ISBN: 978-1-108-48986-7
Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer
University of Oslo
This
brilliant book combines new theoretical perspectives and empirical insights to explain
nuclear competition between the superpowers during the late Cold War. This
competition is not the anomaly posited by proponents of the theory of the nuclear
revolution. Citing Wohlstetter’s 1959 observation that the nuclear balance is
delicate, Green unpacks underexplored assumptions in the theory of the nuclear
revolution and argues that the ’survivability of weapons systems varied over
time, by type, and across the superpowers’. Green recasts the purpose of
nuclear competition and the role of domestic-level factors in shaping it and applies
this in a careful analysis of the superpower nuclear balance during the late
Cold War. The Revolution that Failed is
one of several recent studies challenging the dominant theory of how nuclear
weapons shape international relations. It shows that American decision-makers
did not opt for the stabilizing policies prescribed by the theory of the
nuclear revolution, but instead paired peacetime nuclear competition with arms
control agreements tailored to secure advantages against their adversaries. Increased
technological uncertainty, misperception spirals, and low appeal of arms
control to key players today suggest that qualitative nuclear competition is unlikely
to disappear. This book challenges prevailing narratives about the purpose of nuclear
arms control at a time when this enterprise appears to be eroding or
transforming. While this perspective places clear limitations on what purpose
arms control can deliver as a stabilizing measure, it also underscores that a
world without meaningful arms control is likely to be more dangerous. As this book
shows, life as a nuclear weapons state is replete with vulnerabilities and fear,
even for the biggest players.