The main thesis of this book is that drones produce ‘more but milder conflicts’: they lower the cost of initiating force, draw more shootdowns of unmanned platforms, and reduce retaliation when no pilot is killed. It is built on wargames with 28 mid-career professionals, seven survey experiments including an MTurk sample of 1,609, and case studies of US Cold War reconnaissance and Israel's Campaign Between Wars. The empirical work is methodologically ambitious and at moments genuinely elegant: In February 2018 Israel reportedly destroyed more than half of Syria's air defenses despite the downed F-16 pilot's survival, and surveyed officers were five times more likely to shoot down an unmanned Shahed 129 than an equally threatening crewed Su-25. The trouble is that the evidence is gathered one incident at a time while the policy advice reads as if drones reshape whole conflicts, and the gap is never closed. Lin-Greenberg concedes (p. 164) that drones ‘reduce the bargaining range in which rivals can find peaceful negotiated settlements’, a concession not included among the caveats three pages later when he suggests that drone export restrictions be reconsidered. Lin-Greenberg never adds up ‘more frequent’ and ‘less escalatory’ into a verdict on overall violence, raising the possibility that the remote revolution produces more low-intensity violence rather than less conflict. The systematic case studies also stop in May 2022, leaving Iran's April 2024 drone-and-missile barrage as a single-sentence aside, most of the fall 2024 Hezbollah war, and Russia's Shahed bombardment of Ukrainian cities outside the book's analytical reach. Until that calculation is made plain, the book will explain how drones change individual encounters more clearly than how they reshape conflict.