ISBN: 978-0-19-879259-8
Andreas Forø Tollefsen
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
Through
case studies of conflicts in West Africa and Maoist India, qualitative
fieldwork, formal modeling, and econometric analyses, this volume seeks to
answer what factors explain variations in the combat frontier between
urban-based states and rural-based rebel groups. While some conflicts exhibit
stationary and consolidated frontiers, other display roving and disputed
borders, often with considerable consequences to civilian populations trapped
in the irregular combat frontiers. The book proposes two characteristics of
trade networks as strong determinants for the delineation of the combat
frontier. First, the road networks (the
‘hardware’ of the urban-rural economic relationship), when radial, incentivize
predation and make cities lucrative prey, since
they tend to concentrate profits in towns or cities. Reticulated road networks,
however, increase distribution of trade to towns and cities in the network,
making cities less profitable to capture. Secondly, the social system upon which trade networks are based (the ’software’ of the economic relationship), when ranked,
facilitates elite-elite exchange between the urban traders and the rural rebel
commanders. This results in consolidated territorial borders. Unranked social
structures, however, create fuzzy combat frontiers where profit is concentrated in urban centers. An implicit
assumption of the book is that rural rebel groups are primarily motivated by greed, whereas cities in radial
economies are considered lucrative prey. However, the book gives scant attention to opportunity arguments, where
state capacity, institutional quality and the relative strength between urban
states and rural rebels play an essential role in determining the faith of
urban areas in civil wars. Nonetheless, the book presents a compelling case for
the importance of the social structure of trade networks in explaining the
dynamics of rural-urban conflict.