The failure of Russia’s massive assault on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 exemplifies a strategic blunder of such astounding proportions that in-depth research into its origin still remains in demand. Monaghan applies to this theme ideas pioneered by Basil Liddell Hart, who in the 1930s examined the ‘British way in war’ (p. 12). He uncovers the deep historical roots of President Putin’s decision to start the invasion that was supposed to subjugate Ukraine in the matter of a few weeks. In the ‘Russian way in war’, the strategy of a massive decisive offensive was always present as a ‘theoretical ideal” (p. 260). But greater attention was focused on waging long wars of attrition, so the fall-back to this strategy since 2023 has been entirely natural. Debates between Russia military thinkers are insightfully scrutinized in the historically organized chapters of the book, which argues convincingly that they remained a ‘part of the Western family of traditions’ (p. 6). Russian military history is indeed particular but far from exotic, so the focus on continuity yields a sharper view on further developments than an assessment of impacts of multiple surprises in the on-going war. Monaghan correctly defines politics as the main driver in Russia’s strategic adaptations, but the autocratic mutation of Putin’s regime is generally left out of his analysis, which merely states that ‘Moscow lives in a different world to the Euro-Atlantic community’ (p. 257). The war determines ossification of this autocracy, and as it persists with denials of responsibility for the failed Blitzkrieg, its fears of the younger generals grow and resistance to innovative strategic ideas turns into hostility.