commentators’ primary proposition is to mobilize greater resources to turn the tide in deadlocked battles. Putin is reluctant to incur the economic and political costs of such an escalation (TopWar.ru, April 20). He has stopped meeting with top military leadership, who are instructed to keep producing reports on victorious advances, but information about the Ukrainian success via drone warfare is still getting through the Kremlin’s censorship (Radio Svoboda, April 21; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 23).

Concerns about Putin’s disconnect from reality are growing in many elite groups. The Kremlin has even allowed semi-official polling agencies to publish data on a gradual decline of Putin’s popularity (Forbes.ru, April 24). Putin’s carefully stage-managed approval ratings remain very high, but the trend of Russians’ diminishing trust in the government is unmistakable (Levada.ru, April 21). Fear, generated by increasingly cruel repression, distorts public opinion polling but cannot convert angst and irritation into enthusiasm. The key measure of attitudes toward war—the number of men signing contracts for military service—continues to decline (Meduza, April 13).

The tone of most Russians’ appeals to Putin is pleading rather than demanding. Public anger is aimed at his courtiers—ministers, generals, and governors—who presumably are not telling him the whole truth about mounting problems. Attempts to attract the benevolent attention of the leader are typical in autocratic political culture, which in Russia is reinforced by a long tsarist tradition. Putin may find comfort in this still solid credit of public confidence, but must worry about the next phase, his “loyal subjects’” discovery that he has little power to address their problems, and does not really want to hear about them. Putin’s reading of Russian history is selective and superficial, but he should remember at least a few of its many records of absolute rulers swiftly transmuting into despised losers. Procrastination is often a wise political choice, except when troubles are brewing and time is running short.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Daily Monitor