Thomas Schelling popularized prominent ideas about bargaining, including how commitments could made credible if leaders could tie their hands and be unable to back down, how one could get concessions from opponents through ‘brinkmanship’ by creating risks of inadvertent escalation, and how states could use ‘tripwires’ such as placing soldiers in the line of fire to make retaliation more credible. Reiter argues that these ideas often fall apart when confronted with empirical evidence. A careful examination of the existing historical record shows essentially no instances of inadvertent escalation or brinkmanship leading to successful coercion. Alliances treaties typically leave flexibility to avoid entanglement, and states rarely let mad leaders come to power or computers start wars. Although the main argument of the book is how compelling ideas do not happen in practice, it also offers interesting ideas as to why. Reiter suggests leaders tend to be careful and avoid starting wars; they recognize and avoid risky tactics. The risk of escalation in crises is lower then often feared. It offers a forceful reminder how theories must be evaluated against data and not just whether they appear compelling. For example, it should be a red flag if we cannot find clear empirical examples of ‘audience costs’, where leaders have been punished for breaking commitments and not escalating crises, and perhaps we would be better off by examining conditions where we may see support for leaders staying out of war and avoiding commitments.