How can a world order that aspires to be consensual be both enforced and managed? How can the United States act as the global ‘sheriff’ while maintaining legitimacy? This book explores the tensions inherent in the US’s hegemonic role within a consensual international order. Leadership depends on alignment between the preferences of dominant and subordinate states; when that alignment falters, US authority is contested. At the heart of Chiozza’s argument is the role of domestic institutions in enabling international cooperation. Specifically, partner nations with regular and flexible leadership turnover are more likely to align with US interests, fostering both strategic cooperation and domestic accountability. These institutions allow Washington to secure compliant, yet legitimate and responsive, partners. Introducing the ‘potential successor’ theory, Chiozza links domestic political dynamics to international hierarchy, showing that global order hinges on both social contracts and institutional incentives. Chapter 4 provides quantitative evidence demonstrating a consistent relationship between domestic institutional design and US success in securing compliance and governance outcomes. Chapters 5 and 6 then deepen this analysis through case studies. Examining Japan and South Korea as core allies, and Afghanistan and Iraq as post-9/11 partners, Chiozza illustrates how political structures mediate US influence and constraints in practice. This book offers a compelling framework for understanding how the US (partially) managed the paradox of enforcing a consensual order, revealing the deep interconnection between leadership ambition and global strategic management. Although Chiozza thoughtfully engages with debates around US hegemonic decline, the contemporary unpredictable and ruthless agency of leaders such as Trump or Netanyahu stretches beyond the boundaries of institutional theory and challenges the limits of any speculative model of world order.