The last couple of decades have seen a surge in studies on authoritarian politics. Today, universities teach classes where students learn (still quite recent) canonical models of how non-democratic systems work. Such models are, inevitably, simplifications of reality. This has important pedagogical and other benefits, but also some costs. Brown et al. survey the authoritarian politics literature and its canonical models, highlighting several key assumptions. One is the relevance of autocrats’ motivations to stay in power for explaining policymaking, but also adoption and design of institutions. This ‘functionalist approach’ has generated a fruitful research program, but also – as Brown et al. detail – some blind spots. Authoritarian politics is often characterized by a greater multitude of relevant actors, and institutions – even when leaders initially believed they would support regime survival – may function in different ways and have important unintended consequences. Brown et al. aim to present such a nuanced understanding of authoritarian politics. In particular, they discuss the conditions under which, e.g., bureaucrats, judges, and religious elites obtain the autonomy to operate ‘their’ institutions, and even shape policies and outcomes. One strength is the book’s extensive conceptual discussions in chapter 1. Yet, the main strength is the authors’ ability to detail and contrast historical and more recent cases to illustrate their points in chapters 3 (constitutional courts), 4 (parliaments), and 5 (religious establishments). The quality of the descriptive work is very high. Hence, even readers taking issues with the more abstract theory or overall conclusions will learn a lot about how authoritarian institutions work.