Russia struggles to find a response to U.S.–Israel attack on Iran

The U.S.–Israeli airstrikes against Iran that began on February 28 shocked Moscow. Russian experts argued that the narrow agenda of U.S.–Iranian talks in Geneva, focused on Iran’s nuclear enrichment, indicated U.S. preparations for a limited strike centered on Iranian nuclear assets as in June 2025 (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 26).

Some state-affiliated media speculated about low support for a military operation in the Middle East in the United States (Izvestiya, February 26). The Kremlin did not, at least publicly, anticipate the United States’ massive first strike on Iranian leadership (Kommersant, March 1). Russian President Vladimir Putin staged an emergency virtual meeting of his Security Council after the strikes. Unlike the usual protocol, the Kremlin did not publish a word on the proceedings (RIA Novosti, February 28).

Following the strikes, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning U.S. and Israeli “aggression” (Russian Foreign Ministry, February 28). The Kremlin did not offer any material support despite its Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran, signed in January 2025 (Russian Foreign Ministry, October 2, 2025; Radio Svoboda, February 23). Russia’s clandestine delivery of air defense weapons to Iran over the past few years did not make much difference—the Kremlin cannot spare any significant number as the range and accuracy of Ukrainian missile strikes grow (Meduza, February 28). The foreign ministry statement does not mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which Iran joined in July 2023. The SCO hosted a multilateral military exercise, “Sahand-Anti-Terror,” in December 2025 (Vpoanalytics, December 10, 2025).

Moscow’s statement also does not reference BRICS, which Iran joined in January 2024. Iran has taken part in several naval exercises with its partners, including the “Maritime Security Belt” exercise with Russian and People’s Republic of China (PRC) combat ships in the Strait of Hormuz, just a week prior to the ongoing hostilities (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 19) [1]. Earlier this month, Nikolai Patrushev, the chair of the Russian Maritime Board and one of Putin’s old cronies, even predicted that BRICS exercises would deter Western “piracy” (AiF.ru, February 17).

The day of renewed U.S. attacks, France called for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Russia quickly followed up, presenting the step as a joint initiative with the PRC (Interfax, February 28). The meeting was predictably inconclusive, but Russian envoy Vasily Nebenzya condemned the U.S.–Israeli attack in much stronger language than PRC ambassador Fu Cong, who merely communicated deep diplomatic concern (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, March 1). Nebenzya expressed particular outrage that the United States planned the attacks while engaging in negotiations with Iran, claiming that the United States “stabbed [Iran] in the back” (Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1). Some Russian tabloids suggest that this timing should be a warning to the Kremlin as it continues to engage in Geneva with the same duo of U.S. negotiators, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner (MK.ru, March 1). U.S.–Russia talks are presently on pause, and the plan to continue them in Abu Dhabi is probably off the table. The Kremlin, however, is repeatedly sending contradictory messages about its readiness to accept U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine and its intention to withdraw from the talks if Kyiv refuses to retreat from the Donetsk region (Radio Svoboda, February 28; Novaya Gazeta Evropa, March 1).

Moscow is most concerned about the effect of the ongoing U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on oil prices. Oil prices are always a matter of keen Russian interest, but, given Russia’s economic crisis and sanctions on its oil exports, it is currently a top priority (Izvestiya; Komsomolskaya Pravda, March 1). As the crisis of state finances keeps deepening, the Kremlin is cutting spending and raising taxes, risking economic stagnation (The Moscow Times, February 25). An increase in Russian oil export revenues because of the strikes’ effect on the global supply may reduce the urgency of unpopular financial measures, but the relief will only be temporary. Damage to the Russian economy caused by the enormous costs of the Kremlin’s war of attrition against Ukraine is likely to turn into a long-term deformity (The Bell, February 23; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 26). Sanctions are squeezing the margins of profits of Russian oil exporters, who have to operate through multiple intermediaries and rely on the “shadow fleet” of tankers, another one of which was seized by Belgium last weekend (RBC, March 1).

For some Russian officials and oligarchs, the hostilities in Iran merely mean the end of tough competition with Iran in the PRC and Indian oil markets (Lenta.ru, February 25). For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, these attacks are intensely personal. The attacks’ first target was Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—Putin’s letter of condolences decried his “assassination” as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law” (The President of Russia, March 1). Russian analysts and jingoist bloggers argue that the elimination of the top leadership cannot crack the solid foundation of the Iranian system of governance, and so the U.S. strategy of regime change is set to fail (Kommersant; TopWar.ru, March 1). These arguments are irrelevant for Putin, who is obsessed with personal safety and tolerates no elite dissent in his authoritarian, dictatorial system (Carnegie Politika, February 13). The story about the attempted Ukrainian drone strike on the Valdai presidential residence in late December was exposed as a crude fake, but the massive strike on Khamenei’s residence in Tehran has reignited Putin’s fears of a “decapitating” attack (Nastoyashee Vremya, January 5; Meduza, March 1).

There is speculation that Putin views the horrible death of the former Libyan ruler, Muammar Gaddafi, as a cautionary tale of the costs of regime change for authoritarian leaders. He may have tried to mitigate this possibility by granting sanctuary to former Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. The United States’ capture of  Venezuelan leader Nicolas Maduro appeared to be a particular case, but the extermination of Khamenei and his family may convince Putin that the United States is willing to kill or capture the leader of a disagreeable state. Putin’s fears could escalate to paranoia, which may not be conducive to making a peace deal for Ukraine.

Putin likely hopes that the United States will be preoccupied with Iran for many weeks to come, which might ease pressure on him to accept a compromise short of his maximalist war aims. He cannot fail to see, nevertheless, that Russia’s inability to help one of its few remaining strategic partners exposes its war-aggravated weakness, which is a poor negotiating position.

• Pavel K Baev is a Research Professor at PRIO
• This text is also published by Eurasia Monitor